The text reproduced here is the Fourth Revised Edition, updated by Graham in 1971–1972 and initially published in 1973. Please be advised that the text of Graham’s original footnotes (designated in his chapters with superscript numerals) can be found in the Notes section. The new footnotes that Jason Zweig has introduced appear at the bottom of Graham’s pages (and, in the typeface used here, as occasional additions to Graham’s endnotes).

关于本杰明·格雷厄姆的注释，作者：杰森·茨威格

A Note About Benjamin Graham, by Jason Zweig

诚信的考验在于它是否坚决拒绝妥协。

The test of integrity is its blunt refusal to be compromised.

—奇努阿·阿契贝¹

—Chinua Achebe¹

本杰明·格雷厄姆是谁？为什么你应该听他的？

Who was Benjamin Graham, and why should you listen to him?

格雷厄姆是有史以来最伟大的投资者之一。他也是最聪明的投资者之一，甚至可以说是最睿智的^。2

Graham was one of the greatest investors who ever lived. He also was one of the smartest, and he may well have been the wisest.²

格雷厄姆是一位多么伟大的投资者？

How great an investor was Graham?

他不仅获得了丰厚的回报，更在投资者经历过的几个最艰难的时期，包括大萧条末期，都取得了如此骄人的业绩。1936年至1956年间，他的格雷厄姆-纽曼公司每年平均跑赢大盘约5个百分点。3^很少有其他投资者能在如此漫长的职业生涯中取得如此巨大的业绩增长，其中最杰出的当属沃伦·巴菲特，他从格雷厄姆本人那里学到了投资之道。

He didn’t merely earn superior returns; he did so during some of the most difficult times investors have ever seen, including the end of the Great Depression. His Graham-Newman Corp. beat the market by an average of roughly five percentage points annually between 1936 and 1956.³ Few other investors have ever rivaled so great a margin of outperformance over so long a career—foremost among them Warren Buffett, who learned how to invest from Graham himself.

格雷厄姆有多聪明？

How smart was Graham?

他17岁进入哥伦比亚大学；他本应提前一年被录取，但学校弄糟了他的申请。他用了两年半的时间完成了学业，成绩名列全班第二。格雷厄姆甚至还没毕业，哥伦比亚大学就为他提供了三个不同系的教职：哲学系、数学系和英语系。由于需要赡养丧偶的母亲，他选择在华尔街找到了一份薪水更高的工作。

He entered Columbia University at age 17; he should have been admitted a year earlier, but the college bungled his paperwork. He finished in two and a half years, ranked second in his class. Before Graham even graduated, Columbia offered him faculty positions in three different departments: philosophy, mathematics, and English. Needing to support his widowed mother, he took a better-paying job on Wall Street instead.

格雷厄姆与大卫·多德合著的《证券分析》于1934年出版，成为全球金融分析师的奠基教材。但他的才华远不止于此。格雷厄姆23岁时，《美国数学月刊》发表了他关于如何改进微积分教学的文章。之后，他又为两款创新型手持计算器申请了专利。他还撰写了两本关于如何稳定全球货币的书籍，以及大量关于法律、税收和失业的文章。在业余时间，格雷厄姆创作了一部百老汇戏剧，自学西班牙语，翻译了一部乌拉圭小说，并如饥似渴地阅读法语、古希腊语和拉丁语。

Graham’s book Security Analysis, written with David Dodd and published in 1934, became the foundational text for financial analysts worldwide. But his brilliance knew no bounds. When Graham was 23, the American Mathematical Monthly published his article on how to improve the teaching of calculus. He went on to patent two innovative handheld calculators. He wrote two books on how to stabilize global currencies and numerous articles on law, taxation, and unemployment. In his spare time, Graham wrote a Broadway play, taught himself Spanish and translated a Uruguayan novel, and read voraciously in French, ancient Greek, and Latin.

最重要的是，格雷厄姆非常睿智。在华尔街的几十年里，他经历过各种各样的骗局和欺诈：内幕交易、推销员兜售毫无价值的股票、肮脏的会计手段、以及公司欺骗股东。他见证了数百万人失去理智的市场，他们自欺欺人地认为自己是投资天才，仅仅因为他们买了几只暂时上涨的股票。他也看到过投资者因为听信“专家”的“快速致富”而损失了财富。

Above all, Graham was wise. In his decades on Wall Street, he encountered every kind of scam and fraud: insider trading, promoters touting worthless stocks, dirty accounting tricks, companies shafting their own shareholders. He witnessed markets in which millions of people lost their minds, fooling themselves into thinking they were investing geniuses just because they had bought a few stocks that had gone up—temporarily. He had also seen investors stripped of their wealth by listening to “experts” who told them they could get rich quick.

格雷厄姆不仅从别人的错误中吸取了教训，也从自己的错误中吸取了教训：

Graham learned not only from the mistakes of others but from his own:

他追逐热门股票，结果却损失惨重。
He had chased hot stocks—and gotten burned.
他交易过多了——并且学会了耐心。
He had traded too much—and learned to be patient.
他承担了太多的风险，所以学会了谨慎。
He had taken too much risk—and learned to be cautious.
他用借来的钱进行投资，并且再也没有使用过杠杆。
He had invested with borrowed money—and never used leverage again.
他尝试并测试了无数的投资方法，并且了解试图利用过去的不充分数据来预测未来的陷阱。
He had tried and tested countless investing methods—and understood the pitfalls of attempting to predict the future with inadequate data from the past.

格雷厄姆明白，投资是一项孤独的活动，孤独的个人渴望与他人建立联系并获得他人的认可。同行很容易成为操纵者和骗子的猎物。近年来，人类渴望加入大众的深层欲望被社交媒体和智能手机经纪应用程序劫持，最终数百万人受“错失恐惧症”（FOMO）的驱使，同时交易同一只股票。一旦你加入这种金融快闪族，制定合理的计划并坚持执行就变得几乎不可能。这本书将帮助你独立思考，而不是让数百万陌生人告诉你该怎么想。

Graham understood that investing is a lonely activity in which isolated individuals, yearning for connection and the approval of their peers, easily fall prey to manipulators and crooks. In recent years, the profoundly human desire to join the crowd has been hijacked by social media and smartphone brokerage apps until millions of people ended up trading the same stocks all at once, motivated by FOMO: the fear of missing out. Once you join such a financial flash mob, making a sensible plan and sticking to it become all but impossible. This book will help you think for yourself instead of letting millions of strangers tell you what to think.

格雷厄姆也深知，即使是最诚实的人也未必总是对自己诚实。我们都不愿承认自己的缺点。格雷厄姆的建议不仅关注投资者应该做什么，也关注他们能够做什么。他从不以关于市场或自身的虚假承诺来误导读者。本书将帮助你了解自身的优势和劣势，为你提供做出正确投资决策的理智和情感框架——更重要的是，帮助你坚持这些决策。

Graham also knew that even the most honest people aren’t always honest with themselves. We all hate admitting our own shortcomings. Graham’s advice focuses not only on what investors ought to do, but on what they can do. He never misleads his readers with bogus promises about the markets or themselves. This book will help you understand your own strengths and weaknesses, giving you the intellectual and emotional framework for making good investing decisions—and, more importantly, for sticking with them.

要想脱颖而出，你必须与众不同。要想成为一名聪明的投资者，你必须严守纪律，并且必须独辟蹊径。

To stand out from the crowd, you must stand apart from the crowd. To be an intelligent investor, you must be disciplined and you must think differently.

四大基石

Four Cornerstones

格雷厄姆教授了四条重要原则：

Graham teaches four great principles:

不交易就无法成为投资者，但即使不投资也可以交易。如果你对某只股票一无所知，只知道它的价格上涨了，或者“所有人”都在买入，那么你不是在投资，而是在投机。聪明的投资者会进行彻底的研究，并做出深思熟虑、始终如一、可衡量的决策。
You can’t be an investor without trading, but you can trade without ever investing. If you know nothing about a stock except that its price has gone up or “everybody” is buying it, you’re not investing; you’re speculating. The intelligent investor does thorough research and makes deliberate, consistent, measurable decisions.
股票并非股票代码，也不是智能手机上跳动的价格序列；它是对一家企业的所有权，其基本价值独立于股价。聪明的投资者研究的是企业本身，而不是股票。（参见表0.1。）
A stock isn’t a ticker symbol or a pulsating series of prices on your smartphone; it’s an ownership interest in a business with a fundamental value independent of its share price. The intelligent investor studies the business, not the stock. (See Table 0.1.)
大多数时候，市场价格大致正确，但一旦出错，则可能错得离谱。格雷厄姆创造了一个名叫“市场先生”的人物，这个神话人物在股价上涨时会贪婪狂喜，但同时又会深陷恐惧之中。以及股票下跌时的痛苦。4^聪明的投资者是现实主义者，向乐观者出售，向悲观者购买。你绝不能让你的情绪被“市场先生”的情绪波动所左右。
Most of the time, market prices are approximately right, but when they are wrong they can be abysmally wrong. Graham invented a character called Mr. Market, a mythical figure who goes wild with greed and euphoria when stocks go up but wallows in fear and misery when stocks go down.⁴ The intelligent investor is a realist who sells to optimists and buys from pessimists. You must never let your emotions be taken hostage by Mr. Market’s mood swings.
大多数投资者犯下的最大错误，在于他们专注于如果预测正确能赚多少钱，而忘记考虑如果预测错误会损失多少。聪明的投资者总是会保持格雷厄姆所说的“安全边际”，这是一种谦逊的缓冲，即使你的分析错误，它也能让你承受损失。
Most investors commit their biggest mistakes when they focus on how much money they could make if they turn out to be right—and forget to consider how much they could lose if they turn out to be wrong. The intelligent investor always maintains what Graham called a “margin of safety,” a cushion of humility that will allow you to survive your losses if your analysis is incorrect.

表 0-1：股票与企业

TABLE 0-1: Stocks vs. Businesses

股票

Stocks

企业

Businesses

评估人

Appraised by

价格

Price

价值

Value

数字格式

Numerical format

精确到每一分钱

Precise to the penny

大致范围

Approximate range

评估依据

Basis for appraisal

根据市场情绪，人们今天愿意为拥有或交易该资产支付多少钱

What someone will pay today for the ability to own or trade it, subject to market moods

企业未来产生的现金总额的现值

The present worth of the total future cash generated by the business

他们多久改变一次

How often they change

每天多达数千次

Up to thousands of times a day

一年最多几次

At most a few times a year

他们为什么改变

Why they change

季度盈利增长；股市实力；地缘政治事件；噪音

Quarterly earnings growth; strength of stock market; geopolitical events; noise

长期盈利增长；业务实力；竞争

Long-term earnings growth; strength of business; competition

典型持有期

Typical holding period

一年或更短

One year or less

一代人甚至更久

A generation or more

风险

Risk

市场价格持续、瞬时波动

Continuous, momentary volatility of market price

企业价值永久性下降

Permanent decline in business value

《聪明的投资者》于1949年首次出版。这本75周年纪念版的目标是将格雷厄姆的经典见解与当今的市场现实相结合。

The Intelligent Investor was first published in 1949. The goal of this commemorative 75th anniversary edition is to integrate Graham’s classic insights with today’s market realities.

这一版与2003年出版的上一版一样，遵循了格雷厄姆自己的计划。《聪明的投资者》并非——格雷厄姆也从未打算将其打造成——一本循序渐进的选股指南，或是一本分析和评估企业的指导手册。相反，它阐述了投资成功不可或缺的指导方针和原则。正如格雷厄姆所说：

This edition, like the previous version published in 2003, follows Graham’s own plan. The Intelligent Investor isn’t—and Graham never intended it to be—a step-by-step guide to stock picking or an instructional handbook on how to analyze and evaluate businesses. Instead, it lays down the guidelines and principles that are the indispensable foundation for investing success. As Graham put it:

这里较少谈论证券分析技术；主要关注投资原则和投资者的态度。

Comparatively little will be said here about the technique of analyzing securities; attention will be paid chiefly to investment principles and investors’ attitudes.

格雷厄姆的所有原始章节均保留完好。5^我还用粗体字标出了格雷厄姆的许多段落，以表明它们的重要性。

All of Graham’s original chapters remain intact.⁵ I’ve also highlighted many of Graham’s passages in boldface type to signal their importance.

在格雷厄姆每一章的注释中，我都引用了近期的例子，以证明他的原则至今依然如此强大。注释采用无衬线字体印刷，就像这样。格雷厄姆的原著章节则采用衬线字体印刷，就像这样。

In the commentaries that accompany each of Graham’s chapters, I’ve included recent examples that show how powerful his principles still are. The commentaries are printed in sans serif type, like this. Graham’s original chapters are printed in serif type, like this.

这本书将帮助你养成习惯，培养纪律，这些对于成为一名成功的投资者至关重要。沃伦·巴菲特称《聪明的投资者》是“迄今为止最好的投资书籍”，因为没有人比格雷厄姆更理解和传达这些原则。

This book will help you build the habits and cultivate the discipline that are essential for succeeding as an investor. Warren Buffett calls The Intelligent Investor “by far the best book about investing ever written” because no one else has ever understood and conveyed these principles better than Graham.

有了这本书，你就能顺利成为一名睿智的投资者。下一章，我们将探讨这其中的含义以及实现这一目标所需的条件。

With this book in your hands, you are well on your way to becoming an intelligent investor. In the next chapter, we’ll talk about what that means and what it takes.

修订版序言，沃伦·E·巴菲特著

Preface to the Revised Edition, by Warren E. Buffett

1950年初，我19岁的时候读了这本书的初版。当时我认为它是迄今为止关于投资的最好的书。我现在仍然这么认为。

I read the first edition of this book early in 1950, when I was nineteen. I thought then that it was by far the best book about investing ever written. I still think it is.

一生中成功的投资并不需要超凡的智商、非凡的商业洞察力或内幕信息。你需要的是一个健全的决策思维框架，以及防止情绪侵蚀该框架的能力。本书精准清晰地阐述了正确的框架。你必须具备情绪自律的能力。

To invest successfully over a lifetime does not require a strato-spheric IQ, unusual business insights, or inside information. What’s needed is a sound intellectual framework for making decisions and the ability to keep emotions from corroding that framework. This book precisely and clearly prescribes the proper framework. You must supply the emotional discipline.

如果你遵循格雷厄姆倡导的行为和商业原则，并且特别留意第8章和第20章中那些宝贵的建议，你的投资回报将非常可观。（这代表着比你想象的更大的成就。）你能否取得优异的业绩，取决于你在投资中投入的努力和智慧，以及你投资生涯中股市愚蠢行为的程度。市场行为越愚蠢，精明的投资者就越有机会。追随格雷厄姆，你将从愚蠢中获利，而不是参与其中。

If you follow the behavioral and business principles that Graham advocates—and if you pay special attention to the invaluable advice in Chapters 8 and 20—you will not get a poor result from your investments. (That represents more of an accomplishment than you might think.) Whether you achieve outstanding results will depend on the effort and intellect you apply to your investments, as well as on the amplitudes of stock-market folly that prevail during your investing career. The sillier the market’s behavior, the greater the opportunity for the business-like investor. Follow Graham and you will profit from folly rather than participate in it.

对我来说，本杰明·格雷厄姆远不止是一位作家或老师。除了我父亲，他对我人生的影响比任何人都大。1976年本杰明去世后不久，我写了以下简短的文字：《金融分析师杂志》上刊登了一篇关于他的悼念文章。相信读完这本书，你就会感受到我在悼念文章中提到的一些品质。

To me, Ben Graham was far more than an author or a teacher. More than any other man except my father, he influenced my life. Shortly after Ben’s death in 1976, I wrote the following short remembrance about him in the Financial Analysts Journal. As you read the book, I believe you’ll perceive some of the qualities I mentioned in this tribute.

本杰明·格雷厄姆

BENJAMIN GRAHAM

1894–1976

几年前，年近八十的本杰明·格雷厄姆向一位朋友表达了这样的想法：他希望每天做“一些愚蠢的事、一些有创意的事和一些慷慨的事”。

Several years ago Ben Graham, then almost eighty, expressed to a friend the thought that he hoped every day to do “something foolish, something creative and something generous.”

第一个异想天开的目标体现了他善于将想法包装得恰到好处，避免了任何说教或自负的意味。尽管他的想法很有力量，但表达方式却始终温和。

The inclusion of that first whimsical goal reflected his knack for pack-aging ideas in a form that avoided any overtones of sermonizing or self-importance. Although his ideas were powerful, their delivery was unfailingly gentle.

本杂志的读者无需赘述他以创造力为衡量标准的成就。一门学科的创始人很少会发现自己的成果在短时间内被后继者所超越。然而，在他为混乱无序的学术活动注入结构和逻辑的著作出版四十多年后，我们却很难想象在证券分析领域，哪怕是屈居亚军的候选人也寥寥无几。在一个许多观点在出版几周或几个月后就显得愚蠢的领域，本的原则却始终坚守——在金融风暴摧毁了那些较为薄弱的知识体系之后，这些原则的价值往往会得到提升和更好的理解。他提出的稳健建议为他的追随者带来了丰厚的回报——即使是那些天赋不如那些在追随才华横溢或时尚潮流时跌倒的更有天赋的从业者的人，也从中受益匪浅。

Readers of this magazine need no elaboration of his achievements as measured by the standard of creativity. It is rare that the founder of a discipline does not find his work eclipsed in rather short order by successors. But over forty years after publication of the book that brought structure and logic to a disorderly and confused activity, it is difficult to think of possible candidates for even the runner-up position in the field of security analysis. In an area where much looks foolish within weeks or months after publication, Ben’s principles have remained sound—their value often enhanced and better understood in the wake of financial storms that demolished flimsier intellectual structures. His counsel of soundness brought unfailing rewards to his followers—even to those with natural abilities inferior to more gifted practitioners who stumbled while following counsels of brilliance or fashion.

本在其专业领域占据主导地位的一个显著特点是，他没有将全部精力集中在单一目标上的狭隘思维。相反，这更像是他那几乎超越定义的广度的智力的偶然产物。我从未见过拥有如此广阔视野的人。他几乎完全的记忆力，对新知识永不枯竭的渴望，以及将新知识重新转化为适用于看似毫不相关的问题的能力，使得接触他在任何领域的思想都令人欣喜。

A remarkable aspect of Ben’s dominance of his professional field was that he achieved it without that narrowness of mental activity that concentrates all effort on a single end. It was, rather, the incidental by-product of an intellect whose breadth almost exceeded definition. Certainly I have never met anyone with a mind of similar scope. Virtually total recall, unending fascination with new knowledge, and an ability to recast it in a form applicable to seemingly unrelated problems made exposure to his thinking in any field a delight.

但他的第三项原则——慷慨——才是他超越其他所有原则的地方。我认识本，他是我的老师、我的雇主，也是我的朋友。在每一段关系中——就像他和他的所有学生、员工和朋友一样——他都绝对开放，毫无保留地慷慨分享想法、时间，以及精神。如果需要清晰的思路，这里就是最好的去处。如果需要鼓励或建议，Ben 就在身边。

But his third imperative—generosity—was where he succeeded beyond all others. I knew Ben as my teacher, my employer, and my friend. In each relationship—just as with all his students, employees, and friends—there was an absolutely open-ended, no-scores-kept generosity of ideas, time, and spirit. If clarity of thinking was required, there was no better place to go. And if encouragement or counsel was needed, Ben was there.

沃尔特·李普曼曾说过，有人栽种树木，供他人栖身。本杰明·格雷厄姆就是这样一个人。

Walter Lippmann spoke of men who plant trees that other men will sit under. Ben Graham was such a man.

转载自《金融分析师期刊》， 1976 年 11/12 月。

Reprinted from the Financial Analysts Journal, November/December 1976.

1964年10月，本杰明·格雷厄姆在西班牙塞维利亚。照片由本杰明·格雷厄姆·Jr.提供。

Benjamin Graham in Sevilla, Spain, October 1964. Photo courtesy Benjamin Graham, Jr.

介绍：

Introduction:

本书期望实现的目标

What This Book Expects to Accomplish

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

本书旨在以通俗易懂的方式，为普通读者提供投资策略的制定和执行指导。本书较少涉及证券分析技巧，主要关注投资原则和投资者态度。不过，我们将对一些特定证券（主要以纽约证券交易所股票代码并列的股票组合形式呈现）进行简要比较，以便具体阐明选择特定普通股时需要考虑的重要因素。

The purpose of this book is to supply, in a form suitable for laymen, guidance in the adoption and execution of an investment policy. Comparatively little will be said here about the technique of analyzing securities; attention will be paid chiefly to investment principles and investors’ attitudes. We shall, however, provide a number of condensed comparisons of specific securities—chiefly in pairs appearing side by side in the New York Stock Exchange list—in order to bring home in concrete fashion the important elements involved in specific choices of common stocks.

但我们将用大量篇幅来探讨金融市场的历史模式，有些模式甚至可追溯至数十年前。为了明智地投资证券，投资者应该事先充分了解各类债券和股票在不同条件下的实际表现——至少其中一些情况，投资者在自身经历中可能会再次遇到。没有什么比桑塔亚纳的名言更贴切、更适用于华尔街了：“不铭记历史的人注定要重蹈覆辙。”

But much of our space will be devoted to the historical patterns of financial markets, in some cases running back over many decades. To invest intelligently in securities one should be forearmed with an adequate knowledge of how the various types of bonds and stocks have actually behaved under varying conditions—some of which, at least, one is likely to meet again in one’s own experience. No statement is more true and better applicable to Wall Street than the famous warning of Santayana: “Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

本书面向的是投资者，而非投机者，我们的首要任务是澄清和强调这一如今几乎被遗忘的区别。首先，我们可以声明，本书并非一本“如何赚到百万”的书。无论是在华尔街还是其他任何地方，都没有稳赚不赔的致富之路。或许，我们应该借用一些金融历史来强调我们刚才所说的——尤其是因为其中蕴含着不止一个道理。在1929年，约翰·J·拉斯科布（John J. Raskob）——一位在全国范围内都举足轻重的人物——他在《妇女家庭杂志》上发表了一篇题为“人人都应该致富”的文章，大肆宣扬资本主义的福祉。^*他的论点是，每月只需存下 15 美元投资于优质普通股——并将股息再投资——二十年后就能产生 80,000 美元的财富，而他总共只贡献了 3,600 美元。如果这位通用汽车大亨是对的，那么这确实是一条简单的致富之路。他有多正确？我们粗略计算——基于对道琼斯工业平均指数 (DJIA) 30 只股票的假设投资——表明，如果在 1929 年至 1948 年期间遵循拉斯科布的处方，投资者在 1949 年初的持股价值将达到约 8,500 美元。这与这位伟人承诺的8万美元相去甚远，也表明这种乐观的预测和保证是多么不可靠。不过，顺便说一句，我们应该指出，这20年期操作的实际回报率将超过8%的年复合收益率——尽管投资者最初买入时道琼斯工业平均指数为300点，最终估值基于1948年177点的收盘价。这一记录或许可以被视为对“无论顺境逆境，每月定期买入优质普通股”原则的有力论证——这一策略被称为“平均成本法”。

Our text is directed to investors as distinguished from speculators, and our first task will be to clarify and emphasize this now all but forgotten distinction. We may say at the outset that this is not a “how to make a million” book. There are no sure and easy paths to riches on Wall Street or anywhere else. It may be well to point up what we have just said by a bit of financial history—especially since there is more than one moral to be drawn from it. In the climactic year 1929 John J. Raskob, a most important figure nationally as well as on Wall Street, extolled the blessings of capitalism in an article in the Ladies’ Home Journal, entitled “Everybody Ought to Be Rich.”^* His thesis was that savings of only $15 per month invested in good common stocks—with dividends reinvested—would produce an estate of $80,000 in twenty years against total contributions of only $3,600. If the General Motors tycoon was right, this was indeed a simple road to riches. How nearly right was he? Our rough calculation—based on assumed investment in the 30 stocks making up the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)—indicates that if Raskob’s prescription had been followed during 1929–1948, the investor’s holdings at the beginning of 1949 would have been worth about $8,500. This is a far cry from the great man’s promise of $80,000, and it shows how little reliance can be placed on such optimistic forecasts and assurances. But, as an aside, we should remark that the return actually realized by the 20-year operation would have been better than 8% compounded annually—and this despite the fact that the investor would have begun his purchases with the DJIA at 300 and ended with a valuation based on the 1948 closing level of 177. This record may be regarded as a persuasive argument for the principle of regular monthly purchases of strong common stocks through thick and thin—a program known as “dollar-cost averaging.”

由于本书并非面向投机者，因此也并非面向市场交易者。这类人大多依赖图表或其他高度机械化的手段来确定买卖时机。几乎所有这些所谓的“技术方法”都遵循一个原则：买入是 因为 股票或市场上涨，卖出是 因为下跌。这与其他地方的合理商业理念截然相反，而且不太可能在华尔街带来持久的成功。在我们自己的……纵观我们50多年的股市经验和观察，我们从未发现过任何人通过这种“跟随市场”的方式持续或持久地赚钱。我们毫不犹豫地宣称，这种方法既盛行又谬误。我们将在稍后简要讨论著名的道氏股票交易理论，以证明我们刚才所说的——当然，这不应被视为证据。^*

Since our book is not addressed to speculators, it is not meant for those who trade in the market. Most of these people are guided by charts or other largely mechanical means of determining the right moments to buy and sell. The one principle that applies to nearly all these so-called “technical approaches” is that one should buy because a stock or the market has gone up and one should sell because it has declined. This is the exact opposite of sound business sense everywhere else, and it is most unlikely that it can lead to lasting success on Wall Street. In our own stock-market experience and observation, extending over 50 years, we have not known a single person who has consistently or lastingly made money by thus “following the market.” We do not hesitate to declare that this approach is as fallacious as it is popular. We shall illustrate what we have just said—though, of course this should not be taken as proof—by a later brief discussion of the famous Dow theory for trading in the stock market.^*

《聪明的投资者》自1949年首次出版以来，大约每隔五年就会修订一次。在更新当前版本时，我们将不得不处理自1965年版以来的诸多新发展。这些包括：

Since its first publication in 1949, revisions of The Intelligent Investor have appeared at intervals of approximately five years. In updating the current version we shall have to deal with quite a number of new developments since the 1965 edition was written. These include:

高等级债券利率出现前所未有的上涨。
An unprecedented advance in the interest rate on high-grade bonds.
截至1970年5月，主要普通股股价下跌约35%。这是近30年来的最高跌幅。（无数质量较差的股票跌幅更大。）
A fall of about 35% in the price level of leading common stocks, ending in May 1970. This was the highest percentage decline in some 30 years. (Countless issues of lower quality had a much larger shrinkage.)
批发和消费价格持续上涨，甚至在 1970 年总体商业下滑的情况下，上涨势头依然强劲。
A persistent inflation of wholesale and consumer’s prices, which gained momentum even in the face of a decline of general business in 1970.
“集团型”企业、特许经营以及其他商业和金融领域相对新颖事物的快速发展。（这些包括许多棘手的手段，例如“字母股票”、¹股票期权认股权证的泛滥、误导性名称、使用外国银行等等。）^*
The rapid development of “conglomerate” companies, franchise operations, and other relative novelties in business and finance. (These include a number of tricky devices such as “letter stock,”¹ proliferation of stock-option warrants, misleading names, use of foreign banks, and others.)^*
我们最大的铁路公司破产，许多以前实力雄厚的公司背负过多的短期和长期债务，甚至华尔街金融机构的偿付能力也存在令人不安的问题。^*
Bankruptcy of our largest railroad, excessive short- and long-term debt of many formerly strongly entrenched companies, and even a disturbing problem of solvency among Wall Street houses.^*
投资基金管理（包括一些银行运营的信托基金）中出现了“绩效”风潮，其结果令人不安。
The advent of the “performance” vogue in the management of investment funds, including some bank-operated trust funds, with disquieting results.

我们将认真思考这些现象，其中一些需要我们在结论和重点上与上一版有所调整。合理投资的基本原则不应逐年改变，但这些原则的应用必须适应金融机制和环境的重大变化。

These phenomena will have our careful consideration, and some will require changes in conclusions and emphasis from our previous edition. The underlying principles of sound investment should not alter from decade to decade, but the application of these principles must be adapted to significant changes in the financial mechanisms and climate.

本书初稿完成于1971年1月，撰写期间对最后一条陈述进行了检验。当时，道琼斯工业平均指数正从1970年的632点低点强劲反弹，并朝着1971年的951点高点迈进，市场普遍乐观。1971年11月，最后一稿完成时，市场正处于新一轮下跌的阵痛之中，跌至797点，市场对未来的担忧再度升温。我们并未让这些波动影响我们对稳健投资政策的总体态度，自1949年本书初版出版以来，我们的总体态度基本保持不变。

The last statement was put to the test during the writing of the present edition, the first draft of which was finished in January 1971. At that time the DJIA was in a strong recovery from its 1970 low of 632 and was advancing toward a 1971 high of 951, with attendant general optimism. As the last draft was finished, in November 1971, the market was in the throes of a new decline, carrying it down to 797 with a renewed general uneasiness about its future. We have not allowed these fluctuations to affect our general attitude toward sound investment policy, which remains substantially unchanged since the first edition of this book in 1949.

1969-70年股市的大幅萎缩本应驱散过去二十年里日益盛行的一种幻想。这种幻想认为，领先的普通股可以在任何时间、任何价格买入，不仅可以保证最终获利，而且任何中间的损失都会很快被市场再次上涨至新高所弥补。这简直好得令人难以置信。股市终于“恢复正常”，投机者和股票投资者必须再次做好准备，以应对其持有股票价值的大幅甚至长期下跌和上涨。

The extent of the market’s shrinkage in 1969–70 should have served to dispel an illusion that had been gaining ground during the past two decades. This was that leading common stocks could be bought at any time and at any price, with the assurance not only of ultimate profit but also that any intervening loss would soon be recouped by a renewed advance of the market to new high levels. That was too good to be true. At long last the stock market has “returned to normal,” in the sense that both speculators and stock investors must again be prepared to experience significant and perhaps protracted falls as well as rises in the value of their holdings.

在许多二线和三线普通股领域，尤其是新上市的企业，上次市场崩盘造成的破坏是灾难性的。这本身并不新鲜——1961-62年也发生过类似程度的崩盘——但现在出现了一个新情况：一些投资基金在这类高度投机且明显估值过高的股票上投入了大量资金。显然，需要警告的不仅仅是新手，虽然热情在其他地方或许是取得巨大成就的必要条件，但在华尔街，热情几乎必然会导致灾难。

In the area of many secondary and third-line common stocks, especially recently floated enterprises, the havoc wrought by the last market break was catastrophic. This was nothing new in itself—it had happened to a similar degree in 1961–62—but there was now a novel element in the fact that some of the investment funds had large commitments in highly speculative and obviously overvalued issues of this type. Evidently it is not only the tyro who needs to be warned that while enthusiasm may be necessary for great accomplishments elsewhere, on Wall Street it almost invariably leads to disaster.

我们必须应对的主要问题源于一流债券利率的大幅上涨。自1967年末以来，投资者从此类债券中获得的收益是代表性普通股股息的两倍多。1972年初，最高等级债券的回报率为7.19%，而工业股票的回报率仅为2.76%。（相比之下，1964年底的回报率分别为4.40%和2.92%。）很难想象，在我们1949年首次撰写本书时，数据几乎截然相反：债券回报率仅为2.66%，而股票收益率为6.82%。2^在之前的版本中，我们一直主张保守型投资者的投资组合中至少有25%应该投资于普通股，并且我们通常主张两种投资媒介的回报率各占一半。我们现在必须思考，当前债券收益率相对于股票收益率的巨大优势，是否足以证明推行全债券政策的合理性，直到更合理的关系回归（正如我们预期的那样）。当然，持续通胀的问题对于我们做出这一决定至关重要。我们将用一章来专门讨论这个问题。^*

The major question we shall have to deal with grows out of the huge rise in the rate of interest on first-quality bonds. Since late 1967 the investor has been able to obtain more than twice as much income from such bonds as he could from dividends on representative common stocks. At the beginning of 1972 the return was 7.19% on highest-grade bonds versus only 2.76% on industrial stocks. (This compares with 4.40% and 2.92% respectively at the end of 1964.) It is hard to realize that when we first wrote this book in 1949 the figures were almost the exact opposite: the bonds returned only 2.66% and the stocks yielded 6.82%.² In previous editions we have consistently urged that at least 25% of the conservative investor’s portfolio be held in common stocks, and we have favored in general a 50–50 division between the two media. We must now consider whether the current great advantage of bond yields over stock yields would justify an all-bond policy until a more sensible relationship returns, as we expect it will. Naturally the question of continued inflation will be of great importance in reaching our decision here. A chapter will be devoted to this discussion.^*

过去，我们对本书针对的两类投资者进行了基本区分——“防御型”以及“进取型”投资者。防御型（或被动型）投资者将主要关注避免重大错误或损失。他的第二个目标是免于努力、烦恼和频繁决策的需要。进取型（或主动型、进取型）投资者的决定性特质在于，他们愿意投入时间和精力来选择既稳健又比平均水平更具吸引力的证券。几十年来，这种进取型投资者可以期待因其额外的技能和努力而获得有价值的回报，即比被动型投资者实现的平均回报更高。我们怀疑，在当今条件下，主动型投资者是否会获得真正丰厚的额外回报。但明年或后年的情况可能会有所不同。因此，我们将继续关注进取型投资的可能性，就像它们在过去存在并可能再次出现一样。

In the past we have made a basic distinction between two kinds of investors to whom this book was addressed—the “defensive” and the “enterprising.” The defensive (or passive) investor will place his chief emphasis on the avoidance of serious mistakes or losses. His second aim will be freedom from effort, annoyance, and the need for making frequent decisions. The determining trait of the enterprising (or active, or aggressive) investor is his willingness to devote time and care to the selection of securities that are both sound and more attractive than the average. Over many decades an enterprising investor of this sort could expect a worthwhile reward for his extra skill and effort, in the form of a better average return than that realized by the passive investor. We have some doubt whether a really substantial extra recompense is promised to the active investor under today’s conditions. But next year or the years after may well be different. We shall accordingly continue to devote attention to the possibilities for enterprising investment, as they existed in former periods and may return.

长期以来，人们普遍认为，成功投资的艺术首先在于选择未来最有可能增长的行业，其次在于识别这些行业中最有前景的公司。例如，精明的投资者——或者他们精明的顾问——早就应该认识到整个计算机行业，尤其是国际商业机器公司（IBM）的巨大增长潜力。其他一些增长型行业和增长型公司也同样如此。但这并不像回想起来那么容易。为了首先强调这一点，我们在此补充一下我们在1949年版本书中首次收录的一段话。

It has long been the prevalent view that the art of successful investment lies first in the choice of those industries that are most likely to grow in the future and then in identifying the most promising companies in these industries. For example, smart investors—or their smart advisers—would long ago have recognized the great growth possibilities of the computer industry as a whole and of International Business Machines in particular. And similarly for a number of other growth industries and growth companies. But this is not as easy as it always looks in retrospect. To bring this point home at the outset let us add here a paragraph that we included first in the 1949 edition of this book.

例如，这类投资者可能会购买航空运输类股票，因为他相信这些股票的未来前景比市场目前反映的趋势更加光明。对于这类投资者来说，本书的价值更多地在于它对这种热门投资方法中潜藏的陷阱的警示，而非任何能够帮助他们实现目标的积极技巧。^*

Such an investor may for example be a buyer of air-transport stocks because he believes their future is even more brilliant than the trend the market already reflects. For this class of investor the value of our book will lie more in its warnings against the pitfalls lurking in this favorite investment approach than in any positive technique that will help him along his path.^*

事实证明，这些陷阱在我们提到的行业中尤其危险。当然，人们很容易预测到航空运输量在未来几年会大幅增长。正因如此，航空股成为投资基金青睐的对象。然而，尽管收入增长——其速度甚至超过了计算机行业——技术问题和运力过度扩张的综合作用导致利润波动，甚至灾难性的。1970年，尽管运输量创下新高，但航空公司的股东却损失了约2亿美元。（1945年和1961年也出现过亏损。）这些公司的股票在1969-70年间再次出现比整体市场更大的跌幅。记录表明，即使是高薪的共同基金全职专家，也完全错误地判断了一个重要且并不神秘的行业相当短期的未来。

The pitfalls have proved particularly dangerous in the industry we mentioned. It was, of course, easy to forecast that the volume of air traffic would grow spectacularly over the years. Because of this factor their shares became a favorite choice of the investment funds. But despite the expansion of revenues—at a pace even greater than in the computer industry—a combination of technological problems and overexpansion of capacity made for fluctuating and even disastrous profit figures. In the year 1970, despite a new high in traffic figures, the airlines sustained a loss of some $200 million for their shareholders. (They had shown losses also in 1945 and 1961.) The stocks of these companies once again showed a greater decline in 1969–70 than did the general market. The record shows that even the highly paid full-time experts of the mutual funds were completely wrong about the fairly short-term future of a major and nonesoteric industry.

另一方面，尽管投资基金在IBM上投入了大量资金并获得了丰厚的收益，但由于IBM股价看似高昂，且无法确定其增长率，他们投资这家业绩卓越的公司的资金比例（比如说3%）根本无法超过。因此，这一绝佳选择对他们的整体业绩影响并非决定性的。此外，他们对IBM以外的计算机行业公司（即便不是大多数）的许多投资似乎都未能盈利。从这两个广泛的例子，我们给读者得出两个教训：

On the other hand, while the investment funds had substantial investments and substantial gains in IBM, the combination of its apparently high price and the impossibility of being certain about its rate of growth prevented them from having more than, say, 3% of their funds in this wonderful performer. Hence the effect of this excellent choice on their overall results was by no means decisive. Furthermore, many—if not most—of their investments in computer-industry companies other than IBM appear to have been unprofitable. From these two broad examples we draw two morals for our readers:

企业明显的实体增长前景并不会为投资者带来明显的利润。
Obvious prospects for physical growth in a business do not translate into obvious profits for investors.
专家们没有可靠的方法来选择和集中最有前景的行业中最有前景的公司。
The experts do not have dependable ways of selecting and concentrating on the most promising companies in the most promising industries.

作者在其担任基金经理的金融生涯中并没有采用这种方法，他无法为那些希望尝试这种方法的人提供具体的建议或鼓励。

The author did not follow this approach in his financial career as fund manager, and he cannot offer either specific counsel or much encouragement to those who may wish to try it.

那么，本书的目标是什么呢？我们的主要目标是引导读者避免可能犯下重大错误的领域，并制定出让读者感到舒适的策略。我们将深入探讨投资者的心理。事实上，投资者的主要问题——甚至是他们最大的敌人——很可能是他们自己。（“亲爱的投资者，错不在于我们的运气，也不在于我们的股票，而在于我们自己……”）近几十年来，这一点愈发得到印证，因为保守型投资者越来越有必要购买普通股，从而让自己无论情愿与否都能置身于股市的刺激和诱惑之中。我们希望通过论证、案例和劝诫，帮助读者在投资决策中建立正确的心理和情感态度。我们看到，性格适合投资的“普通人”比那些缺乏这种品质的人，即使他们拥有丰富的金融、会计和股市知识，也能赚到并 保住 更多的钱。

What then will we aim to accomplish in this book? Our main objective will be to guide the reader against the areas of possible substantial error and to develop policies with which he will be comfortable. We shall say quite a bit about the psychology of investors. For indeed, the investor’s chief problem—and even his worst enemy—is likely to be himself. (“The fault, dear investor, is not in our stars—and not in our stocks—but in ourselves. . . .”) This has proved the more true over recent decades as it has become more necessary for conservative investors to acquire common stocks and thus to expose themselves, willy-nilly, to the excitement and the temptations of the stock market. By arguments, examples, and exhortation, we hope to aid our readers to establish the proper mental and emotional attitudes toward their investment decisions. We have seen much more money made and kept by “ordinary people” who were temperamentally well suited for the investment process than by those who lacked this quality, even though they had an extensive knowledge of finance, accounting, and stock-market lore.

此外，我们希望培养读者衡量或量化的习惯。对于100份股票中99份，我们可以说，在某个价格它们足够便宜，值得购买，而在某个价格它们又贵得离谱，应该出售。习惯于将价格与报价联系起来，是投资中一项宝贵的品质。多年前，我们在一本女性杂志上发表的一篇文章中建议读者购买股票时，要像购买食品杂货一样，而不是像购买香水一样。过去几年（以及之前许多类似情况）真正惨痛的损失，就是在那些购买普通股时，买家忘记问“多少钱？”

Additionally, we hope to implant in the reader a tendency to measure or quantify. For 99 issues out of 100 we could say that at some price they are cheap enough to buy and at some other price they would be so dear that they should be sold. The habit of relating what is paid to what is being offered is an invaluable trait in investment. In an article in a women’s magazine many years ago we advised the readers to buy their stocks as they bought their groceries, not as they bought their perfume. The really dreadful losses of the past few years (and on many similar occasions before) were realized in those common-stock issues where the buyer forgot to ask “How much?”

1970年6月，“多少？”这个问题可以用9.40%这个神奇的数字来回答——这是新发行高等级公用事业债券的收益率。如今，这一数字已降至7.3%左右，但即使是这个收益率，也让我们不禁要问：“何必给出其他答案呢？”但还有其他可能的答案，这些答案必须仔细考量。此外，我们再次强调，我们和读者都必须提前做好准备，以应对可能截然不同的情况，例如1973-1977年的情况。

In June 1970 the question “How much?” could be answered by the magic figure 9.40%—the yield obtainable on new offerings of high-grade public-utility bonds. This has now dropped to about 7.3%, but even that return tempts us to ask, “Why give any other answer?” But there are other possible answers, and these must be carefully considered. Besides which, we repeat that both we and our readers must be prepared in advance for the possibly quite different conditions of, say, 1973–1977.

因此，我们将详细介绍一个积极的普通股投资方案，其中一部分适合两类投资者，另一部分主要面向有进取心的群体。颇为奇怪的是，我们建议读者将购买价格限制在略高于其有形资产价值的股票作为我们的主要要求之一。^*这条看似过时的建议既有实际原因，也有心理原因。经验告诉我们，虽然有很多优秀的成长型公司，其市值是净资产的数倍，但这类股票的购买者会过于依赖股市的变幻莫测和波动。相比之下，例如，如果投资者持有的公用事业公司股票的市值与净资产价值相当，那么他们总是可以认为自己拥有了以合理价格购入的稳健且不断扩张的企业的权益——无论股市的走势如何。这种保守政策的最终结果可能比在充满诱惑却又充满危险的预期增长领域进行刺激的冒险更好。

We shall therefore present in some detail a positive program for common-stock investment, part of which is within the purview of both classes of investors and part is intended mainly for the enterprising group. Strangely enough, we shall suggest as one of our chief requirements here that our readers limit themselves to issues selling not far above their tangible-asset value.^* The reason for this seemingly outmoded counsel is both practical and psychological. Experience has taught us that, while there are many good growth companies worth several times net assets, the buyer of such shares will be too dependent on the vagaries and fluctuations of the stock market. By contrast, the investor in shares, say, of public-utility companies at about their net-asset value can always consider himself the owner of an interest in sound and expanding businesses, acquired at a rational price—regardless of what the stock market might say to the contrary. The ultimate result of such a conservative policy is likely to work out better than exciting adventures into the glamorous and dangerous fields of anticipated growth.

投资艺术有一个特点，却鲜为人知。普通投资者只需付出少量努力和能力，就能取得不菲的回报，即便不至于惊艳；但要提升这个唾手可得的水平，需要大量的实践和智慧。如果你只是试图在你的投资计划中多加一点 知识和智慧，而不是取得比平常更好的结果，你很可能会发现自己做得更糟。

The art of investment has one characteristic that is not generally appreciated. A creditable, if unspectacular, result can be achieved by the lay investor with a minimum of effort and capability; but to improve this easily attainable standard requires much application and more than a trace of wisdom. If you merely try to bring just a little extra knowledge and cleverness to bear upon your investment program, instead of realizing a little better than normal results, you may well find that you have done worse.

既然任何人——只要买入并持有一份代表性股票——都能与市场平均水平的表现相媲美，那么“超越平均水平”似乎是一件相对简单的事情；但事实上，尝试这样做却失败的聪明人比例高得惊人。即使是大多数投资基金，拥有经验丰富的人员，也没有取得如此好的表现。多年来，股市一直如此。与上述情况相关的是经纪公司发布的股市预测记录，因为有强有力的证据表明，他们精心计算的预测比简单的抛硬币更不可靠。

Since anyone—by just buying and holding a representative list—can equal the performance of the market averages, it would seem a comparatively simple matter to “beat the averages”; but as a matter of fact the proportion of smart people who try this and fail is surprisingly large. Even the majority of the investment funds, with all their experienced personnel, have not performed so well over the years as has the general market. Allied to the foregoing is the record of the published stock-market predictions of the brokerage houses, for there is strong evidence that their calculated forecasts have been somewhat less reliable than the simple tossing of a coin.

在撰写本书的过程中，我们努力将这一投资陷阱牢记于心。我们强调了简单的投资组合策略的优势——购买高等级债券，并投资于多元化的领先普通股——任何投资者在专家的协助下都能做到。然而，超越这一安全稳健领域的冒险则充满了挑战性的困难，尤其是在性格方面。在尝试这样的冒险之前，投资者应该对自己和顾问充满信心——尤其是要确保他们清楚了解投资与投机、市场价格与潜在价值之间的区别。

In writing this book we have tried to keep this basic pitfall of investment in mind. The virtues of a simple portfolio policy have been emphasized—the purchase of high-grade bonds plus a diversified list of leading common stocks—which any investor can carry out with a little expert assistance. The adventure beyond this safe and sound territory has been presented as fraught with challenging difficulties, especially in the area of temperament. Before attempting such a venture the investor should feel sure of himself and of his advisers—particularly as to whether they have a clear concept of the differences between investment and speculation and between market price and underlying value.

坚定的投资理念，牢牢遵循安全边际原则，能够带来丰厚的回报。但若非认真反思，就不应该为了追求这些回报，而去追求防御性投资的稳定收益。

A strong-minded approach to investment, firmly based on the margin-of-safety principle, can yield handsome rewards. But a decision to try for these emoluments rather than for the assured fruits of defensive investment should not be made without much self-examination.

最后回顾一下。1914年6月，当这位年轻的作家步入华尔街时，没有人能预知接下来的半个世纪将会发生什么。（股市甚至没有想到两个月后就会爆发世界大战，并导致纽约证券交易所关闭。）如今，1972年，我们发现自己是世界上最富有、最强大的国家，但却被各种重大问题所困扰，对未来的担忧多于信心。然而，如果我们将目光局限于美国的投资经验，过去57年的经验或许能给我们带来一些安慰。尽管经历了翻天覆地的变化和灾难，这些灾难既令人震惊又出乎意料，但合理的投资原则总体上确实能够带来合理的结果。我们必须基于这样的假设采取行动：这些原则将继续发挥作用。

A final retrospective thought. When the young author entered Wall Street in June 1914 no one had any inkling of what the next half-century had in store. (The stock market did not even suspect that a World War was to break out in two months, and close down the New York Stock Exchange.) Now, in 1972, we find ourselves the richest and most powerful country on earth, but beset by all sorts of major problems and more apprehensive than confident of the future. Yet if we confine our attention to American investment experience, there is some comfort to be gleaned from the last 57 years. Through all their vicissitudes and casualties, as earth-shaking as they were unforeseen, it remained true that sound investment principles produced generally sound results. We must act on the assumption that they will continue to do so.

读者须知：本书并不针对储蓄者和投资者的整体金融政策；它只涉及他们准备投入可销售（或可赎回）证券的那部分资金，即债券和股票。因此，我们不讨论诸如储蓄和定期存款、储蓄贷款协会账户、人寿保险、年金以及房地产抵押贷款或股权等重要媒介。读者应记住，文中出现的“现在”或类似词语指的是1971年末或1972年初。^*

Note to the Reader: This book does not address itself to the overall financial policy of savers and investors; it deals only with that portion of their funds which they are prepared to place in marketable (or redeemable) securities, that is, in bonds and stocks. Consequently we do not discuss such important media as savings and time desposits, savings-and-loan-association accounts, life insurance, annuities, and real-estate mortgages or equity ownership. The reader should bear in mind that when he finds the word “now,” or the equivalent, in the text, it refers to late 1971 or early 1972.^*

导言评论

Commentary on the Introduction

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

我无法告诉你如何快速致富。我只能告诉你如何快速变穷：努力快速致富。

I can’t tell you how to get rich quickly. I can only tell you how to get poor quickly: by trying to get rich quickly.

—安德烈·科斯托拉尼¹

—André Kostolany¹

“投资者的主要问题——甚至是他最大的敌人——很可能就是他自己。”

“The investor’s chief problem—and even his worst enemy—is likely to be himself.”

格雷厄姆用这些简单的话语表明了投资的意义。

With these simple words, Graham signals what investing is all about.

我们在本书中传达的信息是，投资与你所相信的完全相反。

Our message in this book is that investing is the exact opposite of what you’ve been led to believe.

财经电视、博客、经纪广告和社交媒体将投资描绘成一场在充满敌意的荒野中求生的斗争。他们想让你觉得自己终生都在与股市、对冲基金、央行或其他黑暗神秘的力量作斗争。

Financial television, blogs, brokerage ads, and social media portray investing as a struggle for survival in a hostile wilderness. They want you to think you’re locked in a lifelong battle against the stock market, hedge funds, central banks, or other dark and mysterious forces.

这样的宣传煽动恐惧。它让你感觉自己身处一场竞争之中，只有所有人都输了，你才能赢。对于那些散布这种信息的人来说，一旦你开始相信它，你就会为了生存而愿意支付高额费用。

Such propaganda stokes fear. It makes you feel you’re in a competition that you can win only if everyone else loses. Conveniently for the people who spout this message, once you start believing it, you become willing to pay them high fees in a desperate quest to survive.

您还会感到有必要学习成功投资者的“秘密”，每隔几分钟检查一次投资的价值，陷入有关市场如何被操纵的阴谋论中，或者以极快的速度进行疯狂交易。

You will also feel compelled to learn the “secrets” of successful investors, check the value of your investments every few minutes, get swept up in conspiracy theories about how the market is rigged, or trade obsessively at blazing speed.

这样一来，你似乎就可以在专业比赛中击败他们。

That way, it seems, you can beat the professionals at their own game.

然而，他们自己却无法获胜。大约四分之三的专业投资者未能战胜市场——尽管他们拥有数十年的训练和经验，能够操控能够每秒进行数千次交易，并即时获取地球上所有影响市场的新闻。

Yet they can’t win it themselves. Roughly three-quarters of professional investors fail to beat the market—even though they have decades of training and experience, command computers that can trade thousands of times per second, and get instantaneous access to all the market-moving news on earth.

如果他们无法赢得比赛，你为什么还想玩呢？

If they can’t win their game, why would you even want to play?

好消息是您不必这么做。

The good news is that you don’t have to.

有了格雷厄姆的指导，你就可以忘记所有与市场殊死搏斗的废话，并放弃随之而来的所有压力、费用和失败。

With Graham as your guide, you can forget all that nonsense about being in a fight to the death against the markets—and forgo all the stress, fees, and failure that go with it.

然而，你还必须进行另一场更具挑战性的斗争。

However, you will have to wage another, even more challenging struggle.

要成为一名聪明的投资者，你必须征服一股黑暗而神秘的力量。但它不是市场。

To be an intelligent investor, there is a dark and mysterious force you must conquer. But it isn’t the market.

是你自己。

It’s yourself.

你自己——而不是市场——才是你自己最大的投资敌人。

You—not the market—are your own worst investing enemy.

这是因为人类的大脑是一种解决难题的出色机制，但它更擅长简单的自我欺骗。

That’s because the human mind is a brilliant mechanism for solving difficult problems—but it is even more adept at the simple task of self-deception.

数以百万计的投资者一生都在欺骗自己：承担他们不理解的风险，追逐过去业绩的幻影，过早出售他们的盈利资产，持有亏损资产的时间过长，支付高昂的费用以追求无法实现的目标，吹嘘自己在甚至没有衡量回报的情况下击败了市场。

Millions of investors spend their entire lives fooling themselves: taking risks they don’t understand, chasing the phantoms of past performance, selling their winning assets too soon, holding their losers too long, paying outlandish fees in pursuit of the unobtainable, bragging about beating the market without even measuring their returns.

他们故意无视自己才是最大的敌人这一事实。他们用自欺欺人来维护自尊。他们照镜子，看到的是沃伦·巴菲特。

They are willfully blind to the fact that they are their own worst enemy. They preserve their self-esteem with self-delusion. They look in the mirror and see Warren Buffett.

作为投资者，如果你知道自己在做什么，你就能赚到超乎想象的钱。如果你只是自以为是，你损失的钱会比你最可怕的噩梦还要多。自欺欺人的代价甚至比被别人欺骗还要高昂。

As an investor, if you know what you’re doing, you can make more money than you ever dreamed possible. If you only think you know what you’re doing, you will lose more money than you ever envisioned in your worst nightmares. Fooling yourself can be even more costly than being fooled by someone else.

什么是聪明的投资者？

What Is an Intelligent Investor?

传统的智力衡量标准与你是否能成为格雷厄姆所说的“聪明的投资者”几乎没有关系。1720年，艾萨克·牛顿爵士，有史以来最聪明的人之一，在南海公司股票交易中损失了一大笔钱^。2 1998年，长期资本Management LP 是一家由数学家、计算机科学家和两位诺贝尔经济学奖获得者管理的对冲基金，它在几周内损失了大约 80% 的资本，不得不寻求 36 亿美元的救助^。3

Conventional measures of intelligence have little to do with whether you can be what Graham calls an intelligent investor. In 1720, Sir Isaac Newton, one of the smartest people who ever lived, lost a fortune trading shares in the South Sea Co.² In 1998, Long-Term Capital Management L.P., a hedge fund run by mathematicians, computer scientists, and two Nobel Laureates in economics, lost roughly 80% of its capital in a few weeks and had to be rescued in a $3.6 billion bailout.³

无论你多么聪明，除非你学会诚实面对自己，否则你不可能成为——或者说成为一个——聪明的投资者。在本书的第一版中，格雷厄姆写道：

No matter how brilliant you are, you can’t be—or become—an intelligent investor unless you learn to be honest with yourself. In the first edition of this book, Graham wrote:

我们标题中的“智能”一词将……按照其通常含义和词典定义使用，意为“被赋予获取知识和理解的能力”。它不会被理解为“聪明”或“精明”，或拥有非凡的远见或洞察力。它更多地是一种性格特质，而非大脑特质^。4

The word “intelligent” in our title will be used . . . in its common and dictionary sense as meaning “endowed with the capacity for knowledge and understanding.” It will not be taken to mean “smart” or “shrewd,” or gifted with unusual foresight or insight. [It] is a trait more of the character than of the brain.⁴

“你不需要成为一名火箭科学家，”沃伦·巴菲特曾说过。“投资不是智商160的人打败智商130的人的游戏。理性至关重要。” 巴菲特和他的合伙人查理·芒格曾反复强调他们所谓的“气质”至关重要。

“You don’t need to be a rocket scientist,” Warren Buffett has said. “Investing is not a game where the guy with the 160 IQ beats the guy with a 130 IQ. Rationality is essential.” Buffett and his partner, Charlie Munger, have repeatedly emphasized the vital importance of what they call “temperament.”

伟大投资者的七大美德

The Seven Virtues of Great Investors

格雷厄姆并没有列出构成一位聪明投资者的所有性格特征，但我遇到的优秀基金经理都具备一些不可或缺的品质。我称之为“七大美德” ^：

Graham doesn’t list all the character traits that constitute the temperament of an intelligent investor, but the great money managers I’ve met share a few indispensable qualities. I call them the seven virtues:⁵

好奇心。普通投资者害怕他们不知道的事情。聪明的投资者也害怕他们自以为知道的事情，因为他们意识到这些知识可能是有偏见的、不完整的，甚至是错误的。

Curiosity. Ordinary investors are afraid of what they don’t know. Intelligent investors are also afraid of what they think they do know, because they realize it might be biased, incomplete, or wrong.

因此他们从未偏离他们终身不懈的学习追求甚至更多。他们持续阅读，永不停歇地提问。他们是学习机器。

So they never deviate from their relentless lifelong quest to learn more. They read constantly and never stop asking questions. They are learning machines.

怀疑论。华尔街声称出售投资产品，但其真正的业务是向那些相信魔法的人兜售希望和梦想。加入人工智能革命的底层，为退休储蓄！低风险赚取高收益！独家获取另类资产的丰厚回报！

Skepticism. Wall Street purports to sell investments, but its real business is selling hopes and dreams to people who want to believe in magic. Save for retirement by getting in on the ground floor of the artificial-intelligence revolution! Earn high income at low risk! Get exclusive access to the lucrative returns on alternative assets!

在本书中，您将学会增强您的怀疑精神，并识别表面上的机会是否好得令人难以置信。

In this book, you’ll learn to sharpen your skepticism and recognize when an ostensible opportunity is too good to be true.

独立。你拥有的最宝贵的投资资产就是你自己的头脑。如果你让别人替你思考，你就是在交易你最宝贵的资产——让你的情绪和结果受制于数百万陌生人的突发奇想。像格雷厄姆、巴菲特和芒格这样的伟大投资者不会试图随波逐流；他们会保持距离。别人的认可对他们来说毫无意义。对你来说也同样如此。

Independence. The single most valuable investment asset you will ever have is your own mind. If you let other people do your thinking for you, you’ve traded away your greatest asset—and made your emotions and your results captive to the whims of millions of strangers. Great investors like Graham, Buffett, and Munger don’t try to step in with the crowd; they step away. The approval of others means nothing to them. Nor should it to you.

正如格雷厄姆在第20章中所写：“你既不是对的，也不是错的，因为大众不同意你的观点。你是正确的，因为你的数据和推理是正确的。”

As Graham writes in Chapter 20: “You are neither right nor wrong because the crowd disagrees with you. You are right because your data and reasoning are right.”

谦逊。购买任何上涨资产最危险的地方在于，盈利让你感觉自己像是在证明自己。赚钱会让你自以为知道自己在做什么，也知道自己未来会怎样——即使你错了。这就是为什么保持谦逊如此重要。学得越多，你就越应该意识到自己知道的太少；投资时间越长，你就越应该意识到，你的运气比你自身更强大。

Humility. The most dangerous thing about buying any asset that goes up is that profit feels like proof. Making money makes you think you know what you’re doing and what the future holds—even when you’re wrong. That’s why hanging on to humility is so important. The more you learn, the more you should realize how little you know; the longer you invest, the more you should realize that your luck is bigger than you are.

很多人以为谦逊就是管理别人对你的看法，这很容易。但实际上，谦逊是对自己诚实，这很难。

Many people think humility is about managing what others think of you, which would be easy. Instead, it’s about being honest with yourself, which is hard.

自律。要成为一名明智的投资者，你不能随心所欲地随波逐流，跟着感觉走，试一下这个，试一下那个，看看会发生什么。相反，你需要在做任何决定之前，用自己遵循的政策、程序和规则来约束自己。这样，你就能把投资视为一个持续不断的过程，在每一步都不断练习改进，而不是一系列偶然事件。

Discipline. To be an intelligent investor, you can’t make things up as you go along, following your gut wherever it goes, trying a little of this and a little of that to see what happens. Instead, you need to impose discipline on yourself with policies, procedures, and rules you follow before making any decision. That way, you treat investing as a continuous process you can practice improving at every step, rather than a series of haphazard events.

自律不仅仅意味着始终如一地做你应该做的事，在你应该做的时间和方式去做；它还意味着始终如一地不做你不应该做的事。

Discipline doesn’t just mean consistently doing what you should do, when and how you should do it; it also means consistently not doing what you shouldn’t do.

耐心。在这个充斥着即时满足、海量信息、股票和加密货币飞涨的世界里，何必费心保持耐心呢？为什么不试试快速致富呢？

Patience. Why bother trying to be patient in a world of instant gratification, an endless deluge of information, and stocks and cryptocurrencies that go to the moon? Why not just try to get rich quick?

因为几乎没有一个快速致富的人能够长期保持富有。

Because almost nobody who gets rich quick stays rich for long.

你在几个月、几周、几天或几小时内赚到的钱，几乎肯定会以至少来得快去得也快的速度消失。好运会转瞬即逝，好运会变坏，意外事件会让你的利润化为乌有。

The money you make in a few months or weeks or days or hours will almost certainly disappear at least as fast as it came. Hot streaks go cold, good luck turns bad, surprises blow your profits to bits.

要想获得并保持长期收益，你不能只顾眼前利益。你必须缓慢而稳步地积累财富。

To earn—and keep—long-term gains, you can’t be a short-term thinker. You must build your wealth slowly and steadily.

勇气。说股市下跌时买入更多很容易，但真正勇敢却比说出来难得多。勇气是在2007年末至2009年初期间损失了超过55%的资金，然后继续买入更多股票，不是因为全球金融危机，而是因为它。勇气是在2020年2月至3月的疫情恐慌中，仅仅五周就损失了34%——然后坚持下来，不是因为恐惧和不安，而是因为它。

Courage. It’s easy to say you’ll buy more if the stock market falls, but being brave is a lot harder than saying you are. Courage is losing more than 55% of your money between late 2007 and early 2009—and then buying more stocks, not despite the global financial crisis, but because of it. Courage is losing 34% in only five weeks during the pandemic panic in February and March 2020—and then hanging on, not despite the fear and dread that surrounded you, but because of them.

作为一名投资者，你必须相信未来会更好。历史表明，在最艰难的时刻过后，金融信仰才能带来最佳回报。

To be an investor you must believe in a better tomorrow. History shows that financial faith pays off the best after the times when it is hardest to hold.

在格雷厄姆的指导下，您可以获得并培养这些美德。它们不仅在投资中，而且在生活中都将对您大有裨益。有了这本书，您可以成为更睿智的投资者和更睿智的人。继续阅读，学习吧！

With Graham as your guide, you can acquire and cultivate these virtues. They will serve you well not only in investing but in life. With this book in hand, you can become a more intelligent investor and a wiser person. Read on, and learn!

第一章

Chapter 1 投资与投机：聪明投资者的预期结果

Investment versus Speculation: Results to Be Expected by the Intelligent Investor

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

本章将概述本书其余部分将阐述的观点。特别是，我们希望从一开始就阐明适合个人非专业投资者的投资组合策略的概念。

This chapter will outline the viewpoints that will be set forth in the remainder of the book. In particular we wish to develop at the outset our concept of appropriate portfolio policy for the individual, nonprofessional investor.

投资与投机

Investment versus Speculation

我们所说的“投资者”是什么意思？本书将通篇使用“投资者”一词来与“投机者”相对照。早在1934年，我们的教科书《证券分析》¹就试图对两者之间的区别进行精确的表述，如下：“投资操作是指经过彻底分析，能够保证本金安全和足够回报的操作。不符合这些要求的操作则具有投机性。”

What do we mean by “investor”? Throughout this book the term will be used in contradistinction to “speculator.” As far back as 1934, in our textbook Security Analysis,¹ we attempted a precise formulation of the difference between the two, as follows: “An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative.”

尽管我们在接下来的38年里一直坚持这一定义，但值得注意的是，“投资者”一词的使用在此期间发生了根本性的变化。在1929年至1932年的股市大跌之后，所有普通股都被广泛认为本质上具有投机性。（一位权威人士断然声明，只有债券才可以用于投资。2 ^）因此，我们当时必须捍卫我们的定义，以反驳那些认为其将投资概念范围过广的指控。

While we have clung tenaciously to this definition over the ensuing 38 years, it is worthwhile noting the radical changes that have occurred in the use of the term “investor” during this period. After the great market decline of 1929–1932 all common stocks were widely regarded as speculative by nature. (A leading authority stated flatly that only bonds could be bought for investment.²) Thus we had then to defend our definition against the charge that it gave too wide scope to the concept of investment.

现在我们关心的是相反的问题。我们必须防止读者接受那种将“投资者”一词适用于股票市场中任何人的常见术语。在我们的上一期我们引用了我们领先的金融杂志 1962 年 6 月的一篇头版文章的标题：

Now our concern is of the opposite sort. We must prevent our readers from accepting the common jargon which applies the term “investor” to anybody and everybody in the stock market. In our last edition we cited the following headline of a front-page article of our leading financial journal in June 1962:

散户投资者看跌，他们正在卖空零股

SMALL INVESTORS BEARISH, THEY ARE SELLING ODD-LOTS SHORT

1970 年 10 月，同一期杂志发表了一篇社论，批评所谓的“鲁莽的投资者”，这些人这次都蜂拥而至购买。

In October 1970 the same journal had an editorial critical of what it called “reckless investors,” who this time were rushing in on the buying side.

这些引文恰好体现了多年来在投资和投机这两个词的使用上普遍存在的混淆。想想我们上面给出的投资定义，并将其与一个缺乏经验的公众抛售几股股票的情况进行比较。他甚至不拥有他所抛售的股票，并且在很大程度上出于情感上的确信，他能够以更低的价格买回。（值得指出的是，当1962年的文章发表时，市场已经经历了一次大幅下跌，现在正准备迎接更大的上涨。当时几乎是卖空的最糟糕时机。）从更普遍的意义上讲，后来使用的“鲁莽的投资者”这个短语，如果这种语言误用不那么有害的话，可能会被视为一个可笑的自相矛盾的说法——类似于“挥霍无度的守财奴”。

These quotations well illustrate the confusion that has been dominant for many years in the use of the words investment and speculation. Think of our suggested definition of investment given above, and compare it with the sale of a few shares of stock by an inexperienced member of the public, who does not even own what he is selling, and has some largely emotional conviction that he will be able to buy them back at a much lower price. (It is not irrelevant to point out that when the 1962 article appeared the market had already experienced a decline of major size, and was now getting ready for an even greater upswing. It was about as poor a time as possible for selling short.) In a more general sense, the later-used phrase “reckless investors” could be regarded as a laughable contradiction in terms—something like “spendthrift misers”—were this misuse of language not so mischievous.

该报在这些情况下使用了“投资者”一词，因为用华尔街的通俗话说，所有买卖证券的人都成了投资者，无论他买的是什么，出于什么目的，以什么价格，无论是现金还是保证金。相比之下，1948年公众对普通股的态度则截然不同：当时超过90%的受访者表示反对购买普通股。3大约^一半的人给出的理由是“不安全，像赌博”，还有大约一半的人给出的理由是“不熟悉”。*这确实很讽刺。（虽然并不奇怪）当各种普通股以最具吸引力的价格出售，并即将开始历史上最大的上涨时，人们普遍认为购买所有类型的普通股都是高度投机或风险的；相反，根据过去的经验判断，它们已经上涨到无疑是危险的水平，这一事实后来将它们变成了“投资”，并将所有股票购买公众变成了“投资者”。

The newspaper employed the word “investor” in these instances because, in the easy language of Wall Street, everyone who buys or sells a security has become an investor, regardless of what he buys, or for what purpose, or at what price, or whether for cash or on margin. Compare this with the attitude of the public toward common stocks in 1948, when over 90% of those queried expressed themselves as opposed to the purchase of common stocks.³ About half gave as their reason “not safe, a gamble,” and about half, the reason “not familiar with.”* It is indeed ironical (though not surprising) that common-stock purchases of all kinds were quite generally regarded as highly speculative or risky at a time when they were selling on a most attractive basis, and due soon to begin their greatest advance in history; conversely the very fact they had advanced to what were undoubtedly dangerous levels as judged by past experience later transformed them into “investments,” and the entire stock-buying public into “investors.”

普通股投资与投机之间的区别一直以来都很重要，而这种区别的消失令人担忧。我们常说，华尔街作为一个机构，最好重新确立这一区别，并在其与公众的所有交易中强调这一点。否则，证券交易所或许有一天会因为那些遭受巨额投机损失的人没有得到适当的警告而受到指责。讽刺的是，一些证券交易所近期的财务困境似乎又一次源于将投机性普通股纳入其自有资本基金。我们相信，本书的读者能够对普通股投资的固有风险有一个相当清晰的认识——这些风险与其提供的获利机会密不可分，投资者在进行投资评估时必须将两者考虑在内。

The distinction between investment and speculation in common stocks has always been a useful one and its disappearance is a cause for concern. We have often said that Wall Street as an institution would be well advised to reinstate this distinction and to emphasize it in all its dealings with the public. Otherwise the stock exchanges may some day be blamed for heavy speculative losses, which those who suffered them had not been properly warned against. Ironically, once more, much of the recent financial embarrassment of some stock-exchange firms seems to have come from the inclusion of speculative common stocks in their own capital funds. We trust that the reader of this book will gain a reasonably clear idea of the risks that are inherent in common-stock commitments—risks which are inseparable from the opportunities of profit that they offer, and both of which must be allowed for in the investor’s calculations.

我们刚才所说的表明，或许不再存在一种纯粹的西蒙式投资策略，即只持有代表性普通股——也就是说，人们总是可以等待，以一个不会带来市场或“报价”损失风险、足以令人不安的价格买入。在大多数情况下，投资者必须认识到其持有的普通股中存在 投机因素 。他应该将这种因素控制在较小的限度内，并在财务和心理上做好应对短期或长期不利结果的准备。

What we have just said indicates that there may no longer be such a thing as a simon-pure investment policy comprising representative common stocks—in the sense that one can always wait to buy them at a price that involves no risk of a market or “quotational” loss large enough to be disquieting. In most periods the investor must recognize the existence of a speculative factor in his common-stock holdings. It is his task to keep this component within minor limits, and to be prepared financially and psychologically for adverse results that may be of short or long duration.

应该增加两段关于股票投机本身的内容，以区别于目前大多数代表性普通股中固有的投机成分。纯粹的投机既不违法，也不道德，（对大多数人来说）也不会增加他们的收入。更重要的是，某种程度的投机是必要的，也是不可避免的，因为在许多普通股交易中，盈利和亏损的可能性都很大，而且其中的风险也很大。必须有人假设。*有理智的投机，就有理智的投资。但投机在很多方面也可能不理智。其中最重要的有：（1）当你以为自己在投资时却在投机；（2）当你缺乏适当的知识和技能时，却认真地投机而不是把它当作消遣；（3）在投机中投入的资金超过了你能承受的损失。

Two paragraphs should be added about stock speculation per se, as distinguished from the speculative component now inherent in most representative common stocks. Outright speculation is neither illegal, immoral, nor (for most people) fattening to the pocketbook. More than that, some speculation is necessary and unavoidable, for in many common-stock situations there are substantial possibilities of both profit and loss, and the risks therein must be assumed by someone.* There is intelligent speculation as there is intelligent investing. But there are many ways in which speculation may be unintelligent. Of these the foremost are: (1) speculating when you think you are investing; (2) speculating seriously instead of as a pastime, when you lack proper knowledge and skill for it; and (3) risking more money in speculation than you can afford to lose.

在我们保守的观点中，每个进行保证金^交易的非专业人士都应该认识到，他实际上是在投机，而他的经纪人有责任向他提供建议。任何购买所谓“热门”普通股，或以任何类似方式购买股票的人，要么是在投机，要么是在赌博。投机总是令人着迷，当你领先时，它会充满乐趣。如果你想试试运气，可以留出一部分资金——越少越好——存入一个单独的基金用于此目的。切勿仅仅因为市场上涨、利润滚滚而向该账户注资。（这时才应该考虑从你的投机基金中取钱。）切勿将你的投机和投资操作混放在同一个账户中，也不要将你的任何思维方式混在一起。

In our conservative view every nonprofessional who operates on margin^* should recognize that he is ipso facto speculating, and it is his broker’s duty so to advise him. And everyone who buys a so-called “hot” common-stock issue, or makes a purchase in any way similar thereto, is either speculating or gambling. Speculation is always fascinating, and it can be a lot of fun while you are ahead of the game. If you want to try your luck at it, put aside a portion—the smaller the better—of your capital in a separate fund for this purpose. Never add more money to this account just because the market has gone up and profits are rolling in. (That’s the time to think of taking money out of your speculative fund.) Never mingle your speculative and investment operations in the same account, nor in any part of your thinking.

防御型投资者的预期结果

Results to Be Expected by the Defensive Investor

我们已经将防御型投资者定义为主要追求安全和免于麻烦的投资者。一般来说，在“平均正常条件”下——如果这种条件真的存在——他应该采取什么行动，又能期待多少回报？为了回答这些问题，我们首先要思考一下我们之前关于这个问题的论述。七年前，接下来是从那时起，决定投资者预期回报的潜在因素发生了哪些重大变化，最后是，在当前（1972 年初）条件下，投资者应该做什么以及应该期待什么。

We have already defined the defensive investor as one interested chiefly in safety plus freedom from bother. In general what course should he follow and what return can he expect under “average normal conditions”—if such conditions really exist? To answer these questions we shall consider first what we wrote on the subject seven years ago, next what significant changes have occurred since then in the underlying factors governing the investor’s expectable return, and finally what he should do and what he should expect under present-day (early 1972) conditions.

1. 六年前我们说过的话

1. What We Said Six Years Ago

我们建议投资者将其持有的资产分配在高等级债券和主要普通股之间；债券持有比例不得低于25%，也不得高于75%，而普通股持有比例则必须高于25%。最简单的选择是保持债券和普通股各占一半，当市场波动幅度达到5%时，再进行调整，使其恢复平衡。另一种策略是，如果“他觉得市场价格过高，风险过高”，他可以选择将普通股持有比例降至25%；反之，如果“他觉得股价下跌使股票更具吸引力”，他可以选择将普通股持有比例提升至最高75%。

We recommended that the investor divide his holdings between high-grade bonds and leading common stocks; that the proportion held in bonds be never less than 25% or more than 75%, with the converse being necessarily true for the common-stock component; that his simplest choice would be to maintain a 50–50 proportion between the two, with adjustments to restore the equality when market developments had disturbed it by as much as, say, 5%. As an alternative policy he might choose to reduce his common-stock component to 25% “if he felt the market was dangerously high,” and conversely to advance it toward the maximum of 75% “if he felt that a decline in stock prices was making them increasingly attractive.”

1965年，投资者购买高等级应税债券的收益率约为4.5%，购买优质免税债券的收益率约为3.2%。主要普通股（道琼斯工业平均指数为892点）的股息收益率仅为3.2%左右。这一事实以及其他因素都表明投资者应谨慎行事。我们假设，“在市场正常水平下”，投资者购买股票的初始股息收益率应在3.5%至4.5%之间，再加上代表性股票的标的价值（以及“正常市场价格”）的稳步增长，其价值与债券收益率大致相同，因此股息和股票增值合计收益率约为每年7.5%。债券和股票各占一半，税前收益率约为6%。我们还补充说，股票部分应该能够在一定程度上抵御大规模通货膨胀造成的购买力损失。

In 1965 the investor could obtain about 4½% on high-grade taxable bonds and 31⁄4% on good tax-free bonds. The dividend return on leading common stocks (with the DJIA at 892) was only about 3.2%. This fact, and others, suggested caution. We implied that “at normal levels of the market” the investor should be able to obtain an initial dividend return of between 3½% and 4½% on his stock purchases, to which should be added a steady increase in underlying value (and in the “normal market price”) of a representative stock list of about the same amount, giving a return from dividends and appreciation combined of about 7½% per year. The half and half division between bonds and stocks would yield about 6% before income tax. We added that the stock component should carry a fair degree of protection against a loss of purchasing power caused by large-scale inflation.

需要指出的是，上述计算表明，预期股市上涨速度比 1949 年至 1964 年期间实际上涨速度要低得多。总体而言，上市股票的平均涨幅远高于10%，而且人们普遍认为，这在某种程度上保证了未来也能取得同样令人满意的业绩。很少有人愿意认真考虑这样一种可能性：过去的高涨幅意味着股价“现在过高”，因此“1949年以来的出色业绩意味着未来的业绩不会很好，反而会很糟糕” ^。4

It should be pointed out that the above arithmetic indicated expectation of a much lower rate of advance in the stock market than had been realized between 1949 and 1964. That rate had averaged a good deal better than 10% for listed stocks as a whole, and it was quite generally regarded as a sort of guarantee that similarly satisfactory results could be counted on in the future. Few people were willing to consider seriously the possibility that the high rate of advance in the past means that stock prices are “now too high,” and hence that “the wonderful results since 1949 would imply not very good but bad results for the future.”⁴

2. 1964年以来发生了什么

2. What Has Happened Since 1964

1964 年以来的主要变化是一级债券的利率上升至历史最高水平，尽管此后利率已从 1970 年的最低价大幅回升。目前优质公司债券的可获得回报率约为 7.5%，甚至高于 1964 年的 4.5%。与此同时，在 1969-70 年的市场下跌期间，道琼斯工业平均指数类股票的股息回报率也有了相当大的增长，但在我们撰写本文时（“道琼斯指数”为 900 点），该回报率不到 3.5%，而 1964 年底为 3.2%。在此期间，现行利率的变化导致中期（比如 20 年期）债券的市场价格最大下跌约 38%。

The major change since 1964 has been the rise in interest rates on first-grade bonds to record high levels, although there has since been a considerable recovery from the lowest prices of 1970. The obtainable return on good corporate issues is now about 7½% and even more against 4½% in 1964. In the meantime the dividend return on DJIA-type stocks had a fair advance also during the market decline of 1969–70, but as we write (with “the Dow” at 900) it is less than 3.5% against 3.2% at the end of 1964. The change in going interest rates produced a maximum decline of about 38% in the market price of medium-term (say 20-year) bonds during this period.

这些发展中存在一个矛盾的方面。1964年，我们详细讨论了股票价格可能过高并最终大幅下跌的可能性；但我们并没有具体考虑高等级债券价格也可能出现同样的情况。（据我们所知，其他人也没有。）我们确实警告过（在1965年版的第90页），“长期债券的价格可能会因利率变动而大幅波动”。鉴于后来发生的事情，我们认为这一警告——以及随之而来的例子——没有得到足够的重视。事实上，如果投资者在1964年道琼斯工业平均指数收盘价为874点时持有一定数量的资金，那么他在1971年末就能获得少量利润；即使在1970年的最低水平（631点），他的损失也比持有优质长期债券的损失要小。另一方面，如果他将债券类投资限制在美国储蓄债券、短期公司债券或储蓄账户中，那么在此期间，他的本金市值就不会遭受损失，而且他还能获得比优质股票更高的收益回报。因此，事实证明，1964年，真正的“现金等价物”比普通股更值得投资。尽管理论上通胀应该有利于股票而非现金，但股票却出现了下跌。优质长期债券报价本金价值的下降是由于货币市场的发展，而货币市场是一个深奥的领域，通常对个人的投资政策没有重要影响。

There is a paradoxical aspect to these developments. In 1964 we discussed at length the possibility that the price of stocks might be too high and subject ultimately to a serious decline; but we did not consider specifically the possibility that the same might happen to the price of high-grade bonds. (Neither did anyone else that we know of.) We did warn (on p. 90 of the 1965 edition) that “a long-term bond may vary widely in price in response to changes in interest rates.” In the light of what has since happened we think that this warning—with attendant examples—was insufficiently stressed. For the fact is that if the investor had a given sum in the DJIA at its closing price of 874 in 1964 he would have had a small profit thereon in late 1971; even at the lowest level (631) in 1970 his indicated loss would have been less than that shown on good long-term bonds. On the other hand, if he had confined his bond-type investments to U.S. savings bonds, short-term corporate issues, or savings accounts, he would have had no loss in market value of his principal during this period and he would have enjoyed a higher income return than was offered by good stocks. It turned out, therefore, that true “cash equivalents” proved to be better investments in 1964 than common stocks—in spite of the inflation experience that in theory should have favored stocks over cash. The decline in quoted principal value of good longer-term bonds was due to developments in the money market, an abstruse area which ordinarily does not have an important bearing on the investment policy of individuals.

这只是一系列历史经验中的一个例子，这些经验表明，证券价格的未来永远无法预测。*债券的波动几乎总是远小于股票价格，投资者通常可以购买任何期限的优质债券，而不必担心其市场价值的变化。这条规则也有一些例外，1964年之后的时期就是其中之一。我们将在下一章中详细介绍债券价格的变化。

This is just another of an endless series of experiences over time that have demonstrated that the future of security prices is never predictable.* Almost always bonds have fluctuated much less than stock prices, and investors generally could buy good bonds of any maturity without having to worry about changes in their market value. There were a few exceptions to this rule, and the period after 1964 proved to be one of them. We shall have more to say about change in bond prices in a later chapter.

3. 1971年末和1972年初的预期和政策

3. Expectations and Policy in Late 1971 and Early 1972

1971年底，投资者可以获得优质中期公司债券8%的应税利息，以及优质州或市政债券5.7%的免税利息。在短期领域，投资者可以获得五年期美国政府债券约6%的收益率。在后一种情况下，买家无需担心市场价值可能遭受损失，因为他确信在相对较短的持有期结束后，就能获得全额还款，包括6%的利息回报。道琼斯工业平均指数在1971年900点的惯常价格水平下的收益率仅为3.5%。

Toward the end of 1971 it was possible to obtain 8% taxable interest on good medium-term corporate bonds, and 5.7% tax-free on good state or municipal securities. In the shorter-term field the investor could realize about 6% on U.S. government issues due in five years. In the latter case the buyer need not be concerned about a possible loss in market value, since he is sure of full repayment, including the 6% interest return, at the end of a comparatively short holding period. The DJIA at its recurrent price level of 900 in 1971 yields only 3.5%.

假设现在和过去一样，需要做出的基本政策决策是如何将基金在高等级债券（或其他所谓的“现金等价物”）和道琼斯工业平均指数（DJIA）类领先股票之间进行分配。如果我们没有强有力的理由预测未来一段时间内股市会出现大幅上涨或大幅下跌，那么在当前情况下，投资者应该采取什么策略？首先，我们要指出的是，如果没有严重的不利变化，防御型投资者应该能够预期其股票目前3.5%的股息回报率，以及年均约4%的升值。正如我们稍后将解释的那样，这种升值主要基于各公司每年从未分配利润中拿出相应金额进行再投资。按税前计算，其股票的综合回报率平均为7.5%，略低于其持有的高等级债券的利息。*按税后计算，股票的平均回报率约为5.3%。5^这与目前持有优质免税中期债券的回报率大致相同。

Let us assume that now, as in the past, the basic policy decision to be made is how to divide the fund between high-grade bonds (or other so-called “cash equivalents”) and leading DJIA-type stocks. What course should the investor follow under present conditions, if we have no strong reason to predict either a significant upward or a significant downward movement for some time in the future? First let us point out that if there is no serious adverse change, the defensive investor should be able to count on the current 3.5% dividend return on his stocks and also on an average annual appreciation of about 4%. As we shall explain later, this appreciation is based essentially on the reinvestment by the various companies of a corresponding amount annually out of undistributed profits. On a before-tax basis the combined return of his stocks would then average, say, 7.5%, somewhat less than his interest on high-grade bonds.* On an after-tax basis the average return on stocks would work out at some 5.3%.⁵ This would be about the same as is now obtainable on good tax-free medium-term bonds.

与1964年的分析相比，这些预期对股票的利好远低于债券。（这一结论必然源于一个基本事实，即自1964年以来，债券收益率的涨幅远高于股票收益率。）我们绝不能忽视这样一个事实：优质债券的利息和本金支付比股票的股息和价格上涨更有保障，因此也更确定。因此，我们不得不得出这样的结论：现在，接近1971年底，债券投资似乎明显优于股票投资。如果我们确信这个结论正确，我们就不得不建议防御型投资者将所有资金投入债券，不要投资普通股，直到当前的收益率关系明显向股票倾斜。

These expectations are much less favorable for stocks against bonds than they were in our 1964 analysis. (That conclusion follows inevitably from the basic fact that bond yields have gone up much more than stock yields since 1964.) We must never lose sight of the fact that the interest and principal payments on good bonds are much better protected and therefore more certain than the dividends and price appreciation on stocks. Consequently we are forced to the conclusion that now, toward the end of 1971, bond investment appears clearly preferable to stock investment. If we could be sure that this conclusion is right we would have to advise the defensive investor to put all his money in bonds and none in common stocks until the current yield relationship changes significantly in favor of stocks.

当然，我们不能确定债券在目前的水平上会比股票表现更好。读者会立即认为通货膨胀因素是另一方强有力的理由。下一章我们将论证，我们在本世纪对美国通货膨胀的丰富经验，在目前收益率差异如此之大的情况下，并不支持选择股票而非债券。但通货膨胀加速的可能性始终存在——尽管我们认为这种可能性很小——这将以某种方式使股票比以固定金额美元支付的债券更受青睐。*还有另一种可能性——我们也认为这种可能性极小——即美国企业在没有通货膨胀加剧的情况下，能够获得丰厚的利润，从而证明未来几年普通股价值的大幅上涨是合理的。最后，还有一种更常见的可能性，即我们将见证股市再次出现巨大的投机性上涨，而其基本价值却缺乏真正的合理性。上述任何原因，或许还有其他我们尚未想到的原因，都可能导致投资者后悔将全部精力投入债券，即使在收益率水平更高的情况下也是如此。

But of course we cannot be certain that bonds will work out better than stocks from today’s levels. The reader will immediately think of the inflation factor as a potent reason on the other side. In the next chapter we shall argue that our considerable experience with inflation in the United States during this century would not support the choice of stocks against bonds at present differentials in yield. But there is always the possibility—though we consider it remote—of an accelerating inflation, which in one way or another would have to make stock equities preferable to bonds payable in a fixed amount of dollars.* There is the alternative possibility—which we also consider highly unlikely—that American business will become so profitable, without stepped-up inflation, as to justify a large increase in common-stock values in the next few years. Finally, there is the more familiar possibility that we shall witness another great speculative rise in the stock market without a real justification in the underlying values. Any of these reasons, and perhaps others we haven’t thought of, might cause the investor to regret a 100% concentration on bonds even at their more favorable yield levels.

因此，在简要讨论主要考虑因素之后，我们再次阐明防御型投资者应遵循的基本折衷策略——即始终将相当一部分资金配置于债券类资产，同时将相当一部分资金配置于股票类资产。当然，他们可以选择将债券类资产和股票类资产简单地各占一半，或者根据自身判断，将两者的比例设定在最低25%到最高75%之间。我们将在后续章节中更详细地探讨这些替代策略。

Hence, after this foreshortened discussion of the major considerations, we once again enunciate the same basic compromise policy for defensive investors—namely that at all times they have a significant part of their funds in bond-type holdings and a significant part also in equities. It is still true that they may choose between maintaining a simple 50–50 division between the two components or a ratio, dependent on their judgment, varying between a minimum of 25% and a maximum of 75% of either. We shall give our more detailed view of these alternative policies in a later chapter.

由于目前普通股的预期总回报率与债券几乎相同，因此，目前可预期的回报（包括股票价值的增长）无论投资者如何将资金分配给这两部分，收益都不会太大。如上所述，两部分的总回报率在税前约为 7.8%，或在免税（或预估已缴税款）基础上约为 5.5%。这样的回报率明显高于典型的保守型投资者在过去大部分时间实现的回报率。与 1949 年后 20 年牛市期间普通股 14% 左右的回报率相比，这个回报率可能并不吸引人。但应该记住，在 1949 年至 1969 年间，道琼斯工业平均指数上涨了 5 倍多，而其收益和股息增长了约一倍。因此，该时期令人印象深刻的市场记录大部分是基于投资者和投机者态度的变化，而不是公司基本价值的变化。从这个意义上讲，它可以被称为“引导操作”。

Since at present the overall return envisaged from common stocks is nearly the same as that from bonds, the presently expectable return (including growth of stock values) for the investor would change little regardless of how he divides his fund between the two components. As calculated above, the aggregate return from both parts should be about 7.8% before taxes or 5.5% on a tax-free (or estimated tax-paid) basis. A return of this order is appreciably higher than that realized by the typical conservative investor over most of the long-term past. It may not seem attractive in relation to the 14%, or so, return shown by common stocks during the 20 years of the predominantly bull market after 1949. But it should be remembered that between 1949 and 1969 the price of the DJIA had advanced more than fivefold while its earnings and dividends had about doubled. Hence the greater part of the impressive market record for that period was based on a change in investors’ and speculators’ attitudes rather than in underlying corporate values. To that extent it might well be called a “bootstrap operation.”

在讨论防御型投资者的普通股投资组合时，我们仅讨论了道琼斯工业平均指数30只成分股中的主要股票。我们这样做是为了方便，并不意味着只有这30只股票才适合他购买。实际上，还有许多其他公司的业绩与道琼斯指数的平均水平相当或更胜一筹；这些公司包括许多公用事业公司（它们有单独的道琼斯指数来代表它们）。*但这里的重点是，防御型投资者的总体业绩不太可能与一个多元化或代表性的股票组合与另一个股票组合有决定性的区别，或者——更准确地说——他和他的顾问都无法准确预测最终会出现什么差异。诚然，高超或精明的投资技巧应该尤其在于选择那些能够带来优于一般市场回报的股票。出于其他原因，我们怀疑防御型投资者通常能否获得优于平均水平的回报。结果——这实际上意味着要超越他们自己的整体表现。*（我们的怀疑延伸到专家对大型基金的管理。）

In discussing the common-stock portfolio of the defensive investor, we have spoken only of leading issues of the type included in the 30 components of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. We have done this for convenience, and not to imply that these 30 issues alone are suitable for purchase by him. Actually, there are many other companies of quality equal to or excelling the average of the Dow Jones list; these would include a host of public utilities (which have a separate Dow Jones average to represent them).* But the major point here is that the defensive investor’s overall results are not likely to be decisively different from one diversified or representative list than from another, or—more accurately—that neither he nor his advisers could predict with certainty whatever differences would ultimately develop. It is true that the art of skillful or shrewd investment is supposed to lie particularly in the selection of issues that will give better results than the general market. For reasons to be developed elsewhere we are skeptical of the ability of defensive investors generally to get better than average results—which in fact would mean to beat their own overall performance.* (Our skepticism extends to the management of large funds by experts.)

让我们举一个乍一看似乎与此相反的例子来说明我们的观点。1960年12月至1970年12月期间，道琼斯工业平均指数从616点上涨至839点，涨幅为36%。但在同一时期，规模更大的标准普尔500种股票加权指数却从58.11点上涨至92.15点，涨幅为58%。显然，事实证明，第二组股票比第一组更值得“买入”。但是谁会如此轻率地在1960年预测，看似五花八门的普通股组合，其表现一定会优于道琼斯“三十霸”呢？我们坚持认为，所有这些都证明，人们很少能够对价格变化（无论是绝对的还是相对的）做出可靠的预测。

Let us illustrate our point by an example that at first may seem to prove the opposite. Between December 1960 and December 1970 the DJIA advanced from 616 to 839, or 36%. But in the same period the much larger Standard & Poor’s weighted index of 500 stocks rose from 58.11 to 92.15, or 58%. Obviously the second group had proved a better “buy” than the first. But who would have been so rash as to predict in 1960 that what seemed like a miscellaneous assortment of all sorts of common stocks would definitely outperform the aristocratic “thirty tyrants” of the Dow? All this proves, we insist, that only rarely can one make dependable predictions about price changes, absolute or relative.

我们在此再次重申——无论怎样提醒都不为过——投资者不能指望通过购买新股或任何类型的“热门”股票（即那些被推荐用于快速获利的股票）来获得高于平均水平的收益。^*从长远来看，情况几乎肯定会相反。防御型投资者必须将自己限制在那些拥有长期盈利记录且财务状况良好的重要公司的股票上。（任何一位称职的证券分析师都能列出这样的清单。）激进型投资者可以购买其他类型的普通股，但这些股票必须基于经过理性分析确定的绝对吸引力。

We shall repeat here without apology—for the warning cannot be given too often—that the investor cannot hope for better than average results by buying new offerings, or “hot” issues of any sort, meaning thereby those recommended for a quick profit.^* The contrary is almost certain to be true in the long run. The defensive investor must confine himself to the shares of important companies with a long record of profitable operations and in strong financial condition. (Any security analyst worth his salt could make up such a list.) Aggressive investors may buy other types of common stocks, but they should be on a definitely attractive basis as established by intelligent analysis.

为了总结本节，我们简要地提一下防御型投资者的三个补充概念或做法。第一个是购买成熟投资公司的股票基金作为创建自己的普通股投资组合的替代方案。他也可以运用许多州的信托公司和银行运营的“普通信托基金”或“混合基金”；或者，如果他的资金充足，可以聘请一家知名的投资顾问公司。这将使他的投资计划得到专业的标准化管理。第三种方法是“平均成本法”，简单来说，就是投资者每月或每季度投资相同数量的普通股。这样，他在市场低迷时买入的股票比市场高涨时买入的股票更多，最终很可能以令人满意的价格买入所有持股。严格来说，这种方法是“公式投资”这一更广泛方法的应用。我们在建议投资者可以将其普通股持股比例在最低25%到最高75%之间调整时已经提到了公式投资。这些想法对于防御型投资者来说很有价值，我们将在后面的章节中进行更详细的讨论。*

To conclude this section, let us mention briefly three supplementary concepts or practices for the defensive investor. The first is the purchase of the shares of well-established investment funds as an alternative to creating his own common-stock portfolio. He might also utilize one of the “common trust funds,” or “commingled funds,” operated by trust companies and banks in many states; or, if his funds are substantial, use the services of a recognized investment-counsel firm. This will give him professional administration of his investment program along standard lines. The third is the device of “dollar-cost averaging,” which means simply that the practitioner invests in common stocks the same number of dollars each month or each quarter. In this way he buys more shares when the market is low than when it is high, and he is likely to end up with a satisfactory overall price for all his holdings. Strictly speaking, this method is an application of a broader approach known as “formula investing.” The latter was already alluded to in our suggestion that the investor may vary his holdings of common stocks between the 25% minimum and the 75% maximum, in inverse relationship to the action of the market. These ideas have merit for the defensive investor, and they will be discussed more amply in later chapters.*

积极投资者预期的结果

Results to Be Expected by the Aggressive Investor

当然，我们这位富有进取心的证券买家，会渴望并期望获得比他那位防御型或被动型同伴更好的整体业绩。但首先，他必须确保自己的业绩不会更糟。将大量的精力、研究和天赋投入华尔街，最终却亏损而非盈利，这并非难事。如果这些优点被引导到错误的方向，就会变得与障碍难以区分。因此，对于富有进取心的投资者来说，至关重要的是，首先要清晰地了解哪些行动方案能够提供合理的成功机会，哪些则不会。

Our enterprising security buyer, of course, will desire and expect to attain better overall results than his defensive or passive companion. But first he must make sure that his results will not be worse. It is no difficult trick to bring a great deal of energy, study, and native ability into Wall Street and to end up with losses instead of profits. These virtues, if channeled in the wrong directions, become indistinguishable from handicaps. Thus it is most essential that the enterprising investor start with a clear conception as to which courses of action offer reasonable chances of success and which do not.

首先，让我们来探讨一下投资者和投机者为获得优于平均水平的收益通常会采取的几种方法。这些方法包括：

First let us consider several ways in which investors and speculators generally have endeavored to obtain better than average results. These include:

1. 市场交易。这通常意味着在市场上涨时买入股票，在市场下跌后卖出。所选股票通常“表现”优于市场平均水平。少数专业人士经常进行卖空交易。他们会出售并非自己持有的股票，而是通过证券交易所的既定机制借入的股票。他们的目标是利用这些股票随后价格下跌的有利时机，以低于卖出价的价格买回。（正如我们引用《华尔街日报》的文字所表明的那样，即使是“小投资者”——这个词就此消失吧！——有时也会尝试一些不太熟练的卖空操作。）

1. Trading in the market. This usually means buying stocks when the market has been advancing and selling them after it has turned downward. The stocks selected are likely to be among those which have been “behaving” better than the market average. A small number of professionals frequently engage in short selling. Here they will sell issues they do not own but borrow through the established mechanism of the stock exchanges. Their object is to benefit from a subsequent decline in the price of these issues, by buying them back at a price lower than they sold them for. (As our quotation from the Wall Street Journal here indicates, even “small investors”—perish the term!—sometimes try their unskilled hand at short selling.)

2. 短期选择性。这意味着购买那些报告或预计盈利将增加，或预期出现其他有利发展的公司的股票。

2. Short-term selectivity. This means buying stocks of companies which are reporting or expected to report increased earnings, or for which some other favorable development is anticipated.

3. 长期选择。这类投资通常侧重于过去优异的增长记录，并认为这种增长很可能在未来持续下去。在某些情况下，“投资者”也可能选择那些尚未取得亮眼业绩，但有望在未来实现高盈利的公司。（这类公司通常属于某些技术领域，例如计算机、制药、电子产品，并且它们通常正在开发被认为特别有前景的新工艺或新产品。）

3. Long-term selectivity. Here the usual emphasis is on an excellent record of past growth, which is considered likely to continue in the future. In some cases also the “investor” may choose companies which have not yet shown impressive results, but are expected to establish a high earning power later. (Such companies belong frequently in some technological area—e.g., computers, drugs, electronics—and they often are developing new processes or products that are deemed to be especially promising.)

我们已经对投资者在这些领域中总体的成功几率表达了负面看法。前者，无论从理论还是现实角度，我们都已将其排除在投资领域之外。股票交易并非一项“经过彻底分析，就能确保本金安全并获得令人满意的回报”的操作。关于股票交易，我们将在后续章节中进一步探讨。*

We have already expressed a negative view about the investor’s overall chances of success in these areas of activity. The first we have ruled out, on both theoretical and realistic grounds, from the domain of investment. Stock trading is not an operation “which, on thorough analysis, offers safety of principal and a satisfactory return.” More will be said on stock trading in a later chapter.*

在努力挑选短期或长期最有前途的股票时，投资者面临着两种障碍——第一种障碍源于人性的弱点，第二种障碍源于竞争对手的性质。他对未来的估计可能错误；即使他是正确的，当前的市场价格也可能已经完全反映了他的预期。在短期选择方面，公司今年的业绩通常是华尔街的共同财产；明年的业绩，只要是可以预测的，就已经在仔细考虑之中。因此，如果投资者主要根据今年的优异业绩或明年的预期来选择股票，那么他很可能会发现其他人也出于同样的原因做了同样的事情。

In his endeavor to select the most promising stocks either for the near term or the longer future, the investor faces obstacles of two kinds—the first stemming from human fallibility and the second from the nature of his competition. He may be wrong in his estimate of the future; or even if he is right, the current market price may already fully reflect what he is anticipating. In the area of near-term selectivity, the current year’s results of the company are generally common property on Wall Street; next year’s results, to the extent they are predictable, are already being carefully considered. Hence the investor who selects issues chiefly on the basis of this year’s superior results, or on what he is told he may expect for next year, is likely to find that others have done the same thing for the same reason.

在选择看好长期前景的股票时，投资者面临的障碍基本相同。预测出现彻底错误的可能性——我们之前用航空公司的例子来说明——无疑比处理短期收益时更大。由于专家在此类预测中经常出错，理论上，当华尔街整体预测错误时，投资者有可能通过做出正确的预测而获得巨大收益。但这只是理论上的。有多少有进取心的投资者能够指望自己拥有敏锐的洞察力或预言天赋，在专业分析师最喜欢的预测长期未来收益的游戏中击败他们呢？

In choosing stocks for their long-term prospects, the investor’s handicaps are basically the same. The possibility of outright error in the prediction—which we illustrated by our airlines example here—is no doubt greater than when dealing with near-term earnings. Because the experts frequently go astray in such forecasts, it is theoretically possible for an investor to benefit greatly by making correct predictions when Wall Street as a whole is making incorrect ones. But that is only theoretical. How many enterprising investors could count on having the acumen or prophetic gift to beat the professional analysts at their favorite game of estimating long-term future earnings?

因此，我们得出以下合乎逻辑但令人不安的结论：为了有合理的机会获得持续优于平均水平的业绩，投资者必须遵循以下政策：（1）本质上合理且有前景，以及（2）在华尔街不受欢迎。

We are thus led to the following logical if disconcerting conclusion: To enjoy a reasonable chance for continued better than average results, the investor must follow policies which are (1) inherently sound and promising, and (2) not popular on Wall Street.

对于有进取心的投资者来说，是否存在这样的政策？理论上，答案再次是肯定的；并且有充分的理由认为，在实践中答案也应该是肯定的。众所周知，投机性股票走势在两个方向上都过度波动，这种情况在总体市场中经常发生，在至少部分个股中也始终存在。此外，普通股可能因为缺乏兴趣或不合理的普遍偏见而被低估。我们可以进一步断言，在绝大多数普通股交易中，参与其中的人似乎并不清楚——用礼貌的话说——股票结构的不同部分。本书将指出（过去）价格与价值之间差异的众多例子。因此，似乎任何聪明人，又善于分析数字，在华尔街应该享受一场真正的野餐，靠着别人的愚蠢来维持生计。看起来如此，但不知何故，事情并非如此简单。买入一只被忽视、因此被低估的股票来获利，通常是一个漫长而考验耐心的过程。而卖空一只过于热门、因此被高估的股票，不仅会考验一个人的勇气和毅力，还会考验一个人的钱包。*这个原则很合理，成功运用并非不可能，但要掌握它显然并非易事。^*

Are there any such policies available for the enterprising investor? In theory once again, the answer should be yes; and there are broad reasons to think that the answer should be affirmative in practice as well. Everyone knows that speculative stock movements are carried too far in both directions, frequently in the general market and at all times in at least some of the individual issues. Furthermore, a common stock may be undervalued because of lack of interest or unjustified popular prejudice. We can go further and assert that in an astonishingly large proportion of the trading in common stocks, those engaged therein don’t appear to know—in polite terms—one part of their anatomy from another. In this book we shall point out numerous examples of (past) discrepancies between price and value. Thus it seems that any intelligent person, with a good head for figures, should have a veritable picnic on Wall Street, battening off other people’s foolishness. So it seems, but somehow it doesn’t work out that simply. Buying a neglected and therefore undervalued issue for profit generally proves a protracted and patience-trying experience. And selling short a too popular and therefore overvalued issue is apt to be a test not only of one’s courage and stamina but also of the depth of one’s pocketbook.* The principle is sound, its successful application is not impossible, but it is distinctly not an easy art to master.^*

还有相当多的“特殊情况”，多年来，这些情况可以指望为投资者带来20%或更高的年化收益，同时对那些精通该领域的人来说，总体风险极低。这些情况包括跨证券套利、清算中的赔付或执行，以及某些类型的受保护对冲。最典型的情况是，预计中的并购交易，其对某些股票的价值远高于公告发布之日的价格。近年来，此类交易的数量大幅增加，对于行家来说，这本应是一个利润丰厚的时期。但随着并购公告的增多，并购的障碍和未完成的交易也随之增多；因此，在这些曾经可靠的交易中，不少个人蒙受了损失。运营。或许，总利润率也因竞争过于激烈而下降。*

There is also a fairly wide group of “special situations,” which over many years could be counted on to bring a nice annual return of 20% or better, with a minimum of overall risk to those who knew their way around in this field. They include intersecurity arbitrages, payouts or workouts in liquidations, protected hedges of certain kinds. The most typical case is a projected merger or acquisition which offers a substantially higher value for certain shares than their price on the date of the announcement. The number of such deals increased greatly in recent years, and it should have been a highly profitable period for the cognoscenti. But with the multiplication of merger announcements came a multiplication of obstacles to mergers and of deals that didn’t go through; quite a few individual losses were thus realized in these once-reliable operations. Perhaps, too, the overall rate of profit was diminished by too much competition.*

这些特殊情况的盈利能力下降，似乎是一种自我毁灭过程的表现——类似于收益递减规律——这种过程在本书问世期间逐渐发展。1949年，我们曾对过去75年的股市波动进行研究，该研究支持一个基于收益和当前利率的公式，用于确定在道琼斯工业平均指数“中心”或“内在”价值以下买入，在高于该价值时卖出。这是罗斯柴尔德家族“低买高卖”准则的运用。^*它的优势在于，它与华尔街根深蒂固且有害的准则——股票应该因为上涨而买入，因为下跌而卖出——截然相反。可惜的是，1949年之后，这个公式不再有效。第二个例证是著名的股票市场走势“道氏理论”，通过比较 1897 年至 1933 年期间的辉煌业绩和 1934 年以来更加可疑的表现。

The lessened profitability of these special situations appears one manifestation of a kind of self-destructive process—akin to the law of diminishing returns—which has developed during the lifetime of this book. In 1949 we could present a study of stock-market fluctuations over the preceding 75 years, which supported a formula—based on earnings and current interest rates—for determining a level to buy the DJIA below its “central” or “intrinsic” value, and to sell out above such value. It was an application of the governing maxim of the Rothschilds: “Buy cheap and sell dear.”^* And it had the advantage of running directly counter to the ingrained and pernicious maxim of Wall Street that stocks should be bought because they have gone up and sold because they have gone down. Alas, after 1949 this formula no longer worked. A second illustration is provided by the famous “Dow Theory” of stock-market movements, in a comparison of its indicated splendid results for 1897–1933 and its much more questionable performance since 1934.

第三个也是最后一个例子是最近才出现的黄金机会：我们自己在华尔街的大部分业务都集中在购买廉价股票上，这些股票很容易被识别，因为它们的售价低于其在净流动资产（营运资本）中所占的份额，不包括工厂账户和其他资产，并扣除股票前的所有负债。显然，这些债券的售价远低于该企业作为私营企业的价值。没有哪个业主或多数股东会想到以如此低廉的价格出售其持有的资产。奇怪的是，这种异常现象并不难发现。1957年发布的一份清单显示，市场上有近200种此类债券。几乎所有这些廉价债券都以各种方式盈利，年均收益远高于大多数其他投资。但在接下来的十年里，它们也几乎从股市上消失了，随之而来的是，它们不再是精明而成功的进取型投资者的可靠投资领域。然而，在1970年的低价时期，大量此类“次级营运资金”债券再次出现，尽管市场强劲复苏，但到年底仍有足够多的此类债券剩余，足以构成一个完整的投资组合。

A third and final example of the golden opportunities not recently available: A good part of our own operations on Wall Street had been concentrated on the purchase of bargain issues easily identified as such by the fact that they were selling at less than their share in the net current assets (working capital) alone, not counting the plant account and other assets, and after deducting all liabilities ahead of the stock. It is clear that these issues were selling at a price well below the value of the enterprise as a private business. No proprietor or majority holder would think of selling what he owned at so ridiculously low a figure. Strangely enough, such anomalies were not hard to find. In 1957 a list was published showing nearly 200 issues of this type available in the market. In various ways practically all these bargain issues turned out to be profitable, and the average annual result proved much more remunerative than most other investments. But they too virtually disappeared from the stock market in the next decade, and with them a dependable area for shrewd and successful operation by the enterprising investor. However, at the low prices of 1970 there again appeared a considerable number of such “sub-working-capital” issues, and despite the strong recovery of the market, enough of them remained at the end of the year to make up a full-sized portfolio.

在当今条件下，富有进取心的投资者仍然有各种可能性获得优于平均水平的回报。庞大的上市证券清单中必然包含相当一部分能够通过合理且可靠的标准被认定为被低估的股票。这些股票的平均回报应该比道琼斯工业平均指数或任何类似的代表性指数更令人满意。我们认为，除非投资者能够指望其投资组合中股票部分的平均年回报率（例如税前5%）有所提升，否则寻找这些股票就不值得。我们将尝试开发一种或多种类似的选股方法，供主动型投资者使用。

The enterprising investor under today’s conditions still has various possibilities of achieving better than average results. The huge list of marketable securities must include a fair number that can be identified as undervalued by logical and reasonably dependable standards. These should yield more satisfactory results on the average than will the DJIA or any similarly representative list. In our view the search for these would not be worth the investor’s effort unless he could hope to add, say, 5% before taxes to the average annual return from the stock portion of his portfolio. We shall try to develop one or more such approaches to stock selection for use by the active investor.

第一章评论

Commentary on Chapter 1

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

如果你不知道自己是谁，那么（股票市场）是一个花费高昂的地方。

If you don’t know who you are, [the stock market] is an expensive place to find out.

—“亚当·斯密” (乔治·JW·古德曼) ¹

—“Adam Smith” (George J. W. Goodman)¹

在购买任何股票或其他金融资产之前，首先要了解的不是您要购买什么，而是您是谁。

Before you buy any stock or other financial asset, the first thing to understand isn’t what you are buying, but rather who you are.

您是投资者吗？

Are You an Investor?

“投资”一词源于拉丁语“ vestire”，意为“覆盖、包围或包裹”。投资意味着用金融资产将自己包裹起来并紧紧握在手中。要做到这一点，你应该有充分的信心，确信自己了解自己在做什么——不是基于别人的言行，而是基于你自己的仔细研究。

The word “invest” comes from the Latin vestire, to clothe, surround, or envelop. To invest means to wrap yourself in a financial asset and hold it close. To do that, you should have a reasonable basis for confidence that you understand what you’re doing—based not on what other people say or do, but on your own careful research.

正如格雷厄姆写道：

As Graham writes:

投资操作是指经过全面分析，能够保证本金安全和足够回报的操作。不符合这些要求的操作属于投机行为^。2

An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative.²

格雷厄姆称之为“投资操作”，因为投资是一个过程，而非一个事件。它会持续数年甚至数十年。它依赖于结构化的决策，在这个决策过程中，你采取的每一个行动都符合你预先设定的标准。它需要自律进行彻底和一致的分析，而不仅仅是冲动地在智能手机上滑动。

Graham calls it “an investment operation” because investing is a process, not an event. It unfolds over years and decades. It depends on structured decision-making, in which every action you take conforms to criteria you have set in advance. It requires the discipline of thorough and consistent analysis, not just an impulsive swipe on your smartphone.

投资的回报来源是内在的：债券的利息收入，股票的收益和股息。投资者明白，股票不是玩物；它是对相关企业的所有权。除非该企业持续产生的现金超过其消耗的现金，否则股票不可能持续上涨。

The sources of return for an investment are intrinsic: the interest income of bonds, the earnings and dividends of stocks. An investor understands that a stock isn’t a plaything; it’s an ownership stake in an underlying business. And a stock can’t go up persistently unless that business consistently generates more cash than it consumes.

投资者绝不会仅仅因为股价上涨就买入股票，也不会仅仅因为股价下跌就卖出股票。投资者的眼光不会只停留在股票的短期表现，而是要评估企业的长期健康状况。

An investor never buys a stock merely because its price has been going up or sells it just because its price has been falling. An investor looks beyond the short-term behavior of the stock to evaluate the long-term health of the business.

投资者会问：这对我来说值多少钱？我能持有多久？

The investor asks: What is this worth to me? How long can I hold it?

您是投机者吗？

Are You a Speculator?

过去几年，很多投资者迷失了方向，成为了投机者，而他们往往并没有意识到这一点。

In the past few years, many investors lost their way. They became speculators, often without realizing it.

“推测”一词源自拉丁语speculum（镜子）和specula（瞭望塔）。

To “speculate” comes from the Latin words speculum (mirror) and specula (watchtower).

投机者应该像照镜子一样自我反省，同时也要像瞭望塔上的哨兵一样展望未来^。3

A speculator should look inward, in an act of self-reflection, as in a mirror—as well as forward into the future, like a sentry in a watchtower.³

然而，实际上，许多投机者从不审视内部，也几乎不展望未来。他们买入往往只是因为其他人买入。

In practice, however, many speculators never look inward and barely look forward. Often, they buy just because other people are.

投机活动持续时间很短：几个月、几周，有时甚至几小时甚至几分钟。投机的收益来源是外在的：还有谁拥有这项资产，它有多受欢迎，它的价格是上涨还是下跌。投机者会问：这对其他人来说值多少钱？我多久可以卖掉它？

Speculation unfolds over short horizons: months, weeks, sometimes hours or even minutes. The sources of return for a speculation are extrinsic: who else owns an asset, how popular it is, whether its price has been rising or falling. The speculator asks: What is this worth to somebody else? How soon can I sell it?

对很多人来说，投机就像一个无休止的情绪波动循环，始于怀疑，经过希望和信心，最终发展到自满和贪婪，陷入恐惧和绝望，再次陷入怀疑，然后一切重新开始。投机就像一个仓鼠轮，凭直觉交易，把钱投入股票、期权和其他资产，然后尽快抛售，纯粹是为了好玩——直到它不再有趣为止。

For many people, speculation is an endless cycle of emotional swings, beginning in doubt, progressing through hope and confidence to complacency and greed, falling into fear and despair, fading back into doubt, then starting all over again. It’s a hamster wheel of trading on hunches, throwing money into stocks, options, and other assets and flipping them as soon as possible, just for the fun of it—until it isn’t fun anymore.

图 1-1：投机者的行为生命周期

FIGURE 1-1: The Behavioral Life Cycle of the Speculator

这一切都是可以理解的。赌博的冲动是人类的一部分大自然；我们的祖先似乎至少在1万年前就开始用骰子赌博了。投机令人兴奋：即使是赢得大奖的几率微乎其微，也能打开希望和可能性的大门。如果你在百万分之一的概率下押注1美元，如果你输了——这几乎是必然的——你就会损失1美元。但如果你出乎意料地赢了，你就会突然变得富有100万美元——而且你会觉得，你的生活将永远不一样了。更重要的是，在股市投机赚钱的几率比在赌场或彩票中赢钱的几率要小。

All that is understandable. The urge to gamble is part of human nature; our ancestors appear to have been gambling with dice at least 10,000 years ago. And speculation is exciting: Even a ridiculously remote chance of a big jackpot opens the gates of hope and possibility. Betting $1 on a one-in-a-million long shot leaves you $1 poorer if you lose—as you almost certainly will. But if, against all odds, you happen to win, you will suddenly be $1 million richer—and, you feel, your life will never be the same. What’s more, the odds of making money speculating in the stock market are less adverse than the odds in a casino or the lottery.

投资即努力

Investing as Endeavor

努力是指认真地朝着特定的目标或目的努力；其词源为法语单词devoir，意为责任。这样的目标可能是买房、支付孩子的学费、赡养年迈的父母、筹措退休金，或者仅仅是获得无需为钱操心的宁静。你不可能一蹴而就地实现这些目标，仅仅靠一次交易或一个精明的决定。实现这些目标需要数年甚至数十年的自律和耐心。这就是为什么你应该把投资视为一项努力。

To endeavor is to work conscientiously toward a specified goal or purpose; it is rooted in the French word devoir, or duty. Such a goal might be to buy a house, pay for your children’s tuition, fund care for an aging parent, finance your retirement, or simply achieve the serenity of not needing to worry about money. You can’t fulfill those purposes in a moment, with a single trade or one shrewd decision. Getting there takes years, even decades, of discipline and patience. That’s why you should treat investing as an endeavor.

投资娱乐

Investing as Entertainment

娱乐就是享受乐趣！如果你把投资当成娱乐，你可能会觉得很开心——至少在一段时间内是这样。但这种乐趣很可能以亏损告终，让你离目标越来越远。娱乐性投资可以带来侥幸逃脱的刺激——我差点就发财了！ ——甚至带来中大奖的喜悦。然而，中大奖之所以如此刺激，部分原因在于亏损的概率要大得多。中大奖的概率微乎其微，无法提供实现长期财务目标所需的可靠性。

To be entertained is to have fun! And if you treat investing as entertainment, you probably will have fun—for a while, anyway. But that joyride is likely to end in losses, leaving you farther away from your goals. Investing for entertainment can bring the thrill of a near miss—I came this close to being rich!—or even the elation of hitting the jackpot. Part of what makes hitting the jackpot so exciting, though, is that losses occur much more often. The remote odds of nailing a giant winner can’t provide the reliability you need to meet your long-term financial goals.

失败者的沉默

The Silence of the Losers

就像吃喝玩乐、吸毒和性一样，适度的投机也能带来愉悦。然而，如果投机过度，你可能会面临危险。你的健康。饮酒过量，你可能会成为酒鬼。滥用药物或性，你可能会上瘾或最终锒铛入狱。如果你用超过一小部分的资金进行投机，你很可能会最终失去所有资金。

Like eating and drinking and drugs and sex, speculation can be pleasurable in moderation. Overeat, though, and you can endanger your health. Drink too much, and you can become an alcoholic. Abuse drugs or sex, and you can become an addict or end up in prison. And if you speculate with more than a tiny portion of your money, you are likely to end up losing all of it.

金融市场的赔率通常并非固定或预先确定。它在一定程度上取决于有多少人在投机以及他们押注的金额。投机者当前对资产价格的推动力越大，其未来回报可能就越低。短期内投机的人越多，他们中任何人长期获利的几率就越低。

The odds in financial markets usually aren’t fixed or predetermined. They depend partly on how many people are speculating and on how much money they are betting. The higher speculators drive the price of an asset in the present, the lower its returns are likely to be in the future. The more people speculate in the short run, the lower the odds that any one of them can profit in the long run.

然而，投机的人越多，你就越想尝试。似乎每个人都在做，有些人甚至因此发了财。大多数亏损者羞于谈论自己的损失，而盈利者似乎都在用扩音器大喊大叫。即使他们不知道自己在说什么，持有极端观点的人似乎也更可信，因为他们会“加倍下注”来加大投入。毕竟，他们言出必行，言出必行。

The more people start speculating, though, the more tempted you might be to give it a try. Everybody seems to be doing it, and some of them are getting rich. Most of the losers are too embarrassed to talk about their losses, while the winners all seem to be yelling through megaphones. Even if they don’t know what they’re talking about, people with extreme views seem more credible and trustworthy as they “double down” to escalate their commitment. After all, they’ve put their money where their mouth is.

所以，故事胜过统计数据：你无法避免赢家的吹嘘，而大多数人惨败的证据却根本不会引起你的注意。当那些不计后果、冒险的大型机构不断获得政府救助时，一夜暴富的希望就显得格外诱人。如果他们走捷径却毫发无损，你为什么不呢？如果你努力工作却似乎无法取得进步，为什么不试试股票呢？

So stories triumph over statistics: You can’t avoid the boasting of the winners, while the evidence that most people have gotten wiped out never even comes to your attention. The hope of striking it rich feels especially appealing when big institutions that took reckless risks keep getting bailed out by the government. If they got away with taking shortcuts, why shouldn’t you? If you’re working hard but can’t seem to get ahead, why not try gambling on stocks?

投机很容易让人上瘾。赚钱的快感很快就会让你陷入成瘾的循环：就像药物滥用的人一样，每次都需要更大的剂量才能达到之前的高潮，而亏损只会让你更加渴望收益。每个瘾君子都说：“我想戒掉就戒掉”，但戒掉可能变得几乎不可能。追逐下一个短期收益，你可能会忘记自己的长期目标。你可能会把好钱扔到坏钱堆里，直到一无所有。

And speculation is often habit-forming. The thrill of making money can quickly trap you in the cycle of addiction: Like someone with a substance-abuse problem, you need a bigger fix each time to match the previous high, and losses simply make you crave gains even more. Every addict says, “I can quit anytime I want,” but quitting can become all but impossible. Chasing the next short-term hit, you can lose sight of your long-term goals. You may end up flinging good money after bad until nothing is left.

免费资金

Free Money

2020年和2021年，随着新冠疫情肆虐，股市迅速变成了有史以来最大的网络视频游戏。

In 2020 and 2021, as the Covid pandemic raged, the stock market quickly turned into the biggest online video game ever played.

全球有超过 1.1 亿人失业，与家人和朋友隔离。大多数企业关门，但股市仍在开放。各国政府将利率降至零，并向个人和企业发放了数万亿美元的现金，以刺激全球经济。

More than 110 million people lost their jobs worldwide and were quarantined from their family and friends. Most businesses shut down—but stock markets were open. Governments squashed interest rates to zero and flooded the global economy with trillions of dollars in cash payments to individuals and companies.

贸易狂人

Trade-a-holics

从2019年底到2021年初，在线券商Robinhood的账户数量从略高于500万增长到1800万。这意味着大约有1300万人（每25个美国人中就有1个）在15个月内开设了新账户。

From the end of 2019 through early 2021, the online brokerage Robinhood grew from just over 5 million accounts to 18 million. That means roughly 13 million people—one out of every 25 Americans—opened a new account in 15 months.

2021 年第一季度，这 1800 万客户平均每天交易股票、期权和加密货币 760 万次。

In the first quarter of 2021, those 18 million customers traded stocks, options, and cryptocurrencies an average of 7.6 million times per day.

总部位于新加坡的在线经纪公司 Moomoo 在 2021 年报告称，其年轻客户平均每年交易超过 140 次。

A Singapore-based online brokerage, Moomoo, reported in 2021 that its younger customers were trading an average of more than 140 times a year.

据马萨诸塞州监管机构称，Robinhood 允许一名没有任何投资经验的客户在短短六个月内进行了 12,748 笔交易，平均每天约 92 笔^。1

According to Massachusetts regulators, Robinhood allowed one customer with no investment experience to make 12,748 trades in just over six months—an average of approximately 92 trades per day.¹

就连那些不像内裤着火一样交易的人也变得痴迷：2020 年，Robinhood 报告称，打开其应用程序的客户平均每天使用七次。

Even people who didn’t trade as if their underpants were on fire had become obsessed: In 2020, Robinhood reported that customers who opened its app used it seven times a day on average.

您每年交易近 150 次或每天检查账户七次吗？

Are you trading almost 150 times a year or checking on your accounts seven times a day?

那么你就不是投资者。

Then you aren’t an investor.

你是个瘾君子。

You’re an addict.

你不仅会损害你的财务健康，还会损害你的心理健康。

You aren’t just impairing your financial health, but your mental health as well.

¹ bit.ly/46BxTga。

¹ bit.ly/46BxTga.

由于无处可去，又无力使用这些免费的钱，人们只好将其投入金融市场。

With nowhere to go and nothing to do with all that free money, people flung it into the financial markets.

一切都上涨了。

Everything went up.

截至 2021 年 3 月底，美国股市在 12 个月内上涨了 85%。几个月来，规模最小的股票平均上涨超过120%。事实上，过去12个月里，96%的美国股票总回报率为正。股市仿佛变成了一台老虎机，每次都能中大奖。

By late March 2021, the U.S. stock market had gained 85% in 12 months, with the smallest stocks rising more than 120% on average. In fact, 96% of all U.S. stocks had a positive total return over the prior 12 months. It was as if the stock market had become a slot machine that spewed out a jackpot on every play.

全球股市一片繁荣。截至2021年3月31日的一年中，中国股市上涨了47%，巴西股市上涨了52%，德国股市上涨了67%，印度股市上涨了84%。

Markets were roaring around the world. Over the year ending March 31, 2021, stocks in China gained 47%, Brazil 52%, Germany 67%, and India 84%.

你可以在好股票上赚到很多钱，也可以在坏股票上赚到很多钱。狗狗币，一种最初被当作玩笑而设立、毫无实际用途的加密货币，在2021年前五个月上涨了超过15,000%。

You could make good money on good stocks. You could make good money on bad stocks. Dogecoin, a cryptocurrency that was set up as a joke and served no practical purpose, gained more than 15,000% in the first five months of 2021.

何必费力辨别好资产和坏资产？既然无知反而有回报，何必学习呢？

Why bother trying to distinguish good assets from bad? When knowing nothing pays off, why learn anything?

“我不知道我到底在干什么”

“I Don’t Know What the F—I’m Doing”

这种故意的无知是很典型的。

Such willful ignorance was typical.

在Reddit在线论坛WallStreetBets上，许多成员认为仔细分析一项投资“毫无意义”，该论坛的创始人Jaime Rogozinski在2020年表示。“他们只是把波动性当作一种乐趣……他们不知道自己在做什么，也不在乎自己不知道在做什么。”
On the Reddit online forum WallStreetBets, many members felt that carefully analyzing an investment made “no sense,” the group’s founder, Jaime Rogozinski, said in 2020. “They just regard the volatility as an opportunity for fun . . . they don’t know what they’re doing, and they don’t care that they don’t know what they’re doing.”
2020年年中，一位自称“堕落赌徒”的体育博主戴夫·波特诺伊（Dave Portnoy）开始在推特上直播视频，他买入任何股票，只要股票代码与他从一袋拼字游戏牌中随机抽取的字母相匹配。他经常在买入当天就卖出，公开嘲讽“了解一家公司有什么价值”这种想法^。4
In mid-2020, a sports blogger and self-described “degenerate gambler” named Dave Portnoy began live-tweeting videos in which he bought any stock whose ticker symbol matched the letters he pulled randomly from a bag of Scrabble tiles. He often sold the stocks the same day he bought them, openly mocking the idea that learning anything about a company was worthwhile.⁴
2021年初，一对年轻夫妇查德和珍妮，凭借一段TikTok视频一夜成名，视频讲述了如何在不做朝九晚五工作的情况下赚钱。“我看到一只股票涨了，我就买了，”查德兴高采烈地耸了耸肩，一脸茫然。“而我只是“我会一直观察，直到它停止上涨，然后我就卖掉它。我一遍又一遍地这样做，它支撑着我们整个的生活方式。”
In early 2021, a bright-eyed young couple named Chad and Jenny became instant celebrities with a TikTok video on how to make money without working a 9-to-5 job. “I see a stock going up and I buy it,” said Chad with a cheerfully clueless shrug. “And I just watch it until it stops going up, and then I sell it. And I do that over and over, and it pays for our whole lifestyle.”
“我他妈不知道自己在干嘛，”22岁的丹尼·陈（Danny Tran）在2021年1月的一段TikTok视频中说道。“我只知道我在赚钱。” 他很快就积累了大约50万粉丝。当被问及交易前是否做过任何调查时，陈先生笑着说：“当我说我他妈不知道自己在干嘛时，我是认真的。对我来说，这不过是一场游戏。” 他补充道：“知道自己在做什么总是好的，但在这个市场里，一切皆有可能。”
“I don’t know what the f—I’m doing,” 22-year-old Danny Tran said in a TikTok video in January 2021. “I just know I’m making money.” He quickly racked up roughly 500,000 followers. Asked if he did any research before trading, Mr. Tran laughed, “When I tell you I don’t know what the f—I’m doing, I really mean it. It’s all just a game to me.” He added, “Knowing what you’re doing would always be good, but in this market anything is possible.”

“模仿的东西”

“Something That Is Imitated”

2020 年和 2021 年，数百万新手交易员蜂拥买入 AMC Entertainment Holdings、Bed Bath & Beyond、GameStop 和 Virgin Galactic Holdings 等“模因股”，而不顾相关业务的健康状况。

In 2020 and 2021, millions of novice traders stampeded into such “meme stocks” as AMC Entertainment Holdings, Bed Bath & Beyond, GameStop, and Virgin Galactic Holdings, regardless of the health of the underlying businesses.

“模因”一词由生物学家理查德·道金斯于1976年创造，源自希腊语mimema，意为“被模仿的东西”。其他人都在购买，这才是最重要的^。5

The term “meme,” coined by the biologist Richard Dawkins in 1976, is from the Greek mimema, “something that is imitated.” Everybody else was buying, and that was all that mattered.⁵

在2020年和2021年的几个月里，这种策略确实奏效了。但随后，这些估值过高的股票像过热的闪光灯一样，接连崩盘。

For a few glorious months in 2020 and 2021, it worked. Then, one after another, these overpriced stocks shattered like overheated flashbulbs.

虽然少数早期买家获得了巨额利润，但大多数人买得太晚，付出的代价太大，最终在接近底部时退出。一位交易员把市场“当成赌场”一样对待，赚了150万美元——结果却血本无归，最后只能在拉斯维加斯一家熟食店打工，时薪14美元^。6

While a few early buyers captured enormous profits, most people bought too late, paid too much, and bailed out near the bottom. One trader made $1.5 million treating the market “like a casino”—only to lose it all, ending up working at a deli in Las Vegas for $14 an hour.⁶

投资的几个普遍规则之一是：每当赚钱变得毫不费力时，保住钱就会变得异常困难。

One of investing’s few universal rules is this: Whenever making money becomes effortlessly easy, keeping it is about to become extraordinarily hard.

表 1-1：梦境模因

TABLE 1-1: Memes of Dreams

每日收盘价，每股$；股息不包含在百分比变动中。Riot Blockchain 后更名为 Riot Platforms Inc.；Sundial Growers 后更名为 SNDL Inc.。

Daily closing prices, $ per share; dividends not included in % change. Riot Blockchain later renamed Riot Platforms Inc.; Sundial Growers later renamed SNDL Inc.

来源：FactSet。

Source: FactSet.

保护自己免受最坏敌人的侵害

Protecting Yourself from Your Worst Enemy

我必须提醒你，本书贯穿着一种张力。任何试图战胜市场的尝试都可能是徒劳的，尤其是当你可以通过购买并持有指数基金，毫不费力、几乎不费吹灰之力地追赶市场的时候。另一方面，人类的天性就是讨厌满足于“平均水平”，而试图战胜拥有数十亿人头脑的市场，是一项令人兴奋的挑战，许多人都无法完全放弃。

I must warn you that a tension runs throughout this book. Any attempt to beat the market is probably futile, especially when you can match the market with no effort and nearly no cost by buying and holding an index fund. On the other hand, it’s human nature to hate settling for “average,” and trying to outwit the billion-brained market is an exciting challenge many people can’t completely renounce.

我们的目标是弥合这种矛盾。你不必为满足于平庸而感到羞耻；这让你成为了格雷厄姆所说的“防御型投资者”。7^然而，如果你是一位积极进取的投资者，想要超越对手，那么你设定的目标虽然不太可能实现，但并非完全不可能。为了有机会实现它，你需要严格遵守规则、政策和程序。

Our goal is to bridge that tension. You should feel no shame in settling for average; that makes you what Graham calls a defensive investor.⁷ If, however, you are an enterprising investor who wants to try to outperform, you’ve set an improbable—although not quite impossible—goal. To stand a chance of achieving it, you will need to follow rules, policies, and procedures with rigorous discipline.

如果你仍然想投机，关键在于控制住它（参见此处的侧边栏）。即使最谨慎的人偶尔也会从赌博中获得乐趣；这没问题，只要你承担的风险不超过你能承受的损失，并且你对自己足够诚实，知道你可能会输。

If you still want to speculate, then the key is to contain it (see the sidebar here). Even the most cautious people can get a kick out of gambling every once in a while; that’s fine, so long as you risk no more than you can afford to lose, and you are honest enough with yourself to know you probably will lose.

但一时冲动可能会动摇你的决心。因此，你必须控制自己的冲动，并运用我们将在第4、5、7、11章以及随附的评论中讨论的技巧来构建你的决策。

But the heat of the moment can melt your resolve. That’s why you must control your impulses and structure your decisions with the techniques we’ll discuss in Chapters 4, 5, 7, 11, and the accompanying Commentaries.

如果你进行了投机并遭受了惨重损失，最终不得不承认自己已经跌到了谷底，那该怎么办？

And what if you speculated and got burned so badly that you can finally admit you’ve hit bottom?

真棒！本书的其余部分将指导你如何成为一名成功的投资者，以及如何保持这种状态。

Good for you. The rest of this book will map out how you can get on track as an investor and how to stay there.

疯狂金钱

Mad Money

如果您有投机冲动，请将其隔离到一个“零钱”账户中。将其限制在您资产的最多5%；这样，如果您的任何投机行为成功，您都可以获得可观的收益，但即使资产跌至零，您也不会损失惨重。将零钱与其他资产隔离开来，存放在其他金融机构的独立账户中。无论发生什么，都不要再往这个账户里存钱。

If you have the urge to speculate, segregate it in a “mad money” account. Limit it to a maximum of 5% of your assets; that way, you can make a decent amount if any of your speculations pay off, but you won’t lose a dangerous amount if they go to zero. Quarantine the mad money from the rest of your assets, in an isolated account at a different financial institution. No matter what happens, never add more money to it.

第二章

Chapter 2 投资者与通货膨胀

The Investor and Inflation

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

近年来，通货膨胀及其应对一直是公众关注的焦点。过去美元购买力的缩水，尤其是对未来美元进一步大幅贬值的担忧（或投机者的希望），极大地影响了华尔街的思维方式。显然，当生活成本上涨时，那些拥有固定美元收入的人会受到影响，拥有固定美元本金的人也会受到影响。另一方面，股票持有者则有可能通过股息和股价上涨来弥补美元购买力的损失。

Inflation, and the fight against it, has been very much in the public’s mind in recent years. The shrinkage in the purchasing power of the dollar in the past, and particularly the fear (or hope by speculators) of a serious further decline in the future, has greatly influenced the thinking of Wall Street. It is clear that those with a fixed dollar income will suffer when the cost of living advances, and the same applies to a fixed amount of dollar principal. Holders of stocks, on the other hand, have the possibility that a loss of the dollar’s purchasing power may be offset by advances in their dividends and the prices of their shares.

基于这些不容置疑的事实，许多金融监管机构得出结论：（1）债券本质上是一种不受欢迎的投资形式；（2）因此，普通股本质上比债券更受欢迎。我们听说过一些慈善机构被建议，其投资组合应100%由股票组成，100%由债券组成。*这与早期信托投资受法律限制只能投资高等级债券（以及少数精选优先股）的时代大相径庭。

On the basis of these undeniable facts many financial authorities have concluded that (1) bonds are an inherently undesirable form of investment, and (2) consequently, common stocks are by their very nature more desirable investments than bonds. We have heard of charitable institutions being advised that their portfolios should consist 100% of stocks and zero percent of bonds.* This is quite a reversal from the earlier days when trust investments were restricted by law to high-grade bonds (and a few choice preferred stocks).

我们的读者必须具备足够的智慧才能认识到，即使是优质股票，在任何情况下，也并非比债券更值得投资——也就是说，无论股市行情有多高，无论当前股息收益率与债券收益率相比有多低。这种说法与多年前经常听到的相反说法一样荒谬——任何债券都比任何股票更安全。在本章中，我们将尝试对通货膨胀因素应用各种衡量标准，以便得出一些结论，即投资者在多大程度上可以明智地受到未来物价水平上涨预期的影响。

Our readers must have enough intelligence to recognize that even high-quality stocks cannot be a better purchase than bonds under all conditions—i.e., regardless of how high the stock market may be and how low the current dividend return compared with the rates available on bonds. A statement of this kind would be as absurd as was the contrary one—too often heard years ago—that any bond is safer than any stock. In this chapter we shall try to apply various measurements to the inflation factor, in order to reach some conclusions as to the extent to which the investor may wisely be influenced by expectations regarding future rises in the price level.

在这个问题上，就像在金融领域的许多其他问题上一样，我们必须以过去的经验为基础来制定未来的政策。通货膨胀对这个国家来说是否新鲜事？至少就其自1965年以来出现的严重形式而言，通货膨胀是否新鲜？如果我们在实际生活中也经历过类似（甚至更糟）的通货膨胀，那么在应对当今的通货膨胀时，我们可以从中吸取哪些教训呢？让我们从表2-1开始，这是一份简明的历史表格，其中包含大量关于一般价格水平变化以及随之而来的普通股收益和市值变化的信息。我们的数据从1915年开始，涵盖了55年，每五年呈现一次。（我们使用1946年而不是1945年，是为了避开战时价格管制的最后一年。）

In this matter, as in so many others in finance, we must base our views of future policy on a knowledge of past experience. Is inflation something new for this country, at least in the serious form it has taken since 1965? If we have seen comparable (or worse) inflations in living experience, what lessons can be learned from them in confronting the inflation of today? Let us start with Table 2-1, a condensed historical tabulation that contains much information about changes in the general price level and concomitant changes in the earnings and market value of common stocks. Our figures will begin with 1915, and thus cover 55 years, presented at five-year intervals. (We use 1946 instead of 1945 to avoid the last year of wartime price controls.)

我们首先注意到的是，过去我们经历过通货膨胀——而且通货膨胀非常严重。最大的五年通胀发生在1915年至1920年之间，当时生活成本几乎翻了一番。相比之下，1965年至1970年期间的通胀率却上涨了15%。在这期间，我们经历了三个物价下跌期，然后又经历了六个物价上涨期，涨幅各不相同，有些涨幅相当小。由此可见，投资者显然应该考虑到未来通胀持续或复发的可能性。

The first thing we notice is that we have had inflation in the past—lots of it. The largest five-year dose was between 1915 and 1920, when the cost of living nearly doubled. This compares with the advance of 15% between 1965 and 1970. In between, we have had three periods of declining prices and then six of advances at varying rates, some rather small. On this showing, the investor should clearly allow for the probability of continuing or recurrent inflation to come.

我们能预测通货膨胀率可能是多少吗？我们的表格并未提供明确的答案；它显示了各种各样的变化。然而，从过去20年相当一致的记录中寻找线索似乎是明智的。在此期间，消费者价格水平的年均涨幅为2.5%；1965年至1970年为4.5%；仅1970年就达到了5.4%。官方政府政策一直强烈反对大规模通货膨胀，并且有理由相信，未来联邦政策将比近年来更有效。*我们认为，投资者在当前阶段，将其思考和决策建立在未来可能的（远非确定的）通货膨胀率（例如每年3%）上是合理的。（相比之下，1915年至1970年整个时期的年通货膨胀率约为2.5%）。¹

Can we tell what the rate of inflation is likely to be? No clear answer is suggested by our table; it shows variations of all sorts. It would seem sensible, however, to take our cue from the rather consistent record of the past 20 years. The average annual rise in the consumer price level for this period has been 2.5%; that for 1965–1970 was 4.5%; that for 1970 alone was 5.4%. Official government policy has been strongly against large-scale inflation, and there are some reasons to believe that Federal policies will be more effective in the future than in recent years.* We think it would be reasonable for an investor at this point to base his thinking and decisions on a probable (far from certain) rate of future inflation of, say, 3% per annum. (This would compare with an annual rate of about 2½% for the entire period 1915–1970.)¹

表 2-1 1915-1970 年一般价格水平、股票收益和五年期股票价格

TABLE 2-1 The General Price Level, Stock Earnings, and Stock Prices at Five-Year Intervals, 1915–1970

^a年平均值。表中价格水平1957年=100；但使用新基数1967年=100，则1970年的平均消费者价格为116.3，批发价格为110.4（股票指数）。

^a Annual averages. For price level 1957 = 100 in table; but using new base, 1967 = 100, the average for 1970 is 116.3 for consumers’ prices and 110.4 for wholesale prices for the stock index.

^b 1941–1943 年平均值 = 10。

^b 1941–1943 average = 10.

^大约在1946 年使用，以避免价格管制。

^c 1946 used, to avoid price controls.

这种预支意味着什么？由于生活成本上涨，它将吞噬掉目前优质中期免税债券（或我们假设的高等级公司债券的税后等值收益）约一半的收入。这将是一次严重的缩水，但不应被夸大。这并不意味着投资者财富的真实价值或购买力会随着时间的推移而下降。如果他将税后利息收入的一半用于消费，即使年通胀率为3%，他的购买力也能保持稳定。

What would be the implications of such an advance? It would eat up, in higher living costs, about one-half the income now obtainable on good medium-term tax-free bonds (or our assumed after-tax equivalent from high-grade corporate bonds). This would be a serious shrinkage, but it should not be exaggerated. It would not mean that the true value, or the purchasing power, of the investor’s fortune need be reduced over the years. If he spent half his interest income after taxes he would maintain this buying power intact, even against a 3% annual inflation.

但接下来的问题自然是：“即使在1970-1971年收益率空前的情况下，投资者能否合理地确定购买并持有高等级债券以外的其他资产能带来更好的收益？” 例如，全股票投资计划难道不是比部分债券、部分股票的计划更可取吗？普通股难道没有内在的通胀保护机制吗？而且，它们多年来的回报率难道不是几乎肯定会比债券更高吗？事实上，在我们研究的55年间，股票的回报难道不是远高于债券吗？

But the next question, naturally, is, “Can the investor be reasonably sure of doing better by buying and holding other things than high-grade bonds, even at the unprecedented rate of return offered in 1970–1971?” Would not, for example, an all-stock program be preferable to a part-bond, part-stock program? Do not common stocks have a built-in protection against inflation, and are they not almost certain to give a better return over the years than will bonds? Have not in fact stocks treated the investor far better than have bonds over the 55-year period of our study?

这些问题的答案有些复杂。过去很长一段时间里，普通股的表现确实优于债券。道琼斯工业平均指数从1915年的平均77点上涨至1970年的平均753点，其年复合增长率仅为4%左右，我们还可以在此基础上再加4%作为平均股息回报率。（标准普尔综合指数的相应数据大致相同。）这些8%的年复合增长率当然远高于同期债券的回报率。但其回报率并未超过如今高等级债券的回报率。这引出了下一个逻辑问题：问题：是否有令人信服的理由相信普通股在未来几年的表现可能比过去五十五年好得多？

The answer to these questions is somewhat complicated. Common stocks have indeed done better than bonds over a long period of time in the past. The rise of the DJIA from an average of 77 in 1915 to an average of 753 in 1970 works out at an annual compounded rate of just about 4%, to which we may add another 4% for average dividend return. (The corresponding figures for the S & P composite are about the same.) These combined figures of 8% per year are of course much better than the return enjoyed from bonds over the same 55-year period. But they do not exceed that now offered by high-grade bonds. This brings us to the next logical question: Is there a persuasive reason to believe that common stocks are likely to do much better in future years than they have in the last five and one-half decades?

我们对这个关键问题的回答必须是肯定的“不”。普通股未来的表现可能好于过去，但远非一定如此。这里，我们必须处理投资结果中的两个不同时间要素。第一个要素涵盖长期未来（比如未来 25 年）可能发生的事情。第二个要素适用于投资者在短期或中期（比如五年或更短）可能发生的事情（包括财务上和心理上的变化）。他的心态、他的希望和担忧、他对所做事情的满意或不满，尤其是他下一步该做什么的决定，所有这些都不是由一生的投资回顾决定的，而是由他年复一年的经验决定的。

Our answer to this crucial question must be a flat no. Common stocks may do better in the future than in the past, but they are far from certain to do so. We must deal here with two different time elements in investment results. The first covers what is likely to occur over the long-term future—say, the next 25 years. The second applies to what is likely to happen to the investor—both financially and psychologically—over short or intermediate periods, say five years or less. His frame of mind, his hopes and apprehensions, his satisfaction or discontent with what he has done, above all his decisions what to do next, are all determined not in the retrospect of a lifetime of investment but rather by his experience from year to year.

在这一点上，我们可以断言。通货膨胀（或通货紧缩）状况与普通股收益和价格变动之间没有密切的时间联系。最明显的例子是最近的1966-1970年时期。当时生活成本上涨了22%，是自1946-1950年以来五年期中的最大涨幅。但自1965年以来，股票收益和股票价格整体上都出现了下降。在之前的五年期记录中，也存在类似的双向矛盾。

On this point we can be categorical. There is no close time connection between inflationary (or deflationary) conditions and the movement of common-stock earnings and prices. The obvious example is the recent period, 1966–1970. The rise in the cost of living was 22%, the largest in a five-year period since 1946–1950. But both stock earnings and stock prices as a whole have declined since 1965. There are similar contradictions in both directions in the record of previous five-year periods.

通货膨胀与企业盈利

Inflation and Corporate Earnings

另一个非常重要的方法是研究美国企业的资本收益率。当然，资本收益率会随着总体经济活动水平而波动，但总体上并没有随着批发价格或生活成本的上涨而上升。实际上，尽管过去二十年出现了通货膨胀，但资本收益率却相当显著地下降了。（某种程度上，下降是由于采用了更为宽松的折旧率。参见表2-2。）我们深入的研究得出结论：投资者不能指望道琼斯工业平均指数成分股最近五年的收益率——这些股票背后的净有形资产（账面价值）约为10%——高出太多。2^由于这些股票的市值远高于其账面价值——例如，1971年中期，市值为900股，而账面价值为560股——因此，当前市价下的收益率仅为6.24%左右。（这（这种关系通常以相反的方式或“乘以收益”的方式表示——例如，道琼斯工业平均指数 900 点的价格等于截至 1971 年 6 月的 12 个月的实际收益的 18 倍。）

Another and highly important approach to the subject is by a study of the earnings rate on capital shown by American business. This has fluctuated, of course, with the general rate of economic activity, but it has shown no general tendency to advance with wholesale prices or the cost of living. Actually this rate has fallen rather markedly in the past twenty years in spite of the inflation of the period. (To some degree the decline was due to the charging of more liberal depreciation rates. See Table 2-2.) Our extended studies have led to the conclusion that the investor cannot count on much above the recent five-year rate earned on the DJIA group—about 10% on net tangible assets (book value) behind the shares.² Since the market value of these issues is well above their book value—say, 900 market vs. 560 book in mid-1971—the earnings on current market price work out only at some 61⁄4%. (This relationship is generally expressed in the reverse, or “times earnings,” manner—e.g., that the DJIA price of 900 equals 18 times the actual earnings for the 12 months ended June 1971.)

我们的数据与上一章的建议直接吻合*：投资者可以假设其股票的平均股息回报率约为市值的3.5%，再加上再投资利润带来的年增值，比如说4%。（请注意，账面价值每增加1美元，市价就会上涨约1.60美元。）

Our figures gear in directly with the suggestion in the previous chapter* that the investor may assume an average dividend return of about 3.5% on the market value of his stocks, plus an appreciation of, say, 4% annually resulting from reinvested profits. (Note that each dollar added to book value is here assumed to increase the market price by about $1.60.)

读者可能会反对，说我们的计算最终没有考虑到我们预测的3%年通胀率导致的普通股收益和价值的增长。我们的理由是，没有任何迹象表明过去同等水平的通胀对报告的每股收益有任何直接影响。冷冰冰的数据表明，过去20年道琼斯工业平均指数成分股收益的大幅增长，全部源于来自再投资利润的投资资本的相应大幅增长。如果通胀是一个独立的有利因素，其效果应该是增加先前存在资本的“价值”；这反过来又应该增加这些旧资本的收益率，也就是新旧资本总和的收益率。但在过去20年里，批发价格水平上涨了近40%，但实际上并没有发生这种情况。（企业盈利应该更多地受批发价格而非“消费者价格”的影响。）通货膨胀能够增加普通股价值的唯一途径是提高资本投资收益率。从过去的记录来看，情况并非如此。

The reader will object that in the end our calculations make no allowance for an increase in common-stock earnings and values to result from our projected 3% annual inflation. Our justification is the absence of any sign that the inflation of a comparable amount in the past has had any direct effect on reported per-share earnings. The cold figures demonstrate that all the large gain in the earnings of the DJIA unit in the past 20 years was due to a proportionately large growth of invested capital coming from reinvested profits. If inflation had operated as a separate favorable factor, its effect would have been to increase the “value” of previously existing capital; this in turn should increase the rate of earnings on such old capital and therefore on the old and new capital combined. But nothing of the kind actually happened in the past 20 years, during which the wholesale price level has advanced nearly 40%. (Business earnings should be influenced more by wholesale prices than by “consumer prices.”) The only way that inflation can add to common stock values is by raising the rate of earnings on capital investment. On the basis of the past record this has not been the case.

在过去的经济周期中，生意兴隆时物价上涨，生意萧条时物价下跌。人们普遍认为“少量通货膨胀”有助于企业盈利。这种观点与1950年至1970年的历史并不矛盾，这段时期的经济普遍持续繁荣，物价也普遍上涨。但数据显示，所有这些因素对普通股资本（“权益资本”）盈利能力的影响相当有限；事实上，它甚至未能维持投资收益率。显然，存在一些重要的抵消因素，阻碍了美国企业整体实际盈利能力的任何增长。其中最重要的或许是：(1) 工资率的增长超过了生产率的增长，以及 (2) 对大量新资本的需求，从而压低了销售额与资本投入的比率。

In the economic cycles of the past, good business was accompanied by a rising price level and poor business by falling prices. It was generally felt that “a little inflation” was helpful to business profits. This view is not contradicted by the history of 1950–1970, which reveals a combination of generally continued prosperity and generally rising prices. But the figures indicate that the effect of all this on the earning power of common-stock capital (“equity capital”) has been quite limited; in fact it has not even served to maintain the rate of earnings on the investment. Clearly there have been important offsetting influences which have prevented any increase in the real profitability of American corporations as a whole. Perhaps the most important of these have been (1) a rise in wage rates exceeding the gains in productivity, and (2) the need for huge amounts of new capital, thus holding down the ratio of sales to capital employed.

表 2-2中的数据表明，通货膨胀非但没有给我们的公司及其股东带来好处，反而产生了相反的效果。表中最引人注目的数字是 1950 年至 1969 年间公司债务的增长。令人惊讶的是，经济学家和华尔街对这一发展如此之少的关注。公司的债务扩大了近五倍，而税前利润却只增长了一倍多。随着这一时期利率的大幅上升，很明显，公司债务总额现在已成为一个相当严重的不利经济因素，对许多企业来说是一个真正的问题。（请注意，1950 年息后税前净利润约占公司债务的 30%，而 1969 年仅为债务的 13.2%。1970 年的比例必须（情况更不尽如人意。）总而言之，公司股票整体收益率11%中，很大一部分似乎是通过大量发行税后成本低于4%的新债实现的。如果我们的公司维持1950年的负债率，尽管通货膨胀，它们的股本收益率还会更低。

Our figures in Table 2-2 indicate that so far from inflation having benefited our corporations and their shareholders, its effect has been quite the opposite. The most striking figures in our table are those for the growth of corporate debt between 1950 and 1969. It is surprising how little attention has been paid by economists and by Wall Street to this development. The debt of corporations has expanded nearly fivefold while their profits before taxes a little more than doubled. With the great rise in interest rates during this period, it is evident that the aggregate corporate debt is now an adverse economic factor of some magnitude and a real problem for many individual enterprises. (Note that in 1950 net earnings after interest but before income tax were about 30% of corporate debt, while in 1969 they were only 13.2% of debt. The 1970 ratio must have been even less satisfactory.) In sum it appears that a significant part of the 11% being earned on corporate equities as a whole is accomplished by the use of a large amount of new debt costing 4% or less after tax credit. If our corporations had maintained the debt ratio of 1950, their earnings rate on stock capital would have fallen still lower, in spite of the inflation.

表 2-2 1950-1969 年企业债务、利润和资本收益

TABLE 2-2 Corporate Debt, Profits, and Earnings on Capital, 1950–1969

a 标准普尔工业指数的收益除以年度平均账面价值^。

^a Earnings of Standard & Poor’s industrial index divided by average book value for year.

^b 1950 年和 1955 年的数据来自 Cottle 和 Whitman；1960 年至 1969 年的数据来自《财富》杂志。

^b Figures for 1950 and 1955 from Cottle and Whitman; those for 1960–1969 from Fortune.

股市认为，公用事业企业是通货膨胀的主要受害者，它们夹在借款成本大幅上涨和监管程序下难以提高费率的两难境地。但或许应该指出的是，电力、天然气和电话服务的单位成本涨幅远低于一般价格指数，这一事实本身就使这些公司在未来处于有利的战略地位。3 依法，^它们有权收取足以使其投资资本获得足够回报的费率，这很可能在未来保护其股东，就像过去通货膨胀时期一样。

The stock market has considered that the public-utility enterprises have been a chief victim of inflation, being caught between a great advance in the cost of borrowed money and the difficulty of raising the rates charged under the regulatory process. But this may be the place to remark that the very fact that the unit costs of electricity, gas, and telephone services have advanced so much less than the general price index puts these companies in a strong strategic position for the future.³ They are entitled by law to charge rates sufficient for an adequate return on their invested capital, and this will probably protect their shareholders in the future as it has in the inflations of the past.

以上所有因素让我们再次得出这样的结论：投资者没有充分的理由期望，以1971年末的价格水平购买的类似道琼斯工业平均指数的普通股投资组合，其平均总回报率（例如8%）会超过8%。但即使这些预期被证明被大幅低估，也不应该成为全股票投资计划的理由。如果说未来有一件事是可以保证的，那就是股票投资组合的收益和年平均市值不会以4%或其他任何数字的统一速度增长。用老摩根的那句令人难忘的话来说，“它们会波动。 ” *首先，这意味着，以今天或明天的价格购买普通股的投资者，在数年内都将面临无法令人满意的收益的真正风险。通用电气（以及道琼斯工业平均指数本身）花了25年时间才收复1929-1932年股市崩盘造成的损失。此外，如果投资者将投资组合集中在普通股上他很可能被令人振奋的上涨或令人沮丧的下跌误导。如果他的推理与进一步通胀的预期紧密相关，情况尤其如此。因为，如果再来一次牛市，他不会把这波大涨视为必然下跌的危险信号，也不会将其视为获利的机会，而是将其视为通胀假说的证明，以及无论市场水平多高、股息回报多低，继续购买普通股的理由。那样只会带来悲伤。

All of the above brings us back to our conclusion that the investor has no sound basis for expecting more than an average overall return of, say, 8% on a portfolio of DJIA-type common stocks purchased at the late 1971 price level. But even if these expectations should prove to be understated by a substantial amount, the case would not be made for an all-stock investment program. If there is one thing guaranteed for the future, it is that the earnings and average annual market value of a stock portfolio will not grow at the uniform rate of 4%, or any other figure. In the memorable words of the elder J. P. Morgan, “They will fluctuate.”* This means, first, that the common-stock buyer at today’s prices—or tomorrow’s—will be running a real risk of having unsatisfactory results therefrom over a period of years. It took 25 years for General Electric (and the DJIA itself) to recover the ground lost in the 1929–1932 debacle. Besides that, if the investor concentrates his portfolio on common stocks he is very likely to be led astray either by exhilarating advances or by distressing declines. This is particularly true if his reasoning is geared closely to expectations of further inflation. For then, if another bull market comes along, he will take the big rise not as a danger signal of an inevitable fall, not as a chance to cash in on his handsome profits, but rather as a vindication of the inflation hypothesis and as a reason to keep on buying common stocks no matter how high the market level nor how low the dividend return. That way lies sorrow.

普通股的替代品作为通胀对冲工具

Alternatives to Common Stocks as Inflation Hedges

世界各地不信任本国货币的人们，通常的做法是购买并持有黄金。自1935年以来，这对美国公民来说一直是违法的——这对他们来说很幸运。在过去的35年里，公开市场上的黄金价格从每盎司35美元上涨到1972年初的48美元——涨幅仅为35%。但在此期间，黄金持有者并未获得任何收益回报，反而每年还要承担一些储存费用。显然，尽管物价总体水平上涨，但如果把钱存入储蓄银行并享受利息，他的收益会更好。

The standard policy of people all over the world who mistrust their currency has been to buy and hold gold. This has been against the law for American citizens since 1935—luckily for them. In the past 35 years the price of gold in the open market has advanced from $35 per ounce to $48 in early 1972—a rise of only 35%. But during all this time the holder of gold has received no income return on his capital, and instead has incurred some annual expense for storage. Obviously, he would have done much better with his money at interest in a savings bank, in spite of the rise in the general price level.

黄金几乎完全无法抵御美元购买力的下降，这不得不让人严重怀疑普通投资者能否通过将资金投入“实物”来抵御通货膨胀。*近年来，不少贵重物品的市场价值都出现了显著上涨，例如钻石、大师画作、书籍初版、珍稀邮票和硬币等等。但在很多情况下，或许是大多数情况下，报价似乎都带有人为、不稳定甚至不真实的成分。不知何故，很难想象花67500美元购买一枚1804年的美国银元（但那年甚至还没有铸造）是一项“投资”。4^我们承认，我们在这个领域能力有限。我们的读者中，很少有人会觉得在这个领域游刃有余。

The near-complete failure of gold to protect against a loss in the purchasing power of the dollar must cast grave doubt on the ability of the ordinary investor to protect himself against inflation by putting his money in “things.”* Quite a few categories of valuable objects have had striking advances in market value over the years—such as diamonds, paintings by masters, first editions of books, rare stamps and coins, etc. But in many, perhaps most, of these cases there seems to be an element of the artificial or the precarious or even the unreal about the quoted prices. Somehow it is hard to think of paying $67,500 for a U.S. silver dollar dated 1804 (but not even minted that year) as an “investment operation.”⁴ We acknowledge we are out of our depth in this area. Very few of our readers will find the swimming safe and easy there.

长期以来，房地产的完全所有权一直被认为是一种稳健的长期投资，并附带相当程度的通胀保护。不幸的是，房地产价值也容易大幅波动；在选址、定价等方面可能会出现严重错误；销售人员的花招也存在陷阱。最后，对于中等收入的投资者来说，多元化投资并不切实际，除非通过各种形式的参与，并承担新股上市带来的特殊风险——这与普通股所有权并无太大区别。这也不是我们的领域。我们应该对投资者说的是：“在投资之前，请确保它是你的。”

The outright ownership of real estate has long been considered as a sound long-term investment, carrying with it a goodly amount of protection against inflation. Unfortunately, real-estate values are also subject to wide fluctuations; serious errors can be made in location, price paid, etc.; there are pitfalls in salesmen’s wiles. Finally, diversification is not practical for the investor of moderate means, except by various types of participations with others and with the special hazards that attach to new flotations—not too different from common-stock ownership. This too is not our field. All we should say to the investor is, “Be sure it’s yours before you go into it.”

结论

Conclusion

当然，我们回到上一章推荐的策略。正因为未来的不确定性，投资者无法将所有资金投入一个篮子——既不能投入债券篮子，尽管债券最近提供了前所未有的高收益；也不能投入股票篮子，尽管通胀前景持续。

Naturally, we return to the policy recommended in our previous chapter. Just because of the uncertainties of the future the investor cannot afford to put all his funds into one basket—neither in the bond basket, despite the unprecedentedly high returns that bonds have recently offered; nor in the stock basket, despite the prospect of continuing inflation.

投资者越依赖其投资组合及其收益，就越有必要防范生活中的意外和令人不安的事件。保守型投资者应该努力将风险降至最低，这是不言而喻的。我们坚信，例如，购买收益率接近7.5%的电话公司债券，其风险远低于购买900点的道琼斯工业平均指数（或任何与其相当的股票指数）。但大规模通胀的可能性仍然存在，投资者必须为此购买一些保险。虽然股票成分能否充分抵御此类通胀尚不确定，但它应该比债券成分提供更多的保障。

The more the investor depends on his portfolio and the income therefrom, the more necessary it is for him to guard against the unexpected and the disconcerting in this part of his life. It is axiomatic that the conservative investor should seek to minimize his risks. We think strongly that the risks involved in buying, say, a telephone-company bond at yields of nearly 7½% are much less than those involved in buying the DJIA at 900 (or any stock list equivalent thereto). But the possibility of large-scale inflation remains, and the investor must carry some insurance against it. There is no certainty that a stock component will insure adequately against such inflation, but it should carry more protection than the bond component.

我们在 1965 年版（第 97 页）中就此主题说过这样的话，今天我们也会这样写：

This is what we said on the subject in our 1965 edition (p. 97), and we would write the same today:

读者想必很清楚，我们对目前水平的普通股（道琼斯工业平均指数为892点）并不感冒。基于上述理由，我们认为防御型投资者的投资组合中不能没有相当比例的普通股，即使我们认为这是两害相权取其轻——全债券持有的风险更大。

It must be evident to the reader that we have no enthusiasm for common stocks at these levels (892 for the DJIA). For reasons already given we feel that the defensive investor cannot afford to be without an appreciable proportion of common stocks in his portfolio, even if we regard them as the lesser of two evils—the greater being the risks in an all-bond holding.

第 2 章评论

Commentary on Chapter 2

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

五分钱现在不再值一角钱了。

A nickel ain’t worth a dime anymore.

—尤吉·贝拉¹

—Yogi Berra¹

对于投资者来说，通货膨胀不是一个事件，而是一种环境。

For investors, inflation isn’t an event. It’s the environment.

从 2009 年到 2020 年的很长一段时间里，这一点很容易被忘记，因为当时的生活成本（至少按照许多政府的衡量标准）几乎没有变化。

That was easy to forget over the long period, from 2009 to 2020, when the cost of living—at least as many governments measure it—barely budged.

金钱幻觉

The Money Illusion

投资者往往对短期高通胀反应过度，而对长期低通胀反应不足。我们大多数人都存在一种被心理学家称为“货币幻觉”的根本性误解。

Investors tend to overreact to high inflation in the short run, while underreacting to low inflation in the long run. Most of us suffer from a fundamental misperception that psychologists call “money illusion.”

想象一下三个人：艾米莉亚、贝拉和夏洛特。她们分别在不同时期继承了50万美元，并用这笔钱买了一套房子，一年后又把房子卖了。

Imagine three people: Amelia, Bella, and Charlotte. At different times, each inherited $500,000 and spent it all to buy a house, then sold the house one year later.

在阿米莉亚拥有这所房子的那一年，严重的通货紧缩使生活成本降低了25%。同年年底，她以 385,000 美元的价格卖掉了这栋房子，比当初买价低了 23%。

During the year Amelia owned her house, severe deflation reduced the cost of living by 25%. At the end of that year, she sold the house for $385,000, or 23% less than she paid for it.

贝拉拥有这套房子的那一年，生活成本没有变化，既没有通货膨胀，也没有通货紧缩。那年年底，她以49.5万美元的价格卖掉了这套房子，比当初买入的价格低了1%。

During the year Bella owned her house, the cost of living didn’t change; there was no inflation or deflation. At the end of that year, she sold the house for $495,000, or 1% less than she paid for it.

夏洛特拥有这套房子的那一年，通货膨胀率高达25%。当年年底，她以61.5万美元的价格卖掉了这套房子，比当初买入的价格高出了23%。

During the year Charlotte owned her house, inflation ran at 25%. At the end of that year, she sold the house for $615,000, or 23% more than she paid for it.

谁做了最好的交易？谁做了最糟糕的交易？

Who made the best deal? Who made the worst deal?

调查显示，大多数人认为夏洛特的表现最好，其次是贝拉，而阿米莉亚的表现最差。

Surveys suggest that most people will say Charlotte made out the best, followed by Bella, with Amelia coming out the worst.

然而，阿米莉亚在这三人中表现最好。她是唯一一个在生活成本变化后获利的人。商品和服务价格下降了25%，但她卖掉房子的价格仅比原价低了23%，也就是说，她的收入增加了2%。

Yet Amelia did the best of all three. She’s the only one who came out ahead after changes in the cost of living. Goods and services became 25% cheaper, but she sold her house for only 23% less than it cost her—leaving her 2% better off.

调整生活成本的变化需要额外的脑力劳动，而名义价格——未经通胀调整——则显而易见、简单明了。很难忽视61.5万美元比50万美元高出多少。只有你停下来思考（或拿起计算器），才会意识到夏洛特必须以62.5万美元的价格卖掉她的房子才能在通胀后保持收支平衡^。2

That adjustment for the changing cost of living takes extra mental effort, whereas the nominal price—unadjusted for inflation—is obvious, simple, and salient. It’s hard to ignore how much bigger $615,000 is than $500,000. Only if you stop to think about it (or grab a calculator) will you realize that Charlotte would have had to sell her house for $625,000 to break even after inflation.²

同样，投资者往往会忘记，通常提到的投资回报率是没有经过通胀调整的。假设长期来看，生活成本每年至少上涨3%，你就应该养成从预期回报率中每年减去3%的习惯。如果有人预测股市年均涨幅为10%，实际上是在说，扣除通胀因素后，你的预期年回报率不应该超过7%。

Likewise, investors tend to forget that commonly cited investment returns don’t adjust for inflation. Assuming that the cost of living will tend to rise by at least 3% per year in the long term, you should get in the habit of subtracting 3% annually from any expected return. Someone who projects that stocks will rise an average of 10% annually is really saying you should expect no more than 7% annually, net of inflation.

要成为一名明智的投资者，你必须抵制货币幻觉。保持你的预期切合实际，始终从预期收益中减去一个合理的通胀率。

To be an intelligent investor, you must counteract the money illusion. Keep your expectations realistic by always subtracting a plausible inflation rate from projected returns.

但通货膨胀永远不会消失。对于聪明的投资者来说，关键在于防范通货膨胀，而不是反应过度。

But inflation never dies. The trick, for intelligent investors, is to defend against it without overreacting to it.

边缘还是树篱？

Edges or Hedges?

哪些金融资产能最好地抵御通货膨胀？

Which financial assets provide the best protection against inflation?

当通货膨胀爆发时，可怕的言论可能会蒙蔽你的双眼，使你看不到错误的逻辑，所以一定要根据统计数据而不是故事来做出决定。

When inflation flares up, scary rhetoric can blind you to faulty logic, so be sure to base your decisions on statistics rather than stories.

你是一颗蛋

You Are an Egg

当你考虑抵御通货膨胀时，请将你的资产分为三类。

As you consider defending against inflation, sort your assets into three mental buckets.

金融资本包括现金、债券、股票、公开交易的房地产、大宗商品和其他可交易资产。有些资产比其他资产更能抵御不断上涨的生活成本。为了保护您免受通货膨胀的影响，金融资本应该具有流动性，或者能够快速轻松地转换为现金。

Financial capital consists of cash, bonds, stocks, publicly traded real estate, commodities, and other marketable assets. Some shield better than others against the rising costs of living. To protect you from inflation, financial capital should be liquid, or quickly and easily convertible into cash.

人力资本是你的工作、职业和教育所能创造的所有收入的现值。通过重返校园攻读另一个学位、考取专业证书、精通一项重要的新技能、兼职或创业，你可以增强你的人力资本，并使你的总收入增长远超通货膨胀率。不要将过多的金融资本投入到你人力资本集中的行业。（当你注意不要把所有鸡蛋都放在一个篮子里时，记住也要把自己算在鸡蛋里。）

Human capital is the present value of all the income that your job, career, and education will produce. By going back to school for another degree, studying for a professional certification, acquiring proficiency in a vital new skill, moonlighting in a part-time job, or starting your own business, you can augment your human capital and push the growth in your total income well past the rate of inflation. Don’t invest too much of your financial capital in the same industry where your human capital is concentrated. (When you’re taking care not to put all your eggs in one basket, remember to count yourself among the eggs.)

实物资本是指你的物质财产：你的房屋、汽车、农田或林地，以及艺术品、古董、葡萄酒、珠宝、硬币或邮票等精美收藏品。几十年甚至几个世纪以来，一些实物或“实体”资产往往在通胀时期保持其价值，尤其是那些高质量的资产。然而，它们并不产生收入。

Physical capital is your material possessions: your home, cars, farmland or timberland, and fine collectibles like art, antiques, wine, jewelry, coins, or stamps. Over decades and even centuries, some physical or “real” assets have tended to hold their value during inflationary periods, particularly if they are high quality. They don’t generate income, though.

在对冲通胀时，别忘了考虑你的人力资本和实物资本。否则，投资行业的宣传机器会把你所有的注意力都集中在你的金融资本上。这样，当通胀加剧时，你就会被吓得去购买那些为了好看而精心设计的、收取高额费用的基金。许多这样的基金流动性差，或者不产生收益，这限制了它们作为抗击通胀工具的效用。

Don’t forget to consider your human and physical capital when you’re hedging against inflation. Otherwise, the investment industry’s propaganda machine will fixate all your attention on your financial capital. That way, you’ll be scared into buying funds tailored to look good—and generate high fees—when inflation heats up. Many such funds aren’t liquid or don’t generate income, limiting their usefulness as inflation fighters.

财务顾问和其他投资营销人员很少提醒客户格雷厄姆强调的基本事实：随着生活成本的上升，通胀对冲资产应该持续获得更高的回报。那么，根据定义，随着通货膨胀率下降，它的收益必然会持续下降。

Financial advisers and other investment marketers rarely remind clients of the basic fact Graham emphasizes: An inflation-hedging asset should earn consistently higher returns as the cost of living rises. By definition, then, it must earn consistently lower returns as the rate of inflation falls.

一项在通胀高涨和通胀平缓时都表现良好的资产，或许会成为投资天堂。但这也是不可能的。华尔街并非世外桃源。

An asset that does well when inflation is hot and when it is not would be an investment paradise. It’s also an impossibility. Wall Street is not Shangri-la.

保险不是免费的

Insurance Isn’t Free

要投保通货膨胀险，你必须付出一定的代价，就像投保汽车、房屋和人寿保险一样。以下是一些主要的通货膨胀险投保方式，每种方式都有相应的成本。

To insure against inflation, you must pay a price, just as you do to cover your car, home, and life. Here are the main ways to insure against inflation; each comes at a cost.

黄金作为保值手段的历史由来已久。在奥古斯都皇帝统治时期（公元前27年至公元14年），一位罗马百夫长每年赚取的黄金，在两千多年后，仍然足以支付一位美国陆军上尉一年的薪水^。3
然而，从 1900 年到 2022 年，扣除通货膨胀因素后，黄金的年平均回报率不到 0.8%——仅略高于现金。4^如果你在 1900 年 1 月 1 日投资了 1,000 美元购买黄金，那么到 2022 年，你将拥有约 2,500 美元的收益——相比之下，如果你分别在美国债券和股票上各投资 1,000 美元，你将拥有约 7,800 美元的收益和超过 200 万美元的收益。

在此期间，黄金价格的波动几乎与股票一样剧烈，因此它往往落后于通胀，而不是跑赢通胀。2021年，随着生活成本飙升，金价下跌了3.5%；2022年，随着通胀率突破所有现代纪录，黄金价格下跌了0.4%。2023年，随着通胀率下降，金价上涨了13%。

从长远来看，黄金一直是维持购买力的好方法。但从短期来看，它是一种不可靠的通胀对冲工具。
Gold has served as a store of value for a remarkably long time. The same quantity of gold that a Roman centurion earned annually under Emperor Augustus (27 B.C. to A.D. 14) would still have covered one year’s pay for a U.S. Army captain more than 2,000 years later.³
However, from 1900 through 2022, gold earned an average return of less than 0.8% annually after inflation—only slightly better than cash.⁴ Had you invested $1,000 in gold on January 1, 1900, you’d have finished 2022 with about $2,500—compared with roughly $7,800 in U.S. bonds and more than $2 million in stocks if you’d put the same $1,000 in each.

Along the way, the price of gold swung up and down almost as erratically as stocks did, so it often lagged inflation instead of beating it. In 2021, as the cost of living surged, gold fell 3.5%; in 2022, with inflation breaking all modern records, the precious metal lost 0.4%. In 2023, as inflation fell, gold rose 13%.

In the very long run, gold has been a good way to sustain purchasing power. In the shorter run, it’s an unreliable way to hedge against inflation.
I类债券是美国政府发行的储蓄债券，其利率每年调整两次，以追踪官方消费者物价上涨。这类债券本质上是无风险的：美国财政部保证偿还您的本金，并扣除在此期间累积的任何通货膨胀。这意味着，无论通货膨胀造成多大的损失，您的I类债券都能保持其购买力长达30年。（不过，它们的涨幅不会超过通货膨胀率。）
I类债券也享有税收优惠。然而，您每年的投资额度不能轻易超过1万美元，它们只能在TreasuryDirect.gov网站上购买，除非您是美国公民或居民，否则您不太可能购买。第一年您完全不能出售I类债券，如果您在前五年内出售，您将损失三个月的利息。虽然I类债券能够有效抵御通货膨胀，但它们的流动性并不理想，而且很难批量购买^。5
I bonds are savings bonds issued by the U.S. government whose interest rate adjusts twice a year to track the official rise in consumer prices. They are essentially risk-free: The U.S. Treasury guarantees to pay you your original money back, plus any inflation that has accrued along the way. That means your I bonds will preserve their purchasing power for up to 30 years, no matter how much damage inflation does. (They will not grow above the rate of inflation, though.)
I bonds also have tax advantages. However, you can’t easily invest more than $10,000 per year, they’re available exclusively at TreasuryDirect.gov, and you aren’t likely to be able to buy them unless you’re a U.S. citizen or resident. You can’t sell I bonds at all for the first year, and you’ll forfeit three months’ interest if you sell within the first five years. While they offer excellent protection against inflation, I bonds are imperfectly liquid and are hard to buy in bulk.⁵
通胀保值债券也有助于缓解生活成本上涨。在美国，通胀保值债券（TIPS）被称为“通胀保值债券”，欧洲、亚洲、拉丁美洲和其他地区的许多其他国家的政府也发行了这类债券。这类债券会随着通胀率的上升和下降自动调整其本金（即发行人到期偿还的金额）。
不幸的是，通胀保值债券的价格可能过高，而且对利率变化高度敏感。2022年，美国通胀保值债券（TIPS）下跌了11%，期限最长的30年期TIPS下跌了40%以上。

然而，在2024年初，长期美国通胀保值债券（TIPS）为投资者提供了锁定未来30年至少2%年化收益率（扣除通胀因素）的机会。虽然这个增长率与不断上涨的生活成本相比略显温和，但它的定价却如同一份超级安全的长期保险单。

如果你即将退休，你的工资收入将随着年龄的增长，你的人力资本价值也会随之下降，而通胀保值债券是保证你的金融资本能够承受生活成本上涨的理想方式^。6
Inflation-linked bonds can also help cushion the rising cost of living. Called Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities or TIPS in the U.S., “linkers” are issued by many other governments in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. Such bonds automatically adjust their principal—the amount that the issuer will repay you by the maturity date—as inflation rises and falls.
Unfortunately, inflation-linked bonds can become overpriced and are hypersensitive to changes in interest rates. In 2022, U.S. TIPS lost 11%, and the longest-term TIPS, maturing in 30 years, fell more than 40%.

In early 2024, though, long-term U.S. TIPS offered investors the opportunity to lock in a guaranteed return of at least 2% annually, after inflation, for the next 30 years. While that’s a modest rate of growth above the rising cost of living, it was priced like an ultrasafe, long-term insurance policy.

If you’re approaching retirement, when your wage income will cease and the value of your human capital will dwindle, inflation-protected bonds are an ideal way to guarantee that your financial capital will survive increases in the cost of living as you age.⁶
房地产是避风港——尽管它可能无法像你想象的那样有效地抵御通货膨胀。耶鲁大学经济学家罗伯特·席勒表示，1890年至2014年间，扣除通货膨胀因素后，美国房价年均增长率为0.3% ^。7
你的房子是家，不是避险工具。商业地产对利率上升非常敏感，以至于它只能部分抵御通胀。
Real estate is shelter—although it might not shelter you from inflation as well as you think. Between 1890 and 2014, the average growth rate of U.S. home prices was 0.3% annually after inflation, according to Yale University economist Robert Shiller.⁷
Your house is a home, not a hedge. And commercial real estate is so sensitive to rising interest rates that it only partially protects against inflation.
当生活成本温和上涨时，股市表现良好，年涨幅最高可达4%左右。然而，一旦通胀率达到两位数，就像第一次和第二次世界大战结束时以及20世纪70年代末的美国那样，股市表现就会惨不忍睹，年平均实际亏损超过7%。一个多世纪以来，全球范围内一直存在同样的情况：当通胀率超过7.5%时，股市年平均实际回报率不到1%，而当生活成本以两位数的高位上涨时，股市年平均实际亏损接近10%。
这当然并不意味着你应该避开股票。一项资产不必一直表现良好，也能长期保持良好表现。当通胀率快速大幅上升时，股票将遭受严重损失，可能需要数年时间才能恢复。然而，从历史上看，在很长一段时间内，股票的涨幅都远远超过了消费者价格的涨幅^。8

市场价值几乎肯定会在短期内下跌在通货膨胀高峰期间持有股票是获得更高长期回报所必须付出的代价之一。

生活成本的变化因时间和国家而异，因此，将投资组合中的大部分投资于在本国以外市场上市的公司股票是明智之举。这可以提供回报来源，因为这些资产的价值不会像通货膨胀那样快速缩水。
Stocks do fine when the cost of living rises moderately, up to about 4% annually. However, once inflation hits double digits, as it did in the U.S. around the end of World Wars I and II and in the late 1970s, stocks perform abysmally, with real losses averaging more than 7% annually. The same has been true worldwide for more than a century, with stocks earning an average real return of less than 1% annually when inflation exceeds 7.5% and average real losses of nearly 10% annually when the cost of living rises in the high double digits.
That certainly doesn’t mean you should avoid stocks. An asset doesn’t have to perform well all the time to perform well over time. When the rate of inflation moves up quickly and significantly, stocks will incur severe losses that can take years to recover from. Over very long periods, however, stocks have historically far outpaced the rise in consumer prices.⁸

The all-but-certain short-term decline in the market value of stocks during an inflation spike is one price you must pay to capture their higher longer-term returns.

Changes in the cost of living vary across time and nations, so it makes sense to keep a substantial portion of your stock portfolio in companies whose shares are listed in markets outside your home country. That can provide a source of return from assets whose values aren’t being eroded as fast by inflation.
近年来，比特币经常被吹捧为某种能够抑制通货膨胀的数字终结者。部分原因在于，这种加密货币的发行量被限制在2100万个单位；一旦发行完毕，便不会再有新的发行——这意味着比特币的价值不会因发行量过大而被稀释。
相比之下，传统的政府发行货币的供应量可能无限，其价值会随着时间的推移而贬值。据Bitwise Asset Management的数据，在这种论调的推动下，比特币在2019年上涨了94%，2020年上涨了308%，2021年上涨了57%。

然而，比特币直到 2010 年 7 月才开始公开交易。你无法根据如此短的历史回报得出一概而论的结论，尤其是因为在那段时期的大部分时间里通货膨胀率都很低。

2022年，随着通胀肆虐，比特币的跌幅远超其他大多数资产，暴跌近三分之二。就在投资者最迫切需要通胀保护的时候，比特币却出现了通缩。2023年，随着通胀回落，比特币飙升逾156%——这再次表明，它并非通胀对冲工具应有的水平。

比特币会继续提供高回报吗？

任何人都无法预测。一种更优越的加密货币可能会在未来出现，取代比特币，尽管这似乎不太可能。软件更新可能会引入关键缺陷，削弱市场信心。各国央行可能会推出自己的数字货币，使比特币边缘化。又或者，比特币的价格可能会持续下跌，并不断自我循环，最终削弱其网络的吸引力。

与其将比特币纯粹视为货币，不如将其视为一种稀缺的收藏品，它也可以像黄金一样充当货币。拥有如此稀有的物品会给收藏家带来自豪和快乐——即使它不再流行。这表明，即使比特币从未被完全接受为货币，它也可能保留一定的价值。

它最终的价值会是多少？比特币或许最终会像黄金一样，成为一种稳定的价值储存手段，历经几个世纪的考验。又或许，它像稀有的艺术品一样，价值会随着时间的推移而上涨，但同时也会出现剧烈的波动。又或许，比特币最终会像豆豆娃、椰菜娃娃或宠物石一样，昙花一现——这些玩具的价格在几十年前的疯狂热潮中达到顶峰，从此一蹶不振。

沃伦·巴菲特曾开玩笑说，如果他教一门股票估值课，他会在期末考试时问一家投机性互联网公司值多少钱。“谁能给我答案，”他打趣道，“我就不及格。”

同样，比特币的价值未来某一天可能会达到100万美元甚至更高，或者几乎一文不值。这种豪赌或许会成功，但鉴于比特币历史短暂且波动剧烈，其作为通胀对冲工具的有效性仍未得到证实。
Bitcoin has often been touted in recent years as a sort of digital Terminator that can pulverize inflation. That’s partly because the supply of this cryptocurrency is limited to 21 million units; after the last of those is created, no more will ever exist—which should mean that bitcoin’s value can’t be diluted by too much issuance.
By contrast, the supply of conventional, government-issued currencies is potentially unlimited, degrading their value over time. Fueled largely by such rhetoric, bitcoin gained 94% in 2019, 308% in 2020, and 57% in 2021, according to Bitwise Asset Management.

However, bitcoin didn’t even begin trading publicly until July 2010. You can’t draw sweeping conclusions from returns over such a short history, especially because inflation was so low over most of that period.

And in 2022, as inflation raged, bitcoin fell far worse than most other assets, crashing by almost two-thirds. At exactly the time when investors most urgently needed protection from inflation, bitcoin deflated. In 2023, as inflation fell, bitcoin soared more than 156%—again, not what an inflation hedge should do.

Will bitcoin continue to provide high returns?

That’s anybody’s guess. A superior cryptocurrency might arise later, making bitcoin obsolete, although that seems unlikely. Software updates might introduce critical flaws, undermining confidence. Central banks could introduce their own digital currencies, marginalizing bitcoin. Or its price might go into a protracted decline that feeds on itself, making bitcoin’s network less attractive.

Rather than thinking of bitcoin purely as money, consider it a scarce collectible that can also function as a currency, like gold. Possessing such a rare object gives collectors pride and pleasure—even if the object no longer remains fashionable. That suggests that bitcoin may retain some value even if it never becomes fully accepted as a currency.

How much might it end up being worth? Bitcoin might turn out to be as stable a store of value, measured over centuries, as gold. Or it might resemble rare artwork, whose value tends to rise over time, but with extreme fluctuations along the way. Or bitcoin might turn out to be almost as ephemeral as Beanie Babies, Cabbage Patch Kids, or Pet Rocks—whose prices peaked in wild fads decades ago and have never recovered.

Warren Buffett has joked that if he were teaching a class on valuing stocks, he would ask on the final exam how much a speculative internet company was worth. “And anybody that gave me an answer,” he quipped, “I would flunk.”

By the same token, bitcoin could someday end up being worth $1,000,000 or more—or next to nothing. That gamble just might pay off, but given bitcoin’s short history and wild volatility, its effectiveness as an inflation hedge remains unproven.
大宗商品是一种受欢迎但并非完美的对冲工具。领先的大宗商品基金在2022年上涨了20%至30%甚至更多，轻松跑赢了消费者价格的上涨。
然而，个别大宗商品的回报率随时间差异巨大。煤炭价格在2021年上涨了161%，2022年下跌了48%，2023年又下跌了10%。锂价格在2019年下跌了55%，2020年又下跌了38%，然后在2021年惊人地上涨了443%，2022年又上涨了72%；2023年，锂价格更是暴跌了81%。

近年来，这些货币的受欢迎程度可能扭曲了大宗商品市场，削弱了它们抵御未来通胀的能力。从长远来看，1871年投资1美元购买美国股票，到2022年底将增长到1896美元。而投资大宗商品，其价值只会增长到744美元^。9
Commodities are a popular but imperfect hedge. Leading commodity funds gained 20% to 30% or more in 2022, handily beating the rise in consumer prices.
However, the returns on individual commodities vary wildly over time. Coal gained 161% in 2021, then lost 48% in 2022 and another 10% in 2023. Lithium lost 55% in 2019, fell another 38% in 2020, then gained an astonishing 443% in 2021 and another 72% in 2022; in 2023, it fell a ghastly 81%.

Their popularity in recent years may have distorted the market in commodities, undermining their ability to combat future inflation. Over the longer run, a $1 investment in U.S. stocks in 1871 would have grown to $1,896 by the end of 2022. In commodities, it would have grown to only $744.⁹

简而言之，没有任何单一资产能够完全抵御生活成本上涨。通过在股票投资组合中补充大量通胀保值债券，你可以将你的金融资本打造为更强大的防御堡垒。你的人力资本和物质资本也应该能够为你提供支撑。

In short, no single asset can fully protect against the rising cost of living. By supplementing a stock portfolio with a big slug of inflation-protected bonds, you can build your financial capital into a stronger bulwark. And your human capital and physical capital should bolster you, too.

第三章

Chapter 3 百年股市史：1972年初的股价水平

A Century of Stock-Market History: The Level of Stock Prices in Early 1972

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

投资者的普通股投资组合将代表庞大而令人敬畏的股票市场的一小部分。谨慎起见，投资者应该对股票市场的历史有充分的了解，尤其是价格水平的大幅波动，以及整体股价与其收益和股息之间的不同关系。有了这些背景知识，投资者或许能够对不同时期市场水平的吸引力或风险做出一些有价值的判断。巧合的是，关于价格、收益和股息的有用统计数据可以追溯到100年前，也就是1871年。（前半期的资料远不如后半期那么全面可靠，但仍然足够。）在本章中，我们将以高度精简的形式呈现这些数据，并着眼于两个目标。首先，是展示股票在过去一个世纪的多个周期中，其基本上涨方式。第二种方法是用连续十年的平均值来观察市场情况，不仅要看股价，还要看收益和股息，这样才能看出三个重要因素之间的变化关系。基于这些丰富的资料，我们将转向考察1972年初的股价水平。

The investor’s portfolio of common stocks will represent a small cross-section of that immense and formidable institution known as the stock market. Prudence suggests that he have an adequate idea of stock-market history, in terms particularly of the major fluctuations in its price level and of the varying relationships between stock prices as a whole and their earnings and dividends. With this background he may be in a position to form some worthwhile judgment of the attractiveness or dangers of the level of the market as it presents itself at different times. By a coincidence, useful statistical data on prices, earnings, and dividends go back just 100 years, to 1871. (The material is not nearly as full or dependable in the first half-period as in the second, but it will serve.) In this chapter we shall present the figures, in highly condensed form, with two objects in view. The first is to show the general manner in which stocks have made their underlying advance through the many cycles of the past century. The second is to view the picture in terms of successive ten-year averages, not only of stock prices but of earnings and dividends as well, to bring out the varying relationship between the three important factors. With this wealth of material as a background we shall pass to a consideration of the level of stock prices at the beginning of 1972.

股票市场的长期历史可以用两个表格和一个图表来概括。表 3-1列出了过去 100 年中 19 个熊市和牛市周期的低点和高点。我们在这里使用了两个指数。第一个指数是考尔斯委员会 (Cowles Commission) 早在 1870 年就进行的一项早期研究的结合，该研究成果后来被整合到著名的标准普尔 500 只股票综合指数中，并一直沿用至今。第二个指数是更为著名的道琼斯工业平均指数（简称 DJIA，或“道琼斯指数”），其历史可以追溯到 1897 年；它包含 30 家公司，其中一家是美国电话电报公司，另外 29 家是大型工业企业^。1

The long-term history of the stock market is summarized in two tables and a chart. Table 3-1 sets forth the low and high points of nineteen bear- and bull-market cycles in the past 100 years. We have used two indexes here. The first represents a combination of an early study by the Cowles Commission going back to 1870, which has been spliced on to and continued to date in the well-known Standard & Poor’s composite index of 500 stocks. The second is the even more celebrated Dow Jones Industrial Average (the DJIA, or “the Dow”), which dates back to 1897; it contains 30 companies, of which one is American Telephone & Telegraph and the other 29 are large industrial enterprises.¹

表 3-1 1871 年至 1971 年间股市主要波动

TABLE 3-1 Major Stock-Market Swings Between 1871 and 1971

图一由标准普尔提供，描绘了其 425 种工业股票指数从 1900 年到 1970 年的市场波动。（道琼斯工业平均指数的对应图表看起来非常相似。）读者会注意到三个截然不同的模式，每个模式涵盖了 70 年中的约三分之一。第一个阶段从 1900 年持续到 1924 年，大部分时间都呈现出一系列相当相似的市场周期，持续 3 到 5 年。这一时期的年平均涨幅仅为 3% 左右。我们接着讨论“新时代”牛市，该牛市在 1929 年达到顶峰，随后出现了可怕的崩盘后果，随后一直到 1949 年，波动非常不规律。将 1949 年的平均水平与 1924 年的平均水平进行比较，我们发现年增长率仅为 1.5%；因此，在第二个阶段结束时，公众对普通股毫无热情。根据对立律，我们历史上最大的牛市的开始时机已经成熟，正如我们图表的最后三分之一所示。这一现象可能在1968年12月达到顶峰，标准普尔425种工业指数达到118点（其500种股票综合指数达到108点）。如表3-1所示，1949年至1968年间经历了相当严重的回调（尤其是在1956-57年和1961-62年），但此后的复苏如此迅速，以至于它们不得不（按照长期以来被接受的语义）被定义为单个牛市中的衰退，而不是单独的市场周期。从1949年中期道琼斯指数162点的低点到1966年初995点的高点，17年间上涨了6倍多，平均年复合增长率为11%，这还不包括每年3.5%的股息。（标准普尔综合指数的涨幅略高于道琼斯工业平均指数，实际上是从14点涨到了96点。）

Chart I, presented by courtesy of Standard & Poor’s, depicts the market fluctuations of its 425-industrial-stock index from 1900 through 1970. (A corresponding chart available for the DJIA will look very much the same.) The reader will note three quite distinct patterns, each covering about a third of the 70 years. The first runs from 1900 to 1924, and shows for the most part a series of rather similar market cycles lasting from three to five years. The annual advance in this period averaged just about 3%. We move on to the “New Era” bull market, culminating in 1929, with its terrible aftermath of collapse, followed by quite irregular fluctuations until 1949. Comparing the average level of 1949 with that of 1924, we find the annual rate of advance to be a mere 1½%; hence the close of our second period found the public with no enthusiasm at all for common stocks. By the rule of opposites the time was ripe for the beginning of the greatest bull market in our history, presented in the last third of our chart. This phenomenon may have reached its culmination in December 1968 at 118 for Standard & Poor’s 425 industrials (and 108 for its 500-stock composite). As Table 3-1 shows, there were fairly important setbacks between 1949 and 1968 (especially in 1956–57 and 1961–62), but the recoveries therefrom were so rapid that they had to be denominated (in the long-accepted semantics) as recessions in a single bull market, rather than as separate market cycles. Between the low level of 162 for “the Dow” in mid-1949 and the high of 995 in early 1966, the advance had been more than sixfold in 17 years—which is at the average compounded rate of 11% per year, not counting dividends of, say, 3½% per annum. (The advance for the Standard & Poor’s composite index was somewhat greater than that of the DJIA—actually from 14 to 96.)

这14%甚至更高的回报率在1963年就已得到证实，后来一项被广泛报道的研究也证实了这一点。* ²华尔街对如此出色的业绩自然而然地感到满意，同时也产生了一种相当不合逻辑且危险的信念，认为未来普通股也会有同样出色的表现。似乎很少有人担心，上涨的幅度本身可能表明涨幅过大。随后，从1968年高点到1970年低点，标准普尔综合指数下跌了36%（道琼斯工业平均指数下跌了37%），这是自1939年至1942年期间44%的跌幅以来的最大跌幅，那段时期反映了珍珠港事件后的危险和不确定性。华尔街的戏剧性表现一如既往：1970年5月的低点之后，两大指数均大幅快速回升，并在1972年初创下标准普尔工业指数的历史新高。以1949年至1970年两年的平均数据计算，标准普尔综合指数（或工业指数）的年均价格上涨率约为9%。当然，这一上涨速度远高于1950年之前的任何类似时期。（但在过去十年中，涨幅要低得多——标准普尔综合指数为5.25%，道琼斯工业平均指数仅为曾经常见的3%。）

These 14% and better returns were documented in 1963, and later, in a much publicized study.*² It created a natural satisfaction on Wall Street with such fine achievements, and a quite illogical and dangerous conviction that equally marvelous results could be expected for common stocks in the future. Few people seem to have been bothered by the thought that the very extent of the rise might indicate that it had been overdone. The subsequent decline from the 1968 high to the 1970 low was 36% for the Standard & Poor’s composite (and 37% for the DJIA), the largest since the 44% suffered in 1939–1942, which had reflected the perils and uncertainties after Pearl Harbor. In the dramatic manner so characteristic of Wall Street, the low level of May 1970 was followed by a massive and speedy recovery of both averages, and the establishment of a new all-time high for the Standard & Poor’s industrials in early 1972. The annual rate of price advance between 1949 and 1970 works out at about 9% for the S & P composite (or the industrial index), using the average figures for both years. That rate of climb was, of course, much greater than for any similar period before 1950. (But in the last decade the rate of advance was much lower—51⁄4% for the S & P composite index and only the once familiar 3% for the DJIA.)

图1

CHART 1

价格变动记录应辅以相应的收益和股息数据，以便全面了解过去十年来股票经济的变迁。我们在表3-2中提供了类似的概要。我们期望读者能够仔细研究所有这些数据，但我们希望它们对某些读者来说能够引人入胜且富有启发性。

The record of price movements should be supplemented by corresponding figures for earnings and dividends, in order to provide an overall view of what has happened to our share economy over the ten decades. We present a conspectus of this kind in our Table 3-2. It is a good deal to expect from the reader that he study all these figures with care, but for some we hope they will be interesting and instructive.

让我们对它们进行如下评论：整个十年的数据平滑了逐年波动并呈现出持续增长的总体情况。在第一个十年之后的九个十年中，只有两个十年收益和平均价格下降（1891-1900 年和 1931-1940 年），而 1900 年之后没有一个十年平均股息下降。但是所有三个类别的增长率都有很大差异。总体而言，自第二次世界大战以来的表现优于前几十年，但 1960 年代的进步不如 1950 年代那么明显。今天的投资者无法从这个记录中判断未来十年收益、股息和价格预计会增长多少百分比，但它确实为他提供了持续的普通股投资政策所需的全部鼓励。

Let us comment on them as follows: The full decade figures smooth out the year-to-year fluctuations and leave a general picture of persistent growth. Only two of the nine decades after the first show a decrease in earnings and average prices (in 1891–1900 and 1931–1940), and no decade after 1900 shows a decrease in average dividends. But the rates of growth in all three categories are quite variable. In general the performance since World War II has been superior to that of earlier decades, but the advance in the 1960s was less pronounced than that of the 1950s. Today’s investor cannot tell from this record what percentage gain in earnings dividends and prices he may expect in the next ten years, but it does supply all the encouragement he needs for a consistent policy of common-stock investment.

然而，这里需要指出的是，我们的表格中并未披露这一点。1970年，我国企业的整体盈利状况明显恶化。投资资本利润率跌至二战以来的最低水平。同样令人震惊的是，相当多的公司报告了当年的净亏损；许多公司陷入了“财务困境”，并且三十年来首次出现了相当多的重大破产程序。这些事实以及其他任何事实都促使我们做出上述陈述*：经济繁荣时代可能在1969-1970年就此终结。

However, a point should be made here that is not disclosed in our table. The year 1970 was marked by a definite deterioration in the overall earnings posture of our corporations. The rate of profit on invested capital fell to the lowest percentage since the World War years. Equally striking is the fact that a considerable number of companies reported net losses for the year; many became “financially troubled,” and for the first time in three decades there were quite a few important bankruptcy proceedings. These facts as much as any others have prompted the statement made above* that the great boom era may have come to an end in 1969–1970.

表3-2的一个显著特征是二战以来市盈率的变化。^* 1949年6月，标准普尔综合指数的市盈率仅为过去12个月适用收益的6.3倍；而1961年3月，该比率则为22.9倍。同样，标准普尔指数的股息收益率也从1949年的7%以上降至1961年的仅3.0%，而与此同时，高等级债券的利率却从2.60%升至4.50%，这进一步加剧了这种差距。这无疑是股市历史上公众态度最显著的转变。

A striking feature of Table 3-2 is the change in the price/earnings ratios since World War II.^* In June 1949 the S & P composite index sold at only 6.3 times the applicable earnings of the past 12 months; in March 1961 the ratio was 22.9 times. Similarly, the dividend yield on the S & P index had fallen from over 7% in 1949 to only 3.0% in 1961, a contrast heightened by the fact that interest rates on high-grade bonds had meanwhile risen from 2.60% to 4.50%. This is certainly the most remarkable turnabout in the public’s attitude in all stock-market history.

对于经验丰富、生性谨慎的人来说，从一个极端走向另一个极端，预示着未来将有大麻烦。他们不禁担忧地想起1926年至1929年的牛市及其悲惨的后果。但这些担忧并未被事件所证实。诚然，1970年道琼斯工业平均指数的收盘价与六年半前相同，而备受瞩目的“六十年代飙升”也主要被证明是一段爬坡再跌落的旅程。但无论是商业还是股价，都还没有发生任何能与1929年至1932年的熊市和萧条相提并论的事情。

To people of long experience and innate caution the passage from one extreme to another carried a strong warning of trouble ahead. They could not help thinking apprehensively of the 1926–1929 bull market and its tragic aftermath. But these fears have not been confirmed by the event. True, the closing price of the DJIA in 1970 was the same as it was 6½ years earlier, and the much heralded “Soaring Sixties” proved to be mainly a march up a series of high hills and then down again. But nothing has happened either to business or to stock prices that can compare with the bear market and depression of 1929–1932.

^{表 3-2 1871 年至 1970年}股市表现

TABLE 3-2 A Picture of Stock-Market Performance, 1871–1970^a

^a以下数据主要基于 N. Molodovsky 的文章“股票价值和股票价格”（金融分析师杂志， 1960 年 5 月）中的数字。这些数据又取自考尔斯委员会的书籍《普通股指数》，其中 1926 年之前的年份以及 1926 年至今的标准普尔 500 股票综合指数。

^a The following data based largely on figures appearing in N. Molodovsky’s article, “Stock Values and Stock Prices,” Financial Analysts Journal, May 1960. These, in turn, are taken from the Cowles Commission book Common Stock Indexes for years before 1926 and from the spliced-on Standard & Poor’s 500-stock composite index for 1926 to date.

^b年增长率数字是 Molodovsky 汇编的，涵盖连续 21 年，截止于 1890 年、1900 年等。

^b The annual growth-rate figures are Molodovsky compilations covering successive 21-year periods ending in 1890, 1900, etc.

^c 1968–1970 年与 1958–1960 年的增长率。

^c Growth rate for 1968–1970 vs. 1958–1960.

^d这些增长率数据是 1954-1956 年与 1947-1949 年、1961-1963 年与 1954-1956 年以及 1968-1970 年与 1958-1960 年的比较。

^d These growth-rate figures are for 1954–1956 vs. 1947–1949, 1961–1963 vs. 1954–1956, and for 1968–1970 vs. 1958–1960.

1972年初的股市水平

The Stock-Market Level in Early 1972

在我们面前呈现了长达一个世纪的股票、价格、收益和股息概况之后，让我们尝试对 1972 年 1 月道琼斯工业平均指数 900 点和标准普尔综合指数 100 点的水平得出一些结论。

With a century-long conspectus of stock, prices, earnings, and dividends before our eyes, let us try to draw some conclusions about the level of 900 for the DJIA and 100 for the S & P composite index in January 1972.

在我们之前的每一个版本中，我们都讨论了撰写本文时的股市水平，并努力回答这个问题：该水平是否过高，不适合保守买入。读者可能会发现，回顾我们之前得出的结论会很有启发。这并非完全是一种自我惩罚。它将提供一种连接过去二十年股市各个阶段的纽带，同时也生动地展现了任何试图对当前市场水平做出明智而批判性判断的人所面临的困难。首先，让我们重现一下我们在1965年版本中给出的1948年、1953年和1959年分析的摘要：

In each of our former editions we have discussed the level of the stock market at the time of writing, and endeavored to answer the question whether it was too high for conservative purchase. The reader may find it informing to review the conclusions we reached on these earlier occasions. This is not entirely an exercise in self-punishment. It will supply a sort of connecting tissue that links the various stages of the stock market in the past twenty years and also a taken-from-life picture of the difficulties facing anyone who tries to reach an informed and critical judgment of current market levels. Let us, first, reproduce the summary of the 1948, 1953, and 1959 analyses that we gave in the 1965 edition:

1948年，我们以保守的标准衡量道琼斯指数180点的水平，毫不费力地得出结论：“相对于其基本价值而言，它并不算太高”。1953年，当我们着手解决这个问题时，当年的平均市场水平已达到275点，五年内上涨了50%以上。我们问了自己同样的问题——“我们认为道琼斯工业指数275点的水平是否过高，不适合进行合理的投资？”鉴于随后道琼斯工业指数的惊人涨幅，我们不得不承认，我们很难就1953年股价的吸引力得出明确的结论，这似乎有些奇怪。我们确实非常肯定地表示：“从价值指标——我们的主要投资指南——的角度来看，关于1953年股价的结论肯定是有利的。”但我们担心的是，1953年平均指数的上涨时间比过去大多数牛市都要长，而且其绝对水平也处于历史高位。考虑到这些因素，我们建议采取谨慎或妥协的策略。结果证明，这并不是一个真是绝妙的忠告。一位优秀的预言家本应预见到市场水平在未来五年内将再上涨100%。或许我们应该补充一句，那些以股市预测为业的人——我们并非如此——几乎没有人比我们更清楚未来会发生什么。

In 1948 we applied conservative standards to the Dow Jones level of 180, and found no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that “it was not too high in relation to underlying values.” When we approached this problem in 1953 the average market level for that year had reached 275, a gain of over 50% in five years. We asked ourselves the same question—namely, “whether in our opinion the level of 275 for the Dow Jones Industrials was or was not too high for sound investment.” In the light of the subsequent spectacular advance, it may seem strange to have to report that it was by no means easy for us to reach a definitive conclusion as to the attractiveness of the 1953 level. We did say, positively enough, that “from the standpoint of value indications—our chief investment guide—the conclusion about 1953 stock prices must be favorable.” But we were concerned about the fact that in 1953, the averages had advanced for a longer period than in most bull markets of the past, and that its absolute level was historically high. Setting these factors against our favorable value judgment, we advised a cautious or compromise policy. As it turned out, this was not a particularly brilliant counsel. A good prophet would have foreseen that the market level was due to advance an additional 100% in the next five years. Perhaps we should add in self-defense that few if any of those whose business was stock-market forecasting—as ours was not—had any better inkling than we did of what lay ahead.

1959年初，道琼斯工业平均指数创下584点的历史新高。我们从各个角度进行的长篇分析可以总结如下（摘自1959年版第59页）：“总之，我们不得不得出这样的结论：当前的股价水平是危险的。它之所以危险，或许是因为价格已经过高。但即使情况并非如此，市场的势头也必然会将其推向不合理的高度。坦白说，我们无法想象未来的市场永远不会出现任何重大损失，每个新手都能从购买的股票中获得巨额利润。”

At the beginning of 1959 we found the DJIA at an all-time high of 584. Our lengthy analysis made from all points of view may be summarized in the following (from page 59 of the 1959 edition): “In sum, we feel compelled to express the conclusion that the present level of stock prices is a dangerous one. It may well be perilous because prices are already far too high. But even if this is not the case the market’s momentum is such as inevitably to carry it to unjustifiable heights. Frankly, we cannot imagine a market of the future in which there will never be any serious losses, and in which every tyro will be guaranteed a large profit on his stock purchases.”

我们在1959年表达的谨慎态度，其后续表现比我们在1954年采取的相应态度更有道理。然而，它远未完全得到证实。道琼斯工业平均指数在1961年上涨至685点；随后在当年晚些时候略低于我们设定的584点水平（至566点）；1961年末再次上涨至735点；然后在1962年5月近乎恐慌地跌至536点，在短短的六个月内下跌了27%。与此同时，最受欢迎的“成长型股票”也出现了更为严重的萎缩——无可争议的领头羊国际商业机器公司（IBM）的惊人跌幅就是明证，它从1961年12月607点的高点跌至1962年6月300点的低点。

The caution we expressed in 1959 was somewhat better justified by the sequel than was our corresponding attitude in 1954. Yet it was far from fully vindicated. The DJIA advanced to 685 in 1961; then fell a little below our 584 level (to 566) later in the year; advanced again to 735 in late 1961; and then declined in near panic to 536 in May 1962, showing a loss of 27% within the brief period of six months. At the same time there was a far more serious shrinkage in the most popular “growth stocks”—as evidenced by the striking fall of the indisputable leader, International Business Machines, from a high of 607 in December 1961 to a low of 300 in June 1962.

这一时期，大量新发行的小型企业普通股（即所谓的热门股）彻底崩盘。这些股票最初以高得离谱的价格公开发行，随后又因不必要的投机行为被进一步推高至近乎疯狂的水平。许多这类股票在短短几个月内就跌去了90%甚至更多的^报价。

This period saw a complete debacle in a host of newly launched common stocks of small enterprises—the so-called hot issues—which had been offered to the public at ridiculously high prices and then had been further pushed up by needless speculation to levels little short of insane. Many of these lost 90% and more of the quotations^* in just a few months.

1962 年上半年的崩盘让许多自认是投机者的人，甚至许多自称是轻率之人感到不安，甚至可以说是灾难性的。“投资者”。但当年晚些时候出现的逆转同样出乎金融界的意料。股市平均价格再次上涨，并出现了以下走势：

The collapse in the first half of 1962 was disconcerting, if not disastrous, to many self-acknowledged speculators and perhaps to many more imprudent people who called themselves “investors.” But the turnabout that came later that year was equally unsuspected by the financial community. The stock-market averages resumed their upward course, producing the following sequence:

道琼斯工业平均指数

DJIA

标准普尔 500 指数

Standard & Poor’s 500-Stock Composite

1961年12月

December 1961

735

72.64

1962年6月

June 1962

536

52.32

1964年11月

November 1964

892

86.28

普通股价格的复苏和再次上涨确实引人注目，并相应地改变了华尔街的市场情绪。在1962年6月的低位，市场预测主要看跌，而到了年底部分回升之后，市场预测则褒贬不一，倾向于持怀疑态度。但到了1964年初，经纪公司的自然乐观情绪再次显现；几乎所有预测都看涨，这种乐观情绪在1964年的上涨过程中一直持续。

The recovery and new ascent of common-stock prices was indeed remarkable and created a corresponding revision of Wall Street sentiment. At the low level of June 1962 predictions had appeared predominantly bearish, and after the partial recovery to the end of that year they were mixed, leaning to the skeptical side. But at the outset of 1964 the natural optimism of brokerage firms was again manifest; nearly all the forecasts were on the bullish side, and they so continued through the 1964 advance.

随后，我们着手评估1964年11月的股市水平（道琼斯工业平均指数为892点）。经过多角度的深入讨论，我们得出了三个主要结论。第一点是“旧的（估值）标准似乎已不适用；新的标准尚未经过时间的检验。” 第二点是投资者“必须将自己的投资策略建立在重大不确定性的基础上。市场可能出现两种极端情况：一方面，市场水平持续上涨，比如上涨50%，道琼斯工业平均指数达到1350点；另一方面，市场水平也可能出现几乎未曾预料的同等幅度的暴跌，使平均水平跌至450点左右”（1965年版第63页）。第三点的表述则更加明确。我们说道：“坦率地说，如果1964年的物价水平不算过高，我们怎么能说任何物价水平都过高呢？”本章的结尾如下：

We then approached the task of appraising the November 1964 levels of the stock market (892 for the DJIA). After discussing it learnedly from numerous angles we reached three main conclusions. The first was that “old standards (of valuation) appear inapplicable; new standards have not yet been tested by time.” The second was that the investor “must base his policy on the existence of major uncertainties. The possibilities compass the extremes, on the one hand, of a protracted and further advance in the market’s level—say by 50%, or to 1350 for the DJIA; or, on the other hand, of a largely unheralded collapse of the same magnitude, bringing the average in the neighborhood of, say, 450" (p. 63 of the 1965 edition). The third was expressed in much more definite terms. We said: “Speaking bluntly, if the 1964 price level is not too high how could we say that any price level is too high?” And the chapter closed as follows:

下一步该怎么做

WHAT COURSE TO FOLLOW

投资者不应仅仅因为在本书中读到1964年的市场水平就断定其危险。他们必须权衡我们的论证与华尔街最有能力、最有经验的人士所持的相反论证。最终，每个人都必须做出自己的决定并承担相应的责任。然而，我们建议，如果投资者不确定该采取何种行动，应该选择谨慎行事。本文所述的投资原则要求在1964年的情况下，按紧急程度依次采取以下策略：

Investors should not conclude that the 1964 market level is dangerous merely because they read it in this book. They must weigh our reasoning against the contrary reasoning they will hear from most competent and experienced people on Wall Street. In the end each one must make his own decision and accept responsibility therefor. We suggest, however, that if the investor is in doubt as to which course to pursue he should choose the path of caution. The principles of investment, as set forth herein, would call for the following policy under 1964 conditions, in order of urgency:

不借款购买或持有证券。
No borrowing to buy or hold securities.
基金持有普通股的比例没有增加。
No increase in the proportion of funds held in common stocks.
必要时，减少普通股持股，使其占投资组合总额的最多50%。资本利得税必须尽可能慷慨地缴纳，所得收益应投资于优质债券或作为储蓄存款。
A reduction in common-stock holdings where needed to bring it down to a maximum of 50 per cent of the total portfolio. The capital-gains tax must be paid with as good grace as possible, and the proceeds invested in first-quality bonds or held as a savings deposit.

长期遵循真正美元成本平均策略的投资者，逻辑上可以选择继续维持定期买入不变，或者暂停买入，直到他们认为市场水平不再危险。我们强烈建议不要在1964年末的水平上启动新的美元成本平均策略，因为如果启动后不久结果就非常不利，许多投资者将没有精力继续执行这样的策略。

Investors who for some time have been following a bona fide dollar-cost averaging plan can in logic elect either to continue their periodic purchases unchanged or to suspend them until they feel the market level is no longer dangerous. We should advise rather strongly against the initiation of a new dollar-averaging plan at the late 1964 levels, since many investors would not have the stamina to pursue such a scheme if the results soon after initiation should appear highly unfavorable.

这一次，我们可以说，我们的谨慎得到了证实。道琼斯工业平均指数随后上涨约11%，达到995点，但随后在1970年异常下跌至632点的低点，当年收盘于839点。“热门股票”的价格也遭遇了同样的崩盘——跌幅高达90%——就像1961-62年的大跌一样。而且，正如引言中指出的那样，整个金融格局似乎朝着热情消退、疑虑加重的方向转变。一个事实或许可以概括整个故事：道琼斯工业平均指数在1970年的收盘价低于六年前——这是自1944年以来首次出现这种情况。

This time we can say that our caution was vindicated. The DJIA advanced about 11% further, to 995, but then fell irregularly to a low of 632 in 1970, and finished that year at 839. The same kind of debacle took place in the price of “hot issues”—i.e., with declines running as much as 90%—as had happened in the 1961–62 setback. And, as pointed out in the Introduction, the whole financial picture appeared to have changed in the direction of less enthusiasm and greater doubts. A single fact may summarize the story: The DJIA closed 1970 at a level lower than six years before—the first time such a thing had happened since 1944.

以上就是我们对以往股市水平的评估。我们和读者能从中学到什么吗？我们认为1948年和1953年的市场水平有利于投资（但后者过于谨慎），1959年（道琼斯工业平均指数584点）的市场水平“危险”，1964年（道琼斯工业平均指数892点）的市场水平“过高”。所有这些判断即使在今天也能用巧妙的论据来辩护。但它们是否能像我们那些更平淡无奇的建议一样有效，则值得怀疑——这些建议一方面支持一致且可控的普通股策略，另一方面不鼓励那些试图“战胜市场”或“挑选赢家”的行为。

Such were our efforts to evaluate former stock-market levels. Is there anything we and our readers can learn from them? We considered the market level favorable for investment in 1948 and 1953 (but too cautiously in the latter year), “dangerous” in 1959 (at 584 for DJIA), and “too high” (at 892) in 1964. All of these judgments could be defended even today by adroit arguments. But it is doubtful if they have been as useful as our more pedestrian counsels—in favor of a consistent and controlled common-stock policy on the one hand, and discouraging endeavors to “beat the market” or to “pick the winners” on the other.

尽管如此，我们认为，重新审视股市水平——这次是1971年末——或许能给读者带来一些益处，即便我们的观点最终会显得趣味性大于实用性，或者更具指示性而非结论性。亚里士多德的《伦理学》开篇附近有一段精彩的文字 ：“受过良好教育的头脑的标志，是期望特定学科的性质所能允许的精确程度。接受数学家仅仅给出的可能结论，和要求演说家进行严格的论证，同样不合理。” 金融分析师的工作介于数学家和演说家之间。

Nonetheless we think our readers may derive some benefit from a renewed consideration of the level of the stock market—this time as of late 1971—even if what we have to say will prove more interesting than practically useful, or more indicative than conclusive. There is a fine passage near the beginning of Aristotle’s Ethics that goes: “It is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness which the nature of the particular subject admits. It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstration from an orator.” The work of a financial analyst falls somewhere in the middle between that of a mathematician and of an orator.

1971 年的不同时期，道琼斯工业平均指数处于 1964 年 11 月的 892 点水平，我们在上一版中考虑过这个水平。但在本统计研究中，我们决定使用标准普尔综合指数（或 S&P 500）的价格水平和相关数据，因为它比 30 只股票的道琼斯工业平均指数更全面，更能代表整个市场。我们将重点比较以前版本的四个日期附近的材料——即 1948 年、1953 年、1958 年和 1963 年年末——加上 1968 年；对于当前价格水平，我们取方便的数字 100，它是在 1971 年和 1972 年初的不同时间录得的。主要数据列于表 3-3中。对于我们的收益数字，我们既提供去年的表现，也提供三个日历年的平均值；对于 1971 年的股息，我们使用过去十二个月的数据；对于 1971 年的债券利息和批发价格，我们使用 1971 年 8 月的数据。

At various times in 1971 the Dow Jones Industrial Average stood at the 892 level of November 1964 that we considered in our previous edition. But in the present statistical study we have decided to use the price level and the related data for the Standard & Poor’s composite index (or S & P 500), because it is more comprehensive and representative of the general market than the 30-stock DJIA. We shall concentrate on a comparison of this material near the four dates of our former editions—namely the year-ends of 1948, 1953, 1958 and 1963—plus 1968; for the current price level we shall take the convenient figure of 100, which was registered at various times in 1971 and in early 1972. The salient data are set forth in Table 3-3. For our earnings figures we present both the last year’s showing and the average of three calendar years; for 1971 dividends we use the last twelve months’ figures; and for 1971 bond interest and wholesale prices those of August 1971.

1971年10月，股市的三年市盈率低于1963年末和1968年末。它与1958年大致相同，但远高于长期牛市初期。仅凭这一重要指标，并不能理解为1972年1月的股市特别高。但如果将高等级债券的利息收益率纳入考量，其含义就变得不那么乐观了。读者可以从我们的表格中注意到，股票收益（收益/市盈率）与债券收益的比率在整个时期内都在恶化，因此，按照这一标准，1972年1月的数据对股票的利好程度低于之前任何一年的水平。将股息收益率与债券收益率进行比较，我们发现，1948年至1972年间，两者之间的关系完全相反。年初，股票收益率是债券收益率的两倍；而现在，债券收益率是股票收益率的两倍，甚至更高。

The 3-year price/earnings ratio for the market was lower in October 1971 than at year-end 1963 and 1968. It was about the same as in 1958, but much higher than in the early years of the long bull market. This important indicator, taken by itself, could not be construed to indicate that the market was especially high in January 1972. But when the interest yield on high-grade bonds is brought into the picture, the implications become much less favorable. The reader will note from our table that the ratio of stock returns (earnings/price) to bond returns has grown worse during the entire period, so that the January 1972 figure was less favorable to stocks, by this criterion, than in any of the previous years examined. When dividend yields are compared with bond yields we find that the relationship was completely reversed between 1948 and 1972. In the early year stocks yielded twice as much as bonds; now bonds yield twice as much, and more, than stocks.

表3-3 历年标准普尔综合指数相关数据

TABLE 3-3 Data Relating to Standard & Poor’s Composite Index in Various Years

a 标准普尔 AAA 债券的收益率^。

^a Yield on S & P AAA bonds.

^b 1948 年至 1968 年日历年，加上截至 1971 年 6 月的年份。

^b Calendar years in 1948–1968, plus year ended June 1971.

^c “盈利收益率”是指收益除以价格，以百分比表示。

^c “Earnings yield” means the earnings divided by the price, in %.

^d 1971 年 10 月的价格，相当于道琼斯工业平均指数 900 点。

^d Price in Oct. 1971, equivalent to 900 for the DJIA.

^e三年平均数字。

^e Three-year average figures.

我们最终的判断是，债券收益率/股票收益率比率的不利变化完全抵消了1971年末基于三年盈利数据的较好市盈率。因此，我们对1972年初市场水平的看法与大约七年前相同——也就是说，从保守投资的角度来看，这是一个缺乏吸引力的水平。（这适用于道琼斯工业平均指数1971年的大部分价格区间：例如800到950之间。）

Our final judgment is that the adverse change in the bond-yield/stock-yield ratio fully offsets the better price/earnings ratio for late 1971, based on the 3-year earnings figures. Hence our view of the early 1972 market level would tend to be the same as it was some 7 years ago—i.e., that it is an unattractive one from the standpoint of conservative investment. (This would apply to most of the 1971 price range of the DJIA: between, say, 800 and 950.)

从历史市场波动来看，1971年的市场表现似乎仍是1969-1970年严重挫折后的不规则复苏。过去，这样的复苏往往开启了始于1949年的周期性持续牛市的新阶段。（这也是1971年华尔街的普遍预期。）在1968-1970年周期中，低等级普通股发行的公开买家遭受了惨痛教训，现在（1971年）再度发行新股还为时过早。因此，现在市场缺乏那种预示即将出现危险的可靠信号，就像我们上一期文章中提到的1964年11月道琼斯工业平均指数892点的水平一样。因此，从技术角度来看，在下一次严重挫折或崩盘之前，市场似乎倾向于再次大幅上涨，远远超过道琼斯工业平均指数900点的水平。但我们不能就此止步，或许我们应该这样做。对我们来说，1971年初的市场对不到一年前的惨痛经历漠不关心，是一个令人不安的信号。如此疏忽大意能逍遥法外吗？我们认为投资者必须为未来的艰难时期做好准备——或许是1969-1970年股市暴跌的快速重演，又或许是又一次牛市，随后是一场更具灾难性的崩盘^。3

In terms of historical market swings the 1971 picture would still appear to be one of irregular recovery from the bad setback suffered in 1969–1970. In the past such recoveries have ushered in a new stage of the recurrent and persistent bull market that began in 1949. (This was the expectation of Wall Street generally during 1971.) After the terrible experience suffered by the public buyers of low-grade common-stock offerings in the 1968–1970 cycle, it is too early (in 1971) for another twirl of the new-issue merry-go-round. Hence that dependable sign of imminent danger in the market is lacking now, as it was at the 892 level of the DJIA in November 1964, considered in our previous edition. Technically, then, the outlook would appear to favor another substantial rise far beyond the 900 DJIA level before the next serious setback or collapse. But we cannot quite leave the matter there, as perhaps we should. To us, the early-1971-market’s disregard of the harrowing experiences of less than a year before is a disquieting sign. Can such heedlessness go unpunished? We think the investor must be prepared for difficult times ahead—perhaps in the form of a fairly quick replay of the 1969–1970 decline, or perhaps in the form of another bull-market fling, to be followed by a more catastrophic collapse.³

下一步该怎么做

What Course to Follow

回顾我们在上一期中讨论的内容（此处已复制）。这是我们对道琼斯工业平均指数在 1972 年初和 1964 年末同一价格水平（例如 900）的看法。

Turn back to what we said in the last edition, reproduced here. This is our view at the same price level—say 900—for the DJIA in early 1972 as it was in late 1964.

第三章评论

Commentary on Chapter 3

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

在我近五十年的华尔街生涯中，我发现我对股市的走向了解得越来越少，但我对投资者应该做什么了解得越来越多。

In my nearly fifty years of experience in Wall Street I’ve found that I know less and less about what the stock market is going to do, but I know more and more about what investors ought to do.

—本杰明·格雷厄姆¹

—Benjamin Graham¹

股票市场的过去能告诉我们关于未来的什么信息？

What can the stock market’s past tell us about the future?

正如格雷厄姆在第三章中指出的那样，股市通常会在数十年的时间里上涨，但这一过程很少是一帆风顺的，也永远无法预测。一开始，接受这种不确定性可能会令人不安，但我保证最终会给你带来希望。

As Graham points out in Chapter 3, stocks generally go up over multidecade periods, but the course is seldom smooth and never predictable. Reconciling yourself to that uncertainty can be troubling at first, but I promise to bring you hope in the end.

你的立场取决于你坐在哪里

Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit

如果您正处于工作和储蓄的阶段，那么您需要积累财富。股市下跌让您更容易以更低的价格在更长时间内买入更多股票。

If you are in your working and saving years, you need to be accumulating wealth. Falling stock markets make it easier for you to buy more shares at lower prices for longer.

假设股市最终能够复苏，那么早期的一段价格下跌可以像火箭燃料一样，随着年龄的增长推动您的财富增长。

Assuming stocks do ultimately recover, an early stretch of falling prices can function like rocket fuel to propel your wealth as you grow older.

然而，如果你退休了，不再挣工资，你的储蓄就减少了，市场下跌可能会带来灾难。除非你能依靠债券、房地产、养老金、社会保障金或类似收入，否则你将不得不通过出售部分股票来支付开支。如果你恰好在熊市期间抛售股票，你将锁定永久性损失——而且损失越大，损失越大。市场下跌，您需要出售的股票越多，才能产生稳定的收入流。

If you are retired and no longer earning a salary, however, you are decumulating, and a market decline can be a disaster. Unless you’re able to rely on income from bonds, real estate, pensions, or Social Security or the equivalent, you will have to pay your expenses by selling some of your stocks. If you happen to sell into the teeth of a bear market, you will lock in permanent losses—and the more the market goes down, the more stocks you will have to sell to generate a constant stream of income.

袜子与股票

Socks vs. Stocks

股票的问题在于，这个词里有一个字母“T”。去掉字母“T”，你就得到了“袜子”。如果股票是袜子，人们就不会把价格下跌20%视为抛售，而是卖出。人们不会恐慌，而是会买入。

The problem with stocks is that the word contains the letter T. Take that away, and you have socks. If stocks were socks, people would view a 20% drop in price not as a selloff but as a sale. Instead of panicking, people would be purchasing.

当袜子打八折的时候，你不会突然想把已经买的袜子扔掉；你会去翻翻袜子抽屉，看看还有没有需要的。年轻的投资者应该学会把股票当成袜子来看待：

When socks are 20% off, you don’t feel a sudden urge to get rid of the ones you already own; you check your sock drawer to see if you need any. Young investors should learn to think of stocks like socks:

袜子

Socks

股票

Stocks

当你需要它们时就购买它们。

You buy them when you need them.

当其他人想要时你就买。

You buy them when other people want them.

当价格下跌时，您想购买更多。

You want to buy more when the price goes down.

当价格上涨时，您想购买更多。

You want to buy more when the price goes up.

即使它们有洞，你也要保留它们。

You keep them even if they have some holes.

一旦价格下降你就卖掉它们。

You sell them as soon as the price goes down.

然后你修补它们或者把它们保存起来用作抹布。

Then you mend them or save them to use as rags.

在价格回升之前，您不会再需要它们。

You don’t want them again until the price goes back up.

恐惧角

CAPE Fear

如果您可以确定何时会发生崩盘，那么您可以在最高点卖出，转移到安全的现金中，然后在最低点买回股票。

If you could determine when a crash will strike, you could sell at the top, step aside into the safety of cash, then buy back into stocks at the bottom.

有一种指标已成为进行此类预测的流行方法。该指标名为周期调整市盈率（CAPE），用标准普尔 500 指数的当前价格除以其过去 10 年的平均收益，从而调整了价格以及通货膨胀率下的收益。该模型由耶鲁大学金融学教授罗伯特·席勒（Robert Shiller）设计，部分灵感来自本杰明·格雷厄姆本人。

One measure has become a popular way to try making such predictions. This indicator, the cyclically adjusted price/earnings or CAPE ratio, divides the current price of the S&P 500 index by its average earnings over the past 10 years, adjusting both the price and the earnings for inflation. It was devised by Yale University finance professor Robert Shiller, partly inspired by Benjamin Graham himself.

许多市场评论员认为，当CAPE高于平均水平时，未来的回报将低于平均水平。这很符合直觉：现在买入股票的成本越高，未来可能获得的回报就越低。

Many market commentators argue that when CAPE is higher than average, future returns will be below average. That makes intuitive sense: The more it costs you to buy stocks now, the less return you are likely to earn later.

高于平均水平的 CAPE 往往会导致低于平均水平的回报，如下图散点图所示：

And a higher-than-average CAPE has tended to be followed by lower-than-average returns, as this scatterplot shows:

图 3-1：小希望角

FIGURE 3-1: CAPE of Little Hope

资料来源：耶鲁大学罗伯特·席勒。

Source: Robert Shiller, Yale University.

但这只是一种趋势，并不是法律。

That’s a tendency, however. It isn’t a law.

如图3.1所示，在1999年CAPE达到40.4（最右侧的最低点）之后，股市在接下来的10年里平均每年下跌4.6%。而2000年CAPE达到42.5（最右侧的第二低点）之后，股市在接下来的十年里平均每年下跌3.5%。

As you can see in Figure 3.1, after CAPE hit 40.4 in 1999 (the lowest point at the far right), stocks went on to lose an average of 4.6% annually over the ensuing 10 years. And CAPE’s 42.5 level in 2000 (the second-lowest point at the far right) preceded average annual losses of 3.5% over the following decade.

不过，有时高 CAPE 预示着高回报，而非低回报。2011 年该比率达到 21.8 后，股市在接下来的 10 年里年均上涨了 11.4%。这是图中上部中心区域聚集的几个点之一，这些点的 CAPE和后续长期回报均高于平均水平。（所有这些回报都是扣除通胀因素后的数据。）

Sometimes, though, high CAPEs foretell high—not low—returns. After the ratio hit 21.8 in 2011, stocks nevertheless gained an annual average of 11.4% in the next 10 years. This is one of several points clustered in the upper center of the figure, where both CAPE and subsequent long-term returns are above average. (All these returns are after inflation.)

2021年末，CAPE接近39，创历史新高，远高于其140多年历史中17.4的平均值。但随着时间的推移，这一平均值发生了变化。在截至1910年的30年间，CAPE平均值为17；在接下来的30年里，CAPE平均值为12.7；再之后的30年里，CAPE平均值为15.7。而在最近的30年里，CAPE平均值接近27。

In late 2021, CAPE nearly reached 39, one of the highest levels on record and far above its average of 17.4 over its more than 140-year history. But that average has changed over time. Over the 30 years ending in 1910, CAPE averaged 17; over the next three decades, 12.7; over the 30 years after that, 15.7. Over the most recent three decades, it’s averaged almost 27.

历史并非静止的，它是不稳定的，随着现在被过去所吸收而不断变化。

History isn’t static. It’s unstable, changing continuously as the present gets absorbed into the past.

那么，当你将CAPE与过去的“平均值”进行比较时，应该使用哪个时间段？过去140年？过去50年？还是过去30年？时间段越长，你就越依赖那些可能不再相关的数据。时间段越短，结果就越容易受到近期数据的扭曲，这可能就是一个异常现象。

So, when you compare CAPE to its past “average,” which past should you use? The last 140 years? The last 50? The last 30? The longer the period, the more you rely on data that might no longer be relevant. The shorter the period, the more the results will be skewed by the recent past, which could be an anomaly.

“市场应该评估收益的价值，但收益的价值取决于人们对其售价的判断，”席勒教授说道。他指出，今天的水平“相对于历史水平来说可能很高，但我们怎么知道历史没有改变呢？”

“The market is supposed to estimate the value of earnings, but the value of the earnings depends on people’s perception of what they can sell it for,” Professor Shiller says. Today’s level “might be high relative to history,” he points out, “but how do we know that history hasn’t changed?”

除 2008 年末和 2009 年初的短暂时期外，自 1988 年末以来，美国股市每个月的交易价格都高于其长期平均 CAPE。如果你想在买入股票之前，按照历史上最长的标准，股价再次变得便宜，那么你仍然需要等待——超过三分之一个世纪之后。

Except for a brief period in late 2008 and early 2009, U.S. stocks have traded above their long-term average CAPE every month since late 1988. If you wanted stocks to become cheap again by the longest historical standards before you bought them, you would still be waiting—more than one-third of a century later.

简而言之，那些看似估值过高的股票可能会变得更加昂贵，并且这种状态会持续很长时间。正如格雷厄姆所说，“任何试图对当前市场水平做出明智且批判性判断的人”都会面临极大的“困难” ^。2

In short, stocks that already seem overvalued can get even more expensive—and stay that way for a bewilderingly long time. As Graham says, “anyone who tries to reach an informed and critical judgment of current market levels” faces extreme “difficulties.”²

最简单的经验法则

The Simplest Rule of Thumb

要估算股票未来的长期回报率，可以使用戈登方程。该公式由经济学家迈伦·戈登于20世纪50年代末设计，假设市场价格取决于股票能够产生的收益和增长。

To estimate the future long-term return on stocks, you can use the Gordon equation. Devised in the late 1950s by economist Myron Gordon, the formula assumes that market prices depend on the income and growth that stocks can produce.

股市的未来表现应该接近其当前股息收益率加上股息平均增长率。2024年初，标准普尔500指数的股息收益率为1.4%。在过去的半个世纪里，经通胀调整后的股息年均增长率为2.2%。将这两个数字相加，得出3.6%。这是一个不精确但合理的估计，用于估算未来几十年扣除通胀因素后股票的平均年回报率。虽然它低于长期历史平均水平，但它很可能能够帮助有耐心的投资者实现他们的目标^。1

The stock market’s future performance should approximate its current dividend yield plus the average rate at which dividends grow. In early 2024, the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index was 1.4%. Over the previous half-century, dividends grew 2.2% annually on average, adjusted for inflation. Add those two numbers and you get 3.6%. That’s an imprecise but plausible estimate of the average annual return of stocks, after inflation, over the coming decades. While it’s lower than the long-term historical average, it is likely to enable patient investors to reach their goals.¹

¹有关进一步讨论，请参阅 William J. Bernstein 的《投资的四大支柱》（麦格劳希尔，2023 年）。

¹ For further discussion, see William J. Bernstein, The Four Pillars of Investing (McGraw-Hill, 2023).

股票走势不佳

Stocks for the Wrong Run

从 20 世纪 90 年代开始，投资者的思想开始受到一种新信念的影响：股票没有风险。

Beginning in the 1990s, investors’ minds were infected with a new belief: Stocks aren’t risky.

2010 年，一项对 2,200 多名投资者的调查发现，31% 的投资者认为，在五年或更长时间内， “股票的表现总是比现金和债券等安全投资更好”。

By 2010, a survey of more than 2,200 investors found that 31% believed that “stocks always do better than safe investments” like cash and bonds over periods of five years or more.

这种想法是无稽之谈。它扭曲了历史，误解了风险的含义。

That notion is nonsense. It distorts history and misinterprets what risk means.

我们先来回顾一下历史。

Let’s take the history first.

金融学教授杰里米·西格尔 (Jeremy Siegel) 在其 1994 年首次出版的《长期股票》一书中指出，“股票的风险低于债券，甚至低于（美国国库券）的风险”。他的论点基于 1802 年以来的数据，表明美国股票在几乎所有时期的表现都优于债券和现金。20年或更长时间——而且从未在通货膨胀之后如此长时间内亏损^。3

In his book Stocks for the Long Run, first published in 1994, finance professor Jeremy Siegel argued that “the risks in stocks are less than those found in bonds or even [U.S. Treasury] bills.” He based his argument on data going back to 1802 suggesting that U.S. stocks had outperformed both bonds and cash over nearly every period of 20 years or more—and had never lost money, after inflation, over such long periods.³

这一论点至少存在三个关键缺陷：

That argument has at least three critical flaws:

不准确。商学院教授爱德华·麦夸里修正了幸存者偏差（见此处侧边栏），调整了历史记录，发现在19世纪的大部分时间里，美国股票的^表现都逊于债券。自1793年以来，债券在所有20年期中，有三分之一的表现优于股票——正如西格尔所言，债券的表现甚至不到十分之一。在全球其他几个主要市场，债券的表现也连续数十年优于股票。

Inaccuracy. Correcting for survivorship bias (see sidebar here), business professor Edward McQuarrie has adjusted the historical record and found that stocks underperformed bonds in the U.S. for most of the nineteenth century.⁴ Bonds beat stocks in one-third of all 20-year periods since 1793—not in less than one-tenth of those periods, as Siegel claimed. In several other major markets around the world, bonds have outperformed stocks for decades on end.

不可比性。过去，经纪佣金和管理费至少高出10倍，而且当时还没有跟踪市场的指数基金。分散投资成本高昂且繁琐，导致股票风险比现在更高。投资者必须以更高的回报来补偿这种风险。如今，分散投资变得简单且成本低廉，股票风险降低，因此其未来回报可能会更低。

Incomparability. In the past, brokerage commissions and management fees were at least 10 times higher, and market-tracking index funds didn’t exist. Diversification was costly and cumbersome, making stocks riskier than they are now. Investors had to be compensated for that risk in the form of higher returns. Now that diversification is easy and cheap, stocks are less risky, so their future returns are likely to be lower.

不切实际。历史回报率假设投资者将股息收入重新投入到更多股票中，从而实现增值。然而，直到20世纪70年代末，投资者很少用股息购买更多股票。相反，许多人将股息作为现金，要么储蓄起来，要么花掉；这些现金无法通过再投资于股市来实现增值^。5

Impracticality. Historical rates of return assume that investors took the income from dividends and plowed it back into more shares, generating growth on top of growth. Until the late 1970s, though, investors rarely used their dividends to buy more shares. Instead, many took dividends as cash, which they saved or spent; it couldn’t grow from being reinvested in the stock market.⁵

幸存者

Survivor

想象一下，你去一家退休伐木工人的养老院，被他们的年龄之大所震惊。你可能会得出结论，伐木业的工人平均寿命都很长。但你应该意识到，伐木是世界上最危险的职业之一，你看到的只是极端的例外——年老而罕见的幸存者，而不是一个广泛而典型的样本。你的第一印象是误导性的，因为你没有遇到任何关于那些英年早逝的伐木工人的踪迹^。1

Imagine visiting a nursing home for retired lumberjacks and being struck by how old they are. You might conclude that the average worker in the logging industry lives to a ripe old age. What you should realize instead is that logging is one of the world’s most dangerous occupations and that you saw only the extreme outliers—the old and rare survivors, not a broad and typical sample. Your first impression was misleading, because you encountered no trace of the many loggers who tragically died young.¹

我描述的是幸存者偏差，它高估了历史上的胜利者，而忽略了失败者。它通过描绘一幅不具代表性的画面扭曲了我们对统计证据的认知。它就像一面玫瑰色玻璃制成的后视镜。

I’m describing survivorship bias, which overweights history’s winners by overlooking the losers. It warps our perceptions of statistical evidence by painting an unrepresentative picture. It’s like a rearview mirror made of rose-colored glass.

在19世纪的美国，木制收费公路、鲸油、蒸汽船和驿马车等各种行业纷纷兴起、倒闭，最终导致投资者倾家荡产。亚利桑那州比斯比、南卡罗来纳州查尔斯顿、夏威夷檀香山、西弗吉尼亚州惠灵以及许多其他被遗忘的场所的证券交易所兴衰更替^。2

In the nineteenth-century U.S., entire industries, such as wooden turnpikes and whale oil, steamboats and stagecoaches, sprang up, shut down, and wiped investors out. Stock exchanges boomed and withered in Bisbee, Arizona; Charleston, South Carolina; Honolulu, Hawaii; Wheeling, West Virginia; and many other forgotten venues.²

投资者损失了真金白银，但“生存者”的魔杖却将这些损失挥霍殆尽。纠正这种数据偏差将显著降低股票的早期回报^。3

Investors lost real money, but the magic wand of survivorship waves those losses away. Correcting for this data bias would significantly reduce the early returns of stocks.³

¹根据美国劳工统计局 (bit.ly/43UD3TG) 的数据，伐木业是美国致命工伤发生率最高的职业

¹ According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (bit.ly/43UD3TG), logging has the highest incidence of fatal job-related injuries of any occupation in the U.S.

²近一个世纪前，试图追踪最早的美国股票的学者警告说，他们精心挑选的指数“可能无法以所期望的最大准确度衡量”回报；Walter Buckingham Smith 和 Arthur Harrison Cole，《美国商业波动，1790-1860》（bit.ly/3NoRY1A），第 23 页和第 44 页。

² Almost a century ago, scholars who tried tracking the earliest U.S. stocks warned that their cherry-picked indexes “might fail to measure” returns “with the maximum accuracy desirable”; Walter Buckingham Smith and Arthur Harrison Cole, Fluctuations in American Business, 1790–1860 (bit.ly/3NoRY1A), pp. 23 and 44.

³从二十世纪初开始，股票市场数据和标准普尔 500 指数等指数一般不会受到幸存者偏差的影响，但共同基金、对冲基金和其他“另类”资产的业绩数据库却常常受到这种影响。

³ From the start of the twentieth century onward, stock-market data and indexes like the S&P 500 are generally not contaminated with survivorship bias, although performance databases for mutual funds, as well as hedge funds and other “alternative” assets, often are.

冒险的生意

Risky Business

历史表明，持有股票的时间越长，其回报率波动就越小。长期来看，美国股市年均上涨约10%（扣除通胀因素后约为7%）。即使在2007-09年灾难性的熊市中，美国股市下跌超过55%，其长期年均回报率也仅略有下降，从10.4%降至9.3%。

History shows that the longer you hang on to stocks, the less their rate of return has varied. Over the long term, U.S. stocks have gone up by an average of roughly 10% annually (or about 7% after inflation). Even in the devastating bear market of 2007–09, when U.S. stocks fell more than 55%, their long-term average annual rate of return shrank only slightly, from 10.4% to 9.3%.

如果“风险”是指偏离历史平均回报率的可能性，那么如果你持有股票几十年，风险就会下降。

If “risk” is the chance of deviating from the average historical rate of return, that has declined if you held stocks for decades.

然而，在经历了55%的暴跌之后，你需要122%的回报才能回到之前的水平。你不会想：“嘿，股票没风险！自1926年以来，它们的平均回报率只从10.4%下降到了9.3%。” 相反，你会想：“如果17个月内我的财富蒸发一半以上都不算风险，那什么才算风险？”

However, after a 55% crash, you need a 122% return just to get back to where you were. You are not going to be thinking, “Hey, stocks aren’t risky! Their average rate of return since 1926 has only declined from 10.4% to 9.3%.” Instead, you’ll be thinking, “If getting more than half my wealth eviscerated in 17 months isn’t risk, what is?”

正如我们从CAPE中看到的，我们无法确定股价何时会达到危险的高位。如果你在股价高点买入，那么长期来看，可能感觉像是漫长的岁月。

As we’ve seen from looking at CAPE, it’s impossible to be certain when stocks are dangerously high. And if you buy at what turns out to be a peak, the long run might feel like eons.

正如沃伦·巴菲特在谈到长期投资时所说：“人们说股票必须比债券好，但我的观点恰恰相反：这完全取决于起始价格。” ⁶

As Warren Buffett has noted about investing for the long run: “People say that stocks have to be better than bonds, but I’ve pointed out just the opposite: That all depends on the starting price.”⁶

2000年初购买科技股占比较高的纳斯达克股票指数的投资者在超过15年的时间里都没有实现盈亏平衡。日本投资者等了三十多年才回到1989年该国股价的历史高位。在全球范围内，在法国、德国、瑞士、台湾和泰国等市场，股票在通货膨胀后有时会出现20年甚至更长时间的负收益^。7

People who bought the technology-heavy NASDAQ stock index in early 2000 didn’t break even for more than 15 years. Japanese investors waited more than three decades to get back to that country’s record-high stock prices of 1989. Worldwide, in such markets as France, Germany, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Thailand, stocks have sometimes earned negative returns after inflation for 20 years or more.⁷

认为仅仅延长持股期限就能消除股票风险的想法是错误的。时间可能是你的盟友，但也可能变成你的敌人。更长的持股期限能让你有更多机会从崩盘中恢复，但也会让你有更多机会经历崩盘。即使你持有股票一个世纪，也无法消除这种风险。

The belief that simply extending your holding period can eliminate the risk of stocks is bogus. Time might be your ally, but it also might turn out to be your enemy. A longer horizon gives you more opportunities to recover from crashes, but it also gives you more opportunities to experience them. You can’t erase that risk, even if you hold stocks for a century.

“投资者讨厌不确定性”

“Investors Hate Uncertainty”

矛盾的是，所有这一切都给我们带来了希望。

Paradoxically, all this brings us to a place of hope.

华尔街最喜欢说的一句话是“投资者讨厌不确定性”。但如果你能确定股票会有高回报，它们就不会显得有风险。而这种看似没有风险的感觉反而会制造出比以往任何时候都更大的风险。

One of Wall Street’s favorite sayings is “investors hate uncertainty.” But if you could ever be certain that stocks would have high returns, they wouldn’t seem risky. And that perceived absence of risk would create more risk than ever.

如果股票看起来肯定会跑赢大盘，那么每个人都会买入，从而推高股价，使其未来增长空间荡然无存，最终崩盘不可避免。1720年、1929年、2000年以及许多其他时期都曾发生过类似的情况。

If stocks seemed certain to outperform, everyone would buy them, driving prices so high that there would be no room left for future growth, making a crash inevitable. That’s exactly what happened in 1720 and 1929 and 2000, among many other occasions.

股票风险很大。在经历了多年的上涨之后，你可能会毫无征兆地在漫长的痛苦岁月中损失巨额资金。但持有股票最隐蔽的风险在于，你永远无法确定它们何时被高估或低估，也无法确定它们需要多长时间才能恢复到“正常”水平。

Stocks are risky. Without any warning, after years of gains, you can lose an ungodly amount of money for an agonizingly long time. But the most subtle risk of owning stocks is that you can never be sure when they are overpriced or underpriced—or how long it will take for them to return to “normal.”

从过去的财务数据中唯一可以确定的是，未来总是充满惊喜。而最残酷的是，它会让那些最确信自己知道未来会发生什么的人措手不及。

The only certainty you can derive from past financial data is that the future is always surprising. And it will most brutally surprise those who are the most certain they know what is about to happen.

要成为一名明智的投资者，你必须接受股票可能（但并非一定）在长期内跑赢大盘的事实。与其试图构建一个即使你认为的事情真的发生了也能盈利的投资组合，不如努力构建一个无论发生什么都能盈利的投资组合。别再徒劳地预测不可知的事情了。接受自己能掌控的有限，你就能拥有更大的控制力。这能让你更有自由地制定政策和程序，来构建所有你能够掌控的决策。

To be an intelligent investor, you must accept that stocks are likely—but not certain—to outperform over long periods. Instead of trying to build a portfolio that would thrive if what you think will happen does happen, strive to build a portfolio that should thrive no matter what happens. Stop fruitlessly trying to predict the unknowable. You will exert much more control by accepting how little you can control. That will free you up to establish policies and procedures to structure all the decisions over which you do have control.

第四章

Chapter 4 一般投资组合政策：防御型投资者

General Portfolio Policy: The Defensive Investor

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

投资组合的基本特征通常由所有者的地位和特征决定。一个极端是储蓄银行、人寿保险公司和所谓的合法信托基金。上一代人，许多州的法律规定，他们的投资仅限于高等级债券，在某些情况下，还包括高等级优先股。另一个极端是富裕且经验丰富的商人，只要他认为任何债券或股票具有吸引力，他们就会将其纳入自己的投资清单。

The basic characteristics of an investment portfolio are usually determined by the position and characteristics of the owner or owners. At one extreme we have had savings banks, life-insurance companies, and so-called legal trust funds. A generation ago their investments were limited by law in many states to high-grade bonds and, in some cases, high-grade preferred stocks. At the other extreme we have the well-to-do and experienced businessman, who will include any kind of bond or stock in his security list provided he considers it an attractive purchase.

一条古老而合理的原则是，那些无力承担风险的人应该满足于其投资资金相对较低的回报。由此衍生出一种普遍的观点，即投资者所追求的回报率与其愿意承担的风险程度大致成正比。我们的观点不同。追求的回报率应该取决于投资者愿意并能够为实现目标付出多少智慧和努力。最低回报属于我们所说的被动型投资者，他们既追求安全感，又追求无忧无虑。最高回报将由那些机警进取、运用最大智慧和技能的投资者实现。 1965年，我们补充道：“在许多情况下，购买有机会获得巨额利润的‘廉价债券’，其实际风险可能低于购买收益率约为4.5%的传统债券。” 这句话比我们自己想象的更有道理，因为在随后的几年里，即使是最好的由于利率上升，长期债券的市场价值大幅缩水。

It has been an old and sound principle that those who cannot afford to take risks should be content with a relatively low return on their invested funds. From this there has developed the general notion that the rate of return which the investor should aim for is more or less proportionate to the degree of risk he is ready to run. Our view is different. The rate of return sought should be dependent, rather, on the amount of intelligent effort the investor is willing and able to bring to bear on his task. The minimum return goes to our passive investor, who wants both safety and freedom from concern. The maximum return would be realized by the alert and enterprising investor who exercises maximum intelligence and skill. In 1965 we added: “In many cases there may be less real risk associated with buying a ‘bargain issue’ offering the chance of a large profit than with a conventional bond purchase yielding about 4½%.” This statement had more truth in it than we ourselves suspected, since in subsequent years even the best long-term bonds lost a substantial part of their market value because of the rise in interest rates.

债券-股票配置的基本问题

The Basic Problem of Bond-Stock Allocation

我们已经以最简洁的形式概述了防御型投资者的投资组合政策。*他应该将资金分配在高等级债券和高等级普通股之间。

We have already outlined in briefest form the portfolio policy of the defensive investor.* He should divide his funds between high-grade bonds and high-grade common stocks.

我们提出的一项基本指导原则是，投资者投资普通股的比例不应低于25%，也不应高于75%，而债券的比例则应在75%和25%之间。这意味着，两种主要投资媒介之间的标准分配应该是均等的，即50%对50%。按照传统，增加普通股比例的合理理由是，在长期熊市中出现了“便宜的价格”水平。相反，如果投资者认为市场价格已达到危险的高位，则合理的程序应该将普通股比例降至50%以下。

We have suggested as a fundamental guiding rule that the investor should never have less than 25% or more than 75% of his funds in common stocks, with a consequent inverse range of between 75% and 25% in bonds. There is an implication here that the standard division should be an equal one, or 50–50, between the two major investment mediums. According to tradition the sound reason for increasing the percentage in common stocks would be the appearance of the “bargain price” levels created in a protracted bear market. Conversely, sound procedure would call for reducing the common-stock component below 50% when in the judgment of the investor the market level has become dangerously high.

这些俗套的格言总是说起来容易做起来难——因为它们违背了导致牛市和熊市过度波动的人性。建议普通股东在市场上涨超过某个点位时减持，在相应下跌后增持，以此作为可行的策略，这几乎自相矛盾。正是因为普通人的操作方式（而且显然必须以相反的方式操作）才导致了我们过去经历了股市的大涨和大跌；而且——笔者相信——未来我们很可能还会经历这样的大涨和大跌。

These copybook maxims have always been easy to enunciate and always difficult to follow—because they go against that very human nature which produces that excesses of bull and bear markets. It is almost a contradiction in terms to suggest as a feasible policy for the average stockowner that he lighten his holdings when the market advances beyond a certain point and add to them after a corresponding decline. It is because the average man operates, and apparently must operate, in opposite fashion that we have had the great advances and collapses of the past; and—this writer believes—we are likely to have them in the future.

如果现在投资和投机操作之间的界限像过去一样清晰，我们或许可以设想投资者是一群精明且经验丰富的人，他们以高价将资产卖给那些不顾后果、倒霉的投机者，然后再以低迷的价格买回。这种图景在过去或许颇为逼真，但很难将其与1949年以来的金融发展联系起来。没有迹象表明像共同基金这样的专业运作方式也一直如此。两大基金类型——“平衡型”和“普通股型”——的股票投资组合比例逐年变化不大。它们的抛售行为主要是为了从前景不佳的持股转向前景较好的持股。

If the division between investment and speculative operations were as clear now as once it was, we might be able to envisage investors as a shrewd, experienced group who sell out to the heedless, hapless speculators at high prices and buy back from them at depressed levels. This picture may have had some verisimilitude in bygone days, but it is hard to identify it with financial developments since 1949. There is no indication that such professional operations as those of the mutual funds have been conducted in this fashion. The percentage of the portfolio held in equities by the two major types of funds—“balanced” and “common-stock”—has changed very little from year to year. Their selling activities have been largely related to endeavors to switch from less to more promising holdings.

如果像我们长期以来所认为的那样，股市已经脱离了旧有的界限，而新的界限尚未建立，那么我们就无法为投资者提供可靠的规则，让他们将普通股持股比例减持至25%的最低水平，然后再将其重新调整至75%的上限。我们强烈建议，除非投资者对其股票仓位的稳健性充满信心，并确信能够平静地看待1969-70年那样的市场下跌，否则一般来说，股票投资比例不应超过一半。我们很难理解，在1972年初的水平上，如此强烈的信心如何成立。因此，我们建议目前不要将超过50%的普通股投资比例设定在50%以下。但是，出于互补的原因，建议将该数字减少到 50% 以下几乎同样困难，除非投资者对当前的市场水平感到不安，并且愿意将其参与的任何进一步上涨限制在其总资金的 25% 以内。

If, as we have long believed, the stock market has lost contact with its old bounds, and if new ones have not yet been established, then we can give the investor no reliable rules by which to reduce his common-stock holdings toward the 25% minimum and rebuild them later to the 75% maximum. We can urge that in general the investor should not have more than one-half in equities unless he has strong confidence in the soundness of his stock position and is sure that he could view a market decline of the 1969–70 type with equanimity. It is hard for us to see how such strong confidence can be justified at the levels existing in early 1972. Thus we would counsel against a greater than 50% apportionment to common stocks at this time. But, for complementary reasons, it is almost equally difficult to advise a reduction of the figure well below 50%, unless the investor is disquieted in his own mind about the current market level, and will be satisfied also to limit his participation in any further rise to, say, 25% of his total funds.

因此，我们向大多数读者提出了一个看似过于简化的50-50方案。根据该方案，指导原则是尽可能保持债券和股票持有量的均等分配。当市场水平的变化使普通股比例上升到例如55%时，可以通过出售股票投资组合的1/11并将收益转入债券来恢复平衡。相反，如果普通股比例降至45%，则需要使用债券基金的1/11来购买更多股票。

We are thus led to put forward for most of our readers what may appear to be an oversimplified 50–50 formula. Under this plan the guiding rule is to maintain as nearly as practicable an equal division between bond and stock holdings. When changes in the market level have raised the common-stock component to, say, 55%, the balance would be restored by a sale of one-eleventh of the stock portfolio and the transfer of the proceeds to bonds. Conversely, a fall in the common-stock proportion to 45% would call for the use of one-eleventh of the bond fund to buy additional equities.

耶鲁大学在1937年之后的几年里也采取了类似的计划，但其目标是35%的普通股“正常持股”。然而，到了20世纪50年代初，耶鲁似乎放弃了曾经著名的策略，并在1969年将其投资组合的61%配置为股票（包括一些可转换债券）。（当时，71家此类机构的捐赠基金，总额达76亿美元，其中60.3%配置为普通股。）耶鲁的例子表明，市场大涨对曾经热门的股票市场造成了几乎致命的影响。公式化投资方法。尽管如此，我们坚信，我们这种50-50版本的方法对于防御型投资者来说非常有意义。它极其简单；它的目标毫无疑问是正确的；它让跟随者感觉自己至少在根据市场发展做出一些调整；最重要的是，随着市场上涨到越来越危险的高度，它会阻止他越来越沉迷于普通股。

Yale University followed a somewhat similar plan for a number of years after 1937, but it was geared around a 35% “normal holding” in common stocks. In the early 1950s, however, Yale seems to have given up its once famous formula, and in 1969 held 61% of its portfolio in equities (including some convertibles). (At that time the endowment funds of 71 such institutions, totaling $7.6 billion, held 60.3% in common stocks.) The Yale example illustrates the almost lethal effect of the great market advance upon the once popular formula approach to investment. Nonetheless we are convinced that our 50–50 version of this approach makes good sense for the defensive investor. It is extremely simple; it aims unquestionably in the right direction; it gives the follower the feeling that he is at least making some moves in response to market developments; most important of all, it will restrain him from being drawn more and more heavily into common stocks as the market rises to more and more dangerous heights.

此外，一个真正保守的投资者会满足于在市场上涨时其一半投资组合所呈现的收益，而在市场严重下跌时，他可能会从反思自己比许多更具冒险精神的朋友的境况好多少中获得很大的安慰。

Furthermore, a truly conservative investor will be satisfied with the gains shown on half his portfolio in a rising market, while in a severe decline he may derive much solace from reflecting how much better off he is than many of his more venturesome friends.

虽然我们提出的50-50分配方案无疑是最简单的“万能方案”，但就实际效果而言，它未必是最好的。（当然，任何方法，无论是机械的还是其他的，都不能保证一定比其他方法更好。）目前优质债券的收益远高于代表性股票，这是青睐债券成分的有力论据。投资者在50%或更低的股票配置比例之间做出选择，很可能主要取决于他自己的性格和态度。如果他能够冷静地权衡利弊，他很可能会在此时选择较低的25%股票配置比例，并考虑等到道琼斯工业平均指数股息收益率达到债券收益率的三分之二时，再确定债券和股票50-50的中位数配置比例。假设道琼斯工业平均指数以900点为起点，每股股息为36美元，那么这需要以下两种情况：一是应税债券收益率从7.5%降至5.5%左右，且主要股票的当前回报率保持不变；二是道琼斯工业平均指数跌至660点（债券收益率不变，股息亦不增加）。中间阶段的调整组合也能产生相同的“买入点”。这类方案并不特别复杂；难的是采用并坚持下去，更不用说它可能最终被证明过于保守了。

While our proposed 50–50 division is undoubtedly the simplest “all-purpose program” devisable, it may not turn out to be the best in terms of results achieved. (Of course, no approach, mechanical or otherwise, can be advanced with any assurance that it will work out better than another.) The much larger income return now offered by good bonds than by representative stocks is a potent argument for favoring the bond component. The investor’s choice between 50% or a lower figure in stocks may well rest mainly on his own temperament and attitude. If he can act as a cold-blooded weigher of the odds, he would be likely to favor the low 25% stock component at this time, with the idea of waiting until the DJIA dividend yield was, say, two-thirds of the bond yield before he would establish his median 50–50 division between bonds and stocks. Starting from 900 for the DJIA and dividends of $36 on the unit, this would require either a fall in taxable bond yields from 7½% to about 5.5% without any change in the present return on leading stocks, or a fall in the DJIA to as low as 660 if there is no reduction in bond yields and no increase in dividends. A combination of intermediate changes could produce the same “buying point.” A program of that kind is not especially complicated; the hard part is to adopt it and to stick to it, not to mention the possibility that it may turn out to have been much too conservative.

债券部分

The Bond Component

投资者投资组合中债券部分的发行选择将围绕两个主要问题：他应该购买应税债券还是免税债券，以及他应该购买短期或长期债券？税收决策主要取决于算术，取决于收益率与投资者税级之间的差异。1972 年 1 月，20 年期债券的选择是在“Aa 级”公司债券中获得 7.5% 的收益率，还是在优质免税债券中获得 5.3% 的收益率。（“市政债券”一词通常适用于所有类型的免税债券，包括州政府债券。）因此，对于这种期限的债券，从公司债券转向市政债券领域会损失约 30% 的收入。因此，如果投资者的最高税率高于 30%，那么选择市政债券可以获得税后净节省；如果他的最高税率低于 30%，则相反。单身人士在扣除各项税项后的收入超过 10,000 美元时开始支付 30% 的税率；对于已婚夫妇，当合并应税收入超过 20,000 美元时适用该税率。显然，很大一部分个人投资者从优质市政债券中获得的税后回报要高于优质公司债券。

The choice of issues in the bond component of the investor’s portfolio will turn about two main questions: Should he buy taxable or tax-free bonds, and should he buy shorter- or longer-term maturities? The tax decision should be mainly a matter of arithmetic, turning on the difference in yields as compared with the investor’s tax bracket. In January 1972 the choice in 20-year maturities was between obtaining, say, 7½% on “grade Aa” corporate bonds and 5.3% on prime tax-free issues. (The term “municipals” is generally applied to all species of tax-exempt bonds, including state obligations.) There was thus for this maturity a loss in income of some 30% in passing from the corporate to the municipal field. Hence if the investor was in a maximum tax bracket higher than 30% he would have a net saving after taxes by choosing the municipal bonds; the opposite, if his maximum tax was less than 30%. A single person starts paying a 30% rate when his income after deductions passes $10,000; for a married couple the rate applies when combined taxable income passes $20,000. It is evident that a large proportion of individual investors would obtain a higher return after taxes from good municipals than from good corporate bonds.

选择较长期限还是较短期限，涉及一个截然不同的问题：投资者是否希望确保债券价格不下跌，但代价是（1）年收益率降低，以及（2）失去本金价值大幅上涨的可能性？我们认为这个问题最好在第八章“投资者与市场波动”中讨论。

The choice of longer versus shorter maturities involves quite a different question, viz.: Does the investor want to assure himself against a decline in the price of his bonds, but at the cost of (1) a lower annual yield and (2) loss of the possibility of an appreciable gain in principal value? We think it best to discuss this question in Chapter 8, “The Investor and Market Fluctuations.”

过去许多年里，个人唯一明智的债券投资选择是美国储蓄债券。它们的安全性过去和现在都毋庸置疑；它们的回报率高于其他优质债券投资；它们拥有返还选择权和其他优惠，这极大地增加了它们的吸引力。在我们之前的版本中，我们用整整一章的篇幅来探讨“美国储蓄债券：投资者的福音”。

For a period of many years in the past the only sensible bond purchases for individuals were the U.S. savings issues. Their safety was—and is—unquestioned; they gave a higher return than other bond investments of first quality; they had a money-back option and other privileges which added greatly to their attractiveness. In our earlier editions we had an entire chapter entitled “U.S. Savings Bonds: A Boon to Investors.”

正如我们将要指出的，美国储蓄债券仍然具有某些独特的优势，使其适合任何个人投资者购买。对于资金有限（例如，投资债券的金额不超过1万美元）的人来说，我们认为储蓄债券仍然是最简单、最好的选择。但资金较多的人可能会发现其他投资方式更受欢迎。

As we shall point out, U.S. savings bonds still possess certain unique merits that make them a suitable purchase by any individual investor. For the man of modest capital—with, say, not more than $10,000 to put into bonds—we think they are still the easiest and the best choice. But those with larger funds may find other mediums more desirable.

让我们列出几种值得投资者考虑的主要债券类型，并从一般描述、安全性、收益率、市场价格、风险、所得税状况和其他特点方面简要讨论它们。

Let us list a few major types of bonds that deserve investor consideration, and discuss them briefly with respect to general description, safety, yield, market price, risk, income-tax status, and other features.

1. 美国储蓄债券，E系列和H系列。我们将首先概述其重要条款，然后简要讨论这些独特、诱人且极其便捷的投资方式的诸多优势。H系列债券与其他债券一样，每半年支付一次利息。第一年利率为4.29%，之后九年直至到期，利率均为5.10%。E系列债券不支付利息，而是通过赎回价值的增加而累积到持有人手中。债券以面值的75%出售，并在购买后5年10个月内以100%的利率到期。如果持有至到期，收益率为5%，每半年复利一次。如果提前赎回，收益率将从第一年的最低4.01%上升到之后4年半的平均5.20%。

1. U.S. savings bonds, Series E and Series H. We shall first summarize their important provisions, and then discuss briefly the numerous advantages of these unique, attractive, and exceedingly convenient investments. The Series H bonds pay interest semi-annually, as do other bonds. The rate is 4.29% for the first year, and then a flat 5.10% for the next nine years to maturity. Interest on the Series E bonds is not paid out, but accrues to the holder through increase in redemption value. The bonds are sold at 75% of their face value, and mature at 100% in 5 years 10 months after purchase. If held to maturity the yield works out at 5%, compounded semi-annually. If redeemed earlier, the yield moves up from a minimum of 4.01% in the first year to an average of 5.20% in the next 45⁄6 years.

债券利息需缴纳联邦所得税，但免征州所得税。E系列债券的联邦所得税可由持有人选择，在利息累积时（通过更高的赎回价值）每年缴纳，或等到债券实际处置后再缴纳。

Interest on the bonds is subject to Federal income tax, but is exempt from state income tax. However, Federal income tax on the Series E bonds may be paid at the holder’s option either annually as the interest accrues (through higher redemption value), or not until the bond is actually disposed of.

E 系列债券的持有者可随时（购买后不久）按当前赎回价值兑现债券。H 系列债券的持有者也有类似的权利按票面价值（成本）兑现债券。E 系列债券可以兑换为 H 系列债券，并具有一定的税收优惠。丢失、毁坏或被盗的债券可以免费更换。年度购买数量有限制，但允许家庭成员共同拥有的宽松规定使大多数投资者能够在能力范围内购买尽可能多的债券。评论：没有其他投资能够同时兼具 (1) 绝对保证本金和利息支付，(2) 有权随时要求全额“返还”，以及 (3) 保证至少 10 年内至少 5% 的利率。早期发行的 E 系列债券的持有者有权在到期时展期债券，从而以逐年递增的利率继续积累年价值。长期推迟缴纳所得税具有巨大的美元优势；我们估计，在典型情况下，它使实际税后净利率提高了三分之一。相反，以成本价或更优价格兑现债券的权利，使前几年低利率时期的购买者完全免受许多债券投资者遭遇的本金价值缩水的影响；换句话说，它让他们通过将低息债券以等额方式转换为高息债券，投资者有可能从利率上升中获益。

Owners of Series E bonds may cash them in at any time (shortly after purchase) at their current redemption value. Holders of Series H bonds have similar rights to cash them in at par value (cost). Series E bonds are exchangeable for Series H bonds, with certain tax advantages. Bonds lost, destroyed, or stolen may be replaced without cost. There are limitations on annual purchases, but liberal provisions for co-ownership by family members make it possible for most investors to buy as many as they can afford. Comment: There is no other investment that combines (1) absolute assurance of principal and interest payments, (2) the right to demand full “money back” at any time, and (3) guarantee of at least a 5% interest rate for at least ten years. Holders of the earlier issues of Series E bonds have had the right to extend their bonds at maturity, and thus to continue to accumulate annual values at successively higher rates. The deferral of income-tax payments over these long periods has been of great dollar advantage; we calculate it has increased the effective net-after-tax rate received by as much as a third in typical cases. Conversely, the right to cash in the bonds at cost price or better has given the purchasers in former years of low interest rates complete protection against the shrinkage in principal value that befell many bond investors; otherwise stated, it gave them the possibility of benefiting from the rise in interest rates by switching their low-interest holdings into very-high-coupon issues on an even-money basis.

我们认为，储蓄债券持有者现在享有的特殊优势将足以弥补其与其他直接政府债务相比较低的当前回报。

In our view the special advantages enjoyed by owners of savings bonds now will more than compensate for their lower current return as compared with other direct government obligations.

2. 其他美国债券。这类债券种类繁多，涵盖各种票面利率和到期日。所有这些债券的利息和本金支付都完全安全。它们需缴纳联邦所得税，但免征州所得税。1971年末，长期债券（期限超过十年）的平均收益率为6.09%，中期债券（期限为三至五年）的收益率为6.35%，短期债券的收益率为6.03%。

2. Other United States bonds. A profusion of these issues exists, covering a wide variety of coupon rates and maturity dates. All of them are completely safe with respect to payment of interest and principal. They are subject to Federal income taxes but free from state income tax. In late 1971 the long-term issues—over ten years—showed an average yield of 6.09%, intermediate issues (three to five years) returned 6.35%, and short issues returned 6.03%.

1970年，人们可以以大幅折扣购买许多旧债券。其中一些债券可以按面值兑换遗产税。例如：1990年到期的3.5年期美国国债就属于此类；它们在1970年的售价为60美元，但1970年收盘价高于77美元。

In 1970 it was possible to buy a number of old issues at large discounts. Some of these are accepted at par in settlement of estate taxes. Example: The U.S. Treasury 3½s due 1990 are in this category; they sold at 60 in 1970, but closed 1970 above 77.

值得注意的是，在许多情况下，美国政府的间接债务收益率远高于其同期限的直接债务收益率。本文撰写之际，出现了一笔7.05%的“由美国交通部部长全额担保的证书”的发行。该收益率比同年（1986年）到期的美国直接债务收益率高出整整1%。这些证书实际上是以宾夕法尼亚中央运输公司受托人的名义发行的，但它们的出售是基于美国司法部长的一份声明，该声明称，该担保“使美国承担一项一般性债务，由美国充分的信任和信用支持”。美国政府过去曾承担过相当多此类间接债务，并且所有债务都得到了严格的履行。

It is interesting to note also that in many cases the indirect obligations of the U.S. government yield appreciably more than its direct obligations of the same maturity. As we write, an offering appears of 7.05% of “Certificates Fully Guaranteed by the Secretary of Transportation of the Department of Transportation of the United States.” The yield was fully 1% more than that on direct obligations of the U.S., maturing the same year (1986). The certificates were actually issued in the name of the Trustees of the Penn Central Transportation Co., but they were sold on the basis of a statement by the U.S. Attorney General that the guarantee “brings into being a general obligation of the United States, backed by its full faith and credit.” Quite a number of indirect obligations of this sort have been assumed by the U.S. government in the past, and all of them have been scrupulously honored.

读者或许会疑惑，为什么所有这些花招，竟然牵涉到我们交通部长所谓的“个人担保”，最终却要加重纳税人的成本。这种间接做法的主要原因是国会对政府借款设定的债务上限。显然，政府的担保并不被视为债务——这对……来说，是语义上的意外之财。精明的投资者。这种情况的主要影响或许是免税住房管理局债券的诞生，这些债券享有相当于美国担保的待遇，并且几乎是唯一与政府债券相当的免税债券。另一类政府支持的债券是最近发行的新社区债券，其收益率在1971年9月达到7.60%。

The reader may wonder why all this hocus-pocus, involving an apparently “personal guarantee” by our Secretary of Transportation, and a higher cost to the taxpayer in the end. The chief reason for the indirection has been the debt limit imposed on government borrowing by the Congress. Apparently guarantees by the government are not regarded as debts—a semantic windfall for shrewder investors. Perhaps the chief impact of this situation has been the creation of tax-free Housing Authority bonds, enjoying the equivalent of a U.S. guarantee, and virtually the only tax-exempt issues that are equivalent to government bonds. Another type of government-backed issues is the recently created New Community Debentures, offered to yield 7.60% in September 1971.

3. 州和市政债券。这些债券免征联邦所得税。它们通常在发行州也免征所得税，但在其他地方则不然。它们要么是州或行政区的直接债务，要么是“收益债券”，其利息来源于收费公路、桥梁、建筑租赁等收入。并非所有免税债券都具有足够强的保护性，足以让防御型投资者购买。投资者可以参考穆迪或标准普尔对每只债券的评级来选择。两家机构给出的三个最高评级——Aaa（AAA）、Aa（AA）或A——足以表明其安全性。这些债券的收益率会随着债券质量和期限的不同而变化，期限越短，收益率越低。1971年末，标准普尔市政债券指数所代表的债券平均质量评级为AA，期限为20年，收益率为5.78%。新泽西州维恩兰市的典型债券评级为 AA（A 级），一年期债券收益率仅为 3%，而 1995 年和 1996 年到期的债券收益率上升至 5.8% ^。1

3. State and municipal bonds. These enjoy exemption from Federal income tax. They are also ordinarily free of income tax in the state of issue but not elsewhere. They are either direct obligations of a state or subdivision, or “revenue bonds” dependent for interest payments on receipts from a toll road, bridge, building lease, etc. Not all tax-free bonds are strongly enough protected to justify their purchase by a defensive investor. He may be guided in his selection by the rating given to each issue by Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s. One of the three highest ratings by both services—Aaa (AAA), Aa (AA), or A—should constitute a sufficient indication of adequate safety. The yield on these bonds will vary both with the quality and the maturity, with the shorter maturities giving the lower return. In late 1971 the issues represented in Standard & Poor’s municipal bond index averaged AA in quality rating, 20 years in maturity, and 5.78% in yield. A typical offering of Vineland, N.J., bonds, rated AA for A and gave a yield of only 3% on the one-year maturity, rising to 5.8% to the 1995 and 1996 maturities.¹

4. 公司债券。这些债券需缴纳联邦税和州税。1972年初，最高质量的25年期公司债券收益率为7.19%，这反映在穆迪Aaa公司债券指数公布的收益率中。所谓的中低等级债券（Baa级）的长期收益率为8.23%。在这两个等级中，短期债券的收益率略低于长期债券。

4. Corporation bonds. These bonds are subject to both Federal and state tax. In early 1972 those of highest quality yielded 7.19% for a 25-year maturity, as reflected in the published yield of Moody’s Aaa corporate bond index. The so-called lower-medium-grade issues—rated Baa—returned 8.23% for long maturities. In each class shorter-term issues would yield somewhat less than longer-term obligations.

评论。以上总结表明，普通投资者在高等级债券中拥有多种选择。高收入税率等级的投资者无疑可以从优质的免税债券中获得比应税债券更高的净收益。对于其他投资者而言，1972 年初的应税收益率范围似乎介于 5.00%（含特殊期权的美国储蓄债券）到 7.5%（高等级公司债券）之间。

Comment. The above summaries indicate that the average investor has several choices among high-grade bonds. Those in high income-tax brackets can undoubtedly obtain a better net yield from good tax-free issues than from taxable ones. For others the early 1972 range of taxable yield would seem to be from 5.00% on U.S. savings bonds, with their special options, to about 7½% on high-grade corporate issues.

高收益债券投资

Higher-Yielding Bond Investments

投资者可以通过牺牲债券质量来获得更高的收益回报。长期经验表明，普通投资者最好远离此类高收益债券。虽然总体而言，这类债券的总体回报可能略高于优质债券，但它们也使持有者面临过多的个别风险，这些风险可能带来不利影响，从令人不安的价格下跌到实际违约。（低等级债券中确实经常出现低价机会，但这些机会需要特殊的研究和技巧才能成功利用。）*

By sacrificing quality an investor can obtain a higher income return from his bonds. Long experience has demonstrated that the ordinary investor is wiser to keep away from such high-yield bonds. While, taken as a whole, they may work out somewhat better in terms of overall return than the first-quality issues, they expose the owner to too many individual risks of untoward developments, ranging from disquieting price declines to actual default. (It is true that bargain opportunities occur fairly often in lower-grade bonds, but these require special study and skill to exploit successfully.)*

或许我们应该在此补充一点，美国国会对直接发行美国债券的限制，为投资者购买政府支持债券创造了至少两种“讨价还价的机会”。一种是免税的“新住房债券”，另一种是近期发行的（应税的）“新社区债券”。1971年7月发行的“新住房债券”收益率高达5.8%，且免征联邦税和州税，而1971年9月发行的（应税的）“新社区债券”收益率高达7.60%。这两种债券都得到了美国政府的“充分信任和信用”支持，因此毫无疑问是安全的。而且——按净值计算——它们的收益率远高于普通美国债券。^*

Perhaps we should add here that the limits imposed by Congress on direct bond issues of the United States have produced at least two sorts of “bargain opportunities” for investors in the purchase of government-backed obligations. One is provided by the tax-exempt “New Housing” issues, and the other by the recently created (taxable) “New Community debentures.” An offering of New Housing issues in July 1971 yielded as high as 5.8%, free from both Federal and state taxes, while an issue of (taxable) New Community debentures sold in September 1971 yielded 7.60%. Both obligations have the “full faith and credit” of the United States government behind them and hence are safe without question. And—on a net basis—they yield considerably more than ordinary United States bonds.^*

代替债券的储蓄存款

Savings Deposits in Lieu of Bonds

投资者现在可以从商业银行或储蓄银行的储蓄存款（或银行存款证明）中获得与短期一级债券一样高的利率。银行储蓄账户的利率可能会降低但在目前条件下，它们是个人短期债券投资的适当替代品。*

An investor may now obtain as high an interest rate from a savings deposit in a commercial or savings bank (or from a bank certificate of deposit) as he can from a first-grade bond of short maturity. The interest rate on bank savings accounts may be lowered in the future, but under present conditions they are a suitable substitute for short-term bond investment by the individual.*

可转换债券

Convertible Issues

这些内容将在第16章中讨论。债券价格的一般波动性将在第8章“投资者与市场波动”中讨论。

These are discussed in Chapter 16. The price variability of bonds in general is treated in Chapter 8, “The Investor and Market Fluctuations.”

赎回条款

Call Provisions

在之前的版本中，我们对债券融资的这一方面进行了相当长的讨论，因为它涉及到对投资者严重但鲜为人知的不公平现象。通常情况下，债券在发行后不久即可赎回，而且赎回费会略高于发行价——比如5%。^*这意味着，在基础利率大幅波动期间，投资者必须承受所有不利因素的影响，而除了极少的有利因素外，几乎无法参与任何因素。

In previous editions we had a fairly long discussion of this aspect of bond financing, because it involved a serious but little noticed injustice to the investor. In the typical case bonds were callable fairly soon after issuance, and at modest premiums—say 5%—above the issue price.^* This meant that during a period of wide fluctuations in the underlying interest rates the investor had to bear the full brunt of unfavorable changes and was deprived of all but a meager participation in favorable ones.

例如：我们的标准案例是美国天然气电力公司发行的100年期5%债券，该债券于1928年以101美元的价格公开发行。四年后，在近乎恐慌的环境下，这些优质债券的价格跌至62.5美元，收益率为8%。到1946年，市场出现大逆转，此类债券的收益率仅为3%，而5%债券的报价应该接近160美元。但当时该公司利用了赎回条款，仅以106美元的价格赎回了债券。

Example: Our standard example has been the issue of American Gas & Electric 100-year 5% debentures, sold to the public at 101 in 1928. Four years later, under near-panic conditions, the price of these good bonds fell to 62½, yielding 8%. By 1946, in a great reversal, bonds of this type could be sold to yield only 3%, and the 5% issue should have been quoted at close to 160. But at that point the company took advantage of the call provision and redeemed the issue at a mere 106.

这些债券合约中的赎回条款，几乎可以说是“我赢你输”的翻版。最终，债券购买机构拒绝接受这种不公平的安排；近年来，大多数长期高息债券在发行后十年或更长时间内都享有不可赎回的保障。这仍然限制了它们可能的价格上涨，但并非不公平。

The call feature in these bond contracts was a thinly disguised instance of “heads I win, tails you lose.” At long last, the bond-buying institutions refused to accept this unfair arrangement; in recent years most long-term high-coupon issues have been protected against redemption for ten years or more after issuance. This still limits their possible price rise, but not inequitably.

从实际角度来说，我们为投资者提供长期问题建议牺牲少量收益率来获得不可赎回的保证——比如20年或25年。同样，以折扣价购买低息债券*，比购买以票面价格出售且几年后可赎回的高息债券更有优势。因为折扣——例如，利率为3.5%的债券，收益率为63.5%，收益率为7.85%——可以完全抵御不利的赎回行为。

In practical terms, we advise the investor in long-term issues to sacrifice a small amount of yield to obtain the assurance of noncallability—say for 20 or 25 years. Similarly, there is an advantage in buying a low-coupon bond* at a discount rather than a high-coupon bond selling at about par and callable in a few years. For the discount—e.g., of a 3½% bond at 63½%, yielding 7.85%—carries full protection against adverse call action.

直接优先股（即不可转换优先股）

Straight—i.e., Nonconvertible—Preferred Stocks

关于优先股，这里需要提出一些一般性的观点。真正优秀的优先股确实存在，但它们的投资形式本身就很糟糕，却也值得一提。典型的优先股股东的安全取决于公司支付普通股股息的能力和意愿。一旦普通股股息被忽略，甚至面临风险，股东自身的处境就会变得岌岌可危，因为除非董事也支付普通股股息，否则他们没有义务继续支付股息。另一方面，典型的优先股除了固定股息率外，不享有公司任何利润份额。因此，优先股股东既缺乏债券持有人（或债权人）的合法债权，也缺乏普通股股东（或合伙人）的盈利可能性。

Certain general observations should be made here on the subject of preferred stocks. Really good preferred stocks can and do exist, but they are good in spite of their investment form, which is an inherently bad one. The typical preferred shareholder is dependent for his safety on the ability and desire of the company to pay dividends on its common stock. Once the common dividends are omitted, or even in danger, his own position becomes precarious, for the directors are under no obligation to continue paying him unless they also pay on the common. On the other hand, the typical preferred stock carries no share in the company’s profits beyond the fixed dividend rate. Thus the preferred holder lacks both the legal claim of the bondholder (or creditor) and the profit possibilities of a common shareholder (or partner).

优先股法律地位的这些弱点往往会在经济萧条时期反复凸显。所有优先股中，只有一小部分能够如此稳固地维持其不容置疑的投资地位，无论市场如何变幻。经验告诉我们，购买优先股的时机是其价格因暂时的逆境而过度低迷的时候。（在这种时候，它们可能非常适合激进的投资者，但对于防御型投资者来说，它们可能过于另类。）

These weaknesses in the legal position of preferred stocks tend to come to the fore recurrently in periods of depression. Only a small percentage of all preferred issues are so strongly entrenched as to maintain an unquestioned investment status through all vicissitudes. Experience teaches that the time to buy preferred stocks is when their price is unduly depressed by temporary adversity. (At such times they may be well suited to the aggressive investor but too unconventional for the defensive investor.)

换句话说，要么低价买入，要么干脆不买。我们稍后会讨论可转换债券和类似的特权债券，它们具有一些特殊的盈利可能性。保守型投资组合通常不会选择这类债券。

In other words, they should be bought on a bargain basis or not at all. We shall refer later to convertible and similarly privileged issues, which carry some special possibilities of profits. These are not ordinarily selected for a conservative portfolio.

优先地位的另一个特点是股票值得一提。对于公司投资者来说，股票的纳税条件比个人投资者好得多。公司只需就其股息收入的15%缴纳所得税，但其普通利息收入则全额缴纳所得税。由于1972年的公司税率为48%，这意味着收到的100美元优先股股息仅需缴纳7.20美元的税款，而收到的100美元债券利息则需缴纳48美元的税款。另一方面，个人投资者对优先股投资缴纳的税款与对债券利息缴纳的税款完全相同，除了最近一项小额豁免。因此，严格来说，所有投资级优先股都应该由公司购买，就像所有免税债券都应该由缴纳所得税的投资者购买一样。*

Another peculiarity in the general position of preferred stocks deserves mention. They have a much better tax status for corporation buyers than for individual investors. Corporations pay income tax on only 15% of the income they receive in dividends, but on the full amount of their ordinary interest income. Since the 1972 corporate rate is 48%, this means that $100 received as preferred-stock dividends is taxed only $7.20, whereas $100 received as bond interest is taxed $48. On the other hand, individual investors pay exactly the same tax on preferred-stock investments as on bond interest, except for a recent minor exemption. Thus, in strict logic, all investment-grade preferred stocks should be bought by corporations, just as all tax-exempt bonds should be bought by investors who pay income tax.*

安全表格

Security Forms

如上所述，债券和优先股的形式都很好理解，而且相对简单。债券持有人有权在确定的日期获得固定利息和本金。优先股持有人有权获得固定股息，且不得超过固定股息，股息必须在任何普通股股息之前支付。其本金价值不会在任何指定日期到期。（股息可以是累积的，也可以是非累积的。持有人可能有或没有投票权。）

The bond form and the preferred-stock form, as hitherto discussed, are well-understood and relatively simple matters. A bondholder is entitled to receive fixed interest and payment of principal on a definite date. The owner of a preferred stock is entitled to a fixed dividend, and no more, which must be paid before any common dividend. His principal value does not come due on any specified date. (The dividend may be cumulative or noncumulative. He may or may not have a vote.)

以上描述了标准条款，以及大多数债券和优先股发行，但这些形式也存在无数差异。最著名的类型是可转换债券和类似债券，以及收益债券。在收益债券中，除非公司赚取利息，否则无需支付利息。（未付利息可能会累积，以抵消未来收益，但期限通常限制为三年。）

The above describes the standard provisions and, no doubt, the majority of bond and preferred issues, but there are innumerable departures from these forms. The best-known types are convertible and similar issues, and income bonds. In the latter type, interest does not have to be paid unless it is earned by the company. (Unpaid interest may accumulate as a charge against future earnings, but the period is often limited to three years.)

企业应该更广泛地使用收益债券。避免使用收益债券显然源于经济史上的一个偶然事件——即，它们最初是在铁路重组中大量使用的。因此，它们从一开始就与财务疲软和投资状况不佳联系在一起。但这种债券本身具有一些实际优势，尤其是与近年来发行的众多（可转换）优先股相比，并可替代后者。其中最主要的是，支付的利息可以从公司应税收入中扣除，这实际上将这种资本形式的成本降低了一半。从投资者的角度来看，在大多数情况下，对他来说最好的选择可能是：(1)公司赚取利息时，他拥有无条件获得利息的权利；(2) 如果公司未赚取和支付利息，他拥有获得破产程序以外其他形式保护的权利。收益债券的条款可以根据借款人和贷款人双方的利益进行调整，以使其最适合双方。（当然，也可以包括转换特权。）所有人都接受本质上较弱的优先股形式，而拒绝更强大的收益债券形式，这充分表明，尽管新形势要求新的视角，但华尔街的传统制度和习惯往往依然顽固不化。每当乐观或悲观的浪潮涌来，我们都准备抛弃历史和久经考验的原则，但我们却顽固地、毫无疑问地坚持自己的偏见。

Income bonds should be used by corporations much more extensively than they are. Their avoidance apparently arises from a mere accident of economic history—namely, that they were first employed in quantity in connection with railroad reorganizations, and hence they have been associated from the start with financial weakness and poor investment status. But the form itself has several practical advantages, especially in comparison with and in substitution for the numerous (convertible) preferred-stock issues of recent years. Chief of these is the deductibility of the interest paid from the company’s taxable income, which in effect cuts the cost of that form of capital in half. From the investor’s standpoint it is probably best for him in most cases that he should have (1) an unconditional right to receive interest payments when they are earned by the company, and (2) a right to other forms of protection than bankruptcy proceedings if interest is not earned and paid. The terms of income bonds can be tailored to the advantage of both the borrower and the lender in the manner best suited to both. (Conversion privileges can, of course, be included.) The acceptance by everybody of the inherently weak preferred-stock form and the rejection of the stronger income-bond form is a fascinating illustration of the way in which traditional institutions and habits often tend to persist on Wall Street despite new conditions calling for a fresh point of view. With every new wave of optimism or pessimism, we are ready to abandon history and time-tested principles, but we cling tenaciously and unquestioningly to our prejudices.

第四章评论

Commentary on Chapter 4

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

我不能主宰事物，所以我主宰自己；如果事物不适应我，我就适应事物。

Not being able to rule events, I rule myself, and adapt myself to them if they do not adapt themselves to me.

—米歇尔·德·蒙田¹

—Michel de Montaigne¹

作为一名防御型投资者，最难的部分在于如何保护自己免受自身伤害。大多数传统的投资智慧都聚焦于“该做什么”。而聪明的投资者则将大部分精力放在“不该做什么”上。

The hardest part of being a defensive investor is defending yourself from yourself. Most conventional investing wisdom focuses on what to do. Intelligent investors focus most of their energy on what not to do.

这不是测试

This Is Not a Test

你应该承担多大的风险？

How much risk should you take?

传统的答案取决于财务顾问所说的“风险承受能力”，这是一个模糊的概念，他们通常通过问你六个问题来衡量，其中包括这个荒谬的问题：如果股市下跌 20%，你会卖出、持有还是买入？

The conventional answer depends on what financial advisers call your “risk tolerance,” a nebulous concept they often measure by asking you as few as a half dozen questions, including this nonsensical favorite: If the stock market dropped 20%, would you sell, hold, or buy more?

当市场平静时，你很容易说你会在市场崩溃时买入更多，就像你可能会说你当然会冲进一座燃烧的建筑物去救里面的人一样。

When markets are calm, it’s easy to say you’d buy more in a market crash, the same way you might say of course you’d rush into a burning building to rescue the people inside.

然而，说“你会冲进一栋着火的大楼”比“冲进一栋着火的大楼”容易得多。说“你会在市场崩盘时买入股票”比“真的买入股票”容易得多。

However, saying you’ll run into a burning building is a lot easier than running into a burning building. And saying you’ll buy stocks in a market crash is a lot easier than doing it.

市场崩溃并不是一场测验。

A market crash is not a quiz.

当你手机上的每只股票价格都像血红色一样闪闪发光时，头条新闻都是世界末日般的报道，市场专家在电视上尖叫着说你应该在为时已晚之前卖掉所有东西，而你的家人恳求你不要再把钱扔进火里，购买更多的东西并不是一种虚张声势的行为；这是一种恐惧。

When every stock price is blazing bloodred on your phone, the headlines are apocalyptic, market pundits are shrieking on television that you should sell everything before it’s too late, and your family is begging you to stop throwing money into the flames, buying more isn’t an act of bravado; it’s terrifying.

你对风险的承受能力并非一生中都保持不变，甚至可能并非时时刻刻都保持不变。正因如此，格雷厄姆警告投资者，不要根据你（或你的理财顾问）认为你能承受的风险来选择投资组合。

Your tolerance for risk doesn’t stay constant most of your life. It might not even stay constant from hour to hour. That’s why Graham warns against picking your portfolio based on how much risk you (or your financial adviser) think you can stomach.

你的“风险承受能力”失控了

Your “Risk Tolerance” Is Out of Control

经济学家和心理学家已经证明，你愿意在任何时候承担多大的财务风险取决于：

Economists and psychologists have shown that how much financial risk you’re willing to take at any moment depends on:

股市最近表现如何；
how well the stock market has done lately;
您自己的投资最近表现如何；
how well your own investments have done lately;
无论您是单独投资还是作为团体投资；
whether you’re investing alone or as part of a group;
无论你感到高兴、愤怒、悲伤、焦虑、恐惧还是厌恶；
whether you’re feeling happy, angry, sad, anxious, fearful, or disgusted;
您在 18 岁至 25 岁之间拥有多少钱；
how much money you had between the ages of 18 and 25;
您来自哪个国家或文化；
which country or culture you come from;
股票价格以数字 4、8 还是 9 结尾；
whether stock prices end in the digits 4, 8, or 9;
你投资的钱是从哪里来的？
where you got the money you’re investing;
现在是一年中的什么时候？
what time of year it is;
现在是一天中的什么时间？
what time of day it is;
你的睡眠质量如何；
how well you slept;
您上次吃饭是什么时候？
how long ago you last ate;
阳光是否照耀；
whether the sun is shining;
您最近读到过有关飞机失事的报道；
how recently you read about an airplane crash;
您最喜欢的运动队是否赢得了这场重要比赛。
whether your favorite sports team won or lost the big game.

这些只是已确定的几个因素。它们都提醒我们，如果没有政策和程序的指导，你将受制于市场不断变化的情绪——以及你自己的情绪^。1

These are just a few of the factors that have been identified. They’re all a reminder that, without policies and procedures to guide you, you will be at the mercy of the market’s ever-changing moods—and your own.¹

¹ Elke U. Weber 和 Joachim Klement，“风险承受能力和环境”，bit.ly/45dJzp1。

¹ Elke U. Weber and Joachim Klement, “Risk Tolerance and Circumstances,” bit.ly/45dJzp1.

防御型与进取型

Defensive versus Enterprising

基于人们风险承受能力稳定的错误假设，财务顾问通常会提供“保守”、“中等”或“激进”的投资组合，其风险取决于股票敞口。保守型投资组合的股票配置比例可能不超过40%；中等型投资组合的股票配置比例为60%；激进型投资组合的股票配置比例则为80%或更多。

Based on the faulty assumption that people’s risk tolerance is stable, financial advisers often offer “conservative,” “moderate,” or “aggressive” portfolios whose riskiness is defined by their exposure to stocks. A conservative portfolio might have no more than 40% in stocks; a moderate allocation, 60%; an aggressive basket, 80% or more.

格雷厄姆认为这简直荒唐。当股市飙升时，“保守”投资者就会忘记自己曾经想要避免损失。他们开始嫉妒那些本来可以赚到的收益，如果他们当时持有的股票比那区区40%还要多的话。他们迫切地想要弥补失去的时间，厌倦了听别人吹嘘自己如何致富，于是在股市崩盘前紧急买入股票。

Graham thinks this is ludicrous. When the stock market soars, “conservative” investors forget they ever wanted protection against loss. They become consumed with envy over the gains they would have earned if only they’d had more than that measly 40% in stocks. Desperate to make up for lost time, sick of listening to other people brag about getting rich, they buy stocks urgently—right before a crash.

市场崩盘后，“激进”的投资者忘记了他们最初尽可能多赚钱的目标。财富的崩盘让他们感到震惊，他们逃离股市，涌向安全的现金。股价高涨时，他们像狮子一样勇敢，股价低迷时，他们却变成了老鼠。

After the market crashes, “aggressive” investors forget their original goal of making as much money as possible. Reeling from the wreckage of their wealth, they flee stocks and rush into the safety of cash. Brave as lions when stocks were expensive, they morph into mice when stocks become cheap.

格雷厄姆没有使用关于风险承受能力的虚假概念，而是提出了不同的区分：你应该承担多大的风险取决于你愿意并能够在投资中投入多少时间和“多少智力努力”。

Instead of using phony notions about risk tolerance, Graham draws a different distinction: How much risk you should take depends on how much time and “the amount of intelligent effort” you’re willing and able to put into investing.

如果你太忙，或者觉得自己没有资格投入比读这本书更多的时间和精力，那么格雷厄姆建议你把自己视为一名防御型投资者。这意味着你不必为此付出努力。

If you’re too busy or don’t feel qualified to put in much more time and effort than it takes to read this book, then Graham wants you to consider yourself a defensive investor. That means you don’t have to bother working hard at it.

这并不意味着成为一名防御型投资者很容易。你需要自律地遵守投资政策声明（参见此处）。你还必须接受这样的事实：牛市终将把你抛在身后，你认识的人总会比你赚得更多，最重要的是，你不知道——也不在乎——金融市场将会如何发展。

That doesn’t mean being a defensive investor is easy. You will need to muster the discipline to follow an investment policy statement (see here). You also must accept that bull markets will leave you behind, that someone you know will always be making more money than you, and above all that you don’t know—and don’t care—what the financial markets are going to do.

但你完全不应该因为决定自己是一名防御型投资者而感到羞耻。这并不是承认自己的软弱，推卸责任，或承认自己不够聪明或不够熟练。这只是承认，为了追求更高的回报而支付更高的费用和成本是浪费金钱，除非你也能投入时间和精力，成为一名进取型投资者。

But you should feel no shame whatsoever in deciding you’re a defensive investor. It isn’t a confession of weakness, an abdication of responsibility, or an admission that you aren’t smart or skillful. It’s simply a recognition that incurring higher fees and costs in pursuit of superior returns is a waste of money unless you can also commit the time and effort it takes to be an enterprising investor.

另一方面，如果您喜欢研究企业和分析财务报表，那么您可能是一个有进取心的投资者。

On the other hand, if you enjoy studying businesses and analyzing financial statements, then you probably are an enterprising investor.

您也需要一份正式的投资政策。

You, too, will need a formal investment policy.

您不仅需要投入金钱，还需要投入大量的时间和精力。

And you will have to invest not only your money but also a lot of your time and energy.

首先，在进行任何投资之前以及持有期间，你都必须深入探究。你必须更深入地分析自己，创造一个持续学习的环境，使你能够识别自己的错误，从反馈中获益，并制定并遵循一致的规则^。2

First, you will have to probe deeply into any investment before you make it and so long as you continue to own it. You will have to analyze yourself even more deeply, creating a continuous learning environment that will enable you to identify your mistakes, benefit from feedback, and develop and follow consistent rules.²

格雷厄姆区分防御型投资者和进取型投资者的妙处在于——与你所谓的风险承受能力不同——它不会仅仅因为市场大幅上涨或下跌而改变。防御型投资者在股市飙升时，比“保守型”投资者更少地担心错失良机；而进取型投资者在股市暴跌时，比“激进型”投资者更有可能保持自律。

The beauty of Graham’s distinction between defensive and enterprising investors is that—unlike your purported risk tolerance—it isn’t prone to change just because the markets make a big move up or down. A defensive investor is much less likely than a “conservative” investor to suffer the fear of missing out when stocks soar, and an enterprising investor is much more likely than an “aggressive” one to remain disciplined when stocks crumble.

更好的问题

Better Questions

以下一些问题可以帮助您开始获得有关您应该在股票上投入多少钱的诚实答案。

Here are some questions that can help you start getting honest answers about how much money you should have in stocks.

我的情况、偏好和目标是什么？

What are my circumstances, preferences, and objectives?

年龄
Age
婚姻状况
Marital status
配偶或伴侣的收入或盈利潜力
Income or earnings potential of spouse or partner
预期工作保障
Expected job security
我是否拥有、租赁或计划购买房屋？
Do I own, rent, or plan to buy a home?
我是否有孩子并需要支付学费？
Do I or will I have children and tuition to pay?
我会继承钱财吗？还是我需要赡养父母？
Will I inherit money or will I need to provide for my parents?
我的雇主赞助的退休计划有多充足？
How ample is my employer-sponsored retirement plan?
我对投资产生固定收入的依赖程度如何？
How reliant am I on my investments to produce regular income?
我有多少物质资本？我的人力资本还能增长多少？（见此处）
How much physical capital do I have? How much can I make my human capital grow? (see here)

在过去的市场低迷时期我做了什么？

What did I do during past down markets?

衡量你在下一次崩盘中如何表现的最佳指标，就是你在上一次崩盘中的表现。我们都倾向于改写自己的历史，让自己在记忆中比现实中更加勇敢。如果你还记得2008-09年的金融危机，你很可能会以为自己买入了更多股票，而实际上你只是抛售或冻结了。你或许也会觉得自己在2020年新冠疫情崩盘期间买入了更多股票，而实际上你却因为害怕而什么都不敢做。

The best guide to how you’ll behave in the next crash is how you behaved in the last one. We all tend to rewrite our own history, making ourselves braver in memory than we were in reality. If you can recall the financial crisis of 2008–09, you may well believe you bought more stock when, in fact, you sold or froze. You might also feel you bought more during the Covid crash of 2020 when you were, in real time, too scared to do anything.

翻出你之前的账户报表。如果你在过去的股市崩盘中抛售或袖手旁观，那么下次股市崩盘时你很可能也会这么做。现在不要将你的股票敞口提高到高于当时的水平。

Dig up your old account statements. If you sold or sat on your hands in past crashes, you probably will in the next one. Don’t raise your stock exposure now above where it was then.

我的目标有多灵活？

How flexible are my goals?

你承受风险的能力部分取决于你拥有多少钱以及能赚多少钱，但也取决于你对未来支出时间的控制力。如果你无法推迟购买昂贵的房产，或者你的孩子必须上私立学校，那么你承担风险的能力就会比你的现金余额所暗示的更为有限。始终持有足够的现金来满足至少6到12个月的支出需求，将提高你的灵活性。

Your ability to withstand risk depends partly on how much money you have and can earn—but also on how much control you have over the timing of your future spending. If you can’t defer buying that expensive house or your children must attend private schools, your capacity for taking risk is more limited than your cash balance might imply. Always having enough cash to cover at least six to 12 months of your spending needs will improve your flexibility.

我对我的投资组合中其余部分的风险了解多少？

How well do I understand the risks in the rest of my portfolio?

许多理财顾问都劝说客户投资新兴市场债务、银行贷款基金和非交易房地产等资产。在危机时期，这些能带来收益但风险较高的投资的跌幅可能至少与美国股市相当。如果利率上升，长期债券，甚至美国国债，都将遭受巨额损失。如果您急需现金，私募股权、风险投资、对冲基金和其他“另类资产”等热门持仓可能难以出售。如果这些投资已经取代了您投资组合中的现金和中短期政府债券，那么您抵御股市崩盘的能力将比您想象的更弱。

Many financial advisers have talked their clients into assets like emerging-market debt, bank-loan funds, and non-traded real estate. In a crisis, these income-producing but risky investments may go down at least as much as U.S. stocks. Long-term bonds, even U.S. Treasuries, will suffer steep losses if interest rates rise. Trendy holdings such as private equity, venture capital, hedge funds, and other “alternative assets” can be difficult to sell if you need cash in a hurry. If such investments have supplanted cash and short-to-medium-term government bonds in your portfolio, you’re less able to withstand a stock crash than you think.

我是否已经将规则变成了习惯？

Have I turned rules into habits?

在市场平静的时候，人性本能地相信自己会在一时冲动下做出正确的选择。然而，在市场崩盘时，意志力却毫无价值。只有当你将有益的规则付诸实践，直到它们成为良好的习惯时，你才能保持冷静。如果你在牛市期间每天多次查看投资组合的价值，你就养成了一个有害的习惯——如果你认为自己在熊市期间不会惊慌失措地抛售，那你就是在自欺欺人。

It’s human nature to believe, when times are calm, that you will do the right thing in the heat of the moment. In a market crash, however, willpower is worthless. You can stay calm only if you have practiced beneficial rules until they’ve become good habits. If you check the value of your portfolio multiple times a day during a bull market, you’ve formed a toxic habit—and you’re kidding yourself if you think you won’t freak out and sell during a bear market.

IPS 基础知识

The ABCs of an IPS

投资政策声明（IPS）是一份正式文件，阐明您的投资情况、偏好和目标。它解释了您计划如何实现目标、做出重大决策以及如何衡量进度。它还能不断提醒您承诺不做的事情。

An investment policy statement, or IPS, is a formal document that spells out your investing circumstances, preferences, and goals. It explains how you plan to achieve your objectives, make significant decisions, and measure your progress. It also serves as a constant reminder of what you’re committing not to do.

每份投资计划 (IPS) 都独一无二，如同每位投资者一样。您应该根据自身需求和情况定制以下通用模板，并根据需要进行修改^。3

Every IPS, like every investor, is unique. You should customize the following generic template to your own needs and circumstances, changing it as much as necessary.³

从使命宣言开始：

Start with a mission statement:

该投资组合的首要目标是长期增长，最终期限为____年，以保障我们自己、子孙后代未来几十年的开支。我们将耐心谨慎地追求这一目标，不承担不必要的风险，也绝不追求短期收益最大化。次要目标是提供定期收入。主要决策者是____________和____________。

The primary objective of this portfolio is long-term growth, with an ultimate horizon of ____ years, to help fund the coming decades’ expenses for ourselves, for our children, and for our grandchildren. We will pursue this goal with patience and prudence, taking no unnecessary risks and never seeking to maximize short-term returns. The secondary objective will be to provide regular income. The primary decision-makers will be ____________ and ____________.

然后拼出结构：

Then spell out structure:

投资组合将高度多元化。基于对以下资产的目标、约束条件和合理收益预期的仔细评估，我们将配置__%现金、__%债券、__%美国股票、__%国际股票、__%上市房地产以及__%_________的资产。每项配置都将高度多元化，最低持有___个标的资产。我们绝不会使用保证金或其他借款。4^我们将持有足够的现金，以支付至少六个月的开支。

The portfolio will be broadly diversified. Based on a careful review of our objectives, constraints, and reasonable expectations for returns on the following assets, it will allocate __% to cash, __% to bonds, __% to U.S. stocks, __% to international stocks, __% to public real estate, and __% to _________. Each allocation will be broadly diversified, with a minimum of ___ underlying holdings. We will never use margin or other borrowed money.⁴ We will maintain enough cash to cover at least six months of expenses.

然后描述实现：

Then describe implementation:

我们将通过每年____次再平衡和平均成本法来增强耐心。我们将以最低成本而非最高收益来选择共同基金、ETF 和其他投资产品。包括所有费用和交易成本在内的年度总支出不得超过 1%。我们绝不会仅仅因为价格上涨而买入任何资产，也不会仅仅因为价格下跌而卖出。所有买卖都必须完全符合我们清单中的标准，该清单必须在任何交易前填写。如果我们拥有“疯狂资金”账户，其资金将不超过我们金融资本的 5%，并将与我们其他资产隔离存放在独立的金融机构；无论盈利还是亏损，我们都不得向该账户注入更多资金^。5

We will bolster our patience by rebalancing ____ times per year and by dollar-cost averaging. We will select mutual funds, ETFs, and other investments by the lowest cost, not by the highest return. Total annual expenses, including all fees and trading costs, must not exceed 1%. We will never buy any asset only because its price has gone up or sell only because its price has gone down. All purchases and sales must fully conform to the criteria in our checklist, which must be filled out before any trade. If we have a “mad money” account, it will be funded with no more than 5% of our financial capital and will be segregated at a separate financial institution from the rest of our assets; under no circumstances of either gain or loss can we add more money to it.⁵

最后讨论监控：

Finally, discuss monitoring:

我们每年将更新所有持仓的价值不超过四次。我们将根据________基准衡量业绩，首先评估多年回报，最后评估近期回报。

We will update the value of all our holdings no more than four times a year. We will measure performance relative to the ________ benchmarks, evaluating multiyear returns first and recent returns last.

我们每年都会审查一次该 IPS，以考虑我们的情况、偏好或目标是否发生了变化。

Once a year we will review this IPS to consider whether our circumstances, preferences, or objectives have changed.

任何违反本 IPS 的行为均须以书面形式说明理由，并经所有相关方同意。

Any departure from this IPS must be justified in writing and agreed to by everyone who is a party to it.

我经常半开玩笑地建议投资者，应该把打印好的IPS原件放在标有“火灾时，请打破玻璃”的红色应急箱里。如果你不先用锤子砸开玻璃箱，就无法重写文件的任何细节，那么下次市场下跌时，你会犹豫是否要冲动地更改它。

I’ve often suggested, only half-jokingly, that investors should keep the printed original of their IPS in one of those red emergency boxes labeled IN CASE OF FIRE, BREAK GLASS. If you can’t rewrite any detail of the document unless you first smash open its glass case with a hammer, you’ll hesitate before impulsively changing it the next time the market goes down.

被动还是主动？

Passive or Active?

如果你是一位防御型投资者，就不应该费心挑选特定股票或试图跑赢大盘。如果你无法投入时间和精力，那么尝试一些不可能成功的事情就毫无意义。

If you’re a defensive investor, you shouldn’t bother picking specific stocks or attempting to beat the market. If you can’t commit the time and effort, there’s no point trying to do something you won’t succeed at.

幸运的是，通过选择承认自己是防御型投资者，您并不会排除获得良好结果的可能性。

Fortunately, by choosing to admit that you’re a defensive investor, you don’t preclude the possibility of good results.

一旦你放弃尝试挑选特定股票并试图击败市场，你就可以拥有所有股票并匹配市场走势。指数基金几乎涵盖了标准普尔500指数或MSCI全球指数等基准指数中的所有成分股。通过它们，你可以始终拥有所有股票。赢家不断增长，输家不断萎缩，你无需交易。

Once you renounce attempting to pick specific stocks and trying to beat the market, you can own all the stocks and match the market. Index funds own practically everything in a benchmark like the S&P 500 or the MSCI All-Country World Index. Through them, you own all the stocks all the time. The winners grow and the losers fade, and you never need to trade.

由于指数基金的运营成本几乎为零，其低廉的费用意味着几乎所有的市场回报都会流向你。这反过来又意味着它们的表现优于大多数承担高额交易和研究费用的投资者。随着时间的推移，指数基金的回报率往往高于至少三分之二的专业投资者。格雷厄姆本人就是最早倡导指数投资的人之一^。6

Because index funds cost almost nothing to run, their low expenses mean nearly all the market’s return flows through to you. That, in turn, means they outperform most investors who incur high trading and research expenses. Over time, index funds tend to earn higher returns than at least two-thirds of professional investors. Graham himself was one of the earliest advocates of indexing.⁶

作为一名防御型投资者，您可以购买指数基金，终身持有，几乎无需再做出任何重大投资决策。更棒的是，您可以放心，从长远来看，您的收益会比大多数专业人士更好——而且成本和麻烦只是专业人士的一小部分。

As a defensive investor, you could buy an index fund, hold it for the rest of your life, and almost never need to make another significant investing decision. Even better, you could rest assured that in the long run you’d do better than most professionals—at a fraction of the cost and aggravation.

恢复平衡

Regaining Your Balance

作为一名防御型投资者，您还需要另一种武器。

As a defensive investor, you need yet another weapon in your arsenal.

低买高卖：这是投资最基本的原则之一。但即使你只持有指数基金，你最终也可能做出相反的选择：高买低卖。

Buy low, sell high: That’s one of the most basic principles of investing. But even if you own only index funds, you still might end up doing the opposite: buying high and selling low.

人类大脑的工作方式是，高买低卖感觉自然且必要，而低买高卖感觉可怕且错误。

The way the human brain works, buying high and selling low feel natural and necessary, while buying low and selling high feel frightening and wrong.

高价买入可能会让人兴奋不已，尤其是在你正处于顺风顺水的时候。如果市场突然反转，那么低价卖出往往感觉像是阻止你的财富陷入亏损黑洞的唯一方法。当我们投资时，我们的神经回路会自动让一些有害的行为变得比有益的行为更容易^。7

Buying high can be thrilling, especially when you’re on a hot streak. If the market flips on you, then selling low often feels like the only way to stop your wealth from being sucked into a black hole of loss. When we invest, our neural circuitry automatically makes some harmful actions easier than beneficial behavior.⁷

为了防范这种追逐业绩的怪圈，格雷厄姆提出了一条简单的规则：“股票投资比例永远不要低于25%或高于75%”。这也意味着，债券投资比例永远不要高于75%或低于25%。当股票价格以历史标准衡量显得便宜时，你应该增持股票；当股票价格显得昂贵时，你应该减持股票；大多数时候，你应该倾向于股票和债券各占一半的“标准比例” ^。8

To guard against that cycle of performance chasing, Graham suggests a simple rule: “Never have less than 25% or more than 75%” of your assets in stocks. That also means you should never have more than 75% or less than 25% in bonds. You would hold more in stocks when they appear cheap by historical standards and less when they seem expensive; most of the time, you would favor a 50–50 “standard division” between stocks and bonds.⁸

正如我在第三章的评论中所解释的那样，你永远无法确定股市是被高估还是低估，所以格雷厄姆规则会阻止你采取孤注一掷的策略。当股价上涨了一倍或两倍，你可能会因为确信股价还会进一步上涨而试图将所有资金投入其中时，格雷厄姆规则仍然要求你止损于75%——以防万一你判断失误。即使市场崩盘，似乎即将崩盘，格雷厄姆规则仍然不允许你的持股比例低于25%——以防你再次犯错。

Because, as I explained in the Commentary on Chapter 3, you can never be certain that the stock market is overvalued or undervalued, Graham’s rule prevents you from ever taking an all-or-nothing approach. When stocks have doubled or tripled and you might be tempted to put all your money in them because you’re sure they’re going up even more, his rule still requires you to stop at 75%—just in case you’re wrong. And even when the market is crashing and seems to be heading to oblivion, Graham’s rule still won’t permit you to go below 25% in stocks—just in case you’re wrong again.

如今，格雷厄姆的策略相当于“再平衡”，即设定总资产中股票持有比例的目标值。每年一次，或在股市大幅上涨或下跌后，通过卖出部分涨幅最大的资产并买入部分跌幅最大的资产，将你的持股比例重置到目标值。进行足够的调整以恢复你的目标比例。再平衡的最佳场所是你的退休账户，在那里出售股票不会立即引发税务后果^。9

Today’s equivalent of Graham’s policy is rebalancing, a procedure that sets a target proportion of your total assets to keep in stocks. Once a year, or after any big rise or fall in the stock market, reset your holdings back to your targets by selling some of whichever asset has gone up the most and buying some of whichever has gone down the most. Adjust enough to restore your target percentages. The best place to rebalance is in your retirement account, where sales won’t trigger immediate tax consequences.⁹

为了简单起见，我们假设您的资产由两只广泛分散的交易所交易指数基金组成，一只持有股票，另一只持有债券。在您的投资策略中，您设定了目标一半投资股票，一半投资债券。10^如果股票下跌 20%，债券上涨 20%，那么重新平衡的情况将是这样的：

For simplicity’s sake, let’s assume your assets consist of two broadly diversified exchange-traded index funds, one holding stocks and the other holding bonds. In your investment policy, you’ve set your target allocation at half in stocks, half in bonds.¹⁰ If stocks fall 20% and bonds gain 20%, here’s what rebalancing would look like:

你不是情绪化地高买低卖，而是自动低买高卖。你让市场成为你的仆人，而不是你的主人。

Rather than emotionally buying high and selling low, you’re automatically buying low and selling high. And you’re making the market your servant instead of your master.

毕竟，作为一名防御型投资者的最终目标不是免于努力，而是免于担忧。

After all, the ultimate goal of being a defensive investor isn’t freedom from effort; it’s freedom from worry.

表 4-1：重新平衡法案

TABLE 4-1: Rebalancing Act

第五章

Chapter 5 防御型投资者和普通股

The Defensive Investor and Common Stocks

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

普通股的投资价值

Investment Merits of Common Stocks

在我们1949年的第一版中，我们发现有必要在此插入一段长篇论述，阐述在所有投资组合中纳入大量普通股成分的理由。^*普通股通常被视为高度投机，因此不安全；它们从1946年的高位大幅下跌，但这种下跌非但没有因其合理的价格吸引投资者，反而产生了相反的效果，削弱了人们对股票证券的信心。我们之前评论过在随后20年中出现的相反情况：股价的大幅上涨使它们在创纪录的高位上看似安全且有利可图，但实际上可能蕴含着相当大的风险。^*

In our first edition (1949) we found it necessary at this point to insert a long exposition of the case for including a substantial common-stock component in all investment portfolios.^* Common stocks were generally viewed as highly speculative and therefore unsafe; they had declined fairly substantially from the high levels of 1946, but instead of attracting investors to them because of their reasonable prices, this fall had had the opposite effect of undermining confidence in equity securities. We have commented on the converse situation that has developed in the ensuing 20 years, whereby the big advance in stock prices made them appear safe and profitable investments at record high levels which might actually carry with them a considerable degree of risk.^*

我们在1949年提出的普通股论点主要基于两个要点。首先，它们提供了相当可观的普通股的第二个优势在于其多年来为投资者带来更高的平均回报率。这既源于其平均股息收入超过优质债券收益率，也源于由于未分配利润的再投资，其市值多年来呈现上涨趋势。

The argument we made for common stocks in 1949 turned on two main points. The first was that they had offered a considerable degree of protection against the erosion of the investor’s dollar caused by inflation, whereas bonds offered no protection at all. The second advantage of common stocks lay in their higher average return to investors over the years. This was produced both by an average dividend income exceeding the yield on good bonds and by an underlying tendency for market value to increase over the years in consequence of the reinvestment of undistributed profits.

虽然这两项优势至关重要——并且长期以来使普通股的表现远胜于债券——但我们一直警告称，如果股票买家支付的价格过高，他们可能会失去这些优势。1929年的情况就很明显，市场水平花了25年时间才回升到1929年至1932年期间暴跌的水平。^*自1957年以来，普通股再次因其高昂的价格而失去了其股息收益率高于债券利率的传统优势。^*通胀因素和经济增长因素能否在未来弥补这一显著的不利发展，还有待观察。

While these two advantages have been of major importance—and have given common stocks a far better record than bonds over the long-term past—we have consistently warned that these benefits could be lost by the stock buyer if he pays too high a price for his shares. This was clearly the case in 1929, and it took 25 years for the market level to climb back to the ledge from which it had abysmally fallen in 1929–1932.^* Since 1957 common stocks have once again, through their high prices, lost their traditional advantage in dividend yield over bond interest rates.^* It remains to be seen whether the inflation factor and the economic-growth factor will make up in the future for this significantly adverse development.

读者应该清楚，在 1971 年末道琼斯工业平均指数 900 点的水平上，我们对普通股普遍没有热情。出于已经给出的原因，^我们认为，防御型投资者不能没有相当比例的普通股股票，即使他必须将其视为两害相权取其轻——全债券持有的风险更大。

It should be evident to the reader that we have no enthusiasm for common stocks in general at the 900 DJIA level of late 1971. For reasons already given^* we feel that the defensive investor cannot afford to be without an appreciable proportion of common stocks in his portfolio, even if he must regard them as the lesser of two evils—the greater being the risks attached to an all-bond holding.

普通股成分规则

Rules for the Common-Stock Component

对于防御型投资者来说，选择投资组合中的普通股应该相对简单。我们建议遵循以下四条规则：

The selection of common stocks for the portfolio of the defensive investor should be a relatively simple matter. Here we would suggest four rules to be followed:

1. 多元化投资应适度，但不应过度。这意味着至少应有10种不同的投资品种，最多应有30种左右。^*

1. There should be adequate though not excessive diversification. This might mean a minimum of ten different issues and a maximum of about thirty.^*

2. 所选的每家公司都应规模庞大、实力雄厚且资金稳健。这些形容词虽然含义不明确，但其总体含义清晰。本章末尾添加了关于这一点的观察。

2. Each company selected should be large, prominent, and conservatively financed. Indefinite as these adjectives must be, their general sense is clear. Observations on this point are added at the end of the chapter.

3. 每家公司都应拥有长期持续派息的记录。（道琼斯工业平均指数的所有成分股在1971年都满足了这项股息要求。）具体来说，我们建议至少从1950年开始就要求持续派息。^*

3. Each company should have a long record of continuous dividend payments. (All the issues in the Dow Jones Industrial Average met this dividend requirement in 1971.) To be specific on this point we would suggest the requirement of continuous dividend payments beginning at least in 1950.^*

4. 投资者应该根据某只股票过去七年的平均收益，对其愿意支付的价格设定一个上限。我们建议将该上限设定为过去一年平均收益的25倍，且不超过过去一年平均收益的20倍。但这样的限制会将几乎所有实力最强、最受欢迎的公司排除在投资组合之外。尤其是，它几乎会将整个“成长股”类别都排除在外，而这些股票多年来一直是投机者和机构投资者的宠儿。我们必须解释提出如此严格排除的理由。

4. The investor should impose some limit on the price he will pay for an issue in relation to its average earnings over, say, the past seven years. We suggest that this limit be set at 25 times such average earnings, and not more than 20 times those of the last twelve-month period. But such a restriction would eliminate nearly all the strongest and most popular companies from the portfolio. In particular, it would ban virtually the entire category of “growth stocks,” which have for some years past been the favorites of both speculators and institutional investors. We must give our reasons for proposing so drastic an exclusion.

成长股与防御型投资者

Growth Stocks and the Defensive Investor

“成长股”是指过去每股收益增幅远高于普通股普遍增幅，且预计未来仍将保持这一增幅的股票。（一些权威人士认为，真正的成长股预计每股收益至少在十年内翻一番，即年复合增长率超过7.1%。）^*显然，只要价格不过高，这类股票就颇具吸引力。当然，问题就在这里，因为成长股长期以来的售价相对于当前收益而言一直很高，而且其市盈率远高于过去一段时间的平均利润。这给成长股带来了相当大的投机因素，使得在该领域取得成功绝非易事。

The term “growth stock” is applied to one which has increased its per-share earnings in the past at well above the rate for common stocks generally and is expected to continue to do so in the future. (Some authorities would say that a true growth stock should be expected at least to double its per-share earnings in ten years—i.e., to increase them at a compounded annual rate of over 7.1%.)^* Obviously stocks of this kind are attractive to buy and to own, provided the price paid is not excessive. The problem lies there, of course, since growth stocks have long sold at high prices in relation to current earnings and at much higher multiples of their average profits over a past period. This has introduced a speculative element of considerable weight in the growth-stock picture and has made successful operations in this field a far from simple matter.

长期以来，国际商业机器公司（IBM）一直是增长型股票中的佼佼者，它为那些多年前买入并坚持持有的投资者带来了惊人的回报。但我们已经指出^*，这只“最佳普通股”在1961-62年六个月的下跌中，市价实际上下跌了50%，在1969-70年也跌了差不多同样的百分比。其他成长型股票更容易受到不利因素的影响；在某些情况下，不仅股价回落，收益也随之下跌，这给持有这些股票的人带来了双重打击。第二个适合我们研究的例子是德州仪器，它在六年内从5美元涨到256美元，没有支付股息，而其收益却从每股40美分增长到3.91美元。（请注意，股价上涨的速度是利润上涨的五倍；这是热门普通股的特点。）但两个几年后，收益下降了近 50%，股价下跌了五分之四，跌至 49。^*

The leading growth issue has long been International Business Machines, and it has brought phenomenal rewards to those who bought it years ago and held on to it tenaciously. But we have already pointed out^* that this “best of common stocks” actually lost 50% of its market price in a six-months’ decline during 1961–62 and nearly the same percentage in 1969–70. Other growth stocks have been even more vulnerable to adverse developments; in some cases not only has the price fallen back but the earnings as well, thus causing a double discomfiture to those who owned them. A good second example for our purpose is Texas Instruments, which in six years rose from 5 to 256, without paying a dividend, while its earnings increased from 40 cents to $3.91 per share. (Note that the price advanced five times as fast as the profits; this is characteristic of popular common stocks.) But two years later the earnings had dropped off by nearly 50% and the price by four-fifths, to 49.^*

读者从这些例子中就能理解，为什么我们认为成长型股票整体上对于防御型投资者来说过于不确定且风险过高。当然，只要选择正确的个股，在合适的价位买入，然后在大幅上涨后、可能下跌之前卖出，就能创造奇迹。但普通投资者不可能指望做到这一点，就像钱是天上掉下来的一样。相比之下，我们认为，那些相对不受欢迎、因此可以以合理的市盈率获得的大公司，虽然不引人注目，但对普通公众来说，是一个不错的^选择。我们将在关于投资组合选择的章节中阐述这一观点。

The reader will understand from these instances why we regard growth stocks as a whole as too uncertain and risky a vehicle for the defensive investor. Of course, wonders can be accomplished with the right individual selections, bought at the right levels, and later sold after a huge rise and before the probable decline. But the average investor can no more expect to accomplish this than to find money growing on trees. In contrast we think that the group of large companies that are relatively unpopular, and therefore obtainable at reasonable earnings multipliers,^* offers a sound if unspectacular area of choice by the general public. We shall illustrate this idea in our chapter on portfolio selection.

投资组合变化

Portfolio Changes

现在，定期提交所有证券清单进行检查，以了解其质量是否有提升空间，已成为标准做法。这当然是投资顾问为客户提供服务的重要组成部分。几乎所有经纪公司都愿意提供相应的建议，无需支付特殊费用，作为佣金业务的回报。一些经纪公司则以收费的方式提供投资服务。

It is now standard practice to submit all security lists for periodic inspection in order to see whether their quality can be improved. This, of course, is a major part of the service provided for clients by investment counselors. Nearly all brokerage houses are ready to make corresponding suggestions, without special fee, in return for the commission business involved. Some brokerage houses maintain investment services on a fee basis.

假设我们的防御型投资者应该至少每年一次就其投资组合的调整获得与他最初投资基金时相同的建议。由于他自身缺乏足够的专业知识可以依赖，因此必须只委托声誉最高的公司；否则，他很容易落入不称职或不道德的人之手。无论如何，重要的是，在任何时候在进行此类咨询时，他向顾问明确表示，他希望严格遵守本章前面提到的四条普通股选择规则。顺便说一句，如果他的名单一开始就经过精心挑选，就无需频繁或多次更改。

Presumably our defensive investor should obtain—at least once a year—the same kind of advice regarding changes in his portfolio as he sought when his funds were first committed. Since he will have little expertness of his own on which to rely, it is essential that he entrust himself only to firms of the highest reputation; otherwise he may easily fall into incompetent or unscrupulous hands. It is important, in any case, that at every such consultation he make clear to his adviser that he wishes to adhere closely to the four rules of common-stock selection given earlier in this chapter. Incidentally, if his list has been competently selected in the first instance, there should be no need for frequent or numerous changes.

美元成本平均法

Dollar-Cost Averaging

纽约证券交易所 (NYSE) 为推广其“月度购买计划”付出了巨大努力，该计划规定投资者每月投入相同金额购买一只或多只普通股。这体现了一种名为“平均成本法”的特殊“公式投资”。在1949年以来以上涨为主的市场行情中，这种策略的效果肯定非常令人满意，尤其因为它避免了投资者在错误的时机集中买入。

The New York Stock Exchange has put considerable effort into popularizing its “monthly purchase plan,” under which an investor devotes the same dollar amount each month to buying one or more common stocks. This is an application of a special type of “formula investment” known as dollar-cost averaging. During the predominantly rising-market experience since 1949 the results from such a procedure were certain to be highly satisfactory, especially since they prevented the practitioner from concentrating his buying at the wrong times.

在露西尔·汤姆林森（Lucile Tomlinson）对公式投资计划的全面研究中，作者^对构成道琼斯工业指数的股票组运用美元成本平均法的结果进行了计算。测试涵盖了23个十年的买入期，第一个结束于1929年，最后一个结束于1952年。每次测试都表明，投资者要么在买入期结束时获利，要么在买入期结束后五年内获利。23个买入期结束时的平均盈利为21.5%，这还不包括收到的股息。毋庸置疑，在某些情况下，市场价值确实出现了大幅的暂时性贬值。汤姆林森小姐以一句引人注目的话结束了她对这个极其简单的投资公式的讨论：“迄今为止，还没有人发现任何其他投资公式，能像美元成本平均法一样，无论证券价格如何变动，都能如此自信地运用，最终获得成功。”

In Lucile Tomlinson’s comprehensive study of formula investment plans,¹ the author presented a calculation of the results of dollar-cost averaging in the group of stocks making up the Dow Jones industrial index. Tests were made covering 23 ten-year purchase periods, the first ending in 1929, the last in 1952. Every test showed a profit either at the close of the purchase period or within five years thereafter. The average indicated profit at the end of the 23 buying periods was 21.5%, exclusive of dividends received. Needless to say, in some instances there was a substantial temporary depreciation at market value. Miss Tomlinson ends her discussion of this ultrasimple investment formula with the striking sentence: “No one has yet discovered any other formula for investing which can be used with so much confidence of ultimate success, regardless of what may happen to security prices, as Dollar Cost Averaging.”

有人可能会反对，美元成本平均法虽然原则上合理，但在实践中却相当不切实际，因为很少有人能够每年拿出相同数额的资金，比如说20年，用于投资普通股。在我看来，这种看似反对的观点近年来已大为减弱。普通股正逐渐被普遍接受为稳健储蓄投资计划的必要组成部分。因此，系统性、持续性地购买普通股，可能不会给投资者带来比持续性购买美国储蓄债券和人寿保险更大的心理和财务负担——而储蓄债券和人寿保险本应是两者的补充。每月的金额可能不大，但20年或更长时间后的回报对储蓄者来说可能非常可观且意义重大。^*

It may be objected that dollar-cost averaging, while sound in principle, is rather unrealistic in practice, because few people are so situated that they can have available for common-stock investment the same amount of money each year for, say, 20 years. It seems to me that this apparent objection has lost much of its force in recent years. Common stocks are becoming generally accepted as a necessary component of a sound savings-investment program. Thus, systematic and uniform purchases of common stocks may present no more psychological and financial difficulties than similar continuous payments for United States savings bonds and for life insurance—to which they should be complementary. The monthly amount may be small, but the results after 20 or more years can be impressive and important to the saver.^*

投资者的个人情况

The Investor’s Personal Situation

在本章开头，我们简要提到了个人投资组合所有者的立场。结合我们随后对一般投资策略的讨论，让我们再次探讨这个问题。投资者选择的证券类型应在多大程度上根据其自身情况而变化？作为代表各种不同情况的具体例子，我们将列举：（1）一位寡妇留下20万美元用于养活自己和孩子；（2）一位事业有成、处于职业生涯中期的医生，拥有10万美元的积蓄，每年增加1万美元；（3）一位年轻男子，每周收入200美元，每年积蓄1000美元。^*

At the beginning of this chapter we referred briefly to the position of the individual portfolio owner. Let us return to this matter, in the light of our subsequent discussion of general policy. To what extent should the type of securities selected by the investor vary with his circumstances? As concrete examples representing widely different conditions, we shall take: (1) a widow left $200,000 with which to support herself and her children; (2) a successful doctor in mid-career, with savings of $100,000 and yearly accretions of $10,000; and (3) a young man earning $200 per week and saving $1,000 a year.^*

对寡妇来说，靠自己的收入维持生计是个非常棘手的问题。另一方面，投资中务必保持保守。将她的资金大致等量地分配给美国债券和一级普通股，是两者之间的折衷，也符合我们对防御型投资者的一般建议。（如果投资者做好了心理准备，并且几乎可以肯定自己买入的价格不会过高，那么股票部分可以配置到75%左右。当然，1972年初的情况并非如此。）

For the widow, the problem of living on her income is a very difficult one. On the other hand the need for conservatism in her investments is paramount. A division of her fund about equally between United States bonds and first-grade common stocks is a compromise between these objectives and corresponds to our general prescription for the defensive investor. (The stock component may be placed as high as 75% if the investor is psychologically prepared for this decision, and if she can be almost certain she is not buying at too high a level. Assuredly this is not the case in early 1972.)

我们不排除寡妇可能符合创业型投资者的条件，在这种情况下，她的目标和方法会大不相同。寡妇绝不能做的一件事就是为了“赚取额外收入”而冒险投机。我们指的是在没有……的情况下试图获得利润或高收入。必要的设备，才能确保对整体成功充满信心。对她来说，最好每年从本金中提取2000美元，以维持收支平衡，而不是将一半的本金投入到缺乏根据、因此具有投机性的企业中。

We do not preclude the possibility that the widow may qualify as an enterprising investor, in which case her objectives and methods will be quite different. The one thing the widow must not do is to take speculative chances in order to “make some extra income.” By this we mean trying for profits or high income without the necessary equipment to warrant full confidence in overall success. It would be far better for her to draw $2,000 per year out of her principal, in order to make both ends meet, than to risk half of it in poorly grounded, and therefore speculative, ventures.

这位富裕的医生没有寡妇那样的压力和强迫，但我们相信他的选择大致相同。他是否愿意认真对待投资事业？如果他缺乏这种冲动或天赋，最好还是接受防御型投资者这个轻松的角色。那么，他的投资组合划分应该与“典型”寡妇的投资组合划分并无二致，在确定股票成分比例方面，个人选择也同样重要。年度储蓄的投资比例应与总基金大致相同。

The prosperous doctor has none of the widow’s pressures and compulsions, yet we believe that his choices are pretty much the same. Is he willing to take a serious interest in the business of investment? If he lacks the impulse or the flair, he will do best to accept the easy role of the defensive investor. The division of his portfolio should then be no different from that of the “typical” widow, and there would be the same area of personal choice in fixing the size of the stock component. The annual savings should be invested in about the same proportions as the total fund.

普通医生可能比普通寡妇更有可能选择成为一名有进取心的投资者，而且他们或许更有可能成功。然而，医生有一个重要的障碍——他没有足够的时间用于投资教育和资金管理。事实上，医生在证券交易中的失败是出了名的。原因在于，他们通常对自己的智慧充满信心，并渴望获得丰厚的回报，却没有意识到要成功做到这一点，不仅需要对投资本身投入大量的精力，还需要对证券价值采取某种专业的处理方式。

The average doctor may be more likely than the average widow to elect to become an enterprising investor, and he is perhaps more likely to succeed in the undertaking. He has one important handicap, however—the fact that he has less time available to give to his investment education and to the administration of his funds. In fact, medical men have been notoriously unsuccessful in their security dealings. The reason for this is that they usually have an ample confidence in their own intelligence and a strong desire to make a good return on their money, without the realization that to do so successfully requires both considerable attention to the matter and something of a professional approach to security values.

最后，那位每年存1000美元并期望收益逐渐好转的年轻人，发现自己面临着同样的选择，尽管原因有所不同。他应该将部分储蓄自动用于投资E系列债券。由于余额有限，他似乎不值得为了成为一名激进型投资者而接受严格的教育和严格的性格训练。因此，简单地采用我们针对防御型投资者的标准方案，将是最简单、最合理的策略。

Finally, the young man who saves $1,000 a year—and expects to do better gradually—finds himself with the same choices, though for still different reasons. Some of his savings should go automatically into Series E bonds. The balance is so modest that it seems hardly worthwhile for him to undergo a tough educational and temperamental discipline in order to qualify as an aggressive investor. Thus a simple resort to our standard program for the defensive investor would be at once the easiest and the most logical policy.

在这一点上，我们不应该忽视人性。金融对许多才华横溢、财力有限的年轻人来说，有着巨大的吸引力。他们希望在储蓄配置上既聪明又有进取心，即使投资收益对他们来说远不如工资重要。这种态度是有益的。对于年轻的资本家来说，开始他的职业生涯有着巨大的优势。尽早进行金融教育并积累经验。如果他要成为一名激进的投资者，他肯定会犯一些错误并承受一些损失。年轻人可以承受这些失望并从中获利。我们敦促证券购买新手不要浪费精力和金钱去试图战胜市场。让他研究证券价值，并首先用尽可能小的金额来检验他对价格与价值的判断。

Let us not ignore human nature at this point. Finance has a fascination for many bright young people with limited means. They would like to be both intelligent and enterprising in the placement of their savings, even though investment income is much less important to them than their salaries. This attitude is all to the good. There is a great advantage for the young capitalist to begin his financial education and experience early. If he is going to operate as an aggressive investor he is certain to make some mistakes and to take some losses. Youth can stand these disappointments and profit by them. We urge the beginner in security buying not to waste his efforts and his money in trying to beat the market. Let him study security values and initially test out his judgment on price versus value with the smallest possible sums.

因此，我们回到一开始的陈述，即购买的证券种类和寻求的回报率不取决于投资者的财务资源，而是取决于他在知识、经验和气质方面的财务装备。

Thus we return to the statement, made at the outset, that the kind of securities to be purchased and the rate of return to be sought depend not on the investor’s financial resources but on his financial equipment in terms of knowledge, experience, and temperament.

关于“风险”概念的说明

Note on the Concept of “Risk”

人们通常认为优质债券的风险低于优质优先股，而优质优先股的风险又低于优质普通股。由此引发了人们对普通股的普遍偏见，认为它们不“安全”，这在美联储委员会1948年的调查中得到了证实。我们想指出的是，“风险”和“安全”这两个词在证券上的应用有两种不同的含义，从而导致了思维上的混淆。

It is conventional to speak of good bonds as less risky than good preferred stocks and of the latter as less risky than good common stocks. From this was derived the popular prejudice against common stocks because they are not “safe,” which was demonstrated in the Federal Reserve Board’s survey of 1948. We should like to point out that the words “risk” and “safety” are applied to securities in two different senses, with a resultant confusion in thought.

如果债券未能支付利息或本金，则显然存在风险。同样，如果购买优先股甚至普通股时预期股息率会持续不变，那么股息减少或转嫁也意味着该债券存在风险。如果持有者很有可能在价格远低于成本时抛售，则投资也存在风险。

A bond is clearly proved unsafe when it defaults its interest or principal payments. Similarly, if a preferred stock or even a common stock is bought with the expectation that a given rate of dividend will be continued, then a reduction or passing of the dividend means that it has proved unsafe. It is also true that an investment contains a risk if there is a fair possibility that the holder may have to sell at a time when the price is well below cost.

然而，风险的概念常常被延伸到指证券价格可能下跌，即使这种下跌可能是周期性的、暂时的，即使持有人不太可能被迫在这种时候出售。除美国储蓄债券外，所有证券都存在这种可能性，而且在普通股中比在优先债券中存在的可能性更大。但我们认为，这里所涉及的并非真正意义上的风险。持有建筑物抵押贷款的人如果被迫在不利的时机出售，可能不得不承担巨额损失。这一因素并非在判断普通房地产抵押贷款的安全性或风险时，唯一的标准是按时还款的确定性。同样，衡量普通商业企业的风险，也是看其亏损的可能性，而不是看业主被迫出售时会发生什么。

Nevertheless, the idea of risk is often extended to apply to a possible decline in the price of a security, even though the decline may be of a cyclical and temporary nature and even though the holder is unlikely to be forced to sell at such times. These chances are present in all securities, other than United States savings bonds, and to a greater extent in the general run of common stocks than in senior issues as a class. But we believe that what is here involved is not a true risk in the useful sense of the term. The man who holds a mortgage on a building might have to take a substantial loss if he were forced to sell it at an unfavorable time. That element is not taken into account in judging the safety or risk of ordinary real-estate mortgages, the only criterion being the certainty of punctual payments. In the same way the risk attached to an ordinary commercial business is measured by the chance of its losing money, not by what would happen if the owner were forced to sell.

在第八章中，我们将阐明我们的信念：真正的投资者不会仅仅因为其持有的股票市场价格下跌而亏损；因此，价格下跌并不意味着投资者真正面临亏损风险。如果一组精心挑选的普通股投资在相当长的一段时间内显示出令人满意的总体回报，那么这组投资就被证明是“安全的”。在此期间，其市场价值必然会波动，而且很可能会在一段时间内以低于买方成本的价格出售。如果这一事实使这项投资“具有风险”，那么它就必须同时被称为既有风险又安全。如果我们将风险的概念仅仅应用于价值损失，这种损失要么是通过实际出售实现的，要么是由公司状况的显著恶化造成的——或者，更常见的情况是，是由于支付了相对于证券内在价值过高的价格而造成的，那么这种混淆就可以避免^。2

In Chapter 8 we shall set forth our conviction that the bona fide investor does not lose money merely because the market price of his holdings declines; hence the fact that a decline may occur does not mean that he is running a true risk of loss. If a group of well-selected common-stock investments shows a satisfactory overall return, as measured through a fair number of years, then this group investment has proved to be “safe.” During that period its market value is bound to fluctuate, and as likely as not it will sell for a while under the buyer’s cost. If that fact makes the investment “risky,” it would then have to be called both risky and safe at the same time. This confusion may be avoided if we apply the concept of risk solely to a loss of value which either is realized through actual sale, or is caused by a significant deterioration in the company’s position—or, more frequently perhaps, is the result of the payment of an excessive price in relation to the intrinsic worth of the security.²

许多普通股确实存在此类下跌的风险。但我们的观点是，正确执行的普通股集体投资不会带来任何此类重大风险，因此不应仅仅因为价格波动就将其称为“有风险”。但如果存在价格可能被证明以内在价值标准来看明显过高的风险，则存在此类风险——即使随后的任何严重市场下跌可能在多年后得到弥补。

Many common stocks do involve risks of such deterioration. But it is our thesis that a properly executed group investment in common stocks does not carry any substantial risk of this sort and that therefore it should not be termed “risky” merely because of the element of price fluctuation. But such risk is present if there is danger that the price may prove to have been clearly too high by intrinsic-value standards—even if any subsequent severe market decline may be recouped many years later.

关于“大型、知名、融资保守的公司”类别的说明

Note on the Category of “Large, Prominent, and Conservatively Financed Corporations”

我们标题中引用的短语在本章前面曾用于描述防御型投资者应该限制购买的普通股类型——前提是这些股票连续多年派发股息。基于形容词的标准总是模棱两可的。规模、卓越性和财务结构保守性的分界线是什么？关于最后一点，我们可以提出一个具体的标准，虽然比较武断，但符合公认的思维方式。一家工业公司的财务状况并不保守，除非其普通股（按账面价值计算）至少占其总资本（包括所有银行债务）的一半。3^对于铁路或公用事业公司来说，这个数字至少应该达到30%。

The quoted phrase in our caption was used earlier in the chapter to describe the kind of common stocks to which defensive investors should limit their purchases—provided also that they had paid continuous dividends for a considerable number of years. A criterion based on adjectives is always ambiguous. Where is the dividing line for size, for prominence, and for conservatism of financial structure? On the last point we can suggest a specific standard that, though arbitrary, is in line with accepted thinking. An industrial company’s finances are not conservative unless the common stock (at book value) represents at least half of the total capitalization, including all bank debt.³ For a railroad or public utility the figure should be at least 30%.

“大型”和“杰出”这两个词既指规模庞大，又在行业中占据领先地位。这类公司通常被称为“主要”；所有其他普通股则被称为“次要”；但成长型股票通常会被购买者单独归类。为了更具体一点，我们假设，按照当今的标准，“大型”公司应该拥有 5000 万美元的资产或 5000 万美元的营业额。^*同样，“杰出”公司应该在其行业类别中规模排名前四分之一或前三分之一。

The words “large” and “prominent” carry the notion of substantial size combined with a leading position in the industry. Such companies are often referred to as “primary”; all other common stocks are then called “secondary,” except that growth stocks are ordinarily placed in a separate class by those who buy them as such. To supply an element of concreteness here, let us suggest that to be “large” in present-day terms a company should have $50 million of assets or do $50 million of business.^* Again to be “prominent” a company should rank among the first quarter or first third in size within its industry group.

然而，坚持这种武断的标准是愚蠢的。这些标准仅仅是为那些寻求指导的人提供的指导。但任何投资者为自己制定的规则，只要不违背“大型”和“杰出”的常识性含义，都应该被接受。就情况本身而言，必然会有一大批公司被一些公司纳入适合防御性投资的公司之列，而另一些公司则不会。这种观点和行动的多样性并无害处。事实上，它对股市状况有有益的影响，因为它允许一级股票和二级股票发行类别之间逐渐分化或过渡。

It would be foolish, however, to insist upon such arbitrary criteria. They are offered merely as guides to those who may ask for guidance. But any rule which the investor may set for himself and which does no violence to the common-sense meanings of “large” and “prominent” should be acceptable. By the very nature of the case there must be a large group of companies that some will and others will not include among those suitable for defensive investment. There is no harm in such diversity of opinion and action. In fact, it has a salutary effect upon stock-market conditions, because it permits a gradual differentiation or transition between the categories of primary and secondary stock issues.

第五章评论

Commentary on Chapter 5

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

我划定的底线是：如果一项资产拥有现金流，或者短期内有产生现金流的可能性，并且不完全取决于未来买家的支付金额，那么它就是一项投资。如果一项资产的价值完全取决于未来买家的支付金额，那么购买该资产就是投机。

The line I draw in the sand is that if an asset has cash flow or the likelihood of cash flow in the near term and is not purely dependent on what a future buyer might pay, then it’s an investment. If an asset’s value is totally dependent on the amount a future buyer might pay, then its purchase is speculation.

—塞思·克拉曼¹

—Seth Klarman¹

正如格雷厄姆在第四章中所写，防御型投资者希望尽量减少投资所需的时间和精力，并希望“无忧无虑”。

The defensive investor, as Graham wrote in Chapter 4, wants to minimize the time and effort that investing takes and wants “freedom from concern.”

不过，股市并非你唯一需要担心的。作为一名防御型投资者，你还面临两大外部风险。

The stock market isn’t your only concern, though. You face two great external dangers as a defensive investor.

首先，你需要抵御经纪行业的冲击。

First, you need to fend off the brokerage industry.

由于防御性投资者几乎从不交易，他们不会给券商带来任何收入。所谓的“投资民主化”——任何拥有安装了券商应用程序的智能手机的人都可以进行低成本交易——是一个令人信服的错觉。这听起来让人充满力量，但它可能会把防御性投资者变成极度活跃的交易者，让券商赚得盆满钵满。

Because defensive investors almost never trade, they generate no revenue for brokerage firms. What’s called “the democratization of investing”—low-cost trading for anyone who has a smartphone with a brokerage app—is a compelling delusion. It sounds empowering, but it can transform defensive investors into hyperactive traders who make brokers rich.

您还需要防御社会传染。

You also need to defend against social contagion.

一旦你让别人替你思考，你最宝贵的资产——你的智力独立性——就会受损。而一旦你失去了部分自我意识，失去财富也就不远了。等你意识到自己已经失去了独立思考的能力时，已经太晚了。

Once you let other people do your thinking for you, your single most valuable asset—your intellectual independence—is impaired. And once you lose part of your sense of self, losing financial wealth won’t be far behind. By the time you recognize you’ve lost the ability to think for yourself, it will be too late.

游戏化还是赌博化？

Gamification or Gamblification?

eToro、Robinhood、tastytrade 和 Webull 等交易应用程序背后的公司经常将其描述为“游戏化”，但“赌博化”可能更准确。我们不应该将交易应用程序比作那些让教育、健身、节食和其他活动更具吸引力和可实现性的游戏。我们应该将它们与扑克、赌场、体育博彩应用程序和赌博机归为一类，这些应用程序和赌博机利用了脆弱的用户，并使许多人上瘾。

The companies behind such trading apps as eToro, Robinhood, tastytrade, and Webull often describe them as “gamification,” but “gamblification” would be more accurate. We shouldn’t liken trading apps to the games that can make education, fitness, dieting, and other activities more engaging and achievable. We should classify them with the poker, casino, and sports-betting apps and gambling machines that exploit vulnerable users and addict many of them.

赌博化的投资工具用起来很有趣，但它有三个隐患。它旨在鼓励短期交易。它很容易让人上瘾。而且它依赖于博彩业完善的操纵技巧^。2

A gamblified investing tool is fun to use, but it has three insidious features. It’s designed to encourage short-term trading. It’s potentially addictive. And it relies on manipulative techniques perfected by the gambling industry.²

其中包括：

Among those are:

明亮、充满活力的视听显示屏，使股票价格看起来像老虎机上旋转的卷轴一样——突出显示您的财富变化，而不是财富的数量；
bright, energetic audiovisual displays that make stock prices resemble the spinning reels on a slot machine—highlighting the changes in your wealth, not the amount of your wealth;
刮刮乐奖励类似于彩票，当您首次注册时，您将获得一份随机股票——并且享受使用免费资金进行游戏的兴奋感；
scratch-off rewards resembling lottery tickets, giving you a share of a random stock when you first sign up—and the excitement of playing with what feels like free money;
频繁发出警报，通知您重大举措并促使您进行交易；
frequent alerts notifying you of big moves and goading you to trade;
徽章、奖杯或级别（“银”、“金”、“白金”），激发您的竞争欲望；
badges, trophies, or levels (“Silver,” “Gold,” “Platinum”), getting your competitive juices flowing;
最热门或最受欢迎的股票列表；
lists of the hottest or most-popular stocks;
复制和点赞，您可以模仿或赞扬其他人的交易（他们也可以模仿或赞扬您的交易）；
copying and liking, in which you can mimic or praise other people’s trades (as they can yours);
排行榜显示谁赚的钱最多。
leaderboards showing who’s making the most money.

赌博类应用程序还会诱使用户交易期权合约，而这类合约风险更高，经纪费用也更高^。3

Gamblified apps also goad users into trading options contracts, which are much riskier and generate far higher brokerage fees.³

赌场的设计旨在最大限度地利用运营商所谓的 TOD，或者“设备使用时间”。你在老虎机前待的时间越长，输钱的可能性就越大。如果中了头奖，你应该立即离开，但赌场已经学会了用催眠般的视听效果和“纳米货币化”（允许同时进行许多小额投注）把你牢牢地粘在座位上。赌博化的经纪应用程序也遵循同样的原则，即最大化每日交易时间（TOD）。2020年，在测试Robinhood时，我自己也一度沉迷于交易^。4

Casinos are designed to maximize what operators call TOD, or “time on device.” The longer you spend in front of a slot machine, the more certain you are to lose. You should immediately walk away if you hit the jackpot, but casinos have learned to glue you to your seat with hypnotic audiovisuals and “nanomonetization,” the ability to place many small bets simultaneously. Gamblified brokerage apps follow the same principle of maximizing TOD. In 2020, while testing Robinhood, I temporarily became a trading addict myself.⁴

安大略省证券委员会的一项研究发现，获得奖励会促使人们的交易频率提高 39%；查看每周交易量最高的股票列表，参与者对这些股票的交易量会提高 14%。通过添加徽章、等级和排行榜，将经纪应用程序变成赌博应用程序，也可以改变投资者的思维方式。他们不再追求实现自己的财务目标，而是努力超越其他人——购买高风险股票的可能性会提高一倍^。5

A study by the Ontario Securities Commission found that earning rewards prompted people to trade 39% more often; seeing a weekly list of top-traded stocks led participants to increase their trading of those same stocks by 14%. Gamblifying a brokerage app by adding badges, levels, and leaderboards can also change how investors think. Instead of seeking to fulfill their own financial goals, they will instead strive to beat everybody else—becoming up to twice as likely to buy a highly risky stock.⁵

跑得越快，落后得越快

The Faster You Run, the Behinder You Get

经纪应用程序鼓励的快速交易带来了短期乐趣，也带来了长期损失。

The fast trading encouraged by brokerage apps provides short-term fun—and long-term loss.

在使用大型折扣经纪业务的 66,000 多个美国家庭中，交易最多的家庭的业绩每年比交易最少的家庭的业绩低 7 个百分点以上。
Among more than 66,000 U.S. households using a major discount brokerage, those who traded the most underperformed those who traded the least by more than 7 percentage points annually.
一项针对巴西约 20,000 名零售经纪客户的研究发现，在那些至少连续 300 天进行短期交易的客户中，97% 的人亏损了。
A study of roughly 20,000 retail brokerage customers in Brazil found that among those who kept making short-term trades for at least 300 days, 97% lost money.
台湾活跃的日内交易者中，只有不到3%的人盈利，尽管大多数人无法停止交易。有过亏损经历的人的交易量占总交易量的75%。
Fewer than 3% of active day traders in Taiwan earn a profit, although most can’t stop trading. People with a history of losing money generate 75% of total trading.
差价合约（CFD）是一种流行的交易方式短期押注资产价格上涨或下跌。平均而言，74% 至 89% 的差价合约交易客户亏损^。6
Contracts for difference, or CFDs, are a popular way to place short-term bets on whether an asset’s price will move up or down. On average, 74% to 89% of customers who trade CFDs lose money.⁶

股票市场应该是经济学家所说的正和博弈：随着公司的发展，其不断增加的收益会产生股息和股价上涨，从而使投资者积累财富。

The stock market should be what economists call a positive-sum game: As companies grow, their increasing earnings generate dividends and rising stock prices, enabling investors to build wealth.

然而，如果你选择赌博而不是投资，股市就会变成一场负和博弈：你错失了长期持有的回报，产生了不必要的交易成本，并产生了惩罚性的税单。你不是在享受这种乐趣，而是被这种乐趣所蒙骗^。7

If you gamble instead of investing, however, you turn the stock market into a negative-sum game: You miss out on reaping the rewards of long-term ownership, create unnecessary trading costs, and generate punitive tax bills. Instead of going along for the ride, you get taken for a ride.⁷

赌博化是一种教育吗？

Is Gamblification an Education?

赌博经纪应用程序的支持者为其辩护，理由是“让投资变得有趣是吸引年轻人尝试的好方法，即使他们一开始会亏钱”，或者“你必须承担风险才能学会如何管理风险”。

Proponents of gamblified brokerage apps defend them with such arguments as “Making investing fun is a great way to get young people to try it, even if they lose money at first,” or “You have to take risks to learn how to manage them.”

为什么缺乏经验的投资者要通过冒险行为来学习如何安全行事？我们不会通过挑战青少年一饮而尽50杯威士忌来让他们学会理性饮酒；我们不会通过鼓励年轻人以每小时100英里的速度撞向砖墙来教他们如何驾驶；我们也不会通过让新手练习用猎枪射击自己的脚来教授枪支安全知识。

Why should inexperienced investors have to behave dangerously to learn how to behave safely? We don’t get teenagers to drink responsibly by challenging them to chug down 50 shots of whiskey; we don’t instruct young people how to drive by urging them to crash cars into brick walls at 100 mph; nor do we teach firearm safety by having novices take target practice by blasting shotguns at their own feet.

赌博经纪应用程序鼓励易受影响的人进行危险的投资行为，这是一种可怕的（如果不是悲剧的话）终身训练。

Gamblified brokerage apps that encourage impressionable people to practice dangerous investing behaviors are terrible—if not tragic—training for life.

群体智慧

The Wisdom of Crowds

加入这个群体似乎是合理的。

It can seem rational to join the herd.

我们的日常经验和进化史告诉我们，群体往往是正确的。

Our everyday experience and our evolutionary history teach us that crowds are often correct.

您可能不会在完全空无一人的餐厅吃饭，购买没有正面在线评价的产品，或购买没有人愿意竞标的房子。

You probably wouldn’t eat at a completely empty restaurant, purchase a product that has no positive online reviews, or buy a house that nobody else wants to bid on.

向其他人学习有助于合作和集体解决问题；群体往往比一个人知道得更多。

Learning from other people facilitates cooperation and collective problem-solving; groups often know more than one person does.

此外，融入群体会更有安全感。我们都渴望受欢迎，渴望成为“圈内”人士。我们所属的群体越大，其信息就越引人注目，越令人无法抗拒——而且网络群体的规模不受实体限制。数百万人可以加入。如果你拥有一只正在飙升的股票，可以和成千上万喜欢它的人在线聊天，你会觉得自己属于一群狮子。如果你拥有一只正在下跌、无人问津的股票，你会觉得自己就像花园派对上的一只臭鼬。

Also, it feels safer inside the herd. We all want to be popular, to belong to the “in” crowd. The bigger the group we belong to, the more compelling and irresistible its message will feel—and the size of an online crowd has no physical constraints. Millions can join. Own a soaring stock that you can chat about online with thousands of other people who all love it, and you will feel you belong to a pride of lions. Own a falling stock that nobody wants to touch, and you will feel like a skunk at a garden party.

而且，如果你孤军奋战犯了错，你只能怪自己。如果你随波逐流，最终发现自己错了，你还可以耸耸肩说：“其他人也都错了。”

What’s more, if you’re acting alone and make a mistake, you have no one to blame but yourself. If you go along with the crowd and it turns out to be wrong, you can shrug and say, “Everybody else was wrong, too.”

终于，众人齐聚，成就非凡。从2020年开始，大批投资者聚集在Reddit、Twitter和Discord上，开始汇聚购买力，推高他们看好的股票价格：AMC娱乐控股、GameStop、Bed Bath & Beyond等等。领头羊和先行者获得的利润是其投入的数百倍。通过将数百万散户投资者的购买力引导到少数几只股票上，他们创造了一股巨大的力量，只需在网上提及一家公司，就能让其股价飙升。任何人都可以加入这股浪潮。何不加入这股热潮？

Finally, a crowd can make things happen. Starting in 2020, swarms of investors coalescing on Reddit, Twitter, and Discord began to pool their buying power and drive up the prices of their favorite stocks: AMC Entertainment Holdings, GameStop, Bed Bath & Beyond, and many more. The leaders and early birds made profits hundreds of times larger than what they put in. By channeling the buying power of millions of small investors into a tiny number of stocks, they created a giant force that could send a company’s shares soaring just by mentioning it online. Anyone could go along for the ride. Why not join the fun?

群体的疯狂

The Madness of Crowds

然而，群体并不总是正确的，他们的错误具有传染性。

Yet crowds aren’t always right, and their errors are contagious.

这可能是灾难性的，就像数百万人被希特勒或墨索里尼等嗜杀成性的煽动者所迷惑一样。也可能是阴险的，就像阴谋论成为精神流行病一样——就像毫无根据的投资理念在网上疯传一样。

That can be catastrophic, as when millions of people fall under the spell of murderous rabble-rousers like Hitler or Mussolini. Or it can be insidious, as when conspiracy theories become mental epidemics—and when baseless beliefs about investing go viral.

什么将智慧与群众的疯狂区分开来？

What separates the wisdom from the madness of the crowd?

1907年，统计学家弗朗西斯·高尔顿（Francis Galton）描述了一场农业博览会上竞赛的结果。当时近800名参观者试图猜测一头牛的重量。尽管许多人对牛知之甚少或一无所知，而且他们的猜测差异很大，但参观者的平均估计最终与牛的准确重量相符^。8

In 1907, the statistician Francis Galton described the results of a contest at an agricultural fair in which nearly 800 visitors tried to guess the weight of an ox. Although many knew little or nothing about oxen and their guesses varied widely, the visitors’ average estimate turned out to be the exact weight of the ox.⁸

弗朗西斯·高尔顿的猜谜者观点各异，力求以最准确的猜测赢得奖励，他们不知道其他人的猜测，并且需要支付报名费。比赛的赞助商收集了所有猜测，并进行了公平的统计。

Francis Galton’s guessers had a variety of viewpoints, sought to win a prize for the most accurate guess, didn’t know other people’s estimates, and had to pay an entry fee. The sponsors of the contest collected all the guesses and tallied them fairly.

人群的判断是独立的、保密的、多样化的、受激励的和汇总的——因此，在估计简单价值时非常准确^。9

The judgments of that crowd were independent, confidential, diverse, incentivized, and aggregated—and, therefore, remarkably accurate at estimating simple values.⁹

在当今的金融市场，网络和社交媒体上的暴民情绪沸腾，但有价值的信息却寥寥无几。预测公开发表，无数陌生人试图影响他人的观点。受欢迎的“影响者”可能会引发狂热，数百万人蜂拥而至，拥护相同的观点，从而破坏认知多样性。没有准入门槛，没有简单的方法来验证专业知识的声称，也没有记录来衡量观点的准确性和极端程度。

In today’s financial markets, online and social-media mobs seethe with emotion, but valuable information is scarce. Predictions are made in public, with countless strangers trying to influence other people’s opinions. Popular “influencers” can set off stampedes, crushing cognitive diversity as millions of people rush to embrace the same beliefs. There are no barriers to entry, no easy way to authenticate claims of expertise, and no registry of how accurate or how extreme the opinions are.

这类群体的判断往往与高尔顿的判断截然相反：相互依存、公开透明、同质化、缺乏激励、分散分散。这会让群体智慧沦为疯狂。

All too often, the judgments of this sort of crowd are the opposite of Galton’s: interdependent, public, homogenized, non-incentivized, and disaggregated. That can turn the wisdom of the crowd into madness.

牛的重量不会随着人们对它的估计而改变。然而，如果数百万投机者突然认定某只股票价值 10 万美元，那么它的价格就会飙升——至少是暂时的——即使它一文不值。

The weight of an ox doesn’t change with people’s estimates of it. However, if millions of speculators suddenly decide that a stock is worth $100,000, it will skyrocket—at least temporarily—even if it’s worthless.

街头的羊群

Herd on the Street

了解他人的想法会改变你的思维方式。当你发现一群同龄人与你意见相左时，你的选择与他们一致的可能性会高出三倍，尽管你不会意识到自己受到了影响。一次接触一位自称专家的观点，就能增强你对信息的记忆，并增强你对信息的正面评价。而认同你的同龄人或所谓的专家的观点，会激活大脑中处理奖励预期的相同区域。

Learning what other people think changes how you think. When you find out that a group of your peers disagrees with you, your choices become up to three times more likely to match theirs, although you will have no conscious awareness of being influenced. A single exposure to an opinion from someone described as an expert enhances your memory of the information and how favorably you view it. And agreeing with your peers or with purported experts will activate the same regions of the brain that process the anticipation of reward.

随着信息变得越来越复杂或模糊，你更容易以大众的理解方式解读它。社交媒体的本质就是放大与你观点相似的观点。最近的一项研究发现，社交媒体上的投资者关注认同自己观点的用户的可能性是普通用户的五倍，他们看到的赞同信息几乎是反对信息的三倍。研究表明，陷入这种回音室效应会导致人们交易量增加，但收益却更低^。10

As information becomes more complex or ambiguous, you become more prone to interpret it the same way the crowd does. And social media, by design, amplifies views that resemble your own. One recent study found that investors on social media are five times more likely to follow users who agree with them and will see nearly three times as many messages they agree with than disagree with. Falling into this kind of echo chamber, the study showed, leads people to trade more—and earn lower returns.¹⁰

在社交媒体上，点赞帖子的人越多，你也会点赞的几率就越高。点赞一篇已经被很多人点赞的帖子，比点赞一篇不太热门的帖子更能激活人类大脑中一个关键的奖励中心。在公开的经纪平台上，如果别人点赞你的交易，你的交易频率会比没有收到类似反馈的人高出三倍。

The more people “like” a post on social media, the higher the odds that you will like it as well. “Liking” a post already liked by lots of other people activates a key reward center in the human brain more intensely than liking a less-popular post. On public brokerage platforms, having other people “like” your trades can lead you to trade three times more often than those who don’t receive such feedback.

与此同时，违背共识会激活大脑中产生痛苦、恐惧、焦虑和厌恶的神经回路。如果你曾在拥挤的体育场里为主队加油，或在满是反对党成员的房间里为你的候选人发声，你就会明白格格不入的感觉有多难受。群体越大，孤身一人就越痛苦^。11

Meanwhile, bucking the consensus engages circuits in the brain that generate pain, fear, anxiety, and disgust. If you’ve ever rooted against the home team in a crowded stadium or spoken up for your candidate in a room full of members of an opposing political party, you know how hard it feels not to fit in. The larger the group, the more painful standing alone becomes.¹¹

更糟糕的是，Facebook、Twitter 和 TikTok 等社交媒体平台中嵌入的算法似乎旨在最大限度地延长你在设备上的时间。它们会将你的注意力集中在名人、与你观点一致的人以及那些煽动你情绪的信息和图像上。这使得某些内容看起来比实际更普遍，从而比实际更有说服力。这些算法就像一个无形却无处不在的力场，将你从独立思考中拉出来^。12

Worse, the algorithms embedded in social-media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok appear to be designed to maximize the time you spend on your device. They do that by fixating your attention on celebrities, on people who agree with you, and on information and imagery that inflame your emotions. That makes certain content seem more prevalent than it is and thus more persuasive than it should be. These algorithms are an invisible but pervasive force field that pulls you away from thinking for yourself.¹²

接种疫苗预防传染病

Vaccinating Yourself Against Contagion

因为您可能永远不会意识到一个群体对您的行为和决定有多大的影响，所以在加入人群之前保护自己至关重要。

Because you may never realize how much a group is influencing your behavior and decisions, it’s vital to protect yourself before you join the crowd.

首先，不要加入价值观不同的群体。你应该与你的投资“结缘”，而不是“快速约会”——与那些交易混乱的人交往必然会影响你的行为。在bogleheads.org、HumbleDollar.com、MutualFundObserver.com或ValueInvestorsClub.com等在线社区寻找耐心、志同道合的投资者。

First, don’t join a group that has different values. You should marry your investments, not speed-date them—and associating with people who trade promiscuously is bound to infect your behavior. Seek out patient, like-minded investors at such online communities as bogleheads.org, HumbleDollar.com, MutualFundObserver.com, or ValueInvestorsClub.com.

寻找以下帖子：

Look for posts that:

避开最新头条新闻中的“热门话题”；
steer clear of “hot takes” on the latest headlines;
避免愤怒、自夸和嘲笑；
avoid anger, boasting, and mockery;
并通过链接长期数据和同行评审的研究来揭示其来源，而不是仅仅在没有证据的情况下做出断言。
and reveal their sources by linking to long-term data and peer-reviewed research, rather than just making assertions without evidence.

如果您对哪种资产或投资策略适合您已有看法，请在探索某些在线群组的言论之前，写下您持有这些看法的理由。在采取行动之前，请先审查您最初的理由，并确定有合理的依据来改变它——这些依据必须基于数据和证据，而不仅仅是网上随机用户的意见。

If you have views about which asset or investing strategy is right for you, write down your reasons for those beliefs before you explore what some online group is saying. Take no action without reviewing your original rationale and determining that there’s a reasonable basis for changing it—grounded in data and evidence, not just the opinions of random people online.

请记住，互联网和社交媒体是扭曲现实的场所：“点赞”和“赞同”只会给予那些最响亮、最无礼的建议，而不是最好的建议。利益冲突比比皆是，但往往不为人知。自动机器人会扭曲哪些帖子能获得最多关注。

Remember that the internet and social media are reality-distortion fields: “Likes” and “upvotes” go to the loudest and brashest advice, not the best. Conflicts of interest abound but are often undisclosed. Automated bots skew which posts get the most attention.

矛盾的是，人们的专业知识越丰富，就越会说“我不知道”或“视情况而定”——这让他们听起来好像比那些经常犯错但从不怀疑的人懂得更少。那些承认自己知识有限的人才是值得倾听的。

Paradoxically, the more expertise people have, the more often they will say “I don’t know” or “It depends”—leading them to sound as if they know less than those who are often wrong but never in doubt. The ones who admit the limits of their knowledge are the ones to listen to.

成为投资尺蠖

Be an Investing Inchworm

要想成为一名成功的防御型投资者，你必须能够背对大众；否则，你将面临几乎不断对新闻、观点和谣言反应过度的风险。

To succeed as a defensive investor, you must be able to turn your back on the crowd; otherwise, you’ll run the risk of almost constantly overreacting to news, opinion, and rumor.

不要猜测；自动化。

Don’t speculate; automate.

使用平均成本法，您可以按预定的时间间隔投资固定金额：每周、每月、每季度、每年，只要您有能力，就可以随时投资。您的经纪公司或基金公司会自动将资金从您的银行账户以电子转账的方式转出，您无需动手。

With dollar-cost averaging, you can invest a fixed amount of money at predetermined intervals: every week, every month, every quarter, every year, whenever you can, whatever you can afford. Your brokerage or fund company will automatically move the money from your bank in an electronic transfer, so you don’t have to lift a finger.

许多企业退休计划和政府养老金制度都会为您做到这一点，但使用您自己的额外资金是另一种自我约束的方式。

Many corporate retirement plans and government pension systems do this for you, but using additional money of your own is another way to impose discipline on yourself.

与其大步进出市场，不如像尺蠖一样，无论市场如何变化，稳步增持。这种自动投资计划并不能保证你不会亏钱。但它能迫使你在股市崩盘时继续投资，并防止你在股市飙升时冲动地将资金投入市场。这些自动购买过程在你眼前、脑海之外，因此你不会频繁地做出事后会怀疑或后悔的临时决定。

Rather than jumping in and out of the market in giant leaps, become an inchworm, steadily adding more no matter what the market does. Such an automatic investment plan can’t guarantee you won’t lose money. But it compels you to keep investing even when the stock market is crashing, and it prevents you from heaving money impulsively into the market when stocks are soaring. These automated purchases are out of sight, out of mind, so you aren’t making frequent ad-hoc decisions that you will second-guess or regret later.

通过使用一篮子简单的指数基金进行美元成本平均并仅进行重新平衡交易，您可以将整个投资组合置于多个自动驾驶级别上。

By dollar-cost averaging with a simple basket of index funds and trading only to rebalance, you can put your entire portfolio on multiple levels of autopilot.

正如格雷厄姆在 1962 年关于美元成本平均法所写的那样：

As Graham wrote about dollar-cost averaging in 1962:

无论何时开始，只要在任何情况下都能认真且勇敢地坚持执行，这项政策最终都会获得回报。这……前提是，采用成本平均法的人……不会像过去几代人那样，在股市的波动中经历兴奋与沮丧的交替。

Such a policy will pay off ultimately, regardless of when it is begun, provided that it is adhered to conscientiously and courageously under all intervening conditions. This . . . presupposes that the dollar-cost-averager . . . will not be subject to the alternations of exhilaration and deep gloom that have accompanied the gyrations of the stock market for generations past.

在第二年的一次演讲中，他补充道：

In a speech the next year, he added:

这样，你就可以在市场低迷时买入更多股票，在市场高涨时买入更少股票。对于那些拥有（a）资金、（b）时间和（c）多年坚持一致策略（无论市场涨跌）的性格的人来说，这种方法非常有效。如果你能做到这一点，你的投资就一定能获得令人满意的成功。…… ¹³

That way you buy more shares of stocks when the market level is low and fewer shares when it’s high. That method has worked out extremely well for those who have had (a) the money, (b) the time, and (c) the character necessary to pursue a consistent policy over the years regardless of whether the market has been going up or down. If you can do that you are guaranteed satisfactory success in your investments. . . .¹³

与其随波逐流，不如遵循格雷厄姆的策略。短期内，你会错过一些乐趣；但长期来看，你会积累更多财富。

Rather than following the herd, follow Graham’s policies. In the short run, you’ll miss out on a little fun; in the long run, you’ll build a lot more wealth.

第六章

Chapter 6 进取型投资者的投资组合政策：消极方法

Portfolio Policy for the Enterprising Investor: Negative Approach

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

“进取型”投资者应该与防御型投资者从相同的基础入手，即将资金分配到高等级债券和以合理价格购买的高等级普通股之间。 *他会准备投资其他类型的证券，但在每种情况下，他都需要一个合理的理由来解释这种做法。有序地讨论这个话题很困难，因为进取型操作没有单一或理想的模式。选择范围很广；选择不仅应取决于个人的能力和经验，还应同样取决于他的兴趣和偏好。

The “aggressive” investor should start from the same base as the defensive investor, namely, a division of his funds between high-grade bonds and high-grade common stocks bought at reasonable prices.* He will be prepared to branch out into other kinds of security commitments, but in each case he will want a well-reasoned justification for the departure. There is a difficulty in discussing this topic in orderly fashion, because there is no single or ideal pattern for aggressive operations. The field of choice is wide; the selection should depend not only on the individual’s competence and equipment but perhaps equally well upon his interests and preferences.

对于有进取心的投资者来说，最有用的概括是负面的。让他把高等级优先股留给企业买家。也让他避开劣质债券和优先股，除非它们能以便宜的价格买到——这意味着高息债券的价格通常至少比票面价值低30%。发行债券，尤其是票面利率较低的债券。*他会让其他人购买外国政府债券，即使收益率可能很诱人。他还会对各种新发行的债券保持警惕，包括看似颇具吸引力的可转换债券和优先股，以及近期盈利丰厚的普通股。

The most useful generalizations for the enterprising investor are of a negative sort. Let him leave high-grade preferred stocks to corporate buyers. Let him also avoid inferior types of bonds and preferred stocks unless they can be bought at bargain levels—which means ordinarily at prices at least 30% under par for high-coupon issues, and much less for the lower coupons.* He will let someone else buy foreign-government bond issues, even though the yield may be attractive. He will also be wary of all kinds of new issues, including convertible bonds and preferreds that seem quite tempting and common stocks with excellent earnings confined to the recent past.

对于标准债券投资，激进型投资者最好遵循其防御型同行所建议的模式，并在高等级应税债券（现在可以选择收益率约为 71⁄4）和优质免税债券（长期收益率高达 5.30%）之间进行选择。^*

For standard bond investments the aggressive investor would do well to follow the pattern suggested to his defensive confrere, and make his choice between high-grade taxable issues, which can now be selected to yield about 71⁄4%, and good-quality tax-free bonds, which yield up to 5.30% on longer maturities.^*

二级债券和优先股

Second-Grade Bonds and Preferred Stocks

由于在 1971 年末，可以找到收益率达到 7.25% 甚至更高的一级公司债券，因此仅仅为了更高的回报率而购买二级债券是没有意义的。事实上，在过去两年中，信用状况相对较差的公司几乎不可能向公众出售“直接债券”（即可转换债券）。因此，它们的债务融资是通过出售可转换债券（或附有认股权证的债券）进行的，这使它们被归入单独的类别。因此，几乎所有评级较低的不可转换债券都是发行时间较长、售价折价很大的债券。因此，在未来有利的条件下，它们有可能大幅增加本金价值——这意味着公司信用评级的提高和一般利率的降低。

Since in late 1971 it is possible to find first-rate corporate bonds to yield 71⁄4%, and even more, it would not make much sense to buy second-grade issues merely for the higher return they offer. In fact corporations with relatively poor credit standing have found it virtually impossible to sell “straight bonds”—i.e., nonconvertibles—to the public in the past two years. Hence their debt financing has been done by the sale of convertible bonds (or bonds with warrants attached), which place them in a separate category. It follows that virtually all the nonconvertible bonds of inferior rating represent older issues which are selling at a large discount. Thus they offer the possibility of a substantial gain in principal value under favorable future conditions—which would mean here a combination of an improved credit rating for the company and lower general interest rates.

但即使在价格折扣和由此产生的本金收益机会方面，二级债券也面临着与更优质债券的竞争。一些持有“旧式”票面利率（2.5% 至 4%）的、根基牢固的债券在 1970 年的售价约为面值的 50%。例如：美国电话电报公司 25⁄8 先令债券，1986 年到期，售价为 51 美元；阿奇森托皮卡和圣达菲铁路公司 4 先令债券，1995 年到期，售价为 51 美元；麦格劳希尔公司 37⁄8 先令债券，1992 年到期，售价为 50½ 美元。

But even in the matter of price discounts and resultant chance of principal gain, the second-grade bonds are in competition with better issues. Some of the well-entrenched obligations with “old-style” coupon rates (2½% to 4%) sold at about 50 cents on the dollar in 1970. Examples: American Telephone & Telegraph 25⁄8s, due 1986 sold at 51; Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe RR 4s, due 1995, sold at 51; McGraw-Hill 37⁄8s, due 1992, sold at 50½.

因此，在 1971 年末的情况下，有进取心的投资者可能能够从以大幅折扣出售的优质债券中获得他所合理期望的一切，包括收入和升值机会。

Hence under conditions of late 1971 the enterprising investor can probably get from good-grade bonds selling at a large discount all that he should reasonably desire in the form of both income and chance of appreciation.

本书通篇都在讨论过去任何明确且持续的市场行情在未来都可能重现的可能性。因此，我们应该思考，如果高等级债券的价格和收益率恢复到以前的正常水平，激进的债券投资者可能不得不选择什么样的策略。因此，我们将在此重印我们在1965年版本中对此观点的观察，当时高等级债券的收益率仅为4.5%。

Throughout this book we refer to the possibility that any well-defined and protracted market situation of the past may return in the future. Hence we should consider what policy the aggressive investor might have to choose in the bond field if prices and yields of high-grade issues should return to former normals. For this reason we shall reprint here our observations on that point made in the 1965 edition, when high-grade bonds yielded only 4½%.

现在应该谈谈投资二级债券，这类债券很容易就能获得高达 8% 或更高的特定回报率。一级债券和二级债券的主要区别通常在于收益覆盖利息费用的倍数。例如：1964 年初，芝加哥、密尔沃基、圣保罗和太平洋 5% 收益债券，发行价为 68 美元，收益率为 7.35%。但 1963 年，这条公路在所得税前的总利息费用仅为收益的 1.5 倍，而我们对受到良好保护的铁路债券的要求是 5 倍^。1

Something should be said now about investing in second-grade issues, which can readily be found to yield any specified return up to 8% or more. The main difference between first- and second-grade bonds is usually found in the number of times the interest charges have been covered by earnings. Example: In early 1964 Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific 5% income debenture bonds, at 68, yielded 7.35%. But the total interest charges of the road, before income taxes, were earned only 1.5 times in 1963, against our requirement of 5 times for a well-protected railroad issue.¹

许多投资者购买此类证券是因为他们“需要收益”，无法忍受顶级债券提供的微薄回报。经验清楚地表明，仅仅因为收益率诱人就购买缺乏足够安全性的债券或优先股是不明智的。（这里的“仅仅”一词意味着该债券的售价并没有大幅折让，因此没有提供大幅增加本金价值的机会。）如果以全价购买此类证券——也就是说，价格不会低于100 *点——那么很有可能在未来的某个时候持有人会看到更低的报价。当生意不好或市场不景气时，这类债券很容易受到严重下跌的影响；利息或股息通常会被暂停发放，或至少面临风险，而且即使经营业绩并不糟糕，价格也经常会明显疲软。

Many investors buy securities of this kind because they “need income” and cannot get along with the meager return offered by top-grade issues. Experience clearly shows that it is unwise to buy a bond or a preferred which lacks adequate safety merely because the yield is attractive. (Here the word “merely” implies that the issue is not selling at a large discount and thus does not offer an opportunity for a substantial gain in principal value.) Where such securities are bought at full prices—that is, not many points under 100*—the chances are very great that at some future time the holder will see much lower quotations. For when bad business comes, or just a bad market, issues of this kind prove highly susceptible to severe sinking spells; often interest or dividends are suspended or at least endangered, and frequently there is a pronounced price weakness even though the operating results are not at all bad.

为了具体说明次级优先债券的这一特征，我们来总结一下1946-47年十只铁路收益债券的价格走势。这些债券包括1946年所有售价在96美元或以上的债券，其最高价平均为102.5美元。到第二年，这组债券的最低价平均仅为68美元，在很短的时间内损失了三分之一的市值。奇怪的是，1947年全国铁路的盈利远高于1946年；因此，价格的大幅下跌与商业前景背道而驰，反映了整体市场的抛售。但需要指出的是，这些收益债券的缩水比例高于道琼斯工业指数中普通股的缩水比例（约23%）。显然，以高于100美元的价格购买这些债券的人不可能期望在证券市场的进一步上涨中获益。唯一吸引人的地方是收益率，平均约为4.25%（一级债券的收益率为2.50%，年收益率高出1.75%）。然而，后续结果却过早且过于明显地表明，为了获得微薄的年收益率优势，这些二级债券的买家正冒着损失大量本金的风险。

As a specific illustration of this characteristic of second-quality senior issues, let us summarize the price behavior of a group of ten railroad income bonds in 1946–47. These comprise all of those which sold at 96 or more in 1946, their high prices averaging 102½. By the following year the group had registered low prices averaging only 68, a loss of one-third of the market value in a very short time. Peculiarly enough, the railroads of the country were showing much better earnings in 1947 than in 1946; hence the drastic price decline ran counter to the business picture and was a reflection of the selloff in the general market. But it should be pointed out that the shrinkage in these income bonds was proportionately larger than that in the common stocks in the Dow Jones industrial list (about 23%). Obviously the purchaser of these bonds at a cost above 100 could not have expected to participate to any extent in a further rise in the securities market. The only attractive feature was the income yield, averaging about 4.25% (against 2.50% for first-grade bonds, an advantage of 1.75% in annual income). Yet the sequel showed all too soon and too plainly that for the minor advantage in annual income the buyer of these second-grade bonds was risking the loss of a substantial part of his principal.

上述例子让我们不得不对一个被冠以“商人投资”之名的流行谬论表示敬意。这种谬论指的是购买收益率高于高等级债券的债券，因此风险也相应更高。为了仅仅增加1%或2%的年收入而接受本金损失的已知可能性，这显然是错误的选择。如果你愿意承担一定风险，就应该确信，如果一切顺利，你能够获得丰厚的本金收益。因此，以面值出售的5.5%或6%的二级债券几乎总是一笔糟糕的买卖。以70%的收益率出售同等级债券可能更划算——如果你有耐心，你很可能能够以这个价格买到它。

The above example permits us to pay our respects to the popular fallacy that goes under the sobriquet of a “businessman’s investment.” That involves the purchase of a security showing a larger yield than is obtainable on a high-grade issue and carrying a correspondingly greater risk. It is bad business to accept an acknowledged possibility of a loss of principal in exchange for a mere 1 or 2% of additional yearly income. If you are willing to assume some risk you should be certain that you can realize a really substantial gain in principal value if things go well. Hence a second-grade 5.5 or 6% bond selling at par is almost always a bad purchase. The same issue at 70 might make more sense—and if you are patient you will probably be able to buy it at that level.

二级债券和优先股拥有两个聪明的投资者必须牢记这些相互矛盾的特性。几乎所有债券在市场低迷时都会经历严重的下跌。另一方面，很大一部分债券在市场环境好转时会恢复其仓位，最终“一切顺利”。即使是多年未支付股息的（累积型）优先股也是如此。由于20世纪30年代的长期萧条，20世纪40年代初出现了许多此类债券。在1945年至1947年的战后繁荣时期，许多此类大额累积债券以现金或新证券的形式偿还，本金也经常被偿还。结果，那些几年前在债券无人问津、低价出售时买入的人获得了巨额利润^。2

Second-grade bonds and preferred stocks possess two contradictory attributes which the intelligent investor must bear clearly in mind. Nearly all suffer severe sinking spells in bad markets. On the other hand, a large proportion recover their position when favorable conditions return, and these ultimately “work out all right.” This is true even of (cumulative) preferred stocks that fail to pay dividends for many years. There were a number of such issues in the early 1940s, as a consequence of the long depression of the 1930s. During the postwar boom period of 1945–1947 many of these large accumulations were paid off either in cash or in new securities, and the principal was often discharged as well. As a result, large profits were made by people who, a few years previously, had bought these issues when they were friendless and sold at low prices.²

从总体来看，二级优先债券的较高收益率或许足以抵消那些无法挽回的本金损失。换句话说，以发行价购买所有此类债券的投资者，从长远来看，其收益可能与只购买一级优先债券的投资者一样好，甚至略胜一筹^。3

It may well be true that, in an overall accounting, the higher yields obtainable on second-grade senior issues will prove to have offset those principal losses that were irrecoverable. In other words, an investor who bought all such issues at their offering prices might conceivably fare as well, in the long run, as one who limited himself to first-quality securities, or even somewhat better.³

但就实际目的而言，这个问题基本上无关紧要。无论结果如何，以全价购买二级债券的买家，当其价格急剧下跌时，都会感到担忧和不安。此外，他无法购买足够多的债券来确保获得“平均”收益，也无法从其较大收入中留出一部分来抵消或“摊销”那些最终被证明是永久性的本金损失。最后，如果长期经验表明，在下一个疲软市场中，这些证券的价格可能在70或更低，那么避免以100左右的价格购买，这纯粹是常识。

But for practical purposes the question is largely irrelevant. Regardless of the outcome, the buyer of second-grade issues at full prices will be worried and discommoded when their prices decline precipitately. Furthermore, he cannot buy enough issues to assure an “average” result, nor is he in a position to set aside a portion of his larger income to offset or “amortize” those principal losses which prove to be permanent. Finally, it is mere common sense to abstain from buying securities at around 100 if long experience indicates that they can probably be bought at 70 or less in the next weak market.

外国政府债券

Foreign Government Bonds

所有投资者，即使经验不多，都知道自1914年以来，外国债券总体上投资历史不佳。在两次世界大战和其间史无前例的全球经济衰退的背景下，这在所难免。然而，每隔几年，市场条件就会足够有利，允许一些新的外国债券以大约票面价格出售。这种现象告诉我们关于普通投资者的思维方式有很多研究——而且不仅仅是在债券领域。

All investors with even small experience know that foreign bonds, as a whole, have had a bad investment history since 1914. This was inevitable in the light of two world wars and an intervening world depression of unexampled depth. Yet every few years market conditions are sufficiently favorable to permit the sale of some new foreign issues at a price of about par. This phenomenon tells us a good deal about the working of the average investor’s mind—and not only in the field of bonds.

我们没有确凿的理由担心澳大利亚或挪威等备受推崇的外国债券的未来走势。但我们知道，一旦出现问题，外国债务的持有者没有法律或其他手段来执行其债权。1953 年，那些以 117 美元的高价购买古巴共和国 4.5 先令债券的人，眼睁睁地看着自己违约，然后在 1963 年以 20 美分的价格抛售。同年纽约证券交易所的债券清单还包括以 36 美元的价格出售的比属刚果 5.5 先令债券、以 30 美元的价格出售的希腊 7 先令债券，以及以 7 美元的价格出售的各种波兰债券。有多少读者知道，自 1922 年捷克斯洛伐克 8% 债券在美国首次以 96.5 美元的价格发行以来，它们的跌宕起伏？ 1928 年，该指数上涨至 112，1932 年下跌至 67.3⁄4，1936 年回升至 106，1939 年暴跌至 6，1946 年（令人难以置信）回升至 117，1948 年迅速下跌至 35，1970 年跌至 8！

We have no concrete reason to be concerned about the future history of well-regarded foreign bonds such as those of Australia or Norway. But we do know that, if and when trouble should come, the owner of foreign obligations has no legal or other means of enforcing his claim. Those who bought Republic of Cuba 4½s as high as 117 in 1953 saw them default their interest and then sell as low as 20 cents on the dollar in 1963. The New York Stock Exchange bond list in that year also included Belgian Congo 51⁄4s at 36, Greek 7s at 30, and various issues of Poland as low as 7. How many readers have any idea of the repeated vicissitudes of the 8% bonds of Czechoslovakia, since they were first offered in this country in 1922 at 96½? They advanced to 112 in 1928, declined to 673⁄4 in 1932, recovered to 106 in 1936, collapsed to 6 in 1939, recovered (unbelievably) to 117 in 1946, fell promptly to 35 in 1948, and sold as low as 8 in 1970!

多年前，有人提出购买外国债券的某种理由，认为像我们这样富裕的债权国有道义上的义务向国外放贷。时间带来无数的报复，如今我们却发现自己正面临着棘手的国际收支问题，部分原因在于美国投资者为了追求微薄的收益率优势而大规模购买外国债券。多年来，我们一直质疑这类投资从买家角度出发的内在吸引力；或许现在我们应该补充一点，如果买家拒绝这些机会，他的国家和他自己都将受益。

Years ago an argument of sorts was made for the purchase of foreign bonds here on the grounds that a rich creditor nation such as ours was under moral obligation to lend abroad. Time, which brings so many revenges, now finds us dealing with an intractable balance-of-payments problem of our own, part of which is ascribable to the large-scale purchase of foreign bonds by American investors seeking a small advantage in yield. For many years past we have questioned the inherent attractiveness of such investments from the standpoint of the buyer; perhaps we should add now that the latter would benefit both his country and himself if he declined these opportunities.

新发行股票

New Issues Generally

尝试将新发行债券作为一个类别进行任何宽泛的陈述似乎并不明智，因为它们涵盖了尽可能广泛的质量和吸引力。当然，任何建议的规则都会有例外。我们的一个建议是，所有投资者都应警惕新发行债券——简而言之，这意味着在购买之前，这些债券应该经过仔细的审查和异常严格的测试。

It might seem ill-advised to attempt any broad statements about new issues as a class, since they cover the widest possible range of quality and attractiveness. Certainly there will be exceptions to any suggested rule. Our one recommendation is that all investors should be wary of new issues—which means, simply, that these should be subjected to careful examination and unusually severe tests before they are purchased.

提出这双重警告有两个原因。首先是新发行的股票有特殊的销售技巧，因此需要一定程度的销售阻力。^*第二，大多数新发行的股票是在“有利的市场条件”下出售的，这意味着对卖方有利，因此对买方不利。^*

There are two reasons for this double caveat. The first is that new issues have special salesmanship behind them, which calls therefore for a special degree of sales resistance.^* The second is that most new issues are sold under “favorable market conditions”—which means favorable for the seller and consequently less favorable for the buyer.^*

随着我们从最高品质债券到次级优先发行债券，再到最低级的普通股发行债券，这些考量因素的影响变得越来越重要。过去，大量的融资包括以赎回价偿还现有债券，并以票面利率更低的新发行债券取代。其中大部分属于高等级债券和优先股。买家主要是金融机构，它们完全有资格保护自身利益。因此，这些债券的定价经过精心考量，以符合同类债券的现行价格，而高超的推销技巧对结果几乎没有影响。随着利率不断下降，买家最终为这些债券支付了过高的价格，其中许多债券后来在市场上大幅下跌。这是在条件对发行人最有利时出售各种新证券的普遍趋势的一个方面；但对于一级债券发行而言，对买家的负面影响可能并非严重，而是令人不快。

The effect of these considerations becomes steadily more important as we go down the scale from the highest-quality bonds through second-grade senior issues to common-stock flotations at the bottom. A tremendous amount of financing, consisting of the repayment of existing bonds at call price and their replacement by new issues with lower coupons, was done in the past. Most of this was in the category of high-grade bonds and preferred stocks. The buyers were largely financial institutions, amply qualified to protect their interests. Hence these offerings were carefully priced to meet the going rate for comparable issues, and high-powered salesmanship had little effect on the outcome. As interest rates fell lower and lower the buyers finally came to pay too high a price for these issues, and many of them later declined appreciably in the market. This is one aspect of the general tendency to sell new securities of all types when conditions are most favorable to the issuer; but in the case of first-quality issues the ill effects to the purchaser are likely to be unpleasant rather than serious.

当我们研究1945-46年和1960-61年期间出售的低等级债券和优先股时，情况有所不同。在这里，抛售努力的效果更加明显，因为这些债券中的大多数可能都与个人和缺乏经验的投资者。这些债券的特点是，以公司过去足够多年的业绩来衡量，它们的表现并不理想。如果可以假设近期盈利将持续，不会出现严重下滑，那么它们在大多数情况下看起来确实足够安全。发行这些债券的投资银行家大概也接受了这种假设，他们的销售人员也毫不费力地说服了自己和客户也接受这种假设。然而，这是一种不合理的投资方式，而且很可能代价高昂。

The situation proves somewhat different when we study the lower-grade bonds and preferred stocks sold during the 1945–46 and 1960–61 periods. Here the effect of the selling effort is more apparent, because most of these issues were probably placed with individual and inexpert investors. It was characteristic of these offerings that they did not make an adequate showing when judged by the performance of the companies over a sufficient number of years. They did look safe enough, for the most part, if it could be assumed that the recent earnings would continue without a serious setback. The investment bankers who brought out these issues presumably accepted this assumption, and their salesmen had little difficulty in persuading themselves and their customers to a like effect. Nevertheless it was an unsound approach to investment, and one likely to prove costly.

牛市时期通常以 大量私营企业转型为上市企业为特征。 1945-46年以及1960年之后，情况都如此。随后，这一过程发展到惊人的程度，直到1962年5月灾难性地结束。在经历了数年的“弃股”期后，整个悲喜剧在1967-1969年逐步重演。*

Bull-market periods are usually characterized by the transformation of a large number of privately owned businesses into companies with quoted shares. This was the case in 1945–46 and again beginning in 1960. The process then reached extraordinary proportions until brought to a catastrophic close in May 1962. After the usual “swearing-off” period of several years the whole tragicomedy was repeated, step by step, in 1967–1969.*

新普通股发行

New Common-Stock Offerings

以下段落与 1959 年版无异，但添加了注释：

The following paragraphs are reproduced unchanged from the 1959 edition, with comment added:

普通股融资有两种不同的形式。对于已上市的公司，将按比例向现有股东提供额外股份。认购价格低于当前市场价格，认购“权利”的初始货币价值。*新股的发售几乎总是由一家或多家投资银行承销，但人们普遍希望并预期所有新股都将通过行使认购权的方式售出。因此，上市公司增发普通股通常不需要发行公司积极出售。

Common-stock financing takes two different forms. In the case of companies already listed, additional shares are offered pro rata to the existing stockholders. The subscription price is set below the current market, and the “rights” to subscribe have an initial money value.* The sale of the new shares is almost always underwritten by one or more investment banking houses, but it is the general hope and expectation that all the new shares will be taken by the exercise of the subscription rights. Thus the sale of additional common stock of listed companies does not ordinarily call for active selling effort on the part of distributing firms.

第二种类型是将原为私有企业的普通股公开发行。这些股票大部分出售给控股股东，以便他们利用有利的市场获利，并实现自身财务多元化。（如前所述，企业筹集新资金时，通常是通过出售优先股来实现的。）这种活动遵循着一种明确的模式，根据证券市场的性质，这必然会给公众带来许多损失和失望。风险既来自于通过这种方式融资的企业的性质，也来自于促成这种融资的市场条件。

The second type is the placement with the public of common stock of what were formerly privately owned enterprises. Most of this stock is sold for the account of the controlling interests to enable them to cash in on a favorable market and to diversify their own finances. (When new money is raised for the business it comes often via the sale of preferred stock, as previously noted.) This activity follows a well-defined pattern, which by the nature of the security markets must bring many losses and disappointments to the public. The dangers arise both from the character of the businesses that are thus financed and from the market conditions that make the financing possible.

本世纪初，我们很大一部分领先的公司被引入公开交易。随着时间的推移，仍保持少数人持股的顶级企业数量稳步减少；因此，最初的普通股上市往往越来越集中在相对较小的企业身上。不幸的是，在同一时期，股票购买者对大公司形成了根深蒂固的偏好，而对小公司则产生了类似的偏见。这种偏见，如同许多其他偏见一样，随着牛市的形成而趋于减弱；普通股整体上所展现出的巨额快速利润足以麻痹公众的批判能力，同时也会增强其贪婪的本能。在这些时期，也可以发现许多私营企业取得了优异的业绩——尽管如果将数据回溯到十年或更久以前，其中大多数企业的业绩并不会太令人印象深刻。

In the early part of the century a large proportion of our leading companies were introduced to public trading. As time went on, the number of enterprises of first rank that remained closely held steadily diminished; hence original common-stock flotations have tended to be concentrated more and more on relatively small concerns. By an unfortunate correlation, during the same period the stock-buying public has been developing an ingrained preference for the major companies and a similar prejudice against the minor ones. This prejudice, like many others, tends to become weaker as bull markets are built up; the large and quick profits shown by common stocks as a whole are sufficient to dull the public’s critical faculty, just as they sharpen its acquisitive instinct. During these periods, also, quite a number of privately owned concerns can be found that are enjoying excellent results—although most of these would not present too impressive a record if the figures were carried back, say, ten years or more.

将这些因素综合起来，就会出现以下后果：在牛市中期，首批普通股上市出现。这些股票的定价颇具吸引力，早期发行的买家获得了巨额利润。随着市场持续上涨，此类融资变得越来越频繁；公司的质量逐渐下降；要价和成交价都接近过高。一个相当可靠的迹象表明牛市即将结束，那就是小型且不起眼的公司的新普通股发行价略高于许多拥有悠久上市历史的中型公司的当前水平。（需要补充的是，这类普通股融资通常很少由规模大、信誉好的银行进行。）*

When these factors are put together the following consequences emerge: Somewhere in the middle of the bull market the first common-stock flotations make their appearance. These are priced not unattractively, and some large profits are made by the buyers of the early issues. As the market rise continues, this brand of financing grows more frequent; the quality of the companies becomes steadily poorer; the prices asked and obtained verge on the exorbitant. One fairly dependable sign of the approaching end of a bull swing is the fact that new common stocks of small and nondescript companies are offered at prices somewhat higher than the current level for many medium-sized companies with a long market history. (It should be added that very little of this common-stock financing is ordinarily done by banking houses of prime size and reputation.)*

公众的疏忽大意，以及销售机构愿意抛售任何可能有利可图的股票，都只会导致一个结果——价格暴跌。许多情况下，新发行的股票会比发行价下跌75%甚至更多。此外，上述事实也使情况雪上加霜，因为从根本上来说，公众对那些在粗心大意时轻易买入的小额债券，他们真的非常厌恶。许多这类债券的跌幅，与其之前高价出售时的价格成正比，如今跌幅远低于其真实价值。

The heedlessness of the public and the willingness of selling organizations to sell whatever may be profitably sold can have only one result—price collapse. In many cases the new issues lose 75% and more of their offering price. The situation is worsened by the aforementioned fact that, at bottom, the public has a real aversion to the very kind of small issue that it bought so readily in its careless moments. Many of these issues fall, proportionately, as much below their true value as they formerly sold above it.

聪明的投资者的基本要求是能够抵制牛市期间推销员推销新普通股的花言巧语。即使能找到一两只经得起严格质量和价值考验的股票，卷入这类交易也可能并非明智之举。当然，推销员会指出许多这类股票在市场上取得了相当大的涨幅——其中一些甚至在出售当天就大幅上涨。但这一切都是投机氛围的一部分。这很容易赚钱。你用这种方式赚的每一块钱，如果最终只损失两块钱，就算幸运了。

An elementary requirement for the intelligent investor is an ability to resist the blandishments of salesmen offering new common-stock issues during bull markets. Even if one or two can be found that can pass severe tests of quality and value, it is probably bad policy to get mixed up in this sort of business. Of course the salesman will point to many such issues which have had good-sized market advances—including some that go up spectacularly the very day they are sold. But all this is part of the speculative atmosphere. It is easy money. For every dollar you make in this way you will be lucky if you end up by losing only two.

其中一些可能被证明是极好的购买选择——但几年后，当没有人想要它们时，它们的价格就会降到真实价值的一小部分。

Some of these issues may prove excellent buys—a few years later, when nobody wants them and they can be had at a small fraction of their true worth.

在 1965 年版中，我们继续讨论这个主题，如下所示：

In the 1965 edition we continued our discussion of this subject as follows:

虽然1949年以来股市行为的总体情况并不适合基于长期经验进行分析，但新普通股发行的发展却完全遵循着古老的法则。我们是否曾经历过像1960-1962年那样数量如此之多、质量如此低劣、股价暴跌如此剧烈的局面，令人怀疑。4 整个股市能够迅速摆脱那场灾难，这确实是一个非同寻常的现象，它让人回想起1925年佛罗里达房地产大崩盘时，^股市也曾展现出类似的“无懈可击”的韧性。

While the broader aspects of the stock market’s behavior since 1949 have not lent themselves well to analysis based on long experience, the development of new common-stock flotations proceeded exactly in accordance with ancient prescription. It is doubtful whether we ever before had so many new issues offered, of such low quality, and with such extreme price collapses, as we experienced in 1960–1962.⁴ The ability of the stock market as a whole to disengage itself rapidly from that disaster is indeed an extraordinary phenomenon, bringing back long-buried memories of the similar invulnerability it showed to the great Florida real-estate collapse in 1925.

在本轮牛市最终结束之前，新股发行狂潮是否一定会卷土重来？谁知道呢？但我们知道，聪明的投资者不会忘记1962年发生的事情，他们会让其他人在这个领域再次快速获利，并承受随之而来的惨痛损失。

Must there be a return of the new-stock-offering madness before the present bull market can come to its definitive close? Who knows? But we do know that an intelligent investor will not forget what happened in 1962 and will let others make the next batch of quick profits in this area and experience the consequent harrowing losses.

在1965年版中，我们引用了“一个可怕的例子”，即1961年11月安泰维护公司（Aetna Maintenance Co.）股票以9美元的价格出售。以典型的方式，股价迅速上涨至15美元；第二年跌至2.3/8美元，1964年又跌至7/8美元。这家公司后来的历史非同寻常，展现了近年来美国企业（无论大小）发生的一些奇特的蜕变。好奇的读者可以在附录5中找到这家企业过去和现在的历史（参见2003年版第575-576页）。

We followed these paragraphs in the 1965 edition by citing “A Horrible Example,” namely, the sale of stock of Aetna Maintenance Co. at $9 in November 1961. In typical fashion the shares promptly advanced to $15; the next year they fell to 23⁄8, and in 1964 to 7⁄8. The later history of this company was on the extraordinary side, and illustrates some of the strange metamorphoses that have taken place in American business, great and small, in recent years. The curious reader will find the older and newer history of this enterprise in Appendix 5 (see pp. 575–576 of the 2003 edition).

从涵盖1967年至1970年期间的“老调重弹”的较新版本中，举出更令人痛心的例子绝非难事。没有什么比AAA企业的案例更符合我们的目的了，它恰好是当时第一家被列入标准普尔股票指南的公司。 1968年，该公司股票以14美元的价格公开发行，迅速涨至28美元，但在1971年初，其报价却低至惨淡的25美分。（即使是这个价格，也表明该公司估值过高，因为它当时正处于无望的境地，刚刚进入破产法庭。）从这家公司的上市故事中，我们可以学到很多东西，也可以汲取重要的警示，因此我们将在第17章中详细论述。

It is by no means difficult to provide even more harrowing examples taken from the more recent version of “the same old story,” which covered the years 1967–1970. Nothing could be more pat to our purpose than the case of AAA Enterprises, which happens to be the first company then listed in Standard & Poor’s Stock Guide. The shares were sold to the public at $14 in 1968, promptly advanced to 28, but in early 1971 were quoted at a dismal 25¢. (Even this price represented a gross overvaluation of the enterprise, since it had just entered the bankruptcy court in a hopeless condition.) There is so much to be learned, and such important warnings to be gleaned, from the story of this flotation that we have reserved it for detailed treatment below, in Chapter 17.

第六章评论

Commentary on Chapter 6

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

如果你能在错误还只是一颗橡子大小的时候就承认它，那么修复它就会比等到它长成一棵树，拥有深厚而广泛的根基时更容易。

If you can admit a mistake when it is the size of an acorn, it will be easier to repair than if you wait until it becomes the size of a tree, with deep, wide-ranging roots.

—Carol Tavris 和 Elliot Aronson ¹

—Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson¹

即使你是一位有进取心的投资者，你仍然需要保持防御——既要防范那些想让你锁定资金的人，也要防范那些想让你不断动用资金的人。

Even if you’re an enterprising investor, you still need to be on the defensive—both against those who want you to lock up your money and those who want you to keep it in constant motion.

专注于该做什么固然有趣，但专注于不该做什么则至关重要。否则，正如格雷厄姆警告的那样，作为一名有进取心的投资者，“你赚的每一美元，如果最终只损失两美元，就算幸运了。”

Focusing on what to do is fun, but focusing on what not to do is vital. Otherwise, as Graham warns, “for every dollar you make” as an enterprising investor, “you will be lucky if you end up by losing only two.”

另类宇宙

The Alternative Universe

进取型投资者的一个潜在错误是，为了追求巨额收益而以高额费用锁定资金多年。

One potential mistake of enterprising investors is locking money up for years at high fees in pursuit of big gains.

投资者的收益通常取决于其费用。银行家、经纪人和财务顾问从一项资产中赚取的利润越多，他们就越努力地出售该资产。

What investors see often depends on its fee. The more bankers, brokers, and financial advisers can earn from an asset, the harder they’ll push to sell it.

在 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代，这意味着投资者不断面临购买高成本共同基金和年金以及首次公开募股 (IPO) 的压力。2^近来，这种压力已转向“另类”资产包括对冲基金、收购整个公司的私募股权基金、为初创企业提供融资的风险资本、专门从事非交易债务的私人信贷基金以及私人房地产投资组合。

In the 1980s and 1990s, that meant constant pressure on investors to buy high-cost mutual funds and annuities, as well as initial public offerings (IPOs).² Lately, the arm-twisting has shifted to “alternative” assets such as hedge funds, private-equity funds that buy out entire companies, venture capital that finances start-ups, private-credit funds specializing in non-traded debt, and portfolios of private real estate.

这些资产对于有进取心的投资者来说极具吸引力，承诺带来丰厚的潜在回报，并带来拥有历史上只有精英才能拥有的基金的温暖感觉。

These assets are tantalizing for enterprising investors, promising potentially superior returns and the warm glow of owning funds that historically were available only to the elite.

声望是有代价的。

Prestige comes at a price.

PitchBook 数据显示，2013 年至 2022 年间，私募股权、风险投资、房地产和其他私募基金在全球范围内共筹集了 11.7 万亿美元。投资者向基金经理和营销人员支付的费用和支出累计高达数千亿美元。

Between 2013 and 2022, private-equity, venture-capital, real-estate, and other private funds raised a total of $11.7 trillion worldwide, according to PitchBook Data. Investors paid managers and marketers hundreds of billions of dollars in cumulative fees and expenses.

投资者在一种流行的“基金中的基金”（一种投资于一组其他非交易基金的非交易投资组合）中支付的成本是极端的，但并非独一无二：

The costs investors pay at one popular “fund of funds”—a non-traded portfolio that invests in a bundle of other non-traded funds—are extreme but hardly unique:

表 6-1：费用蜂巢

TABLE 6-1: Fee Hive

领先的“另类”基金的费用和开支：

Fees and expenses at a leading “alternative” fund:

预付费用

Upfront fees

最高销售费用

Maximum sales charge

3.00%

年度开支

Annual expenses

咨询费

Advisory fee

1.20%

借入资金的利息支付

Interest payments on borrowed funds

0.02%

其他费用

Other expenses

1.60%

收购基金的费用和开支

Acquired funds’ fees and expenses

4.67%

年度总支出

Total annual expenses

7.49%

注：销售费用为发行价的百分比。费用为净资产的百分比。

Notes: Sales charge is percentage of offering price. Expenses are percentages of net assets.

来源：招股说明书，SkyBridge Multi-Adviser Hedge Fund Portfolios LLC 多策略 G 系列，2023 年 7 月 23 日，bit.ly/3GuDGcp。

Source: Prospectus, SkyBridge Multi-Adviser Hedge Fund Portfolios LLC Multi-Strategy Series G, July 23, 2023, bit.ly/3GuDGcp.

这里，有两件事是可能的，其中一件事是肯定的。

Here, two things are possible, and one is certain.

你可能会获得丰厚的回报。

You might get a good return.

您也许可以在需要时取出您的钱。

You might be able to get your money out when you need to.

您将支付高额费用。

You will pay high fees.

另类基金通常不公开交易，甚至不披露其持有的具体资产。许多基金仅每月或每季度更新价格（并允许提现），有时甚至更频繁。推广者表示，这些基金在私人市场运作，这些市场由经验丰富的投资者主导，不受公开市场的短期压力影响。因此，另类基金的投资期限更长、风险更低、回报更高，因此其费用物有所值。

Alternative funds often don’t trade publicly or even disclose exactly what they own. Many update their prices (and permit withdrawals) only monthly or quarterly—sometimes even less often. Promoters say these funds operate in private markets dominated by sophisticated investors immune to the short-term pressures of public markets. Therefore, the story goes, alternatives offer longer investment horizons, lower risks, and higher returns—making their fees worth paying.

让我们考虑一下。

Let’s think about that.

缺乏公开交易就意味着价格不会下跌吗？当然不是。21世纪初，科技股暴跌，风险投资基金暴跌65%；21世纪末的全球金融危机期间，私人房地产基金损失了63%。

Does the absence of public trading mean prices can’t go down? Of course not. Venture-capital funds slumped 65% as technology stocks collapsed in the early 2000s; private real-estate funds lost 63% during the global financial crisis in the late 2000s.

当市场既有深度（参与者众多）又有广度（意见分歧很大）时，市场才能发挥最佳作用。这在很多时候是对股票市场公开交易的恰当描述^。3

Markets work best when they are both deep (with many participants) and wide (with strong differences of opinion). That’s a good description of public trading in the stock market much of the time.³

私募市场的参与者少得多，他们往往在同一个圈子里活动，拥有相似的信念，持有相似的投资组合。私募市场并非深广，而是浅薄；它们并非独立，而是相互依存。在这种俱乐部式的氛围下，私募市场的估值最终可能更多地依赖于信念、猜测和群体思维，而不是最初的分析。

Private markets have far fewer participants, who tend to move in the same circles, share similar beliefs, and hold similar portfolios. Instead of being deep and wide, private markets are shallow and narrow; rather than being independent, they’re codependent. In such a clubby atmosphere, private-market valuations can end up relying more on faith, guesswork, and groupthink than on original analysis.

一项对近900名风险投资家的调查显示，在决定投资哪些公司时，44%的人“经常凭直觉做决定”，9%的人表示他们根本不使用任何财务指标。一项对数十名私募股权高管的调查发现，一家公司是否便宜并非决定是否投资的主要因素，而且“很少有人”通过估算未来收益或现金流来评估公司^。4

A survey of nearly 900 venture capitalists reported that when deciding which companies to invest in, 44% “often make a gut decision,” and 9% said they use no financial metrics at all. A survey of dozens of private-equity executives found that whether a company is cheap isn’t a major determinant of whether to invest, and “very few” evaluate companies by estimating future earnings or cash flows.⁴

看看血液检测初创公司 Theranos Inc.、办公室共享公司 WeWork 和加密货币交易所 FTX 的惨败。

Look at the fiascos of blood-testing start-up Theranos Inc., office-sharing firm WeWork, and cryptocurrency exchange FTX.

私人风险投资市场在 2014 年对 Theranos 的估值为 90 亿美元，在 2022 年对 FTX 的估值为 320 亿美元，在 2018 年对 WeWork 的估值为 470 亿美元^。5

The private venture-capital market valued Theranos at $9 billion in 2014, FTX at $32 billion in 2022, and WeWork at $47 billion in 2018.⁵

Theranos 于 2018 年倒闭；其创始人因欺诈罪被判处 11 年监禁。FTX 和 WeWork 分别于 2022 年底和 2023 年申请破产保护。FTX 创始人 Sam Bankman-Fried 于 2024 年 3 月因窃取交易所客户数十亿美元而被判处 25 年监禁。

Theranos shut down in 2018; its founder was sentenced to 11 years in prison for fraud. FTX and WeWork filed for bankruptcy protection in late 2022 and in 2023, respectively. FTX’s founder Sam Bankman-Fried was sentenced in March 2024 to serve 25 years in prison for stealing billions of dollars from the exchange’s customers.

这些失败的公司是由一些全球最知名的对冲基金、私募股权和风险投资公司资助的，这些公司收取了巨额费用，但显然并没有进行尽职调查。

These flame-outs were funded by some of the world’s most renowned hedge funds and private-equity and venture-capital firms—which charged gigantic fees for due diligence they apparently didn’t do.

公开股票市场也会犯一些荒唐的错误，但它并不假装无所不知，也不会收取高昂的费用。

The public stock market makes absurd mistakes, too, but it doesn’t pretend to be omniscient and doesn’t charge an arm and a leg.

像耶鲁一样投资，先像耶鲁一样做事

To Invest Like Yale, Be Like Yale

耶鲁大学捐赠基金长期负责人戴维·斯文森（David Swensen）于2021年去世，他率先投资于对冲基金、私募股权和非交易房地产等另类投资。在他35年的任期内，耶鲁大学的投资组合年均回报率高达13.1%，远远超过同行以及美国和全球股市。

The longtime head of Yale University’s endowment, David Swensen, who died in 2021, pioneered investing in such alternatives as hedge funds, private equity, and non-traded real estate. Over his 35-year tenure, Yale’s portfolio gained an average of 13.1% annually, far surpassing its peers and U.S. and global stock markets.

斯文森解释说，私募资产的风险比股票和债券更高，流动性也更低，因此可以获得更高的回报。同时，他警告称，私募资产的赢家和输家之间的差距远大于公开市场。因此，另类基金的潜在优厚回报只有能够承受更高风险和更低流动性的专业投资者才能获得。¹

Swensen explained that private assets were more risky and less liquid than stocks and bonds—and, therefore, could earn higher returns. At the same time, he warned, the gap between winners and losers in private assets is much wider than in public markets. Therefore, the potentially superior returns in alternative funds can be captured only by specialized investors who can withstand higher risk and lower liquidity.¹

要想像耶鲁那样投资，你必须像耶鲁那样。耶鲁拥有非凡的优势：

To invest like Yale, you must be like Yale. It has extraordinary advantages:

专业知识。耶鲁大学拥有一支经验丰富的专业团队，专门分析这些基金。您或您的顾问是否在另类基金的费用、经理和资产估值方法方面拥有长期深厚的研究经验？
Expertise. A large, experienced staff at Yale specializes in analyzing these funds. Do you or your advisers have long, deep experience studying alternative funds’ fees, managers, and methods of valuing assets?
时间。耶鲁大学成立于1701年，未来可能还会继续发展数百年，它拥有一次性投资数十年的优势。你呢？
Time. Founded in 1701 and likely to survive for centuries more, Yale has the luxury of investing for decades at a time. Do you?
规模。耶鲁大学的捐赠基金超过400亿美元，使其能够接触到全球最佳的另类投资基金，并能够同时在多个领域实现多元化投资。你能做到吗？
Size. Yale’s endowment exceeds $40 billion, granting it special access to the world’s best alternative funds and enabling it to diversify across many at once. Can you?
韧性。作为一家永久性机构，耶鲁大学能够承受其私募基金严重的暂时性甚至永久性损失。您能否承受巨额亏损和无力出售的困境？
Resilience. As a perpetual institution, Yale can outlast severe interim—even permanent—losses on its private funds. Can you survive deep losses and the inability to sell?
现金。耶鲁大学通过学费、捐赠和助学金获得额外收入，因此如果投资组合表现不佳，它可以削减开支。当市场下跌带来便宜货时，它可以调配剩余资本。您是否拥有多种充足的收入来源？
Cash. Yale derives additional income from tuition, gifts, and grants, so it can cut spending if its portfolio underperforms. And it can deploy surplus capital when falling markets create bargains. Do you have multiple sources of ample income?

如果（但仅当）您对所有这五个问题的回答都是肯定的，那么另类投资可能适合您。²

If—but only if—you can answer yes to all five of those questions, alternative investments may be right for you.²

¹ David F. Swensen，《先锋投资组合管理》（自由出版社，2000 年）。

¹ David F. Swensen, Pioneering Portfolio Management (Free Press, 2000).

²劳伦斯·B·西格尔，“大众的替代方案？”bit.ly/3O7T2YZ。

² Laurence B. Siegel, “Alternatives for the Masses?,” bit.ly/3O7T2YZ.

反击正在被推行的政策

Push Back Against What’s Being Pushed

养老金和捐赠基金——最“老练”的投资者——已将其30%至60%的资产投入另类基金。投资顾问理查德·恩尼斯估计，自2008年以来，这些机构的业绩表现每年都比一个由大约70%股票和30%债券组成的简单投资组合低多达两个百分点^。6

Pensions and endowments—the ultimate “sophisticated” investors—have sunk 30% to 60% of their assets into alternative funds. As a result, investment consultant Richard Ennis estimates, these institutions have underperformed a simple portfolio of roughly 70% stocks and 30% bonds by as much as two percentage points annually since 2008.⁶

然而，推广者表示，你可以使用另类基金来获得更高的回报。

Yet promoters say you can use alternative funds to earn superior returns.

你能做到吗？除了“像耶鲁一样投资，先像耶鲁一样做人”中的指导方针外，你还应该借鉴我在引言评论中描述的一些美德。独立性会告诉你，不要仅仅因为“其他人”都投资另类投资，就投资它们。谦逊会告诉你，作为个人投资者，你不太可能有机会投资像耶鲁这样的巨头所青睐的少数顶级基金。怀疑论会提醒你，私募基金被赚取高额费用的销售人员大肆宣传，幸存者偏差会扭曲报告的数字，甚至大多数机构投资者在另类资产上也未必占得先机。

Can you? In addition to the guidelines in “To Invest Like Yale, Be Like Yale,” you should rely on some of the virtues I described in the Commentary on the Introduction. Independence will tell you not to invest in alternatives just because “everybody else” is. Humility will counsel you that, as an individual investor, you’re unlikely to be offered the opportunity to invest in the few superlative funds that welcome giants like Yale. Skepticism will remind you that private funds are hyped by salespeople earning fat fees, that survivorship bias skews the reported numbers, and that even most institutional investors don’t come out ahead on alternative assets.

误差幅度

Margin for Error

虽然金融业向许多有进取心的投资者施压，要求他们将资金锁定在将永久收取高额费用的另类基金中，但它也在鼓励其他人将资金投入永续投资。

While the financial industry pressured many enterprising investors to lock up money in alternative funds that will charge high fees in perpetuity, it was goading others into putting money into perpetual motion.

在 2020-21 年的繁荣时期，许多缺乏经验的投资者用保证金债务（从经纪人那里借来的钱）购买了风险资产。

During the boom of 2020–21, many inexperienced investors bought risky assets with margin debt, money they borrowed from their broker.

与所有形式的杠杆一样，保证金会增加你的潜在收益，同时也会放大你的潜在损失。许多交易应用程序鼓励新手投资者使用保证金，称其可以让你“购买力”翻倍。

Like all forms of leverage, margin increases your potential gains—and magnifies your potential losses. Many trading apps encouraged newly minted investors to take on margin by describing it as a way of doubling your “buying power.”

保证金也会使你的亏损能力加倍。

Margin also doubles your losing power.

假设你以每股50美元的价格购买了100股股票，保证金比例为50%，这是美国的监管限额。你支付的5,000美元中，有2,500美元是你自己投入的资金；其中2,500美元来自你的经纪人。如果股价上涨至75美元，这些股票的总价值将达到7,500美元，盈利2,500美元，或者说，你投入资金的100%将获得收益。如果你自己投入全部5,000美元，而不是借入资金，那么你的收益“只有”50%。

Imagine you buy 100 shares of stock at $50 using 50% margin, the regulatory limit in the U.S. Of the $5,000 you paid, $2,500 is your money; $2,500 came from your broker. If the stock goes up to $75, the shares are worth a total of $7,500, a gain of $2,500—or a 100% profit on the money you put in. If you’d put up the entire $5,000 yourself without borrowing, you’d have “only” a 50% gain.

如果股票价格下跌而不是上涨25美元，会发生什么？如果你只用自己的钱买入，你的持股价值将达到2500美元，损失50%。如果你使用保证金，这2500美元的损失将让你损失全部投资^。7

What happens if the stock goes down, not up, $25? If you’d used only your own money to buy it, your holding would be worth $2,500, a 50% loss. If you used margin, that $2,500 loss would incinerate your entire investment.⁷

本杰明·格雷厄姆本人在大萧条时期几乎被保证金债务搞垮——他从未重蹈覆辙。“我毫不怀疑，”他在1963年说道，“在经纪商那里开设保证金账户的人，十个里面有九个本身就是投机者。 ” ⁸

Ben Graham himself was nearly wiped out by margin debt in the Great Depression—a mistake he never repeated. “I haven’t the slightest doubt,” he said in 1963, “that nine people out of ten who have margin accounts with brokers are ipso facto speculators.”⁸

我认为格雷厄姆的意思是，使用保证金会让你在不知不觉和不情愿的情况下从投资者变成投机者。

I believe what Graham meant is that using margin can transform you, unwittingly and unwillingly, from an investor into a speculator.

假设，用第一章中格雷厄姆的话来说，“经过彻底的分析”，你认定某只股票“保证本金安全和足够的回报”，并且你打算持有它数年甚至数十年。

Let’s say, to use Graham’s words from Chapter 1, that “upon thorough analysis,” you’ve decided a stock “promises safety of principal and an adequate return” and you intend to hold it for years, even decades.

如果您用保证金买入了这只股票，而股价下跌，那么它的价格甚至比您最初买入时还要便宜。但您可能无法再买入更多股票；您必须向账户中存入现金，才能防止经纪人以“追加保证金”的方式扣押您的股票。手机上经纪应用程序不断更新的信息可能会加剧您的焦虑（请参阅此处的侧边栏）。恐惧可能会让您惊慌失措，抛售原本打算持有的股票。

If you bought that stock on margin and it goes down, it has become even cheaper than when you first bought it. But you might no longer be able to buy more; you’ll have to add cash to your account just to keep your broker from seizing the stock from you in a “margin call.” Constant updates from the brokerage app on your phone may crank up your anxiety (see the sidebar here). Fear could make you freak out and sell a stock you intended to hold.

据美联储称，2022年，保证金贷款从5190亿美元暴跌至3710亿美元，这可能是因为经纪客户通过恐慌性抛售股票来偿还贷款，以防止损失进一步扩大。

In 2022, margin loans plunged from $519 billion to $371 billion, according to the Federal Reserve, probably because brokerage customers paid them off with panic-selling of stock to prevent even worse losses.

最后一点：对冲基金、私募股权基金、私募信贷基金以及其他另类投资组合通常使用杠杆。即使你可能没有借钱投资这些基金，但如果它们借钱购买资产，那么你实际上就通过它们获得了保证金。

One final point: Hedge funds, private-equity and private-credit funds, as well as other alternative portfolios, commonly use leverage. Even though you might not have borrowed to invest in them, if they borrowed to buy their assets, then you have effectively taken on margin through them.

这会使你的整体投资组合风险更大——这是替代方案的推动者几乎从未提及的一个障碍。

That makes your overall portfolio riskier—a handicap the promoters of alternatives almost never mention.

沉迷于应用程序

App-sorbed

预计到 2050 年，全球一半人口将患有近视。尽管这个问题出现的时间太短，尚未得到全面研究，但一些视觉科学家认为，过度使用智能手机可能是导致全球近视流行的原因之一。

Half the world’s population is expected to suffer from myopia by 2050. Although the problem is too new to have been comprehensively studied, some vision scientists believe that excessive use of smartphones may be contributing to this worldwide epidemic of nearsightedness.

就像每天盯着那个小屏幕几个小时可能会让你的眼睛不再轻易聚焦于远处的物体一样，它也可能会让你的思维不再设定和实现长期投资目标。

Just as staring at that little screen for a few hours every day might retrain your eye away from easily focusing on distant objects, so it might retrain your mind away from setting and achieving long-term investing goals.

巴西、中国、韩国等地的研究发现，那些无法放下智能手机的年轻人更容易做出冲动的决定。智能手机成瘾者更喜欢早点获得小额奖励，而不是晚点获得大额奖励；他们对损失也相对漠不关心，难以区分哪些赌注是有利可图的，哪些是无利可图的。过度使用智能手机还可能损害你解决数学问题和创造性思维的能力。

Studies in Brazil, China, South Korea, and elsewhere have found that young people who can’t put their smartphones down tend to make impulsive decisions. Smartphone addicts prefer smaller rewards sooner over larger rewards later; they also are relatively indifferent to losses and struggle to distinguish profitable from unprofitable gambles. Overusing your smartphone may also impair your ability to solve math problems and think creatively.

运营你的在线经纪业务的人深谙此道。所以他们希望你使用智能手机应用程序进行交易。你花在智能手机上的时间越多，你的交易频率就越高，无论你自己是否赚钱，经纪业务都能从中获利。

The people who run your online brokerage know all this. That’s why they want you to trade using smartphone apps. The more time you spend on that device, the more often you’re likely to trade, making money for the brokerage regardless of whether you make any for yourself.

过去，你必须在买卖股票之前通过电话或面对面与股票经纪人沟通。这种沟通方式——加上经纪人高昂的佣金——在你的冲动和行动之间制造了一层摩擦。你的股票经纪人就是想掏你的腰包，而你对此心知肚明。

In the old days, you had to talk with your stockbroker over the phone or face-to-face before a purchase or sale. That—and your broker’s punitively high commissions—introduced a layer of friction between your impulses and your actions. Your stockbroker was out to pick your pocket, and you knew it.

如今，你的股票经纪人就在你的口袋里，在你的手机里。这不仅会导致视觉短视，还会导致投资短视。

Nowadays, your stockbroker is in your pocket, on your phone. That could lead not just to visual myopia, but investing myopia as well.

SPACullative发烧

SPACulative Fever

对于有进取心的投资者来说，另一个诱惑就是成为一名参与者：与名人联手，顺着他们的潮流走向更大的财富。

Another temptation for enterprising investors is to be a player: to join forces with celebrities and glide along in their slipstream toward greater wealth.

近年来，职业运动员斯蒂芬·库里和塞雷娜·威廉姆斯、音乐家贾斯汀·比伯和埃米纳姆，以及演员格温妮丝·帕特洛和凯文·哈特等富有的“网红”纷纷推出他们的NFT（非同质化代币），助推了这些数字资产的购买狂潮。其中最热门的NFT是“无聊猿游艇俱乐部”（Bored Ape Yacht Club），这是一个色彩缤纷的电子漫画形象，画着身穿水手服、眼神疲惫、满脸胡茬的灵长类动物，有时售价超过100万美元。到2022年底，交易量暴跌，许多NFT的价格下跌了90%以上。

In recent years, such wealthy “influencers” as professional athletes Stephen Curry and Serena Williams, musicians Justin Bieber and Eminem, and actors Gwyneth Paltrow and Kevin Hart touted their NFTs, or non-fungible tokens—helping set off a buying frenzy in these digital assets. Among the hottest of NFTs were the Bored Ape Yacht Club, colorful electronic caricatures of weary-eyed, stubbly-faced primates in sailor suits, sometimes selling for more than $1 million. By late 2022, trading volume had collapsed, and many NFTs had fallen in price by more than 90%.

近期或许没有哪项投资比特殊目的收购公司 (SPAC) 更能从知名支持者那里获益。SPAC 没有资产或收益。它们押注于尚不存在的事物，通过 IPO（首次公开募股）筹集资金，在预定期限（通常为 24 个月）前收购其他公司。

Perhaps no recent investment benefited more from famous backers than special-purpose acquisition companies. SPACs have no assets or earnings. They’re a bet on something that doesn’t exist yet, as they raise money through an IPO, or initial public offering of stock, to buy other firms by a predetermined deadline, often 24 months.

2020-21年，航空和音乐巨头理查德·布兰森（Richard Branson）以及前Facebook高管查马斯·帕里哈皮蒂亚（Chamath Palihapitiya）等明星企业家吸引了无数投资者购买其SPAC的股份。

In 2020–21, such celebrity entrepreneurs as airline and music magnate Richard Branson and former Facebook executive Chamath Palihapitiya attracted countless investors to buy shares in their SPACs.

在短暂而辉煌的时刻，名声似乎能确保财富。

For a brief and shining moment, fame seemed to ensure fortune.

2020年，美国共有248家SPAC公司融资830亿美元；2021年，有613家SPAC公司融资超过1600亿美元，其中大部分是在年初。单日涨幅超过50%，吸引了大批新买家。

In 2020, 248 SPACs raised a total of $83 billion in the U.S.; in 2021, 613 raised more than $160 billion, mostly in the beginning of the year. Gains of more than 50% in a single day attracted swarms of new buyers.

不幸的是，正如格雷厄姆在第六章中警告的那样，“巨额快速利润……足以削弱公众的批判能力，同时也会增强其占有欲。”你不可能通过盲目相信亿万富翁会为你的最大利益行事，或者相信资产和收益会凭空而来，从而积累长期财富。

Unfortunately, as Graham warns in Chapter 6, “large and quick profits . . . are sufficient to dull the public’s critical faculty, just as they sharpen its acquisitive instinct.” You can’t build long-term wealth with blind-faith bets that billionaires will act in your best interest, or that assets and earnings will materialize out of thin air.

如果您所做的唯一研究就是注意到一个著名名字的存在，那么您就忘记了格雷厄姆的告诫：进取的投资者在购买任何资产之前必须投入大量的时间和精力。

And if the only research you did was to notice the presence of a famous name, you forgot Graham’s injunction that enterprising investors must commit significant time and energy before buying any asset.

SPAC 充斥着利益冲突。即使只是看一眼典型 SPAC 的 IPO 招股说明书（或披露文件），也能发现一些危险信号，包括：

SPACs bristle with conflicts of interest. Even a glance at the IPO prospectus, or disclosure document, of the typical offering should unfurl blazing red flags, including:

内部人士只需支付每股十分之一美分即可控制公司 20% 的股份；
insiders pay as little as a tenth of a penny per share to control 20% of the company;
内部人士保留用自己的公司直接与 SPAC 竞争的权利；
insiders reserve the right to compete directly against the SPAC with their own companies;
经理们可能会从收购目标那里获得报酬，从而激励他们推荐自己能从中受益的交易；
managers potentially get paid by acquisition targets, giving them incentives to recommend deals they personally benefit from;
本应充当监督者的“独立”董事获得了数万股股票，但市值却只是股票的一小部分；
“independent” directors, meant to serve as watchdogs, receive tens of thousands of shares at a fraction of market value;
无法保证内部人员将继续投资 SPAC；
no assurance that insiders will remain invested in the SPAC;
无法保证 SPAC 一定能找到值得收购的企业。
no assurance that the SPAC will ever find a business to buy.

SPAC通常被称为空白支票公司，因为外部投资者赋予内部人员全权委托其将所得款项用于几乎任何用途。投资银行收取的费用为2%至5%甚至更高。

SPACs are often called blank-check companies because outside investors give the insiders carte blanche to spend the proceeds on just about anything. Investment banks earn fees of 2% to 5% or more.

图 6-1： SPACtacular

FIGURE 6-1: SPACtacular

资料来源：华尔街日报。

Source: The Wall Street Journal.

当内部人士可以通过向投资公众推销资产而赚取数亿美元时，他们就会有动力大力推销，并趁着有利时机退出。

When insiders can make hundreds of millions of dollars for pushing an asset onto the investing public, they have an incentive to push very hard—and to get out while the getting’s good.

随着SPAC陆续破产，它们也随之崩溃。2021年2月至8月期间，SPAC的总市值蒸发了1000亿美元^。9 很少有任何投资能如此迅速地从成功变成失败。

As deal after deal fizzled, SPACs imploded. Between February and August 2021, SPACs lost $100 billion in combined market value.⁹ Seldom has any investment turned so fast from a success to a slaughterhouse.

没有捷径

No Shortcuts

问题不在于投资者从未吸取教训，而是他们吸取了错误的教训。

The problem isn’t that investors never learn a lesson. It’s that they learn the wrong lessons.

如果你投机了 NFT 或 SPAC，结果惨败，你学到的教训可能是：永远不要再投机 NFT 或 SPAC 了！然而，你应该学到的教训是：永远不要再投机了！

If you speculated on NFTs or SPACs and got wiped out, the lesson you learned was probably Never speculate on NFTs or SPACs again! The lesson you should have learned, however, is Never speculate again!

这是因为下一轮市场狂热不会用NFT或SPAC来诱惑你。它将是某种听起来完全不同、极具诱惑力的全新颠覆或变革。

That’s because the next bout of market madness won’t tempt you with NFTs or SPACs. It will be some new disruption or transformation that sounds completely different and utterly seductive.

每一次投资热潮最终都只是同一个老故事的翻版：追求低风险、高回报且不费吹灰之力的“圣杯”。在 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代初，是主动型基金经理管理的共同基金。在 90 年代中期，是新兴市场。在 90 年代末，是互联网股票。在 21 世纪初，是房地产。然后是从市场下跌中获利的“反向”基金。接下来是私人另类投资，然后是加密货币、NFT 和 SPAC。

Every investing craze turns out to be another iteration of the same old story: the quest for the Holy Grail of high returns at low risk with no work. In the 1980s and early 1990s, it was mutual funds run by active managers. In the mid-1990s, it was emerging markets. In the late 1990s, it was internet stocks. In the early 2000s, it was real estate. Then it was “inverse” funds that benefit from falling markets. Next it was private alternatives, then cryptocurrency, NFTs, and SPACs.

追寻投资圣杯总是徒劳无功。要想获得高于平均水平的回报，你必须承担额外的风险，投入额外的时间和精力。如果你认为有捷径，那你就是在自欺欺人。

The quest for the investing Holy Grail is always futile. To earn higher-than-average returns, you must take extra risk and you must commit additional time and effort. You’re kidding yourself if you think there’s a shortcut.

第七章

Chapter 7 进取型投资者的投资组合政策：积极的一面

Portfolio Policy for the Enterprising Investor: The Positive Side

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

顾名思义，进取型投资者会投入大量的注意力和精力，以获得比普通投资更好的回报。在我们讨论一般投资策略时，我们针对债券投资提出了一些建议，这些建议主要针对进取型投资者。他们可能对以下类型的特殊投资机会感兴趣：

The enterprising investor, by definition, will devote a fair amount of his attention and efforts toward obtaining a better than run-of-the-mill investment result. In our discussion of general investment policy we have made some suggestions regarding bond investments that are addressed chiefly to the enterprising investor. He might be interested in special opportunities of the following kinds:

（1）由美国政府有效担保的免税新住房管理局债券。

(1) Tax-free New Housing Authority bonds effectively guaranteed by the United States government.

（2）应税但高收益的新社区债券，也由美国政府担保。

(2) Taxable but high-yielding New Community bonds, also guaranteed by the United States government.

（3）市政当局发行的免税工业债券，但由实力雄厚的公司支付租赁费用来偿还。

(3) Tax-free industrial bonds issued by municipalities, but serviced by lease payments made by strong corporations.

第四章已经提到了这些不寻常的债券发行类型。*

References have been made to these unusual types of bond issues in Chapter 4.*

而另一方面，或许存在一些低质量债券，其价格低廉，构成真正的廉价投资机会。但这些债券属于“特殊情况”。债券和普通股之间没有真正的区别。*

At the other end of the spectrum there may be lower-quality bonds obtainable at such low prices as to constitute true bargain opportunities. But these would belong in the “special situation” area, where no true distinction exists between bonds and common stocks.*

普通股运营

Operations in Common Stocks

普通股领域进取型投资者的特殊活动可以分为四类：

The activities specially characteristic of the enterprising investor in the common-stock field may be classified under four heads:

在低市买入，在高市卖出
Buying in low markets and selling in high markets
购买精心挑选的“成长股”
Buying carefully chosen “growth stocks”
购买各种类型的廉价商品
Buying bargain issues of various types
购买“特殊情况”
Buying into “special situations”

一般市场政策——配方时机

General Market Policy—Formula Timing

我们将在下一章讨论在市场低迷时入场，在市场繁荣后期抛售的策略的可能性和局限性。过去许多年来，这个绝妙的想法看起来既简单又可行，至少从初次查看涵盖其周期性波动的市场图表来看是如此。我们已经遗憾地承认，过去20年的市场行为在任何数学基础上都不适合进行此类操作。虽然已经发生的波动幅度并不小，但需要特殊的交易天赋或“感觉”才能利用它们。这与我们假设读者具备的智力水平截然不同，我们必须将基于此类技巧的操作排除在我们的参考范围之外。

We reserve for the next chapter our discussion of the possibilities and limitations of a policy of entering the market when it is depressed and selling out in the advanced stages of a boom. For many years in the past this bright idea appeared both simple and feasible, at least from first inspection of a market chart covering its periodic fluctuations. We have already admitted ruefully that the market’s action in the past 20 years has not lent itself to operations of this sort on any mathematical basis. The fluctuations that have taken place, while not inconsiderable in extent, would have required a special talent or “feel” for trading to take advantage of them. This is something quite different from the intelligence which we are assuming in our readers, and we must exclude operations based on such skill from our terms of reference.

我们向防御型投资者提出并在此处描述的 50-50 计划，是我们能在 1972 年的条件下向所有投资者推荐的最佳具体或自动公式。但是，我们在普通股的最低 25% 和最高 75% 之间保留了很大的回旋余地，允许那些对一般市场水平的危险性或吸引力有强烈信念的投资者使用。大约 20 年前，人们可以详细讨论一些明确的公式来改变普通股持有百分比，并确信这些计划具有实用性。1^时代似乎已经抛弃了这种方法，试图确定自 1949 年以来市场模式的新的买入和卖出水平已毫无意义。这段时间太短，无法为未来提供任何可靠的指导。*

The 50–50 plan, which we proposed to the defensive investor and described here, is about the best specific or automatic formula we can recommend to all investors under the conditions of 1972. But we have retained a broad leeway between the 25% minimum and the 75% maximum in common stocks, which we allow to those investors who have strong convictions about either the danger or the attractiveness of the general market level. Some 20 years ago it was possible to discuss in great detail a number of clear-cut formulas for varying the percentage held in common stocks, with confidence that these plans had practical utility.¹ The times seem to have passed such approaches by, and there would be little point in trying to determine new levels for buying and selling out of the market patterns since 1949. That is too short a period to furnish any reliable guide to the future.*

成长股方法

Growth-Stock Approach

每个投资者都希望选择那些在几年内表现优于平均水平的公司股票。成长型股票可以定义为过去表现优异且未来预期仍将如此的股票。2^因此，明智的投资者专注于选择成长型股票似乎是合乎逻辑的。实际上，情况要复杂得多，我们将尝试阐明这一点。

Every investor would like to select the stocks of companies that will do better than the average over a period of years. A growth stock may be defined as one that has done this in the past and is expected to do so in the future.² Thus it seems only logical that the intelligent investor should concentrate upon the selection of growth stocks. Actually the matter is more complicated, as we shall try to show.

找出过去“跑赢平均水平”的公司，纯粹是统计上的琐事。投资者可以从经纪人那里获得一份包含50家或100家此类企业的名单。^*那么，为什么他不从中挑选出15到20只看起来最有可能的股票，然后瞧！他就拥有了一个保证成功的股票投资组合呢？

It is a mere statistical chore to identify companies that have “outperformed the averages” in the past. The investor can obtain a list of 50 or 100 such enterprises from his broker.^* Why, then, should he not merely pick out the 15 or 20 most likely looking issues of this group and lo! he has a guaranteed-successful stock portfolio?

这个简单的想法有两个陷阱。首先，那些拥有良好业绩记录和良好前景的普通股会以相应的高价出售。投资者对这些股票前景的判断可能是正确的，但其业绩仍然不会特别好，仅仅是因为他已经为预期的繁荣付出了全部代价（甚至可能付出了过高的价格）。其次，他对未来的判断也可能被证明是错误的。异常快速的增长不可能永远持续下去；当一家公司已经实现了辉煌的扩张时，其规模的扩大本身就使得复制其辉煌更加困难。在某个点上，增长曲线会趋于平缓，在很多情况下，它会向下拐弯。

There are two catches to this simple idea. The first is that common stocks with good records and apparently good prospects sell at correspondingly high prices. The investor may be right in his judgment of their prospects and still not fare particularly well, merely because he has paid in full (and perhaps overpaid) for the expected prosperity. The second is that his judgment as to the future may prove wrong. Unusually rapid growth cannot keep up forever; when a company has already registered a brilliant expansion, its very increase in size makes a repetition of its achievement more difficult. At some point the growth curve flattens out, and in many cases it turns downward.

显然，如果有人事后诸葛亮，只选择几个例子，就能证明在成长股领域，财富的积累和损失都很容易。那么，怎样才能公正地评判这里所能获得的整体结果呢？我们认为，通过研究专门从事成长股投资基金的业绩，可以得出相当合理的结论。权威手册《投资公司》每年由纽约证券交易所的成员公司亚瑟·维森伯格公司出版，统计了大约 120 只此类“成长基金”在几年内的年度业绩。其中，45 只基金的业绩记录长达十年或更长时间。这些公司的平均总收益（不按基金规模加权）在 1961 年至 1970 年间为 108%，而标准普尔综合指数和道琼斯工业平均指数的收益分别为 105% 和 83%。³在1969年和1970年两年间，126只“成长型基金”中的大多数表现都逊于这两个指数。我们之前的研究也发现了类似的结果。这意味着，与投资普通股相比，对成长型公司的多元化投资并没有带来显著的回报。*

It is obvious that if one confines himself to a few chosen instances, based on hindsight, he could demonstrate that fortunes can readily be either made or lost in the growth-stock field. How can one judge fairly of the overall results obtainable here? We think that reasonably sound conclusions can be drawn from a study of the results achieved by the investment funds specializing in the growth-stock approach. The authoritative manual entitled Investment Companies, published annually by Arthur Wiesenberger & Company, members of the New York Stock Exchange, computes the annual performance of some 120 such “growth funds” over a period of years. Of these, 45 have records covering ten years or more. The average overall gain for these companies—unweighted for size of fund—works out at 108% for the decade 1961–1970, compared with 105% for the S & P composite and 83% for the DJIA.³ In the two years 1969 and 1970 the majority of the 126 “growth funds” did worse than either index. Similar results were found in our earlier studies. The implication here is that no outstanding rewards came from diversified investment in growth companies as compared with that in common stocks generally.*

根本没有理由认为平均智力水平即使付出了巨大的努力，投资者多年来从购买成长型股票中获得的回报也能比专注于该领域的投资公司更好。这些机构肯定比你拥有更多的人才和更先进的研究设备。因此，我们建议进取型投资者不要投资常见的成长型股票。*这类股票的良好前景已得到市场充分认可，并已反映在当前市盈率（例如高于20倍）中。（对于防御型投资者，我们建议购买价格上限为过去七年平均收益的25倍。在大多数情况下，这两个标准大致相同。）^*

There is no reason at all for thinking that the average intelligent investor, even with much devoted effort, can derive better results over the years from the purchase of growth stocks than the investment companies specializing in this area. Surely these organizations have more brains and better research facilities at their disposal than you do. Consequently we should advise against the usual type of growth-stock commitment for the enterprising investor.* This is one in which the excellent prospects are fully recognized in the market and already reflected in a current price-earnings ratio of, say, higher than 20. (For the defensive investor we suggested an upper limit of purchase price at 25 times average earnings of the past seven years. The two criteria would be about equivalent in most cases.)^*

成长型股票这一类别的显著特点是其市场价格波动幅度较大。对于规模最大、历史最悠久的公司（例如通用电气和IBM）而言，情况确实如此，对于规模较小、较成功的新兴公司而言更是如此。它们印证了我们的论点：自1949年以来，股市的主要特征就是股票市场被注入了高度投机的元素。那些取得了最辉煌成就、本身就有资格获得高投资评级的公司。（它们的信用状况最佳，且其借款利率最低。）这类公司的投资能力可能不会在很长一段时间内发生变化，但其 股票的风险特征将取决于其在股市中的表现。公众对其的热情越高，其股价上涨速度与其实际盈利增长速度相比越快，其投资风险就越大。*

The striking thing about growth stocks as a class is their tendency toward wide swings in market price. This is true of the largest and longest-established companies—such as General Electric and International Business Machines—and even more so of newer and smaller successful companies. They illustrate our thesis that the main characteristic of the stock market since 1949 has been the injection of a highly speculative element into the shares of companies which have scored the most brilliant successes, and which themselves would be entitled to a high investment rating. (Their credit standing is of the best, and they pay the lowest interest rates on their borrowings.) The investment caliber of such a company may not change over a long span of years, but the risk characteristics of its stock will depend on what happens to it in the stock market. The more enthusiastic the public grows about it, and the faster its advance as compared with the actual growth in its earnings, the riskier a proposition it becomes.*

但读者可能会问，普通股的巨额财富难道不是由那些在公司早期就投入巨额资金，对未来充满信心，并在公司股价上涨100倍甚至更多时依然坚定持有的人积累的吗？答案是肯定的。但从单一公司投资中获得巨额财富的人几乎总是与该公司有着密切的关系——通过工作、家庭关系等等——这使得他们有理由将大部分资源投入到一家公司，并在各种风风雨雨中坚守承诺，即使过程中面临无数次以看似高价抛售的诱惑。缺乏这种密切个人联系的投资者将不断面临一个问题：他的资金是否过多地投入到这家公司。^*每一次下跌——无论后续情况如何短暂——都会加剧他的问题；内外压力可能会迫使他接受看似丰厚的利润，但最终的收益远低于真正的巨额收益。⁴

But is it not true, the reader may ask, that the really big fortunes from common stocks have been garnered by those who made a substantial commitment in the early years of a company in whose future they had great confidence, and who held their original shares unwaveringly while they increased 100-fold or more in value? The answer is “Yes.” But the big fortunes from single-company investments are almost always realized by persons who have a close relationship with the particular company—through employment, family connection, etc.—which justifies them in placing a large part of their resources in one medium and holding on to this commitment through all vicissitudes, despite numerous temptations to sell out at apparently high prices along the way. An investor without such close personal contact will constantly be faced with the question of whether too large a portion of his funds are in this one medium.^* Each decline—however temporary it proves in the sequel—will accentuate his problem; and internal and external pressures are likely to force him to take what seems to be a goodly profit, but one far less than the ultimate bonanza.⁴

^{表 7-1 1961-1970年}“增长基金”的平均业绩

TABLE 7-1 Average Results of “Growth Funds,” 1961–1970^a

^a这些数据由 Wiesenberger Financial Services 提供。

^a These figures are supplied by Wiesenberger Financial Services.

三大“创业投资”推荐领域

Three Recommended Fields for “Enterprising Investment”

要想长期获得优于平均水平的投资收益，需要一种具备双重优势的选择或操作策略：(1) 它必须符合客观或理性的稳健性测试；(2) 它必须与大多数投资者或投机者所遵循的策略有所不同。根据我们的经验和研究，我们推荐三种符合这些标准的投资方法。它们彼此之间差异很大，并且每种方法都可能需要评估者具备不同的知识和性格。

To obtain better than average investment results over a long pull requires a policy of selection or operation possessing a twofold merit: (1) It must meet objective or rational tests of underlying soundness; and (2) it must be different from the policy followed by most investors or speculators. Our experience and study leads us to recommend three investment approaches that meet these criteria. They differ rather widely from one another, and each may require a different type of knowledge and temperament on the part of those who assay it.

相对不受欢迎的大公司

The Relatively Unpopular Large Company

如果我们假设市场习惯于高估那些增长强劲或因其他原因而备受追捧的普通股，那么，我们完全有理由相信，市场至少会相对低估那些因暂时性发展不尽如人意而失宠的公司。这或许可以被视为股市的一条基本规律，它所体现的投资策略应该既保守又有前景。

If we assume that it is the habit of the market to overvalue common stocks which have been showing excellent growth or are glamorous for some other reason, it is logical to expect that it will undervalue—relatively, at least—companies that are out of favor because of unsatisfactory developments of a temporary nature. This may be set down as a fundamental law of the stock market, and it suggests an investment approach that should prove both conservative and promising.

这里的关键要求是，富有进取心的投资者要专注于那些正经历一段低迷时期的大型公司。虽然小型公司也可能因为类似原因被低估，而且在很多情况下，其盈利和股价可能会在之后上涨，但它们面临着盈利能力最终丧失的风险，以及尽管盈利能力有所提升，但仍可能被市场长期忽视的风险。因此，大型公司比其他公司拥有双重优势。首先，它们拥有充足的资本和人才资源，能够帮助它们渡过难关，重回令人满意的盈利基础。其次，市场可能会对任何出现的改善做出合理的反应。

The key requirement here is that the enterprising investor concentrate on the larger companies that are going through a period of unpopularity. While small companies may also be undervalued for similar reasons, and in many cases may later increase their earnings and share price, they entail the risk of a definitive loss of profitability and also of protracted neglect by the market in spite of better earnings. The large companies thus have a double advantage over the others. First, they have the resources in capital and brain power to carry them through adversity and back to a satisfactory earnings base. Second, the market is likely to respond with reasonable speed to any improvement shown.

对道琼斯工业平均指数中不受欢迎股票价格行为的研究，有力地证明了这一论点的合理性。这些研究假设每年投资于道琼斯工业平均指数中以当年或上一年收益的最低乘数出售的六只或十只股票。这些股票可以被称为名单上“最便宜”的股票，而它们的便宜显然反映了它们在投资者或交易员中相对不受欢迎。进一步假设这些股票在持有期（1 至 5 年）结束时售出。然后，将这些投资的结果与道琼斯工业平均指数整体或最高乘数（即最受欢迎的）组的结果进行比较。

A remarkable demonstration of the soundness of this thesis is found in studies of the price behavior of the unpopular issues in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. In these it was assumed that an investment was made each year in either the six or the ten issues in the DJIA which were selling at the lowest multipliers of their current or previous year’s earnings. These could be called the “cheapest” stocks in the list, and their cheapness was evidently the reflection of relative unpopularity with investors or traders. It was assumed further that these purchases were sold out at the end of holding periods ranging from one to five years. The results of these investments were then compared with the results shown in either the DJIA as a whole or in the highest multiplier (i.e., the most popular) group.

我们现有的详细资料涵盖了过去 53 年中每年购买股票的结果。5^在1917 年至 1933 年的早期阶段，这种方法被证明是无利可图的。但自 1933 年以来，这种方法已显示出非常成功的结果。德崇公司（现为德崇费尔斯通公司）*进行了 34次一年期持有测试——从 1937 年到 1969 年——廉价股票的表现肯定比道琼斯工业平均指数差的只有三次；结果大致相同有六次；廉价股票在 25 年内明显跑赢平均水平。与道琼斯工业平均指数和十只高乘数股票相比，低乘数股票的连续五年平均结果始终表现更好（表 7-2 ）。

The detailed material we have available covers the results of annual purchases assumed in each of the past 53 years.⁵ In the early period, 1917–1933, this approach proved unprofitable. But since 1933 the method has shown highly successful results. In 34 tests made by Drexel & Company (now Drexel Firestone)* of one-year holding—from 1937 through 1969—the cheap stocks did definitely worse than the DJIA in only three instances; the results were about the same in six cases; and the cheap stocks clearly outperformed the average in 25 years. The consistently better performance of the low-multiplier stocks is shown (Table 7-2) by the average results for successive five-year periods, when compared with those of the DJIA and of the ten high-multipliers.

德雷克塞尔的计算进一步表明，1936年对低乘数股票的初始投资为10,000美元，并根据该原则每年进行转换，到1962年将增长到66,900美元。对高乘数股票的相同操作最终价值仅为25,300美元；而对全部30只股票的操作将使原始基金价值增至44,000美元。^*

The Drexel computation shows further that an original investment of $10,000 made in the low-multiplier issues in 1936, and switched each year in accordance with the principle, would have grown to $66,900 by 1962. The same operations in high-multiplier stocks would have ended with a value of only $25,300; while an operation in all thirty stocks would have increased the original fund to $44,000.^*

表 7-2 1937 年至 1969 年测试问题的平均年增减百分比

TABLE 7-2 Average Annual Percentage Gain or Loss on Test Issues, 1937–1969

时期

Period

10个低乘数问题

10 Low-Multiplier Issues

10个高乘数问题

10 High-Multiplier Issues

30 只道琼斯工业平均指数股票

30 DJIA Stocks

1937–1942

– 2.2

–10.0

– 6.3

1943–1947

17.3

8.3

14.9

1948–1952

16.4

4.6

9.9

1953–1957

20.9

10.0

13.7

1958–1962

10.2

– 3.3

3.6

1963–1969年（8年）

1963–1969 (8 years)

8.0

4.6

4.0

如上所述，购买“不受欢迎的大公司”的概念及其在集团基础上的执行都相当简单。但在考虑个别公司时，有时必须考虑一个具有相反重要性的特殊因素。由于收益差异很大而本质上具有投机性的公司在其好年景往往以相对较高的价格和相对较低的乘数出售，反之，在其坏年景则以较低的价格和较高的乘数出售。这些关系在表 7-3中进行了说明，其中涵盖了克莱斯勒公司普通股的波动。在这些情况下，市场对异常高利润的持续性持足够的怀疑态度，以保守地对其进行估值，而在收益较低或不存在时则相反。（请注意，根据算术，如果一家公司的收益“几乎为零”，则其股票必须以这些微不足道的利润的高乘数出售。）

The concept of buying “unpopular large companies” and its execution on a group basis, as described above, are both quite simple. But in considering individual companies a special factor of opposite import must sometimes be taken into account. Companies that are inherently speculative because of widely varying earnings tend to sell both at a relatively high price and at a relatively low multiplier in their good years, and conversely at low prices and high multipliers in their bad years. These relationships are illustrated in Table 7-3, covering fluctuations of Chrysler Corp. common. In these cases the market has sufficient skepticism as to the continuation of the unusually high profits to value them conservatively, and conversely when earnings are low or nonexistent. (Note that, by the arithmetic, if a company earns “next to nothing” its shares must sell at a high multiplier of these minuscule profits.)

事实上，克莱斯勒在道琼斯工业平均指数领先公司榜单中表现相当突出，因此对低乘数计算的影响并不大。通过要求股价低于过去平均收益或进行类似测试，很容易避免将此类异常股票纳入低乘数榜单。

As it happens Chrysler has been quite exceptional in the DJIA list of leading companies, and hence it did not greatly affect the low-multiplier calculations. It would be quite easy to avoid inclusion of such anomalous issues in a low-multiplier list by requiring also that the price be low in relation to past average earnings or by some similar test.

在撰写此修订版时，我们测试了道琼斯工业平均指数低乘数方法的结果，该方法适用于假设在 1968 年底购买并在 1971 年 6 月 30 日重新估值的一组股票。这一次数据结果令人失望，低乘数6倍或10倍的投资组合大幅亏损，而高乘数的投资组合则获得了不错的收益。这起糟糕的案例不应该影响基于30多次实验得出的结论，但近期发生的事件却给它带来了特别不利的影响。或许，激进的投资者应该从“低乘数”的理念入手，并在构建投资组合时添加其他量化和定性要求。

While writing this revision we tested the results of the DJIA-low-multiplier method applied to a group assumed to be bought at the end of 1968 and revalued on June 30, 1971. This time the figures proved quite disappointing, showing a sharp loss for the low-multiplier six or ten and a good profit for the high-multiplier selections. This one bad instance should not vitiate conclusions based on 30-odd experiments, but its recent happening gives it a special adverse weight. Perhaps the aggressive investor should start with the “low-multiplier” idea, but add other quantitative and qualitative requirements thereto in making up his portfolio.

表 7-3 克莱斯勒普通股价格和收益，1952–1970 年

TABLE 7-3 Chrysler Common Prices and Earnings, 1952–1970

^{1962 年的最低点}是 37.5。

^a 1962 low was 37½.

^b已根据股票分割进行调整。def.：净亏损。

^b Adjusted for stock splits. def.: Net loss.

购买廉价债券

Purchase of Bargain Issues

我们将廉价发行定义为，根据分析确定的事实，其价值远高于其售价的发行。这类发行包括远低于票面价值的债券和优先股，以及普通股。为了尽可能具体，我们假设，除非标价至少比实际价格高出50%，否则发行的股票就不是真正的“廉价发行”。什么样的事实能够证明存在如此巨大的差异？廉价发行是如何产生的？投资者又是如何从中获利的？

We define a bargain issue as one which, on the basis of facts established by analysis, appears to be worth considerably more than it is selling for. The genus includes bonds and preferred stocks selling well under par, as well as common stocks. To be as concrete as possible, let us suggest that an issue is not a true “bargain” unless the indicated value is at least 50% more than the price. What kind of facts would warrant the conclusion that so great a discrepancy exists? How do bargains come into existence, and how does the investor profit from them?

有两种测试方法可以识别廉价普通股。第一种是估值法。这主要依赖于估算未来收益，然后将其乘以适用于特定发行的因素。如果最终价值远高于市场价格，并且投资者对所采用的技术有信心，他就可以将该股票标记为便宜货。第二个测试是企业对私人所有者的价值。该价值通常也主要由预期未来收益决定——在这种情况下，结果可能与第一个测试相同。但在第二个测试中，人们可能会更加关注资产的可实现价值，尤其强调净流动资产或营运资本。

There are two tests by which a bargain common stock is detected. The first is by the method of appraisal. This relies largely on estimating future earnings and then multiplying these by a factor appropriate to the particular issue. If the resultant value is sufficiently above the market price—and if the investor has confidence in the technique employed—he can tag the stock as a bargain. The second test is the value of the business to a private owner. This value also is often determined chiefly by expected future earnings—in which case the result may be identical with the first. But in the second test more attention is likely to be paid to the realizable value of the assets, with particular emphasis on the net current assets or working capital.

按照这些标准衡量，在一般市场低迷时期，很大一部分普通股都是便宜货。（一个典型的例子是通用汽车，1941年其股价不到30美元，相当于1971年每股5美元。而当时该公司的盈利超过4美元，股息高达3.5美元甚至更多。）诚然，当前的盈利和短期前景可能都不佳，但冷静地评估未来的平均状况，就会发现其价值远高于现行价格。因此，在低迷的市场中保持勇气的智慧不仅可以通过经验之谈得到证实，也可以通过合理的价值分析技术的应用得到验证。

At low points in the general market a large proportion of common stocks are bargain issues, as measured by these standards. (A typical example was General Motors when it sold at less than 30 in 1941, equivalent to only 5 for the 1971 shares. It had been earning in excess of $4 and paying $3.50, or more, in dividends.) It is true that current earnings and the immediate prospects may both be poor, but a levelheaded appraisal of average future conditions would indicate values far above ruling prices. Thus the wisdom of having courage in depressed markets is vindicated not only by the voice of experience but also by application of plausible techniques of value analysis.

市场反复出现的波动，在一般的清单中形成了便宜货的条件，也解释了几乎所有市场层面都存在着许多个别便宜货。市场喜欢小题大做，把普通的波动夸大成重大挫折。即使仅仅是缺乏兴趣或热情，也可能导致价格跌至荒谬的低位。因此，我们似乎有两个主要的低估原因：(1) 目前令人失望的业绩；(2) 长期的忽视或不受欢迎。

The same vagaries of the market place that recurrently establish a bargain condition in the general list account for the existence of many individual bargains at almost all market levels. The market is fond of making mountains out of molehills and exaggerating ordinary vicissitudes into major setbacks. Even a mere lack of interest or enthusiasm may impel a price decline to absurdly low levels. Thus we have what appear to be two major sources of undervaluation: (1) currently disappointing results and (2) protracted neglect or unpopularity.

然而，如果单独考虑这两个原因，都不能作为普通股投资成功的指南。我们怎么能确定目前令人失望的结果只是暂时的呢？诚然，我们可以提供一些很好的例子。钢铁股过去以其周期性而闻名，精明的买家可以在盈利较低时低价买入，然后在景气时期以丰厚的利润卖出。克莱斯勒公司就是一个很好的例子，如表7-3所示。

However, neither of these causes, if considered by itself alone, can be relied on as a guide to successful common-stock investment. How can we be sure that the currently disappointing results are indeed going to be only temporary? True, we can supply excellent examples of that happening. The steel stocks used to be famous for their cyclical quality, and the shrewd buyer could acquire them at low prices when earnings were low and sell them out in boom years at a fine profit. A spectacular example is supplied by Chrysler Corporation, as shown by the data in Table 7-3.

如果这是波动股票的标准行为盈利，那么在股市获利就轻而易举了。可惜的是，我们可以举出许多盈利和股价下跌的例子，但两者并没有自动大幅回升。Anaconda Wire and Cable 就是一个例子，该公司在 1956 年之前的盈利很高，当年股价最高达到 85 美元。随后，盈利连续六年不规律下降；1962 年股价跌至 23.5 美元，次年被母公司（Anaconda Corporation）收购，当时股价仅为 33 美元。

If this were the standard behavior of stocks with fluctuating earnings, then making profits in the stock market would be an easy matter. Unfortunately, we could cite many examples of declines in earnings and price which were not followed automatically by a handsome recovery of both. One such was Anaconda Wire and Cable, which had large earnings up to 1956, with a high price of 85 in that year. The earnings then declined irregularly for six years; the price fell to 23½ in 1962, and the following year it was taken over by its parent enterprise (Anaconda Corporation) at the equivalent of only 33.

此类经验表明，投资者需要的不仅仅是盈利和股价双双下跌，才能为买入提供坚实的依据。他应该要求至少有迹象表明过去十年或更长时间盈利保持合理稳定——即没有出现盈利亏损的年份——以及足够的规模和财务实力来应对未来可能出现的挫折。因此，理想的组合是一家大型知名公司的股价和市盈率都远低于其过去的平均水平。这无疑会排除克莱斯勒等公司的大部分盈利机会，因为它们的低价年份通常伴随着高市盈率。但现在我们要向读者保证——而且我们无疑还会再次强调—— “事后利润”和“实际利润”之间存在着天壤之别。我们严重怀疑克莱斯勒式的过山车式盈利是否适合我们这位富有进取心的投资者。

The many experiences of this type suggest that the investor would need more than a mere falling off in both earnings and price to give him a sound basis for purchase. He should require an indication of at least reasonable stability of earnings over the past decade or more—i.e., no year of earnings deficit—plus sufficient size and financial strength to meet possible setbacks in the future. The ideal combination here is thus that of a large and prominent company selling both well below its past average price and its past average price/earnings multiplier. This would no doubt have ruled out most of the profitable opportunities in companies such as Chrysler, since their low-price years are generally accompanied by high price/earnings ratios. But let us assure the reader now—and no doubt we shall do it again—that there is a world of difference between “hindsight profits” and “real-money profits.” We doubt seriously whether the Chrysler type of roller coaster is a suitable medium for operations by our enterprising investor.

我们提到过，长期被忽视或不受欢迎是导致股价跌至过低水平的第二个原因。目前这种情况的一个例子似乎是国家普雷斯托工业公司（National Presto Industries）。在1968年的牛市中，它的股价最高达到了45美元，仅为当年5.61美元收益的8倍。1969年和1970年的每股利润都有所增长，但股价在1970年跌至仅21美元。这还不到当年（创纪录）收益的4倍，也低于其净流动资产价值。1972年3月，它的股价为34美元，仍然仅为上次报告收益的5.5倍，大约相当于其扩大后的净流动资产价值。

We have mentioned protracted neglect or unpopularity as a second cause of price declines to unduly low levels. A current case of this kind would appear to be National Presto Industries. In the bull market of 1968 it sold at a high of 45, which was only 8 times the $5.61 earnings for that year. The per-share profits increased in both 1969 and 1970, but the price declined to only 21 in 1970. This was less than 4 times the (record) earnings in that year and less than its net-current-asset value. In March 1972 it was selling at 34, still only 5½ times the last reported earnings, and at about its enlarged net-current-asset value.

另一个例子是加州标准石油公司，这是一家举足轻重的公司。1972年初，它的股价与13年前差不多，比如56美元。它的盈利非常稳定，增长相对较小。但整个期间仅有一次小幅下跌。其账面价值与市场价格大致相等。尽管1958年至1971年期间的业绩表现保守乐观，但该公司的年平均市盈率从未超过其当前收益的15倍。1972年初，市盈率仅为10倍左右。

Another example of this type is provided currently by Standard Oil of California, a concern of major importance. In early 1972 it was selling at about the same price as 13 years before, say 56. Its earnings had been remarkably steady, with relatively small growth but with only one small decline over the entire period. Its book value was about equal to the market price. With this conservatively favorable 1958–71 record the company has never shown an average annual price as high as 15 times its current earnings. In early 1972 the price/earnings ratio was only about 10.

普通股价格过低的第三个原因可能是市场未能识别其真实的盈利状况。我们这里的典型例子是北太平洋铁路公司，它在1946-47年从36美元跌至13.5美元。1947年，该公司的真实盈利接近每股10美元。股价的下跌很大程度上受到其1美元股息的压制。它之所以被忽视，还因为其盈利能力的大部分被铁路公司特有的会计方法所掩盖。

A third cause for an unduly low price for a common stock may be the market’s failure to recognize its true earnings picture. Our classic example here is Northern Pacific Railway, which in 1946–47 declined from 36 to 13½. The true earnings of the road in 1947 were close to $10 per share. The price of the stock was held down in great part by its $1 dividend. It was neglected also because much of its earnings power was concealed by accounting methods peculiar to railroads.

最容易识别的廉价发行类型是普通股，其售价低于公司扣除所有先前债务后的净营运资本。*这意味着买方无需为固定资产（例如建筑物、机器等）或任何可能存在的商誉项目支付任何费用。很少有公司的最终价值低于营运资本本身，尽管偶尔也会发现一些例子。令人惊讶的是，市场上有如此多的企业以这种廉价的方式进行估值。1957 年的一份汇编显示，当时的市场水平并不低，披露了大约 150 只此类普通股。在表 7-4中，我们总结了在 1957 年 12 月 31 日购买《标准普尔月度股票指南》中列出的 85 家公司股票并持有两年的结果。

The type of bargain issue that can be most readily identified is a common stock that sells for less than the company’s net working capital alone, after deducting all prior obligations.* This would mean that the buyer would pay nothing at all for the fixed assets—buildings, machinery, etc., or any good-will items that might exist. Very few companies turn out to have an ultimate value less than the working capital alone, although scattered instances may be found. The surprising thing, rather, is that there have been so many enterprises obtainable which have been valued in the market on this bargain basis. A compilation made in 1957, when the market’s level was by no means low, disclosed about 150 of such common stocks. In Table 7-4 we summarize the result of buying, on December 31, 1957, one share of each of the 85 companies in that list for which data appeared in Standard & Poor’s Monthly Stock Guide, and holding them for two years.

巧合的是，这两组股票在两年内都上涨至接近总净流动资产价值的水平。同期，整个“投资组合”的收益为75%，而标准普尔425种工业成分股的收益为50%。更引人注目的是，所有股票均未出现重大亏损，7只股票基本持平，78只股票则实现了可观的收益。

By something of a coincidence, each of the groups advanced in the two years to somewhere in the neighborhood of the aggregate net-current-asset value. The gain for the entire “portfolio” in that period was 75%, against 50% for Standard & Poor’s 425 industrials. What is more remarkable is that none of the issues showed significant losses, seven held about even, and 78 showed appreciable gains.

我们对此类投资选择的经验——多元化基础——在1957年之前的许多年里一直表现良好。可以毫不犹豫地肯定，这是一种安全且有利可图的识别和利用低估机会的方法。然而，在1957年之后的市场普遍上涨期间，此类机会变得极其有限，许多可用的机会都呈现微薄的营业利润，甚至亏损。1969-70年的市场下跌催生了一批新的“低于营运资本”的股票。我们将在第15章“进取型投资者的股票选择”中讨论这类股票。

Our experience with this type of investment selection—on a diversified basis—was uniformly good for many years prior to 1957. It can probably be affirmed without hesitation that it constitutes a safe and profitable method of determining and taking advantage of undervalued situations. However, during the general market advance after 1957 the number of such opportunities became extremely limited, and many of those available were showing small operating profits or even losses. The market decline of 1969–70 produced a new crop of these “sub-working-capital” stocks. We discuss this group in Chapter 15, on stock selection for the enterprising investor.

表 7-4 1957-1959 年低估股票的盈利情况

TABLE 7-4 Profit Experience of Undervalued Stocks, 1957–1959

二级公司的廉价发行模式

Bargain-Issue Pattern in Secondary Companies

我们将次级公司定义为在相当重要的行业中并非领导者的公司。因此，它通常是其领域中规模较小的公司之一，但也可能是某个不重要行业的领头羊。作为例外，任何已确立成长型股票地位的公司通常不被视为“次级公司”。

We have defined a secondary company as one that is not a leader in a fairly important industry. Thus it is usually one of the smaller concerns in its field, but it may equally well be the chief unit in an unimportant line. By way of exception, any company that has established itself as a growth stock is not ordinarily considered “secondary.”

在20世纪20年代的大牛市中，行业领袖与其他上市公司之间几乎没有区别，前提是后者的规模足够大。公众认为，一家中型公司足够强大，能够抵御风暴，而且比一家规模已经很大的公司更有可能实现真正惊人的扩张。1931-1932年的大萧条时期，然而，对规模或内在稳定性低于第一级的公司造成了尤其毁灭性的打击。由于这一经历，投资者此后明显偏爱行业领袖，而相应地，大多数时候对次要的普通公司缺乏兴趣。这意味着后者的出售价格（相对于收益和资产而言）通常远低于前者。这进一步意味着，在许多情况下，价格跌至如此低位，以至于发行价被划归为廉价股。*

In the great bull market of the 1920s relatively little distinction was drawn between industry leaders and other listed issues, provided the latter were of respectable size. The public felt that a middle-sized company was strong enough to weather storms and that it had a better chance for really spectacular expansion than one that was already of major dimensions. The depression years 1931–32, however, had a particularly devastating impact on the companies below the first rank either in size or in inherent stability. As a result of that experience investors have since developed a pronounced preference for industry leaders and a corresponding lack of interest most of the time in the ordinary company of secondary importance. This has meant that the latter group have usually sold at much lower prices in relation to earnings and assets than have the former. It has meant further that in many instances the price has fallen so low as to establish the issue in the bargain class.*

当投资者拒绝购买二级公司的股票时，即使这些公司的股价相对较低，他们也表达了一种信念或担忧，认为这些公司的未来黯淡。事实上，至少在潜意识里，他们认为任何价格对他们来说都太高了，因为他们正在走向消亡——正如1929年关于“蓝筹股”的伴随理论认为，任何价格对它们来说都不算高，因为它们未来的可能性无限。这两种观点都夸大其词，并导致了严重的投资失误。实际上，与普通私营企业相比，典型的中型上市公司规模已经很大了。没有充分的理由说明为什么这样的公司不应该无限期地运营下去，经历我们经济特有的兴衰变迁，但总体上能够获得合理的投资回报。

When investors rejected the stocks of secondary companies, even though these sold at relatively low prices, they were expressing a belief or fear that such companies faced a dismal future. In fact, at least subconsciously, they calculated that any price was too high for them because they were heading for extinction—just as in 1929 the companion theory for the “blue chips” was that no price was too high for them because their future possibilities were limitless. Both of these views were exaggerations and were productive of serious investment errors. Actually, the typical middle-sized listed company is a large one when compared with the average privately owned business. There is no sound reason why such companies should not continue indefinitely in operation, undergoing the vicissitudes characteristic of our economy but earning on the whole a fair return on their invested capital.

这篇简短的回顾表明，股市对二级公司的态度往往不切实际，因此在正常时期造成了无数的股价严重低估。事实上，二战时期和战后繁荣时期对小型企业的利好大于对大型企业的利好，因为当时正常的销售竞争暂停，小型企业可以更显著地扩大销售额和利润率。因此，到1946年，市场格局与战前完全相反。道琼斯工业平均指数中的领头股从1938年底到1946年的最高点仅上涨了40%，而标准普尔低价股指数则飙升了至少280%。同一时期。投机者和许多自诩为投资者的人——他们有着股市里众所周知的短视——渴望以过高的价格购买不重要公司的新旧股票。因此，钟摆明显摆向了另一个极端。过去提供最大比例廉价机会的次级发行，如今却呈现出最多过度热情和估值过高的例子。这种现象在1961年和1968年以不同的方式重演——现在的重点放在那些不太重要的小公司股票的新发行上，以及几乎所有某些受青睐领域的公司，例如“电子”、“计算机”、“特许经营”等。*

This brief review indicates that the stock market’s attitude toward secondary companies tends to be unrealistic and consequently to create in normal times innumerable instances of major undervaluation. As it happens, the World War II period and the postwar boom were more beneficial to the smaller concerns than to the larger ones, because then the normal competition for sales was suspended and the former could expand sales and profit margins more spectacularly. Thus by 1946 the market’s pattern had completely reversed itself from that before the war. Whereas the leading stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average had advanced only 40% from the end of 1938 to the 1946 high, Standard & Poor’s index of low-priced stocks had shot up no less than 280% in the same period. Speculators and many self-styled investors—with the proverbial short memories of people in the stock market—were eager to buy both old and new issues of unimportant companies at inflated levels. Thus the pendulum had swung clear to the opposite extreme. The very class of secondary issues that had formerly supplied by far the largest proportion of bargain opportunities was now presenting the greatest number of examples of overenthusiasm and overvaluation. In a different way this phenomenon was repeated in 1961 and 1968—the emphasis now being placed on new offerings of the shares of small companies of less than secondary character, and on nearly all companies in certain favored fields such as “electronics,” “computers,” “franchise” concerns, and others.*

正如预期，随后的市场下跌主要受这些估值过高的影响。在某些情况下，这种钟摆式波动甚至可能达到明确的估值过低的程度。

As was to be expected the ensuing market declines fell most heavily on these overvaluations. In some cases the pendulum swing may have gone as far as definite undervaluation.

如果大多数次级发行股票通常被低估，投资者有什么理由相信自己能从中获利呢？因为如果这种情况无限期地持续下去，投资者的市场地位难道不会一直与买入时一样吗？答案有些复杂。以低价购买次级公司股票的丰厚利润来源多种多样。首先，股息回报相对较高。其次，再投资收益相对于支付的价格而言相当可观，最终会影响股价。在五到七年的时间里，这些优势在精心挑选的股票名单中会相当显著。第三，牛市通常对低价股票最为慷慨。发行；因此，它往往会将典型的廉价发行价至少提升到合理的水平。第四，即使在相对平淡的市场时期，价格调整过程也会持续进行，在此期间，被低估的次级发行价至少可能会升至同类证券的正常水平。第五，在许多情况下，导致盈利记录令人失望的具体因素可能会随着新情况的出现、新政策的采用或管理层的变动而得到纠正。

If most secondary issues tend normally to be undervalued, what reason has the investor to believe that he can profit from such a situation? For if it persists indefinitely, will he not always be in the same market position as when he bought the issue? The answer here is somewhat complicated. Substantial profits from the purchase of secondary companies at bargain prices arise in a variety of ways. First, the dividend return is relatively high. Second, the reinvested earnings are substantial in relation to the price paid and will ultimately affect the price. In a five- to seven-year period these advantages can bulk quite large in a well-selected list. Third, a bull market is ordinarily most generous to low-priced issues; thus it tends to raise the typical bargain issue to at least a reasonable level. Fourth, even during relatively featureless market periods a continuous process of price adjustment goes on, under which secondary issues that were undervalued may rise at least to the normal level for their type of security. Fifth, the specific factors that in many cases made for a disappointing record of earnings may be corrected by the advent of new conditions, or the adoption of new policies, or by a change in management.

近年来，一个重要的新现象是大公司收购小公司，这通常是多元化计划的一部分。在这些情况下，收购价格几乎总是相对慷慨，远高于不久前的成交价。

An important new factor in recent years has been the acquisition of smaller companies by larger ones, usually as part of a diversification program. In these cases the consideration paid has almost always been relatively generous, and much in excess of the bargain levels existing not long before.

当利率远低于1970年时，廉价债券发行的范围扩展到债券和优先股，这些债券的发行价格远低于其债权金额。目前的情况有所不同，即使是担保良好的债券，如果票面利率低于4.5%或更低，也会以大幅折价出售。例如：美国电话电报公司1986年到期的2.5/8先令债券，在1970年曾低至51美元；迪尔公司1983年到期的4.5先令债券，则低至62美元。如果现行利率大幅下降，这些债券很可能很快就会成为廉价债券发行的机会。对于更传统意义上的廉价债券发行，我们或许不得不再次转向目前陷入财务困境的铁路公司的一级抵押债券，这些债券的售价在20到30美元之间。这种情况不适合非专业投资者；如果缺乏这方面的真正价值判断，他可能会损失惨重。但该领域的市场下跌趋势存在过度的潜在趋势；因此，这组债券整体而言，尤其值得我们进行谨慎而大胆的分析。在截至1948年的十年间，这批数十亿美元的违约铁路债券为该领域带来了众多绝佳的投资机会。自那以后，这样的机会就变得相当稀缺；但它们似乎很可能在20世纪70年代卷土重来。

When interest rates were much lower than in 1970, the field of bargain issues extended to bonds and preferred stocks that sold at large discounts from the amount of their claim. Currently we have a different situation in which even well-secured issues sell at large discounts if carrying coupon rates of, say, 4½% or less. Example: American Telephone & Telegraph 25⁄8s, due 1986, sold as low as 51 in 1970; Deere & Co. 4½s, due 1983, sold as low as 62. These may well turn out to have been bargain opportunities before very long—if ruling interest rates should decline substantially. For a bargain bond issue in the more traditional sense perhaps we shall have to turn once more to the first-mortgage bonds of railroads now in financial difficulties, which sell in the 20s or 30s. Such situations are not for the inexpert investor; lacking a real sense of values in this area, he may burn his fingers. But there is an underlying tendency for market decline in this field to be overdone; consequently the group as a whole offers an especially rewarding invitation to careful and courageous analysis. In the decade ending in 1948 the billion-dollar group of defaulted railroad bonds presented numerous and spectacular opportunities in this area. Such opportunities have been quite scarce since then; but they seem likely to return in the 1970s.

特殊情况，或“锻炼”

Special Situations, or “Workouts”

不久前，这个领域几乎可以保证那些熟悉该领域的人获得可观的回报率；在几乎任何类型的一般市场中都是如此这种情况。这实际上并非普通公众的禁区。一些对这类事情有天赋的人可以掌握诀窍，成为相当有能力的实践者，而无需长期的学术学习或学徒期。其他人则足够敏锐，认识到这种方法的潜在合理性，并依附于那些主要负责这些“特殊情况”的基金的聪明年轻人。但近年来，由于我们稍后将阐述的原因，“套利和债务重组”领域的风险更大，利润更低。或许在未来几年，该领域的条件会变得更加有利。无论如何，值得用一两个例子来概述这些操作的一般性质和起源。

Not so long ago this was a field which could almost guarantee an attractive rate of return to those who knew their way around in it; and this was true under almost any sort of general market situation. It was not actually forbidden territory to members of the general public. Some who had a flair for this sort of thing could learn the ropes and become pretty capable practitioners without the necessity of long academic study or apprenticeship. Others have been keen enough to recognize the underlying soundness of this approach and to attach themselves to bright young men who handled funds devoted chiefly to these “special situations.” But in recent years, for reasons we shall develop later, the field of “arbitrages and workouts” became riskier and less profitable. It may be that in years to come conditions in this field will become more propitious. In any case it is worthwhile outlining the general nature and origin of these operations, with one or two illustrative examples.

典型的“特殊情况”源于大公司收购小公司的情况日益增多，因为越来越多的管理层奉行产品多元化的理念。对于这样的企业来说，与其白手起家，不如收购其目标领域的现有公司，这往往看起来是一笔不错的交易。为了使收购成为可能，并获得小公司所需多数股东的批准，几乎总是需要提供远高于当前水平的价格。这类公司举措为那些对该领域进行过深入研究，并凭借丰富的经验掌握良好判断力的人创造了诱人的盈利机会。

The typical “special situation” has grown out of the increasing number of acquisitions of smaller firms by large ones, as the gospel of diversification of products has been adopted by more and more managements. It often appears good business for such an enterprise to acquire an existing company in the field it wishes to enter rather than to start a new venture from scratch. In order to make such acquisition possible, and to obtain acceptance of the deal by the required large majority of shareholders of the smaller company, it is almost always necessary to offer a price considerably above the current level. Such corporate moves have been producing interesting profit-making opportunities for those who have made a study of this field, and have good judgment fortified by ample experience.

几年前，精明的投资者通过购买破产铁路公司的债券赚了一大笔钱——他们知道，这些债券的价值在铁路公司最终重组后将远高于其成本。重组计划公布后，出现了一个针对新证券的“发行前”市场。这些新证券的售价几乎总是远高于用于兑换旧证券的成本。尽管存在计划无法完成或意外延误的风险，但总体而言，这种“套利操作”被证明利润丰厚。

A great deal of money was made by shrewd investors not so many years ago through the purchase of bonds of railroads in bankruptcy—bonds which they knew would be worth much more than their cost when the railroads were finally reorganized. After promulgation of the plans of reorganization a “when issued” market for the new securities appeared. These could almost always be sold for considerably more than the cost of the old issues which were to be exchanged therefor. There were risks of nonconsummation of the plans or of unexpected delays, but on the whole such “arbitrage operations” proved highly profitable.

根据1935年的法律，公用事业控股公司的拆分也带来了类似的机遇。几乎所有这些企业都被证明比预期价值更高。从控股公司转变为独立运营的公司集团。

There were similar opportunities growing out of the breakup of public-utility holding companies pursuant to 1935 legislation. Nearly all these enterprises proved to be worth considerably more when changed from holding companies to a group of separate operating companies.

其根本原因在于，证券市场倾向于低估任何复杂法律诉讼所涉及的问题。华尔街有一句古老的格言：“永远不要卷入诉讼。”对于那些希望迅速获利的投机者来说，这或许是一条合理的建议。但公众的这种态度必然会为受其影响的证券创造逢低买入的机会，因为公众对这类证券的偏见会将其价格压低到不合理的低位。*

The underlying factor here is the tendency of the security markets to undervalue issues that are involved in any sort of complicated legal proceedings. An old Wall Street motto has been: “Never buy into a lawsuit.” This may be sound advice to the speculator seeking quick action on his holdings. But the adoption of this attitude by the general public is bound to create bargain opportunities in the securities affected by it, since the prejudice against them holds their prices down to unduly low levels.*

利用特殊情况是投资的一个技术分支，需要某种程度上非同寻常的思维和技能。或许只有我们这些富有进取心的投资者中，只有一小部分人会参与其中，而本书并非阐述其复杂性的合适媒介。6

The exploitation of special situations is a technical branch of investment which requires a somewhat unusual mentality and equipment. Probably only a small percentage of our enterprising investors are likely to engage in it, and this book is not the appropriate medium for expounding its complications.6

我们的投资规则的更广泛的含义

Broader Implications of Our Rules for Investment

本文阐述的投资政策首先取决于投资者是选择防御型（被动型）还是积极型（进取型）角色。积极型投资者必须具备丰富的证券价值知识——事实上，这些知识足以让他将证券运营视为一个商业企业。这种理念中，被动型和积极型之间不存在中间地带或一系列等级。许多（或许是大多数）投资者都试图将自己置于这样一个中间类别；我们认为，这种妥协更有可能带来失望而非成功。

Investment policy, as it has been developed here, depends in the first place on a choice by the investor of either the defensive (passive) or aggressive (enterprising) role. The aggressive investor must have a considerable knowledge of security values—enough, in fact, to warrant viewing his security operations as equivalent to a business enterprise. There is no room in this philosophy for a middle ground, or a series of gradations, between the passive and aggressive status. Many, perhaps most, investors seek to place themselves in such an intermediate category; in our opinion that is a compromise that is more likely to produce disappointment than achievement.

作为一名投资者，你不能轻易地成为“半个商人”，并期望用你的资金实现正常商业利润率的一半。

As an investor you cannot soundly become “half a businessman,” expecting thereby to achieve half the normal rate of business profits on your funds.

由此推论，大多数证券持有者应该选择防御性类别。他们没有时间，或是决心，或是将投资视为一项准商业活动的心理准备。因此，他们应该满足于目前从防御性投资组合中获得的丰厚回报（甚至更低的回报），并坚决抵制通过转向其他途径来增加回报的反复诱惑。

It follows from this reasoning that the majority of security owners should elect the defensive classification. They do not have the time, or the determination, or the mental equipment to embark upon investing as a quasi-business. They should therefore be satisfied with the excellent return now obtainable from a defensive portfolio (and with even less), and they should stoutly resist the recurrent temptation to increase this return by deviating into other paths.

有进取心的投资者可以适当地开展任何证券业务，只要他的培训和判断能力足够，并且按照既定的商业标准衡量，该业务看起来有足够前景。

The enterprising investor may properly embark upon any security operation for which his training and judgment are adequate and which appears sufficiently promising when measured by established business standards.

在针对这类投资者的建议和注意事项中，我们尝试运用这些商业标准。在针对防御型投资者的建议和注意事项中，我们主要遵循三个要求：基础安全性、选择的简便性以及令人满意的结果承诺，这三个要求既基于心理学，也基于数学原理。基于这些标准，我们将一些通常被认为适合各类投资者的证券类别排除在推荐投资范围之外。这些禁止性规定已在我们的第一章中列出。

In our recommendations and caveats for this group of investors we have attempted to apply such business standards. In those for the defensive investor we have been guided largely by the three requirements of underlying safety, simplicity of choice, and promise of satisfactory results, in terms of psychology as well as arithmetic. The use of these criteria has led us to exclude from the field of recommended investment a number of security classes that are normally regarded as suitable for various kinds of investors. These prohibitions were listed in our first chapter here.

让我们比之前更全面地思考一下这些排除条款的含义。我们建议不要以“全价”购买以下三类重要证券：(1) 外国债券，(2) 普通优先股，以及 (3) 二级普通股，当然也包括此类证券的首次发行。“全价”是指债券或优先股接近票面价值的价格，以及普通股代表企业公允价值的价格。大多数防御性投资者无论价格如何都应避免购买这些类别的证券；进取型投资者则应仅在价格便宜时购买——我们将其定义为不超过证券评估价值三分之二的价格。

Let us consider a little more fully than before what is implied in these exclusions. We have advised against the purchase at “full prices” of three important categories of securities: (1) foreign bonds, (2) ordinary preferred stocks, and (3) secondary common stocks, including, of course, original offerings of such issues. By “full prices” we mean prices close to par for bonds or preferred stocks, and prices that represent about the fair business value of the enterprise in the case of common stocks. The greater number of defensive investors are to avoid these categories regardless of price; the enterprising investor is to buy them only when obtainable at bargain prices—which we define as prices not more than two-thirds of the appraisal value of the securities.

如果所有投资者都遵循我们的建议，会发生什么？这个问题在外国债券方面已经讨论过了，目前我们没有什么可补充的。投资级优先股将仅由保险公司等公司购买，这些公司将受益于其所持有股票的特殊所得税地位。

What would happen if all investors were guided by our advice in these matters? That question was considered in regard to foreign bonds, here, and we have nothing to add at this point. Investment-grade preferred stocks would be bought solely by corporations, such as insurance companies, which would benefit from the special income-tax status of stock issues owned by them.

我们的排除政策最麻烦的后果是在二级普通股领域。如果大多数如果投资者（属于防御型投资者）根本不购买这些债券，潜在买家的范围就会受到严重限制。此外，如果激进型投资者只在低价位购买，那么这些债券的售价注定会低于其公允价值，除非是出于不明智的购买。

The most troublesome consequence of our policy of exclusion is in the field of secondary common stocks. If the majority of investors, being in the defensive class, are not to buy them at all, the field of possible buyers becomes seriously restricted. Furthermore, if aggressive investors are to buy them only at bargain levels, then these issues would be doomed to sell for less than their fair value, except to the extent that they were purchased unintelligently.

这听起来可能很严重，甚至略显不道德。但实际上，我们只是认识到了过去40年大部分时间里该领域实际发生的情况。次级债券的价格大多围绕远低于其公允价值的中心水平波动。它们有时会达到甚至超过该价值；但这种情况发生在牛市的上游，届时实践经验会反驳以现行价格购买普通股的合理性。

This may sound severe and even vaguely unethical. Yet in truth we are merely recognizing what has actually happened in this area for the greater part of the past 40 years. Secondary issues, for the most part, do fluctuate about a central level which is well below their fair value. They reach and even surpass that value at times; but this occurs in the upper reaches of bull markets, when the lessons of practical experience would argue against the soundness of paying the prevailing prices for common stocks.

因此，我们仅建议积极的投资者认识到次级债券所代表的现实生活，并接受该类别的正常中心市场水平作为确定其自身购买水平的指导。

Thus we are suggesting only that aggressive investors recognize the facts of life as it is lived by secondary issues and that they accept the central market levels that are normal for that class as their guide in fixing their own levels for purchase.

然而，这里存在一个悖论。一家普通的、精心挑选的二级市场公司，其前景可能与行业领军企业一样光明。规模较小的公司缺乏内在的稳定性，但其卓越的增长潜力却足以弥补。因此，许多读者可能认为，以全额“企业价值”购买此类二级市场股票是“不明智的”行为，这似乎不合逻辑。我们认为，最有力的逻辑是经验之谈。金融史清楚地表明，投资者只有以低于其对私人所有者的价值的价格，即以低价购买，才能平均而言从二级市场普通股中获得满意的回报。

There is a paradox here, nevertheless. The average well-selected secondary company may be fully as promising as the average industrial leader. What the smaller concern lacks in inherent stability it may readily make up in superior possibilities of growth. Consequently it may appear illogical to many readers to term “unintelligent” the purchase of such secondary issues at their full “enterprise value.” We think that the strongest logic is that of experience. Financial history says clearly that the investor may expect satisfactory results, on the average, from secondary common stocks only if he buys them for less than their value to a private owner, that is, on a bargain basis.

最后一句表明，这一原则适用于普通外部投资者。任何能够控制二级公司，或属于拥有此类控制权的凝聚性集团的人，都有充分理由以与投资“封闭式公司”或其他私人企业相同的方式购买股票。随着企业本身重要性的降低，内部人员和外部人员的持股情况及其相应的投资政策之间的区别变得更加重要。一级公司或领先公司的一个基本特征是，一股独立股份的价值通常与控股集团的股份价值相同。在二级公司中，一股独立股份的平均市场价值其价值远低于其对控股股东的价值。正因如此，股东与管理层的关系，以及内部股东与外部股东的关系，在二级公司中往往比在一级公司中更为重要，也更具争议性。

The last sentence indicates that this principle relates to the ordinary outside investor. Anyone who can control a secondary company, or who is part of a cohesive group with such control, is fully justified in buying the shares on the same basis as if he were investing in a “close corporation” or other private business. The distinction between the position, and consequent investment policy, of insiders and of outsiders becomes more important as the enterprise itself becomes less important. It is a basic characteristic of a primary or leading company that a single detached share is ordinarily worth as much as a share in a controlling block. In secondary companies the average market value of a detached share is substantially less than its worth to a controlling owner. Because of this fact, the matter of shareholder-management relations and of those between inside and outside shareholders tends to be much more important and controversial in the case of secondary than in that of primary companies.

在第五章的结尾，我们讨论了在一级和二级公司之间做出任何严格区分的难度。边界区域内的许多普通股可能表现出中等价格行为。投资者以略低于其指示价值或评估价值的折扣价购买此类股票并非不合逻辑，因为他们认为该股票距离一级评级只有一小段距离，并且可能在不久的将来获得无条件评级。

At the end of Chapter 5 we commented on the difficulty of making any hard and fast distinction between primary and secondary companies. The many common stocks in the boundary area may properly exhibit an intermediate price behavior. It would not be illogical for an investor to buy such an issue at a small discount from its indicated or appraisal value, on the theory that it is only a small distance away from a primary classification and that it may acquire such a rating unqualifiedly in the not too distant future.

因此，主要发行和次要发行之间的区别无需过于精确；因为，如果区分得过于精确，那么质量上的微小差异必然会导致合理购买价格的巨大差异。我们这样说，承认普通股分类中存在中间立场，尽管我们反对在投资者分类中采用这种中间立场。我们之所以认为这种明显的不一致，是出于以下原因：对单一证券持有某种观点的不确定性并不会造成太大的损害，因为这种情况属于例外，而且事关重大。但投资者在防御性立场和积极性立场之间的选择对他来说至关重要，他不应让自己在这个基本决策上感到困惑或妥协。

Thus the distinction between primary and secondary issues need not be made too precise; for, if it were, then a small difference in quality must produce a large differential in justified purchase price. In saying this we are admitting a middle ground in the classification of common stocks, although we counseled against such a middle ground in the classification of investors. Our reason for this apparent inconsistency is as follows: No great harm comes from some uncertainty of viewpoint regarding a single security, because such cases are exceptional and not a great deal is at stake in the matter. But the investor’s choice as between the defensive or the aggressive status is of major consequence to him, and he should not allow himself to be confused or compromised in this basic decision.

第七章评论

Commentary on Chapter 7

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

我生命中有一个人，我就是无法信任……这个人就是我自己。你不该相信自己！做决定？就像把泡沫包装纸递给一个五岁的孩子。你知道会发生什么！

There’s a person in my life I just do not trust. . . . And that person is me. You should not trust yourself! Decisions? It’s like handing over bubble wrap to a five-year-old. You know what’s going to happen!

—Sendhil Mullainathan ¹

—Sendhil Mullainathan¹

格雷厄姆已经告诉我们，即使是有进取心的投资者也不应该将100%的资产投入股票。2^风险不仅取决于判断正确的概率，还取决于判断错误后的后果。无论你多么乐观，你的判断仍然可能出错。而通过不将全部或全部资金投入股票，你就能保护自己免受判断错误所带来的最极端后果的影响。

Graham has already told us that even enterprising investors should never put 100% of their assets in stocks.² Risk is a function not only of the probabilities of being right, but of the consequences if you turn out to be wrong. No matter how bullish you feel, your judgments could still be mistaken. And by never putting all—or none—of your money in stocks, you protect yourself against the most extreme consequences of being wrong.

你还必须防范那些不太严重的后果——那些由重复且可避免的错误造成的后果。非受迫性失误的代价，可能会让原本可观的回报变成业绩不佳。

You must also protect against less severe consequences, too—those that arise from repeated and avoidable mistakes. The costs of unforced errors can turn what would have been superior returns into underperformance.

假装投资组合

Pretend Portfolios

对于一位有进取心的投资者来说，第一步是检验你的想法并训练自己。格雷厄姆建议，为了做到这一点，你应该花一整年的时间研究和挑选几只股票——但不要买入任何一只^。3

The first step for an enterprising investor is to test your ideas and train yourself. To do that, Graham urges, you should spend a full year studying and picking a few stocks—but don’t buy any.³

几乎每个经纪或投资网站和应用程序都支持无需投入任何资金，即可在模型投资组合中追踪股票。在线投资组合追踪器中创建模拟投资组合，就如同演员或音乐家在公开演出前闭门排练一样。

Just about every brokerage or investing website and app enables you to track stocks in a model portfolio without putting up any money. Creating a pretend portfolio in an online portfolio tracker is the equivalent of being an actor or musician rehearsing behind closed doors before a public performance.

用你的模拟投资组合看看哪些方法有效。重点不在于在最短时间内赚最多的钱——你用的不是真钱！——而是看看你是否能开发出一套系统来识别那些股票被低估的优质企业。构建你的投资组合时，请遵循一份清单（参见第11章评论中的“直觉检验”）。

Use your pretend portfolio to see what works. The point isn’t to make the most money in the shortest time—you aren’t using real money!—but to see whether you can develop a system to identify good businesses whose stocks are undervalued. To assemble your portfolio, follow a checklist (see “Gut Check” in the Commentary on Chapter 11).

全年持有你选的所有股票；不要反复买进卖出。衡量你的成功，与其说是看你选的股票上涨了多少，不如说是看它们上涨了多少——以及上涨的原因。它们的价格上涨是因为你清单上最初的逻辑是正确的，还是因为你没有预料到或理解的原因？

Hang on to all your picks for the full year; don’t trade in and out. Judge your success less by how much your stock picks go up than by how many of them go up—and why. Did they rise in price because the original rationale in your checklist was right—or for reasons you didn’t anticipate or understand?

在一年中，继续阅读这些公司的财务报表，试用他们的产品或服务，并了解他们的竞争对手。12个月结束后，仔细审视你的模拟投资组合。将其表现与标准普尔500指数等大盘指数进行比较。这应该显而易见。无论你是擅长投资，正在进步，还是一无所知。如果你模拟投资组合的业绩明显低于基准，那么你还有很多投资知识需要学习——而且可能不愿意投入所需的时间和精力。或许你应该承认自己是一位防御型投资者——而且你不应该为此感到羞耻。

Over the course of the year, continue to read the companies’ financial statements, sample their products or services, and learn about their competitors. When the 12 months are up, take a hard look at your pretend portfolio. Compare its performance against that of a broad market index like the S&P 500. It should be obvious whether you are good at this, getting better, or have no aptitude. If your pretend portfolio’s results are significantly worse than those of the benchmark, you have a lot more to learn about investing—and might not be prepared to put in the time and effort that will take. Maybe you should concede that you’re a defensive investor—and you should feel no shame in doing so.

格雷厄姆的最终基金

Graham’s Final Fund

格雷厄姆晚年提倡他所谓的“群体投资方法”，即购买一篮子符合简单廉价标准的股票——“不考虑行业，也很少关注个别公司”。

Late in life, Graham advocated what he called a “group approach,” buying baskets of stocks that all met simple criteria of cheapness—“regardless of the industry and with very little attention to the individual company.”

格雷厄姆应该被视为当今所谓的“因素”或“智能贝塔”投资的先驱：持有一批通过一系列统计障碍的股票。

Graham should be regarded as a pioneer of what today is often called “factor” or “smart-beta” investing: holding bundles of stocks that all clear a set of statistical hurdles.

在研究了 50 年的数据以确定具有各种特征的股票假设投资组合的过去表现后，格雷厄姆建议寻找具有以下特征的公司：

After studying 50 years of data to determine the past performance of hypothetical portfolios of stocks with various characteristics, Graham recommended looking for companies with:

债务不超过股权（占总资本的 50％或更少）；
debt no greater than equity (50% or less of total capital);
年度股息至少达到优质公司债券收益率的三分之二（当时股息至少为 5%；如今，投资级债券收益率为 5.5%，股息至少为 3.7%）；
an annual dividend at least two-thirds as high as the yield on high-quality corporate bonds (then, a dividend of at least 5%; today, with investment-grade bonds yielding 5.5%, a dividend of at least 3.7%);
收益率（每股净收入除以每股价格）至少是优质公司债券收益率的两倍（在格雷厄姆时代，收益率为 14；今天约为 11）^。1
an earnings yield—net income per share divided by price per share—that was at least twice the yield on high-quality corporate bonds (in Graham’s day, an earnings yield of 14; today, approximately 11).¹

格雷厄姆的初级研究伙伴詹姆斯·雷于1976年成立了一只基金，以推行这种策略。其设计略显奇怪：该基金将三分之一的投资组合投资于美国政府债券，三分之一投资于股价低于净流动资产价值的公司，三分之一投资于通过格雷厄姆股息和盈利测试的股票。该基金将在持有的股票上涨50%或两年后（以先到者为准）出售所有持股。

Graham’s junior research partner, James Rea, formed a fund in 1976 to pursue this approach. Its design was a bit odd: The fund would keep one-third of its portfolio in U.S. government bonds, a third in companies whose shares were trading at less than net current asset value, and a third in stocks that passed Graham’s dividend and earnings tests. It would sell any holding after a 50% gain or after two years, whichever came first.

几个月后，格雷厄姆去世。雷亚-格雷厄姆基金在几年内取得了丰厚的收益，随后逐渐销声匿迹。该基金的衰落似乎是因为过早抛售了盈利的股票，在通胀上升时期持有债券，以及在格雷厄姆去世后调整了规则。要将一个虚假的投资组合变成真实的投资组合，一致性是关键。

Graham died a few months later. The Rea-Graham fund earned robust gains for several years, then faded into obscurity. It seems to have faltered because it sold its winners too soon, held bonds in a time of rising inflation, and rejiggered its rules after Graham’s death. To turn a pretend portfolio into a real one, consistency is key.

¹收益率与更常用的市盈率是倒数。当一只股票的收益率为 11 时，其市盈率为 [1 / 11] * 100 = 9.1。当市盈率为 50 时，收益率为 2。

¹ Earnings yield and the more commonly used price/earnings ratio are reciprocal. When a stock has an earnings yield of 11, its P/E ratio is [1 / 11] * 100 = 9.1. When the P/E is 50, the earnings yield is 2.

等待观察

Wait-Watching

构建决策的另一种方法是让您不单单依赖直觉：保留一份您已经熟悉的公司关注列表，如果这些公司的股价跌至便宜水平，您会愿意持有这些公司的股票。许多券商网站允许你设置通知功能，当股票跌破目标价时，系统会提醒你。你可以将目标价设定为比当前价低25%（例如）。如果你已经对该业务进行了充分的分析，并确定了其股票在哪个价格区间具有吸引力，那么你可以标记你的关注列表，以便在股票跌至该区间时为你标记。

Another way to structure your decisions so you don’t rely on gut feelings alone: Keep a watchlist of companies you’re already familiar with and would like to own if their stock prices fall to bargain levels. Many brokerage websites permit you to set up notifications that will alert you whenever a stock falls below a target price, which you might set (for example) 25% below where it is now. If you’ve already analyzed the business thoroughly enough to be confident of the price range within which its stock would be attractive, mark your watchlist to flag the stock for you if it falls to that range.

在等待期间，请继续阅读公司的财务报告，确保其保持健康。这样，即使股价暴跌，但业务未受损，你也能做好买入的准备。

While you wait, continue to read the company’s financial reports to make sure it remains healthy. That way, if the stock takes a dive but the business is unimpaired, you will be ready to buy.

关注列表有助于克服高买低卖的本能和破坏性倾向。它会自动迫使你考虑低买，拥抱下跌的市场，而不是逃离。

A watchlist helps override the instinctive, destructive tendency to buy high and sell low. It automatically compels you to consider buying low and to embrace a falling market rather than flee from it.

记住你的错误

Memorialize Your Mistakes

在纽约戴维斯顾问公司的办公室里，至少有十几张装裱好的股票证书挂在所谓的“错误墙”上。其中包括：美国国际集团（American International Group）股价在 2008 年下跌了 96%，以及朗讯科技（Lucent Technologies）股价在 1999 年至 2001 年间下跌了 94%。

In the offices of Davis Advisors in New York, at least a dozen and a half framed stock certificates hang on what’s called the “mistake wall.” Among them: American International Group, which fell 96% in 2008, and Lucent Technologies, which dropped 94% between 1999 and 2001.

错误墙既包括“作为之错”（即对现有数据的误解），也包括“不作为之错”（即未能考虑所有相关信息）。股票证书每天都会不可避免地提醒人们出了问题，而每张证书的简短描述都解释了问题所在。戴维斯在每家公司的海量文件中保存了更多错误记录。

The mistake wall includes both “sins of commission,” or misinterpretations of available data, and “sins of omission,” or failures to take all relevant information into account. The stock certificates are unavoidable daily reminders that something went wrong, while brief descriptions of each explain what went wrong. Davis keeps even more records of its mistakes in extensive files on each of the companies.

董事长克里斯托弗·戴维斯表示，这样做的目的是将关注点从结果（决策有多糟糕）转移到过程（导致错误决策的原因以及如何避免重蹈覆辙）。这有助于公司识别何时可能重蹈覆辙。“它为我们提供了一个工具包，让人们更容易改变主意，”戴维斯说。“这是一种评估我们工作的方式，有助于我们更加专注于企业估值的‘北极星’，而不仅仅是股票交易。”

The idea, says chairman Christopher Davis, is to shift the focus from outcome (how bad the decision was) to process (what led to the bad decision and how to avoid repeating it). That helps the firm recognize when it may be about to echo a mistake it’s made before. “It gives us a toolkit that makes it easier for people to change their minds,” says Davis. “It’s a way to evaluate our work that helps keep us more focused on the North Star of valuing businesses versus just trading stocks.”

你也应该纪念自己的错误。不必用股票证书。可以把公司产品的样品放在你的家庭办公室；也可以把公司标志的图片贴在你的墙上、电脑显示器上或桌面上。

You should memorialize your mistakes, too. You don’t need to use a stock certificate. Put a sample of a company’s products in your home office; post an image of its logo on your wall, your computer monitor, or your desktop.

还要记住，你的错误不仅仅是购买了不该买的股票。

Remember, too, that your mistakes aren’t just the stocks you bought that you shouldn’t have.

如果你真的想成为一名积极进取的投资者，你不仅会使用投资组合追踪器来监控你持有的股票，还会监控你卖出的股票。你不再持有的股票表现是否比你持有的股票更好？那么你可能犯了一个常见的错误：过早抛售。

If you’re serious about being an enterprising investor, you’ll use a portfolio tracker to monitor not only the stocks you hold but the stocks you sold. Are the companies you no longer own doing better than the ones you kept? Then you’re probably making the common mistake of selling too soon.

你还会追踪那些你考虑过但最终没有买入的股票。你差点买入的股票表现比你最终买入的股票更好吗？那么你需要完善你的核对清单和关注清单中的标准。

You’ll also track the stocks you considered buying but didn’t. Are the ones you almost bought doing better than those you did buy? Then you need to refine the criteria in your checklist and watchlist.

不承担风险就无法成为投资者，不犯错误就无法承担风险。但如果你从不承认错误，就无法从错误中吸取教训。只有通过学习错误，你才能不断改进你的政策和程序。少犯错误，就能让你的损失更少、更小。这也能让你拥有更多资金，让你在技能提升的同时，能够充分发挥自己的潜能。

You can’t be an investor without taking risks, and you can’t take risks without making mistakes. But you can’t learn from your mistakes if you never admit you make any. Only by studying your mistakes can you keep improving your policies and procedures. Making fewer mistakes will help you incur fewer and smaller losses. And that will give you more capital to work with, enabling you to make the most of your skills as they improve.

第八章

Chapter 8 投资者与市场波动

The Investor and Market Fluctuations

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

如果投资者的资金配置在期限相对较短的高等级债券（例如七年或更短），他不会受到市场价格变动的显著影响，也无需考虑这些因素。（这也适用于他持有的美国储蓄债券，他总是可以以成本价或更高的价格赎回这些债券。）他的长期债券在其存续期内价格波动幅度可能相对较大，而他的普通股投资组合的价值几乎肯定会在任何几年内波动。

To the extent that the investor’s funds are placed in high-grade bonds of relatively short maturity—say, of seven years or less—he will not be affected significantly by changes in market prices and need not take them into account. (This applies also to his holdings of U.S. savings bonds, which he can always turn in at his cost price or more.) His longer-term bonds may have relatively wide price swings during their lifetimes, and his common-stock portfolio is almost certain to fluctuate in value over any period of several years.

投资者应该了解这些可能性，并做好财务和心理上的准备。他希望从市场水平的变化中获益——当然是通过持有股票的价值随着时间的推移而上涨，也可能是通过在有利的价格买卖。他的这种兴趣是不可避免的，也是合理的。但它也蕴含着一个非常现实的风险，那就是它会导致他陷入投机心态和活动。我们很容易告诉你不要投机；但难就难在你是否遵循这个建议。让我们重复一下我们一开始说的话：如果你想投机，那就睁大眼睛，要知道你最终可能会亏钱；一定要限制风险金额，并将其与你的投资计划完全分开。

The investor should know about these possibilities and should be prepared for them both financially and psychologically. He will want to benefit from changes in market levels—certainly through an advance in the value of his stock holdings as time goes on, and perhaps also by making purchases and sales at advantageous prices. This interest on his part is inevitable, and legitimate enough. But it involves the very real danger that it will lead him into speculative attitudes and activities. It is easy for us to tell you not to speculate; the hard thing will be for you to follow this advice. Let us repeat what we said at the outset: If you want to speculate do so with your eyes open, knowing that you will probably lose money in the end; be sure to limit the amount at risk and to separate it completely from your investment program.

我们将首先讨论更重要的普通股价格变动问题，然后再讨论债券。在第三章中，我们提供了过去一百年股市走势的历史回顾。在本节中，我们将不时回顾这些内容，以了解过去的记录给投资者带来了什么——无论是长期的投资组合在连续上涨和下跌过程中保持相对不变的升值，或者在熊市低点附近买入并在牛市高点以下不太远的地方卖出的可能性。

We shall deal first with the more important subject of price changes in common stocks, and pass later to the area of bonds. In Chapter 3 we supplied a historical survey of the stock market’s action over the past hundred years. In this section we shall return to that material from time to time, in order to see what the past record promises the investor—in either the form of long-term appreciation of a portfolio held relatively unchanged through successive rises and declines, or in the possibilities of buying near bear-market lows and selling not too far below bull-market highs.

市场波动作为投资决策的指导

Market Fluctuations as a Guide to Investment Decisions

由于普通股，即使是投资级股票，其价格也容易出现反复且大幅波动，因此，明智的投资者应该关注从这些钟摆式波动中获利的可能性。投资者可以通过两种方式实现这一目标：时机选择 和定价。时机选择是指努力预测股市走势——当未来走势被认为向上时买入或持有，当走势向下时卖出或不买入。定价是指努力在股票报价低于其公允价值时买入，在股票报价高于其公允价值时卖出。一种不那么激进的定价方式是简单地确保买入时不会为股票支付过高的价格。这对于注重长期持有的防御型投资者来说可能足够了；但就其本身而言，这代表着对市场水平的最低限度关注^。1

Since common stocks, even of investment grade, are subject to recurrent and wide fluctuations in their prices, the intelligent investor should be interested in the possibilities of profiting from these pendulum swings. There are two possible ways by which he may try to do this: the way of timing and the way of pricing. By timing we mean the endeavor to anticipate the action of the stock market—to buy or hold when the future course is deemed to be upward, to sell or refrain from buying when the course is downward. By pricing we mean the endeavor to buy stocks when they are quoted below their fair value and to sell them when they rise above such value. A less ambitious form of pricing is the simple effort to make sure that when you buy you do not pay too much for your stocks. This may suffice for the defensive investor, whose emphasis is on long-pull holding; but as such it represents an essential minimum of attention to market levels.¹

我们坚信，聪明的投资者能够从任何一种定价方式中获得满意的结果。我们同样确信，如果他把重点放在时机选择上，也就是预测上，最终会成为一名投机者，并获得投机者的财务结果。这种区别在外行人看来可能相当牵强，而且在华尔街也并不普遍接受。出于商业惯例，或者说是出于坚定的信念，股票经纪人和投资服务机构似乎都坚持这样的原则：普通股的投资者和投机者都应该认真关注市场预测。

We are convinced that the intelligent investor can derive satisfactory results from pricing of either type. We are equally sure that if he places his emphasis on timing, in the sense of forecasting, he will end up as a speculator and with a speculator’s financial results. This distinction may seem rather tenuous to the layman, and it is not commonly accepted on Wall Street. As a matter of business practice, or perhaps of thoroughgoing conviction, the stock brokers and the investment services seem wedded to the principle that both investors and speculators in common stocks should devote careful attention to market forecasts.

我们相信，离华尔街越远，就越会对股市预测或时机的虚伪性产生怀疑。投资者几乎不会认真对待几乎每天都会出现的无数预测，而且这些预测随时都可以得到。然而，在很多情况下，他都会关注这些预测，甚至采取行动。为什么？因为他一直 相信他对股票市场的未来走向形成一些看法很重要，因为他觉得经纪或服务的预测至少比他自己的更可靠。 *

The farther one gets from Wall Street, the more skepticism one will find, we believe, as to the pretensions of stock-market forecasting or timing. The investor can scarcely take seriously the innumerable predictions which appear almost daily and are his for the asking. Yet in many cases he pays attention to them and even acts upon them. Why? Because he has been persuaded that it is important for him to form some opinion of the future course of the stock market, and because he feels that the brokerage or service forecast is at least more dependable than his own.*

这里篇幅有限，无法详细讨论市场预测的利弊。大量的脑力投入到这个领域，毫无疑问，有些人可以通过成为优秀的股市分析师来赚钱。但认为 普通大众 能够通过市场预测赚钱的想法是荒谬的。因为，当普通大众听到某个信号就蜂拥而至，想要获利抛售时，谁还会买入呢？如果您，作为读者，期望通过遵循某种市场预测系统或领导者，在未来几年致富，那么您一定是期望尝试去做无数其他人正在追求的事情，并且能够比市场上众多的竞争对手做得更好。无论是逻辑上还是经验上，都没有任何依据可以假设任何典型或普通投资者能够比普通大众更成功地预测市场走势，而他自己也是其中的一员。

We lack space here to discuss in detail the pros and cons of market forecasting. A great deal of brain power goes into this field, and undoubtedly some people can make money by being good stock-market analysts. But it is absurd to think that the general public can ever make money out of market forecasts. For who will buy when the general public, at a given signal, rushes to sell out at a profit? If you, the reader, expect to get rich over the years by following some system or leadership in market forecasting, you must be expecting to try to do what countless others are aiming at, and to be able to do it better than your numerous competitors in the market. There is no basis either in logic or in experience for assuming that any typical or average investor can anticipate market movements more successfully than the general public, of which he is himself a part.

“时机”哲学中有一个方面似乎未被所有人注意到。时机对投机者来说具有重要的心理意义，因为他想迅速获利。等待一年才让股票上涨的想法令他厌恶。但等待期本身对投资者来说无关紧要。将资金闲置，直到收到一些（大概是）可靠的信号表明买入时机已经到来，对他来说有什么好处呢？只有通过等待，他能够以足够低的价格买入，以抵消股息收入的损失，他才享有优势。这意味着，除非时机与定价相吻合，也就是说，除非时机能让投资者以远低于之前卖出价格的价格回购股票，否则时机对投资者来说没有实际价值。

There is one aspect of the “timing” philosophy which seems to have escaped everyone’s notice. Timing is of great psychological importance to the speculator because he wants to make his profit in a hurry. The idea of waiting a year before his stock moves up is repugnant to him. But a waiting period, as such, is of no consequence to the investor. What advantage is there to him in having his money uninvested until he receives some (presumably) trustworthy signal that the time has come to buy? He enjoys an advantage only if by waiting he succeeds in buying later at a sufficiently lower price to offset his loss of dividend income. What this means is that timing is of no real value to the investor unless it coincides with pricing—that is, unless it enables him to repurchase his shares at substantially under his previous selling price.

在这方面，著名的道氏理论（Dow Theory）有着一段非同寻常的历史。*简而言之，该理论的买入信号来自股价在上涨时出现的一种特殊“突破”，卖出信号则来自股价在下跌时出现类似的突破。使用该方法计算的结果（不一定是实际结果）显示，从1897年到20世纪60年代初，道氏理论的运营几乎连续盈利。基于此，道氏理论的实用价值似乎已得到牢固确立；如果真有疑问，那也只是质疑这份已发表的“记录”是否真实反映了道氏理论家在市场上的实际操作。

In this respect the famous Dow theory for timing purchases and sales has had an unusual history.* Briefly, this technique takes its signal to buy from a special kind of “breakthrough” of the stock averages on the up side, and its selling signal from a similar breakthrough on the down side. The calculated—not necessarily actual—results of using this method showed an almost unbroken series of profits in operations from 1897 to the early 1960s. On the basis of this presentation the practical value of the Dow theory would have appeared firmly established; the doubt, if any, would apply to the dependability of this published “record” as a picture of what a Dow theorist would actually have done in the market.

仔细研究这些数字就会发现，道氏理论的预测结果在1938年之后发生了根本性的变化——这距离该理论开始受到华尔街的重视已经过去了几年。它最辉煌的成就在于，在1929年股市崩盘前约一个月，道氏指数在306点发出了卖出信号，并使其追随者远离了漫长的熊市，直到1933年市场基本回稳，道氏指数在84点。但从1938年起，道氏理论的运作方式主要是，以相当好的价格让其追随者退出市场，然后再以更高的价格让他们重新入市。此后近30年里，仅仅买入并持有道琼斯工业平均指数，就能获得更好的回报^。2

A closer study of the figures indicates that the quality of the results shown by the Dow theory changed radically after 1938—a few years after the theory had begun to be taken seriously on Wall Street. Its spectacular achievement had been in giving a sell signal, at 306, about a month before the 1929 crash and in keeping its followers out of the long bear market until things had pretty well righted themselves, at 84, in 1933. But from 1938 on the Dow theory operated mainly by taking its practitioners out at a pretty good price but then putting them back in again at a higher price. For nearly 30 years thereafter, one would have done appreciably better by just buying and holding the DJIA.²

基于对这一问题的大量研究，我们认为道氏理论结果的变化并非偶然。它体现了商业和金融领域预测和交易公式的固有特性。那些获得拥护者和重视的公式之所以如此，是因为它们在一段时间内行之有效，或者有时仅仅是因为它们被合理地调整以适应过去的统计记录。但随着它们被接受的程度不断提高，其可靠性也趋于下降。出现这种情况的原因有两个：首先，随着时间的推移，新的条件使旧公式不再适用。其次，在股票市场中，交易理论的流行本身也会影响市场行为，从长远来看，这会降低市场盈利的可能性。（类似某种理论的流行）道氏理论似乎自证其有理，因为它会根据其追随者发出买入或卖出信号时的行为，推动市场上涨或下跌。当然，这种“蜂拥而至”的现象对公开交易者来说，危害远大于好处。

In our view, based on much study of this problem, the change in the Dow-theory results is not accidental. It demonstrates an inherent characteristic of forecasting and trading formulas in the fields of business and finance. Those formulas that gain adherents and importance do so because they have worked well over a period, or sometimes merely because they have been plausibly adapted to the statistical record of the past. But as their acceptance increases, their reliability tends to diminish. This happens for two reasons: First, the passage of time brings new conditions which the old formula no longer fits. Second, in stock-market affairs the popularity of a trading theory has itself an influence on the market’s behavior which detracts in the long run from its profit-making possibilities. (The popularity of something like the Dow theory may seem to create its own vindication, since it would make the market advance or decline by the very action of its followers when a buying or selling signal is given. A “stampede” of this kind is, of course, much more of a danger than an advantage to the public trader.)

低买高卖法

Buy-Low–Sell-High Approach

我们确信，普通投资者无法通过预测价格波动来成功应对。那么，价格波动已经发生，他能否从中获利呢？也就是说，每次大幅下跌后买入，每次大幅上涨后卖出。1950年之前多年的市场波动，在很大程度上印证了这一观点。事实上，“精明的投资者”的经典定义是“在熊市中，当所有人都在抛售时买入，在牛市中，当所有人都在买入时卖出”。如果我们查看一下图表1（涵盖了1900年至1970年间标准普尔综合指数的波动情况），以及表3-1中支持该观点的数据，我们就能很容易地理解，为什么这种观点直到最近几年才显得站得住脚。

We are convinced that the average investor cannot deal successfully with price movements by endeavoring to forecast them. Can he benefit from them after they have taken place—i.e., by buying after each major decline and selling out after each major advance? The fluctuations of the market over a period of many years prior to 1950 lent considerable encouragement to that idea. In fact, a classic definition of a “shrewd investor” was “one who bought in a bear market when everyone else was selling, and sold out in a bull market when everyone else was buying.” If we examine our Chart I, covering the fluctuations of the Standard & Poor’s composite index between 1900 and 1970, and the supporting figures in Table 3-1, we can readily see why this viewpoint appeared valid until fairly recent years.

1897年至1949年间，市场经历了十个完整的周期，从熊市低点到牛市高点，再回到熊市低点。其中六个周期持续时间不超过四年，四个周期持续了六七年，而一个——著名的1921-1932年“新时代”周期——则持续了十一年。从低点到高点的涨幅百分比从44%到500%不等，大多数涨幅在50%到100%之间。后续下跌的百分比从24%到89%不等，大多数跌幅在40%到50%之间。（需要记住的是，50%的跌幅完全抵消了之前100%的涨幅。）

Between 1897 and 1949 there were ten complete market cycles, running from bear-market low to bull-market high and back to bear-market low. Six of these took no longer than four years, four ran for six or seven years, and one—the famous “new-era” cycle of 1921–1932—lasted eleven years. The percentage of advance from the lows to highs ranged from 44% to 500%, with most between about 50% and 100%. The percentage of subsequent declines ranged from 24% to 89%, with most found between 40% and 50%. (It should be remembered that a decline of 50% fully offsets a preceding advance of 100%.)

几乎所有牛市都具有一些明确的共同特征，例如：（1）历史高位价格；（2）高市盈率；（3）股息收益率低于债券收益率；（4）保证金投机活动活跃；以及（5）发行大量低质量普通股。因此，对于研究股市历史的人来说，聪明的投资者应该能够识别反复出现的熊市和牛市，在熊市买入，在牛市卖出，并且因此，在大多数情况下，买卖价差的时间间隔都比较短。人们开发了各种方法来确定一般市场的买卖水平，这些方法要么基于价值因素，要么基于价格的百分比变动，或者两者兼而有之。

Nearly all the bull markets had a number of well-defined characteristics in common, such as (1) a historically high price level, (2) high price/earnings ratios, (3) low dividend yields as against bond yields, (4) much speculation on margin, and (5) many offerings of new common-stock issues of poor quality. Thus to the student of stock-market history it appeared that the intelligent investor should have been able to identify the recurrent bear and bull markets, to buy in the former and sell in the latter, and to do so for the most part at reasonably short intervals of time. Various methods were developed for determining buying and selling levels of the general market, based on either value factors or percentage movements of prices or both.

但我们必须指出，即使在1949年那场史无前例的牛市之前，连续的市场周期也存在着足够的波动，使得低买高卖这一理想的过程变得复杂，有时甚至会受阻。其中最显著的背离当然是20世纪20年代末的大牛市，它彻底颠覆了所有的计算方法。*因此，即使在1949年，投资者也绝不能确定其金融政策和程序是否能够主要基于在熊市中低买入、在牛市中高卖出这一原则。

But we must point out that even prior to the unprecedented bull market that began in 1949, there were sufficient variations in the successive market cycles to complicate and sometimes frustrate the desirable process of buying low and selling high. The most notable of these departures, of course, was the great bull market of the late 1920s, which threw all calculations badly out of gear.* Even in 1949, therefore, it was by no means a certainty that the investor could base his financial policies and procedures mainly on the endeavor to buy at low levels in bear markets and to sell out at high levels in bull markets.

后来事实证明，事实恰恰相反。过去20年的市场行为既没有遵循之前的模式，也没有遵循那些曾经根深蒂固的危险信号，也没有通过应用低买高卖的旧规则来成功利用它。我们尚不清楚过去那种相当规律的牛熊市模式最终是否会回归。但在我们看来，投资者试图将目前的策略建立在经典公式之上——即等待熊市明显出现后再购买任何普通股——似乎不现实。然而，我们推荐的策略已考虑到，如果投资者选择这样做，投资组合中普通股与债券的比例将根据股票价格水平在价值标准上显得更具吸引力还是更低而调整。^*

It turned out, in the sequel, that the opposite was true. The market’s behavior in the past 20 years has not followed the former pattern, nor obeyed what once were well-established danger signals, nor permitted its successful exploitation by applying old rules for buying low and selling high. Whether the old, fairly regular bull-and-bear-market pattern will eventually return we do not know. But it seems unrealistic to us for the investor to endeavor to base his present policy on the classic formula—i.e., to wait for demonstrable bear-market levels before buying any common stocks. Our recommended policy has, however, made provision for changes in the proportion of common stocks to bonds in the portfolio, if the investor chooses to do so, according as the level of stock prices appears less or more attractive by value standards.^*

公式计划

Formula Plans

在1949-50年股市上涨的初期，人们对各种利用股市周期的方法产生了浓厚的兴趣。这些方法被称为“公式投资计划”。所有此类计划的本质——除了简单的美元平均法——都是投资者在市场大幅上涨时自动抛售部分普通股。其中许多计划规定，当市场水平大幅上涨时，投资者会抛售所有普通股；其他一些计划则规定，在任何情况下都只保留少量股票。

In the early years of the stock-market rise that began in 1949–50 considerable interest was attracted to various methods of taking advantage of the stock market’s cycles. These have been known as “formula investment plans.” The essence of all such plans—except the simple case of dollar averaging—is that the investor automatically does some selling of common stocks when the market advances substantially. In many of them a very large rise in the market level would result in the sale of all common-stock holdings; others provided for retention of a minor proportion of equities under all circumstances.

这种方法兼具双重吸引力：一是听起来合乎逻辑（且保守），二是回顾过去多年应用于股市，效果显著。不幸的是，它最盛行的时候，恰恰是它注定行不通的时候。许多“公式规划师”在20世纪50年代中期的某个时期发现自己完全或几乎退出了股市。诚然，他们实现了丰厚的利润，但从广义上讲，市场此后“背弃”了他们，他们的公式几乎没有让他们有机会回购普通股头寸。*

This approach had the double appeal of sounding logical (and conservative) and of showing excellent results when applied retrospectively to the stock market over many years in the past. Unfortunately, its vogue grew greatest at the very time when it was destined to work least well. Many of the “formula planners” found themselves entirely or nearly out of the stock market at some level in the middle 1950s. True, they had realized excellent profits, but in a broad sense the market “ran away” from them thereafter, and their formulas gave them little opportunity to buy back a common-stock position.*

20世纪50年代初采用公式投资方法的人的经历与20年前信奉纯机械版道氏理论的人的经历颇有相似之处。在这两种情况下，普及的开始几乎标志着该系统失效的那一刻。我们用自己的“中心价值法”来确定道琼斯工业平均指数的指示买入和卖出水平，也曾有过类似的令人不安的经历。其寓意似乎是，任何在股市中赚钱的方法，如果能轻易地被描述并被许多人遵循，那么从其术语上来说，就太过简单，太过容易，难以持久。斯宾诺莎的结论也适用。这句话不仅适用于华尔街，也适用于哲学：“所有优秀的事物都是如此的困难和稀有。”

There is a similarity between the experience of those adopting the formula-investing approach in the early 1950s and those who embraced the purely mechanical version of the Dow theory some 20 years earlier. In both cases the advent of popularity marked almost the exact moment when the system ceased to work well. We have had a like discomfiting experience with our own “central value method” of determining indicated buying and selling levels of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The moral seems to be that any approach to moneymaking in the stock market which can be easily described and followed by a lot of people is by its terms too simple and too easy to last. Spinoza’s concluding remark applies to Wall Street as well as to philosophy: “All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.”

投资者投资组合的市场波动

Market Fluctuations of the Investor’s Portfolio

每位持有普通股的投资者都必须预料到，这些股票的价值会随着时间的推移而波动。自1964年我们上一版出版以来，道琼斯工业平均指数的走势或许很好地反映了一位保守型投资者的股票投资组合的走势。这位投资者将股票持仓限制在大型、知名且融资保守的公司股票上。整体价值从平均水平约890点上涨至1966年的995点高点（1968年再次回升至985点），1970年跌至631点，然后在1971年初几乎完全回升至940点。（由于各支股票的最高点和最低点出现的时间不同，道琼斯指数整体的波动幅度小于各成分股的波动幅度。）我们追踪了其他类型的多元化和保守型普通股投资组合的价格波动情况，发现整体结果不太可能与上述结果有显著差异。一般来说，二线公司*的股价波动比一线公司更大，但这并不一定意味着一批规模较小但信誉良好的公司在相当长的一段时间内业绩会更差。无论如何，投资者最好提前接受这样的可能性，而不是仅仅接受这样的可能性：他的大部分持股将在未来五年的不同时期从低点上涨50%或更多，并从高点下跌三分之一或更多。^*

Every investor who owns common stocks must expect to see them fluctuate in value over the years. The behavior of the DJIA since our last edition was written in 1964 probably reflects pretty well what has happened to the stock portfolio of a conservative investor who limited his stock holdings to those of large, prominent, and conservatively financed corporations. The overall value advanced from an average level of about 890 to a high of 995 in 1966 (and 985 again in 1968), fell to 631 in 1970, and made an almost full recovery to 940 in early 1971. (Since the individual issues set their high and low marks at different times, the fluctuations in the Dow Jones group as a whole are less severe than those in the separate components.) We have traced through the price fluctuations of other types of diversified and conservative common-stock portfolios and we find that the overall results are not likely to be markedly different from the above. In general, the shares of second-line companies* fluctuate more widely than the major ones, but this does not necessarily mean that a group of well-established but smaller companies will make a poorer showing over a fairly long period. In any case the investor may as well resign himself in advance to the probability rather than the mere possibility that most of his holdings will advance, say, 50% or more from their low point and decline the equivalent one-third or more from their high point at various periods in the next five years.^*

一位认真的投资者不太可能相信股市每日甚至每月的波动会让他变得更富有或更贫穷。但长期和更广泛的变化又如何呢？这里出现了一些实际问题，而心理问题可能会变得更加复杂。市场的大幅上涨既是令人欣慰的正当理由，也是谨慎担忧的原因，但它也可能带来强烈的诱惑，促使你采取轻率的行动。你的股票上涨了，很好！你比以前更富有了，很好！但是股价是否涨得太高了？你是否应该考虑抛售？或者你是否应该后悔在股价较低的时候没有买入更多股票？或者——最糟糕的是——你是否应该现在屈服于牛市氛围，被广大公众（毕竟，你也是其中的一员）的热情、过度自信和贪婪所感染，做出更大、更危险的投资？从印刷品上看，最后一个问题的答案显然是否定的，但即使是聪明的投资者也可能需要相当大的意志力才能避免随波逐流。

A serious investor is not likely to believe that the day-to-day or even month-to-month fluctuations of the stock market make him richer or poorer. But what about the longer-term and wider changes? Here practical questions present themselves, and the psychological problems are likely to grow complicated. A substantial rise in the market is at once a legitimate reason for satisfaction and a cause for prudent concern, but it may also bring a strong temptation toward imprudent action. Your shares have advanced, good! You are richer than you were, good! But has the price risen too high, and should you think of selling? Or should you kick yourself for not having bought more shares when the level was lower? Or—worst thought of all—should you now give way to the bull-market atmosphere, become infected with the enthusiasm, the overconfidence and the greed of the great public (of which, after all, you are a part), and make larger and dangerous commitments? Presented thus in print, the answer to the last question is a self-evident no, but even the intelligent investor is likely to need considerable willpower to keep from following the crowd.

正是出于这些人类本性的原因，而非出于对财务盈亏的计算，我们更 倾向于采用某种机械方法来调整投资者投资组合中债券与股票的比例。其主要优势或许在于，这种方法能让投资者有 事可做。随着市场上涨，他会不时抛售股票，将收益投入债券；而当市场下跌时，他则会逆转这一过程。这些活动将为他原本被压抑的精力提供一些释放渠道。如果他是一位合适的投资者，他会从与大众截然相反的策略中获得额外的满足感。*

It is for these reasons of human nature, even more than by calculation of financial gain or loss, that we favor some kind of mechanical method for varying the proportion of bonds to stocks in the investor’s portfolio. The chief advantage, perhaps, is that such a formula will give him something to do. As the market advances he will from time to time make sales out of his stockholdings, putting the proceeds into bonds; as it declines he will reverse the procedure. These activities will provide some outlet for his otherwise too-pent-up energies. If he is the right kind of investor he will take added satisfaction from the thought that his operations are exactly opposite from those of the crowd.*

企业估值与股票市场估值

Business Valuations versus Stock-Market Valuations

市场波动对投资者真实状况的影响，也可以从股东作为各类企业的部分所有者的视角来考量。流通股的持有者实际上拥有双重身份，并享有根据自身选择利用其中任何一种身份的特权。一方面，他的地位类似于私营企业的少数股东或隐名合伙人。在这里，他的业绩完全取决于企业的利润或其资产基础价值的变化。他通常会通过计算其在最新资产负债表中净值中所占的份额来确定此类私营企业权益的价值。另一方面，普通股投资者持有一张纸，一张刻有字样的股票证书，可以在几分钟内以随时变化的价格（即市场开放时的价格）出售，而且通常与资产负债表上的价值相差甚远。*

The impact of market fluctuations upon the investor’s true situation may be considered also from the standpoint of the shareholder as the part owner of various businesses. The holder of marketable shares actually has a double status, and with it the privilege of taking advantage of either at his choice. On the one hand his position is analogous to that of a minority shareholder or silent partner in a private business. Here his results are entirely dependent on the profits of the enterprise or on a change in the underlying value of its assets. He would usually determine the value of such a private-business interest by calculating his share of the net worth as shown in the most recent balance sheet. On the other hand, the common-stock investor holds a piece of paper, an engraved stock certificate, which can be sold in a matter of minutes at a price which varies from moment to moment—when the market is open, that is—and often is far removed from the balance-sheet value.*

近几十年来，股市的发展使普通投资者更加依赖价格走势，不再像以前那样自由地将自己视为仅仅是企业主。原因在于，他可能集中持股的成功企业，其售价几乎总是远高于其净资产价值（或账面价值，即“资产负债表价值”）。投资者支付这些市场溢价，就等于将宝贵的财富拱手让给了财富，因为他必须依靠股市本身来验证自己的承诺。^*

The development of the stock market in recent decades has made the typical investor more dependent on the course of price quotations and less free than formerly to consider himself merely a business owner. The reason is that the successful enterprises in which he is likely to concentrate his holdings sell almost constantly at prices well above their net asset value (or book value, or “balance-sheet value”). In paying these market premiums the investor gives precious hostages to fortune, for he must depend on the stock market itself to validate his commitments.^*

这是当今投资中至关重要的一个因素，但却未得到应有的重视。股市报价的整个结构本身就包含一个矛盾。一家公司的业绩和前景越好，其股价与账面价值的关联性就越小。但高于账面价值的溢价越高，确定其内在价值的依据就越不确定——也就是说，这种“价值”就越依赖于股市不断变化的情绪和衡量标准。因此，我们得出了最终的悖论：公司越成功，其股价波动就越大。这实际上意味着，从非常实际的意义上讲，普通股的质量越好，其 投机性 就越强——至少与那些平淡无奇的中档股票相比是如此。*（我们所说的内容适用于将领先的成长型公司与大多数成熟企业进行比较；我们在此将那些投机性很强的股票排除在外，因为这些公司本身就具有投机性。）

This is a factor of prime importance in present-day investing, and it has received less attention than it deserves. The whole structure of stock-market quotations contains a built-in contradiction. The better a company’s record and prospects, the less relationship the price of its shares will have to their book value. But the greater the premium above book value, the less certain the basis of determining its intrinsic value—i.e., the more this “value” will depend on the changing moods and measurements of the stock market. Thus we reach the final paradox, that the more successful the company, the greater are likely to be the fluctuations in the price of its shares. This really means that, in a very real sense, the better the quality of a common stock, the more speculative it is likely to be—at least as compared with the unspectacular middle-grade issues.* (What we have said applies to a comparison of the leading growth companies with the bulk of well-established concerns; we exclude from our purview here those issues which are highly speculative because the businesses themselves are speculative.)

上述论证应该能够解释我们最成功、最令人印象深刻的企业经常出现的股价波动。我们最常举的例子是其中的霸主——国际商业机器公司（IBM）。1962-63年，其股价在七个月内从607美元跌至300美元；经过两次拆股后，其股价在1970年从387美元跌至219美元。同样，施乐——其盈利甚至更为可观——近几十年来涨幅最大的公司——1962-63 年从 171 跌至 87，1970 年从 116 跌至 65。这些惊人的损失并不表明对 IBM 或施乐未来长期增长的任何怀疑；相反，它们反映出对股票市场本身赋予这些优秀前景的溢价估值缺乏信心。

The argument made above should explain the often erratic price behavior of our most successful and impressive enterprises. Our favorite example is the monarch of them all—International Business Machines. The price of its shares fell from 607 to 300 in seven months in 1962–63; after two splits its price fell from 387 to 219 in 1970. Similarly, Xerox—an even more impressive earnings gainer in recent decades—fell from 171 to 87 in 1962–63, and from 116 to 65 in 1970. These striking losses did not indicate any doubt about the future long-term growth of IBM or Xerox; they reflected instead a lack of confidence in the premium valuation that the stock market itself had placed on these excellent prospects.

前述讨论使我们得出一个对保守型普通股投资者具有实际意义的结论。如果他要特别注意投资组合的选择，最好集中精力于那些售价与其有形资产价值相当接近的股票——比如，价格不高于该数字的三分之一。以这样的价格或更低的价格购买股票，在逻辑上可以被视为与公司资产负债表相关，并且具有独立于市场价格波动的合理性或支持。可能涉及的高于账面价值的溢价可以被视为一种额外费用，用于享受证券交易所上市的优势及其随之而来的市场流动性。

The previous discussion leads us to a conclusion of practical importance to the conservative investor in common stocks. If he is to pay some special attention to the selection of his portfolio, it might be best for him to concentrate on issues selling at a reasonably close approximation to their tangible-asset value—say, at not more than one-third above that figure. Purchases made at such levels, or lower, may with logic be regarded as related to the company’s balance sheet, and as having a justification or support independent of the fluctuating market prices. The premium over book value that may be involved can be considered as a kind of extra fee paid for the advantage of stock-exchange listing and the marketability that goes with it.

这里需要注意的是。一只股票不会仅仅因为能够以接近其资产价值的价格买入就成为一项稳健的投资。投资者还应该要求其具备令人满意的市盈率、足够强劲的财务状况，以及至少在未来几年内能够维持盈利的前景。这似乎对一只价格适中的股票要求很高，但在任何危险的高市情况下，这个药方都不难满足。一旦投资者愿意放弃美好的前景——即高于平均水平的预期增长——他将不费吹灰之力就能找到符合这些标准的众多股票。

A caution is needed here. A stock does not become a sound investment merely because it can be bought at close to its asset value. The investor should demand, in addition, a satisfactory ratio of earnings to price, a sufficiently strong financial position, and the prospect that its earnings will at least be maintained over the years. This may appear like demanding a lot from a modestly priced stock, but the prescription is not hard to fill under all but dangerously high market conditions. Once the investor is willing to forgo brilliant prospects—i.e., better than average expected growth—he will have no difficulty in finding a wide selection of issues meeting these criteria.

在我们关于普通股选择的章节（第14章和第15章）中，我们将提供数据，表明超过一半的道琼斯工业平均指数成分股在1970年底符合我们的资产价值标准。在我们撰写本文时，持有最广泛的投资——美国电信公司——的股价实际上低于其有形资产价值。大多数电力照明类股票，除了其他优势外，现在（1972年初）的股价也相当接近其资产价值。

In our chapters on the selection of common stocks (Chapters 14 and 15) we shall give data showing that more than half of the DJIA issues met our asset-value criterion at the end of 1970. The most widely held investment of all—American Tel. & Tel.—actually sells below its tangible-asset value as we write. Most of the light-and-power shares, in addition to their other advantages, are now (early 1972) available at prices reasonably close to their asset values.

拥有如此账面价值的股票投资组合的投资者，可以比那些支付高额收益和有形资产乘数的投资者，对股市波动采取更加独立和客观的看法。只要盈利能力他的持股情况仍然令人满意，他可以随心所欲地减少对股市波动的关注。更重要的是，有时他还能利用这些波动，玩出低买高卖的高招。

The investor with a stock portfolio having such book values behind it can take a much more independent and detached view of stock-market fluctuations than those who have paid high multipliers of both earnings and tangible assets. As long as the earning power of his holdings remains satisfactory, he can give as little attention as he pleases to the vagaries of the stock market. More than that, at times he can use these vagaries to play the master game of buying low and selling high.

A. & P. 示例

The A. & P. Example

现在，我们将介绍我们最初的例子之一。它的历史可以追溯到很多年前，但对我们来说却颇具吸引力，因为它融合了企业和投资经验的诸多方面。它涉及大西洋和太平洋茶叶公司。故事如下：

At this point we shall introduce one of our original examples, which dates back many years but which has a certain fascination for us because it combines so many aspects of corporate and investment experience. It involves the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. Here is the story:

1929年，A.&P.股票在“场外市场”（现为美国证券交易所）上市交易，最高价格达到494美元。到1932年，股价跌至104美元，尽管在那场通常灾难性的年份里，公司的盈利几乎与前一年一样高。1936年，股价在111美元至131美元之间波动。随后，在1938年的商业衰退和熊市中，股价跌至36美元的新低。

A. & P. shares were introduced to trading on the “Curb” market, now the American Stock Exchange, in 1929 and sold as high as 494. By 1932 they had declined to 104, although the company’s earnings were nearly as large in that generally catastrophic year as previously. In 1936 the range was between 111 and 131. Then in the business recession and bear market of 1938 the shares fell to a new low of 36.

这个价格非同寻常。这意味着优先股和普通股加起来要卖1.26亿美元，尽管该公司刚刚公布，其持有的现金仅8500万美元，营运资本（或净流动资产）高达1.34亿美元。A.&P.是美国乃至全球最大的零售企业，多年来一直保持着令人瞩目的高盈利记录。然而，在1938年，华尔街认为这家杰出企业的价值还不及其流动资产本身——这意味着，作为一家持续经营的公司，其价值甚至低于被清算。原因何在？首先，连锁店面临特别税的威胁；其次，上一年净利润大幅下降；第三，市场普遍低迷。第一个原因是过度夸大且最终毫无根据的恐惧；后两个原因则是典型的暂时性影响。

That price was extraordinary. It meant that the preferred and common were together selling for $126 million, although the company had just reported that it held $85 million in cash alone and a working capital (or net current assets) of $134 million. A. & P. was the largest retail enterprise in America, if not in the world, with a continuous and impressive record of large earnings for many years. Yet in 1938 this outstanding business was considered on Wall Street to be worth less than its current assets alone—which means less as a going concern than if it were liquidated. Why? First, because there were threats of special taxes on chain stores; second, because net profits had fallen off in the previous year; and, third, because the general market was depressed. The first of these reasons was an exaggerated and eventually groundless fear; the other two were typical of temporary influences.

假设这位投资者在1937年以相当于其五年平均收益12倍（约80倍）的价格买入了A. & P.的普通股。我们绝不会断言，随后股价跌至36倍对他来说无关紧要。他最好仔细审视一下市场情况，看看自己是否有任何误判。但如果他的研究结果令人放心——正如他们本应的那样——他有权将市场下跌视为金融的暂时异常，除非他有足够的资金和勇气利用这一机会，以优惠的价格购买更多股票。

Let us assume that the investor had bought A. & P. common in 1937 at, say, 12 times its five-year average earnings, or about 80. We are far from asserting that the ensuing decline to 36 was of no importance to him. He would have been well advised to scrutinize the picture with some care, to see whether he had made any miscalculations. But if the results of his study were reassuring— as they should have been—he was entitled then to disregard the market decline as a temporary vagary of finance, unless he had the funds and the courage to take advantage of it by buying more on the bargain basis offered.

续集与反思

Sequel and Reflections

次年，即1939年，A. & P. 的股价上涨至117.5美元，相当于1938年最低价的三倍，远高于1937年的平均水平。普通股的这种逆转并不少见，但A. & P. 的股价表现尤为引人注目。1949年之后，这家连锁超市的股价跟随大盘上涨，直到1961年，其股票拆细（拆10股，拆1股）达到70.5美元的高点，相当于1938年股票的705美元。

The following year, 1939, A. & P. shares advanced to 117½, or three times the low price of 1938 and well above the average of 1937. Such a turnabout in the behavior of common stocks is by no means uncommon, but in the case of A. & P. it was more striking than most. In the years after 1949 the grocery chain’s shares rose with the general market until in 1961 the split-up stock (10 for 1) reached a high of 70½ which was equivalent to 705 for the 1938 shares.

70.5 美元的股价之所以引人注目，是因为它相当于 1961 年收益的 30 倍。这样的市盈率——相比之下，当年道琼斯工业平均指数的市盈率为 23 倍——必定意味着对收益大幅增长的预期。这种乐观情绪在公司前几年的收益记录中毫无根据，事实证明它完全错了。在随后的一段时间里，收益不但没有快速增长，反而普遍下降。在 70.5 美元的高点之后的第二年，股价下跌了一半以上，降至 34 美元。但这一次，股价并不像 1938 年的低价那样划算。经过各种波动后，股价在 1970 年跌至另一个低点 21.5 美元，1972 年跌至 18 美元，并报告了其历史上第一个季度亏损。

This price of 70½ was remarkable for the fact it was 30 times the earnings of 1961. Such a price/earnings ratio—which compares with 23 times for the DJIA in that year—must have implied expectations of a brilliant growth in earnings. This optimism had no justification in the company’s earnings record in the preceding years, and it proved completely wrong. Instead of advancing rapidly, the course of earnings in the ensuing period was generally downward. The year after the 70½ high the price fell by more than half to 34. But this time the shares did not have the bargain quality that they showed at the low quotation in 1938. After varying sorts of fluctuations the price fell to another low of 21½ in 1970 and 18 in 1972—having reported the first quarterly deficit in its history.

我们从这段历史中可以看到，一家美国大企业在短短一代人的时间里经历了多么巨大的变迁，也可以看到公众对其股票的估值是多么的失算，以及过度的乐观和悲观。1938年，这家企业实际上被白白送人，无人问津；1961年，公众却以高得离谱的价格争相购买股票。此后，市值迅速缩水了一半，几年后又进一步大幅下跌。与此同时，该公司的盈利表现从一家杰出的公司变成了一家平庸的公司；它在1968年经济繁荣时期的利润低于1958年；它支付了一系列令人困惑的小额股息，而这些股息与当时新增的盈余不符；等等。A. & P. 是一家规模更大的公司，1961 年和 1972 年的业绩比 1938 年有所提高，但经营状况不如 1938 年，盈利能力也不如 1938 年，吸引力也不如 1938 年。*

We see in this history how wide can be the vicissitudes of a major American enterprise in little more than a single generation, and also with what miscalculations and excesses of optimism and pessimism the public has valued its shares. In 1938 the business was really being given away, with no takers; in 1961 the public was clamoring for the shares at a ridiculously high price. After that came a quick loss of half the market value, and some years later a substantial further decline. In the meantime the company was to turn from an outstanding to a mediocre earnings performer; its profit in the boom-year 1968 was to be less than in 1958; it had paid a series of confusing small stock dividends not warranted by the current additions to surplus; and so forth. A. & P. was a larger company in 1961 and 1972 than in 1938, but not as well-run, not as profitable, and not as attractive.*

这个故事有两个主要寓意。首先，股市经常会大错特错，有时机警而勇敢的投资者可以利用其明显的错误。其次，大多数企业的性质和质量会随着时间的推移而发生变化，有时会变好，但更多时候可能会变坏。投资者无需像鹰一样密切关注公司的表现；但他应该时不时地仔细观察。

There are two chief morals to this story. The first is that the stock market often goes far wrong, and sometimes an alert and courageous investor can take advantage of its patent errors. The other is that most businesses change in character and quality over the years, sometimes for the better, perhaps more often for the worse. The investor need not watch his companies’ performance like a hawk; but he should give it a good, hard look from time to time.

让我们回到之前对可流通股票持有者和私人企业股东的比较。我们之前说过，前者可以选择将自己仅仅视为其所投资各类企业的部分所有者，或者将其视为可随时按市场报价出售的股票的持有者。

Let us return to our comparison between the holder of marketable shares and the man with an interest in a private business. We have said that the former has the option of considering himself merely as the part owner of the various businesses he has invested in, or as the holder of shares which are salable at any time he wishes at their quoted market price.

但请注意一个重要事实：真正的投资者几乎不会 被迫出售 股票，在其他任何时候，他都可以自由地忽略当前的股价报价。他只需关注股价，并根据其符合自身策略的程度采取行动，无需更多。^* 因此，如果投资者因持有的股票市场出现不合理的下跌而感到恐慌或过度担忧，那么他的基本优势就会被扭曲地转化为基本劣势。如果他的股票根本没有市场报价，那么他会过得更好，因为这样他就可以免受他人判断 失误带来的精神痛苦。^*

But note this important fact: The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at all other times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more.^* Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons’ mistakes of judgment.^*

顺便说一句，在1931年至1933年的黑暗大萧条时期，这种普遍的情况确实存在过。当时有一个持有没有上市市场的商业权益具有心理优势。例如，持有持续支付利息的房地产一级抵押贷款的人可以告诉自己，他们的投资保持了原有的价值，因为没有市场报价表明情况并非如此。另一方面，许多质量更好、基础实力更强的上市公司债券的市场报价也大幅缩水，这让持有者认为自己的资产明显缩水。实际上，尽管这些上市证券的价格很低，持有者的境况反而更好。因为如果他们愿意，或者被迫这样做，他们至少可以出售这些证券——或许可以换取更划算的股票。或者，他们也可以同样合乎逻辑地忽略市场波动，认为它们只是暂时的，基本上毫无意义。但仅仅因为持有的证券根本没有上市市场就告诉自己价值没有缩水，那就是自欺欺人了。

Incidentally, a widespread situation of this kind actually existed during the dark depression days of 1931–1933. There was then a psychological advantage in owning business interests that had no quoted market. For example, people who owned first mortgages on real estate that continued to pay interest were able to tell themselves that their investments had kept their full value, there being no market quotations to indicate otherwise. On the other hand, many listed corporation bonds of even better quality and greater underlying strength suffered severe shrinkages in their market quotations, thus making their owners believe they were growing distinctly poorer. In reality the owners were better off with the listed securities, despite the low prices of these. For if they had wanted to, or were compelled to, they could at least have sold the issues—possibly to exchange them for even better bargains. Or they could just as logically have ignored the market’s action as temporary and basically meaningless. But it is self-deception to tell yourself that you have suffered no shrinkage in value merely because your securities have no quoted market at all.

回到1938年那位A. & P.股东，我们认为，只要他持有股票，就不会因股价下跌而遭受损失，除非他自己的判断认为这些损失是由于股票基础价值或内在价值缩水造成的。如果没有发生这种缩水，他有权预期市场报价最终会回到1937年的水平或更高——事实上，第二年就确实如此。从这个角度来看，他的处境至少与他持有一家没有上市股票市场的私营企业的股份一样好。因为在这种情况下，由于1938年经济衰退的影响，他或许有理由在心理上削减部分持股成本——这取决于他的公司当时的情况。

Returning to our A. & P. shareholder in 1938, we assert that as long as he held on to his shares he suffered no loss in their price decline, beyond what his own judgment may have told him was occasioned by a shrinkage in their underlying or intrinsic value. If no such shrinkage had occurred, he had a right to expect that in due course the market quotation would return to the 1937 level or better—as in fact it did the following year. In this respect his position was at least as good as if he had owned an interest in a private business with no quoted market for its shares. For in that case, too, he might or might not have been justified in mentally lopping off part of the cost of his holdings because of the impact of the 1938 recession—depending on what had happened to his company.

股票投资价值法的批评者认为，上市普通股不能像对待类似私营企业的权益那样被恰当地看待或评估，因为有组织的证券市场的存在“为股权注入了流动性这一新的、极其重要的属性”。但 这种流动性的真正含义是，首先，投资者可以从股市对其持股的每日不断变化的估值中获益， 无论该估值值多少钱；其次，投资者可以根据市场的每日价格增加或减少其投资——如果他愿意的话。因此，报价市场的存在赋予了投资者 某些选择 ，而这些选择是在其持有的证券未上市时所无法获得的。但它不会将当前的报价强加于那些倾向于从其他来源获取价值观念的投资者。

Critics of the value approach to stock investment argue that listed common stocks cannot properly be regarded or appraised in the same way as an interest in a similar private enterprise, because the presence of an organized security market “injects into equity ownership the new and extremely important attribute of liquidity.” But what this liquidity really means is, first, that the investor has the benefit of the stock market’s daily and changing appraisal of his holdings, for whatever that appraisal may be worth, and, second, that the investor is able to increase or decrease his investment at the market’s daily figure—if he chooses. Thus the existence of a quoted market gives the investor certain options that he does not have if his security is unquoted. But it does not impose the current quotation on an investor who prefers to take his idea of value from some other source.

让我们用一个寓言故事来结束本节。想象一下，在一家私营企业中，你拥有一小股股份，价值1000美元。你的一位合伙人，名叫“市场先生”，他非常乐于助人。他每天都会告诉你他认为你的股份值多少钱，并且还会提出要么买断你的股份，要么在此基础上再卖给你一些股份。有时，他给出的价值评估似乎合理，并且根据你所了解的业务发展和前景可以证明这一点。另一方面，“市场先生”往往会被他的热情或恐惧冲昏头脑，他给出的价值在你看来简直是愚蠢至极。

Let us close this section with something in the nature of a parable. Imagine that in some private business you own a small share that cost you $1,000. One of your partners, named Mr. Market, is very obliging indeed. Every day he tells you what he thinks your interest is worth and furthermore offers either to buy you out or to sell you an additional interest on that basis. Sometimes his idea of value appears plausible and justified by business developments and prospects as you know them. Often, on the other hand, Mr. Market lets his enthusiasm or his fears run away with him, and the value he proposes seems to you a little short of silly.

如果您是一位审慎的投资者或精明的商人，您会让“市场先生”的日常沟通来决定您对1000美元企业权益的价值判断吗？除非您同意他的观点，或者您想与他交易。当他给您报出高得离谱的价格时，您可能乐意卖给他；当他报价低廉时，您可能也乐意从他那里买入。但其余时间，您更明智的做法是，根据公司关于其运营和财务状况的完整报告，形成自己对所持股份价值的看法。

If you are a prudent investor or a sensible businessman, will you let Mr. Market’s daily communication determine your view of the value of a $1,000 interest in the enterprise? Only in case you agree with him, or in case you want to trade with him. You may be happy to sell out to him when he quotes you a ridiculously high price, and equally happy to buy from him when his price is low. But the rest of the time you will be wiser to form your own ideas of the value of your holdings, based on full reports from the company about its operations and financial position.

真正的投资者持有上市普通股时就处于这种境地。他可以根据自己的判断和偏好，利用每日市场价格或置之不理。他必须留意重要的价格变动，否则他的判断将毫无意义。可以想象，这些价格变动可能会给他一个警告信号，他最好留意——用通俗的话说，就是他应该卖出股票，因为价格下跌了，预示着更糟糕的事情即将发生。我们认为，此类信号至少在帮助和误导性方面都一样多。基本上，价格波动对真正的投资者只有一个重要意义：在价格大幅下跌时，它为他提供了一个明智买入的机会，在价格大幅上涨时，他也可以明智卖出。在其他时候，如果他能暂时忘掉股市，专注于股息回报和公司的经营业绩，他的收益会更好。

The true investor is in that very position when he owns a listed common stock. He can take advantage of the daily market price or leave it alone, as dictated by his own judgment and inclination. He must take cognizance of important price movements, for otherwise his judgment will have nothing to work on. Conceivably they may give him a warning signal which he will do well to heed—this in plain English means that he is to sell his shares because the price has gone down, foreboding worse things to come. In our view such signals are misleading at least as often as they are helpful. Basically, price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor. They provide him with an opportunity to buy wisely when prices fall sharply and to sell wisely when they advance a great deal. At other times he will do better if he forgets about the stock market and pays attention to his dividend returns and to the operating results of his companies.

概括

Summary

投资者和投机者之间最现实的区别在于他们对股市走势的态度。投机者的主要兴趣在于预测市场波动并从中获利。投资者的主要兴趣在于以合适的价格购入并持有合适的证券。市场走势对他来说在实际意义上很重要，因为它会交替地创造出低价位（在低价位时买入是明智的）和高价位（在高价位时他肯定应该避免买入，甚至可能应该卖出）。

The most realistic distinction between the investor and the speculator is found in their attitude toward stock-market movements. The speculator’s primary interest lies in anticipating and profiting from market fluctuations. The investor’s primary interest lies in acquiring and holding suitable securities at suitable prices. Market movements are important to him in a practical sense, because they alternately create low price levels at which he would be wise to buy and high price levels at which he certainly should refrain from buying and probably would be wise to sell.

典型的投资者是否应该经常等到市场出现低位才买入，这很难确定，因为这可能意味着漫长的等待，很可能造成收入损失，甚至错失投资机会。总的来说，投资者最好在有资金投入股票时就买入股票，除非 市场总体水平远高于公认的价值标准所能接受的水平。如果投资者想要精明，可以寻找个股中随时存在的低价机会。

It is far from certain that the typical investor should regularly hold off buying until low market levels appear, because this may involve a long wait, very likely the loss of income, and the possible missing of investment opportunities. On the whole it may be better for the investor to do his stock buying whenever he has money to put in stocks, except when the general market level is much higher than can be justified by well-established standards of value. If he wants to be shrewd he can look for the ever-present bargain opportunities in individual securities.

除了预测整体市场走势外，华尔街还投入大量精力和能力，用于筛选那些在未来相当短的时间内价格表现“优于”其他股票或行业集团。尽管这种做法看似合乎逻辑，但我们认为它并不符合真正投资者的需求或性格——尤其是考虑到他要与大量试图做同样事情的股票交易员和一流金融分析师竞争。正如所有其他首先强调价格走势、其次才是潜在价值的活动一样，许多长期从事这一领域的聪明才智，其工作往往会随着时间的推移而自我抵消、自我挫败。

Aside from forecasting the movements of the general market, much effort and ability are directed on Wall Street toward selecting stocks or industrial groups that in matter of price will “do better” than the rest over a fairly short period in the future. Logical as this endeavor may seem, we do not believe it is suited to the needs or temperament of the true investor—particularly since he would be competing with a large number of stock-market traders and first-class financial analysts who are trying to do the same thing. As in all other activities that emphasize price movements first and underlying values second, the work of many intelligent minds constantly engaged in this field tends to be self-neutralizing and self-defeating over the years.

持有稳健股票投资组合的投资者应该预期股价会波动，既不应为大幅下跌而担忧，也不应对大幅上涨而兴奋。他应该始终牢记，市场报价的存在是为了方便他，要么被利用，要么被忽视。他永远不应该因为 股票上涨而买入，也不应该 因为股票上涨而卖出。 它已经下跌了。如果他的座右铭更简单地理解为“永远不要在股价大幅上涨后立即买入股票，也不要因为股价大幅下跌而立即卖出股票”，那也未免太过分了。

The investor with a portfolio of sound stocks should expect their prices to fluctuate and should neither be concerned by sizable declines nor become excited by sizable advances. He should always remember that market quotations are there for his convenience, either to be taken advantage of or to be ignored. He should never buy a stock because it has gone up or sell one because it has gone down. He would not be far wrong if this motto read more simply: “Never buy a stock immediately after a substantial rise or sell one immediately after a substantial drop.”

额外的考虑

An Added Consideration

应该强调一下平均市场价格作为衡量管理能力的重要意义。股东判断自身投资是否成功，既要看股息，也要看平均市场价值的长期趋势。同样的标准也应该适用于检验公司管理的有效性及其对待股东的态度是否合理。

Something should be said about the significance of average market prices as a measure of managerial competence. The shareholder judges whether his own investment has been successful in terms both of dividends received and of the long-range trend of the average market value. The same criteria should logically be applied in testing the effectiveness of a company’s management and the soundness of its attitude toward the owners of the business.

这句话听起来或许不言自明，但需要强调。因为目前尚无公认的技术或方法，能够让管理层接受市场舆论的评判。相反，管理层一直坚称，他们对其股票市值的变化不承担任何责任。当然，他们确实不对那些价格波动负责，正如我们一直强调的那样，这些波动与基本条件和价值无关。但正是由于普通股东缺乏警觉和智慧，才使得这种豁免权扩展到整个市场报价领域，包括长期维持低迷且不令人满意的价格水平。良好的管理能够创造良好的平均市场价格，而糟糕的管理则会导致糟糕的市场价格。*

This statement may sound like a truism, but it needs to be emphasized. For as yet there is no accepted technique or approach by which management is brought to the bar of market opinion. On the contrary, managements have always insisted that they have no responsibility of any kind for what happens to the market value of their shares. It is true, of course, that they are not accountable for those fluctuations in price which, as we have been insisting, bear no relationship to underlying conditions and values. But it is only the lack of alertness and intelligence among the rank and file of shareholders that permits this immunity to extend to the entire realm of market quotations, including the permanent establishment of a depreciated and unsatisfactory price level. Good managements produce a good average market price, and bad managements produce bad market prices.*

债券价格波动

Fluctuations in Bond Prices

投资者应该意识到，即使本金和利息的安全性毋庸置疑，长期债券的市场价格仍可能因利率变动而大幅波动。表8-1列出了自1902年以来不同年份的高等级公司债券和免税债券的收益率数据。为了单独说明，我们添加了两支具有代表性的铁路债券在相似时期的价格波动情况。（这两支债券分别是：1995年到期的阿奇森、托皮卡和圣达菲4年期普通抵押贷款债券，这是我们发行的几代人优先发行的不可赎回债券之一；以及2047年到期的北太平洋铁路3年期债券——最初的期限为150年！——是典型的Baa级债券。）

The investor should be aware that even though safety of its principal and interest may be unquestioned, a long-term bond could vary widely in market price in response to changes in interest rates. In Table 8-1 we give data for various years back to 1902 covering yields for high-grade corporate and tax-free issues. As individual illustrations we add the price fluctuations of two representative railroad issues for a similar period. (These are the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe general mortgage 4s, due 1995, for generations one of our premier noncallable bond issues, and the Northern Pacific Ry. 3s, due 2047—originally a 150-year maturity!—long a typical Baa-rated bond.)

由于收益率与价格呈反比关系，低收益率对应高价格，反之亦然。1940年北太平洋3年期债券的下跌主要体现了人们对其发行安全性的怀疑。令人惊讶的是，价格在接下来的几年里回升至历史最高点，然后又因普遍利率上升而下跌了三分之二。过去四十年，即使是最高等级的债券，其价格也出现了惊人的波动。

Because of their inverse relationship the low yields correspond to the high prices and vice versa. The decline in the Northern Pacific 3s in 1940 represented mainly doubts as to the safety of the issue. It is extraordinary that the price recovered to an all-time high in the next few years, and then lost two-thirds of its price chiefly because of the rise in general interest rates. There have been startling variations, as well, in the price of even the highest-grade bonds in the past forty years.

需要注意的是，债券价格的波动幅度与计算出的收益率并不相同（反比），因为其100%的固定期限价值会产生调节作用。然而，对于期限极长的债券，例如我们北太平洋铁路的案例，价格和收益率的变动幅度接近相同。

Note that bond prices do not fluctuate in the same (inverse) proportion as the calculated yields, because their fixed maturity value of 100% exerts a moderating influence. However, for very long maturities, as in our Northern Pacific example, prices and yields change at close to the same rate.

自1964年以来，高等级债券市场双向波动创下纪录。以“优质市政债券”（免税）为例，其收益率翻了一番多，从1965年1月的3.2%飙升至1970年6月的7%。其价格指数则相应从110.8降至67.5。1970年中期，高等级长期债券的收益率高于美国近200年经济史上的任何时候。* 25年前，就在我们这轮持续的牛市开始之前，债券收益率处于历史最低点；长期市政债券的收益率仅为1%，工业债券的收益率为2.40%，而此前被认为“正常”的收益率为4.5%至5%。我们这些在华尔街长期摸爬滚打的人，都见证了牛顿“作用力与反作用力，大小相等，方向相反”的定律在股市中反复出现——最显著的例子是道琼斯工业平均指数从1921年的64点上涨到1929年的381点，随后又在1932年创纪录地跌至41点。但这一次，钟摆式波动幅度最大的，却是通常走势平缓的高等级债券价格和收益率。寓意：华尔街上任何重要的事情都不可能一成不变。这正应验了我们最喜欢的那句名言的前半部分：“变化越大，越是相同。”

Since 1964 record movements in both directions have taken place in the high-grade bond market. Taking “prime municipals” (tax-free) as an example, their yield more than doubled, from 3.2% in January 1965 to 7% in June 1970. Their price index declined, correspondingly, from 110.8 to 67.5. In mid-1970 the yields on high-grade long-term bonds were higher than at any time in the nearly 200 years of this country’s economic history.* Twenty-five years earlier, just before our protracted bull market began, bond yields were at their lowest point in history; long-term municipals returned as little as 1%, and industrials gave 2.40% compared with the 4½ to 5% formerly considered “normal.” Those of us with a long experience on Wall Street had seen Newton’s law of “action and reaction, equal and opposite” work itself out repeatedly in the stock market—the most noteworthy example being the rise in the DJIA from 64 in 1921 to 381 in 1929, followed by a record collapse to 41 in 1932. But this time the widest pendulum swings took place in the usually staid and slow-moving array of high-grade bond prices and yields. Moral: Nothing important on Wall Street can be counted on to occur exactly in the same way as it happened before. This represents the first half of our favorite dictum: “The more it changes, the more it’s the same thing.”

表 8-1 1902 年至 1970 年期间债券收益率和两种代表性债券发行价格的波动情况

TABLE 8-1 Fluctuations in Bond Yields, and in Prices of Two Representative Bond Issues, 1902–1970

如果对股票价格走势几乎不可能做出有价值的预测，那么对债券价格走势也完全不可能做出准确的预测。至少在过去，人们通常可以通过研究债券的先前走势来预测牛市或熊市即将结束，但对于即将到来的利率和债券价格变化，却没有类似的线索。因此，投资者必须主要根据个人偏好在长期和短期债券投资之间做出选择。如果他想确保市场价值不会下跌，他最好的选择可能是美国储蓄债券，E 系列或 H 系列，正如本文所述。两种债券的收益率均为 5%（第一年后），E 系列债券的期限最长为 5.5⁄6 年，H 系列债券的期限最长为 10 年，并保证转售价值等于或高于成本价。

If it is virtually impossible to make worthwhile predictions about the price movements of stocks, it is completely impossible to do so for bonds. In the old days, at least, one could often find a useful clue to the coming end of a bull or bear market by studying the prior action of bonds, but no similar clues were given to a coming change in interest rates and bond prices. Hence the investor must choose between long-term and short-term bond investments on the basis chiefly of his personal preferences. If he wants to be certain that the market values will not decrease, his best choices are probably U.S. savings bonds, Series E or H, which were described here. Either issue will give him a 5% yield (after the first year), the Series E for up to 55⁄6 years, the Series H for up to ten years, with a guaranteed resale value of cost or better.

如果投资者想要获得目前优质长期公司债券7.5%的收益率，或免税市政债券5.3%的收益率，就必须做好承受价格波动的准备。银行和保险公司有权根据“摊销成本”的数学基础来评估此类高评级债券，而这种计算方法忽略了市场价格；个人投资者也可以采取类似的方法。

If the investor wants the 7.5% now available on good long-term corporate bonds, or the 5.3% on tax-free municipals, he must be prepared to see them fluctuate in price. Banks and insurance companies have the privilege of valuing high-rated bonds of this type on the mathematical basis of “amortized cost,” which disregards market prices; it would not be a bad idea for the individual investor to do something similar.

可转换债券和优先股的价格波动由三个不同的因素造成：(1) 相关普通股价格的波动，(2) 公司信用状况的波动，以及 (3) 一般利率的波动。许多可转换债券的发行者，其信用评级远低于最佳水平。3其中一些公司在 1970 年金融危机中受到了严重影响。因此，近年来，可转换债券整体上受到了三重不利因素的影响，价格波动异常剧烈。因此，在典型情况下，投资者如果他期望在可转换债券中找到既有高等级债券的安全性和价格保护，又有机会从普通股价格上涨中获益的理想组合，那他就是在自欺欺人。

The price fluctuations of convertible bonds and preferred stocks are the resultant of three different factors: (1) variations in the price of the related common stock, (2) variations in the credit standing of the company, and (3) variations in general interest rates. A good many of the convertible issues have been sold by companies that have credit ratings well below the best.3 Some of these were badly affected by the financial squeeze in 1970. As a result, convertible issues as a whole have been subjected to triply unsettling influences in recent years, and price variations have been unusually wide. In the typical case, therefore, the investor would delude himself if he expected to find in convertible issues that ideal combination of the safety of a high-grade bond and price protection plus a chance to benefit from an advance in the price of the common.

或许现在正是提出关于“未来长期债券”建议的好时机。为什么不应该在借款人和贷款人之间，基于某种切实可行的公平原则，分摊利率变动的影响呢？一种可能性是出售长期债券，其利息支付会随着现行利率的某个适当指数而变化。这种安排的主要结果是：(1) 如果公司维持其信用评级，投资者债券的本金价值将始终约为100，但收到的利息将随着传统新发行债券的利率而变化；(2) 公司将拥有长期债务的优势——避免频繁续期再融资带来的问题和成本——但其利息成本将逐年变化。4

This may be a good place to make a suggestion about the “long-term bond of the future.” Why should not the effects of changing interest rates be divided on some practical and equitable basis between the borrower and the lender? One possibility would be to sell long-term bonds with interest payments that vary with an appropriate index of the going rate. The main results of such an arrangement would be: (1) the investor’s bond would always have a principal value of about 100, if the company maintains its credit rating, but the interest received will vary, say, with the rate offered on conventional new issues; (2) the corporation would have the advantages of long-term debt—being spared problems and costs of frequent renewals of refinancing—but its interest costs would change from year to year.4

过去十年，债券投资者面临着一个日益严峻的困境：是选择本金价值完全稳定，但利率波动且通常较低（短期）的债券？还是选择固定利息收入，但本金价值波动较大（通常似乎向下）的债券？对于大多数投资者来说，如果能够在这两个极端之间做出妥协，并确保他们的利息回报和本金价值在（例如）20年内都不会低于规定的最低水平，那将是件好事。这可以通过一种新形式的、合适的债券合同轻松实现。重要提示：实际上，美国政府在将原始储蓄债券合同与其更高利率的延期合同结合起来时也做了类似的事情。我们在此提出的建议将涵盖比储蓄债券更长的固定投资期限，并在利率条款中引入更大的灵活性。*

Over the past decade the bond investor has been confronted by an increasingly serious dilemma: Shall he choose complete stability of principal value, but with varying and usually low (short-term) interest rates? Or shall he choose a fixed-interest income, with considerable variations (usually downward, it seems) in his principal value? It would be good for most investors if they could compromise between these extremes, and be assured that neither their interest return nor their principal value will fall below a stated minimum over, say, a 20-year period. This could be arranged, without great difficulty, in an appropriate bond contract of a new form. Important note: In effect the U.S. government has done a similar thing in its combination of the original savings-bonds contracts with their extensions at higher interest rates. The suggestion we make here would cover a longer fixed investment period than the savings bonds, and would introduce more flexibility in the interest-rate provisions.*

不可转换优先股几乎不值一提，因为它们的特殊税收地位使得这些安全的股票更受企业（例如保险公司）而非个人的青睐。质量较差的优先股几乎总是在较大的范围内波动（按百分比计算），与普通股并无太大差别。关于它们，我们无法提供其他有用的评论。下表16-2列出了1968年12月至1970年12月期间低等级不可转换优先股价格变化的一些信息。平均跌幅为17%，而标准普尔普通股综合指数则为11.3%。

It is hardly worthwhile to talk about nonconvertible preferred stocks, since their special tax status makes the safe ones much more desirable holdings by corporations—e.g., insurance companies—than by individuals. The poorer-quality ones almost always fluctuate over a wide range, percentagewise, not too differently from common stocks. We can offer no other useful remark about them. Table 16-2 below gives some information on the price changes of lower-grade nonconvertible preferreds between December 1968 and December 1970. The average decline was 17%, against 11.3% for the S & P composite index of common stocks.

第 8 章评论

Commentary on Chapter 8

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

当所有人都走向堕落时，似乎没有人动，但如果有人停下来，他就会像一个定点一样，让其他还在奔跑的人看到。

When everyone is moving toward depravity, no one seems to be moving, but if someone stops he shows up the others who are rushing on, by acting as a fixed point.

—布莱斯·帕斯卡¹

—Blaise Pascal¹

真正的投资者几乎不会被迫出售股票，在其他时候，他可以自由地忽略当前的股价。他只需关注股价，并根据其交易策略采取行动，无需过多考虑。因此，如果投资者因为持有的股票出现不合理的市场下跌而感到恐慌或过度担忧，那么他的基本优势就会被扭曲地转化为基本劣势。如果他的股票根本没有市场报价，那么这个人的境况会更好，因为他可以免受他人判断失误带来的精神痛苦。

The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at all other times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more. Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons’ mistakes of judgment.

在上一版中，我写道，第 8 章中的这些话“可能是格雷厄姆整本书中最重要的段落”。

In the previous edition, I wrote that those words in Chapter 8 “may well be the single most important paragraph in Graham’s entire book.”

我错了：这些话可能是有史以来关于投资的最重要的一段话。

I was wrong: Those words may well be the single most important paragraph about investing ever written.

见见市场先生

Meet Mr. Market

在本章中，格雷厄姆引入了“市场先生”这个绝妙的比喻。假设你拥有一家私人企业，比如一家餐馆、一家自行车店，瑜伽馆、服装店或计算机软件咨询公司。市场先生是你企业中一个虚拟的合伙人。他每天都会敲你的门，告诉你他认为这家企业的价值。

In this chapter, Graham introduces the brilliant metaphor of Mr. Market. Let’s say you own a private business, perhaps a restaurant, a bike shop, a yoga studio, a clothing store, or a computer-software consulting firm. Mr. Market is an imaginary partner in your business. Every day he knocks on your door and tells you what he thinks the business is worth.

市场先生的情绪不稳定，他对价值的估值不仅取决于他的感受，也取决于你的企业经营状况。他通常会给出一个听起来差不多的数字。但有时，市场先生会欣喜若狂，给出一个高得离谱的估值。有时，市场先生会感到沮丧，给出一个低得离谱的数字。

Mr. Market’s moods are unstable, and his estimates of value are determined as much by how he is feeling as by how your business is doing. He normally names a number that sounds about right. But some days Mr. Market is euphoric and puts a value on the business that’s ridiculously high. Other days, Mr. Market is miserable and names a number that’s absurdly low.

在市场先生敲门之前，你永远不知道他会是什么感受。他的情绪波动越大，他就越会用他那些古怪的价格向你施压，迫使你跟他交易。

Before he knocks on your door, you never know how Mr. Market will be feeling. The more extreme his mood swings, the more intensely he will pressure you to trade with him at the wacky prices he comes up with.

你应该让自己的心情，或者你对公司价值的评估，被这个人左右吗？他想卖的时候，你应该买吗？他想买的时候，你应该卖给他吗？

Should you let either your own mood, or your appraisal of what the business is worth, be determined by this guy? Should you buy from him when he wants to sell? Should you sell to him when he wants to buy?

当然，“市场先生”不仅仅是一个比喻。他就是股市：一头由数百万个头脑组成的集体野兽，通常理智，但有时轻浮，有时阴沉。如果你让自己成为他情感上的俘虏，你就不可能成为一个明智的投资者——无论是防御性的还是进取性的。

Mr. Market, of course, is more than a metaphor. He is the stock market: a collective beast made up of millions of minds, usually sensible, but sometimes giddy and sometimes grim. You cannot be an intelligent investor—either defensive or enterprising—if you let yourself become his emotional hostage.

个人与机构

Individuals versus Institutions

在这句话中...

In this sentence . . .

因此，如果投资者因为持有的股票在市场上不合理地下跌而感到恐慌或过度担忧，那么他的基本优势就会被扭曲地转化为基本劣势。

Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage.

...格雷厄姆所说的投资者的“基本优势”是什么意思？

. . . what does Graham mean by the investor’s “basic advantage”?

他的意思是，听从“市场先生”的指引是一种选择，而非义务。你不必因为他想要你这么做而跟着他交易，也不必让他的观点成为你的。

He means that listening to Mr. Market is an option, not an obligation. You don’t have to trade with him because he wants you to, and you don’t have to let his outlook become yours.

为什么这是你的基本优势？

Why is that your basic advantage?

专业投资者的目标并不是最大化他们所管理的投资组合的回报，而是最大化他们所管理的投资组合的费用。

Professional investors aren’t in the business of maximizing the returns on the portfolios they manage. They are in the business of maximizing the fees on the portfolios they manage.

你是委托人；投资经理只是你的代理人。代理人的动机和偏好与你不同。

You are a principal; an investment manager is only your agent. An agent has different incentives and preferences than you do.

表 8-1：机构与个人

TABLE 8-1: Institutions vs. Individuals

机构必须...

Institutions must . . .

你可以。。。

You can . . .

. . . 回答客户、监管机构、媒体

. . . answer to clients, regulators, the media

……除了你自己，不要对任何人负责

. . . answer to no one but yourself

. . . 每年、每季度、每月、每周、每天衡量市场表现

. . . measure performance against the market annually, quarterly, monthly, weekly, daily

. . . 根据长期个人目标衡量绩效并忽略短期市场波动

. . . measure performance against long-term personal goals and ignore short-term market fluctuations

...避免采用与市场差异较大、造成“声誉风险”或危及管理费的策略

. . . shun strategies that diverge widely from the market, create “reputational risk,” or jeopardize management fees

……想怎么标新立异就怎么标新立异

. . . be as unconventional as you wish

. . . 大量买卖

. . . buy and sell in vast quantities

. . .小额买卖

. . . buy and sell in small amounts

. . . 支付高额交易成本

. . . pay high trading costs

. . . 交易成本接近于零

. . . incur close to zero trading cost

……通过出售巨额亏损的股票来逃避批评

. . . dodge criticism by selling stocks on which they incur big losses

……在遭受巨大损失后坚持下去，期待最终复苏

. . . hold on after big losses in expectation of eventual recovery

……通常卖出一只小股票，然后变大

. . . typically sell a small stock that gets big

……无论股票变得多大，都持有之前的小型股票

. . . hold a formerly small stock no matter how big it becomes

……尽量少带现金

. . . keep as little cash as possible

. . . 保留尽可能多的现金

. . . keep as much cash you wish

……收取管理费，减少净回报

. . . charge management fees, reducing net return

. . . 完全避免管理费

. . . avoid management fees entirely

……通常不考虑税收后果进行交易

. . . generally trade with no regard for tax consequences

. . . 机会性交易以尽量减少纳税义务

. . . trade opportunistically to minimize tax liability

……在市场高点买入更多，在市场低点卖出更多

. . . buy more at market highs and sell more at market lows

. . . 只在您希望时买入或卖出

. . . buy or sell only when you wish

几十年前，机构投资者比个人投资者更具优势。他们可以以更低的成本进行交易，更容易实现多元化投资。他们可以获得与公司经理接触的特权，并挖掘个人投资者无法触及的原创研究成果。

Decades ago, institutions had the edge over individuals. They could trade at lower cost and diversify more easily. They could obtain privileged access to companies’ managers and unearth original research beyond the reach of individual investors.

那些日子已经一去不复返了。

Those days are gone.

由于机构投资者管理着庞大的投资组合，他们通常需要买入价值数百万美元的典型股票，才能建立起足够大的仓位，对业绩产生有意义的贡献。他们的买入会推高他们想要持有的股票的价格，直到他们买入完成。相反，当他们卖出时，会压低股价，直到他们能够退出。

Because institutions run giant portfolios, they often need to buy millions of dollars’ worth of the typical stock to build a position big enough to make a meaningful contribution to performance. Their purchases drive up the price of the stock they want to own before they can finish buying it. Conversely, when they sell, they drive down the price before they can get out.

个人几乎可以买卖任何股票，而不会对股价造成任何影响。他们可以通过一只全股票市场指数基金，以极低的成本实现完全的多元化投资。监管改革早已消除了赋予机构信息优势的选择性披露^。2

Individuals can buy and sell nearly any stock without affecting the price at all. They can diversify completely, at extremely low cost, with a total stock-market index fund. Regulatory reforms long ago eliminated the selective disclosures that gave institutions an informational edge.²

由于客户在市场火爆时会向投资组合经理投入更多资金，而在回报不佳时则会撤回资金，因此专业人士被迫在股价上涨时买入，在股价下跌时卖出。而你则可以自由地做相反的事情。

Because clients give more money to portfolio managers when markets are hot and withdraw it when returns are poor, the professionals are compelled to buy stocks as they get more expensive and sell as they get cheaper. You are free to do the opposite.

小公司在成长为大公司的过程中，回报最为丰厚。许多投资组合经理被迫过早抛售，因为小型股票基金不应该持有大型股票。3^你可以无限期地持有。

Small companies generate their best returns as they grow into big companies. Many portfolio managers are forced to sell too soon, because small-stock funds aren’t supposed to own large stocks.³ You can hang on indefinitely.

大型基金经常抛售那些遭受巨额亏损的股票，以免客户指责他们犯了错误。你可以持有那些预计会反弹的亏损股票。机构投资者通常不会买入近期遭受重创的股票；但你可以。

Big funds regularly dump stocks on which they incurred big losses, lest their clients blame them for blundering. You can hang on to losers you expect will recover. Institutions also tend not to buy stocks that have suffered severe recent losses; you can.

短期内，一家忽视“市场先生”的投资公司几乎肯定会产生与平均水平相差甚远的回报——这会吓跑客户提取资金，从而降低公司的管理费。

In the short term, an investment firm that ignores Mr. Market is all but certain to generate returns that deviate widely from average—which will spook clients into withdrawing money, reducing the firm’s management fees.

经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯 (John Maynard Keynes) 在 1936 年写道，从长远来看，要想获得优异表现，投资组合经理“在一般人看来应该是古怪的、不落俗套的、鲁莽的”。然而，凯恩斯补充道：

In the long term, to have any chance of outperforming, a portfolio manager “should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of average opinion,” the economist John Maynard Keynes wrote in 1936. However, Keynes added:

如果他成功了，那只会证实人们普遍认为他鲁莽行事；而如果他短期内失败——这很有可能——他也不会得到太多宽恕。世故的智慧教导（基金经理们），与其以非常规的方式取得成功，不如以常规的方式失败，以免名誉受损^。4

If he is successful, that will only confirm the general belief in his rashness; and if in the short run he is unsuccessful, which is very likely, he will not receive much mercy. Worldly wisdom teaches [fund managers] that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.⁴

图 8-1中的简单矩阵显示了客户如何将投资组合经理的决策与市场的其他部分进行比较。

This simple matrix in Figure 8-1 shows how clients compare a portfolio manager’s decisions to the rest of the market.

一位跟随大众选择好股或坏股的经理（见右栏）不太可能受到批评或解雇。但是如果一位经理独自挑选出一只好股票（左上），客户会认为他要么很幸运，要么很古怪，而如果一位经理挑选的股票不符合常规，导致他亏损（左下），客户就会认为这位经理很危险。

A manager who follows the herd in picking either a good or bad stock (see the right column) isn’t likely to be criticized or fired. But clients will view a manager who stands alone in picking a good stock (upper left) as either lucky or eccentric, while if an unorthodox stock pick loses money (lower left) they will regard the manager as dangerous.

图 8-1：错误且孤独

FIGURE 8-1: Wrong and Alone

资料来源：改编自 Windham Capital Management 的 Mark Kritzman。

Source: Adapted from Mark Kritzman, Windham Capital Management.

专业投资者绝不会甘于“孤注一掷”，因为客户可能会抛弃他们。所以他们会随波逐流——这样一来，客户获得超额收益的可能性就会被最小化，而他们自己的佣金收入却会最大化。然而，你不必屈服于这种压力^。5

Professional investors never want to be in the bottom left corner, “wrong and alone,” where clients might desert them. So they go along with the crowd—thereby minimizing the chance that their clients can ever outperform, but maximizing the odds that their own fees won’t be impaired. You, however, don’t have to cave to that kind of pressure.⁵

随着市场波动加剧，交易波动性加大，个人的基本优势愈发凸显。没有人会因为你买了一只不受欢迎的股票而被解雇。你可以自由地在最不起眼的公司中寻找价值，并在最黑暗的时刻找到希望。在短期世界中进行长期投资的能力是一种超能力^。6

As markets move faster and trading becomes more volatile, the basic advantage of individuals looms even larger. No one can fire you for buying an unpopular stock. You are free to seek value in the most obscure companies and to find hope in the darkest hour. Your ability to invest for the long term in a short-term world is a superpower.⁶

你可以胜过专业人士，因为你没有他们那些规模、短视、僵化、墨守成规和高成本的劣势。然而，要想打败专业人士，你不能玩他们的游戏。你必须玩你自己的游戏。你必须让市场先生安分守己，只在符合你利益而不是他的利益时进行交易。

You can outperform the professionals, because you don’t have their handicaps of size, myopia, rigidity, conformity, and high cost. To beat the professionals, however, you can’t play their game. You must play your own game. You must put Mr. Market in his place by trading only when it is in your interest, not his.

市场先生如何扰乱你的思维

How Mr. Market Messes with Your Mind

听从“市场先生”的指引会抹杀你的个性。一旦你开始随波逐流，你的思想就不再完全属于你自己。

Listening to Mr. Market will obliterate your individuality. Once you begin to conform with the crowd, your mind is no longer entirely your own.

如果你在荒岛上投资，你只会关心你决策的概率和后果。但你并非身处荒岛，所以你可能也会关心其他人的决策，以及他们对你的决策的看法，以及他们对你的看法。

If you were investing on a desert island, you would care only about the probabilities and consequences of your decisions. But you aren’t on a desert island, so you probably also care about other people’s decisions, what they think about your decisions, and what they think about you.

如何将你的基本优势转化为劣势

How to Turn Your Basic Advantage into a Disadvantage

伟大的投资家查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）曾担任伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司副董事长，直至2023年去世，他喜欢用“颠倒”的方式来解决问题。要想成功，先想想失败的代价是什么。

The great investor Charlie Munger, vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway until his death in 2023, liked to solve problems by “inverting” them. To figure out how you can succeed, think about what it would take to fail.

如果廉价交易的选择让您觉得您有义务像专业人士一样频繁地进行交易，那么您最终会浪费您的资金并增加您的税单。
If the option of cheap trading makes you feel you have an obligation to trade as often as professionals do, you’ll end up sandpapering your money away and jacking up your tax bill.
如果低成本多元化的选择产生了不加区分地进行多元化的义务感，你最终将拥有一个三倍杠杆基金，该基金使用人工智能来挑选位于西撒哈拉东南部的具有社会责任感的锂业初创企业^。1
If the option of diversifying cheaply creates the sense of obligation to diversify indiscriminately, you’ll end up owning a triple-leveraged fund that uses artificial intelligence to pick socially responsible lithium start-ups based in southeastern Western Sahara.¹
如果您将忽视市场先生的选择变成了随心所欲采取行动的义务，那么您最终会满足自己的自负并忘记做出结构化决策的重要性。
If you let the option of being able to ignore Mr. Market turn into an obligation to act on every whim, you’ll end up feeding your own ego and forgetting the importance of making structured decisions.

诺贝尔经济学奖得主詹姆斯·托宾曾写道，捐赠基金（例如大学或慈善基金会）的受托人是“守护未来、抵御当下索取的人”。他们的任务是“维护代际公平” ^。2

The Nobel Prize–winning economist James Tobin once wrote that the trustees of an endowment, such as a university or charitable foundation, are “the guardians of the future against the claims of the present.” Their task is “to preserve equity among generations.”²

同样，你们是守护未来、抵御当下诉求的守护者。你们也必须维护代际公平。

Likewise, you are the guardian of your future against the claims of the present. You, too, must preserve equity among generations.

为了履行这些责任，你必须区分选择和义务。否则，你的基本优势就会变成致命的劣势。

To meet those responsibilities, you must distinguish between options and obligations. Otherwise, you turn your basic advantages into crippling disadvantages.

¹有关杠杆基金，请参阅第 9 章的评论。

¹ For leveraged funds, see the Commentary on Chapter 9.

² James Tobin，“什么是永久性捐赠收入？”bit.ly/3OnubR3。

² James Tobin, “What Is Permanent Endowment Income?,” bit.ly/3OnubR3.

融入大众会让人感觉更安全，尤其是在你还是新手、面临陌生挑战或承担高风险的时候。在决策更艰难的时候，你可能会更倾向于遵循共识，因为能够转移重大失误的责任会让你感觉更好。

Being part of the crowd feels safer, especially if you’re a novice, facing unfamiliar challenges, or taking on high risks. You may tend to defer to the consensus even more when decisions are harder, because being able to deflect blame over big mistakes feels even better.

当你和其他人同时关注同一件事时，你会记得更牢，情绪会更加强烈，判断也会更加极端，行动也会更有动力。试想一下，独自在家观看延迟的体育赛事，与在体育场现场观看，甚至只是用手机观看直播，两者之间的区别^。7

When you pay attention to the same thing at the same time as other people, you will remember it better, feel intensified emotions, make more extreme judgments, and be more motivated to act. Think of the difference between watching a sporting event by yourself on a delayed video feed at home and attending it live in a stadium—or even just watching it live on your phone.⁷

互联网和社交媒体创造了无边界的社群，成千上万甚至数百万人可以共同关注同一个话题或事件。当每个人都能同时获取信息时，每个人都能立即看到和听到所有人都在关注同一件事。在这种共同关注的状态下，你能感受到他人的思想与你的思想交汇。你的经验是集体的。你的自信因知道你并不孤单而高涨。你成为了我们。

The internet and social media create borderless communities in which thousands, even millions, can focus together on the same topic or event. When everyone has simultaneous mutual access to information, each can immediately see and hear that all are paying attention to the same thing at the same time. In this state of shared attention, you can feel other people’s minds converging with your own. Your experience is collective. Your confidence surges from knowing you’re not alone in what you believe. You become we.

人类进化出以氏族或小群体形式合作的能力；无数人，无论分散多远，都能凝聚成一个集体思维，这在人类历史上是前所未有的。我们个体的大脑尚未学会如何应对这种局面。

Humans evolved to cooperate in clans or small groups; the ability for countless people, no matter how widely dispersed, to coalesce into one collective mind is unprecedented in human history. Our individual brains haven’t learned how to cope with it yet.

技术已经把市场先生变成了一个怪物。

Technology has turned Mr. Market into a monster.

2020 年和 2021 年，人们蜂拥购买 AMC Entertainment 和 GameStop 等模因股票，这体现了这种现象的陷阱。

The individuals who flocked to buy such meme stocks as AMC Entertainment and GameStop in 2020 and 2021 exemplify the pitfalls of this phenomenon.

在线论坛 WallStreetBets 截至 2020 年 12 月拥有 180 万订阅用户。一个月后，其订阅用户数量达到 840 万。2021 年 1 月 26 日，也就是埃隆·马斯克发布“GameStop！！”推文的当天，WallStreetBets 订阅用户发表了惊人的 352,597 条评论，其中大部分是关于 GameStop 的。1 月 28 日，WallStreetBets 的页面浏览量超过 2.71 亿次，成为当天全球访问量第三大的网站，仅次于谷歌和YouTube。从1月21日的收盘价到1月28日的高点，GameStop的股价上涨了超过1020% ^。8

WallStreetBets, the online forum, ended December 2020 with 1.8 million subscribers. A month later it had 8.4 million. On January 26, 2021—the day Elon Musk tweeted “Gamestonk!!”—WallStreetBets subscribers posted an astounding 352,597 comments, mostly about GameStop. On January 28, WallStreetBets generated more than 271 million page views, making it the third-most-visited website in the world that day, behind only Google and YouTube. From its closing price on January 21 to its high on January 28, GameStop stock rose more than 1,020%.⁸

少数人在最高价卖出并赚了钱。

A few people, who sold at the top, made money.

大多数人坚持持有，希望继续上涨。2月份，该股暴跌69%，他们蒙受了巨额损失。

Most hung on, hoping for more. They incurred massive losses as the stock went into a kamikaze dive in February, losing 69%.

由于共同的关注强化了他们的记忆、情感和动力，许多人仍然记得股票价格的每一次波动，仍然对损失感到愤怒，相信被推翻的阴谋论，并且拒绝出售，即使他们的持股在他们眼前缩水。

With shared attention intensifying their memory, emotions, and motivation, many still remember every twitch in the prices of their stocks, remain outraged over their losses, believe discredited conspiracy theories, and refuse to sell even though their holdings have shriveled before their eyes.

市场先生如何扰乱你的心

How Mr. Market Messes with Your Heart

股市的情绪波动会严重影响你的情绪。心理学家已经证明，情绪不仅塑造我们的感知，也塑造我们的行为——它会形成无意识的偏见，即使我们从未意识到，这些偏见也会左右我们的行为。即使是一丝微弱的情绪波动，也可能扭曲你的决定：

The emotional mood swings of the stock market can wreak havoc on your feelings. Psychologists have shown that emotions shape both our perceptions and our actions—creating unconscious biases that can govern our behavior even if we’re never aware of it. Even a faint whiff of emotion can skew your decisions:

愤怒会激发紧迫感、自信心和掌控感。愤怒的人更依赖快速判断。他们也认为好事更有可能发生在自己身上，而坏事则不太可能发生在别人身上。愤怒的人，尤其是男性，会承担更大的风险^。9

Anger fires up urgency, confidence, and the sensation of being in control. Angry people rely more on snap judgments. They also think good things are more likely—and bad things less likely—to happen to them than to others. Angry people, especially men, take greater risks.⁹

焦虑会让你对潜在回报的规模比获得回报的概率更加敏感。当你焦虑的时候，那些胜算不大的赌注看起来会更好——尤其是在你一直在亏钱的时候^。10

Anxiety makes you more sensitive to the magnitude of a possible reward than to the probability of receiving it. Long-shot bets look better when you’re anxious—especially if you’ve been losing money.¹⁰

孤独会让你不愿去寻找那些可能与你既有信念相悖的信息。它还会加剧你的焦虑，削弱你的推理能力，缩短你的注意力持续时间。“幽居病”会削弱你的自控力，让你变得更加冲动^。11

Loneliness can make you less likely to seek out information that could contradict what you already believe. It also can increase your anxiety, impair your reasoning, and shred your attention span. “Cabin fever” can undermine your self-control and make you more impulsive.¹¹

悲伤会让人们更倾向于早点获得较小的回报，而不是晚点获得较大的回报。它还会提高你购买不属于自己的东西的意愿。悲伤会让冒险的赌注更有吸引力，让延迟满足变得更加困难。悲伤是耐心的情感毒药^。12

Sadness makes people prefer smaller rewards sooner over larger rewards later. It also can raise the price you’re willing to pay to buy something you don’t own. Feeling sad makes riskier bets more attractive and deferring gratification more difficult. Sadness is emotional poison for patience.¹²

压力会损害工作记忆，使人难以专注于长期目标；它会导致固执己见，即人们无论得到何种反馈，都会重复同样失败的行为。在压力之下，你可能会妄下结论，而忽略解决问题的新方法。压力还会促使人们更加冒险^。13

Stress impairs working memory and makes focusing on long-term goals difficult; it can lead to perseveration, in which people follow the same failing behaviors regardless of feedback. Under stress, you might jump to conclusions and neglect novel solutions to problems. Stress can also trigger increased risk-taking.¹³

难怪在新冠疫情期间，当数亿人感到愤怒、焦虑、孤独、悲伤和压力时，数千万人开始冲动地交易股票？

Is it any wonder that, during the Covid pandemic, when hundreds of millions of people felt angry, anxious, lonely, sad, and stressed, tens of millions started impetuously trading stocks?

回应市场先生

Talking Back to Mr. Market

今天股市暴跌超过30%。

Today the stock market crashed more than 30%.

你的手机里充斥着各种新闻提醒，电子股票行情显示器不停地闪烁着深红色，总统敦促公众保持冷静，电视评论员们尖叫着，每个人都应该抛售所有股票，亲朋好友也给你发短信，让你趁现在还能抛售股票的时候赶紧抛售。无论你是否意识到，你的心跳加速，肌肉紧绷，手心冒汗。

Your phone is flaring with news alerts, electronic stock tickers are an endless crawl of crimson, the president is urging the public to remain calm, television pundits are shrieking that everyone should sell everything, friends and family are texting you to dump your stocks while you still can. Whether you realize it or not, your heart is racing, your muscles are tense, your palms are sweating.

市场先生满脸通红地敲你的门，大喊你昨天在股票上投入的每一美元今天都价值不到 70 美分。

Mr. Market is red in the face as he bangs on your door, yelling that every dollar you had in stocks yesterday is worth less than 70 cents today.

你怎么回答他？

How do you answer him?

您可以选择出售，但有义务三思而后行。

You have the option to sell, but the obligation to think before you act.

走进一个安静的房间，想象一下有人刚刚遭受了这些损失，正在向你寻求建议。这应该会促使你思考以下问题：

Go to a quiet room and imagine that somebody else had just suffered these losses and is asking you for advice. That should prompt you to reflect on questions like these:

除了股价以外，您所拥有的企业还有哪些具体方面发生了变化？
Other than stock prices, which specific aspects of the businesses you own have changed?
如果您出售，会产生多少税款？
How large a tax bill would you incur if you sell?
如果这只股票或基金是一份礼物而不是购买的，那么现在它的价格已经下跌了，你会把它退还给送礼的人吗？
If this stock or fund were a gift rather than a purchase, would you return it to the person who gave it to you now that it’s fallen in price?
这只股票或基金以前跌过这么多吗？如果跌过，如果你当时卖掉，或者买入更多，你的收益会更好吗？
Has this stock or fund ever gone down this much before? If so, would you have done better if you had sold out—or if you had bought more?
如果您非常喜欢这项资产并愿意以更高的价格购买它，那么现在价格下跌了，您难道不应该更喜欢它吗？
If you liked this asset well enough to buy it at a higher price, shouldn’t you like it more now that the price has fallen?

这些问题需要一些研究才能解答——这理所当然。这样，你就能避免“市场先生”对价格变动的过度反应影响你对潜在价值的看法。他可能是对的，也可能是错的。只有通过比较价格和价值，你才能判断。

Such questions will take some research to answer—which is as it should be. This way, you stop Mr. Market’s overreaction to a change in price from contaminating your view of underlying value. He might be right; he might be wrong. Only by comparing price against value will you be able to tell.

无论是单只股票、一个行业还是整个市场崩盘，你都可以使用同样的方法。每当价格上涨幅度和速度超出你的预期时，你也可以反过来思考这个问题。

You can use the same approach whether a single stock, an industry, or the entire market collapses. You can also invert the questions whenever prices go up farther and faster than you expected.

迟早，“市场先生”都会出轨。

Sooner or later, Mr. Market will go off the rails.

做好准备，这样你才能保持正轨。

Be prepared, so you can stay on track.

第九章

Chapter 9 投资基金

Investing in Investment Funds

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

防御型投资者可以选择的一种方式是将资金投入投资公司股票。持有人可按净资产价值按需赎回的股票通常被称为“共同基金”（或“开放式基金”）。这些基金大多通过销售人员积极出售增发的股票。持有不可赎回股票的股票被称为“封闭式”公司或基金；其股票数量保持相对稳定。所有重要的基金均在美国证券交易委员会（SEC）注册，并受其监管和控制。

One course open to the defensive investor is to put his money into investment-company shares. Those that are redeemable on demand by the holder, at net asset value, are commonly known as “mutual funds” (or “open-end funds”). Most of these are actively selling additional shares through a corps of salesmen. Those with nonredeemable shares are called “closed-end” companies or funds; the number of their shares remains relatively constant. All of the funds of any importance are registered with the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), and are subject to its regulations and controls.

这个行业规模非常庞大。截至1970年底，美国证券交易委员会（SEC）注册的基金共有383只，资产总额达546亿美元。其中，356家公司为共同基金，资产总额达506亿美元；27家公司为封闭式基金，资产总额达40亿美元。

The industry is a very large one. At the end of 1970 there were 383 funds registered with the SEC, having assets totaling $54.6 billions. Of these 356 companies, with $50.6 billions, were mutual funds, and 27 companies with $4.0 billions, were closed-end.*

基金的分类方法多种多样。一种是根据其投资组合的大致构成；如果基金持有的债券占比很大（通常约为三分之一），则属于“平衡基金”；如果基金持有的几乎全部是普通股，则属于“股票基金”。（此外，还有一些其他类型的基金，例如“债券基金”、“对冲基金”、“字母股票基金”等）^*另一种是根据其目标，例如它们的主要目标是收益、价格稳定或资本增值（“增长”）。另一个区别在于它们的销售方式。“收费基金”会在收费前的价值上加上销售费用（通常为最低购买额的资产价值的 9% 左右）。1^其他被称为“无收费”基金的基金则不收取此类费用；管理层对处理资本的通常投资顾问费用感到满意。由于无力支付销售人员的佣金，无收费基金的规模往往偏低。*封闭式基金的买卖价格不由公司固定，而是像普通公司股票一样在公开市场上波动。

There are different ways of classifying the funds. One is by the broad division of their portfolio; they are “balanced funds” if they have a significant (generally about one-third) component of bonds, or “stock-funds” if their holdings are nearly all common stocks. (There are some other varieties here, such as “bond funds,” “hedge funds,” “letter-stock funds,” etc.)^* Another is by their objectives, as their primary aim is for income, price stability, or capital appreciation (“growth”). Another distinction is by their method of sale. “Load funds” add a selling charge (generally about 9% of asset value on minimum purchases) to the value before charge.¹ Others, known as “no-load” funds, make no such charge; the managements are content with the usual investment-counsel fees for handling the capital. Since they cannot pay salesmen’s commissions, the size of the no-load funds tends to be on the low side.* The buying and selling prices of the closed-end funds are not fixed by the companies, but fluctuate in the open market as does the ordinary corporate stock.

大多数公司都依据所得税法的特殊规定运营，旨在避免股东的收益被双重征税。实际上，这些基金必须支付几乎所有的普通收入——即股息和利息收入减去支出。此外，它们还可以以“资本利得股息”的形式支付出售投资所实现的长期利润——股东将这些利润视为自己的证券收益。（这里还有另一种选择，为了避免混乱，我们省略了。）^*几乎所有基金都只有一类未偿还的证券。1967年引入的一项新规定将资本化分为优先股（获得所有普通收入）和资本股（或普通股），优先股将获得所有证券销售利润。（这些被称为“双重用途基金”。）^*

Most of the companies operate under special provisions of the income-tax law, designed to relieve the shareholders from double taxation on their earnings. In effect, the funds must pay out virtually all their ordinary income—i.e., dividends and interest received, less expenses. In addition they can pay out their realized long-term profits on sales of investments—in the form of “capital-gains dividends”—which are treated by the shareholder as if they were his own security profits. (There is another option here, which we omit to avoid clutter.)^* Nearly all the funds have but one class of security outstanding. A new wrinkle, introduced in 1967, divides the capitalization into a preferred issue, which will receive all the ordinary income, and a capital issue, or common stock, which will receive all the profits on security sales. (These are called “dual-purpose funds.”)^*

许多声称其主要目标是获取资本收益的公司专注于购买所谓的“成长股”，而且它们的名称中经常带有“成长”一词。一些专注于化学制品、航空、海外投资等指定领域；这通常在他们的头衔中表明。

Many of the companies that state their primary aim is for capital gains concentrate on the purchase of the so-called “growth stocks,” and they often have the word “growth” in their name. Some specialize in a designated area such as chemicals, aviation, overseas investments; this is usually indicated in their titles.

因此，想要明智地投资基金份额的投资者面临着众多且略显眼的选择——与直接投资的选择并无太大区别。本章将探讨一些主要问题，即：

The investor who wants to make an intelligent commitment in fund shares has thus a large and somewhat bewildering variety of choices before him—not too different from those offered in direct investment. In this chapter we shall deal with some major questions, viz:

1. 投资者能否通过选择合适的基金来确保自己获得优于平均水平的收益？（子问题：那么“业绩基金”呢？）*

1. Is there any way by which the investor can assure himself of better than average results by choosing the right funds? (Subquestion: What about the “performance funds”?)*

2. 如果不是，他如何避免选择那些业绩低于平均水平的基金？

2. If not, how can he avoid choosing funds that will give him worse than average results?

3. 他能否在不同类型的基金之间做出明智的选择——例如，平衡型基金与全股票型基金、开放式基金与封闭式基金、收费基金与无收费基金？

3. Can he make intelligent choices between different types of funds—e.g., balanced versus all-stock, open-end versus closed-end, load versus no-load?

投资基金整体表现

Investment-Fund Performance as a Whole

在尝试回答这些问题之前，我们应该先谈谈基金行业的整体表现。它是否为股东带来了良好的回报？总体而言，基金投资者的收益与直接投资的投资者相比如何？我们确信，总体而言，这些基金发挥了有益的作用。它们促进了良好的储蓄和投资习惯；它们保护了无数个人避免在股市中犯下代价高昂的错误；它们为参与者带来了与普通股整体收益相当的收入和利润。相比之下，我们大胆猜测，过去十年中，那些将资金全部投入投资基金的普通投资者的收益要好于那些直接购买普通股的普通投资者。

Before trying to answer these questions we should say something about the performance of the fund industry as a whole. Has it done a good job for its shareholders? In the most general way, how have fund investors fared as against those who made their investments directly? We are quite certain that the funds in the aggregate have served a useful purpose. They have promoted good habits of savings and investment; they have protected countless individuals against costly mistakes in the stock market; they have brought their participants income and profits commensurate with the overall returns from common stocks. On a comparative basis we would hazard the guess that the average individual who put his money exclusively in investment-fund shares in the past ten years has fared better than the average person who made his common-stock purchases directly.

最后一点可能是正确的，尽管实际这些基金的业绩似乎并不比普通股整体表现更好，尽管投资共同基金的成本可能高于直接购买。普通个人的真正选择并非构建和获得一个均衡的普通股投资组合，还是通过购买基金来做同样的事情（成本略高）。更有可能的是，他的选择是，要么屈服于上门推销共同基金的花招，要么屈服于更加狡猾、更加危险的二流和三流新产品兜售者。我们不禁想到，那些怀着保守的普通股投资想法开设经纪账户的普通个人很可能会发现自己受到不利影响，最终走向投机和投机亏损；而对于共同基金买家来说，这些诱惑应该小得多。

The last point is probably true even though the actual performance of the funds seems to have been no better than that of common stocks as a whole, and even though the cost of investing in mutual funds may have been greater than that of direct purchases. The real choice of the average individual has not been between constructing and acquiring a well-balanced common-stock portfolio or doing the same thing, a bit more expensively, by buying into the funds. More likely his choice has been between succumbing to the wiles of the doorbell-ringing mutual-fund salesman on the one hand, as against succumbing to the even wilier and much more dangerous peddlers of second- and third-rate new offerings. We cannot help thinking, too, that the average individual who opens a brokerage account with the idea of making conservative common-stock investments is likely to find himself beset by untoward influences in the direction of speculation and speculative losses; these temptations should be much less for the mutual-fund buyer.

但是，这些投资基金相对于整体市场的表现如何呢？这是一个颇具争议的话题，但我们将尽量以简单但恰当的方式进行阐述。表9-1列出了我们1970年底十大股票基金在1961年至1970年间的一些计算结果，但我们只选取了每个管理集团中规模最大的一只。表9-1总结了这些基金在1961年至1965年、1966年至1970年以及1969年和1970年的整体回报。我们还给出了基于这十只基金中每只基金份额总和的平均回报。截至1969年底，这些公司的总资产超过150亿美元，约占所有普通股基金的三分之一。因此，它们应该能够代表整个行业。（理论上，该榜单应该偏向于表现优于行业表现的公司，因为这些表现较好的公司理应比其他公司享有更快的扩张速度；但实际情况可能并非如此。）

But how have the investment funds performed as against the general market? This is a somewhat controversial subject, but we shall try to deal with it in simple but adequate fashion. Table 9-1 gives some calculated results for 1961–1970 of our ten largest stock funds at the end of 1970, but choosing only the largest one from each management group. It summarizes the overall return of each of these funds for 1961–1965, 1966–1970, and for the single years 1969 and 1970. We also give average results based on the sum of one share of each of the ten funds. These companies had combined assets of over $15 billion at the end of 1969, or about one-third of all the common-stock funds. Thus they should be fairly representative of the industry as a whole. (In theory, there should be a bias in this list on the side of better than industry performance, since these better companies should have been entitled to more rapid expansion than the others; but this may not be the case in practice.)

从该表中可以得出一些有趣的事实。首先，我们发现这十只基金在1961年至1970年间的总体业绩与标准普尔500种股票综合平均指数（或标准普尔425种工业股票平均指数）并无显著差异，但它们肯定比道琼斯工业平均指数要好。（这就引出了一个耐人寻味的问题：为什么道琼斯工业平均指数中的30只巨头的表现比标准普尔使用的更多、显然更杂乱的名单更差。）*第二点是，与之前五年相比，这些基金相对于标准普尔指数的总体表现在过去五年中有所改善。这些基金的收益在1961年至1965年间略低于标准普尔指数，在1966年至1970年间略高于标准普尔指数。第三点是，各个基金的业绩之间存在很大差异。

Some interesting facts can be gathered from this table. First, we find that the overall results of these ten funds for 1961–1970 were not appreciably different from those of the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock composite average (or the S & P 425-industrial stock average). But they were definitely better than those of the DJIA. (This raises the intriguing question as to why the 30 giants in the DJIA did worse than the much more numerous and apparently rather miscellaneous list used by Standard & Poor’s.)* A second point is that the funds’ aggregate performance as against the S & P index has improved somewhat in the last five years, compared with the preceding five. The funds’ gain ran a little lower than S & P’s in 1961–1965 and a little higher than S & P’s in 1966–1970. The third point is that a wide difference exists between the results of the individual funds.

表9-1 十大共同基金的管理^业绩

TABLE 9-1 Management Results of Ten Large Mutual Funds^a

^a这些是1970年底净资产最大的股票基金，但每个管理集团只使用一只基金。数据由Wiesenberger Financial Services提供。

^a These are the stock funds with the largest net assets at the end of 1970, but using only one fund from each management group. Data supplied by Wiesenberger Financial Services.

我们认为，共同基金行业的表现不如整个市场，这本身就不应该受到批评。它们的经理及其专业竞争对手管理着如此庞大的流通普通股份额，以至于整个市场的变化必然（大致）影响到它们旗下基金的总额。（请注意，截至1969年底，受保商业银行的信托资产中包含1810亿美元的普通股；如果我们再加上投资顾问账户中的普通股，再加上560亿美元的共同基金和类似基金，我们必然会得出这样的结论：这些专业人士的综合决策几乎决定了股票平均价格的走势，而股票平均价格的走势又几乎决定了基金的总体业绩。）

We do not think the mutual-fund industry can be criticized for doing no better than the market as a whole. Their managers and their professional competitors administer so large a portion of all marketable common stocks that what happens to the market as a whole must necessarily happen (approximately) to the sum of their funds. (Note that the trust assets of insured commercial banks included $181 billion of common stocks at the end of 1969; if we add to this the common stocks in accounts handled by investment advisers, plus the $56 billion of mutual and similar funds, we must conclude that the combined decisions of these professionals pretty well determine the movements of the stock averages, and that the movement of the stock averages pretty well determines the funds’ aggregate results.)

是否存在优于平均水平的基金？投资者能否选择这些基金，从而为自己获得更佳的回报？显然，并非所有投资者都能做到这一点，因为那样的话，我们很快就会回到原点，没有人比其他人表现更好。让我们先以简化的方式考虑这个问题。为什么投资者不找出哪只基金在过去足够长的时间内表现最佳，并由此假设其管理能力最强，因此未来的业绩将优于平均水平，然后将资金投入该基金呢？这个想法似乎更可行，因为在共同基金中，他可以获得这种“最有能力的管理”，而无需支付相对于其他基金的特殊溢价。（相比之下，在非投资公司中管理最好的公司相对于其当前收益和资产而言以相应较高的价格出售。）

Are there better than average funds and can the investor select these so as to obtain superior results for himself? Obviously all investors could not do this, since in that case we would soon be back where we started, with no one doing better than anyone else. Let us consider the question first in a simplified fashion. Why shouldn’t the investor find out what fund has made the best showing of the lot over a period of sufficient years in the past, assume from this that its management is the most capable and will therefore do better than average in the future, and put his money in that fund? This idea appears the more practicable because, in the case of the mutual funds, he could obtain this “most capable management” without paying any special premium for it as against the other funds. (By contrast, among noninvestment corporations the best-managed companies sell at correspondingly high prices in relation to their current earnings and assets.)

多年来，关于这一点的证据一直存在争议。但我们涵盖十大基金的表9-1表明，1961年至1965年表现最佳的五只基金的业绩总体上延续到了1966年至1970年，尽管其中两只基金的表现不如其他五只基金中的两只。我们的研究表明，共同基金份额的投资者可以适当地考虑过去一段时间（比如至少五年）的比较业绩，前提是这些数据并不代表整个市场的大幅净上涨。在后一种情况下，投资者可能会以非传统的方式获得惊人的收益——正如我们将在下一节关于“业绩”基金的论述中所示。这些结果本身可能仅仅表明基金经理承担了过度的投机风险，并且暂时没有受到惩罚。

The evidence on this point has been conflicting over the years. But our Table 9-1 covering the ten largest funds indicates that the results shown by the top five performers of 1961–1965 carried over on the whole through 1966–1970, even though two of this set did not do as well as two of the other five. Our studies indicate that the investor in mutual-fund shares may properly consider comparative performance over a period of years in the past, say at least five, provided the data do not represent a large net upward movement of the market as a whole. In the latter case spectacularly favorable results may be achieved in unorthodox ways—as will be demonstrated in our following section on “performance” funds. Such results in themselves may indicate only that the fund managers are taking undue speculative risks, and getting away with same for the time being.

“绩效”基金

“Performance” Funds

近年来，投资基金（甚至许多信托基金）管理中出现了一种“业绩崇拜”。本节开头必须声明，这并非指大多数成熟的基金，而是指业内一小部分备受瞩目的基金。故事很简单。一些负责人着手取得远超平均水平（或道琼斯工业平均指数）的业绩。他们一度成功，获得了大量关注，并获得了额外的资金管理。这个目标合情合理；但不幸的是，在投资规模真正庞大的基金时，实现这一目标似乎需要承担巨大的风险。而这些风险在相对较短的时间内就得到了应有的回报。

One of the new phenomena of recent years was the appearance of the cult of “performance” in the management of investment funds (and even of many trust funds). We must start this section with the important disclaimer that it does not apply to the large majority of well-established funds, but only to a relatively small section of the industry which has attracted a disproportionate amount of attention. The story is simple enough. Some of those in charge set out to get much better than average (or DJIA) results. They succeeded in doing this for a while, garnering considerable publicity and additional funds to manage. The aim was legitimate enough; unfortunately, it appears that, in the context of investing really sizable funds, the aim cannot be accomplished without incurring sizable risks. And in a comparatively short time the risks came home to roost.

围绕着“表演”现象的若干情况，令我们这些经历远至 20 世纪 20 年代的人不祥地摇头，正因如此，我们的观点被认为过时，与这个（第二个）“新时代”无关。首先，也正是在这一点上，几乎所有这些才华横溢的表演者都是年轻人——他们的三四十年代的投资者——他们的直接金融经验仅限于1948年至1968年几乎持续不断的牛市。其次，他们常常把“稳健投资”的定义当成是未来几个月市场可能大幅上涨的股票。这导致他们以与其资产或记录收益完全不成比例的价格对新企业进行巨额投资。他们之所以“合理”，只能是因为他们对这些企业未来业绩抱有天真的希望，同时又精明地利用了无知且贪婪的公众的投机热情。

Several of the circumstances surrounding the “performance” phenomenon caused ominous headshaking by those of us whose experience went far back—even to the 1920s—and whose views, for that very reason, were considered old-fashioned and irrelevant to this (second) “New Era.” In the first place, and on this very point, nearly all these brilliant performers were young men—in their thirties and forties—whose direct financial experience was limited to the all but continuous bull market of 1948–1968. Secondly, they often acted as if the definition of a “sound investment” was a stock that was likely to have a good rise in the market in the next few months. This led to large commitments in newer ventures at prices completely disproportionate to their assets or recorded earnings. They could be “justified” only by a combination of naïve hope in the future accomplishments of these enterprises with an apparent shrewdness in exploiting the speculative enthusiasms of the uninformed and greedy public.

本节不会提及人名。但是我们有充分的理由举出具体的公司例子。最受公众关注的“业绩基金”无疑是 1965 年底成立的曼哈顿基金公司。它首次发行了 2700 万股，发行价为每股 9.25 至 10 美元。该公司最初拥有 2.47 亿美元的资本。当然，它的重点是资本收益。它的大部分基金投资于以当前收益的高乘数出售的债券，不支付股息（或支付很少的股息），有大量投机者跟进，价格波动剧烈。1967 年，该基金的总收益率为 38.6%，而标准普尔综合指数仅为 11%。但此后，其表现就不尽如人意了，如表 9-2所示。

This section will not mention people’s names. But we have every reason to give concrete examples of companies. The “performance fund” most in the public’s eye was undoubtedly Manhattan Fund, Inc., organized at the end of 1965. Its first offering was of 27 million shares at $9.25 to $10 per share. The company started out with $247 million of capital. Its emphasis was, of course, on capital gains. Most of its funds were invested in issues selling at high multipliers of current earnings, paying no dividends (or very small ones), with a large speculative following and spectacular price movements. The fund showed an overall gain of 38.6% in 1967, against 11% for the S & P composite index. But thereafter its performance left much to be desired, as is shown in Table 9-2.

1969年底，曼哈顿基金的投资组合至少可以说是非同寻常的。令人匪夷所思的是，其最大的两笔投资中的公司在六个月内就申请破产，而第三笔投资则在1971年面临债权人的诉讼。另一个令人匪夷所思的事实是，这些注定破产的公司中至少有一家的股票不仅被投资基金购买，还被大学捐赠基金、大型银行机构的信托部门等机构购买。*第三个令人匪夷所思的事实是，曼哈顿基金的创始经理将其在一家独立管理公司的股份以超过2000万美元的价格卖给了另一家大型企业；而当时，这家被出售的管理公司的资产不足100万美元。这无疑是“经理”与“被管理人”业绩之间有史以来最大的差距之一。

The portfolio of Manhattan Fund at the end of 1969 was unorthodox to say the least. It is an extraordinary fact that two of its largest investments were in companies that filed for bankruptcy within six months thereafter, and a third faced creditors’ actions in 1971. It is another extraordinary fact that shares of at least one of these doomed companies were bought not only by investment funds but by university endowment funds, the trust departments of large banking institutions, and the like.* A third extraordinary fact was that the founder-manager of Manhattan Fund sold his stock in a separately organized management company to another large concern for over $20 million in its stock; at that time the management company sold had less than $1 million in assets. This is undoubtedly one of the greatest disparities of all times between the results for the “manager” and the “managees.”

表 9-2 业绩基金投资组合和业绩

TABLE 9-2 A Performance-Fund Portfolio and Performance

（曼哈顿基金较大持股，1969 年 12 月 31 日）

(Larger Holdings of Manhattan Fund, December 31, 1969)

^a 2 比 1 拆分后。

^a After 2-for-1 split.

^b还有价值 110 万美元的附属股票。

^b Also $1.1 million of affiliated stocks.

^c不包括现金等价物。

^c Excluding cash equivalents.

年度表现与标准普尔综合指数比较

Annual Performance Compared with S & P Composite Index

1969年底出版的一本书^[2]介绍了十九位“在管理他人数十亿美元资金的苛刻游戏中名列前茅”的男士。书中的摘要进一步写道：“他们年轻……有些人年薪超过一百万美元……他们是新一代的金融人才……他们对市场有着十足的迷恋……并且拥有发现赢家的非凡本领。”通过研究他们所管理基金的已公布业绩，我们可以很好地了解这群顶尖人士的成就。《资金经理》一书中描述的十九位人士中，有十二位管理的基金都公布了这样的业绩。他们一如既往地在1966年表现良好，在1967年更是辉煌。1968年，他们的总体表现仍然良好，但个别基金的表现参差不齐。1969年，他们全部亏损，只有一位基金的业绩略好于标准普尔综合指数。 1970 年他们的相对表现甚至比 1969 年还要差。

A book published at the end of 1969² provided profiles of nineteen men “who are tops at the demanding game of managing billions of dollars of other people’s money.” The summary told us further that “they are young . . . some earn more than a million dollars a year . . . they are a new financial breed . . . they all have a total fascination with the market . . . and a spectacular knack for coming up with winners.” A fairly good idea of the accomplishments of this top group can be obtained by examining the published results of the funds they manage. Such results are available for funds directed by twelve of the nineteen persons described in The Money Managers. Typically enough, they showed up well in 1966, and brilliantly in 1967. In 1968 their performance was still good in the aggregate, but mixed as to individual funds. In 1969 they all showed losses, with only one managing to do a bit better than the S & P composite index. In 1970 their comparative performance was even worse than in 1969.

我们呈现这幅图景是为了阐明一个道理，或许用一句古老的法国谚语来表达最为贴切：越变越好。 自古以来，聪明、精力充沛的人——通常都很年轻——就承诺用“别人的钱”创造奇迹。他们通常能够暂时成功——或者至少表面上看起来成功了——但最终却不可避免地给公众带来了损失。*大约半个世纪前，“奇迹”往往伴随着明目张胆的操纵、误导性的公司报告、令人发指的资本结构以及其他半欺诈性的金融行为。所有这些都促使美国证券交易委员会（SEC）建立了一套复杂的金融控制系统，也促使公众对普通股采取了谨慎的态度。1965年至1969年，新“资金经理”的运作方式比1926年至1929年的那些骗局晚了整整一代人。* 1929年金融危机后被禁止的特定违规行为如今已不再被采用——它们可能面临牢狱之灾。但在华尔街的许多角落，这些行为被更新的花招和噱头所取代，最终也产生了非常相似的效果。直接操纵价格的做法消失了，但还有许多其他方法可以吸引轻信的公众关注“热门”股票的盈利潜力。“字母股票” ³可以以远低于市场报价的价格购买，但其销售受到未披露的限制；它们可以立即以其全部市场价值在报告中披露，从而显示出诱人的、虚幻的利润。等等。令人惊奇的是，在完全不同的监管和禁令氛围中，华尔街竟然能够重复20世纪20年代的诸多过度行为和错误。

We have presented this picture in order to point a moral, which perhaps can best be expressed by the old French proverb: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. Bright, energetic people—usually quite young—have promised to perform miracles with “other people’s money” since time immemorial. They have usually been able to do it for a while—or at least to appear to have done it—and they have inevitably brought losses to their public in the end.* About a half century ago the “miracles” were often accompanied by flagrant manipulation, misleading corporate reporting, outrageous capitalization structures, and other semifraudulent financial practices. All this brought on an elaborate system of financial controls by the SEC, as well as a cautious attitude toward common stocks on the part of the general public. The operations of the new “money managers” in 1965–1969 came a little more than one full generation after the shenanigans of 1926–1929.* The specific malpractices banned after the 1929 crash were no longer resorted to—they involved the risk of jail sentences. But in many corners of Wall Street they were replaced by newer gadgets and gimmicks that produced very similar results in the end. Outright manipulation of prices disappeared, but there were many other methods of drawing the gullible public’s attention to the profit possibilities in “hot” issues. Blocks of “letter stock”³ could be bought well below the quoted market price, subject to undisclosed restrictions on their sale; they could immediately be carried in the reports at their full market value, showing a lovely and illusory profit. And so on. It is amazing how, in a completely different atmosphere of regulation and prohibitions, Wall Street was able to duplicate so much of the excesses and errors of the 1920s.

毫无疑问，新的监管和禁令将会出台。20世纪60年代末的具体弊端将在华尔街得到相当程度的禁止。但指望投机冲动会消失，或者指望对这种冲动的利用会被根除，或许有些奢望。了解这些“非同寻常的大众妄想” ⁴并尽可能远离它们是明智投资者的必备素质之一。

No doubt there will be new regulations and new prohibitions. The specific abuses of the late 1960s will be fairly adequately banned from Wall Street. But it is probably too much to expect that the urge to speculate will ever disappear, or that the exploitation of that urge can ever be abolished. It is part of the armament of the intelligent investor to know about these “Extraordinary Popular Delusions,”⁴ and to keep as far away from them as possible.

如果我们从1967年辉煌的业绩来看，大多数业绩基金的状况都很糟糕。但考虑到1967年的数据，它们的整体表现并不算糟糕。基于此，其中一位“资金经理”的运营者的表现远好于标准普尔综合指数，三位明显逊色，还有六位表现差不多。让我们以另一组业绩基金——1967年表现最佳的十支基金——为例，单年涨幅从84%到301%不等。其中，如果算上1967年的涨幅，有四只基金的四年整体表现优于标准普尔指数；还有两只基金在1968年至1970年间跑赢了该指数。这些基金规模都不大，平均规模约为6000万美元。因此，有充分的证据表明，较小的规模是持续取得优异业绩的必要因素。

The picture of most of the performance funds is a poor one if we start after their spectacular record in 1967. With the 1967 figures included, their overall showing is not at all disastrous. On that basis one of “The Money Managers” operators did quite a bit better than the S & P composite index, three did distinctly worse, and six did about the same. Let us take as a check another group of performance funds—the ten that made the best showing in 1967, with gains ranging from 84% up to 301% in that single year. Of these, four gave a better overall four-year performance than the S & P index, if the 1967 gains are included; and two excelled the index in 1968–1970. None of these funds was large, and the average size was about $60 million. Thus, there is a strong indication that smaller size is a necessary factor for obtaining continued outstanding results.

上述论述隐含着一个结论：投资基金经理追求卓越业绩可能存在特殊风险。迄今为止的所有金融经验表明，管理完善的大型基金，其长期业绩充其量也只能略高于平均水平。如果管理不善，它们可能会在一段时间内产生惊人的、但很大程度上是虚幻的利润，随后不可避免地会遭受灾难性的损失。有些基金的业绩持续优于市场平均水平，甚至长达十年或更长时间。但这些只是少数例外，因为它们的大部分业务都集中在专业领域，对所使用的资本有自我限制——而且不会主动向公众出售。*

The foregoing account contains the implicit conclusion that there may be special risks involved in looking for superior performance by investment-fund managers. All financial experience up to now indicates that large funds, soundly managed, can produce at best only slightly better than average results over the years. If they are unsoundly managed they can produce spectacular, but largely illusory, profits for a while, followed inevitably by calamitous losses. There have been instances of funds that have consistently outperformed the market averages for, say, ten years or more. But these have been scarce exceptions, having most of their operations in specialized fields, with self-imposed limits on the capital employed—and not actively sold to the public.*

封闭式基金与开放式基金

Closed-End versus Open-End Funds

几乎所有共同基金或开放式基金，都赋予持有人按每日投资组合估值套现的权利，并设有相应的新股出售机制。通过这种方式，大多数共同基金的规模多年来不断扩大。封闭式公司几乎都是很久以前成立的，拥有固定的资本结构，因此其相对价值已经下降。成千上万精力充沛、善于说服的销售人员正在销售开放式公司；而封闭式股票则无人特别感兴趣。因此，大多数“共同基金”可以出售给以高于净资产价值约9%的固定溢价（用于支付销售人员佣金等）向公众发售，而大多数封闭式股票的发行价一直低于其资产价值。不同公司之间的价格折扣各不相同，整个集团的平均折扣也在不同时期有所不同。表9-3列出了1961年至1970年期间关于这一点的数据。

Almost all the mutual funds or open-end funds, which offer their holders the right to cash in their shares at each day’s valuation of the portfolio, have a corresponding machinery for selling new shares. By this means most of them have grown in size over the years. The closed-end companies, nearly all of which were organized a long time ago, have a fixed capital structure, and thus have diminished in relative dollar importance. Open-end companies are being sold by many thousands of energetic and persuasive salesmen; the closed-end shares have no one especially interested in distributing them. Consequently it has been possible to sell most “mutual funds” to the public at a fixed premium of about 9% above net asset value (to cover salesmen’s commissions, etc.), while the majority of close-end shares have been consistently obtainable at less than their asset value. This price discount has varied among individual companies, and the average discount for the group as a whole has also varied from one date to another. Figures on this point for 1961–1970 are given in Table 9-3.

表9-3 封闭式基金、共同基金和标准普尔综合指数的部分数据

TABLE 9-3 Certain Data on Closed-End Funds, Mutual Funds, and S & P Composite Index

^{这是Wiesenberger}对十家多元化公司进行的平均值。

^a Wiesenberger average of ten diversified companies.

^b每年对普通股基金进行五次 Wiesenberger 平均值的平均值。

^b Average of five Wiesenberger averages of common-stock funds each year.

^c在所有情况下，分布都会被添加回来。

^c In all cases distributions are added back.

^d高级。

^d Premium.

无需多加思索，就能猜想，封闭式股票相对于开放式股票的较低相对价格与两组股票总体投资结果的差异几乎没有关系。这一点可以从以下数据中看出：表 9-3列出了 1961 年至 1970 年两组年度结果的比较。

It does not take much shrewdness to suspect that the lower relative price for closed-end as against open-end shares has very little to do with the difference in the overall investment results between the two groups. That this is true is indicated by the comparison of the annual results for 1961–1970 of the two groups included in Table 9-3.

这样，我们得出了投资者选择的几条显而易见的规则之一。如果你想投资基金，不妨以低于资产价值10%到15%的价格购买一组封闭式股票，而不是以高于资产价值约9%的价格购买开放式公司的股票。假设这两组股票未来的股息和资产价值变动继续大致相同，那么你从封闭式股票中获得的收益将比现在多出约五分之一。*

Thus we arrive at one of the few clearly evident rules for investors’ choices. If you want to put money in investment funds, buy a group of closed-end shares at a discount of, say, 10% to 15% from asset value, instead of paying a premium of about 9% above asset value for shares of an open-end company. Assuming that the future dividends and changes in asset values continue to be about the same for the two groups, you will thus obtain about one-fifth more for your money from the closed-end shares.*

共同基金销售员会迅速反驳道：“啊，但如果你持有封闭式股票，你永远无法确定能以什么价格卖出。折价可能比现在更大，价差扩大会让你吃亏。持有我们的股票，你有权以资产价值的100%卖出，绝不会低于这个价格。” 让我们稍微分析一下这个论点；这将是一次很好的逻辑和常识练习。问题：假设封闭式股票的折价确实扩大，那么与购买同等价值的开放式股票相比，持有这些股票的收益会更差的可能性有多大？

The mutual-fund salesman will be quick to counter with the argument: “Ah, but if you own closed-end shares you can never be sure what price you can sell them for. The discount can be greater than it is today, and you will suffer from the wider spread. With our shares you are guaranteed the right to turn in your shares at 100% of asset value, never less.” Let us examine this argument a bit; it will be a good exercise in logic and plain common sense. Question: Assuming that the discount on closed-end shares does widen, how likely is it that you will be worse off with those shares than with an otherwise equivalent purchase of open-end shares?

这需要一点算术。假设投资者 A 以资产价值的 109% 买入一些开放式股票，投资者 B 以资产价值的 85% 买入封闭式股票，外加 1.5% 的佣金。这两组股票在比如四年内都赚取并支付该资产价值的 30%，最终价值与开始时相同。投资者 A 以价值的 100% 赎回其股票，损失了他支付的 9% 的溢价。他这段时间的总回报率为 30% 减去 9%，即资产价值的 21%。这也就是他投资的 19%。投资者 B 必须将他的封闭式股票变现多少才能获得与投资者 A 相同的投资回报？答案是 73%，即资产价值的折价 27%。换句话说，封闭式投资者的回报要降到开放式投资者的水平之前，市场折价可能扩大 12 个点（大约两倍）。封闭式股票历史上，如此规模的不利变化罕见，甚至从未发生过。因此，如果以折扣价买入一只（具有代表性的）封闭式公司股票，其投资业绩与一只具有代表性的共同基金大致相当，那么你从中获取更低的整体回报的可能性极小。如果用一只通常收取“8.5%”佣金的基金替代一只收取小额佣金（或无佣金）的基金，封闭式投资的优势当然会降低，但优势依然存在。

This calls for a little arithmetic. Assume that Investor A buys some open-end shares at 109% of asset value, and Investor B buys closed-end shares at 85% thereof, plus 1½% commission. Both sets of shares earn and pay 30% of this asset value in, say, four years, and end up with the same value as at the beginning. Investor A redeems his shares at 100% of value, losing the 9% premium he paid. His overall return for the period is 30% less 9%, or 21% on asset value. This, in turn, is 19% on his investment. How much must Investor B realize on his closed-end shares to obtain the same return on his investment as Investor A? The answer is 73%, or a discount of 27% from asset value. In other words, the closed-end man could suffer a widening of 12 points in the market discount (about double) before his return would get down to that of the open-end investor. An adverse change of this magnitude has happened rarely, if ever, in the history of closed-end shares. Hence it is very unlikely that you will obtain a lower overall return from a (representative) closed-end company, bought at a discount, if its investment performance is about equal to that of a representative mutual fund. If a small-load (or no-load) fund is substituted for one with the usual “8½%” load, the advantage of the closed-end investment is of course reduced, but it remains an advantage.

^{表 9-4 1961-1970年}多元化封闭式基金的平均业绩

TABLE 9-4 Average Results of Diversified Closed-End Funds, 1961–1970^a

^a数据来自 Wiesenberger Financial Services。

^a Data from Wiesenberger Financial Services.

少数封闭式基金的溢价高于大多数共同基金9%的实际收费，这一事实给投资者带来了另一个问题。这些溢价公司是否拥有优秀的管理，其价值是否足以证明其高昂的价格是合理的？如果从过去五年或十年的比较结果中寻找答案，答案似乎是否定的。六家溢价公司中有三家主要在国外投资。这些公司一个显著的特点是价格在几年内变化很大；1970年底，一家的售价仅为其最高价的四分之一，另一家的售价为三分之一，还有一家的售价不到其最高价的一半。如果我们考虑三家以高于资产价值的价格出售的国内公司，我们会发现它们十年总回报率的平均值略高于十家折价基金，但在过去五年中情况正好相反。表9-5比较了我们历史最悠久、规模最大的两家封闭式公司雷曼公司和通用美国投资者公司在1961年至1970年间的业绩。其中一个的售价比 1970 年底的净资产价值高出 14%，而另一个的售价比其净资产价值低 7.6%。这些数字似乎并没有证明价格与净资产关系的差异。

The fact that a few closed-end funds are selling at premiums greater than the true 9% charge on most mutual funds introduces a separate question for the investor. Do these premium companies enjoy superior management of sufficient proven worth to warrant their elevated prices? If the answer is sought in the comparative results for the past five or ten years, the answer would appear to be no. Three of the six premium companies have mainly foreign investments. A striking feature of these is the large variation in prices in a few years’ time; at the end of 1970 one sold at only one-quarter of its high, another at a third, another at less than half. If we consider the three domestic companies selling above asset value, we find that the average of their ten-year overall returns was somewhat better than that of ten discount funds, but the opposite was true in the last five years. A comparison of the 1961–1970 record of Lehman Corp. and of General American Investors, two of our oldest and largest closed-end companies, is given in Table 9-5. One of these sold 14% above and the other 7.6% below its net-asset value at the end of 1970. The difference in price to net-asset relationships did not appear warranted by these figures.

表 9-5 两家领先的封闭式公司^比较

TABLE 9-5 Comparison of Two Leading Closed-End Companies^a

^a数据来自 Wiesenberger Financial Services。

^a Data from Wiesenberger Financial Services.

平衡基金投资

Investment in Balanced Funds

维森伯格报告涵盖的23只平衡基金，其资产配置比例在25%至59%之间，投资于优先股和债券，平均比例仅为40%。剩余部分则持有普通股。对于典型的投资者来说，直接进行债券类投资似乎比将其纳入共同基金投资更为合理。这些平衡基金在1970年的平均年收益率仅为资产价值的3.9%，或者说发行价的3.6%。对于债券部分，更佳的选择是购买美国储蓄债券、A级或更高评级的公司债券或免税债券，作为投资者的债券投资组合。

The 23 balanced funds covered in the Wiesenberger Report had between 25% and 59% of their assets in preferred stocks and bonds, the average being just 40%. The balance was held in common stocks. It would appear more logical for the typical investor to make his bond-type investments directly, rather than to have them form part of a mutual-fund commitment. The average income return shown by these balanced funds in 1970 was only 3.9% per annum on asset value, or say 3.6% on the offering price. The better choice for the bond component would be the purchase of United States savings bonds, or corporate bonds rated A or better, or tax-free bonds, for the investor’s bond portfolio.

第九章评论

Commentary on Chapter 9

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

基金经理们按照古老而经典的方式在自己和客户之间分配资金，也就是说，在一天交易结束时，他们会把所有资金抛向空中。所有粘在天花板上的钱都属于客户。

[Fund managers] allocate the funds between themselves and their clients in the ancient classic manner, i.e., at the close of the day’s business they take all the money and throw it up in the air. Everything that sticks to the ceiling belongs to the clients.

—Fred Schwed, Jr. ¹

—Fred Schwed, Jr.¹

几十年来，基金行业一直在欺骗投资大众。

For decades, the fund industry had the investing public fooled.

从 20 世纪 20 年代开始，基金经理们就伪装成奇迹创造者，能够将风险降至最低，找到赢家，避开输家，并将市场打得血肉模糊——这使得高额佣金和丰厚的年费看起来值得支付。

Beginning in the 1920s, fund managers masqueraded as miracle workers who could minimize risk, find winners and shun losers, and beat the market to a bloody pulp—making big commissions and fat annual fees seem worth paying.

直到2008-2009年全球金融危机之后，公众才终于醒悟过来。

Only after the global financial crisis of 2008–09 did the public finally wake up.

资金的无用性

The Futility of the Funds

年复一年，受过良好教育、训练有素的专业人士，凭借海量数据和强大的计算能力，试图挑选那些能够获得高于标准普尔500指数等市场平均水平回报的投资产品。然而，年复一年，这些主动管理型基金大多以失败告终。

Year after year, well-educated, highly trained professionals, armed with vast quantities of data and computing power, attempt to pick investments that will earn higher returns than a market average like the S&P 500 index. Year after year, most of these actively managed funds fail.

晨星公司（Morningstar）的数据显示，2022年，43%的主动管理型美国共同基金和ETF跑赢了各自的市场平均水平，低于前一年的47%。在投资大型美国股票的基金中，只有10.5%在截至2023年6月30日的整整10年中存活下来，并跑赢了基准。

In 2022, 43% of actively managed U.S. mutual funds and ETFs outperformed their respective market average, according to Morningstar, down from 47% the year before. Only 10.5% of funds investing in large U.S. stocks survived for the full 10 years ending June 30, 2023, and beat their benchmark.

在那些确实在某一年跑赢市场的共同基金中，几乎没有一个能够继续重复这样的表现：

Among those mutual funds that do beat the market one year, almost none go on to repeat:

表 9-1：高处不胜寒

TABLE 9-1: It’s Lonely at the Top

2020年12月美国股票基金排名前半部分（数量）

Top half of U.S. stock funds in December 2020 (number)

到 2021 年 12 月仍保持前半部分（百分比）

Remaining in top half by December 2021 (percentage)

到 2022 年 12 月仍保持前半部分（百分比）

Remaining in top half by December 2022 (percentage)

975

32.1%

7.2%

2020年12月美股基金表现前四分之一（数量）

Top quarter of U.S. stock funds in December 2020 (number)

到 2021 年 12 月仍保持第一季度地位（百分比）

Remaining in top quarter by December 2021 (percentage)

到 2022 年 12 月仍保持第一季度地位（百分比）

Remaining in top quarter by December 2022 (percentage)

488

4.1%

0.0%

来源：标准普尔道琼斯指数，bit.ly/3rPkBO8。

Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices, bit.ly/3rPkBO8.

三大障碍阻碍了基金经理及其投资者的发展。

Three main handicaps cripple fund managers—and their investors.

资产规模过大。随着基金规模的扩大，购买规模较小的股票变得越来越困难。一个拥有1亿美元资金的基金，可以把1%的资金投入任何股票；但这仅仅相当于100万美元。一个拥有100亿美元资金的基金，如果把1%的资金投入股票，就必须购买其中的1亿美元——对于大多数小公司来说，这笔资金实在是太大了。随着基金规模的扩大，交易成本也可能上升。投资者投入的资金越多，购买任何能够让所有新增资金发挥作用的东西的压力就越大。

Asset elephantiasis. As funds grow bigger, buying smaller stocks becomes harder. A fund with $100 million can put 1% in any stock; that’s only $1 million. A fund with $10 billion putting 1% in a stock has to buy $100 million of it—a prohibitively huge hunk of most small companies. Trading costs may also go up as a fund becomes a giant. And the more money investors add, the greater the pressure to buy something, anything, that can put all that new cash to work.

费用。根据投资公司协会 (Investment Company Institute) 的数据，截至 2022 年，美国股票基金的平均年费用为 1.15%。

Fees. In the U.S., the average stock fund charged 1.15% in annual expenses as of 2022, according to the Investment Company Institute.

交易成本。假设某基金的投资组合周转率为100%，这意味着基金经理持有该基金的典型股票一年。假设买卖股票的经纪费用为0.25%。那么该基金的投资者每年的交易成本为0.5%。

Trading costs. Imagine a fund has a portfolio turnover rate of 100%, meaning the managers hold its typical stock for one year. Let’s say it incurs 0.25% in brokerage costs to buy and to sell a stock. Trading would cost this fund’s investors 0.5% annually.

如果一只基金的费用为1.15%，经纪费用为0.5%，那么每年的拖累就是1.65%。如果市场一年上涨10%，那么该基金必须在扣除费用后获得11.65%的收益，才能追赶市场。扣除费用后的回报。这意味着该基金在扣除费用前必须表现好16.5%，才能避免扣除费用后表现不佳！²

If a fund charges 1.15% in expenses and racks up 0.5% in brokerage costs, that’s a 1.65% annual drag. If the market goes up 10% in a year, the fund must gain 11.65% before expenses just to match the market’s return after expenses. That means the fund must perform 16.5% better, before fees, to avoid underperforming after fees!²

对于基金经理来说，困难的不仅仅是跑赢大盘，甚至匹配大盘的表现也很困难。

It isn’t just beating the market that’s hard for fund managers. Even matching the market is hard.

当“平均”优于平均时

When “Average” Is Better than Average

格雷厄姆比大多数人早几十年就洞悉了这一切。早在1951年，他就提出，如果投资者能够投资于市场平均水平，他们的收益将会更高。格雷厄姆反复强调这一观点，直到1976年去世。同年，先锋集团的约翰·C·博格推出了指数共同基金^。3

Graham understood all this—decades before most other people. As early as 1951 he suggested that investors would be better off if they could invest in a market average. Graham emphasized the idea repeatedly until he died in 1976. That same year, John C. Bogle of Vanguard Group introduced the index mutual fund.³

指数基金几乎涵盖了所有市场基准的投资，例如标准普尔 500 指数、MSCI 全球指数或彭博美国综合债券指数。它们寻求的是与市场回报率（扣除费用前）持平，而非超越市场回报率。它们无需投入巨额资金进行研究，也无需支付高昂的交易成本，因为它们并非试图挑选最佳投资并规避最差投资——而只是买入并持有所有投资。

Index funds hold practically every investment in a market benchmark like the S&P 500, MSCI All-Country World Index, or Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index. They seek to match the market’s return (before fees), not to beat it. They don’t need to spend lavish sums on research or pay high trading costs, because they aren’t trying to pick the best investments and avoid the worst—but only to buy and hold them all.

自动地，赢家的收益会增加，输家的收益会减少，无需经理人进行分析或交易。指数基金的总成本每年可能低于0.05%，远低于寻求跑赢大盘的传统基金成本的十分之一。而且，由于交易频率低，指数基金很少产生高额税费。

Automatically, the winners will grow and the losers shrink, with no need for the manager to analyze or trade them. Total costs at an index fund can be below 0.05% per year—well under one-tenth the cost of traditional funds seeking to beat the market. And, because they trade so seldom, index funds rarely generate high tax bills.

通过满足于平均水平，你最终的收益会远高于平均水平。如果一个投资者在交易中获利，另一个投资者必然会损失相同的金额；在整个市场中，所有这些活动的净收益为零。这还不包括成本。扣除研究和交易的费用后，大多数试图战胜市场的投资者最终都被市场打败了。

By settling for average, you end up doing much better than average. If one investor gains on a trade, another must have lost by the same amount; across the entire market, all that activity nets out to zero. And that’s before costs. After the expenses of research and trading, most investors trying to beat the market get beaten by it.

相反，拥有指数基金，你将比市场更早成本——从而超越几乎所有试图超越它的业余爱好者和专业人士，尽管他们付出了高得多的费用。因此，通过“满足于平均水平”，你就能获得高于平均水平的结果^。4

Own an index fund instead, and you will match the market before costs—thereby surpassing almost all the amateurs and professionals trying to beat it, after they pay their much higher expenses. Thus, by “settling for average” you can secure above-average results.⁴

极具诱惑力的基金

Extremely Tempting Funds

您可以使用共同基金或交易所交易基金 (ETF)来构建您的投资组合。在美国，共同基金只能在交易日结束时以一个价格买卖，而 ETF 则可以随时交易。

You can index your portfolio with mutual funds or exchange-traded funds. Unlike mutual funds, which in the U.S. you can buy or sell only at one price at the end of the trading day, you can trade ETFs anytime.

ETF 非常便宜，费用低至 0.03%，或者说投资 10,000 美元每年仅需 3 美元。

ETFs are remarkably cheap, with expenses as low as 0.03%, or only $3 per year on a $10,000 investment.

指数共同基金的价格几乎可以一样便宜。但一支力求跑赢大盘、年均收费1.15%的传统共同基金，其成本却要高出近40倍。数十年的研究表明，决定基金成功与否的最重要因素是其收费是否低廉。

Index mutual funds can be almost as cheap. But a traditional mutual fund seeking to beat the market that charges an average of 1.15% annually is nearly 40 times more expensive. Decades of research show that the single most important determinant of a fund’s success is whether its fees are low.

ETF 的危险之处在于你可以整天交易它们，而且很多人都这样做。

The peril of ETFs is that you can trade them all day long, and many people do.

如果你以这种方式使用ETF，你的基本优势就会变成劣势。你为什么要把一个可以以接近零成本持有数十年的资产变成短期交易的玩具呢？

If you used ETFs this way, you would turn your basic advantage into a disadvantage. Why would you want to take an asset that you can hold at near-zero cost for decades and turn it into a short-term trading toy?

另一个潜在的问题是：你可以找到各种用途的 ETF，甚至一些难以想象的用途的 ETF。

Another potential problem: You can find an ETF for every conceivable purpose, and some inconceivable ones too.

2023 年，各类 ETF：

In 2023, various ETFs:

为韩国媒体公司提供曝光机会；
offered exposure to Korean media companies;
拥有镍矿股票；
owned nickel-mining stocks;
只购买美国国会民主党议员交易的股票；
bought only stocks traded by Democratic members of the U.S. Congress;
巴西股市每天每上涨1%，就下跌2%；
lost 2% for every 1% daily gain in Brazilian stocks;
根据市场情况，仅提供 25% 至 200% 的特斯拉公司股票敞口；
offered between 25% and 200% exposure to nothing but Tesla Inc. stock, depending on market conditions;
使用人工智能挑选农业公司；
used artificial intelligence to pick agriculture companies;

表 9-2：交易活跃的基金

TABLE 9-2: Exuberantly Traded Funds

注：数据来自2023年。100%的年换手率意味着持有期为12个月；200%的年换手率意味着持有期为6个月；2,400%的年换手率意味着持有期为2周。年化换手率假设交易日为252个。

Notes: Data from 2023. A 100% annual turnover rate implies a holding period of 12 months; 200% annual turnover translates to a six-month holding period; 2,400% annual turnover equates to a two-week holding period. Annualized rate assumes 252 trading days.

资料来源：Strategas Securities。

Source: Strategas Securities.

试图获得与财经电视评论员吉姆·克莱默 (Jim Cramer) 所获得的回报相反的回报；
sought to generate returns that are the opposite of those earned by financial-television pundit Jim Cramer;
捕捉夜间而非白天的股票表现；或者
captured the performance of stocks during the night but not during the day; or
用借来的钱来交易大麻股票。
used borrowed money to trade marijuana stocks.

据伦敦研究公司ETFGI称，截至2023年12月31日，美国拥有3383只ETF（及相关产品），资产总额达8.12万亿美元；世界其他地区拥有8486只ETF，资产总额达3.51万亿美元。

As December 31, 2023, the U.S. had 3,383 ETFs (and related products) with assets of $8.12 trillion, according to ETFGI, a research firm in London; the rest of the world had 8,486 ETFs with assets of $3.51 trillion.

许多ETF的定位狭窄，持有的证券种类有限，而非尽可能广泛。它们通常基于业绩记录较短的指数，这使得过往表现的参考价值比以往更不可靠。由于规模通常较小，它们收取的费用要高得多，而且倒闭的可能性也更大^。5

Many ETFs fill narrow niches, owning few holdings rather than the broadest possible swath of securities. They often are based on indexes with short track records, making past performance an even poorer guide than usual. Because they tend to be small, they charge much higher fees and are far more likely to go out of business.⁵

许多此类ETF是反向或杠杆型的。反向基金的收益与基准指数的收益相反——例如，在标的指数下跌1%的当天，反向基金却上涨1%。杠杆基金利用借入资金或其他技术来放大收益和损失。杠杆基金的每日收益可能是市场平均水平的两倍甚至三倍。从设计上讲，它也会使每日损失翻倍或三倍。如果你不了解自己在做什么，那么尝试这些基金就像在装满炸药的仓库里玩火柴一样。

Many such ETFs are inverse or leveraged. Inverse funds generate the opposite of a benchmark’s return—for example, gaining 1% on a day when the underlying index loses 1%. Leveraged funds use borrowed money or other techniques to amplify their gains—and losses. A leveraged fund might double or even triple the daily gain of a market average. It will, by design, also double or triple any daily loss. If you don’t know what you’re doing, experimenting with these funds is like playing with matches in a warehouse full of dynamite.

这些专门的 ETF 不但不能分散你的投资组合，反而会造成富达麦哲伦基金前经理彼得林奇所说的“更糟糕的情况”：它们会用一堆奇怪的高风险资产弄乱你的投资组合。

Instead of diversifying your portfolio, these specialized ETFs do what Peter Lynch, the former manager of Fidelity Magellan Fund, calls di-worse-ifying: They clutter your portfolio with risky clusters of weird assets.

您可以选择购买非同寻常的ETF，但您没有义务购买。

You have the option to buy eccentric ETFs. You do not have an obligation.

如何选择ETF

How to Pick an ETF

面对成千上万的 ETF，您该如何挑选一只最适合自己的呢？

With thousands of ETFs, how should you pick one that’s right for you?

FactSet Research Systems 全球基金分析主管 Elisabeth Kashner 提出了一个简单的助记符：

Elisabeth Kashner, head of global fund analytics at FactSet Research Systems, suggests a simple mnemonic:

效率，

Efficiency,

可交易性，以及

Tradability, and

合身。

Fit.

效率意味着较低的年度支出，最好是0.10%或更低。“你计划持有ETF的时间越长，这笔成本就越重要，”卡什纳说，因为支出是长期拖累业绩的因素。

Efficiency means low annual expenses, preferably 0.10% or less. “The longer you plan to hold the ETF, the more this cost matters,” says Kashner, because expenses are a perennial drag on performance.

可交易性衡量买卖ETF的成本。在美国，一只基金的每日交易量至少应为25万美元。买卖价差，即买家愿意支付的价格与卖家接受的价格之间的差额，应为0.05%或更低，理想情况下为0.01%。卡什纳表示：“你计划持有ETF的时间越长，这笔成本的影响就越小。”因为这是一次性成本，在最终出售基金之前无需再次支付。交易时，请仅使用限价单，该限价单规定了买入时你愿意支付的最高价格以及卖出时你能够接受的最低价格。

Tradability measures how much it costs to buy or sell an ETF. In the U.S., at least $250,000 of a fund’s shares should trade daily. The bid/ask spread, or the gap between what buyers are willing to pay and what sellers will accept, should be 0.05% or less—ideally, 0.01%. “The longer you plan to hold the ETF, the less this cost matters,” says Kashner, because it’s a one-time cost you won’t have to pay again until you ultimately sell the fund. Trade only with a limit order that specifies the highest price you’re willing to pay if you’re buying and the lowest you’ll accept if you’re selling.

适配是多元化的另一种说法：你希望你的基金能够紧密地覆盖尽可能广泛的资产组合。全市场ETF是理想的选择。卡什纳说：“一只覆盖你的祖国，另一只覆盖世界其他地区”会对你很有帮助。

Fit is another word for diversification: You want your fund to wrap itself snugly around the broadest possible bundle of assets. Total market ETFs are ideal. “One covering your home country and another covering the rest of the world” will serve you well, says Kashner.

ETF 追踪的指数越窄，你应该投资的资金就越少。（如果一只窄幅 ETF 的资金有一丁点儿价值，那就应该放在你的“零花钱”账户里^。6）

The narrower the index the ETF tracks, the less money you should invest in it. (If a smidgen of a narrow ETF belongs anywhere, it belongs in your “mad money” account.⁶)

传统指数共同基金的运作效果与 ETF 一样好，前提是它们的费用一样低。

Traditional index mutual funds work as well as ETFs, assuming their fees are as low.

主动管理型共同基金或 ETF 可能是有意义的，但前提是——其费用也很低，它持有股票多年，并且其投资组合与市场截然不同。

An actively managed mutual fund or ETF might make sense if—but only if—its fees are also low, it holds stocks for years on end, and its portfolio is drastically different from the market.

极其道貌岸然的噱头？

Extremely Sanctimonious Gimmicks?

华尔街最新的热潮是ESG基金，它旨在让企业和世界环境更清洁、社会更公平、治理更完善。营销人员表示，ESG基金能让你既做好事，又能获得成功。拥有一只ESG基金会让你感到自己站在天使的一边，充满正义感，而且一些研究表明，ESG 基金的表现与传统投资组合一样好。

The latest craze on Wall Street is ESG funds, which purport to make businesses and the world [E]nvironmentally cleaner, [S]ocially fairer, and [G]overned better. They enable you to do good and do well at the same time, marketers say. Owning an ESG fund will give you that righteous glow from feeling you’re on the side of the angels, and some studies suggest ESG funds have performed about as well as conventional portfolios.

不幸的是，你也许会做好事，也许不会，但你会付出更多来感觉良好。

Unfortunately, you might or might not do good, but you will pay more to feel good.

正如詹姆斯·麦金托什在《华尔街日报》一系列精彩专栏中所指出的，ESG基金言过其实，兑现不足。污染企业和其他不良企业公民已经将其股票出售给公众，因此拒绝购买其股票对他们没有直接影响。如果每家“好”公司都剥离其“不良”资产，那么矿山、油井和工厂最终将落入那些不在乎公众舆论的运营商手中，造成比以往任何时候都更大的危害。ESG的火爆人气推动了该运动的许多宠儿（例如电动汽车制造商特斯拉）的股价飙升至如此高位，以至于未来的回报率必然会更低。

As James Mackintosh showed in a brilliant series of columns in The Wall Street Journal, ESG funds overpromise and underdeliver. Polluters and other bad corporate citizens have already sold their shares to the public, so refusing to buy their stock has no direct effect on them. If every “good” company divests its “bad” assets, then mines, oil wells, and factories will end up in the hands of operators that don’t care about public opinion, producing more harm than ever. And the intense popularity of ESG helped drive the stock prices of many of the movement’s darlings, like electric-vehicle manufacturer Tesla, to such unearthly heights that future returns are bound to be lower.

更重要的是，许多ESG基金甚至不假装持有“好”公司；它们持有的是最不糟糕的公司。由于投资者对ESG公司的需求远远超过供应，筛选公司的公司最终会宣传“污染行业中最环保的公司”。

What’s more, many ESG funds don’t even pretend to own “good” companies; they own the least bad. With the demand from investors far exceeding the supply of ESG companies, the firms that screen companies end up promoting “the greenest within a dirty industry.”

2021年，MSCI全球污染预防指数和众多ESG基金的一大持仓是一家公司，该公司因涉嫌排放恶臭导致附近居民患上偏头痛而被新泽西州起诉。其他ESG基金竞相投资一家在海底开采稀有金属的公司，尽管环保人士认为这种行为令人憎恶^。7

In 2021, a big holding in MSCI’s Global Pollution Prevention Index and many ESG funds was a company that had been sued by the state of New Jersey for allegedly releasing such putrid odors that nearby residents suffered migraines. Other ESG funds raced to invest in a company mining the ocean floor for rare metals, even though environmentalists consider that an abomination.⁷

最后，许多ESG基金与市场上的其他基金几乎没有什么区别。一组经济学家在2022年发现，ESG基金68%的持仓与传统基金完全重合。这意味着，即使只有三分之一的投资是定制的，你也要为100%的投资支付高额费用。这相当于支付三倍的费用——经济学家估计每年的费用为0.63%。

Finally, many ESG funds barely differ from the rest of the market. A team of economists found in 2022 that 68% of the holdings of ESG funds overlap perfectly with those of conventional funds. That means you pay high fees on 100% of your investment, even though only a third of it is customized. That’s like paying a triple fee—estimated by the economists at 0.63% annually.

总体而言，ESG基金或许对让世界变得更美好贡献不大。然而，或许你并不指望一只基金能让世界变得更好；你只是不想把自己的钱投到你认为正在让世界变得更糟的公司。

Overall, ESG funds probably don’t do much to make the world a better place. Maybe, however, you don’t expect a fund to make the world better; you just don’t want any of your money in companies you feel are making the world worse.

在这种情况下，你购买基金并非因为它物有所值，而是因为它能让你感觉自己是在践行自己的价值观。这很合理——只要你避免高额费用，确认基金不持有你不看好的公司，并且能够接受可能更低的回报即可。你也应该意识到，如果你想让世界变得更美好，你必须自己采取行动。共同基金和ETF只是投资组合，并非能够治愈地球疾病的灵丹妙药。

In that case, you’re buying the fund not because it’s a good value but because it enables you to feel you’re acting on your good values. Fair enough—so long as you avoid high fees, confirm that the fund doesn’t own any companies you disapprove of, and can live with returns that might be lower. You should also realize that if you want to make the world a better place, you’ll have to take action yourself. Mutual funds and ETFs are baskets of investments; they aren’t magical healers that can cure what ails the planet.

当投资赚钱而投资者却不赚钱时

When Investments Make Money and Investors Don’t

假设一只基金年初每股价格为10美元，年末也同样为10美元。年内波动较大，但没有派发股息。这意味着年回报率为0%。

Imagine a fund that starts the year at $10 a share. It also finishes the year at $10. It fluctuated during the year, but didn’t pay a dividend. That’s an annual return of 0%.

所有投资者的回报率都是 0% 吗？

Did all its investors have a 0% return?

当然不是。有些人在基金交易价格低于10美元时买入，而其他人则支付了10美元以上。还有一些人在年底前卖出——有些人获利，有些人亏损。

Of course not. Some bought the fund when it was trading below $10, whereas others paid more than $10. Still others sold before year end—some at a profit and some at a loss.

基金投资者的收益如何，不仅取决于基金本身的回报，还取决于他们的投资行为。如果大多数投资者在市场高点买入，或在市场低点卖出，那么他们整体的收益将低于基金投资组合本身的收益。

How well the fund’s investors fared depends not only on the fund’s returns, but on their actions. If most of them bought at a market high or sold at a market low, they will collectively earn lower returns than the fund’s portfolio itself.

在极端情况下，投资者可能会损失数十亿美元的基金，而这只基金原本盈利。很少有比选股名人凯西·伍德管理的ARK基金更极端的例子了。

In extreme cases, investors can lose billions of dollars in a fund that made money. Few examples have ever been more extreme than the ARK funds run by stock-picking celebrity Cathie Wood.

这支基金中的旗舰ETF——ARK Innovation，在2017年上涨了87%。当时，它的规模很小，年初资产规模仅为1200万美元，因此巨额收益仅由少数投资者获得。ARK Innovation在2020年实现了惊人的153%的回报率。但即使在年初，它的总资产也只有19亿美元。

ARK Innovation, the flagship ETF in this fleet, gained 87% in 2017. It then was tiny, with only $12 million in assets at the beginning of the year, so that enormous gain was earned by only a few investors. ARK Innovation returned an astounding 153% in 2020. But even by the beginning of that year it had just $1.9 billion in total assets.

最终，在 2020 年，公众开始大量注资。2020 年 3 月至 7 月期间，该基金的资产增长了两倍，达到 60 亿美元。从 2020 年 9 月到 2021 年 3 月，投资者向 ARK Innovation 注入了 130 亿美元的新资金。

Finally, in 2020, the public poured money in. The fund’s assets tripled to $6 billion between March and July 2020. From September 2020 through March 2021, investors inundated ARK Innovation with $13 billion in new money.

就在这时，业绩达到了顶峰。ARK Innovation 在 2021 年下跌了 23%，2022 年更是跌至令人震惊的 67%。

Right on cue, performance peaked. ARK Innovation lost 23% in 2021 and a bloodcurdling 67% in 2022.

少数抢占基金最大收益的早期投资者，与遭受最大损失的后来者相比，显得微不足道。ARK Innovation 股东的损失总计高达100 亿美元，尽管该基金已经取得了历史上最大的收益，甚至在 2022 年该基金继续上涨 68% 之后也是如此^。8

The few early-bird investors who captured the fund’s biggest gains were dwarfed by the flocks of latecomers who suffered its worst losses. Collectively, ARK Innovation’s shareholders lost as much as $10 billion even though the fund had racked up some of the biggest gains in history—and even after the fund went on to go up 68% in 2022.⁸

图 9-1：泄漏的 ARKK

FIGURE 9-1: A Leaky ARKK

资料来源：晨星。

Source: Morningstar.

教训是什么？赚钱或亏钱的是投资者，而不是投资。你的基金表现远不如你自己的行为重要。如果你追逐热门业绩，最终只会亏本。

The lessons? It’s investors, not investments, that make or lose money. How your fund behaves is much less important than how you behave. And if you chase hot performance, you will get burned.

第十章

Chapter 10 投资者及其顾问

The Investor and His Advisers

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

证券投资在商业运作中独树一帜，因为它几乎总是在某种程度上基于他人的建议。绝大多数投资者都是业余爱好者。他们自然认为，在选择证券时，专业人士的指导能够让他们获利。然而，投资建议的概念本身就存在着一些特殊性。

The investment of money in securities is unique among business operations in that it is almost always based in some degree on advice received from others. The great bulk of investors are amateurs. Naturally they feel that in choosing their securities they can profit by professional guidance. Yet there are peculiarities inherent in the very concept of investment advice.

如果人们投资的目的是为了赚钱，那么寻求建议就等于请求他人告诉他们如何赚钱。这种想法多少有些天真。商人会就其业务的各个方面寻求专业建议，但他们并不指望有人告诉他们如何盈利。那是他们自己的职责所在。当他们，或者非商业人士，依靠他人为他们赚取投资利润时，他们期望的是一种在普通商业活动中无法真正实现的结果。

If the reason people invest is to make money, then in seeking advice they are asking others to tell them how to make money. That idea has some element of naïveté. Businessmen seek professional advice on various elements of their business, but they do not expect to be told how to make a profit. That is their own bailiwick. When they, or nonbusiness people, rely on others to make investment profits for them, they are expecting a kind of result for which there is no true counterpart in ordinary business affairs.

如果我们假设投资证券可以获得正常或标准的收益，那么顾问的角色就更容易确定。他会运用其卓越的培训和经验，保护客户免于犯错，并确保他们获得与其资金应得的回报。当投资者要求的回报高于平均水平，或者顾问承诺为其提供更好的服务时，就会出现一个问题：他们提出的要求或承诺是否超出了实际可能实现的范围。

If we assume that there are normal or standard income results to be obtained from investing money in securities, then the role of the adviser can be more readily established. He will use his superior training and experience to protect his clients against mistakes and to make sure that they obtain the results to which their money is entitled. It is when the investor demands more than an average return on his money, or when his adviser undertakes to do better for him, that the question arises whether more is being asked or promised than is likely to be delivered.

投资建议可以从多种渠道获得。这些渠道包括：(1) 可能具备相关知识的亲戚或朋友证券从业人员；(2) 地方（商业）银行家；(3) 经纪公司或投资银行；(4) 金融服务机构或期刊；以及 (5) 投资顾问。这份名单内容杂乱，表明投资者目前尚未形成一套合乎逻辑或系统的方法来处理这个问题。

Advice on investments may be obtained from a variety of sources. These include: (1) a relative or friend, presumably knowledgeable in securities; (2) a local (commercial) banker; (3) a brokerage firm or investment banking house; (4) a financial service or periodical; and (5) an investment counselor. The miscellaneous character of this list suggests that no logical or systematic approach in this matter has crystallized, as yet, in the minds of investors.

某些常识性考虑与上述正常或标准结果的标准相关。我们的基本论点是：如果投资者在管理资金时主要依赖他人的建议，那么他要么必须严格限制自己及其顾问进行标准、保守甚至缺乏想象力的投资，要么必须对将要引导其资金进入其他渠道的人有异常亲密和良好的了解。但如果投资者与其顾问之间存在普通的业务或专业关系，那么只有在他自身知识和经验增长，并因此能够对他人的建议做出独立判断的情况下，他才能接受 不那么传统的 建议。这样一来，他就从防御性或缺乏进取心的投资者转变为积极进取的投资者。

Certain common-sense considerations relate to the criterion of normal or standard results mentioned above. Our basic thesis is this: If the investor is to rely chiefly on the advice of others in handling his funds, then either he must limit himself and his advisers strictly to standard, conservative, and even unimaginative forms of investment, or he must have an unusually intimate and favorable knowledge of the person who is going to direct his funds into other channels. But if the ordinary business or professional relationship exists between the investor and his advisers, he can be receptive to less conventional suggestions only to the extent that he himself has grown in knowledge and experience and has therefore become competent to pass independent judgment on the recommendations of others. He has then passed from the category of defensive or unenterprising investor into that of aggressive or enterprising investor.

银行投资顾问及信托服务

Investment Counsel and Trust Services of Banks

真正专业的投资顾问——也就是那些收取高额年费的知名投资咨询公司——在承诺和虚伪方面相当低调。他们大多将客户的资金投入标准的有息和有股息的证券，并主要依靠正常的投资经验来获得整体业绩。通常情况下，除了龙头公司和政府债券（包括州和市政债券）之外，很少有超过10%的总资金会投资于其他证券；他们也不会认真利用整体市场的波动。

The truly professional investment advisers—that is, the well-established investment counsel firms, who charge substantial annual fees—are quite modest in their promises and pretentions. For the most part they place their clients’ funds in standard interest- and dividend-paying securities, and they rely mainly on normal investment experience for their overall results. In the typical case it is doubtful whether more than 10% of the total fund is ever invested in securities other than those of leading companies, plus government bonds (including state and municipal issues); nor do they make a serious effort to take advantage of swings in the general market.

领先的投资顾问公司并不自诩卓越；他们引以为豪的是谨慎、保守和能力。他们的主要目标是多年来保住本金价值，并创造一个保守可接受的收益率。任何超越这一点的成就——他们确实努力做到他们认为，这更有利于实现目标——这本质上是额外的服务。或许，他们对客户的主要价值在于保护他们免于犯下代价高昂的错误。他们提供的服务，与任何服务于公众的顾问所能提供的服务一样，都是防御型投资者应有的。

The leading investment-counsel firms make no claim to being brilliant; they do pride themselves on being careful, conservative, and competent. Their primary aim is to conserve the principal value over the years and produce a conservatively acceptable rate of income. Any accomplishment beyond that—and they do strive to better the goal—they regard in the nature of extra service rendered. Perhaps their chief value to their clients lies in shielding them from costly mistakes. They offer as much as the defensive investor has the right to expect from any counselor serving the general public.

我们对知名投资咨询公司的评价通常适用于大型银行的信托和咨询服务。

What we have said about the well-established investment-counsel firms applies generally to the trust and advisory services of the larger banks.

金融服务

Financial Services

所谓的金融服务机构是指向其订阅者发送统一公告（有时以电报形式）的机构。其涵盖的主题可能包括商业现状和前景、证券市场的行为和前景，以及有关个别问题的信息和建议。通常设有一个“咨询部门”，负责解答与个人订阅者相关的问题。这类服务的平均费用远低于投资顾问向其个人客户收取的费用。一些机构——尤其是巴布森和标准普尔——在不同的层面上运营金融服务和投资咨询服务。（顺便提一句，其他机构——例如斯卡德、史蒂文斯和克拉克——则分别以投资咨询和一个或多个投资基金的形式运营。）

The so-called financial services are organizations that send out uniform bulletins (sometimes in the form of telegrams) to their subscribers. The subjects covered may include the state and prospects of business, the behavior and prospect of the securities markets, and information and advice regarding individual issues. There is often an “inquiry department” which will answer questons affecting an individual subscriber. The cost of the service averages much less than the fee that investment counselors charge their individual clients. Some organizations—notably Babson’s and Standard & Poor’s—operate on separate levels as a financial service and as investment counsel. (Incidentally, other organizations—such as Scudder, Stevens & Clark—operate separately as investment counsel and as one or more investment funds.)

总体而言，金融服务机构面向的公众群体与投资咨询公司截然不同。后者的客户通常希望免于麻烦和决策的需要。金融服务机构为那些管理自身财务或为他人提供咨询服务的人提供信息和指导。许多此类服务机构仅仅或几乎仅仅局限于通过各种“技术”方法预测市场走势。我们暂且不谈这些服务，并指出它们的工作与本书中使用的“投资者”一词无关。

The financial services direct themselves, on the whole, to a quite different segment of the public than do the investment-counsel firms. The latters’ clients generally wish to be relieved of bother and the need for making decisions. The financial services offer information and guidance to those who are directing their own financial affairs or are themselves advising others. Many of these services confine themselves exclusively, or nearly so, to forecasting market movements by various “technical” methods. We shall dismiss these with the observation that their work does not concern “investors” as the term is used in this book.

另一方面，一些最知名的公司——例如穆迪投资服务公司和标准普尔公司——与统计机构联系在一起，这些机构汇编了大量统计数据，构成了所有严肃证券分析的基础。这些服务的客户群体多种多样，从最保守的投资者到最狂热的投机者，不一而足。因此，他们必须找到在形成自己的观点和建议时很难遵循任何明确或基本的哲学。

On the other hand, some of the best known—such as Moody’s Investment Service and Standard & Poor’s—are identified with statistical organizations that compile the voluminous statistical data that form the basis for all serious security analysis. These services have a varied clientele, ranging from the most conservative-minded investor to the rankest speculator. As a result they must find it difficult to adhere to any clear-cut or fundamental philosophy in arriving at their opinions and recommendations.

像穆迪这样的老牌服务机构显然必须为广大投资者提供一些有价值的信息。是什么呢？基本上，他们关注的是普通活跃投资者和投机者感兴趣的领域，他们的观点要么具有一定的权威性，要么至少看起来比独立客户的观点更可靠。

An old-established service of the type of Moody’s and the others must obviously provide something worthwhile to a broad class of investors. What is it? Basically they address themselves to the matters in which the average active investor-speculator is interested, and their views on these either command some measure of authority or at least appear more reliable than those of the unaided client.

多年来，金融服务机构一直在进行股市预测，但无人认真对待。如同业内其他人一样，他们有时正确，有时错误。只要有可能，他们就会规避自己的观点，以免被证明完全错误。（有一种成熟的德尔菲式表达技巧，可以成功地根据未来的任何情况进行调整。）在我们看来——或许带有偏见——他们这部分工作除了揭示证券市场中的人性之外，并无实际意义。几乎每个对普通股感兴趣的人都希望别人告诉他对市场走势的看法。有需求，就必然有供给。

For years the financial services have been making stock-market forecasts without anyone taking this activity very seriously. Like everyone else in the field they are sometimes right and sometimes wrong. Wherever possible they hedge their opinions so as to avoid the risk of being proved completely wrong. (There is a well-developed art of Delphic phrasing that adjusts itself successfully to whatever the future brings.) In our view—perhaps a prejudiced one—this segment of their work has no real significance except for the light it throws on human nature in the securities markets. Nearly everyone interested in common stocks wants to be told by someone else what he thinks the market is going to do. The demand being there, it must be supplied.

当然，他们对商业状况的解读和预测更加权威，也更具参考价值。这些是大量经济情报的重要组成部分，这些情报在证券买卖双方之间持续传播，并且在大多数情况下往往能够为股票和债券创造相当合理的价格。毫无疑问，金融服务机构发布的资料丰富了可用的信息储备，并强化了客户的投资判断。

Their interpretations and forecasts of business conditions, of course, are much more authoritative and informing. These are an important part of the great body of economic intelligence which is spread continuously among buyers and sellers of securities and tends to create fairly rational prices for stocks and bonds under most circumstances. Undoubtedly the material published by the financial services adds to the store of information available and fortifies the investment judgment of their clients.

很难评估他们对个别证券的推荐。每项服务都应单独评判，而最终的结论只能基于一项涵盖多年的详尽而全面的研究。根据我们的经验，我们注意到他们普遍持有一种态度，我们认为这种态度往往会损害原本可能更有用的咨询工作。他们普遍认为，如果某只股票的短期前景良好，就应该买入；如果前景不佳，就应该卖出——无论当前价格如何。这种肤浅的原则往往会阻碍这些服务进行合理的分析。他们的工作人员能够胜任的工作——即根据某只股票预期的长期未来盈利能力来确定其当前价格是否被高估或低估。

It is difficult to evaluate their recommendations of individual securities. Each service is entitled to be judged separately, and the verdict could properly be based only on an elaborate and inclusive study covering many years. In our own experience we have noted among them a pervasive attitude which we think tends to impair what could otherwise be more useful advisory work. This is their general view that a stock should be bought if the near-term prospects of the business are favorable and should be sold if these are unfavorable—regardless of the current price. Such a superficial principle often prevents the services from doing the sound analytical job of which their staffs are capable—namely, to ascertain whether a given stock appears over- or undervalued at the current price in the light of its indicated long-term future earning power.

明智的投资者不会仅仅根据金融服务机构的建议进行买卖。一旦确立了这一点，金融服务机构的作用就变成了提供信息和建议。

The intelligent investor will not do his buying and selling solely on the basis of recommendations received from a financial service. Once this point is established, the role of the financial service then becomes the useful one of supplying information and offering suggestions.

经纪公司的建议

Advice from Brokerage Houses

证券持有者获得的信息和建议数量之多，或许都来自股票经纪人。他们是纽约证券交易所和其他交易所的成员，执行买卖指令并收取标准佣金。几乎所有与公众打交道的股票经纪公司都设有“统计”或分析部门，负责解答问询并提供建议。大量的分析文献，其中一些内容详尽且价格昂贵，都免费分发给公司的客户——更确切地说，他们被称为“客户”。

Probably the largest volume of information and advice to the security-owning public comes from stockbrokers. These are members of the New York Stock Exchange, and of other exchanges, who execute buying and selling orders for a standard commission. Practically all the houses that deal with the public maintain a “statistical” or analytical department, which answers inquiries and makes recommendations. A great deal of analytical literature, some of it elaborate and expensive, is distributed gratis to the firms’ customers—more impressively referred to as clients.

“顾客”还是“客户”这个名称看似无关紧要，却关系重大。企业有客户；专业人士或机构也有客户。华尔街经纪行业或许是所有行业中道德标准最高的，但它仍在摸索着，努力达到真正职业的标准和地位。*

A great deal is at stake in the innocent-appearing question whether “customers” or “clients” is the more appropriate name. A business has customers; a professional person or organization has clients. The Wall Street brokerage fraternity has probably the highest ethical standards of any business, but it is still feeling its way toward the standards and standing of a true profession.*

过去，华尔街主要依靠投机繁荣，而股市投机者作为一个群体几乎注定会亏损。因此，从逻辑上讲，经纪公司不可能完全专业地运营。要做到这一点，他们就必须努力减少而不是增加业务。

In the past Wall Street has thrived mainly on speculation, and stock-market speculators as a class were almost certain to lose money. Hence it has been logically impossible for brokerage houses to operate on a thoroughly professional basis. To do that would have required them to direct their efforts toward reducing rather than increasing their business.

某些经纪公司在这方面做得最彻底的（也是可以预料到的）就是避免诱导或鼓励任何人进行投机。这类机构仅限于执行客户下达的指令、提供财务信息和分析，以及就证券的投资价值发表意见。因此，至少在理论上，它们对投机客户的盈利或亏损不承担任何责任。*

The farthest that certain brokerage houses have gone in that direction—and could have been expected to go—is to refrain from inducing or encouraging anyone to speculate. Such houses have confined themselves to executing orders given them, to supplying financial information and analyses, and to rendering opinions on the investment merits of securities. Thus, in theory at least, they are devoid of all responsibility for either the profits or the losses of their speculative customers.*

然而，大多数证券交易所仍然坚守着那些过时的口号：他们做生意是为了赚取佣金，而商业成功的秘诀就是满足客户的需求。由于最赚钱的客户需要投机性的建议和建议，典型公司的思维和活动与市场中的日常交易紧密相关。因此，他们竭尽全力帮助客户在一个几乎被数学定律注定最终亏损的领域赚钱。^*我们这样说的意思是，对于大多数经纪公司的客户来说，他们业务中的投机部分从长远来看无法盈利。但只要他们的业务与真正的投资相似，他们产生的投资收益可能会超过投机损失。

Most stock-exchange houses, however, still adhere to the old-time slogans that they are in business to make commissions and that the way to succeed in business is to give the customers what they want. Since the most profitable customers want speculative advice and suggestions, the thinking and activities of the typical firm are pretty closely geared to day-to-day trading in the market. Thus it tries hard to help its customers make money in a field where they are condemned almost by mathematical law to lose in the end.^* By this we mean that the speculative part of their operations cannot be profitable over the long run for most brokerage-house customers. But to the extent that their operations resemble true investing they may produce investment gains that more than offset the speculative losses.

投资者通过两类员工从证券交易所获得建议和信息，这两类员工现在正式称为“客户经纪人”（或“账户经理”）和金融分析师。

The investor obtains advice and information from stock-exchange houses through two types of employees, now known officially as “customers’ brokers” (or “account executives”) and financial analysts.

客户的经纪人，也称为“注册代表”，以前被称为“客户经纪人”，这个头衔不太尊贵。如今，他大多品行端正，精通证券知识，并遵守严格的行为准则。然而，由于他的工作是赚取佣金，他很难避免投机倾向。因此，证券买家任何想要避免受到投机性考虑影响的人，通常都必须在与客户经纪人打交道时谨慎而明确；他必须通过言行清楚地表明，他对任何类似于股市“内幕”的东西都不感兴趣。一旦客户的经纪人清楚地了解到自己面对的是真正的投资者，他就会尊重这一观点并与之合作。

The customer’s broker, also called a “registered representative,” formerly bore the less dignified title of “customer’s man.” Today he is for the most part an individual of good character and considerable knowledge of securities, who operates under a rigid code of right conduct. Nevertheless, since his business is to earn commissions, he can hardly avoid being speculation-minded. Thus the security buyer who wants to avoid being influenced by speculative considerations will ordinarily have to be careful and explicit in his dealing with his customer’s broker; he will have to show clearly, by word and deed, that he is not interested in anything faintly resembling a stock-market “tip.” Once the customer’s broker understands clearly that he has a real investor on his hands, he will respect this point of view and cooperate with it.

金融分析师，以前主要被称为证券分析师，是笔者特别关注的人群。笔者本人从事金融分析师工作已逾五十年，并培养了无数金融分析师。本文仅指经纪公司聘用的金融分析师。证券分析师的职责从其头衔便可清晰看出。他们负责对单个证券进行详细研究，对同一领域内的各种证券进行仔细比较，并就各种股票和债券的安全性、吸引力或内在价值形成专家意见。

The financial analyst, formerly known chiefly as security analyst, is a person of particular concern to the author, who has been one himself for more than five decades and has helped educate countless others. At this stage we refer only to the financial analysts employed by brokerage houses. The function of the security analyst is clear enough from his title. It is he who works up the detailed studies of individual securities, develops careful comparisons of various issues in the same field, and forms an expert opinion of the safety or attractiveness or intrinsic value of all the different kinds of stocks and bonds.

在外行人看来，证券分析师的正式资格要求似乎有些奇怪。相比之下，客户的经纪人必须通过考试，通过必要的品格测试，并获得纽约证券交易所的正式认可和注册。实际上，几乎所有年轻的分析师都接受过商学院的广泛培训，而老一辈的分析师也至少在商学院获得了相当丰富的经验。在绝大多数情况下，聘用他们的经纪公司可以确保其分析师的资质和能力。*

By what must seem a quirk to the outsider there are no formal requirements for being a security analyst. Contrast with this the facts that a customer’s broker must pass an examination, meet the required character tests, and be duly accepted and registered by the New York Stock Exchange. As a practical matter, nearly all the younger analysts have had extensive business-school training, and the oldsters have acquired at least the equivalent in the school of long experience. In the great majority of cases, the employing brokerage house can be counted on to assure itself of the qualifications and competence of its analysts.*

经纪公司的客户可以直接与证券分析师打交道，也可以通过客户的经纪人间接联系。无论哪种情况，分析师都可以为客户提供大量的信息和建议。让我们在此强调一下。证券分析师的价值对投资者而言，很大程度上取决于投资者自身的态度。如果投资者向分析师提出正确的问题，他很可能会得到正确的——或者至少是有价值的——答案。我们相信，经纪公司聘请的分析师在很大程度上受到这样一种观念的束缚：他们也应该兼任市场分析师。当被问及某只普通股是否“稳健”时，他们通常的意思是：“这只股票在未来几个月内有可能上涨吗？”结果，他们中的许多人被迫一边盯着股票行情自动收录器一边进行分析——这种姿势不利于进行合理的思考或得出有价值的结论。

The customer of the brokerage firm may deal with the security analysts directly, or his contact may be an indirect one via the customer’s broker. In either case the analyst is available to the client for a considerable amount of information and advice. Let us make an emphatic statement here. The value of the security analyst to the investor depends largely on the investor’s own attitude. If the investor asks the analyst the right questions, he is likely to get the right—or at least valuable—answers. The analysts hired by brokerage houses, we are convinced, are greatly handicapped by the general feeling that they are supposed to be market analysts as well. When they are asked whether a given common stock is “sound,” the question often means, “Is this stock likely to advance during the next few months?” As a result many of them are compelled to analyze with one eye on the stock ticker—a pose not conducive to sound thinking or worthwhile conclusions.

在本书的下一部分中，我们将探讨证券分析的一些概念及其可能取得的成就。许多在证券交易所工作的分析师可以为那些希望确保资金物有所值，甚至可能略有回报的真正投资者提供重要的帮助。与客户的经纪人一样，分析师首先需要清楚地了解投资者的态度和目标。一旦分析师确信自己正在与一位注重价值而非注重报价的人打交道，那么他的建议就很有可能真正带来整体效益。

In the next section of this book we shall deal with some of the concepts and possible achievements of security analysis. A great many analysts working for stock exchange firms could be of prime assistance to the bona fide investor who wants to be sure that he gets full value for his money, and possibly a little more. As in the case of the customers’ brokers, what is needed at the beginning is a clear understanding by the analyst of the investor’s attitude and objectives. Once the analyst is convinced that he is dealing with a man who is value-minded rather than quotation-minded, there is an excellent chance that his recommendations will prove of real overall benefit.

特许金融分析师证书

The CFA Certificate for Financial Analysts

1963年，在赋予金融分析师专业地位和责任方面迈出了重要一步。特许金融分析师（CFA）的正式头衔如今授予那些通过规定考试并符合其他资格测试的高级从业人员。1涵盖的科目包括证券分析和投资组合管理。这与^历史悠久的注册会计师（CPA）专业头衔的相似之处显而易见，且是有意为之。这种相对较新的认可和控制机制应该有助于提升金融分析师的标准，并最终使他们的工作真正专业化。*

An important step was taken in 1963 toward giving professional standing and responsibility to financial analysts. The official title of chartered financial analyst (CFA) is now awarded to those senior practitioners who pass required examinations and meet other tests of fitness.¹ The subjects covered include security analysis and portfolio management. The analogy with the long-established professional title of certified public accountant (CPA) is evident and intentional. This relatively new apparatus of recognition and control should serve to elevate the standards of financial analysts and eventually to place their work on a truly professional basis.*

与经纪公司的交易

Dealings with Brokerage Houses

在我们撰写本修订版的这段时间里，最令人不安的事态发展之一是相当多的纽约证券交易所公司陷入财务困境——简单地说，就是破产或濒临破产——其中包括至少两家规模相当大的公司。*这是半个多世纪以来首次发生这样的事情，而且它令人震惊的原因不止一个。几十年来，纽约证券交易所一直在对其成员的运营和财务状况实施更严格、更严密的控制——包括最低资本要求、突击审计等等。除此之外，美国证券交易委员会（SEC）对交易所及其成员的控制已经持续了37年。最后，股票经纪行业本身也一直处于有利的条件下——即交易量大幅增长、固定的最低佣金率（在很大程度上消除了竞争性费用）以及有限的成员公司数量。

One of the most disquieting developments of the period in which we write this revision has been the financial embarrassment—in plain words, bankruptcy or near-bankruptcy—of quite a few New York Stock Exchange firms, including at least two of considerable size.* This is the first time in half a century or more that such a thing has happened, and it is startling for more than one reason. For many decades the New York Stock Exchange has been moving in the direction of closer and stricter controls over the operations and financial condition of its members—including minimum capital requirements, surprise audits, and the like. Besides this, we have had 37 years of control over the exchanges and their members by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Finally, the stock-brokerage industry itself has operated under favorable conditions—namely, a huge increase in volume, fixed minimum commission rates (largely eliminating competitive fees), and a limited number of member firms.

经纪公司首次陷入财务困境（1969年）的原因就在于交易量本身的增长。据称，这导致他们的设备不堪重负，增加了管理费用，并在财务结算方面造成了诸多麻烦。需要指出的是，这或许是历史上第一次，大型企业因为业务量超出其处理能力而破产。1970年，随着经纪公司倒闭数量的增加，人们主要将其归咎于“交易量下降”。考虑到纽约证券交易所1970年的成交量总计29.37亿股，创历史新高，这样的抱怨似乎有些奇怪。比1965年之前的任何一年都高出两倍多。在1964年结束的15年牛市中，年平均交易量“仅”7.12亿股——仅为1970年的四分之一——但经纪业务却经历了历史上最辉煌的时期。如果正如目前所见，所有成员公司都允许其管理费用和其他费用以无法承受一年中部分时间交易量轻微下降的速度增长，那么这既不能说明他们的商业头脑，也不能说明他们的财务保守主义。

The first financial troubles of the brokerage houses (in 1969) were attributed to the increase in volume itself. This, it was claimed, overtaxed their facilities, increased their overhead, and produced many troubles in making financial settlements. It should be pointed out this was probably the first time in history that important enterprises have gone broke because they had more business than they could handle. In 1970, as brokerage failures increased, they were blamed chiefly on “the falling off in volume.” A strange complaint when one reflects that the turnover of the NYSE in 1970 totaled 2,937 million shares, the largest volume in its history and well over twice as large as in any year before 1965. During the 15 years of the bull market ending in 1964 the annual volume had averaged “only” 712 million shares—one quarter of the 1970 figure—but the brokerage business had enjoyed the greatest prosperity in its history. If, as it appears, the member firms as a whole had allowed their overhead and other expenses to increase at a rate that could not sustain even a mild reduction in volume during part of a year, this does not speak well for either their business acumen or their financial conservatism.

对财务困境的第三种解释最终浮出水面，我们认为这是三种解释中最可信、最有意义的。某些经纪公司的很大一部分资本似乎以普通股的形式持有，这些普通股由合伙人个人持有。其中一些似乎具有高度投机性，价格被高估。1969年市场低迷时，此类证券的报价大幅下跌，公司相当一部分资本也随之蒸发。2实际上，合伙人们用本应用于保护客户免受经纪业务常见财务风险影响^的资金进行投机，以期从中赚取双倍利润。这是不可原谅的；我们不再赘述。

A third explanation of the financial trouble finally emerged out of a mist of concealment, and we suspect that it is the most plausible and significant of the three. It seems that a good part of the capital of certain brokerage houses was held in the form of common stocks owned by the individual partners. Some of these seem to have been highly speculative and carried at inflated values. When the market declined in 1969 the quotations of such securities fell drastically and a substantial part of the capital of the firms vanished with them.² In effect the partners were speculating with the capital that was supposed to protect the customers against the ordinary financial hazards of the brokerage business, in order to make a double profit thereon. This was inexcusable; we refrain from saying more.

投资者不仅应该在制定财务政策时运用智慧，还应该在相关细节上运用智慧。这包括选择一家信誉良好的经纪商来执行订单。到目前为止，我们建议读者只与纽约证券交易所的会员公司交易就足够了，除非他们有充分的理由选择非会员公司。我们不得不在这方面补充一些建议。我们认为，没有保证金账户的人——在我们的词汇中，这意味着所有非专业投资者——应该由他们的银行来处理证券的交付和接收。当您向经纪商发出买入指令时，您可以指示他们将购买的证券交付给您的银行，银行会支付相应的款项；相反，当您卖出证券时，您可以指示您的银行在收到款项后将证券交付给经纪商。这些服务会收取一些额外费用，但就安全性和安心而言，这些费用是值得的。这条建议可以忽略，因为现在不再需要了。在投资者确信证券交易所公司的所有问题都已得到解决之后，而不是之前。*

The investor should use his intelligence not only in formulating his financial policies but also in the associated details. These include the choice of a reputable broker to execute his orders. Up to now it was sufficient to counsel our readers to deal only with a member of the New York Stock Exchange, unless he had compelling reasons to use a nonmember firm. Reluctantly, we must add some further advice in this area. We think that people who do not carry margin accounts—and in our vocabulary this means all nonprofessional investors—should have the delivery and receipt of their securities handled by their bank. When giving a buying order to your brokers you can instruct them to deliver the securities bought to your bank against payment therefor by the bank; conversely, when selling you can instruct your bank to deliver the securities to the broker against payment of the proceeds. These services will cost a little extra but they should be well worth the expense in terms of safety and peace of mind. This advice may be disregarded, as no longer called for, after the investor is sure that all the problems of stock-exchange firms have been disposed of, but not before.*

投资银行家

Investment Bankers

“投资银行家”一词指的是大量参与发行、承销和销售新股和债券的公司。（承销是指向发行公司或其他发行人保证证券将被全部售出。）许多经纪公司都从事一定数量的承销业务。通常，这仅限于参与由主要投资银行家组成的承销团。经纪公司还倾向于发行和赞助少量新股融资，尤其是在牛市如火如荼的时候，以小额普通股发行的形式。

The term “investment banker” is applied to a firm that engages to an important extent in originating, underwriting, and selling new issues of stocks and bonds. (To underwrite means to guarantee to the issuing corporation, or other issuer, that the security will be fully sold.) A number of the brokerage houses carry on a certain amount of underwriting activity. Generally this is confined to participating in underwriting groups formed by leading investment bankers. There is an additional tendency for brokerage firms to originate and sponsor a minor amount of new-issue financing, particularly in the form of smaller issues of common stocks when a bull market is in full swing.

投资银行或许是华尔街最受尊敬的部门，因为金融正是在这里发挥着建设性的作用，为产业扩张提供新的资本。事实上，尽管股市经常出现过度投机，但维持股市活跃的大部分理论依据在于，有组织的证券交易所促进了新发行债券和股票的销售。如果投资者或投机者无法指望看到新发行的证券有现成的市场，他们很可能会拒绝购买。

Investment banking is perhaps the most respectable department of the Wall Street community, because it is here that finance plays its constructive role of supplying new capital for the expansion of industry. In fact, much of the theoretical justification for maintaining active stock markets, notwithstanding their frequent speculative excesses, lies in the fact that organized security exchanges facilitate the sale of new issues of bonds and stocks. If investors or speculators could not expect to see a ready market for a new security offered them, they might well refuse to buy it.

投资银行家和投资者之间的关系基本上就像销售员和潜在买家。多年来，以美元价值计算的新发行债券主要由银行和保险公司等金融机构购买。在这一行业中，证券销售人员一直在与精明且经验丰富的买家打交道。因此，投资银行家向这些客户提出的任何建议都必须经过仔细且持怀疑态度的审查。因此，这些交易几乎总是在务实的基础上进行的。

The relationship between the investment banker and the investor is basically that of the salesman to the prospective buyer. For many years past the great bulk of the new offerings in dollar value has consisted of bond issues that were purchased in the main by financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies. In this business the security salesmen have been dealing with shrewd and experienced buyers. Hence any recommendations made by the investment bankers to these customers have had to pass careful and skeptical scrutiny. Thus these transactions are almost always effected on a businesslike footing.

但在个人证券购买者与投资银行（包括充当承销商的股票经纪人）之间的关系中，情况则有所不同。在这种情况下，购买者往往缺乏经验，也很少精明。他很容易受到销售人员的言辞的影响，尤其是在购买普通股时，因为他购买时未曾表露的意图往往主要是为了快速获利。所有这些的结果是，公众投资者的保护与其说是在于自身的批判能力，不如说是在于发行机构的良知和道德。3

But a different situation obtains in a relationship between the individual security buyer and the investment banking firms, including the stockbrokers acting as underwriters. Here the purchaser is frequently inexperienced and seldom shrewd. He is easily influenced by what the salesman tells him, especially in the case of common-stock issues, since often his unconfessed desire in buying is chiefly to make a quick profit. The effect of all this is that the public investor’s protection lies less in his own critical faculty than in the scruples and ethics of the offering houses.3

承销公司能够相当好地将顾问和销售员这两个不协调的角色结合起来，这值得称赞。但买方如果完全依赖卖方的判断，则是不明智的。1959 年，我们就此指出：“这种不健全态度的不良后果在承销领域反复显现，在投机活跃时期新发行普通股的销售中影响显著。”此后不久，事实证明这一警告是迫切需要的。正如已经指出的，1960-61 年以及 1968-69 年，质量最低的股票大量涌现，以高得离谱的发行价出售给公众，在许多情况下，由于盲目的投机和某种半操纵，价格甚至被推得更高。华尔街一些比较重要的公司都不同程度地参与了这些不太光彩的活动，这表明贪婪、愚蠢和不负责任的普遍现象还没有从金融领域中消除。

It is a tribute to the honesty and competence of the underwriting firms that they are able to combine fairly well the discordant roles of adviser and salesman. But it is imprudent for the buyer to trust himself to the judgment of the seller. In 1959 we stated at this point: “The bad results of this unsound attitude show themselves recurrently in the underwriting field and with notable effects in the sale of new common stock issues during periods of active speculation.” Shortly thereafter this warning proved urgently needed. As already pointed out, the years 1960–61 and, again, 1968–69 were marked by an unprecedented outpouring of issues of lowest quality, sold to the public at absurdly high offering prices and in many cases pushed much higher by heedless speculation and some semimanipulation. A number of the more important Wall Street houses have participated to some degree in these less than creditable activities, which demonstrates that the familiar combination of greed, folly, and irresponsibility has not been exorcized from the financial scene.

聪明的投资者会留意投资银行的建议和推荐，尤其是那些他所知道的声誉良好的投资银行；但他一定会做出合理和独立的判断。基于这些建议——如果他有能力的话，可以是他自己的建议，也可以是其他类型顾问的建议。*

The intelligent investor will pay attention to the advice and recommendations received from investment banking houses, especially those known by him to have an excellent reputation; but he will be sure to bring sound and independent judgment to bear upon these suggestions—either his own, if he is competent, or that of some other type of adviser.*

其他顾问

Other Advisers

尤其是在小城镇，向当地银行家咨询投资事宜是一个古老的传统。商业银行家或许并非证券价值方面的专家，但他们经验丰富，且行事保守。对于缺乏经验的投资者来说，他们尤其有用，因为这些投资者常常容易偏离防御性策略那条笔直而平淡的道路，需要谨慎的头脑来稳定他们的情绪。而那些更加警觉、更积极进取的投资者，在选择证券交易时寻求建议，通常不会发现商业银行家的观点特别适合自己的目标。^*

It is a good old custom, especially in the smaller towns, to consult one’s local banker about investments. A commercial banker may not be a thoroughgoing expert on security values, but he is experienced and conservative. He is especially useful to the unskilled investor, who is often tempted to stray from the straight and unexciting path of a defensive policy and needs the steadying influence of a prudent mind. The more alert and aggressive investor, seeking counsel in the selection of security bargains, will not ordinarily find the commercial banker’s viewpoint to be especially suited to his own objectives.^*

我们对向亲朋好友寻求投资建议的普遍做法持更为批判的态度。咨询者总是认为自己有充分的理由假设被咨询者拥有更丰富的知识或经验。我们自身的观察表明，选择令人满意的非专业顾问几乎和在无人协助的情况下选择合适的证券一样困难。很多糟糕的建议都是免费提供的。

We take a more critical attitude toward the widespread custom of asking investment advice from relatives or friends. The inquirer always thinks he has good reason for assuming that the person consulted has superior knowledge or experience. Our own observation indicates that it is almost as difficult to select satisfactory lay advisers as it is to select the proper securities unaided. Much bad advice is given free.

概括

Summary

愿意为资金管理付费的投资者可以明智地选择一些信誉良好、备受推崇的投资咨询公司。或者，他们也可以选择大型信托公司的投资部门，或一些纽约证券交易所主要机构提供的收费监管服务。预期收益绝非出类拔萃，但与普通消息灵通、谨慎的投资者的收益相当。

Investors who are prepared to pay a fee for the management of their funds may wisely select some well-established and well-recommended investment-counsel firm. Alternatively, they may use the investment department of a large trust company or the supervisory service supplied on a fee basis by a few of the leading New York Stock Exchange houses. The results to be expected are in no wise exceptional, but they are commensurate with those of the average well-informed and cautious investor.

大多数证券买家获得建议时无需专门付费。因此，在大多数情况下，他们无权也不应该期望获得高于平均水平的结果，这是理所当然的。他们应该警惕所有承诺巨额收入或利润的人，无论是客户的经纪人还是证券销售员。这既适用于证券选择，也适用于指导难以捉摸（甚至可能是虚幻的）的市场交易技巧。

Most security buyers obtain advice without paying for it specifically. It stands to reason, therefore, that in the majority of cases they are not entitled to and should not expect better than average results. They should be wary of all persons, whether customers’ brokers or security salesmen, who promise spectacular income or profits. This applies both to the selection of securities and to guidance in the elusive (and perhaps illusive) art of trading in the market.

我们所定义的防御型投资者通常不具备对其顾问的证券建议做出独立判断的能力。但他们可以明确地——甚至反复地——说明他们想要购买的证券类型。如果他们遵循我们的建议，他们会将投资范围限制在高等级债券和领先公司的普通股上，最好是那些根据经验和分析能够以较低价格水平购买的股票。任何一家信誉良好的证券交易所的证券分析师都可以列出一份合适的此类普通股清单，并向投资者证明，根据过去的经验判断，这些股票的当前价格水平是否合理保守。

Defensive investors, as we have defined them, will not ordinarily be equipped to pass independent judgment on the security recommendations made by their advisers. But they can be explicit—and even repetitiously so—in stating the kind of securities they want to buy. If they follow our prescription they will confine themselves to high-grade bonds and the common stocks of leading corporations, preferably those that can be purchased at individual price levels that are not high in the light of experience and analysis. The security analyst of any reputable stock-exchange house can make up a suitable list of such common stocks and can certify to the investor whether or not the existing price level therefor is a reasonably conservative one as judged by past experience.

积极的投资者通常会积极地与其顾问合作。他希望顾问的建议能够得到详细的解释，并坚持对其做出自己的判断。这意味着投资者会根据自身在该领域的知识和经验发展来调整自己的预期和证券操作的性质。只有在特殊情况下，即顾问的正直和能力得到充分证明的情况下，投资者才应该在不理解和认可其决定的情况下，采纳他人的建议。

The aggressive investor will ordinarily work in active cooperation with his advisers. He will want their recommendations explained in detail, and he will insist on passing his own judgment upon them. This means that the investor will gear his expectations and the character of his security operations to the development of his own knowledge and experience in the field. Only in the exceptional case, where the integrity and competence of the advisers have been thoroughly demonstrated, should the investor act upon the advice of others without understanding and approving the decision made.

一直以来，都存在着不讲原则的股票推销员和不靠谱的股票经纪人，因此——理所当然地——我们建议读者尽可能只与纽约证券交易所的会员进行交易。但我们不得不额外谨慎地提醒大家，证券的交付和支付必须通过投资者的银行进行。华尔街经纪公司令人不安的形象或许几年后就会完全消散，但在1971年末，我们仍然建议“谨慎行事，以免后悔”。

There have always been unprincipled stock salesmen and fly-by-night stock brokers, and—as a matter of course—we have advised our readers to confine their dealings, if possible, to members of the New York Stock Exchange. But we are reluctantly compelled to add the extra-cautious counsel that security deliveries and payments be made through the intermediary of the investor’s bank. The distressing Wall Street brokerage-house picture may have cleared up completely in a few years, but in late 1971 we still suggest, “Better safe than sorry.”

第十章评论

Commentary on Chapter 10

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

明智人以知识为冠冕。

The prudent are crowned with knowledge.

——箴言14:18

—Proverbs 14:18.

一位好的财务顾问可以防止您成为自己最大的敌人，从而为您赚取或节省一大笔钱。

A good financial adviser can make or save you a fortune by preventing you from being your own worst enemy.

好的顾问可以阻止你高买低卖。他们可以帮你弄清楚如何买得起房子、支付大学学费、赡养年迈的父母，以及如何应对卡夫卡式的税务、遗产和退休规划等复杂的问题。他们还能帮你避免诈骗和欺诈。

Good advisers can deter you from buying high and selling low. They can help you figure out how to afford to buy a house, pay for college, provide for your aging parents, and navigate the Kafkaesque complexities of tax, estate, and retirement planning. They can help you avoid scams and frauds.

许多防御型投资者——以及积极进取型投资者——都能从一位优秀顾问的建议中受益。如果你负债累累，难以控制支出，在股票交易中损失惨重，管理着一堆看似不协调的资产，或者根本无法应对艰难的财务决策，那么一位优秀的顾问或许就是天赐之物。然而，找到合适的顾问远没有想象中那么容易。

Many defensive—and enterprising—investors could benefit from the counsel of a good adviser. If you carry too much debt, struggle to get your spending under control, lost a ton of money trading stocks, are juggling a jumble of assets that don’t seem to work together, or just can’t face difficult financial decisions, a good adviser can be a godsend. Finding the right one is nowhere near as easy as it should be, however.

只顾收费却不见森林

Can’t See the Forest for the Fees

正如格雷厄姆警告的那样：

As Graham warns:

大多数证券买家获得咨询建议时，并不会专门付费。因此，在大多数情况下，他们无权获得优于平均水平的结果，也不应该期望获得。

想象一下，两个人去看同一个牙医。后来，他们发现其中一个病人的账单比另一个病人高出五倍，尽管他们接受了同样的治疗。当账单较高的病人要求解释时，办公室助理说：“你的投资组合规模是原来的五倍。”

Imagine two people going to the same dentist. Afterward, they discover that one patient’s bill is five times higher, even though they received the same treatment. When the patient with the higher bill demands an explanation, the office assistant says, “Your investment portfolio is five times bigger.”

你应该选择机器人吗？

Should You Go Robo?

数字咨询公司使用软件以低成本在线构建投资组合，如今已变得炙手可热。这些“机器人顾问”在过去十年间兴起，在美国管理着约7500亿美元的资产。其费用通常约为每年0.25%；客户可以获得一个ETF投资组合，定期进行再平衡，并选择性地出售亏损仓位，以最大限度地提高税收效率。对于那些没有空闲时间或精力监控自身投资组合的防御型投资者来说，这种简单的服务或许更有意义^。1

Digital advisory firms, which use software to assemble investment portfolios online at low cost, have become popular. These “robo-advisers” arose over the past decade and manage roughly $750 billion in the U.S. Fees generally are about 0.25% annually; clients get a portfolio of ETFs, periodic rebalancing, and selective sales of losing positions to maximize tax efficiency. Such bare-bones service may make sense for defensive investors who have zero spare time or energy to monitor their own portfolios.¹

一些机器人顾问也提供财务规划建议，通常由人工工作人员提供。然而，这类公司专注于自动化投资组合管理，因此个性化财务规划的优先级较低。

Some robo-advisers also offer financial-planning advice, typically from a human staffer. However, such firms specialize in automated portfolio management, so personalized financial planning is a lower priority.

最终，人工智能或许能弥补这一差距。在职业象棋比赛中，“半人马”（人机结合）往往能够击败人类顶尖棋手或训练有素的计算机。财务规划最终或许会拥有自己的“半人马”：一位经验丰富的财务规划师加上一个能够提供准确实用建议的人工智能工具。然而，目前大多数客户更倾向于由人类来做财务规划。

Eventually, artificial intelligence may bridge that gap. In professional chess, “centaurs” (the combination of a human and a computer) have tended to be able to beat either the best of human chess players or a well-trained computer. Financial planning might ultimately employ its own centaurs: an experienced financial planner coupled with an artificial-intelligence tool that can generate accurate and helpful advice. For now, however, most clients prefer to have a human do their financial planning.

¹如果您正在阅读这本书，您可能不会那么防御。

¹ If you’re reading this book, you probably aren’t that defensive.

任何人（包括支付较少的病人）会认为这公平吗？

Would anyone—including the patient who paid less—think that’s fair?

然而，金融咨询行业就是这样运作的。大多数顾问不会根据他们提供的服务收取费用——例如，计算你退休后的预期收入或审查你的遗产计划。相反，他们会根据管理的资产规模（AUM）收取年费：他们为你管理的资金规模。

Yet that’s how the financial-advice business works. Most advisers don’t charge fees based on the services they provide—for example, to calculate your projected income during retirement or to review your estate plans. Instead, they charge an annual fee based on assets under management or AUM: how much money they oversee for you.

资产管理规模费用让顾问关注你的投资组合表现。投资组合涨得越高，顾问赚得越多。这可能比每笔交易都向经纪人支付佣金更好，因为后者可以激励投资者尽可能频繁地交易。但资产管理规模费用也会产生一些负面激励，具体表现为：

AUM fees give an adviser an interest in how well your investment portfolio performs. The more it goes up, the more your adviser earns. That might be better than paying brokers a commission for every transaction, which can create an incentive to trade as often as possible. But AUM fees also create perverse incentives by:

奖励顾问不是因为他们的建议有多好，而是因为他们有多少钱；
rewarding advisers not for how good their advice is, but for how much money you have;
施加压力，迫使人们承担风险和采取行动，无论是否必要，以证明“赚取”这些费用是合理的；
creating pressure to take risks and actions, necessary or not, to justify “earning” those fees;
鼓励顾问推动通常质量较差的内部投资；
encouraging advisers to push in-house investments that are often inferior;
对提供投资管理服务的顾问进行补偿，这种服务可以通过指数基金以几乎免费的成本获得，同时对于个性化的财务规划，他们无需支付任何费用，而这种规划可能是极其有价值的。
compensating advisers for providing investment management, which is a commodity available through index funds at virtually no cost—while paying them nothing for personalized financial planning, which can be extraordinarily valuable.

以百分比来表示，1% 听起来很小。但对于一个 100 万美元的账户来说，每年的费用就是 1 万美元。如果投资者清楚地知道自己要支付多少钱，他们肯定会货比三家，寻找更低的费用^。1

Expressed as a percentage, 1% sounds like a teeny number. But, on a $1 million account, it’s $10,000 annually. If investors clearly understood how much they are paying, they surely would shop around for lower fees.¹

行业分析师鲍勃·维尔斯（Bob Veres）和迈克尔·基特斯（Michael Kitces）分别于2020年和2022年对美国1000多名财务顾问进行了调查，发现顾问对高达100万美元的账户收取的年平均费用为0.9%至1.0%。即使是500万美元的账户，也只收取0.6%至0.7%的费用。这些费用几十年来几乎没有变化——尽管在过去几十年里，通过共同基金和ETF投资的成本已经下降了90%甚至更多。

Separate surveys of more than 1,000 financial advisers in the U.S. by industry analysts Bob Veres and Michael Kitces, in 2020 and 2022 respectively, found that advisers were charging a median of 0.9% to 1.0% annually to advise accounts of up to $1,000,000. Even accounts with $5 million paid 0.6% to 0.7%. These fees have barely budged in decades—even though, over the past few decades, the cost of investing through mutual funds and ETFs has fallen 90% or more.

这让投资者陷入了一种荒谬的境地：他们不得不向挑选基金的人支付比管理基金的人高得多的费用。你可以以每年不到0.1%的利率购买指数共同基金或ETF，然后几十年都不受干扰地持有它们。为什么你要每年为此向顾问支付1%的费用呢？为什么复杂的理财建议可以免费，而简单的基金挑选却如此昂贵？

That puts investors in the absurd position of having to pay far more to someone who picks funds than to the people who manage them. You can buy index mutual funds or ETFs for well under 0.1% annually—and then leave them undisturbed for decades. Why should you pay an adviser 1% every year for that? And why should complex financial advice be free but simple fund-picking so expensive?

这些都说不通。寻找按服务收费的顾问：每项任务的定价取决于所需的时间和专业知识，而不是你的资金。有些顾问按小时收费，接受预付款，甚至按月收取订阅费。如果你询问，很多顾问会协商收费。

None of that makes any sense. Look for an adviser who charges fees for service: pricing each task by how much time and expertise it takes, not by how much money you have. Some advisers charge by the hour, accept retainers, or even charge monthly subscription fees. Many will negotiate their fees—if you ask.

认识马克斯，一位甚至没有办公桌的顶级理财规划师

Meet Max, the Top Financial Planner Who Didn’t Even Have a Desk

你的医生、律师或会计师很可能只会在办公室墙上挂一两份裱起来的文件：医学或法律学位、注册会计师或其他会计证书。然而，财务顾问通常会用一整面墙来展示裱起来的、类似文凭的证书和奖项。

Chances are, your doctor, lawyer, or accountant has only one or two framed documents hanging on the office wall: a medical or law degree, a CPA or other accountancy certificate. Financial advisers, though, often display an entire wall full of framed, diploma-like certificates and awards.

由于没有针对金融顾问的知识、能力和职业道德的国家公共标准，声称授予官方认可的私人组织激增。

Because there are no national public standards of knowledge, competence, and professional ethics for financial advisers, private organizations claiming to confer official recognition have proliferated.

有些资格，例如特许金融分析师或注册会计师，需要多年的严格学习和培训。其他资格，例如注册财务规划师，虽然要求不那么繁重，但仍然需要认真的准备。

Some, like Chartered Financial Analyst or Certified Public Accountant, require years of rigorous study and training. Others, such as Certified Financial Planner, take less onerous but still diligent preparation.

但很多都毫无意义。有些机构会给任何有心人，愿意掏出几百美元，就给他们一个经济资助，让他们可以装裱照片。

Many, though, are meaningless. Some organizations will award a financial designation, suitable for framing, to anyone with a pulse willing to fork over a few hundred dollars.

如果您拥有相关执照或学位，并具备三年“相关工作经验”，即可获得财务规划师（Master Financial Planner，简称MFP）证书，费用为349美元，另加29美元运费。无需学习或考试^。1

If you have a relevant license or degree and three years of “related work experience,” then the certificate for a Master Financial Planner or MFP is yours for $349, plus $29 shipping. No studying or exam is required.¹

职位描述也充满弹性。“财富经理”听起来很了不起，但实际上只是一个自封的、自以为是的头衔，缺乏法律定义。

Job descriptions are also elastic. “Wealth manager” sounds impressive but is merely a self-appointed, self-important title with no legal definition.

最后，奖项非常容易获得。2009年，麦克斯韦尔·泰尔瓦格（Maxwell Tailwagger）被评为“美国顶级财务规划师”之一。科罗拉多州科罗拉多斯普林斯的财务规划师艾伦·罗斯（Allan Roth）通过一张183美元的支票“提名”了他，麦克斯因此获得了这一殊荣。作为回报，麦克斯获得了一块令人印象深刻的奖牌，可以挂在办公桌上显眼的地方——如果他有办公桌的话。

Finally, awards are remarkably easy to get. Honored as one of “America’s Top Financial Planners” in 2009, Maxwell Tailwagger won the accolade after financial planner Allan Roth of Colorado Springs, Colorado, “nominated” him by sending in a check for $183. In exchange, Max received an impressive plaque that he could display prominently on his desk—if, that is, he’d had a desk.

美国消费者研究委员会的宗旨是“帮助教育和协助消费者获得最好的专业服务”，尽管马克斯根本不是一名理财规划师，该委员会还是将该奖项授予了他。

Consumers’ Research Council of America, which purported to “help educate and assist consumers in obtaining the finest professional services,” bestowed the award on Max even though he wasn’t a financial planner at all.

马克斯是罗斯先生六个月大的腊肠犬小狗。

Max was Mr. Roth’s six-month-old dachshund puppy.

¹请参阅 FINRA，“专业职称”，bit.ly/47oJosS；Jason Zweig 和 Mary Pilon，“你的顾问是否在夸大其资历？”，bit.ly/3KvRkOO。

¹ See FINRA, “Professional Designations,” bit.ly/47oJosS; Jason Zweig and Mary Pilon, “Is Your Adviser Pumping Up His Credentials?,” bit.ly/3KvRkOO.

寻找顾问

Searching for an Adviser

获得良好财务建议的第一步是了解您的需求。您想要一位主要管理您投资的顾问吗？（除非您是极其谨慎的投资者，否则可能不会。）还是您想要一位主要帮助您处理复杂财务规划的顾问？

The first step in getting good financial advice is knowing what you need. Do you want an adviser who will mainly manage your investments? (Probably not, unless you are an extremely defensive investor.) Or do you want an adviser who can help primarily with the intricacies of financial planning?

其次，坚持聘请一位能够充当受托人的顾问，受托人有义务以您的最佳利益提供建议，披露所有关于成本和利益冲突的重要事实，并确保利益冲突不会损害建议的质量。聘请受托人并不能保证您获得良好的指导，但它是建立在信任基础上的关系的基本前提。

Second, insist on an adviser who will act as a fiduciary, with obligations to provide advice in your best interest, to disclose all material facts about costs and conflicts of interest, and to ensure that conflicts don’t corrupt the quality of the advice. Hiring a fiduciary doesn’t guarantee that you’ll get good guidance, but it’s the basic prerequisite for a relationship built on trust.

在美国，首先访问 NAPFA.org 和 LetsMakeAPlan.org，它们可让您搜索您所在地区的财务规划师。

In the U.S., start by visiting NAPFA.org and LetsMakeAPlan.org, which enable you to search for a financial planner in your geographic area.

找到几位看似合适的顾问后，请快速进行背景调查：访问 brokercheck.finra.org 和 advisorinfo.sec.gov，查看他们是否有违纪记录。查找顾问及其所在公司的信息。留意客户投诉、诉讼和仲裁、监管机构的处罚、刑事案件以及个人破产记录。

Once you find a handful of advisers who seem like possible matches, do a quick background check: Go to brokercheck.finra.org and adviserinfo.sec.gov to see whether they have a disciplinary history. Look up the advisers and their firms. Watch for customer complaints, lawsuits and arbitrations, punishments from regulators, criminal cases, and personal bankruptcies.

然后下载 ADV 表格第 2 部分手册，可在 advisorinfo.sec.gov 上搜索个人或公司名称获取。如果费用达到或超过 1%，纪律处分信息与您在 brokercheck.finra.org 上看到的信息不符，该顾问经营的是佣金制保险代理机构，或者该顾问因推荐客户进行某些投资而收取额外费用，请另寻其他顾问。

Then download the Form ADV Part 2 brochure, available by searching for the name of the person or firm at adviserinfo.sec.gov. If fees are 1% or more, the disciplinary information doesn’t match what you saw on brokercheck.finra.org, the adviser runs a commission-based insurance agency, or the adviser takes extra payments for referring clients into certain investments, find someone else.

在文档中搜索经常使用的术语“年金”、“图表”、“技术分析”、“战术”和“私人基金”。

Search the document for frequent use of the terms “annuities,” “charting,” “technical analysis,” “tactical,” and “private funds.”

年金——通常在预付购买后随着时间的推移产生收入的保险合同——很少是合适的。它们是收取高额费用的最后堡垒之一，有时佣金高达10%，年度费用甚至超过2%。一些顾问会使用其他人则像鹅肝农场主把饲料颗粒塞进鹅的咽喉一样，把年金强行塞进客户的喉咙。

Annuities—insurance contracts that produce income, usually over time after an upfront purchase—are seldom appropriate. They’re one of the last bastions of fat fees, sometimes carrying commissions up to 10% and annual expenses that can exceed 2%. A few advisers use annuities judiciously. Others cram them down clients’ throats like foie-gras farmers stuffing feed pellets down the gullets of geese.

图表分析类似于技术分析，试图通过研究过去的价格模式来预测未来的价格。这些深奥的技巧，如果由训练有素的专业人士操作，几乎难以令人信服；而在许多财务顾问的业余操作下，它们会导致更高的费用、不必要的税单以及糟糕的业绩。

Charting, like technical analysis, attempts to predict future prices by studying the pattern of past prices. These are abstruse arts that are barely credible when practiced by trained specialists; in the amateur hands of many financial advisers, they create higher fees, unnecessary tax bills, and lousy performance.

战术顾问们进进出出，反复交易。如果他们能准确预测市场何时上涨或下跌，他们还会坐在某个不起眼的办公室里，试图把你的钱都抢走吗？还是他们会在游艇上数着自己的钱呢？

Tactical advisers trade in and out. If they could reliably predict when markets are going to rise or fall, would they be sitting in some piddly office trying to get their mitts on your money? Or would they be on a yacht, counting their own?

正如我们在第六章的评论中所见，私募基金价格高得离谱，且存在诸多利益冲突；提供“专有”私募基金的理财顾问很难推荐其他投资，即使其他投资方式可能更适合您。除了极少数例外，私募基金对潜在顾问来说又是一次打击。

Private funds, as we saw in the Commentary on Chapter 6, are extortionately expensive and riddled with conflicts; financial advisers who offer “proprietary” private funds have a powerful disincentive to recommend other investments, even if just about anything else would be better for you. With rare exceptions, private funds are another strike against a potential adviser.

提出正确的问题

Asking the Right Questions

一旦您将可能的顾问候选人名单缩小到三到五人，就预约与他们进行面谈。

Once you’ve winnowed down your list of possible advisory candidates to three to five, make appointments to interview them in person.

向每个人询问同一组问题。

Ask each the same set of questions.

以下是一些至关重要的问题，后面是最佳答案：

Here are a few that are critical, followed by the preferable answer:

您会一直充当受托人吗？您会以书面形式声明吗？（是的。）

Will you always act as a fiduciary, and will you state that in writing? (Yes.)

您主要专注于投资管理，还是也提供税收、遗产和退休、预算、债务管理或保险方面的建议？（在这里，您自己的需求将决定哪个答案是正确的。）

Do you focus mainly on investment management, or do you also advise on taxes, estates and retirement, budgeting, debt management, or insurance? (Here, your own needs will determine which answer is correct.)

推荐某些产品或服务是否会给您带来更多收入（现金或其他奖励）？（不会。）

Do you earn more (in cash or other incentives) for recommending certain products or services? (No.)

您是否通过向客户推荐私募基金或其他投资来赚取费用？（没有。）

Do you earn fees to advise a private fund or other investments you may recommend to clients? (No.)

你们的费用可以协商吗？是按小时还是按服务收费，而不是按管理资产收费？（是的。）

Are your fees negotiable, and will you charge by the hour or by the service, rather than on assets under management? (Yes.)

客户是否曾对您或您的律所提出书面投诉或仲裁请求？您或您的律所是否曾被客户起诉？（问题²）

Have clients filed written complaints or arbitration claims against you or your firm? Have you or your firm been sued by clients? (No.²)

你相信自己可以战胜市场吗？（不相信。）

Do you believe you can beat the market? (No.)

扣除费用、手续费、通货膨胀和税金后，我的投资组合未来年平均回报率的合理预期是多少？（最多 4%。任何给出更高数字的人要么是傻瓜，要么就是在试图欺骗你^。3）

What’s a reasonable expectation for future average annual returns on my portfolio, after expenses, your fees, inflation, and taxes? (4% at most. Anyone who gives a much higher number is either a fool or trying to fool you.³)

谁管理你的资金？（我管理，而且我投资的资产和我向客户推荐的资产相同。）

Who manages your money? (I do, and I invest in the same assets I recommend to my clients.)

如果觉得当面问这么多问题有点尴尬，可以提前通过电子邮件提交。请每位顾问都通过电子邮件回复；他们总能在你们见面时提供更多细节。

If asking so many questions in person feels awkward, submit them by email in advance. Ask each adviser to reply by email; they can always provide extra detail when you meet in person.

提前准备一个记事本或电子表格，记录你的问题和顾问的回答。用从1（最低）到5（最好）的数字等级对每个答案进行评分。用相同的等级对所有答案进行评分，可以避免你武断地过分重视某个答案。

In advance, prepare a notepad or a spreadsheet to keep track of your questions and the advisers’ responses. Rate each answer on a numerical scale from 1 (lowest) to 5 (best). By scoring all the answers on the same scale, you prevent yourself from arbitrarily overweighting a particular response.

顾问回答后立即对每个问题进行评分。如果可能，您和您的配偶或伴侣（如果您是单身，则由您最亲密的朋友或亲戚）应分别对答案进行评分^。4

Score each as soon as the adviser answers. If possible, you and your spouse or partner (or your closest friend or relative if you’re unattached) should rate the answers independently.⁴

警告语

Words of Warning

当你面试一位潜在的顾问时，要警惕那些意在煽动恐惧或贪婪、制造确定性幻觉以及促使你采取紧急行动的词语和短语。顾问是否会不断地用类似的流行语来转移话题，不谈你的目标和处境？

When you interview a potential adviser, be on the alert for words and phrases intended to stoke fear or greed, to invoke the illusion of certainty, and to prod you into taking urgent action. Does the adviser keep changing the subject away from your goals and circumstances to catchphrases like these?

我们的专有算法

our proprietary algorithms

我们的时间模型

our timing model

我们的模型投资组合

our model portfolios

期权策略

options strategy

保证

guaranteed

这是肯定的

it’s a sure thing

每月回报

monthly returns

我们的专属私募基金

our exclusive private funds

在这个市场中，你必须有另类投资

in this market, you have to have alternative investments

我们可以为您提供访问权限

we can get you access

制度质量

institutional quality

我们了解市场

we understand the markets

我们知道如何识别……

we know how to identify . . .

我们的股票推荐上涨了___%

our stock recommendations are up ___%

波动性较小，风险较低，回报较高

less volatility, lower risk, higher return

我们已经为你完成了所有工作

we’ve done all the work for you

其他人都在投资这个

everyone else is investing in this

不要错过这个机会

don’t miss out on this opportunity

你得快点

you need to hurry

这将是你能做出的最好的决定

this will be the best decision you can make

上涨潜力无限

the upside is potentially unlimited

给我们机会展示我们能为您做什么

give us the chance to show what we can do for you

我们没有利益冲突⁵

we have no conflicts of interest⁵

与顾问会面后，请按照相同的五分量表再分配两个等级：一个用于沟通，一个用于您的整体印象。

After you’ve met with the adviser, assign two more grades on the same five-point scale: one for communication, one for your overall impression.

顾问是否用陈词滥调轰炸你？还是你得到了关于费用、策略和利益冲突的清晰、具体的解释？请用同样的1-5分制来评分。

Did the adviser bombard you with clichés? Or did you get clear, specific explanations of fees, strategies, and conflicts? Rate that on the same 1–5 scale.

现在，用你的直觉来评价这位顾问的能力、关怀和可信度。别想太多；闭上眼睛，快速地给你的直觉打分，从1到5。

Now rate your gut feelings about how competent, caring, and trustworthy the adviser is. Don’t overthink it; close your eyes and quickly score your intuitive impression from 1 to 5.

面试完所有顾问并记录好评分后，别再纠结于直觉了：你只需把这些评分算进你的分数里就行了。把每位顾问的分数加起来，然后聘请总分最高的那位。

After you’ve interviewed the advisers and recorded all your ratings, forget about your gut feelings: You’ve just accounted for them in your tally. Add up each adviser’s scores and hire the one with the highest total.

你不应该觉得这一切太过繁琐：你即将把现有的财富和未来的财务状况托付给这个人。与其凭直觉或随机推荐来选择这个人，你难道不应该采取谨慎周全的流程吗？

You shouldn’t view all this as more work than it’s worth: You’re about to consign your current wealth and financial future into this person’s hands. Instead of picking that person by a hunch or by relying on a random referral, shouldn’t you use a careful and deliberate process?

第十一章

Chapter 11 面向普通投资者的证券分析：一般方法

Security Analysis for the Lay Investor: General Approach

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

金融分析如今已成为一个成熟且蓬勃发展的职业，或者说是一个半职业。组成美国金融分析师联合会（National Federation of Financial Analysts）的各个分析师协会拥有超过13,000名会员，其中大多数人以此为生。金融分析师拥有教科书、道德准则和季刊。 *他们也面临着一些尚未解决的问题。近年来，有一种趋势是用“金融分析”取代“证券分析”的通用概念。后者含义更广，更适合描述华尔街大多数高级分析师的工作。将证券分析视为几乎仅限于对股票和债券的审查和评估是有益的，而金融分析则包含这些工作，以及投资政策的制定（投资组合选择），以及大量的一般经济分析。1^在本章中，我们将使用最适用的名称，主要强调证券分析师本身的工作。

Financial analysis is now a well-established and flourishing profession, or semiprofession. The various societies of analysts that make up the National Federation of Financial Analysts have over 13,000 members, most of whom make their living out of this branch of mental activity. Financial analysts have textbooks, a code of ethics, and a quarterly journal.* They also have their share of unresolved problems. In recent years there has been a tendency to replace the general concept of “security analysis” by that of “financial analysis.” The latter phrase has a broader implication and is better suited to describe the work of most senior analysts on Wall Street. It would be useful to think of security analysis as limiting itself pretty much to the examination and evaluation of stocks and bonds, whereas financial analysis would comprise that work, plus the determination of investment policy (portfolio selection), plus a substantial amount of general economic analysis.¹ In this chapter we shall use whatever designation is most applicable, with chief emphasis on the work of the security analyst proper.

证券分析师负责处理任何特定证券的过去、现在和未来。他描述公司业务；总结公司的经营业绩和财务状况；阐述公司的优势和劣势、可能性和风险；评估公司未来的盈利能力。他会根据各种假设，或作为“最佳猜测”来评估其影响力。他会对不同的公司，或同一家公司在不同时期的表现进行细致的比较。最后，他会对发行的安全性（如果是债券或投资级优先股）发表意见，或对普通股的购买吸引力发表意见。

The security analyst deals with the past, the present, and the future of any given security issue. He describes the business; he summarizes its operating results and financial position; he sets forth its strong and weak points, its possibilities and risks; he estimates its future earning power under various assumptions, or as a “best guess.” He makes elaborate comparisons of various companies, or of the same company at various times. Finally, he expresses an opinion as to the safety of the issue, if it is a bond or investment-grade preferred stock, or as to its attractiveness as a purchase, if it is a common stock.

在做所有这些事情时，证券分析师会运用各种各样的技巧，从最基础的到最深奥的都有。他可能会大幅修改公司年度报表中的数字，即使这些数字得到了注册会计师的神圣认可。他尤其会留意这些报告中那些可能比其表述的内容更有意义或更不重要的内容。

In doing all these things the security analyst avails himself of a number of techniques, ranging from the elementary to the most abstruse. He may modify substantially the figures in the company’s annual statements, even though they bear the sacred imprimatur of the certified public accountant. He is on the lookout particularly for items in these reports that may mean a good deal more or less than they say.

证券分析师制定并应用安全标准，以此判断特定债券或优先股是否足够稳健，值得购买投资。这些标准主要与过去的平均收益相关，但也涉及资本结构、营运资本、资产价值和其他事项。

The security analyst develops and applies standards of safety by which we can conclude whether a given bond or preferred stock may be termed sound enough to justify purchase for investment. These standards relate primarily to past average earnings, but they are concerned also with capital structure, working capital, asset values, and other matters.

直到最近，证券分析师在处理普通股时，很少应用像处理债券和优先股那样明确的价值标准。大多数时候，他们满足于对过去业绩的总结、对未来的大致预测（尤其侧重于未来12个月）以及一个相当武断的结论。后者过去和现在往往只是盯着股票行情或市场图表就得出。然而，在过去几年中，执业分析师对成长股的估值问题给予了极大关注。许多成长股的售价相对于过去和当前的收益而言如此之高，以至于推荐这些股票的人感到有义务通过对未来相当长一段时间的预期收益进行相当明确的预测来证明其购买的合理性。某些相当复杂的数学技术不得不被用来支持最终的估值。

In dealing with common stocks the security analyst until recently has only rarely applied standards of value as well defined as were his standards of safety for bonds and preferred stocks. Most of the time he contented himself with a summary of past performances, a more or less general forecast of the future—with particular emphasis on the next 12 months—and a rather arbitrary conclusion. The latter was, and still is, often drawn with one eye on the stock ticker or the market charts. In the past few years, however, much attention has been given by practicing analysts to the problem of valuing growth stocks. Many of these have sold at such high prices in relation to past and current earnings that those recommending them have felt a special obligation to justify their purchase by fairly definite projections of expected earnings running fairly far into the future. Certain mathematical techniques of a rather sophisticated sort have perforce been invoked to support the valuations arrived at.

我们稍后会以简略的形式讨论这些技术。然而，我们必须指出一个棘手的悖论，那就是数学估值恰恰在人们认为它们最不可靠的领域变得最为盛行。因为估值越依赖于对未来的预期——就越与某个数字脱节。过去业绩证明的越少，就越容易出现误算和严重失误。高乘数成长股的价值很大一部分源于对未来的预测，而这些预测与过去业绩存在显著差异——或许除了增长率本身。因此，可以说，如今的证券分析师发现自己被迫在最不利于精确处理的情况下变得最数学化和“科学化”。*

We shall deal with these techniques, in foreshortened form, a little later. However, we must point out a troublesome paradox here, which is that the mathematical valuations have become most prevalent precisely in those areas where one might consider them least reliable. For the more dependent the valuation becomes on anticipations of the future—and the less it is tied to a figure demonstrated by past performance—the more vulnerable it becomes to possible miscalculation and serious error. A large part of the value found for a high-multiplier growth stock is derived from future projections which differ markedly from past performance—except perhaps in the growth rate itself. Thus it may be said that security analysts today find themselves compelled to become most mathematical and “scientific” in the very situations which lend themselves least auspiciously to exact treatment.*

尽管如此，我们还是继续讨论证券分析中更重要的要素和技巧。本文高度精简的论述旨在满足非专业投资者的需求。非专业投资者至少应该理解证券分析师的论述和目标；除此之外，如果可能的话，他还应该能够区分肤浅的分析和合理的分析。

Let us proceed, nonetheless, with our discussion of the more important elements and techniques of security analysis. The present highly condensed treatment is directed to the needs of the nonprofessional investor. At the minimum he should understand what the security analyst is talking about and driving at; beyond that, he should be equipped, if possible, to distinguish between superficial and sound analysis.

对于普通投资者来说，证券分析通常始于解读公司年度财务报告。我们在另一本名为《财务报表解读》的书中，已为普通投资者讲解过这个主题。我们认为在本章中讨论这个问题^既没有必要也不太合适，尤其考虑到本书的重点在于原则和态度，而非信息和描述。让我们来探讨投资选择背后的两个基本问题。衡量公司债券或优先股安全性的主要标准是什么？普通股估值的主要因素是什么？

Security analysis for the lay investor is thought of as beginning with the interpretation of a company’s annual financial report. This is a subject which we have covered for laymen in a separate book, entitled The Interpretation of Financial Statements.² We do not consider it necessary or appropriate to traverse the same ground in this chapter, especially since the emphasis in the present book is on principles and attitudes rather than on information and description. Let us pass on to two basic questions underlying the selection of investments. What are the primary tests of safety of a corporate bond or preferred stock? What are the chief factors entering into the valuation of a common stock?

债券分析

Bond Analysis

证券分析中最可靠、因而也是最受尊敬的分支关注的是债券发行和投资级优先股的安全性或质量。公司债券的主要衡量标准是过去几年可用收益覆盖总利息费用的倍数。对于优先股，衡量标准是债券利息和优先股股息之和的覆盖倍数。

The most dependable and hence the most respectable branch of security analysis concerns itself with the safety, or quality, of bond issues and investment-grade preferred stocks. The chief criterion used for corporate bonds is the number of times that total interest charges have been covered by available earnings for some years in the past. In the case of preferred stocks, it is the number of times that bond interest and preferred dividends combined have been covered.

具体适用的标准会因不同的权威机构而异。由于测试本质上是任意的，因此无法精确确定最合适的标准。在我们1961年修订的教科书《证券分析》中，我们推荐了一些“覆盖”标准，如表11-1所示。*

The exact standards applied will vary with different authorities. Since the tests are at bottom arbitrary, there is no way to determine precisely the most suitable criteria. In the 1961 revision of our textbook, Security Analysis, we recommend certain “coverage” standards, which appear in Table 11-1.*

我们的基本测试仅适用于一段时间内的平均业绩。其他机构也要求显示每个被考量年份的最低覆盖范围。我们批准使用“最差年份”测试来替代七年平均测试；只要债券或优先股符合其中任何一个标准，即可满足要求。

Our basic test is applied only to the average results for a period of years. Other authorities require also that a minimum coverage be shown for every year considered. We approve a “poorest-year” test as an alternative to the seven-year-average test; it would be sufficient if the bond or preferred stock met either of these criteria.

有人可能会反对，认为自1961年以来债券利率的大幅上涨，应该相应减少所需费用的覆盖率。显然，对于一家工业公司来说，在利率为8%时，要证明其利息费用覆盖率达到七倍，要比在利率为4.5%时困难得多。为了应对这种变化，我们现在建议采用与债务本金收益率百分比相关的替代要求。对于工业公司，这些数字可能是税前33%，对于公用事业公司，可能是20%，对于铁路公司，可能是25%。需要注意的是，大多数公司实际支付的总债务利率远低于目前的8%，因为它们受益于较老的债券发行。附有较低的票息。“最贫困年份”的要求可以设定为七年要求的三分之二左右。

It may be objected that the large increase in bond interest rates since 1961 would justify some offsetting reduction in the coverage of charges required. Obviously it would be much harder for an industrial company to show a seven-times coverage of interest charges at 8% than at 4½%. To meet this changed situation we now suggest an alternative requirement related to the percent earned on the principal amount of the debt. These figures might be 33% before taxes for an industrial company, 20% for a public utility, and 25% for a railroad. It should be borne in mind here that the rate actually paid by most companies on their total debt is considerably less than the current 8% figure, since they have the benefit of older issues bearing lower coupons. The “poorest year” requirement could be set at about two-thirds of the seven-year requirement.

表 11-1 债券和优先股的最低“覆盖率”建议

TABLE 11-1 Recommended Minimum “Coverage” for Bonds and Preferred Stocks

B.对于投资级优先股

B. For Investment-grade Preferred Stocks

所得税前收益与固定费用之和加上两倍优先股股息之和的比率需要显示与上述相同的最低数字。

The same minimum figures as above are required to be shown by the ratio of earnings before income taxes to the sum of fixed charges plus twice preferred dividends.

注意：纳入两倍优先股息意味着优先股息不能扣除所得税，而利息费用可以扣除。

NOTE: The inclusion of twice the preferred dividends allows for the fact that preferred dividends are not income-tax deductible, whereas interest charges are so deductible.

C.其他类别的债券和优先股

C. Other Categories of Bonds and Preferreds

上述标准不适用于（1）公用事业控股公司、（2）金融公司、（3）房地产公司。此处省略对这些特殊群体的要求。

The standards given above are not applicable to (1) public-utility holding companies, (2) financial companies, (3) real-estate companies. Requirements for these special groups are omitted here.

除了收入覆盖测试外，通常还会采用其他一些测试。这些测试包括：

In addition to the earnings-coverage test, a number of others are generally applied. These include the following:

1.企业规模。企业的业务规模有一个最低标准——介于工业、公用事业和铁路——以及一个城市的人口。

1. Size of Enterprise. There is a minimum standard in terms of volume of business for a corporation—varying as between industrials, utilities, and railroads—and of population for a municipality.

2.股票/权益比率。这是次级股发行的市场价格*与债务票面总额（即债务加优先股）的比率。它粗略衡量了次级投资所提供的保护或“缓冲”，该投资必须首先承受不利发展的影响。该因素包括市场对企业未来前景的评估。

2. Stock/Equity Ratio. This is the ratio of the market price of the junior stock issues* to the total face amount of the debt, or the debt plus preferred stock. It is a rough measure of the protection, or “cushion,” afforded by the presence of a junior investment that must first bear the brunt of unfavorable developments. This factor includes the market’s appraisal of the future prospects of the enterprise.

3.资产价值。资产价值，无论是资产负债表上显示的还是评估的，过去被认为是债券发行的主要保障。经验表明，在大多数情况下，安全性在于盈利能力，如果盈利能力不足，资产将损失其大部分声誉价值。然而，资产价值仍然重要，因为它是衡量三类企业债券和优先股是否具有充足安全性的单独测试标准：公用事业（因为利率可能在很大程度上取决于房地产投资）、房地产公司和投资公司。

3. Property Value. The asset values, as shown on the balance sheet or as appraised, were formerly considered the chief security and protection for a bond issue. Experience has shown that in most cases safety resides in the earning power, and if this is deficient the assets lose most of their reputed value. Asset values, however, retain importance as a separate test of ample security for bonds and preferred stocks in three enterprise groups: public utilities (because rates may depend largely on the property investment), real-estate concerns, and investment companies.

此时，警惕的投资者应该问：“鉴于利息和本金的支付取决于未来的发展，以过去和现在的表现来衡量的安全性测试有多可靠？” 答案只能基于经验。投资历史表明，基于过去经验，通过严格安全性测试的债券和优先股，在绝大多数情况下都能够成功应对未来的变迁。这一点在铁路债券这一主要领域得到了显著证明——该领域破产和巨额亏损的灾难性频率令人震惊。几乎在所有陷入困境的铁路公司中，都曾长期持有过多的债券，在平均繁荣时期，固定费用的覆盖率不足，因此……被采用严格安全测试的投资者排除在外。相反，几乎每一条通过此类测试的铁路都摆脱了财务困境。20 世纪 40 年代和 1950 年重组的众多铁路的财务历史有力地证明了我们的前提。除一家外，所有这些铁路公司在成立之初都采用固定收费，并将其降低到足以满足当前固定利息要求的程度，或者至少是相当可观的。纽黑文铁路是个例外，它在 1947 年重组那一年，其新收费的收益仅为其 1.1 倍。结果，当所有其他铁路公司都能够安然度过相当困难的时期并且偿付能力未受损害时，纽黑文铁路却在 1961 年再次陷入托管（第三次）。

At this point the alert investor should ask, “How dependable are tests of safety that are measured by past and present performance, in view of the fact that payment of interest and principal depends upon what the future will bring forth?” The answer can be founded only on experience. Investment history shows that bonds and preferred stocks that have met stringent tests of safety, based on the past, have in the great majority of cases been able to face the vicissitudes of the future successfully. This has been strikingly demonstrated in the major field of railroad bonds—a field that has been marked by a calamitous frequency of bankruptcies and serious losses. In nearly every case the roads that got into trouble had long been overbonded, had shown an inadequate coverage of fixed charges in periods of average prosperity, and would thus have been ruled out by investors who applied strict tests of safety. Conversely, practically every road that has met such tests has escaped financial embarrassment. Our premise was strikingly vindicated by the financial history of the numerous railroads reorganized in the 1940s and in 1950. All of these, with one exception, started their careers with fixed charges reduced to a point where the current coverage of fixed-interest requirements was ample, or at least respectable. The exception was the New Haven Railroad, which in its reorganization year, 1947, earned its new charges only about 1.1 times. In consequence, while all the other roads were able to come through rather difficult times with solvency unimpaired, the New Haven relapsed into trusteeship (for the third time) in 1961.

下文第17章将探讨宾夕法尼亚中央铁路公司破产案的某些方面，该案于1970年震惊了金融界。该案的一个基本事实是，早在1965年，固定费用的覆盖范围就不符合保守标准；因此，谨慎的债券投资者早在该系统财务崩溃之前就会避免或处置其发行的债券。

In Chapter 17 below we shall consider some aspects of the bankruptcy of the Penn Central Railroad, which shook the financial community in 1970. An elementary fact in this case was that the coverage of fixed charges did not meet conservative standards as early as 1965; hence a prudent bond investor would have avoided or disposed of the bond issues of the system long before its financial collapse.

我们对过去记录是否足以判断未来安全性的观察，尤其适用于公用事业，因为公用事业是债券投资的主要领域。接管一家资本充足的（电力）公用事业公司或系统几乎是不可能的。自美国证券交易委员会（SEC）设立监管部门*以及大多数控股公司体系解散以来，公用事业的融资一直很稳健，破产事件鲜有发生。20世纪30年代电力和天然气公用事业的财务困境几乎100%可以归咎于财务过度和管理不善，这些都对公司的资本结构产生了显著的影响。因此，简单但严格的安全性测试可以警示投资者远离那些后来违约的公司。

Our observations on the adequacy of the past record to judge future safety apply, and to an even greater degree, to the public utilities, which constitute a major area for bond investment. Receivership of a soundly capitalized (electric) utility company or system is almost impossible. Since Securities and Exchange Commission control was instituted,* along with the breakup of most of the holding-company systems, public-utility financing has been sound and bankruptcies unknown. The financial troubles of electric and gas utilities in the 1930s were traceable almost 100% to financial excesses and mismanagement, which left their imprint clearly on the companies’ capitalization structures. Simple but stringent tests of safety, therefore, would have warned the investor away from the issues that were later to default.

在工业债券发行中，长期记录是情况有所不同。尽管工业集团整体盈利能力的增长速度优于铁路或公用事业，但它也显示出个别公司和业务线的内在稳定性较低。因此，至少在过去，有令人信服的理由将工业债券和优先股的购买范围限制在那些不仅规模庞大，而且过去也表现出能够抵御严重经济衰退的公司。

Among industrial bond issues the long-term record has been different. Although the industrial group as a whole has shown a better growth of earning power than either the railroads or the utilities, it has revealed a lesser degree of inherent stability for individual companies and lines of business. Thus in the past, at least, there have been persuasive reasons for confining the purchase of industrial bonds and preferred stocks to companies that not only are of major size but also have shown an ability in the past to withstand a serious depression.

自1950年以来，工业债券违约事件很少发生，但这部分归因于这段漫长的时期内没有发生大萧条。自1966年以来，许多工业公司的财务状况出现了不利的变化。不明智的扩张导致了巨大的困难。一方面，这导致银行贷款和长期债务的大量增加；另一方面，它常常导致经营亏损，而不是预期的利润。1971年初，据计算，在过去七年里，所有非金融公司的利息支出从1963年的98亿美元增长到1970年的261亿美元，利息支出占1971年息税前利润总额的29%，而1963年仅为16%。3^显然，许多个体公司的负担远不止于此。过度负债的公司已经司空见惯。我们有充分的理由重申我们在1965年版中所表达的警告：

Few defaults of industrial bonds have occurred since 1950, but this fact is attributable in part to the absence of a major depression during this long period. Since 1966 there have been adverse developments in the financial position of many industrial companies. Considerable difficulties have developed as the result of unwise expansion. On the one hand this has involved large additions to both bank loans and long-term debt; on the other it has frequently produced operating losses instead of the expected profits. At the beginning of 1971 it was calculated that in the past seven years the interest payments of all nonfinancial firms had grown from $9.8 billion in 1963 to $26.1 billion in 1970, and that interest payments had taken 29% of the aggregate profits before interest and taxes in 1971, against only 16% in 1963.³ Obviously, the burden on many individual firms had increased much more than this. Overbonded companies have become all too familiar. There is every reason to repeat the caution expressed in our 1965 edition:

我们还没有完全准备好建议投资者可以依赖这种有利形势无限期地持续下去，从而放松其在工业或任何其他集团的债券选择标准。

We are not quite ready to suggest that the investor may count on an indefinite continuance of this favorable situation, and hence relax his standards of bond selection in the industrial or any other group.

普通股分析

Common-Stock Analysis

理想的普通股分析方法是对发行股票进行估值，并将其与当前价格进行比较，以确定该证券是否具有购买吸引力。而估值通常是通过估算未来几年的平均收益，然后将该估值乘以一个合适的“资本化系数”得出的。

The ideal form of common-stock analysis leads to a valuation of the issue which can be compared with the current price to determine whether or not the security is an attractive purchase. This valuation, in turn, would ordinarily be found by estimating the average earnings over a period of years in the future and then multiplying that estimate by an appropriate “capitalization factor.”

目前，估算未来盈利能力的标准程序始于实物量、销售价格和营业利润率的平均历史数据。然后，基于对先前基数上销量和价格水平变化量的假设，预测未来的美元销售额。这些估算首先基于对国民生产总值的一般经济预测，然后基于适用于相关行业和公司的特殊计算。

The now-standard procedure for estimating future earning power starts with average past data for physical volume, prices received, and operating margin. Future sales in dollars are then projected on the basis of assumptions as to the amount of change in volume and price level over the previous base. These estimates, in turn, are grounded first on general economic forecasts of gross national product, and then on special calculations applicable to the industry and company in question.

这种估值方法的例子可以参考我们1965年版，并通过添加续篇进行了更新。领先的投资服务公司“价值线”（Value Line）通过上述程序预测未来收益和股息，然后通过对每只债券应用一个主要基于过去某些关系的估值公式，得出“价格潜力”（或预计市场价值）的数值。在表11-2中，我们复制了1964年6月对1967-1969年债券的预测，并将其与1968年（接近1967-1969年期间）实际实现的收益和平均市场价格进行了比较。

An illustration of this method of valuation may be taken from our 1965 edition and brought up to date by adding the sequel. The Value Line, a leading investment service, makes forecasts of future earnings and dividends by the procedure outlined above, and then derives a figure of “price potentiality” (or projected market value) by applying a valuation formula to each issue based largely on certain past relationships. In Table 11-2 we reproduce the projections for 1967–1969 made in June 1964, and compare them with the earnings, and average market price actually realized in 1968 (which approximates the 1967–1969 period).

综合预测结果显示，估值略偏低，但并不严重。六年前的相应预测对盈利和股息的预期过于乐观；但低乘数的使用抵消了这一影响，最终“价格潜力”数据与1963年的实际平均价格大致相同。

The combined forecasts proved to be somewhat on the low side, but not seriously so. The corresponding predictions made six years before had turned out to be overoptimistic on earnings and dividends; but this had been offset by use of a low multiplier, with the result that the “price potentiality” figure proved to be about the same as the actual average price for 1963.

读者会注意到，相当多的个别预测都大错特错。这恰恰印证了我们普遍的观点：综合估值或集团估值可能比个别公司的估值更可靠。理想情况下，证券分析师应该挑选出他认为最了解其未来走势的三四家公司，并将自己和客户的注意力集中在他对它们的预测上。不幸的是，几乎不可能提前区分哪些个别预测是可靠的，哪些预测容易出错。归根结底，这正是投资基金广泛采用多元化投资策略的原因。因为，与其仅仅为了多元化而将业绩稀释到平庸的水平，不如专注于一只你 知道 会盈利丰厚的股票。但人们并没有这样做，因为这样做不可能可靠。⁴广泛多元化的盛行本身就是对华尔街不断口头宣扬的“选择性”迷信的务实否定。*

The reader will note that quite a number of the individual forecasts were wide of the mark. This is an instance in support of our general view that composite or group estimates are likely to be a good deal more dependable than those for individual companies. Ideally, perhaps, the security analyst should pick out the three or four companies whose future he thinks he knows the best, and concentrate his own and his clients’ interest on what he forecasts for them. Unfortunately, it appears to be almost impossible to distinguish in advance between those individual forecasts which can be relied upon and those which are subject to a large chance of error. At bottom, this is the reason for the wide diversification practiced by the investment funds. For it is undoubtedly better to concentrate on one stock that you know is going to prove highly profitable, rather than dilute your results to a mediocre figure, merely for diversification’s sake. But this is not done, because it cannot be done dependably.⁴ The prevalence of wide diversification is in itself a pragmatic repudiation of the fetish of “selectivity,” to which Wall Street constantly pays lip service.*

表 11-2 道琼斯工业平均指数

TABLE 11-2 The Dow Jones Industrial Average

价值线对 1967-1969 年的预测（1964 年中期做出）与 1968 年实际结果的比较

The Value Line’s Forecast for 1967–1969 (Made in Mid-1964) Compared With Actual Results in 1968

^a假设优先股转换。

^a Assuming conversion of preferred stock.

^b每股 13 美分的特殊费用之后。

^b After special charge of 13 cents per share.

^c年度截至 1970 年 9 月。

^c Year ended Sept. 1970.

影响资本化率的因素

Factors Affecting the Capitalization Rate

虽然平均未来收益被认为是决定价值的主要因素，但证券分析师还会考虑许多其他或多或少确定的因素。其中大部分因素都会体现在他的资本化率中，而资本化率的波动范围可能很大，取决于股票发行的“质量”。因此，即使两家公司在1973年至1975年间的预期每股收益相同（比如4美元），分析师也可能将其中一家的估值低至40，而将另一家的估值高至100。让我们简要讨论一下这些不同乘数中的一些考虑因素。

Though average future earnings are supposed to be the chief determinant of value, the security analyst takes into account a number of other factors of a more or less definite nature. Most of these will enter into his capitalization rate, which can vary over a wide range, depending upon the “quality” of the stock issue. Thus, although two companies may have the same figure of expected earnings per share in 1973–1975—say $4—the analyst may value one as low as 40 and the other as high as 100. Let us deal briefly with some of the considerations that enter into these divergent multipliers.

1.总体长期前景。 没有人真正知道遥远的未来会发生什么，但分析师和投资者对此持有强烈的看法。这些看法反映在个别公司和行业集团市盈率之间的巨大差异上。在1965年版中，我们在此补充了以下内容：

1. General Long-Term Prospects. No one really knows anything about what will happen in the distant future, but analysts and investors have strong views on the subject just the same. These views are reflected in the substantial differentials between the price/earnings ratios of individual companies and of industry groups. At this point we added in our 1965 edition:

例如，1963 年底，道琼斯工业平均指数中的化学公司股票的市盈率远高于石油公司，这表明投资者对前者的前景比后者更有信心。市场通常有着稳固的基础，但当主要受过去表现的左右时，它们可能正确也可能错误。

For example, at the end of 1963 the chemical companies in the DJIA were selling at considerably higher multipliers than the oil companies, indicating stronger confidence in the prospects of the former than of the latter. Such distinctions made by the market are often soundly based, but when dictated mainly by past performance they are as likely to be wrong as right.

我们将在表 11-3中提供道琼斯工业平均指数中化工和石油公司在 1963 年末的成分股数据，并将其收益结转到 1970 年底。可以看出，尽管化工公司的乘数很高，但在 1963 年之后，它们的收益几乎没有增长。石油公司的表现比化工公司好得多，大致与它们 1963 年乘数所隐含的增长一致。5^因此，我们的化工股票示例被证明是市场乘数被证明是错误的案例之一。*

We shall supply here, in Table 11-3, the 1963 year-end material on the chemical and oil company issues in the DJIA, and carry their earnings to the end of 1970. It will be seen that the chemical companies, despite their high multipliers, made practically no gain in earnings in the period after 1963. The oil companies did much better than the chemicals and about in line with the growth implied in their 1963 multipliers.⁵ Thus our chemical-stock example proved to be one of the cases in which the market multipliers were proven wrong.*

2.管理。华尔街关于这个话题的讨论很多，但真正有用的却很少。在客观、量化且合理可靠的管理能力测试被设计出来并应用之前，人们仍会对这个因素抱有迷茫的印象。一家极其成功的公司拥有异常优秀的管理，这种假设是合理的。这在过去的业绩记录中已经得到体现；它将在未来五年的估值中再次体现，并再次体现在之前讨论过的长期前景因素中。如果再一次将其作为单独的看涨因素考虑，很容易导致代价高昂的估值。我们认为，管理因素在近期发生的变化尚未在实际数据中体现其重要性的情况下最为有效。

2. Management. On Wall Street a great deal is constantly said on this subject, but little that is really helpful. Until objective, quantitative, and reasonably reliable tests of managerial competence are devised and applied, this factor will continue to be looked at through a fog. It is fair to assume that an outstandingly successful company has unusually good management. This will have shown itself already in the past record; it will show up again in the estimates for the next five years, and once more in the previously discussed factor of long-term prospects. The tendency to count it still another time as a separate bullish consideration can easily lead to expensive overvaluations. The management factor is most useful, we think, in those cases in which a recent change has taken place that has not yet had the time to show its significance in the actual figures.

表 11-3 道琼斯工业平均指数中化工和石油类股票的表现，1970 年与 1964 年

TABLE 11-3 Performance of Chemical and Oil Stocks in the DJIA, 1970 versus 1964

^{1963 年的数据}根据通用汽车股份的分配进行了调整。

^a 1963 figures adjusted for distribution of General Motors shares.

^b 1963 年的数据根据随后的股票分割进行了调整。

^b 1963 figures adjusted for subsequent stock splits.

克莱斯勒汽车公司就曾发生过两次类似的惊人事件。第一次发生在1921年，当时沃尔特·克莱斯勒接管了濒临倒闭的麦克斯韦汽车公司，并在几年内将其打造成为一家规模庞大、利润丰厚的企业，而与此同时，许多其他汽车公司则被迫倒闭。第二次发生在1962年，当时克莱斯勒的股价已远超其曾经的高点，股价也跌至多年来的最低点。随后，与联合煤炭公司（Consolidation Coal）相关的新利益集团接管了克莱斯勒。公司收益从1961年的每股1.24美元飙升至1963年的每股17美元，股价也从1962年的8.5美元低点飙升至次年的近200美元^。6

Two spectacular occurrences of this kind were associated with the Chrysler Motor Corporation. The first took place as far back as 1921, when Walter Chrysler took command of the almost moribund Maxwell Motors, and in a few years made it a large and highly profitable enterprise, while numerous other automobile companies were forced out of business. The second happened as recently as 1962, when Chrysler had fallen far from its once high estate and the stock was selling at its lowest price in many years. Then new interests, associated with Consolidation Coal, took over the reins. The earnings advanced from the 1961 figure of $1.24 per share to the equivalent of $17 in 1963, and the price rose from a low of 8½ in 1962 to the equivalent of nearly 200 the very next year.⁶

3.财务实力和资本结构。一家拥有大量剩余现金且普通股没有优先股的公司股票，在同等价格下，显然比另一家每股收益相同但银行贷款额度较大且持有优先证券的公司更值得购买。证券分析师会妥善且仔细地考虑这些因素。然而，少量债券或优先股并不一定对普通股不利，适度使用季节性银行信贷亦然。（顺便说一句，头重脚轻的结构——普通股相对于债券和优先股过少——在有利条件下，可能会为普通股带来巨额投机利润。这就是所谓的“杠杆”。）

3. Financial Strength and Capital Structure. Stock of a company with a lot of surplus cash and nothing ahead of the common is clearly a better purchase (at the same price) than another one with the same per share earnings but large bank loans and senior securities. Such factors are properly and carefully taken into account by security analysts. A modest amount of bonds or preferred stock, however, is not necessarily a disadvantage to the common, nor is the moderate use of seasonal bank credit. (Incidentally, a top-heavy structure—too little common stock in relation to bonds and preferred—may under favorable conditions make for a huge speculative profit in the common. This is the factor known as “leverage.”)

4.股息记录。衡量高质量公司最有说服力的指标之一是多年来持续的股息支付记录。我们认为，过去20年或更长时间的持续股息支付记录是公司质量评级的一个重要加分因素。事实上，防御型投资者或许有理由将购买范围限制在符合这一标准的公司。

4. Dividend Record. One of the most persuasive tests of high quality is an uninterrupted record of dividend payments going back over many years. We think that a record of continuous dividend payments for the last 20 years or more is an important plus factor in the company’s quality rating. Indeed the defensive investor might be justified in limiting his purchases to those meeting this test.

5.当前股息率。这是我们最后一个附加因素，也是最难令人满意地处理的因素。幸运的是，大多数公司都遵循了所谓的标准股息政策。这意味着公司会分配约三分之二的平均收益，但在近期高利润和通货膨胀导致资本需求增加的时期，这一数字往往会降低。（1969 年，股票的股息率为 59.5%）道琼斯指数的平均股息收益率为55%，而所有美国公司的平均股息收益率为55%。*如果股息与收益呈正常关系，则估值可以采用任何一种基准，而不会对结果产生实质性影响。例如，一家典型的二级市场公司，其预期平均收益为3美元，预期股息为2美元，其估值可以采用其收益的12倍或股息的18倍，两种情况下的估值均为36倍。

5. Current Dividend Rate. This, our last additional factor, is the most difficult one to deal with in satisfactory fashion. Fortunately, the majority of companies have come to follow what may be called a standard dividend policy. This has meant the distribution of about two-thirds of their average earnings, except that in the recent period of high profits and inflationary demands for more capital the figure has tended to be lower. (In 1969 it was 59.5% for the stocks in the Dow Jones average, and 55% for all American corporations.)* Where the dividend bears a normal relationship to the earnings, the valuation may be made on either basis without substantially affecting the result. For example, a typical secondary company with expected average earnings of $3 and an expected dividend of $2 may be valued at either 12 times its earnings or 18 times its dividend, to yield a value of 36 in both cases.

然而，越来越多的成长型公司正在放弃曾经将60%或更多收益用于股息的标准政策，理由是将几乎所有利润用于扩张资金更符合股东利益。这个问题存在诸多问题，需要仔细区分。我们决定将关于合理股息政策这一关键问题的讨论推迟到下一节——第19章——我们将在下一节中将其作为管理层与股东关系的一般问题的一部分来处理。

However, an increasing number of growth companies are departing from the once standard policy of paying out 60% or more of earnings in dividends, on the grounds that the shareholders’ interests will be better served by retaining nearly all the profits to finance expansion. The issue presents problems and requires careful distinctions. We have decided to defer our discussion of the vital question of proper dividend policy to a later section—Chapter 19—where we shall deal with it as a part of the general problem of management-shareholder relations.

成长股的资本化率

Capitalization Rates for Growth Stocks

证券分析师撰写的关于正式评估的文章大多与成长股的估值有关。我们对各种方法的研究，促使我们提出了一个简化且相当简单的成长股估值公式，该公式旨在得出与更精细的数学计算结果相当接近的数字。我们的公式是：

Most of the writing of security analysts on formal appraisals relates to the valuation of growth stocks. Our study of the various methods has led us to suggest a foreshortened and quite simple formula for the valuation of growth stocks, which is intended to produce figures fairly close to those resulting from the more refined mathematical calculations. Our formula is:

价值 = 当前（正常）收益 × （8.5 加上两倍预期年增长率）

Value = Current (Normal) Earnings × (8.5 plus twice the expected annual growth rate)

这个增长数字应该是未来七到十年的预期数字^。7

The growth figure should be that expected over the next seven to ten years.⁷

在表11-4中，我们展示了我们的公式在不同假设增长率下的计算结果。假设我们的公式成立，很容易进行逆向计算，并确定当前市场价格预期的增长率。在上一版中，我们对道琼斯工业平均指数和六只重要股票进行了同样的计算。这些数字列于表11-5中。我们当时评论道：

In Table 11-4 we show how our formula works out for various rates of assumed growth. It is easy to make the converse calculation and to determine what rate of growth is anticipated by the current market price, assuming our formula is valid. In our last edition we made that calculation for the DJIA and for six important stock issues. These figures are reproduced in Table 11-5. We commented at the time:

施乐公司32.4%的隐含年增长率与通用汽车极其温和的2.8%之间的差距确实令人震惊。部分原因在于股市认为，通用汽车1963年的盈利——历史上任何公司的最高纪录——难以维持，最多只能略微超过。而施乐公司的市盈率则相当典型地体现了人们对这家成就斐然、甚至可能前景光明的公司所抱有的投机热情。

The difference between the implicit 32.4% annual growth rate for Xerox and the extremely modest 2.8% for General Motors is indeed striking. It is explainable in part by the stock market’s feeling that General Motors’ 1963 earnings—the largest for any corporation in history—can be maintained with difficulty and exceeded only modestly at best. The price earnings ratio of Xerox, on the other hand, is quite representative of speculative enthusiasm fastened upon a company of great achievement and perhaps still greater promise.

道琼斯工业平均指数的隐含或预期增长率为 5.1%，而 1951-1953 年和 1961-1963 年期间的实际年增长率为 3.4%（复合）。

The implicit or expected growth rate of 5.1% for the DJIA compares with an actual annual increase of 3.4% (compounded) between 1951–1953 and 1961–1963.

我们本应添加以下警告：如果我们假设这些增长率能够真正实现，那么预期高增长股票的估值必然偏低。事实上，根据算法，如果一家公司未来能够 无限期地 以8%或更高的速度增长，那么它的价值将是无限的，任何价格都不会高到难以承受。在这种情况下，估值师实际上的做法是在计算中引入安全边际——有点像工程师在设计结构规范时所做的那样。*在此基础上，即使实际实现的增长率远低于公式中的预测值，这些购买行为也能实现其既定目标（1963年，未来年总回报率为7.5%）。当然，如果该增长率真的实现了，投资者肯定会获得丰厚的额外回报。实际上，没有办法对高增长公司（预期年增长率高于 8%）进行估值，分析师可以对当前收益的适当乘数和未来收益的预期乘数做出现实的假设。

We should have added a caution somewhat as follows: The valuations of expected high-growth stocks are necessarily on the low side, if we were to assume these growth rates will actually be realized. In fact, according to the arithmetic, if a company could be assumed to grow at a rate of 8% or more indefinitely in the future its value would be infinite, and no price would be too high to pay for the shares. What the valuer actually does in these cases is to introduce a margin of safety into his calculations—somewhat as an engineer does in his specifications for a structure.* On this basis the purchases would realize his assigned objective (in 1963, a future overall return of 7½% per annum) even if the growth rate actually realized proved substantially less than that projected in the formula. Of course, then, if that rate were actually realized the investor would be sure to enjoy a handsome additional return. There is really no way of valuing a high-growth company (with an expected rate above, say, 8% annually), in which the analyst can make realistic assumptions of both the proper multiplier for the current earnings and the expectable multiplier for the future earnings.

表 11-4 基于预期增长率的年度收益乘数（基于简化公式）

TABLE 11-4 Annual Earnings Multipliers Based on Expected Growth Rates, Based on a Simplified Formula

表 11-5 1963 年 12 月和 1969 年 12 月的隐含增长率或预期增长率

TABLE 11-5 Implicit or Expected Growth Rates, December 1963 and December 1969

^a根据此处的公式。

^a Based on formula here.

^b 1968 年和 1970 年的平均值，因为 1969 年罢工导致收入减少。

^b Average of 1968 and 1970, since 1969 earnings were reduced by strike.

^c已根据股票分割进行调整。

^c Adjusted for stock splits.

事实上，施乐和IBM的实际增长率与我们公式所隐含的高增长率非常接近。正如刚才所解释的，这种良好的表现必然导致这两家公司的股价大幅上涨。道琼斯工业平均指数本身的增长率也与1963年收盘价的预测值大致相同。但5%的适度增长率并不存在施乐和IBM的数学难题。事实证明，截至1970年底23%的股价涨幅，加上28%的总股息回报率，与我们公式所假设的7.5%的年总收益率相差无几。对于其他四家公司，可以说它们的增长率并未达到1963年股价所隐含的预期，而且它们的股价涨幅也未能赶上道琼斯工业平均指数。警告：本材料仅供参考，因为在证券分析中，预测大多数研究公司的未来增长率是不可避免的。请读者不要误以为此类预测具有高度可靠性，或者相反，可以指望未来的价格会随着预言的实现、超越或落空而发生相应的变动。

As it happened the actual growth for Xerox and IBM proved very close to the high rates implied from our formula. As just explained, this fine showing inevitably produced a large advance in the price of both issues. The growth of the DJIA itself was also about as projected by the 1963 closing market price. But the moderate rate of 5% did not involve the mathematical dilemma of Xerox and IBM. It turned out that the 23% price rise to the end of 1970, plus the 28% in aggregate dividend return received, gave not far from the 7½% annual overall gain posited in our formula. In the case of the other four companies it may suffice to say that their growth did not equal the expectations implied in the 1963 price and that their quotations failed to rise as much as the DJIA. Warning: This material is supplied for illustrative purposes only, and because of the inescapable necessity in security analysis to project the future growth rate for most companies studied. Let the reader not be misled into thinking that such projections have any high degree of reliability or, conversely, that future prices can be counted on to behave accordingly as the prophecies are realized, surpassed, or disappointed.

我们应该指出，任何基于预期未来结果的“科学”或至少合理可靠的股票估值都必须考虑未来利率。对于给定的预期收益或股息，如果我们假设利率较高，其现值会比假设利率较低时更小。*这类假设一直以来都很难以任何程度的信心做出，而近期长期利率的剧烈波动利率使得这类预测几乎显得武断。因此，我们保留了上面的旧公式，只是因为没有新的公式看起来更合理。

We should point out that any “scientific,” or at least reasonably dependable, stock evaluation based on anticipated future results must take future interest rates into account. A given schedule of expected earnings, or dividends, would have a smaller present value if we assume a higher than if we assume a lower interest structure.* Such assumptions have always been difficult to make with any degree of confidence, and the recent violent swings in long-term interest rates render forecasts of this sort almost presumptuous. Hence we have retained our old formula above, simply because no new one would appear more plausible.

行业分析

Industry Analysis

由于企业的总体前景在市场价格的形成中占据重要地位，证券分析师自然会高度关注行业及其所属公司的整体经济状况。此类研究可以深入细致，有时甚至能够洞察未来将发挥作用、但当前市场尚未充分重视的重要因素。如果能够得出相当有把握的结论，就能为投资决策提供坚实的基础。

Because the general prospects of the enterprise carry major weight in the establishment of market prices, it is natural for the security analyst to devote a great deal of attention to the economic position of the industry and of the individual company in its industry. Studies of this kind can go into unlimited detail. They are sometimes productive of valuable insights into important factors that will be operative in the future and are insufficiently appreciated by the current market. Where a conclusion of that kind can be drawn with a fair degree of confidence, it affords a sound basis for investment decisions.

然而，我们自身的观察导致我们在某种程度上低估了大多数提供给投资者的行业研究的实际价值。这些研究材料通常都是公众已经相当熟悉的，并且已经对市场行情产生了相当大的影响。很少有经纪公司的研究能够用一系列令人信服的事实指出一个热门行业即将衰落，或者一个不受欢迎的行业即将繁荣。众所周知，华尔街对长远未来的看法是容易出错的，这必然也适用于其调查中预测各行业利润走势的重要部分。

Our own observation, however, leads us to minimize somewhat the practical value of most of the industry studies that are made available to investors. The material developed is ordinarily of a kind with which the public is already fairly familiar and that has already exerted considerable influence on market quotations. Rarely does one find a brokerage-house study that points out, with a convincing array of facts, that a popular industry is heading for a fall or that an unpopular one is due to prosper. Wall Street’s view of the longer future is notoriously fallible, and this necessarily applies to that important part of its investigations which is directed toward the forecasting of the course of profits in various industries.

然而，我们必须认识到，近年来技术的快速普及对证券分析师的态度和工作产生了重大影响。与过去相比，未来十年典型公司的进步或倒退可能更多地取决于其与新产品和新流程的关系，而分析师可能有机会提前研究和评估这些产品和流程。因此，毫无疑问，分析师可以通过实地考察、与研究人员的访谈以及自身深入的技术调查，开展一项颇具前景的有效工作。主要基于对未来的这种预测，而缺乏目前可证明的价值支撑，由此得出的投资结论存在风险。然而，或许，严格遵循基于实际结果的冷静计算所设定的价值界限，风险是等同的。投资者不可能两全其美。他可以富有想象力，追逐丰厚的利润，这是他被事实证明是正确的远见卓识的回报；但这样一来，他就必须承担重大或轻微失算的巨大风险。或者，他可以保守一些，拒绝为尚未得到证实的可能性支付超过少量溢价的费用；但在这种情况下，他必须为日后可能错失的黄金机会做好准备。

We must recognize, however, that the rapid and pervasive growth of technology in recent years is not without major effect on the attitude and the labors of the security analyst. More so than in the past, the progress or retrogression of the typical company in the coming decade may depend on its relation to new products and new processes, which the analyst may have a chance to study and evaluate in advance. Thus there is doubtless a promising area for effective work by the analyst, based on field trips, interviews with research men, and on intensive technological investigation on his own. There are hazards connected with investment conclusions derived chiefly from such glimpses into the future, and not supported by presently demonstrable value. Yet there are perhaps equal hazards in sticking closely to the limits of value set by sober calculations resting on actual results. The investor cannot have it both ways. He can be imaginative and play for the big profits that are the reward for vision proved sound by the event; but then he must run a substantial risk of major or minor miscalculation. Or he can be conservative, and refuse to pay more than a minor premium for possibilities as yet unproved; but in that case he must be prepared for the later contemplation of golden opportunities foregone.

两部分评估流程

A Two-Part Appraisal Process

让我们暂时回到我们在此开始讨论的普通股估值或估价的概念。经过大量的思考，我们得出结论，最好采用与现有惯例截然不同的方式进行估值。我们建议分析师首先计算出所谓的“过往业绩价值”，该价值完全基于过往业绩记录。这将表明，如果假设该股票的过往相对业绩在未来保持不变，该股票的价值——绝对价值，或占道琼斯工业平均指数或标准普尔综合指数的百分比。（这包括假设其过去七年的相对增长率在未来七年也将保持不变。）这一过程可以通过应用一个公式机械地进行，该公式为盈利能力、稳定性和增长以及当前财务状况的过往数据赋予单独的权重。分析的第二部分应该考虑，由于未来预期的新情况，仅基于过往业绩的价值应该在多大程度上进行修改。

Let us return for a moment to the idea of valuation or appraisal of a common stock, which we began to discuss here. A great deal of reflection on the subject has led us to conclude that this had better be done quite differently than is now the established practice. We suggest that analysts work out first what we call the “past-performance value,” which is based solely on the past record. This would indicate what the stock would be worth—absolutely, or as a percentage of the DJIA or of the S & P composite—if it is assumed that its relative past performance will continue unchanged in the future. (This includes the assumption that its relative growth rate, as shown in the last seven years, will also continue unchanged over the next seven years.) This process could be carried out mechanically by applying a formula that gives individual weights to past figures for profitability, stability, and growth, and also for current financial condition. The second part of the analysis should consider to what extent the value based solely on past performance should be modified because of new conditions expected in the future.

这一程序将按以下方式划分高级和初级分析师的工作：（1）高级分析师将制定适用于所有公司、用于确定过往业绩价值的公式。（2）初级分析师将为指定公司计算这些因素——几乎是机械的方式。（3）然后，高级分析师将确定一家公司的业绩（绝对或相对）可能与其过往记录的差异程度，以及应在价值中做出哪些调整以反映这些预期的变化。最好是高级分析师的报告显示了原始估值和修改后的估值，并说明了修改的原因。

Such a procedure would divide the work between senior and junior analysts as follows: (1) The senior analyst would set up the formula to apply to all companies generally for determining past-performance value. (2) The junior analysts would work up such factors for the designated companies—pretty much in mechanical fashion. (3) The senior analyst would then determine to what extent a company’s performance—absolute or relative—is likely to differ from its past record, and what change should be made in the value to reflect such anticipated changes. It would be best if the senior analyst’s report showed both the original valuation and the modified one, with his reasons for the change.

这类工作值得做吗？我们的答案是肯定的，但我们的理由在读者看来可能有些愤世嫉俗。我们怀疑，对于典型的工业公司，无论规模大小，如此得出的估值是否足够可靠。下一章我们将在讨论美国铝业公司（ALCOA）时阐述这项工作的难度。尽管如此，对于这类普通股，我们还是应该这样做。为什么？首先，许多证券分析师在日常工作中必然会进行当前或预期的估值。我们提出的方法应该比目前普遍采用的方法有所改进。其次，它应该能为实践这种方法的分析师提供有益的经验和洞见。第三，这类工作可以产生宝贵的经验记录——就像医学领域长期以来的情况一样——这或许能带来更好的操作方法，并使其可能性和局限性更加有用。公用事业股票很可能是这种方法真正体现实用价值的重要领域。最终，聪明的分析师将把自己限制在那些未来看起来合理可预测的群体中，或者过去表现价值相对于当前价格的安全边际非常大，以至于他可以抓住未来变化的机会——就像他在选择安全性良好的优先证券时所做的那样。

Is a job of this kind worth doing? Our answer is in the affirmative, but our reasons may appear somewhat cynical to the reader. We doubt whether the valuations so reached will prove sufficiently dependable in the case of the typical industrial company, great or small. We shall illustrate the difficulties of this job in our discussion of Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) in the next chapter. Nonetheless it should be done for such common stocks. Why? First, many security analysts are bound to make current or projected valuations, as part of their daily work. The method we propose should be an improvement on those generally followed today. Secondly, because it should give useful experience and insight to the analysts who practice this method. Thirdly, because work of this kind could produce an invaluable body of recorded experience—as has long been the case in medicine—that may lead to better methods of procedure and a useful knowledge of its possibilities and limitations. The public-utility stocks might well prove an important area in which this approach will show real pragmatic value. Eventually the intelligent analyst will confine himself to those groups in which the future appears reasonably predictable,* or where the margin of safety of past-performance value over current price is so large that he can take his chances on future variations—as he does in selecting well-secured senior securities.

在后续章节中，我们将提供应用分析技术的具体示例。但它们仅供参考。如果读者觉得这个主题有趣，应该系统而彻底地进行研究，然后才有资格对某个证券问题做出最终的买入或卖出判断。

In subsequent chapters we shall supply concrete examples of the application of analytical techniques. But they will only be illustrations. If the reader finds the subject interesting he should pursue it systematically and thoroughly before he considers himself qualified to pass a final buy-or-sell judgment of his own on a security issue.

第11章评论

Commentary on Chapter 11

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

如果你想买和朋友或投资分析师一样的东西，你肯定买不到便宜货。如果你买和他们一样的东西，你也会得到和他们一样的回报。如果你想获得更好的回报，你就必须买别人不买的东西，甚至是别人正在卖的东西。

If you want to buy the same thing that is popular with your friends or popular with the investment analysts, you can’t get a bargain. If you buy the same thing they buy you will get the same performance they get. If you are going to have a superior performance, you’ve got to buy what the other people are not buying or even what those are selling.

—约翰·邓普顿爵士¹

—Sir John Templeton¹

作为一名聪明的投资者，如果您希望在竞争激烈且通常高效的市场中成功分析股票，您必须遵循格雷厄姆的基本原则：与众不同，严守纪律。

As an intelligent investor, if you hope to succeed at analyzing stocks in an always competitive and usually efficient market, you must follow Graham’s essential principles: Be different from the crowd, and be disciplined.

这两个目标都无法靠一时兴起来实现。然而，如果你能自律并坚持下去，那么你就会与众不同——这在定义上是必然的^。2

You can’t achieve either of those goals by acting on whims. If, however, you can become disciplined and stay that way, then you will be different from the crowd—by definition.²

“善良”与“邪恶”

“Kind” versus “Wicked”

首先要明白，我们能从经验中学到多少，取决于我们得到的反馈的质量。巴塞罗那庞培法布拉大学的心理学家罗宾·霍加斯描述了两种类型的学习环境。“友善”的环境会提供及时、准确、明确的反馈，以判断你的学习是否有效。“恶劣”的环境则会提供延迟、不准确且模棱两可的反馈^。3

Start by understanding that how much any of us can learn from our experience depends on the quality of the feedback we get. Robin Hogarth, a psychologist at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, described two types of learning environments. A “kind” setting provides prompt, accurate, unambiguous feedback on whether what you’re doing works. A “wicked” environment offers feedback that is delayed, inaccurate, and ambiguous.³

股票市场是世界上最邪恶的学习环境之一，模糊的反馈不断变化。假设你确信一家公司的股价为每股 14 到 16 美元。你在上午 11:42 以 10 美元的价格买入股票。到上午 11:48，价格为 10.87 美元：市场已经同意我的看法！一小时后，股价跌至 9.94 美元：市场错了！第二天，开盘价和收盘价均为 10 美元：好吧，至少我收支平衡。一周后，股价为 11.50 美元：是的！上涨了 15%！再下一周，股价跌至 9 美元，然后是 8.50 美元，再到 8 美元：不！我损失了 20%！下个月，股价跌至 6.66 美元，这时你惊慌失措并卖出，甚至损失了超过三分之一的资金。

The stock market is among the most wicked learning environments in the world, with murky feedback in constant flux. Let’s say you’re convinced a company is worth $14 to $16 a share. You buy the stock at 11:42 a.m. for $10. By 11:48 a.m., it’s at $10.87: The market already agrees with me! An hour later, the stock has fallen to $9.94: The market is wrong! The next day, trading opens—and closes—at $10: Well, at least I’m breaking even. A week later, the stock is at $11.50: Yes! It’s up 15%! The week after that, it sinks to $9, then to $8.50, then to $8: No! I’ve lost 20%! Over the next month the stock sinks to $6.66, at which point you panic and sell before you lose even more than a third of your money.

当天晚些时候，一家竞争对手宣布以每股 14 美元的价格收购该公司。

Later that day, a competitor announces it’s buying the company for $14 per share.

你说得对吗？

Were you right?

你错了吗？

Were you wrong?

除非你把你的推理记录下来，否则你根本无法判断。这是在充满挑战的学习环境中获得善意反馈的唯一方法。在你买入之前，记录下你的理由：你了解这家公司哪些其他投资者忽略的具体证据？为什么他们错过了？你为什么认为这家公司每股价值 14 到 16 美元？达到这个价格需要多长时间？你对自己的判断有多大把握——90% 确定？80%？50%？还是 100%？

You won’t be able to tell unless you documented your reasoning. That’s the only way to get kind feedback out of a wicked learning environment. Before you buy, make a record of your rationale: What specific evidence do you understand about the company that other investors are overlooking, and why did they miss it? Why do you think the company is worth $14 to $16 a share? How long should it take to reach that price? How confident are you that you’re correct—are you 90% certain? 80%? 50%? 100%?

肠道检查

Gut Check

记录您的理由并组织您的反馈的最佳方法之一是使用清单。

One of the best ways to create a record of your rationale and structure your feedback is with a checklist.

通过给自己制定一条规则——我绝不会在没有完成清单的情况下买股票——你可以避免冲动买入后恐慌抛售带来的痛苦。你还能判断自己是出于正确的理由而做出的正确选择，还是仅仅因为运气好。

By imposing a rule on yourself—I will never buy a stock without first completing a checklist—you can avoid the heartache that comes from selling in a panic after buying on an impulse. And you can help determine whether you were right for the right reasons, or whether you just got lucky.

清单并不能创造奇迹：它本身并不能让你找到下一个亚马逊或苹果。但它能消除股市反馈中的大部分不稳定性。它迫使你保持一致，并确保你不会低估或忽视你想要依赖的因素。最重要的是，它能让你了解哪些方法有效，哪些无效，以及如何改进你的分析^。4

A checklist can’t work miracles: It won’t, all by itself, enable you to find the next Amazon or Apple. But it takes much of the wickedness out of the stock market’s feedback. It compels you to be consistent and ensures that you don’t underemphasize or overlook factors you intend to rely on. Above all, it enables you to learn what works, what doesn’t, and how to improve your analyses.⁴

每个投资者的核对清单都会有所不同：它应该部分基于你从成功和错误中汲取的经验教训，而且并非所有公司或行业都能用相同的方式进行分析。不过，你的核对清单至少必须将你的注意力从股票转移到业务本身。它可能包含以下要素：

Every investor’s checklist will be different: It should be based partly on what you’ve learned from your successes and mistakes, and not every company or industry can be analyzed the same way. At a minimum, though, your checklist must refocus your attention away from the stock and onto the business. It might include such elements as these:

我是否至少阅读过最近三份年度报告和过去一年的季度报告？一家公司的财务报告由三个关键部分组成：资产负债表、损益表和现金流量表。我是否足够了解资产负债表，从而判断公司是否负债累累？我能否从损益表中判断成本是否得到控制且利润是否在上升？现金流量表如何反映公司如何产生和消耗现金？公司是否持续从其运营中产生更多的现金？从公司报告的叙述部分，我可以了解到公司最大竞争对手的哪些信息？公司对少数原材料来源、某个地理区域的销售或少数几个大客户的依赖程度如何？公司是通过收购其他公司还是内部扩张而发展壮大的？管理层是否明智地分配剩余资本，还是公司是否反复进行会计冲销以弥补投资或收购失败的成本？⁵
Have I read at least the last three annual reports and the past year’s quarterly reports? A company’s financial reports consist of three key components: the balance sheet, the income statement, and the cash-flow statement. Do I understand the balance sheet well enough to determine whether the company is dangerously in debt? Can I tell from the income statement whether costs are under control and profits are rising? What does the statement of cash flows indicate about how the company generates and consumes cash? Is the business consistently generating more cash over time from its operations? From the narrative portion of the company’s reports, what can I learn about the company’s biggest competitors? How dependent is it on a few sources of raw materials, sales in one geographical region, or a handful of large customers? Has it grown by acquiring other companies or by expanding internally? Does management allocate surplus capital wisely, or has the company repeatedly taken accounting write-offs to cover the costs of investments or acquisitions that went bad?⁵
我是否阅读了最新的代理声明？与同行业其他公司相比，这家公司的管理层薪酬是否公平？管理层是否参与了广泛的“关联方交易”或享受了丰厚的福利，从而引发了令人不安的利益冲突？董事们是否持有大量股票？高管是否使用自有资金购买股票，或者仅仅是获得了股票期权的免费赠予？激励性薪酬是否与长期盈利能力和财务稳健性的合理指标挂钩，例如多年期股本回报率或每股账面价值的增长，还是仅仅与原始股价或“调整后息税折旧摊销前利润”增长等虚构指标挂钩？⁶
Have I read the latest proxy statement? Relative to other firms in the same industry, is this company’s management compensated fairly? Are managers engaging in extensive “related party transactions” or receiving lavish perks that raise troubling conflicts of interest? Do the directors have significant stock holdings? Are top executives using their own cash to buy shares, or simply being granted a free ride with stock options? Is incentive compensation tied to sensible measures of long-term profitability and financial soundness, such as growth in return on equity or book value per share over multiyear horizons—or purely to the raw share price or to make-believe metrics like growth in “adjusted EBITDA”?⁶
该公司是否拥有持久的优势？正如沃伦·巴菲特所说：“投资的关键在于……确定任何一家公司的竞争优势，以及最重要的是，这种优势的持久性。” 该公司的品牌有多强？为什么？它是否拥有专利或其他知识产权，使其免受竞争？它是否持续以低于竞争对手的价格，为消费者提供极具吸引力的价值？该公司是否能够产生“网络效应”，即其产品或服务的价值会随着使用人数的增加而增长？如果该公司明天消失，客户找到类似的供应商会有多难？⁷
Does the company have durable advantages? As Warren Buffett has said, “The key to investing is . . . determining the competitive advantage of any given company and, above all, the durability of that advantage.” How dominant are its brands, and why? Does it have patents or other intellectual property that insulate it from competition? Does it continuously undercut its rivals’ prices, providing consumers with compelling value? Does the business generate “network effects,” in which its products or services become more valuable as more people use them? If the company disappeared tomorrow, how hard would it be for customers to find a comparable provider?⁷
管理者是运营者还是推动者？高管们是否言行一致？他们是否承诺少而交付多？他们是否乐于承认错误？他们是否始终遵循保守的会计准则，还是一再更改公司财务报告的方式？业绩如何？他们关注的是企业的长期价值，还是股票的短期价格？
Are the managers operators or promoters? Do the top executives say what they will do and do what they say? Do they underpromise and overdeliver? Do they readily admit mistakes? Do they consistently follow conservative accounting rules, or do they repeatedly change how the company reports its financial results? Are they focused on the long-term value of the business or the short-term price of the stock?
我做过事前剖析吗？我是否足够了解这家公司，能够预见到哪些竞争弱点可能会让它走向灭亡？假设一年后，这家公司刚刚申请破产保护。问题出在哪里：是新管理层未能扭转局面，还是利率上升导致债务负担加重，还是消费者放弃了公司过度依赖的热门产品，又或者收购最终导致公司惨败？
Have I conducted a premortem? Do I understand the business well enough to imagine the competitive weaknesses that could kill it? Pretend it’s one year from now and the company just filed for bankruptcy protection. What went wrong: Did new management fail to turn the business around, did rising interest rates turn its debt into an unbearable burden, did consumers abandon a hot product on which the company was overdependent, did an acquisition turn into a debacle?
我的优势是什么？我对这家公司的了解究竟有哪些是大多数投资者所忽略的？为什么？
What is my edge? What, exactly, do I understand about this company that most other investors are missing, and why?
概率有多大？根据我的经验，我有多大把握预测正确？我估计这只股票需要多长时间才能达到我的目标价？
What are the odds? Based on my experience, how confident am I that I’m right? How long do I estimate the stock will take to reach my target?
如果股市在未来五年内停摆，我会乐意持有这家公司的股份吗？写下三到五个与股价无关的理由，说明为什么这是一家好公司，并且五年后应该会更好。
If the stock market shut down for the next five years, would I be happy owning a piece of this company? Write down three to five reasons—having nothing to do with the stock price—why this is a good business that should be even better five years from now.

最重要的是，要遵守这条规则：如果我没有遵循清单上的所有步骤，我就不能购买这项投资^。8

Above all, live by this rule: If I haven’t followed all the steps in my checklist, I can’t buy this investment.⁸

如果觉得遵循清单上的所有步骤太费劲，你应该重新考虑一下自己是否是一位进取型投资者。除非你准备好并愿意在投资前投入大量时间和精力来分析一家公司，否则你就是一位防御型投资者。这本身并没有错。

If complying with all the steps in a checklist sounds like too much work, you should reconsider whether you’re an enterprising investor after all. Unless you’re ready and willing to commit many hours of time and effort to analyzing a company before you invest, you’re a defensive investor. And there’s nothing wrong with that.

第十二章

Chapter 12 关于每股收益需要考虑的事项

Things to Consider About Per-Share Earnings

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

本章首先向投资者提出两条建议，这两条建议的含义难免相互矛盾。第一条是：不要把一年的收益当真。第二条是：如果你确实关注短期收益，要警惕每股收益数据中的陷阱。如果我们严格遵守第一条警告，第二条就没有必要了。但是，期望大多数股东能够将所有普通股决策与长期记录和长期前景联系起来，那就太过分了。季度数据，尤其是年度数据，是金融界关注的重点，这种重视难免会对投资者的思维产生影响。投资者可能需要在这方面接受一些教育，因为其中充满了误导性的可能性。

This chapter will begin with two pieces of advice to the investor that cannot avoid being contradictory in their implications. The first is: Don’t take a single year’s earnings seriously. The second is: If you do pay attention to short-term earnings, look out for booby traps in the per-share figures. If our first warning were followed strictly the second would be unnecessary. But it is too much to expect that most shareholders can relate all their common-stock decisions to the long-term record and the long-term prospects. The quarterly figures, and especially the annual figures, receive major attention in financial circles, and this emphasis can hardly fail to have its impact on the investor’s thinking. He may well need some education in this area, for it abounds in misleading possibilities.

撰写本章时，《华尔街日报》刊登了美国铝业公司（ALCOA）1970年的盈利报告。报告显示，首先出现的是

As this chapter is being written the earnings report of Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) for 1970 appears in the Wall Street Journal. The first figures shown are

1970

1969

分享^收益

Share earnings^a

5.20 美元

$5.20

5.58 美元

$5.58

脚注中解释了开头的小写字母^“a”指的是特殊费用之前的“主要收入”。脚注内容远多于此；事实上，它所占的篇幅是基本数字本身的两倍。

The little ^a at the outset is explained in a footnote to refer to “primary earnings,” before special charges. There is much more footnote material; in fact it occupies twice as much space as do the basic figures themselves.

仅就 12 月季度而言，1970 年的“每股收益”为 1.58 美元，而 1969 年为 1.56 美元。

For the December quarter alone, the “earnings per share” are given as $1.58 in 1970 against $1.56 in 1969.

对美国铝业公司股票感兴趣的投资者或投机者看到这些数据后，可能会心想：“还不错。我知道1970年是铝业衰退的一年。但第四季度的业绩比1969年有所增长，年化收益达到6.32美元。让我想想，这只股票的市盈率是62倍。哎呀，这还不到市盈率的10倍。相比国际镍业等公司的16倍市盈率，这看起来相当便宜。”

The investor or speculator interested in ALCOA shares, reading those figures, might say to himself: “Not so bad. I knew that 1970 was a recession year in aluminum. But the fourth quarter shows a gain over 1969, with earnings at the rate of $6.32 per year. Let me see. The stock is selling at 62. Why, that’s less than ten times earnings. That makes it look pretty cheap, compared with 16 times for International Nickel, etc., etc.”

但是，如果我们的投资者兼投机者朋友费心阅读脚注中的所有材料，他就会发现，1970 年每股收益的数字实际上不只有一个，而是四个，即：

But if our investor-speculator friend had bothered to read all the material in the footnote, he would have found that instead of one figure of earnings per share for the year 1970 there were actually four, viz.:

1970

1969

主要收入

Primary earnings

5.20 美元

$5.20

5.58 美元

$5.58

净收入（扣除特殊费用）

Net income (after special charges)

4.32

5.58

完全稀释，不含特殊费用

Fully diluted, before special charges

5.01

5.35

经过特殊收费后完全稀释

Fully diluted, after special charges

4.19

5.35

仅就第四季度而言，仅给出了两个数据：

For the fourth quarter alone only two figures are given:

主要收入

Primary earnings

1.58 美元

$1.58

1.56 美元

$1.56

净收入（扣除特殊费用）

Net income (after special charges)

.70

1.56

这些额外收益意味着什么？哪些收益是本年度和12月季度的真实收益？如果后者按70美分计算（扣除特殊费用后的净利润），那么年利率将是2.80美元，而不是6.32美元，而62%的市盈率将是“22倍收益”，而不是我们一开始假设的10倍。

What do all these additional earnings mean? Which earnings are true earnings for the year and the December quarter? If the latter should be taken at 70 cents—the net income after special charges—the annual rate would be $2.80 instead of $6.32, and the price 62 would be “22 times earnings,” instead of the 10 times we started with.

关于美国铝业公司“真实收益”的部分问题很容易回答。为了考虑“稀释”的影响，将每股收益从5.20美元降至5.01美元显然是合理的。美国铝业公司发行了大量可转换为普通股的债券；要根据1970年的结果计算普通股的“盈利能力”，必须假设如果债券持有人认为行使转换特权有利可图，他们就会行使转换特权。美国铝业公司所涉及的金额相对较小，几乎不值得详细评论。但在其他情况下，考虑到转换的影响，权利——以及股票认购权证的存在——可能会使表观收益减少一半甚至更多。我们将在下文（此处）列举一些真正显著的稀释因素的例子。（金融服务机构在其报告和分析中对稀释因素的考量并不总是一致的。）*

Part of the question as to the “true earnings” of ALCOA can be answered quite easily. The reduction from $5.20 to $5.01, to allow for the effects of “dilution,” is clearly called for. ALCOA has a large bond issue convertible into common stock; to calculate the “earning power” of the common, based on the 1970 results, it must be assumed that the conversion privilege will be exercised if it should prove profitable to the bondholders to do so. The amount involved in the ALCOA picture is relatively small, and hardly deserves detailed comment. But in other cases, making allowance for conversion rights—and the existence of stock-purchase warrants—can reduce the apparent earnings by half, or more. We shall present examples of a really significant dilution factor below (here). (The financial services are not always consistent in their allowance for the dilution factor in their reporting and analyses.)*

现在让我们来谈谈“特殊费用”的问题。第四季度扣除的1880万美元，即每股88美分，这笔费用并非不重要。这笔费用是应该完全忽略，还是应该全部计入收益减少，还是部分计入，部分忽略？警觉的投资者或许还会自问，为什么这种特殊费用在1970年末之后几乎泛滥成灾，而前几年却没有？是不是有一些意大利高手在做会计工作——当然，这些工作总是在允许的范围内？如果我们仔细观察，就会发现，这些损失在实际发生之前就被冲销了，可以设法弥补，而不会对过去或未来的“^主要收益”造成不利影响。在某些极端情况下，这些费用甚至可能被用来使后续收益看起来几乎是实际收益的两倍——通过对所涉及的税收抵免进行或多或少夸张的处理。

Let us turn now to the matter of “special charges.” This figure of $18,800,000, or 88 cents per share, deducted in the fourth quarter, is not unimportant. Is it to be ignored entirely, or fully recognized as an earnings reduction, or partly recognized and partly ignored? The alert investor might ask himself also how does it happen that there was a virtual epidemic of such special charge-offs appearing after the close of 1970, but not in previous years? Could there possibly have been some fine Italian hands^* at work with the accounting—but always, of course, within the limits of the permissible? When we look closely we may find that such losses, charged off before they actually occur, can be charmed away, as it were, with no unhappy effect on either past or future “primary earnings.” In some extreme cases they might be availed of to make subsequent earnings appear nearly twice as large as in reality—by a more or less prestidigitous treatment of the tax credit involved.

在处理美国铝业公司的特殊费用时，首先要确定的是这些费用是如何产生的。脚注已经足够具体。这些扣除额来自四个来源，即：

In dealing with ALCOA’s special charges, the first thing to establish is how they arose. The footnotes are specific enough. The deductions came from four sources, viz.:

管理层对关闭制造产品部门的预期成本的估计。
Management’s estimate of the anticipated costs of closing down the manufactured products division.
关闭 ALCOA Castings Co. 的工厂也是如此。
Ditto for closing down ALCOA Castings Co.’s plants.
逐步淘汰美国铝业信贷公司 (ALCOA Credit Co.) 也造成了同样的损失。
Ditto for losses in phasing out ALCOA Credit Co.
此外，完成“幕墙”合同的相关成本预计为 530 万美元。
Also, estimated costs of $5.3 million associated with completion of the contract for a “curtain wall.”

所有这些项目都与未来的成本和损失有关。人们很容易说它们不属于1970年的“常规经营成果”——但如果是这样，它们应该归类到哪里呢？它们是否“非常规且非经常性”，以至于不属于任何地方？像美国铝业公司这样规模庞大、年营业额达15亿美元的企业，肯定拥有众多分部、部门、附属机构等等。如果一个或多个分部被证明无利可图，需要关闭，这难道不是正常的，而不是非常规的吗？像建墙合同这样的事情也是如此。假设一家公司任何业务出现亏损时，它都灵机一动，将其作为“特殊项目”冲销，从而报告其每股“主要收益”，只包括其盈利的合同和运营？就像爱德华七世国王的日晷只指示“晴天”一样。*

All of these items are related to future costs and losses. It is easy to say that they are not part of the “regular operating results” of 1970—but if so, where do they belong? Are they so “extraordinary and nonrecurring” as to belong nowhere? A widespread enterprise such as ALCOA, doing a $1.5 billion business annually, must have a lot of divisions, departments, affiliates, and the like. Would it not be normal rather than extraordinary for one or more to prove unprofitable, and to require closing down? Similarly for such things as a contract to build a wall. Suppose that any time a company had a loss on any part of its business it had the bright idea of charging it off as a “special item,” and thus reporting its “primary earnings” per share so as to include only its profitable contracts and operations? Like King Edward VII’s sundial that marked only the “sunny hours.”*

读者应该注意到我们一直在讨论的ALCOA程序的两个巧妙之处。首先，通过预测未来的损失，公司避免了分配将损失本身归类到可识别的年份。它们不属于1970年，因为它们实际上并非在那一年发生的。而且，它们也不会在实际发生的年份显示，因为它们已经被计入。这很巧妙，但是否会造成一些误导？

The reader should note two ingenious aspects of the ALCOA procedure we have been discussing. The first is that by anticipating future losses the company escapes the necessity of allocating the losses themselves to an identifiable year. They don’t belong in 1970, because they were not actually taken in that year. And they won’t be shown in the year when they are actually taken, because they have already been provided for. Neat work, but might it not be just a little misleading?

美国铝业公司（ALCOA）的脚注并未提及这些损失未来可节省的税款。（大多数其他类似声明都明确指出，只有“税后影响”被冲销了。）如果美国铝业公司（ALCOA）的数据代表的是扣除相关税收抵免之前的未来损失，那么未来的收益不仅可以免除这些费用（因为这些费用是实际发生的），而且还会额外获得约50%的税收抵免。很难相信账目会这样处理。但事实是，某些过去曾遭受巨额亏损的公司能够报告未来收益，而无需缴纳正常税款，这样一来，他们实际上就获得了非常可观的利润——这其实是基于他们过去的耻辱，这本身就很矛盾。（过去年度亏损产生的税收抵免现在被单独列为“特殊项目”，但它们将作为最终“净收入”数字的一部分计入未来的统计数据。然而，目前为未来损失设立的准备金，如果扣除预期的税收抵免，则不应在以后年度的净收入中产生此类增加。）

The ALCOA footnote says nothing about the future tax saving from these losses. (Most other statements of this sort state specifically that only the “after-tax effect” has been charged off.) If the ALCOA figure represents future losses before the related tax credit, then not only will future earnings be freed from the weight of these charges (as they are actually incurred), but they will be increased by a tax credit of some 50% thereof. It is difficult to believe that the accounts will be handled that way. But it is a fact that certain companies which have had large losses in the past have been able to report future earnings without charging the normal taxes against them, in that way making a very fine profits appearance indeed—based paradoxically enough on their past disgraces. (Tax credits resulting from past years’ losses are now being shown separately as “special items,” but they will enter into future statistics as part of the final “net-income” figure. However, a reserve now set up for future losses, if net of expected tax credit, should not create an addition of this sort to the net income of later years.)

另一个巧妙之处是，美国铝业公司（ALCOA）和其他许多公司利用1970年年末的数据进行这些特殊的冲销。1970年上半年，股市经历了一场血洗。每个人都预计大多数公司今年的业绩会相对较差。华尔街现在却预期1971年、1972年等等会有更好的业绩。那么，这真是一个绝妙的安排，把尽可能多的钱记在业绩不佳的年份上，而这些年份早已在心理上被一笔勾销，几乎成为过去，为未来几年的丰厚业绩铺平了道路！或许，这是一种好的会计处理方式，一种好的商业政策，也有利于管理层与股东之间的关系。但我们仍然心存疑虑。

The other ingenious feature is the use by ALCOA and many other companies of the 1970 year-end for making these special charge-offs. The stock market took what appeared to be a blood bath in the first half of 1970. Everyone expected relatively poor results for the year for most companies. Wall Street was now anticipating better results in 1971, 1972, etc. What a nice arrangement, then, to charge as much as possible to the bad year, which had already been written off mentally and had virtually receded into the past, leaving the way clear for nicely fattened figures in the next few years! Perhaps this is good accounting, good business policy, and good for management-shareholder relationships. But we have lingering doubts.

广泛（或者应该说是疯狂？）的多元化经营，加上1970年底的清理门户冲动，导致年报中出现了一些看起来奇怪的脚注。读者可能会对以下纽约证券交易所一家公司（不愿透露姓名）的解释感到好笑：该公司“特殊项目”总额达2,357,000美元，约占其总资产的三分之一。冲销前收入：“包括关闭斯伯丁英国业务的准备金；部门重组费用的准备金；出售一家小型婴儿裤和围兜制造公司的成本、处置西班牙汽车租赁公司的部分权益以及清算滑雪靴业务的成本。” *

The combination of widely (or should it be wildly?) diversified operations with the impulse to clean house at the end of 1970 has produced some strange-looking footnotes to the annual reports. The reader may be amused by the following explanation given by a New York Stock Exchange company (which shall remain unnamed) of its “special items” aggregating $2,357,000, or about a third of the income before charge-offs: “Consists of provision for closing Spalding United Kingdom operations; provision for reorganizational expenses of a division; costs of selling a small baby-pants and bib manufacturing company, disposing of part interest in a Spanish car-leasing facility, and liquidation of a ski-boot operation.”*

多年前，实力雄厚的公司常常会用好年景的利润设立“应急储备” ，以吸收未来经济萧条时期的部分负面影响。其根本目的是或多或少地平衡报告的收益，并提高公司记录中的稳定性。这看起来似乎是一个值得的动机；但会计师们非常正确地反对这种做法，认为它虚报了真实收益。他们坚持要求每年的业绩都要如实呈现，无论好坏，并允许股东和分析师自行进行平均或平衡。我们现在似乎看到了相反的现象，每个人都尽可能地将1970年遗忘，以便以一个不仅干净而且经过特别准备的记录来迎接1971年，以便在未来几年里展现令人满意的每股收益。

Years ago the strong companies used to set up “contingency reserves” out of the profits of good years to absorb some of the bad effects of depression years to come. The underlying idea was to equalize the reported earnings, more or less, and to improve the stability factor in the company’s record. A worthy motive, it would seem; but the accountants quite rightly objected to the practice as misstating the true earnings. They insisted that each year’s results be presented as they were, good or bad, and the shareholders and analysts be allowed to do the averaging or equalizing for themselves. We seem now to be witnessing the opposite phenomenon, with everyone charging off as much as possible against forgotten 1970, so as to start 1971 with a slate not only clean but specially prepared to show pleasing per-share figures in the coming years.

现在该回到我们的第一个问题了。那么，美国铝业公司1970年的真实收益是多少呢？准确的答案应该是：每股5.01美元，扣除“稀释”后的每股5.01美元，减去82美分“特殊费用”中可以合理归因于1970年发生的费用。但我们不知道这部分金额是多少，因此无法准确表述当年的真实收益。管理层和审计师本应就这一点给出他们的最佳判断，但他们没有这样做。此外，管理层和审计师本应将这些费用的余额从未来适当年份（比如不超过五年）的普通收益中扣除。显然，他们也不会这样做，因为他们已经把这笔款项全部作为1970年的特殊费用处理了。

It is time to return to our first question. What then were the true earnings of ALCOA in 1970? The accurate answer would be: The $5.01 per share, after “dilution,” less that part of the 82 cents of “special charges” that may properly be attributed to occurrences in 1970. But we do not know what that portion is, and hence we cannot properly state the true earnings for the year. The management and the auditors should have given us their best judgment on this point, but they did not do so. And furthermore, the management and the auditors should have provided for deduction of the balance of these charges from the ordinary earnings of a suitable number of future years—say, not more than five. This evidently they will not do either, since they have already conveniently disposed of the entire sum as a 1970 special charge.

投资者对公布的每股收益数据越认真，就越有必要对各种会计因素保持警惕这可能会损害数字的真实可比性。我们已经提到了三种这样的因素：使用特殊费用，这些费用可能永远不会反映在每股收益中，由于过去的损失而减少正常的所得税抵扣额，以及大量可转换证券或认股权证的存在隐含的稀释因素。1^第四项对过去报告的收益有重大影响的因素是折旧处理方法——主要是在“直线”和“加速”时间表之间进行。我们在这里不做详细介绍。但作为我们撰写本文时的一个例子，让我们提到 1970 年特灵公司的报告。该公司的每股收益比 1969 年增长了近 20%——3.29 美元对 2.76 美元——但其中一半来自恢复旧的直线折旧率，比前一年使用的加速方法对收益的负担要小。（该公司将继续在其所得税申报表上使用加速税率，从而推迟支付差额的所得税。）还有一个有时很重要的因素，就是选择在研发成本发生当年冲销还是在几年内摊销。最后，让我们谈谈在先进先出法（FIFO）和后进先出法（LIFO）之间选择存货计价方法的问题。

The more seriously investors take the per-share earnings figures as published, the more necessary it is for them to be on their guard against accounting factors of one kind and another that may impair the true comparability of the numbers. We have mentioned three sorts of these factors: the use of special charges, which may never be reflected in the per-share earnings, the reduction in the normal income-tax deduction by reason of past losses, and the dilution factor implicit in the existence of substantial amounts of convertible securities or warrants.¹ A fourth item that has had a significant effect on reported earnings in the past is the method of treating depreciation—chiefly as between the “straight-line” and the “accelerated” schedules. We refrain from details here. But as an example current as we write, let us mention the 1970 report of Trane Co. This firm showed an increase of nearly 20% in per-share earnings over 1969—$3.29 versus $2.76—but half of this came from returning to the older straight-line depreciation rates, less burdensome on earnings than the accelerated method used the year before. (The company will continue to use the accelerated rate on its income-tax return, thus deferring income-tax payments on the difference.) Still another factor, important at times, is the choice between charging off research and development costs in the year they are incurred or amortizing them over a period of years. Finally, let us mention the choice between the FIFO (first-in-first-out) and LIFO (last-in-first-out) methods of valuing inventories.

这里显而易见的一点是，如果涉及的金额相对较小，投资者不应关注这些会计变量。但华尔街就是这样，即使是本身很小的项目也会受到重视。在美国铝业公司报告刊登于《华尔街日报》的两天前，该报对陶氏化学的相应声明进行了一番讨论。文章最后指出，“许多分析师”对陶氏化学将一项21美分的项目计入1969年的常规利润，而不是将其视为“非常规收入”感到不安。为什么这么大惊小怪？显然，对陶氏化学涉及数百万美元总额的估值似乎取决于1969年相对于1968年的百分比收益——在本例中是9%还是4.5%。这在我们看来相当荒谬；一年业绩中的微小差异不太可能对未来的平均利润或增长，以及对企业保守、现实的估值产生任何影响。

An obvious remark here would be that investors should not pay any attention to these accounting variables if the amounts involved are relatively small. But Wall Street being as it is, even items quite minor in themselves can be taken seriously. Two days before the ALCOA report appeared in the Wall Street Journal, the paper had quite a discussion of the corresponding statement of Dow Chemical. It closed with the observation that “many analysts” had been troubled by the fact that Dow had included a 21-cent item in regular profits for 1969, instead of treating it as an item of “extraordinary income.” Why the fuss? Because, evidently, evaluations of Dow Chemical involving many millions of dollars in the aggregate seemed to depend on exactly what was the percentage gain for 1969 over 1968—in this case either 9% or 4½%. This strikes us as rather absurd; it is very unlikely that small differences involved in one year’s results could have any bearing on future average profits or growth, and on a conservative, realistic valuation of the enterprise.

相比之下，考虑一下另一个出现在1971年1月。这涉及西北工业公司1970年的报告。*该公司计划一次性注销不少于2.64亿美元的特殊费用。其中，2亿美元是拟定出售铁路子公司给员工的损失，其余部分是近期股票购买的减值。这些金额在稀释抵销前，相当于每股普通股约35美元的亏损，或当时市价的两倍。这里涉及到一个非常重要的问题。如果交易顺利进行，且税法不变，那么1970年计提的这笔亏损将使西北工业公司能够从其其他多元化投资中获得约4亿美元的未来利润（五年内），而无需缴纳所得税。^*那么，这家企业的实际收益是多少？计算这些收益时，是否应该计入或不计入其实际上无需缴纳的近50%的所得税？我们认为，正确的计算方式应该是首先考虑基于全额所得税负债的预期盈利能力，并在此基础上大致估算股票价值。此外，还应加上一些红利数字，代表公司将享受的重要但暂时的免税政策的每股价值。（在这种情况下，还必须考虑到可能出现的大规模稀释。实际上，如果行使这些特权，可转换优先股和认股权证将使已发行普通股的数量增加一倍以上。）

By contrast, consider another statement also appearing in January 1971. This concerned Northwest Industries Inc.’s report for 1970.* The company was planning to write off, as a special charge, not less than $264 million in one fell swoop. Of this, $200 million represents the loss to be taken on the proposed sale of the railroad subsidiary to its employees and the balance a write-down of a recent stock purchase. These sums would work out to a loss of about $35 per share of common before dilution offsets, or twice its then current market price. Here we have something really significant. If the transaction goes through, and if the tax laws are not changed, this loss provided for in 1970 will permit Northwest Industries to realize about $400 million of future profits (within five years) from its other diversified interests without paying income tax thereon.^* What will then be the real earnings of that enterprise; should they be calculated with or without provision for the nearly 50% in income taxes which it will not actually have to pay? In our opinion, the proper mode of calculation would be first to consider the indicated earning power on the basis of full income-tax liability, and to derive some broad idea of the stock’s value based on that estimate. To this should be added some bonus figure, representing the value per share of the important but temporary tax exemption the company will enjoy. (Allowance must be made, also, for a possible large-scale dilution in this case. Actually, the convertible preferred issues and warrants would more than double the outstanding common shares if the privileges are exercised.)

这一切可能会让读者感到困惑和厌烦，但它属于我们的故事。公司会计通常很棘手；证券分析可能很复杂；股票估值只有在特殊情况下才真正可靠。对于大多数投资者来说，最好的办法或许是确保自己支付的价格物有所值，然后就此打住。

All this may be confusing and wearisome to our readers, but it belongs in our story. Corporate accounting is often tricky; security analysis can be complicated; stock valuations are really dependable only in exceptional cases. For most investors it would be probably best to assure themselves that they are getting good value for the prices they pay, and let it go at that.

使用平均收入

Use of Average Earnings

过去，分析师和投资者非常关注过去相当长一段时间内（通常为七到十年）的平均收益。这种“平均数” *有助于消除商业周期频繁的波动，并且被认为比仅仅关注最近一年的业绩更能反映公司的盈利能力。这种平均方法的一个重要优势在于，它可以解决几乎所有特殊费用和贷项的处理问题。它们应该计入平均收益。因为这些损失和收益中的大部分肯定是公司经营历史的一部分。如果我们对美国铝业公司（ALCOA）进行同样的计算，那么1961年至1970年（十年）的平均收益将为每股3.62美元，而1964年至1970年七年的平均收益将为每股4.62美元。如果将这些数据与同期收益的增长和稳定性评级结合使用，它们可以真实地反映公司过去的业绩。

In former times analysts and investors paid considerable attention to the average earnings over a fairly long period in the past—usually from seven to ten years. This “mean figure”* was useful for ironing out the frequent ups and downs of the business cycle, and it was thought to give a better idea of the company’s earning power than the results of the latest year alone. One important advantage of such an averaging process is that it will solve the problem of what to do about nearly all the special charges and credits. They should be included in the average earnings. For certainly most of these losses and gains represent a part of the company’s operating history. If we do this for ALCOA, the average earnings for 1961–1970 (ten years) would appear as $3.62 and for the seven years 1964–1970 as $4.62 per share. If such figures are used in conjunction with ratings for growth and stability of earnings during the same period, they could give a really informing picture of the company’s past performance.

过去增长率的计算

Calculation of the Past Growth Rate

充分考虑公司业绩记录中的增长因素至关重要。如果增长迅速，近期收益将远高于七年或十年的平均水平，而分析师可能认为这些长期数据无关紧要。但事实并非如此。收益可以用平均值和最新数字两种形式表示。我们建议，增长率本身可以通过比较过去三年的平均值与十年前的相应数字来计算。（如果存在“特殊费用或贷项”的问题，可以采取某种折衷办法处理。）请注意以下美国铝业公司 (ALCOA) 相对于西尔斯罗巴克 (Sears Roebuck) 和道琼斯工业平均指数 (DJIA) 集团整体的增长计算结果。

It is of prime importance that the growth factor in a company’s record be taken adequately into account. Where the growth has been large the recent earnings will be well above the seven- or ten-year average, and analysts may deem these long-term figures irrelevant. This need not be the case. The earnings can be given in terms both of the average and the latest figure. We suggest that the growth rate itself be calculated by comparing the average of the last three years with corresponding figures ten years earlier. (Where there is a problem of “special charges or credits” it may be dealt with on some compromise basis.) Note the following calculation for the growth of ALCOA as against that of Sears Roebuck and the DJIA group as a whole.

表 12-1

TABLE 12-1

^{a 1970 年 82 美分的特殊费用的五分之三}在此扣除。

^a Three-fifths of special charges of 82 cents in 1970 deducted here.

评论：这几个数字足以引发一场漫长的讨论。它们或许能像其他经过精心数学处理的数据一样，反映出1958年至1970年这段较长时期内公司的实际盈利增长情况。但这个通常被认为是普通股估值核心的数字，与美国铝业公司（ALCOA）的案例究竟有多大关联？该公司过去的增长率非常出色，实际上略高于备受赞誉的西尔斯罗巴克（Sears Roebuck），远高于道琼斯工业平均指数（DJIA）。但1971年初的市场价格似乎并未注意到这一良好表现。美国铝业公司的市盈率仅为最近三年平均水平的11.5倍，而西尔斯的市盈率为27倍，道琼斯工业平均指数本身的市盈率也超过15倍。这是怎么回事？显然，华尔街对美国铝业公司未来的盈利走势持相当悲观的看法，与其过去的业绩相比，情况并非如此。令人惊讶的是，美国铝业公司（ALCOA）的最高价早在1959年就已创下。当年，其股价为116美元，相当于其收益的45倍。（相比之下，西尔斯·罗巴克（Sears Roebuck）1959年的调整后最高价为25.5美元，相当于其收益的20倍。）尽管此后美国铝业公司的利润确实实现了出色的增长，但很明显，当时的市场价格大大高估了未来的可能性。1970年，美国铝业公司的收盘价恰好是1959年高点的一半，而西尔斯的股价却上涨了两倍，道琼斯工业平均指数上涨了近30%。

Comment: These few figures could be made the subject of a long discussion. They probably show as well as any others, derived by elaborate mathematical treatment, the actual growth of earnings for the long period 1958–1970. But how relevant is this figure, generally considered central in common-stock valuations, to the case of ALCOA? Its past growth rate was excellent, actually a bit better than that of acclaimed Sears Roebuck and much higher than that of the DJIA composite. But the market price at the beginning of 1971 seemed to pay no attention to this fine performance. ALCOA sold at only 11½ times the recent three-year average, while Sears sold at 27 times and the DJIA itself at 15+ times. How did this come about? Evidently Wall Street has fairly pessimistic views about the future course of ALCOA’s earnings, in contrast with its past record. Surprisingly enough, the high price for ALCOA was made as far back as 1959. In that year it sold at 116, or 45 times its earnings. (This compares with a 1959 adjusted high price of 25½ for Sears Roebuck, or 20 times its then earnings.) Even though ALCOA’s profits did show excellent growth thereafter, it is evident that in this case the future possibilities were greatly overestimated in the market price. It closed 1970 at exactly half of the 1959 high, while Sears tripled in price and the DJIA moved up nearly 30%.

需要指出的是，美铝公司的资本基金收益*一直处于平均水平甚至更低，这或许才是决定性因素。只有公司保持高于平均水平的盈利能力，才能在股市中保持较高的乘数。

It should be pointed out that ALCOA’s earnings on capital funds* had been only average or less, and this may be the decisive factor here. High multipliers have been maintained in the stock market only if the company has maintained better than average profitability.

现在，让我们将上一章提出的“两步评估法”应用于美国铝业公司（ALCOA）。^*这种方法可能会得出美国铝业公司的“过往业绩价值”相当于道琼斯工业平均指数的10%，或者说，相对于道琼斯工业平均指数1970年840点的收盘价，每股84美元。基于此，其57.25美元的股价将显得颇具吸引力。

Let us apply at this point to ALCOA the suggestion we made in the previous chapter for a “two-part appraisal process.”^* Such an approach might have produced a “past-performance value” for ALCOA of 10% of the DJIA, or $84 per share relative to the closing price of 840 for the DJIA in 1970. On this basis the shares would have appeared quite attractive at their price of 571⁄4.

这位高级分析师应该在多大程度上降低“过往业绩价值”，以弥补他预见的未来不利发展？坦白说，我们对此一无所知。假设他有理由相信1971年的收益将低至每股2.50美元——与1970年的数字相比大幅下降，而道琼斯工业平均指数则预期上涨。股市很可能会认真对待这一糟糕的表现，但这真的会让曾经强大的美国铝业公司沦为一家相对无利可图的企业，其估值低于其股票背后的有形资产吗？^*（1971年，股价从5月份的高点70美元跌至12月份的低点36美元，而账面价值为55美元。）

To what extent should the senior analyst have marked down the “past-performance value” to allow for adverse developments that he saw in the future? Frankly, we have no idea. Assume he had reason to believe that the 1971 earnings would be as low as $2.50 per share—a large drop from the 1970 figure, as against an advance expected for the DJIA. Very likely the stock market would take this poor performance quite seriously, but would it really establish the once mighty Aluminum Company of America as a relatively unprofitable enterprise, to be valued at less than its tangible assets behind the shares?^* (In 1971 the price declined from a high of 70 in May to a low of 36 in December, against a book value of 55.)

美国铝业公司无疑是一家具有代表性的大型工业公司，但我们认为，其市盈率历史比大多数其他大型企业更加不同寻常，甚至充满矛盾。然而，这一案例在一定程度上印证了我们在上一章中提出的质疑，即评估程序应用于典型工业公司时是否可靠。

ALCOA is surely a representative industrial company of huge size, but we think that its price-and-earnings history is more unusual, even contradictory, than that of most other large enterprises. Yet this instance supports, to some degree, the doubts we expressed in the last chapter as to the dependability of the appraisal procedure when applied to the typical industrial company.

第十二章评论

Commentary on Chapter 12

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

这并不是一种偏执的妄想——财务报表的发布者确实想陷害你！

It’s not a paranoid delusion—the issuers of financial statements really are out to get you!

—马丁·S·弗里德森¹

—Martin S. Fridson¹

当公司宣布其收益时，有一个问题至关重要：这些报告的数字是否公平地代表了基础业务的盈利能力？

When companies announce their earnings, one question matters above all: Do these reported numbers fairly represent the profitability of the underlying business?

如果这个问题能像问一样容易回答就好了。

If only the question were as easy to answer as it is to ask.

注意 GAAP

Mind the GAAP

根据公认会计准则（GAAP），收入和支出通常在其发生的财务期间内入账。这听起来很合理，但可能会造成误导。

Under generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP, income and expenses are typically booked within the fiscal period in which they occur. That sounds sensible, but it can paint a misleading picture.

想象一下，一家工业公司去年收购了一家化学品制造商。今年，环境监管机构对该公司处以8000万美元罚款，要求其清理其新收购的子公司17年前关闭的一家工厂的污染。这家公司甚至不再生产污染该工厂的化学品。

Imagine an industrial company that bought a manufacturer of chemicals last year. This year, environmental regulators fined the company $80 million to clean up pollution at the site of a factory that its newly acquired subsidiary shut down 17 years ago. It no longer even makes the chemical that contaminated the factory site.

根据美国公认会计准则 (GAAP)，过去几年的罚款属于一项费用，会减少今年的净利润。然而，这笔费用是——或者至少应该是——一次性或非经常性费用，而不是一项长期经营成本。这样的成本几乎无法反映公司今年的基本健康状况，也几乎无法反映其未来几年创造现金和利润的能力。

Under GAAP rules, that fine for activities in years past is an expense that reduces net earnings this year. However, it is—or at least should be—a one-time or nonrecurring expense, rather than a perennial cost of doing business. Such a cost says little about the company’s fundamental health this year and next to nothing about its ability to generate cash and profits in future years.

同样，假设一家公司在针对其唯一主要竞争对手的专利侵权诉讼中胜诉，获赔10亿美元。这确实会夸大GAAP收入，但这几乎肯定是一次性事件。指望它再次发生是愚蠢的。

Likewise, let’s say a company wins $1 billion in a patent-infringement lawsuit against its only major competitor. That will inflate GAAP income, but it’s almost certainly a one-time event. You’d be foolish to count on its recurrence.

由于公认会计准则 (GAAP) 并不完美，公司越来越依赖非公认会计准则报告，即在费用或收入中剔除各种项目。公司会在收益公告、部分财务报表和电话会议中报告这些替代数据。分析师和投资者依赖它们。公司高管的薪酬通常也是如此^。2

Because GAAP isn’t perfect, companies increasingly rely on non-GAAP reporting in which they exclude various items from expenses or income. Companies report these alternative numbers in their earnings announcements, parts of their financial statements, and conference calls. Analysts and investors rely on them. Corporate executives’ compensation often does, too.²

影子数字至少已经变得和真实数字一样重要。“整个体系已经习惯于接受这些非公认会计准则的概念作为合法的衡量标准，”纽约投资公司Impactive Capital的执行合伙人劳伦·泰勒·沃尔夫(Lauren Taylor Wolfe)表示。

The shadow numbers have become at least as important as the real ones. “The entire system has been conditioned to accept these non-GAAP notions as legitimate measures,” says Lauren Taylor Wolfe, managing partner of Impactive Capital, an investment firm in New York.

正如美国证券交易委员会所言，非公认会计准则（non-GAAP）对费用或收入的调整是否公平或具有误导性“取决于公司的具体情况和环境”。美国证券交易委员会表示，非公认会计准则财务报表应在一段时间内以一致的方式处理项目；不应扣除“正常的、经常性的现金运营费用”；如果同一期间排除了非经常性费用，则不应包括非经常性收益。

As the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has said, whether a non-GAAP adjustment to expenses or income is fair or misleading “depends on a company’s individual facts and circumstances.” The SEC says non-GAAP financial statements should treat items consistently over time; shouldn’t subtract “normal, recurring, cash operating expenses”; and shouldn’t include nonrecurring gains if nonrecurring charges are excluded in the same period.

原则上，非公认会计准则数据应该消除任何不寻常或额外的成本或收入，从而更清楚地反映公司的经营状况以及未来可能的盈利能力。

In principle, non-GAAP numbers should remove any unusual or extraordinary costs or income, creating a clearer picture of how well the company is doing and how profitable it is likely to be in the future.

在实践中，非公认会计准则 (Non-GAAP) 数据已然沦为“魔鬼工坊”。没有任何监管或会计准则能够明确规定哪些数据可以剔除、何时剔除以及为何剔除。公司可以随时更改其非公认会计准则指标，无需事先通知或解释。哪些类型的收入或支出应该调整多少？哪些构成正常的经营成本？如何定义一项收入来源不太可能重复出现？公司应该如何判断——并传达——其调整是否公平、合理且一致？所有这些都取决于每家公司的高管；他们有权做出判断，他们有权讲述故事。

In practice, non-GAAP numbers have become the devil’s workshop. No regulatory or accounting standards determine exactly what can be excluded, when, and why. Companies can change their non-GAAP metrics whenever they want, without warning or explanation. How much of which types of income or expenses should be adjusted? What constitutes a normal cost of doing business? What defines whether a source of income is unlikely to recur? How should a company decide—and communicate—whether its adjustments are fair, sensible, and consistent? All that is up to each company’s executives; the judgments are theirs to make, and the story is theirs to tell.

欢迎来到非公认会计准则土地

Welcome to Non-GAAP Land

自然而然，当公司成为讲故事的人时，许多公司会选择讲述童话故事。这些幻想发生在我称之为“非公认会计准则之地”的地方。

Naturally, when companies become storytellers, many choose to tell fairy tales. These fantasies are set in a place I call Non-GAAP Land.

在这个神奇的世界里，每只青蛙都是王子，每棵豆茎都能长到平流层，皇帝总是穿着新衣。在非公认会计准则的世界里，公司可以让开支消失，让转瞬即逝的收入看起来像大理石一样持久：

In this magical world, every frog is a prince, every beanstalk grows into the stratosphere, and the emperor always has clothes. In Non-GAAP Land, companies can make expenses vanish and ephemeral income appear as durable as marble:

2011年，Groupon公司制定了一项非公认会计准则（Non-GAAP）盈利指标，名为ACSOI（调整后合并分部营业利润）。在截至2010年12月31日的三年中，Groupon按照公认会计准则亏损4.23亿美元。然而，按照ACSOI指标，该公司“盈利”6300万美元。在非公认会计准则下，Groupon——一家在线营销公司！——认为将在线营销费用排除在其盈利指标之外是公平的。（美国证券交易委员会后来迫使Groupon将其纳入。）
In 2011, Groupon, Inc., concocted a non-GAAP measure of profitability called ACSOI, or adjusted consolidated segment operating income. In the three years ended December 31, 2010, Groupon lost $423 million under GAAP rules. Using its ACSOI measure, however, the company “earned” $63 million. In Non-GAAP Land, Groupon—an online marketing company!—decided it was fair to exclude online marketing expenses from its measure of earnings. (The SEC later compelled Groupon to include them.)
2018年，共享办公初创公司WeWork Cos.创建了一项名为“社区调整后息税折旧摊销前利润”（Community-adjusted EBITDA）的盈利指标。该指标剔除了销售、营销和管理成本。此外，该指标还有效地将房东提供的预付折扣视为一项长期而非暂时的收入来源。在现实世界中，根据美国通用会计准则（GAAP），该公司前一年亏损9.33亿美元。而在非GAAP领域，WeWork“盈利”了2.33亿美元。（WeWork在2019年尝试的股票发行失败；在2021年最终上市后，该公司于2023年末申请破产保护。）³
In 2018, WeWork Cos., the office-sharing start-up, created a measure of purported profitability called “community-adjusted EBITDA.” That waved away the costs of sales, marketing, and administration. It also effectively treated upfront discounts from landlords as a perennial, rather than transitory, source of income. In the real world, under GAAP rules, the company lost $933 million the year before. In Non-GAAP Land, WeWork “earned” $233 million. (WeWork bungled its attempted stock offering in 2019; after finally going public in 2021, the company filed for bankruptcy protection in late 2023.)³
年复一年，百时美施贵宝公司、礼来公司和辉瑞公司等制药巨头的非公认会计准则收入指标都剔除了部分研发成本——尽管研发新药是其业务的核心。这为其非公认会计准则收入增加了数十亿美元。（2022年，在监管机构的压力下，这些公司最终改变了这一做法。）⁴
Year after year, measures of non-GAAP income at such pharmaceutical giants as Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Eli Lilly & Co., and Pfizer Inc. excluded a portion of research and development costs—even though researching and developing new drugs is the heart of their business. That added billions of dollars to their “earnings” in Non-GAAP Land. (In 2022, under pressure from regulators, the companies finally changed that practice.)⁴

你相信魔法吗？

Do You Believe in Magic?

在非公认会计准则领域的其他地方，一些航空公司排除了部分飞机租赁成本；能源公司剔除了部分石油和天然气勘探成本；软件公司消除了部分软件开发成本。

Elsewhere in Non-GAAP Land, some airlines exclude a portion of the cost of renting airplanes; energy companies strip out some of the cost of exploring for oil and gas; software firms wipe away part of the cost of developing software.

因为你不住在非公认会计准则地区，你可能会想：我不能假装我的支出不会减少我的收入。企业为什么要这么做呢？

Because you don’t live in Non-GAAP Land, you’re probably thinking: I can’t pretend that my expenses don’t reduce my income. Why should a business get to do that?

答案是：专业投资者会附和这种伪装。如果没有有权势的人质疑一种商业行为，就会有更多企业效仿。一旦股价因明显的盈利增长而上涨，要求实际盈利增长就显得吹毛求疵了。而当水涨船高时，没有人愿意打破任何一条船。

The answer: Professional investors go along with the charade. If no one powerful questions a business practice, more businesses will practice it. Once stocks go up because of apparent earnings growth, demanding actual earnings growth seems like nitpicking. And when a rising tide lifts all boats, no one wants to rock any boat.

但人们知道得更多。

Yet people know better.

一项对169位上市公司首席财务官的调查询问了哪些因素使得报告的收益“高质量”。高达94%的首席财务官表示，收益应反映“长期一致的报告选择”；超过三分之二的受访者表示，收益不应包含“一次性或特殊项目”。

A survey of 169 chief financial officers of public companies asked what made reported earnings “high quality.” Fully 94% of the CFOs said earnings should reflect “consistent reporting choices over time”; more than two-thirds said earnings shouldn’t include “one-time or special items.”

在另一项调查中，超过一半的专业分析师和投资者表示，许多非公认会计准则调整有时或总是不合适的。

In a separate survey, more than half of professional analysts and investors said many non-GAAP adjustments are sometimes or always inappropriate.

然而，许多首席财务官监督的财务报告却呈现出一种幻想，而许多专业投资者所拥有的公司恰恰是他们认为会计工作不充分的公司。

Yet many of these CFOs oversee the production of financial reports that present a fantasy—and many of these professional investors own the very companies whose accounting they consider inadequate.

这项针对首席财务官的调查发现，93% 的受访者认为，公司虚报收益是为了支撑股价，并满足不断提高报告利润的“外部压力”。89% 的受访者认为，公司虚报收益是为了“影响”高管薪酬，即虚报高管薪酬^。5

The survey of CFOs found that 93% believe that companies misrepresenting earnings do so to support their stock price and to satisfy “outside pressure” for ever-higher reported profits. And 89% think companies misrepresenting earnings want to “influence”—i.e., to inflate—executive compensation.⁵

研究还表明，习惯性地从非公认会计准则收益中排除项目的公司往往成立时间较短、规模较小；它们拥有广泛的机构持股，近期股票回报率较高，因此对未来更丰厚的回报抱有很高的期望^。6

Research also indicates that companies that habitually exclude items from non-GAAP earnings tend to be younger and smaller; they have wide institutional ownership, high recent stock returns, and thus great expectations for more hot returns in the future.⁶

公司讲童话故事，是因为受众不希望咒语被打破。当投资者愿意相信魔法时，公司就会让愿望看起来成真。

Companies tell fairy tales because their audience doesn’t want the spell to be broken. When investors want to believe in magic, companies will make wishes seem to come true.

我们发誓，这样的事永远不会再发生……直到明年

We Swear It Won’t Happen Ever Again . . . Until Next Year

企业提升业绩的一个方法是将重组费用从非公认会计准则业绩中剔除。企业在亏本出售资产、关闭部门或裁员时，都可能产生此类成本。

One way companies can polish their performance is to exclude restructuring charges from non-GAAP results. A business can incur such costs when it sells assets at a loss, shuts down a division, or lays off employees.

在现实世界中，这些都是费用。但在非公认会计准则下，它们可能会消失。

In the real world, those are expenses. In Non-GAAP Land, they can disappear.

原则上，一家健康的公司不应该长期抛售资产、裁员。收购成本过高以及过度扩张员工规模并非正常的经营成本。

In principle, a healthy company shouldn’t be chronically dumping assets and jettisoning workers. Overpaying for acquisitions and overexpanding the workforce aren’t part of the ordinary cost of doing business.

然而，实际上，每家公司都需要偶尔调整经营方向，因此重组费用每隔几年就会出现。将其排除在公司盈利能力评估之外是合理的：短期内偶尔发生的成本不太可能在长期内限制利润。

In practice, however, every company needs to change course occasionally, so restructuring charges do crop up every few years. Excluding them from your assessment of a company’s profitability can make sense: A cost that occurs sporadically in the short term isn’t likely to constrict profits in the long term.

但如果重组费用经常发生，那么它们就会开始成为企业运营的常规特征——在这种情况下，忽视它们就太天真了。

But if restructuring charges recur often, then they start to resemble a regular feature of how the business operates—in which case, you would be naïve to overlook them.

然而，许多公司都告诉投资者要这样做。

Many companies, however, are telling investors to do just that.

据金融数据公司 Calcbench 称，从 2013 年到 2022 年，标准普尔 500 指数中的 68 家公司每年都会承担重组费用。其中，36 家公司在 2022 年调整了数据，将重组费用重新添加到其报告的非 GAAP 收入指标中。

According to Calcbench, a financial-data firm, 68 companies in the S&P 500 took restructuring charges every year from 2013 to 2022. Of those, 36 adjusted their numbers in 2022 by adding restructuring charges back into their reported measures of non-GAAP income.

这些公司实际上是在用经典电影《鸭汤》中奇科·马克思的态度嘲讽投资者：“好吧，你会相信谁：我还是你自己的眼睛？”

These companies are effectively taunting investors with the attitude of Chico Marx in the classic movie Duck Soup: “Well, who are you gonna believe: me or your own eyes?”

亲眼看看惠普公司。

Look with your own eyes at HP Inc.

截至2023年的10年间，惠普计入了10次重组费用；此外，每年都计入了“收购与资产剥离”费用（尽管2015年仅为100万美元）。这些费用总计近51亿美元，相当于惠普427亿美元累计营业利润（按传统GAAP衡量）的八分之一。惠普在财务报表中清除这些费用后，该公司报告的非公认会计准则营业收入累计达到 495 亿美元。

Over the 10 years through 2023, HP took restructuring charges 10 times; it also took “acquisition and divestiture” charges in every one of those years (although only for $1 million in 2015). Those charges totaled nearly $5.1 billion—an eighth of HP’s $42.7 billion in cumulative operating profits (by the conventional GAAP measure). After HP cleansed those charges in its financial statements, the company reported a cumulative $49.5 billion in non-GAAP operating income.

惠普表示，此类费用涵盖“金额和频率不一致”且不代表预期未来运营支出的“非经常性成本”。年复一年地重复出现，这有点像说“祝你生日快乐”的歌词不重复，因为不是每个人都有相同的名字。

HP says such charges cover “nonrecurring costs” that are “inconsistent in amount and frequency” and unrepresentative of expected future operating expenses. After recurring year after year after year, that’s a bit like saying the lyrics of “Happy Birthday to You” aren’t repetitive because not every person has the same name.

积累收益

Stocking Up Earnings

非公认会计准则土地表中另一个夸大“收入”指标的项目是股票薪酬：即公司向员工和高管支付股票或期权所产生的成本。尤其是在软件和其他科技公司中，这是一项巨大且经常性的经营成本。在许多公司，它是薪酬的主要组成部分。

Another item that bloats measures of “income” in Non-GAAP Land is stock-based compensation: the cost companies incur to pay employees and executives with shares or options. Especially among software and other technology companies, that’s a huge—and regular—cost of doing business. At many, it’s the dominant component of pay.

截至2023年5月的10个财年中，甲骨文公司累计非公认会计准则运营收入为1789亿美元，比其根据公认会计准则报告的运营收入高出三分之一以上。部分原因是这家软件巨头向其管理层支付了156亿美元的股票薪酬。和员工——并将该费用加回到其非公认会计准则营业收入中。

Over the 10 fiscal years ending in May 2023, Oracle Corp.’s cumulative non-GAAP operating income of $178.9 billion was more than one-third higher than the operating earnings it reported under GAAP rules. That’s partly because the software giant paid $15.6 billion of stock-based compensation to its management and employees—and added that expense back into its non-GAAP operating income.

图 12-1：普通的复发？

FIGURE 12-1: An Ordinary Recurrence?

资料来源：HP 收益报告，SEC.gov。

Source: HP earnings presentations, SEC.gov.

Oracle 在其收益报告中承认“股票薪酬费用将在未来期间再次出现”，但“我们将继续评估不包括股票薪酬费用的业务表现。”

Oracle concedes in its earnings reports that “stock-based compensation expenses will recur in future periods,” but “we continue to evaluate our business performance excluding stock-based compensation expenses.”

同期，另一家软件巨头Salesforce在其非GAAP报告中公布了256亿美元的累计营业收入。然而，按照GAAP常规衡量，该公司的累计营业收入仅为31亿美元。

Over the same period, another software giant, Salesforce, Inc., reported $25.6 billion of cumulative operating income in its non-GAAP reports. Yet the company’s cumulative operating income, as measured conventionally by GAAP, totaled just $3.1 billion.

Salesforce 在非 GAAP 领域的盈利为何比实际盈利高出八倍之多？原因在于，它拿出了支付给员工和管理层的 141 亿美元股票薪酬费用，却宣称这笔费用不属于支出。

How did Salesforce earn more than eight times as much in Non-GAAP Land than it did in the real world? By taking the $14.1 billion it had paid employees and management in stock-based compensation expense and declaring that it wasn’t an expense.

Salesforce 解释说，它将股票薪酬（和其他费用）添加到非公认会计准则收入计算中，因为这些成本不是为了“增加特定时期的收入，而是为了公司在多个时期的长期利益”。

Salesforce has explained that it adds stock-based compensation (and other expenses) into its non-GAAP calculations of income because such costs aren’t incurred to “increase revenue in a particular period, but instead for the Company’s long-term benefit over multiple periods.”

然而，在同样的10年里，微软公司支付了高达481亿美元的股票薪酬。这笔支出中有多少计入了微软的非公认会计准则利润？

Yet, over the same 10-year stretch, Microsoft Corp. paid out an enormous $48.1 billion in stock-based compensation. How much of that expense did Microsoft shovel into its non-GAAP income?

零。

Zero.

通过这样做，微软认识到了股票薪酬的本质：一种正常的、经常性的经营成本，公司和投资者不应该将其添加到童话般的收入衡量标准中。

By doing so, Microsoft recognized stock-based compensation as what it is: a normal, recurring cost of doing business that companies and investors shouldn’t be adding back into a fairy-tale measure of income.

正如沃伦·巴菲特在 2016 年所写：

As Warren Buffett wrote in 2016:

……管理者告诉股东忽略某些实际发生的费用项目已变得司空见惯。“股票薪酬”就是最令人震惊的例子。“薪酬”这个词本身就说明了一切。如果薪酬不是一项费用，那它是什么？而且，如果实际发生的费用和经常性费用不属于收益计算，那么它们究竟属于哪里呢？⁷

. . . it has become common for managers to tell their owners to ignore certain expense items that are all too real. “Stock-based compensation” is the most egregious example. The very name says it all: “compensation.” If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if real and recurring expenses don’t belong in the calculation of earnings, where in the world do they belong?⁷

表 12-1：库存

Table 12-1: Stockpiling

注：所有数字均以百万美元为单位。由于四舍五入和其他细微差异，非公认会计准则营业利润总额可能与上述项目之和不完全一致。

Notes: All numbers in $millions. Non-GAAP operating income totals may not exactly match sum of items above them because of rounding and other minor discrepancies.

资料来源：各公司年度盈利报告。

Sources: Companies’ annual earnings releases.

我曾经将“损益表”定义为“公司财务报表中可能夸大收入、低估支出的部分”。8^非公认会计准则调整的泛滥使这个小笑话变得极其严肃。

I once defined “income statement” as “the part of a company’s financial statements in which it may exaggerate its income and understate its expenses.”⁸ The plague of non-GAAP adjustments has made that little joke deadly serious.

值得称赞的是，有些公司确实会使用非公认会计准则数据来澄清事实，而不是为了掩盖或混淆视听。但太多公司却并非如此。对于有进取心的投资者来说，最重要的——也是最具挑战性的任务之一，就是弄清楚非公认会计准则数据描绘的是真实的景象还是虚幻的景象^。9

Some companies, to their credit, do use non-GAAP numbers to clarify rather than to camouflage or confuse. Far too many don’t. One of the most important—and challenging—tasks for enterprising investors is figuring out whether the non-GAAP numbers paint a fair picture or a fantasy.⁹

第十三章

Chapter 13 四家上市公司比较

A Comparison of Four Listed Companies

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

本章将提供一个证券分析的样本。我们随机选取了四家在纽约证券交易所上市的公司，它们分别是ELTRA公司（由Electric Autolite和Mergenthaler Linotype两家企业合并而成）、Emerson电气公司（一家电气和电子产品制造商）、Emery Air Freight公司（一家国内空运货运代理公司）和Emhart公司（最初只生产装瓶机械，但现在也生产建筑五金）。 *这三家制造公司之间存在一些广泛的相似之处，但差异似乎更为显著。财务和运营数据应足够多样化，以便进行更有意义的研究。

In this chapter we should like to present a sample of security analysis in operation. We have selected, more or less at random, four companies which are found successively on the New York Stock Exchange list. These are ELTRA Corp. (a merger of Electric Autolite and Mergenthaler Linotype enterprises), Emerson Electric Co. (a manufacturer of electric and electronic products), Emery Air Freight (a domestic forwarder of air freight), and Emhart Corp. (originally a maker of bottling machinery only, but now also in builders’ hardware).* There are some broad resemblances between the three manufacturing firms, but the differences will seem more significant. There should be sufficient variety in the financial and operating data to make the examination of interest.

在表 13-1中，我们概述了这四家公司在 1970 年底的市场售价，并列出了它们 1970 年运营的一些数据。然后，我们详细列出了一些关键比率，这些比率一方面与业绩相关，另一方面与价格相关。业绩模式的各个方面与相对价格模式的吻合程度值得商榷。最后，我们将对这四家公司进行回顾，提出一些比较和关联性建议，并根据保守型普通股投资者的要求对每家公司进行评估。

In Table 13-1 we present a summary of what the four companies were selling for in the market at the end of 1970, and a few figures on their 1970 operations. We then detail certain key ratios, which relate on the one hand to performance and on the other to price. Comment is called for on how various aspects of the performance pattern agree with the relative price pattern. Finally, we shall pass the four companies in review, suggesting some comparisons and relationships and evaluating each in terms of the requirements of a conservative common-stock investor.

这四家公司最引人注目的事实是，它们目前的市盈率差异远大于其经营业绩或财务状况。其中两家公司——ELTRA和Emhart——的市盈率仅为1968年至1970年平均市盈率的9.7倍和12倍，而道琼斯工业平均指数的市盈率则为15.5倍。另外两家公司——Emerson和Emery——的市盈率则非常高，分别为33倍和45倍。这种差异必然有其原因，而这可以从近年来这些受青睐公司利润的强劲增长中找到答案，尤其是货运代理公司。（但其他两家公司的增长数据也并不令人失望。）

The most striking fact about the four companies is that the current price/earnings ratios vary much more widely than their operating performance or financial condition. Two of the enterprises—ELTRA and Emhart—were modestly priced at only 9.7 times and 12 times the average earnings for 1968–1970, as against a similar figure of 15.5 times for the DJIA. The other two—Emerson and Emery—showed very high multiples of 33 and 45 times such earnings. There is bound to be some explanation of a difference such as this, and it is found in the superior growth of the favored companies’ profits in recent years, especially by the freight forwarder. (But the growth figures of the other two firms were not unsatisfactory.)

表 13-1 四家上市公司比较

TABLE 13-1 A Comparison of Four Listed Companies

^a假设优先股转换。

^a Assuming conversion of preferred stock.

^b每股 13 美分的特殊费用之后。

^b After special charge of 13 cents per share.

^c年度截至 1970 年 9 月。

^c Year ended Sept. 1970.

表13-2 四家上市公司比较（续）

TABLE 13-2 A Comparison of Four Listed Companies (continued)

为了进行更全面的处理，让我们简要回顾一下从数据中可以看出的性能的主要要素。

For more comprehensive treatment let us review briefly the chief elements of performance as they appear from our figures.

1.盈利能力。（a）所有公司都显示出令人满意的账面收益，但艾默生和埃默里的数据远高于其他两家公司。高投资回报率通常伴随着每股收益的高年增长率。除 Emery 外，所有公司 1969 年的账面价值收益都高于 1961 年；但 Emery 的数字在这两年都非常大。（b ）对于制造公司来说，每美元销售额的利润数字通常可以表明比较优势或劣势。我们在这里使用标准普尔上市股票报告中提供的“营业收入与销售额的比率” 。这四家公司的结果再次令人满意，其中 Emerson 的表现尤其令人印象深刻。1961 年至 1969 年间，各公司的变化差异很大。

1. Profitability. (a) All the companies show satisfactory earnings on their book value, but the figures for Emerson and Emery are much higher than for the other two. A high rate of return on invested capital often goes along with a high annual growth rate in earnings per share. All the companies except Emery showed better earnings on book value in 1969 than in 1961; but the Emery figure was exceptionally large in both years. (b) For manufacturing companies, the profit figure per dollar of sales is usually an indication of comparative strength or weakness. We use here the “ratio of operating income to sales,” as given in Standard & Poor’s Listed Stock Reports. Here again the results are satisfactory for all four companies, with an especially impressive showing by Emerson. The changes between 1961 and 1969 vary considerably among the companies.

2.稳定性。我们衡量的是过去十年中任何一年每股收益的最大跌幅，与前三年的平均值进行比较。没有跌幅就意味着100%的稳定性，而这两家颇受欢迎的公司都体现了这一点。但在“糟糕的一年”1970年，ELTRA和Emhart的跌幅相当温和，根据我们的衡量，它们分别只有8%，而道琼斯工业平均指数则为7%。

2. Stability. This we measure by the maximum decline in per-share earnings in any one of the past ten years, as against the average of the three preceding years. No decline translates into 100% stability, and this was registered by the two popular concerns. But the shrinkages of ELTRA and Emhart were quite moderate in the “poor year” 1970, amounting to only 8% each by our measurement, against 7% for the DJIA.

3.增长。两家低乘数公司的增长率相当令人满意，均优于道琼斯集团。ELTRA 的业绩与其较低的市盈率相比尤其令人印象深刻。当然，高乘数公司的增长更为令人印象深刻。

3. Growth. The two low-multiplier companies show quite satisfactory growth rates, in both cases doing better than the Dow Jones group. The ELTRA figures are especially impressive when set against its low price/earnings ratio. The growth is of course more impressive for the high-multiplier pair.

4.财务状况。这三家制造公司的财务状况良好，其流动资产与流动负债之比高于标准比率（2美元流动资产与1美元流动负债之比）。埃默里航空货运公司的比率较低，但它属于不同的类别，凭借其良好的业绩记录，筹集所需现金应该不成问题。所有公司的长期债务都相对较低。“稀释”说明：截至1970年底，埃默森电气公司持有的低股息可转换优先股的市值为1.63亿美元。在我们的分析中，我们按照惯例将稀释因素考虑在内，将优先股视为转换为普通股。这导致近期每股收益下降约10美分，或约4%。

4. Financial Position. The three manufacturing companies are in sound financial condition, having better than the standard ratio of $2 of current assets for $1 of current liabilities. Emery Air Freight has a lower ratio; but it falls in a different category, and with its fine record it would have no problem raising needed cash. All the companies have relatively low long-term debt. “Dilution” note: Emerson Electric had $163 million of market value of low-dividend convertible preferred shares outstanding at the end of 1970. In our analysis we have made allowance for the dilution factor in the usual way by treating the preferred as if converted into common. This decreased recent earnings by about 10 cents per share, or some 4%.

5.股息。真正重要的是持续不间断的记录。这里最好的记录是埃姆哈特（Emhart），自1902年以来从未暂停过支付。ELTRA的记录非常好，埃默森（Emerson）的记录相当令人满意，而埃默里货运（Emery Freight）则是一家新来者。派息率的差异似乎并不特别显著。根据市盈率计算，“便宜”股票的当前股息收益率是“昂贵”股票的两倍。

5. Dividends. What really counts is the history of continuance without interruption. The best record here is Emhart’s, which has not suspended a payment since 1902. ELTRA’s record is very good, Emerson’s quite satisfactory, Emery Freight is a newcomer. The variations in payout percentage do not seem especially significant. The current dividend yield is twice as high on the “cheap pair” as on the “dear pair,” corresponding to the price/earnings ratios.

6.价格历史。读者应该会对这四只股票过去34年间从最低点到最高点的涨幅印象深刻。（所有情况下，最低价均已根据后续股票分割进行了调整。）请注意，道琼斯工业平均指数的最低价与最高价之间的差值约为11比1；而我们公司的差值则从埃姆哈特“仅”17比1到埃默里空运公司不低于528比1不等。*这些成倍的价格上涨是我们大多数早期普通股的特点，它们预示着过去股市中存在的巨大获利机会。（但它们也可能表明，在1950年出现低价之前的熊市中，跌幅有多么过大。）ELTRA和埃姆哈特在1969-70年的跌势中都经历了超过50%的跌幅。埃默森和埃默里经历了严重但不那么令人沮丧的下跌；前者在1970年底前反弹至历史新高，后者则在1971年初反弹至历史新高。

6. Price History. The reader should be impressed by the percentage advance shown in the price of all four of these issues, as measured from the lowest to the highest points during the past 34 years. (In all cases the low price has been adjusted for subsequent stock splits.) Note that for the DJIA the range from low to high was on the order of 11 to 1; for our companies the spread has varied from “only” 17 to 1 for Emhart to no less than 528 to 1 for Emery Air Freight.* These manifold price advances are characteristic of most of our older common-stock issues, and they proclaim the great opportunities of profit that have existed in the stock markets of the past. (But they may indicate also how overdone were the declines in the bear markets before 1950 when the low prices were registered.) Both ELTRA and Emhart sustained price shrinkages of more than 50% in the 1969–70 price break. Emerson and Emery had serious, but less distressing, declines; the former rebounded to a new all-time high before the end of 1970, the latter in early 1971.

对四家公司的总体观察

General Observations on the Four Companies

艾默生电气的总市值巨大，远远超过其他三家公司的总和。^*它是我们“善意巨头”之一，稍后会进行评论。一位记忆力超群（或记忆力欠佳）的金融分析师会想到艾默生电气和 Zenith Radio 之间的类比，而这并非令人安心。因为多年来，Zenith 一直保持着辉煌的增长记录；它在市场上的售价也达到了 17 亿美元（1966 年）；但其利润从 1968 年的 4300 万美元跌至 1970 年的一半，并在当年的大抛售中，其股价从之前的最高价 89 美元跌至 22.5 美元。高估值意味着高风险。

Emerson Electric has an enormous total market value, dwarfing the other three companies combined.^* It is one of our “good-will giants,” to be commented on later. A financial analyst blessed (or handicapped) with a good memory will think of an analogy between Emerson Electric and Zenith Radio, and that would not be reassuring. For Zenith had a brilliant growth record for many years; it too sold in the market for $1.7 billion (in 1966); but its profits fell from $43 million in 1968 to only half as much in 1970, and in that year’s big selloff its price declined to 22½ against the previous top of 89. High valuations entail high risks.

如果要部分解释其市盈率接近其最高报告收益的40倍，那么埃默里航空货运公司（Emery Air Freight）在未来增长方面无疑是四家公司中最有前景的。当然，该公司过去的增长令人印象深刻。但如果考虑到其起步规模很小，1958年的净利润仅为57万美元，那么这些数字对未来而言可能意义不大。事实证明，在运量和利润已经大幅增长之后，继续保持高增长往往更加困难。埃默里航空货运公司最令人惊讶的一点是，在1970年，也就是国内航空客运业表现最差的一年，其收益和市价却继续快速增长。这确实是一项非凡的成就，但也引发了一个问题：未来的利润是否会受到不利因素的影响，例如竞争加剧、货运代理和航空公司之间达成新协议的压力等等。在对这些因素做出合理判断之前，可能需要进行深入研究，但保守型投资者不能将其排除在总体考量之外。

Emery Air Freight must be the most promising of the four companies in terms of future growth, if the price/earnings ratio of nearly 40 times its highest reported earnings is to be even partially justified. The past growth, of course, has been most impressive. But these figures may not be so significant for the future if we consider that they started quite small, at only $570,000 of net earnings in 1958. It often proves much more difficult to continue to grow at a high rate after volume and profits have already expanded to big totals. The most surprising aspect of Emery’s story is that its earnings and market price continued to grow apace in 1970, which was the worst year in the domestic air-passenger industry. This is a remarkable achievement indeed, but it raises the question whether future profits may not be vulnerable to adverse developments, through increased competition, pressure for new arrangements between forwarders and airlines, etc. An elaborate study might be needed before a sound judgment could be passed on these points, but the conservative investor cannot leave them out of his general reckoning.

埃姆哈特和ELTRA。过去14年，埃姆哈特的业务表现优于股市。1958年，其市盈率高达22倍，与道琼斯工业平均指数的市盈率大致相同。此后，其利润增长了两倍，而道琼斯指数的涨幅不到100%。但1970年的收盘价仅比1958年的最高价高出三分之一，而道琼斯指数则上涨了43%。ELTRA的业绩也与之类似。在目前的市场环境下，这两家公司似乎都缺乏魅力或“性感”；但从所有统计数据来看，它们的表现却出奇地好。它们的未来前景如何？我们在这里无法给出高见，但标准普尔在1971年对这四家公司给出了如下评价：

Emhart and ELTRA. Emhart has done better in its business than in the stock market over the past 14 years. In 1958 it sold as high as 22 times the current earnings—about the same ratio as for the DJIA. Since then its profits tripled, as against a rise of less than 100% for the Dow, but its closing price in 1970 was only a third above the 1958 high, versus 43% for the Dow. The record of ELTRA is somewhat similar. It appears that neither of these companies possesses glamour, or “sex appeal,” in the present market; but in all the statistical data they show up surprisingly well. Their future prospects? We have no sage remarks to make here, but this is what Standard & Poor’s had to say about the four companies in 1971:

ELTRA —“长期前景：某些业务具有周期性，但既定的竞争地位和多样化是抵消因素。”

ELTRA—“Long-term Prospects: Certain operations are cyclical, but an established competitive position and diversification are offsetting factors.”

艾默生电气——“尽管目前的价格合理（71）展望未来，该股具有长期吸引力。...持续的收购政策、在工业领域的强势地位以及加速的国际计划预示着销售和盈利将进一步增长。

Emerson Electric—“While adequately priced (at 71) on the current outlook, the shares have appeal for the long term. . . . A continued acquisition policy together with a strong position in industrial fields and an accelerated international program suggests further sales and earnings progress.”

Emery Air Freight——“从目前的前景来看，该股价格似乎过高（为 57 美元），但值得长期持有。”

Emery Air Freight—“The shares appear amply priced (at 57) on current prospects, but are well worth holding for the long pull.”

Emhart—“尽管今年玻璃容器行业资本支出减少，但1972年商业环境的改善应该会有助于盈利。该股值得持有（34）。”

Emhart—“Although restricted this year by lower capital spending in the glass-container industry, earnings should be aided by an improved business environment in 1972. The shares are worth holding (at 34).”

结论：许多金融分析师会发现，埃默森和埃默里两家公司的股票比其他两家更有趣、更有吸引力——这或许主要因为它们的“市场行为”更佳，其次是因为它们近期盈利增长更快。根据我们的保守投资原则，前者并非入选的正当理由——那是投机者可以随意发挥的。后者有其合理性，但也要适度。埃默里航空货运过去的增长和预期的良好前景能否支撑其60多倍的近期盈利？¹我们的答案是：对于那些深入研究过这家公司潜力并得出异常坚定乐观结论的人来说，或许可以。但对于那些谨慎的投资者来说，他们并非如此，因为他们希望事先合理地确定自己不会犯华尔街典型的错误，即过度热衷于盈利和股市的良好表现。*同样的警示性声明似乎也适用于艾默生电气 (Emerson Electric) 的案例，尤其需要注意的是，该股的无形资产（或盈利能力）估值目前已超过十亿美元。值得一提的是，“电子行业”曾是股市的摇篮，但通常在股价低迷时就会下跌。艾默生电气是一个突出的例外，但它还必须在未来很多年里继续保持这样的例外状态，才能完全证明其1970年的收盘价是合理的。

Conclusions: Many financial analysts will find Emerson and Emery more interesting and appealing stocks than the other two—primarily, perhaps, because of their better “market action,” and secondarily because of their faster recent growth in earnings. Under our principles of conservative investment the first is not a valid reason for selection—that is something for the speculators to play around with. The second has validity, but within limits. Can the past growth and the presumably good prospects of Emery Air Freight justify a price more than 60 times its recent earnings?¹ Our answer would be: Maybe for someone who has made an in-depth study of the possibilities of this company and come up with exceptionally firm and optimistic conclusions. But not for the careful investor who wants to be reasonably sure in advance that he is not committing the typical Wall Street error of overenthusiasm for good performance in earnings and in the stock market.* The same cautionary statements seem called for in the case of Emerson Electric, with a special reference to the market’s current valuation of over a billion dollars for the intangible, or earning-power, factor here. We should add that the “electronics industry,” once a fair-haired child of the stock market, has in general fallen on disastrous days. Emerson is an outstanding exception, but it will have to continue to be such an exception for a great many years in the future before the 1970 closing price will have been fully justified by its subsequent performance.

相比之下，27 岁的 ELTRA 和 33 岁的 Emhart 都拥有指定那些其价格背后具有足够价值、足以构成合理受保护投资的公司。如果投资者愿意，可以认为自己基本上是这些企业的部分所有者，其成本与资产负债表上显示的投入资金相对应。*长期以来，投资资本收益率一直令人满意；利润也保持稳定；过去的增长率令人惊讶。这两家公司符合我们将其纳入防御性投资者投资组合的七项统计要求。这些要求将在下一章中展开，但我们将其总结如下：

By contrast, both ELTRA at 27 and Emhart at 33 have the earmarks of companies with sufficient value behind their price to constitute reasonably protected investments. Here the investor can, if he wishes, consider himself basically a part owner of these businesses, at a cost corresponding to what the balance sheet shows to be the money invested therein.* The rate of earnings on invested capital has long been satisfactory; the stability of profits also; the past growth rate surprisingly so. The two companies will meet our seven statistical requirements for inclusion in a defensive investor’s portfolio. These will be developed in the next chapter, but we summarize them as follows:

尺寸合适。
Adequate size.
足够强劲的财务状况。
A sufficiently strong financial condition.
至少过去20年持续分红。
Continued dividends for at least the past 20 years.
过去十年没有盈利赤字。
No earnings deficit in the past ten years.
每股收益十年增长至少三分之一。
Ten-year growth of at least one-third in per-share earnings.
股票价格不超过净资产价值的1.5倍。
Price of stock no more than 1½ times net asset value.
价格不超过过去三年平均收益的15倍。
Price no more than 15 times average earnings of the past three years.

我们不预测ELTRA或Emhart未来的盈利表现。投资者分散化的普通股名单中，必然会有一些表现令人失望，而这两支股票中的一支或两支都可能出现这种情况。但基于上述选择原则，加上投资者可能希望应用的其他合理标准，分散化的名单本身在未来几年应该会表现良好。至少，长期的经验告诉我们如此。

We make no predictions about the future earnings performance of ELTRA or Emhart. In the investor’s diversified list of common stocks there are bound to be some that prove disappointing, and this may be the case for one or both of this pair. But the diversified list itself, based on the above principles of selection, plus whatever other sensible criteria the investor may wish to apply, should perform well enough across the years. At least, long experience tells us so.

最后一点：即使一位经验丰富的证券分析师接受了我们对这四家公司的一般性推理，他也会犹豫是否应该在1970年底建议艾默生或埃默里公司的股东将其股票换成ELTRA或埃姆哈特公司的股票——除非该股东清楚地理解了该建议背后的理念。没有理由期望在任何短期内在一段时间内，低乘数组合的表现将优于高乘数组合。后者在市场上享有盛誉，因此拥有相当大的发展势头，并且这种势头可能会持续很长一段时间。客户选择Eltra和Emhart而非Emerson和Emery的合理依据在于，他经过深思熟虑后得出结论：他更喜欢价值型投资，而不是魅力型投资。因此，在很大程度上，普通股投资策略必须取决于个人投资者的态度。我们将在下一章更详细地讨论这种方法。

A final observation: An experienced security analyst, even if he accepted our general reasoning on these four companies, would have hesitated to recommend that a holder of Emerson or Emery exchange his shares for ELTRA or Emhart at the end of 1970—unless the holder understood clearly the philosophy behind the recommendation. There was no reason to expect that in any short period of time the low-multiplier duo would outperform the high-multipliers. The latter were well thought of in the market and thus had a considerable degree of momentum behind them, which might continue for an indefinite period. The sound basis for preferring eltra and Emhart to Emerson and Emery would be the client’s considered conclusion that he preferred value-type investments to glamour-type investments. Thus, to a substantial extent, common-stock investment policy must depend on the attitude of the individual investor. This approach is treated at greater length in our next chapter.

第十三章评论

Commentary on Chapter 13

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

作为一名科学家，我相信无需确定性的证据，而其他人则倾向于相信无需证明的确定性。

As a scientist I believe in proof without certainty, while other people tend to believe in certainty without proof.

—阿什利·蒙塔古¹

—Ashley Montagu¹

在第十三章中，格雷厄姆提醒你将关注点从表面转移到根本。作为一名聪明的投资者，你必须透过股票价格，关注其所代表的业务表现。格雷厄姆列出了衡量业绩的六个维度——盈利能力、稳定性、增长、财务状况、股息和股价历史。只有最后一个维度与股票本身直接相关；其他所有维度都需要你了解公司业务。

In Chapter 13, Graham reminds you to shift your focus from the superficial to the fundamental. As an intelligent investor, you must look past the price of the stock to the performance of the business it represents. Graham maps out six dimensions on which you can measure performance—profitability, stability, growth, financial position, dividends, and price history. Only the last has anything to do with the stock directly; all the others require you to learn about the business.

四条路径

Four Paths

格雷厄姆在本章中比较的四家公司中，只有艾默生电气公司至今仍独立运营。让我们看看艾默生电气公司以及其他三家以字母E开头的当代公司——劲量控股公司（Energizer Holdings Inc.）、伊士曼柯达公司（Eastman Kodak Co.）和精确科学公司（Exact Sciences Corp.）——能从中汲取什么经验。

Of the four companies Graham compared in this chapter, only Emerson Electric still exists independently. Let’s see what we can learn from looking at Emerson and three other contemporary companies whose names begin with the letter E: Energizer Holdings Inc., Eastman Kodak Co., and Exact Sciences Corp.

艾默生是一家制造和工程巨头，年收入超过 150 亿美元，股票市值在 2024 年初超过 540 亿美元。它生产重要的工具和技术：阀门、电动机、温度传感器、地震分析、激光焊接设备、过程控制软件、重型吸尘器以及许多其他设备和服务。与许多企业集团一样，艾默生经常收购其他公司，也经常出售一些公司；它不断地重塑和重新设计自己。艾默生自1965年以来一直是标准普尔500指数的成分股。

Emerson is a manufacturing and engineering giant with more than $15 billion in annual revenue and a stock-market value that exceeded $54 billion in early 2024. It produces essential tools and technologies: valves, electric motors, temperature sensors, seismic analysis, laser-based welding equipment, process-control software, heavy-duty vacuums, and many other devices and services. Like many conglomerates, Emerson frequently buys other companies and often sells some, too; it is continually remaking and redesigning itself. Emerson has been in the S&P 500 index since 1965.

Energizer总部位于密苏里州圣路易斯附近，距离艾默生仅 20 英里，其股票代码 ENR 与艾默生 (EMR) 几乎完全相同。但这两家公司并非孪生兄弟。Energizer 的主要业务是生产 Energizer、Eveready 和 Rayovac 品牌的电池；它还生产汽车和卡车的蜡、香料和燃料添加剂。多年来，随着智能手机取代相机、钟表、计算器、手电筒、收音机、视频游戏机以及录音机和录像机，电池业务的势头一直在减弱。截至 2024 年，Energizer 专注于恢复稳定的盈利能力，主要通过削减成本来实现。

Energizer is headquartered only 20 miles away from Emerson near St. Louis, Missouri, and its ticker symbol, ENR, is almost an exact match for Emerson’s (EMR). But the two companies are far from twins. Energizer’s primary business is manufacturing batteries under the Energizer, Eveready, and Rayovac brands; it also makes waxes, fragrances, and fuel additives for cars and trucks. The battery business has been losing power for years as smartphones have superseded cameras, clocks, calculators, flashlights, radios, videogame consoles, and audio and video recorders. As of 2024, Energizer was focused on trying to return to stable profitability, largely by cutting costs.

伊士曼柯达公司曾是摄影行业的巨头，统治了超过一个世纪。然而，它却像一张被遗弃在阳光下的快照一样黯然失色。1975年发明数码摄影后，柯达花了近二十年时间才将自己的电子相机推向消费者。柯达的大部分收入来自胶卷销售，因此不愿推出一款不使用胶卷的产品。竞争对手迅速超越了柯达；后来，智能手机让传统相机沦为恐龙，胶卷也沦为化石。1993年至2022年间，柯达的年收入缩水了93%；2012年，该公司申请破产保护，之后步履蹒跚地继续前行。到2020年初，柯达的会计师警告称，该公司可能无法生存下去。

Eastman Kodak was the colossus of the photo industry for more than a century. Then it faded like a snapshot left out in the sun. After inventing digital photography in 1975, Kodak took nearly two decades to market its own electronic cameras to consumers. Making most of its money selling photographic film, the company was reluctant to advance a product that didn’t use any. Rivals raced past Kodak; later, smartphones turned traditional cameras into dinosaurs and film into a fossil. Between 1993 and 2022, Kodak’s annual revenues shrank by 93%; in 2012, the company filed for bankruptcy protection, then staggered on. By early 2020, Kodak’s accountants were warning that it might not survive.

Exact Sciences是一家开发癌症筛查测试的公司，于 2001 年初首次向公众出售股票。在成立初期，该公司在研发以及销售和营销上投入了大量资金。在作为上市公司的头八年里，Exact Sciences 的销售额仅为 2100 万美元，但累计净亏损却达到 1.49 亿美元。到 2008 年底，其股票市值已跌至 2000 万美元以下。直到 2014 年，美国食品和药物管理局才最终批准 Exact Sciences 的 Cologuard 结直肠癌筛查测试。那时，该业务呈爆炸式增长，年收入从 2014 年的不到 200 万美元飙升至 2018 年的 4.54 亿美元。该公司还生产可以检测乳腺癌、前列腺癌和 Covid-19 病毒的测试。

Exact Sciences, which develops cancer-screening tests, first sold stock to the public in early 2001. In its early years, it spent massively on research and development, as well as on sales and marketing. In its first eight years as a public company, Exact Sciences generated only $21 million in sales but $149 million in cumulative net losses. By the end of 2008 its stock-market value had dwindled below $20 million. Not until 2014 did the U.S. Food and Drug Administration finally approve Exact Sciences’ Cologuard screening test for colorectal cancer. At that point, the business exploded, with annual revenues soaring from less than $2 million in 2014 to $454 million in 2018. The company also produces tests that can detect breast cancer, prostate cancer, and the Covid-19 virus.

六个维度

Six Dimensions

现在我们按照格雷厄姆的六个维度来简单分析一下每家公司。

Now let’s briefly analyze each company along Graham’s six dimensions.

1.盈利能力

1.Profitability

尽管艾默生在1993年至2022年期间每年都盈利，但其增长却有些断断续续。截至2023年的五个财年，持续经营业务的每股收益累计仅增长8%，勉强超过2015年的水平。2022年的股本回报率为13.8%，低于前五年超过26%的平均水平，部分原因是2023年出售已停止运营的业务导致艾默生的股本大幅膨胀。

Although Emerson was profitable every year between 1993 and 2022, its growth was somewhat spasmodic. Earnings per share from continuing operations expanded by only 8% cumulatively over the five fiscal years ended in 2023 and barely surpassed their level in 2015. Return on equity was 13.8% in 2022, down from an average of more than 26% over the previous five years, partly because the sale of discontinued operations swelled Emerson’s equity in 2023.

Energizer 的利润一直不稳定；该公司 2017 年盈利 2.01 亿美元，但 2022 年却亏损 2.31 亿美元。2023 年，该公司净利润为 1.41 亿美元。更糟糕的是，该公司在此期间发行了新股；其收益不得不分配到大约 20% 的股票中。根据 FactSet 的数据，Energizer 的股本回报率波动剧烈，从 2017 年的 700% 以上，到 2022 年的负 95%，再到 2023 年的正 82%。

Energizer’s profits have been erratic; the company earned $201 million in 2017, only to lose $231 million in 2022. In 2023, it earned a $141 million net profit. Worse, the company issued new stock along the way; its earnings had to be parceled out across a roughly 20% greater number of shares. Energizer’s return on equity was wildly volatile, swinging from more than 700% in 2017 to negative 95% in 2022 to positive 82% in 2023, according to FactSet.

伊士曼柯达过去二十年亏损33亿美元，其中只有八年实现盈利。2022年，该公司勉强盈利，股本回报率仅为1.4%；2023年前九个月，伊士曼柯达盈利7000万美元，高于2022年前三个季度的1900万美元。

Eastman Kodak lost $3.3 billion over the past two decades and was profitable in only eight of those years. In 2022 it squeaked out a profit, earning a razor-thin return on equity of 1.4%; in the first nine months of 2023, Eastman Kodak earned $70 million, up from $19 million in the first three quarters of 2022.

与许多快速发展的科技公司一样，Exact Sciences 牺牲了短期收益，以追求长期增长和盈利能力。到 2023 年，其年收入已飙升至 25 亿美元，十年内增长了 1000 多倍。在此期间，Exact Sciences 的累计亏损超过 31 亿美元——如果（但前提是）该公司的增长持续下去，这笔亏损将显得微不足道。

Like many fast-growing technology companies, Exact Sciences sacrificed near-term earnings to pursue long-term growth and profitability. By 2023, its annual revenues had boomed to $2.5 billion, up more than 1,000-fold in a decade. Over that period, Exact Sciences’ cumulative losses exceeded $3.1 billion—a sum that will seem like a pittance if (but only if) the company’s growth continues.

2.稳定

2.Stability

格雷厄姆将“稳定”定义为过去十年中，盈利（以前三年的平均水平衡量）没有下降。我们列出的四家公司均未通过这项测试，其中柯达和Exact Sciences表现最差。

Graham defines “stability” as no decline in earnings (measured against the average of the prior three years) in any of the past 10 years. None of our four companies passed that test, with Kodak and Exact Sciences faring the worst.

3.生长

3.Growth

在这里，格雷厄姆希望我们比较一下公司每股收益在多年期间的增长率。这样，我们就可以计算出预测全球经济扩张和收缩的可能性；我们还将尽量减少由于运气或不可重复的原因而导致的短暂优异表现（或不佳表现）的影响。

Here, Graham wants us to compare the rates at which companies’ earnings per share grew over multiyear periods. That way, we account for expansion and contraction in the global economy; we also minimize the effects of short bursts of outperformance (or underperformance) that might be the result of luck or unrepeatable causes.

我们将使用两个五年期：2014-2018年和2019-2023年。第一个五年期几乎完全是经济繁荣期；第二个五年期则包括了2020-2021年疫情引发的近乎萧条的时期，以及随后的快速复苏。

We’ll use two five-year periods: 2014–18, and 2019–23. The first consisted almost entirely of an economic boom; the second includes both the pandemic-induced near-depression of 2020–21 and the rapid recovery afterward.

2014 年至 2018 年，艾默生持续经营每股收益每年平均增长 2%，到 2023 年则为 3.72 美元，不高于 2019 年的 3.74 美元。

Emerson’s earnings per share from continuing operations grew by a sluggish average of 2% annually from 2014 through 2018, then finished 2023 at $3.72, no higher than the $3.74 figure in 2019.

从 2015 年（即脱离其前母公司独立的第一年）到 2018 年，劲量公司的收益从每股亏损 6 美分增长到每股盈利 1.52 美元；然后，在 2019 年至 2023 年期间，公司的收益从每股盈利 58 美分波动到每股亏损 3.37 美元，再到每股盈利 1.94 美元。

From 2015, its first year of independence from its former parent company, through 2018, Energizer’s earnings grew from a loss of six cents per share to a $1.52 gain; then, between 2019 through 2023, they wobbled from a 58-cent gain to a $3.37 loss to a $1.94 gain.

伊士曼柯达的每股亏损从 2014 年可怕的每股 2.95 美元收窄至 2018 年惨淡的每股 84 美分；2019 年和 2020 年，该公司每股亏损分别为 2.74 美元和 9.77 美元，然后从 2021 年开始盈利微薄，预计 2023 年将实现小幅增长。

Eastman Kodak’s losses per share moderated from a ghastly $2.95 per share in 2014 to a grim 84 cents in 2018; it lost $2.74 and $9.77 per share in 2019 and 2020, then was thinly profitable from 2021 on, with a modest gain projected for 2023.

从2014年到2018年，Exact Sciences的亏损以年均近3%的速度扩大。截至目前，亏损在2020年达到峰值，超过8.2亿美元。到2023年底，该公司似乎很快就能实现首次年度盈利。

At Exact Sciences, from 2014 through 2018, losses widened at an average annual rate of almost 3%. They peaked, so far anyway, at more than $820 million in 2020. By late 2023, it looked as if the company might be able to report its first annual profit before much longer.

4.财务状况

4.Financial position

艾默生总资产近430亿美元，账面价值近210亿美元，尽管其中很大一部分归因于商誉（艾默生为多项收购支付的超出净资产的部分）等无形资产。其160亿美元的总债务看起来尚可控制。

Emerson has total assets of nearly $43 billion and book value of nearly $21 billion, although much of that is attributable to intangible assets such as goodwill (the excess above net worth that Emerson paid for many of its acquisitions). Its total debt of $16 billion looks manageable.

Energizer 33亿美元的长期债务相当可观，尤其是在其股东权益仅为2.11亿美元、现金仅2.23亿美元的情况下。该公司在2023年确实偿还了超过2亿美元的债务。

Energizer’s $3.3 billion in long-term debt is substantial, especially on its small base of $211 million in shareholders’ equity and $223 million in cash. The company did pay down well over $200 million in debt during 2023.

伊士曼柯达公司在 2023 年前 9 个月的现金储备增加了 2900 万美元，尽管该公司仍背负着超过 4.5 亿美元的长期债务。

Eastman Kodak was able to increase its cash on hand by $29 million in the first nine months of 2023, although it was still carrying more than $450 million in long-term debt.

Exact Sciences 拥有超过 7 亿美元的现金。该公司拥有超过 23 亿美元的可转换债券，这些债券最终可能会转换为新的普通股；这将分散未来收益将分配给更多股份，导致每个股东的剩余收益减少。否则，公司的债务就很少。

Exact Sciences has more than $700 million in cash. It has more than $2.3 billion in convertible notes, which are likely to be turned into new shares of common stock eventually; that will diffuse future earnings over a larger number of shares, leaving less for each stockholder. The company otherwise has little debt.

5.股息

5.Dividends

自1956年以来，艾默生每年都会增加股息。劲量公司（Energizer）将股息从2015年的25美分提高到2019年的1.20美元，并一直保持这一水平。柯达公司自2003年以来就没有支付过股息；Exact Sciences也从未支付过股息。

Emerson has increased its dividend every year since 1956. Energizer raised its dividend from 25 cents in 2015 to $1.20 in 2019 and has sustained it since. Kodak hasn’t paid a dividend since 2003; Exact Sciences has never paid one.

6.价格历史

6.Price history

在长期表现优异之后，艾默生一直努力保持领先。截至2023年的十年间，其表现每年都比标准普尔500指数低5.7个百分点。

After a long period of outperformance, Emerson has strained to keep up. Over the decade ending in 2023, it underperformed the S&P 500 index by 5.7 percentage points annually.

自 2015 年独立以来，劲量公司的股价平均每年上涨 2%，远远落后于市场。

Energizer has gained an average of 2% annually since it became an independent company in 2015, falling far behind the market.

伊士曼柯达的回报中穿插着两件荒唐事。2018年初，柯达宣布将推出自己的加密货币，但很快放弃了这一计划，股价在一天内上涨了一倍多。2020年，有消息称美国政府可能向柯达提供7.65亿美元贷款用于发展制药部门，柯达股价在三天内从2美元飙升至60美元——但这笔钱最终未能兑现。截至2023年的十年间，柯达股价下跌了88%以上。

Eastman Kodak’s returns were punctuated by two absurdities. In early 2018, the stock more than doubled in a day when Kodak announced it would launch its own cryptocurrency—a venture it soon abandoned. In 2020, Kodak’s shares shot from $2 to as high as $60 in three days when word leaked that the U.S. government might loan the company $765 million to develop a pharmaceutical division—money that never materialized. Over the decade ending in 2023, Kodak’s shares fell more than 88%.

截至2023年的10年间，Exact Sciences的股票年均回报率超过20%。期间涨跌互现，涨跌互现。从2017年到2019年9月初，该股上涨了817%。随后，到2020年3月，该股下跌了55%。随后，在名人选股人凯西·伍德(Cathie Wood)为她的ARK基金增持了超过500万股股票后，该股在不到一年的时间内上涨了180%。之后，在2021年和2022年，Exact Sciences在18个月内下跌了80%以上，之后才有所回升。2023年，该股飙升49%。

Exact Sciences’ stock returned an average of more than 20% annually over the 10 years ending in 2023. It did so in stupendous swoops of interim gains and losses. From 2017 through early September 2019, the stock rose 817%. It then proceeded to fall 55% by March 2020. Next, it gained 180% in less than a year after celebrity stock-picker Cathie Wood amassed more than 5 million shares for her ARK funds. Then, in 2021 and 2022, Exact Sciences lost more than 80% in an 18-month stretch before partially recovering. In 2023 it soared 49%.

进化

E-volution

公司是人为的物质资产组织，但它与自然界的生物体相似，会诞生、快速成长、扩张放缓、变得沉重、衰老，甚至死亡。

Companies are artificial organizations of physical assets, but they resemble natural living organisms. They are born, they grow fast, their expansion slows, they become heavy, they grow old, and often they die.

新生的植物和新生的动物能够以极快的速度生长——前提是它们能够避开随时可能出现的疾病死亡、极端天气下死亡或被捕食者吞食的风险。有些生物，比如鲨鱼、乌龟和狐尾松，可以存活数百年甚至数千年。

Newly sprouted plants and newborn animals can grow extraordinarily fast—if they evade the ever-present risks of dying from disease, perishing in extreme weather, or being eaten by predators. Some creatures, like sharks, tortoises, and bristlecone pines, can live for centuries or even millennia.

表 13-1：E 评估

TABLE 13-1: E-valuation

注：价格和比率截至 2023 年 8 月。数据根据 GAAP 计算。

Notes: Prices and ratios as of August 2023. Figures according to GAAP.

来源：FactSet。

Source: FactSet.

成立于1890年的艾默生公司（Emerson）正在重塑自我，希望迎来一轮复苏式增长。同样起源于19世纪90年代的劲量公司（Energizer）或许不得不接受停滞不前。成立于1892年的伊士曼柯达公司（Eastman Kodak）在失去了原有业务的显著残余后，正苦苦挣扎。精科公司（Exact Sciences）勉强撑过了童年时期；仅仅七年之后，其股票就在2009年几乎退市。到2024年初，其市值已达120亿美元。

Emerson, founded in 1890, is reshaping itself in hopes of a burst of rejuvenating growth. Energizer, whose heritage also dates back to the 1890s, may have to reconcile itself to stagnation. Eastman Kodak, incorporated in 1892, is struggling to survive without any significant remnants of its original business. Exact Sciences barely outlasted childhood; after only seven years, its stock was nearly delisted from trading in 2009. Early in 2024 its stock had a market capitalization of $12 billion.

最近，这四家公司的股价至少暂时上涨。如果你只关注股价的动量，很容易就会过度推断出一种增长趋势，而这种趋势往往最终只是一种假象。

Recently, the stocks of all four companies have shot up, at least temporarily. If you focused only on the momentum of the share price, you could easily have gotten carried away extrapolating a trend of growth that often turned out to be an illusion.

当你按照格雷厄姆的六个维度来评估一家公司时，你的注意力就会从股价转移到基础业务——并且可以更好地评估它可能处于企业生命周期的哪个时期。你永远无法确定任何公司的未来，但有条不紊地将你的注意力从股价上移开是评估企业下一阶段是卓越还是灭绝的最佳方法。

When you instead evaluate a company along Graham’s six dimensions, you reorient your focus from the stock price to the underlying business—and can better assess which period of the corporate lifecycle it is likely to be in. You can never be certain of any company’s future, but methodically disengaging your attention from the stock price is the best way to assess whether the next phase of a business is distinction or extinction.

第十四章

Chapter 14 防御型投资者的股票选择

Stock Selection for the Defensive Investor

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

现在是时候探讨证券分析技术的一些更广泛应用了。由于我们已经概括地描述了针对两类投资者*的投资策略，因此，现在我们有必要指出证券分析如何在实施这些策略中发挥作用。遵循我们建议的防御型投资者将只购买高等级债券，并投资于多元化的领先普通股。他需要确保购买后者的价格根据适用标准判断不会过高。

It is time to turn to some broader applications of the techniques of security analysis. Since we have already described in general terms the investment policies recommended for our two categories of investors,* it would be logical for us now to indicate how security analysis comes into play in order to implement these policies. The defensive investor who follows our suggestions will purchase only high-grade bonds plus a diversified list of leading common stocks. He is to make sure that the price at which he bought the latter is not unduly high as judged by applicable standards.

在构建这份多元化股票清单时，他有两种选择：道琼斯工业平均指数 (DJIA) 类型的投资组合和经过量化测试的投资组合。第一种方法是，他获取主要股票的真实横截面样本，其中既包括一些受青睐的成长型公司（其股票的市盈率特别高），也包括一些不太受欢迎且价格较低的公司。最简单的方法或许是，购买道琼斯工业平均指数 (DJIA) 中所有 30 只股票的相同数量。以 900 点的平均值计算，每种股票 10 股的总成本约为 16,000 美元。1^根据过去的记录，他可以通过购买几只代表性投资基金的股票来预期大致相同的未来收益。^*

In setting up this diversified list he has a choice of two approaches, the DJIA-type of portfolio and the quantitatively-tested portfolio. In the first he acquires a true cross-section sample of the leading issues, which will include both some favored growth companies, whose shares sell at especially high multipliers, and also less popular and less expensive enterprises. This could be done, most simply perhaps, by buying the same amounts of all thirty of the issues in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Ten shares of each, at the 900 level for the average, would cost an aggregate of about $16,000.¹ On the basis of the past record he might expect approximately the same future results by buying shares of several representative investment funds.^*

他的第二种选择是，在每次买入股票时应用一套标准，以确保（1）公司过往业绩和当前财务状况达到最低质量标准，以及（2）每股收益和资产达到最低数量标准。在上一章结尾，我们列出了七项用于选择特定普通股的质量和数量标准。让我们按顺序进行描述。

His second choice would be to apply a set of standards to each purchase, to make sure that he obtains (1) a minimum of quality in the past performance and current financial position of the company, and also (2) a minimum of quantity in terms of earnings and assets per dollar of price. At the close of the previous chapter we listed seven such quality and quantity criteria suggested for the selection of specific common stocks. Let us describe them in order.

1. 企业规模足够

1. Adequate Size of the Enterprise

我们设定的所有最低数字都必须是任意的，尤其是在规模要求方面。我们的目标是排除那些可能承受超乎寻常波动的小公司，尤其是在工业领域。（这类企业通常有良好的发展潜力，但我们认为它们不适合防御型投资者的需求。）我们采用整数：工业公司的年销售额不低于1亿美元，公用事业公司的总资产不低于5000万美元。

All our minimum figures must be arbitrary and especially in the matter of size required. Our idea is to exclude small companies which may be subject to more than average vicissitudes especially in the industrial field. (There are often good possibilities in such enterprises but we do not consider them suited to the needs of the defensive investor.) Let us use round amounts: not less than $100 million of annual sales for an industrial company and, not less than $50 million of total assets for a public utility.

2. 足够强劲的财务状况

2. A Sufficiently Strong Financial Condition

对于工业企业来说，流动资产至少应为流动负债的两倍，即所谓的二比一流动比率。此外，长期债务不应超过净流动资产（或“营运资本”）。对于公用事业公司，债务不应超过股权（按账面价值计算）的两倍。

For industrial companies current assets should be at least twice current liabilities—a so-called two-to-one current ratio. Also, long-term debt should not exceed the net current assets (or “working capital”). For public utilities the debt should not exceed twice the stock equity (at book value).

3. 盈利稳定性

3. Earnings Stability

过去十年中每年普通股的一些收益。

Some earnings for the common stock in each of the past ten years.

4. 股息记录

4. Dividend Record

至少过去 20 年不间断付款。

Uninterrupted payments for at least the past 20 years.

5.盈利增长

5. Earnings Growth

按期初和期末的三年平均值计算，过去十年每股收益至少增加三分之一。

A minimum increase of at least one-third in per-share earnings in the past ten years using three-year averages at the beginning and end.

6. 适中的市盈率

6. Moderate Price/Earnings Ratio

当前股价不应超过过去三年平均收益的15倍。

Current price should not be more than 15 times average earnings of the past three years.

7. 适度的市资比

7. Moderate Ratio of Price to Assets

当前股价不应超过上次报告账面价值的1.5倍。但是，如果市盈率低于15倍，则资产乘数可能需要相应提高。根据经验，我们建议乘数乘以市净率不应超过22.5倍。（该数字相当于市盈率15倍，账面价值1.5倍。这意味着发行价仅为市盈率9倍，资产价值2.5倍，等等。）

Current price should not be more than 1½ times the book value last reported. However, a multiplier of earnings below 15 could justify a correspondingly higher multiplier of assets. As a rule of thumb we suggest that the product of the multiplier times the ratio of price to book value should not exceed 22.5. (This figure corresponds to 15 times earnings and 1½ times book value. It would admit an issue selling at only 9 times earnings and 2.5 times asset value, etc.)

一般评论：这些要求是专门针对防御型投资者的需求和性格而制定的。它们将以两种相反的方式排除绝大多数普通股作为投资组合的候选对象。一方面，它们将排除以下公司：(1) 规模过小；(2) 财务状况相对较弱；(3) 十年历史中存在亏损记录；以及 (4) 缺乏长期持续派息的历史。在最近的金融环境下，这些测试中最严格的是财务实力测试。近年来，我们相当多的大型、曾经根基稳固的企业已经降低了流动比率或过度扩张了债务，或两者兼而有之。

GENERAL COMMENTS: These requirements are set up especially for the needs and the temperament of defensive investors. They will eliminate the great majority of common stocks as candidates for the portfolio, and in two opposite ways. On the one hand they will exclude companies that are (1) too small, (2) in relatively weak financial condition, (3) with a deficit stigma in their ten-year record, and (4) not having a long history of continuous dividends. Of these tests the most severe under recent financial conditions are those of financial strength. A considerable number of our large and formerly strongly entrenched enterprises have weakened their current ratio or overexpanded their debt, or both, in recent years.

我们的最后两个标准则恰恰相反，要求每股收益和资产总额高于热门股票所能提供的水平。这绝不是金融分析师的标准观点；事实上，大多数人会坚持认为，即使是保守的投资者也应该愿意为精选公司的股票支付高昂的价格。我们上文已阐述了我们的相反观点；其主要依据是，当股价的很大一部分必须依赖于未来持续增长的收益时，缺乏足够的安全系数。读者必须在权衡正反两方的论点之后，自行决定这个重要的问题。

Our last two criteria are exclusive in the opposite direction, by demanding more earnings and more assets per dollar of price than the popular issues will supply. This is by no means the standard viewpoint of financial analysts; in fact most will insist that even conservative investors should be prepared to pay generous prices for stocks of the choice companies. We have expounded our contrary view above; it rests largely on the absence of an adequate factor of safety when too large a portion of the price must depend on ever-increasing earnings in the future. The reader will have to decide this important question for himself—after weighing the arguments on both sides.

尽管如此，我们还是选择加入适度过去十年的增长要求。如果没有它，典型的公司将出现倒退，至少在单位投资资本的利润方面是如此。防御型投资者没有理由纳入这类公司——尽管如果股价足够低，它们可能符合逢低买入的条件。

We have nonetheless opted for the inclusion of a modest requirement of growth over the past decade. Without it the typical company would show retrogression, at least in terms of profit per dollar of invested capital. There is no reason for the defensive investor to include such companies—though if the price is low enough they could qualify as bargain opportunities.

建议的最高市盈率应为15倍，这可能导致典型的投资组合平均乘数为12到13倍。需要注意的是，1972年2月，美国电话电报公司(American Tel. & Tel.)的市盈率为其三年（及当前）收益的11倍，而加州标准石油公司(Standard Oil of California)的市盈率不到其最新收益的10倍。我们的基本建议是，股票投资组合在购入时，其总市盈率（市盈率的倒数）应至少与当前高等级债券的收益率相当。这意味着，对于7.5%的AA级债券收益率，市盈率不应高于13.3。*

The suggested maximum figure of 15 times earnings might well result in a typical portfolio with an average multiplier of, say, 12 to 13 times. Note that in February 1972 American Tel. & Tel. sold at 11 times its three-year (and current) earnings, and Standard Oil of California at less than 10 times latest earnings. Our basic recommendation is that the stock portfolio, when acquired, should have an overall earnings/price ratio—the reverse of the P/E ratio—at least as high as the current high-grade bond rate. This would mean a P/E ratio no higher than 13.3 against an AA bond yield of 7.5%.*

我们的标准在 1970 年底对道琼斯工业平均指数的应用

Application of Our Criteria to the DJIA at the End of 1970

1970年底的道琼斯工业平均指数股票符合我们建议的所有标准，但其中两支股票勉强符合。以下是基于1970年收盘价和相关数据的调查。（每家公司的基本数据分别列于表14-1和14-2。）

All of our suggested criteria were satisfied by the DJIA issues at the end of 1970, but two of them just barely. Here is a survey based on the closing price of 1970 and the relevant figures. (The basic data for each company are shown in Tables 14-1 and 14-2.)

对于每家公司来说，规模都绰绰有余。
Size is more than ample for each company.
总体而言，财务状况良好，但并非每家公司都如此^。2
Financial condition is adequate in the aggregate, but not for every company.²
自 1940 年以来，每家公司都支付一定比例的股息。其中五项股息记录可以追溯到上个世纪。
Some dividend has been paid by every company since at least 1940. Five of the dividend records go back to the last century.
过去十年，这些公司的总盈利相当稳定。在1961年至1969年的繁荣时期，这些公司均未出现亏损，但克莱斯勒在1970年出现了小幅亏损。
The aggregate earnings have been quite stable in the past decade. None of the companies reported a deficit during the prosperous period 1961–69, but Chrysler showed a small deficit in 1970.
相比十年前的三年平均值，总增长率为77%，即每年约6%。但其中五家公司的增长率还不到三分之一。
The total growth—comparing three-year averages a decade apart—was 77%, or about 6% per year. But five of the firms did not grow by one-third.
年底股价与三年平均收益的比率为 839 比 55.5 美元，即 15 比 1——正好是我们建议的上限。
The ratio of year-end price to three-year average earnings was 839 to $55.5 or 15 to 1—right at our suggested upper limit.
价格与净资产价值的比率为 839 比 562，也刚好在我们建议的 1.5 比 1 的限度内。
The ratio of price to net asset value was 839 to 562—also just within our suggested limit of 1½ to 1.

表14-1 1971年9月30日道琼斯工业平均指数30只股票的基本数据

TABLE 14-1 Basic Data on 30 Stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average at September 30, 1971

^{a 已}根据股票股利和股票分割进行调整。

^a Adjusted for stock dividends and stock splits.

^b通常为截至 1971 年 6 月 30 日的 12 个月。

^b Typically for the 12 months ended June 30, 1971.

表 14-2 1971 年 9 月 30 日道琼斯工业平均指数成分股的重要比率

TABLE 14-2 Significant Ratios of DJIA Stocks at September 30, 1971

^a数据为 1970 财年年末公司业绩。

^a Figures taken for fiscal 1970 year-end co. results.

^b数据取自穆迪工业手册（1971 年）。

^b Figures taken from Moody’s Industrial Manual (1971).

^c NCA 的借方余额。（NCA = 净流动资产。）

^c Debit balance for NCA. (NCA = net current assets.)

^d 1958–1960 年报告的赤字。

^d Reported deficit for 1958–1960.

然而，如果我们想将同样的七项标准应用于每家公司，就会发现只有五家公司能够满足所有要求。它们是：美国罐头公司、美国电话和电话公司、Anaconda、Swift 和 Woolworth。这五家公司的总数列于表 14-3中。当然，除了过去的增长率之外，它们的统计表现远胜于道琼斯工业平均指数整体^。3

If, however, we wish to apply the same seven criteria to each individual company, we would find that only five of them would meet all our requirements. These would be: American Can, American Tel. & Tel., Anaconda, Swift, and Woolworth. The totals for these five appear in Table 14-3. Naturally they make a much better statistical showing than the DJIA as a whole, except in the past growth rate.³

我们对这组精选的工业股票应用了特定的标准，结果表明，符合我们所有测试的股票数量在所有上市工业股票中所占的比例相对较小。我们大胆猜测，1970 年底的标准普尔股票指南中大约可以找到 100 只此类股票，足以让投资者在个人选择方面获得满意的回报。

Our application of specific criteria to this select group of industrial stocks indicates that the number meeting every one of our tests will be a relatively small percentage of all listed industrial issues. We hazard the guess that about 100 issues of this sort could have been found in the Standard & Poor’s Stock Guide at the end of 1970, just about enough to provide the investor with a satisfactory range of personal choice.

公用事业“解决方案”

The Public-Utility “Solution”

现在，如果我们转向公用事业类股票领域，我们会发现投资者面临的情况更加舒适和诱人。我们根据其业绩记录和价格比率，对绝大多数股票进行了筛选，以符合我们评判的防御型投资者的需求。在公用事业类股票的测试中，我们剔除了一个标准——流动资产与流动负债的比率。在该行业中，营运资本因素作为其通过出售债券和股票持续融资增长的一部分，自然而然地得以解决。我们确实要求股本与债务的比例足够^。4

If we turn now to the field of public-utility stocks we find a much more comfortable and inviting situation for the investor. Here the vast majority of issues appear to be cut out, by their performance record and their price ratios, in accordance with the defensive investor’s needs as we judge them. We exclude one criterion from our tests of public-utility stocks—namely, the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. The working-capital factor takes care of itself in this industry as part of the continuous financing of its growth by sales of bonds and shares. We do require an adequate proportion of stock capital to debt.⁴

表 14-3 1970 年底符合特定投资标准的道琼斯工业平均指数股票

TABLE 14-3 DJIA Issues Meeting Certain Investment Criteria at the End of 1970

^a请参阅此处的定义。

^a See definition here.

^b鉴于斯威夫特在糟糕的 1970 年表现良好，我们在此免除 1968-1970 年的缺口。

^b In view of Swift’s good showing in the poor year 1970, we waive the 1968–1970 deficiency here.

^c此处低于 2 比 1 的小额缺口被额外债务融资的保证金所抵消。

^c The small deficiency here below 2 to 1 was offset by margin for additional debt financing.

na = 不适用。American Tel. & Tel. 的债务低于其股票权益。

n.a. = not applicable. American Tel. & Tel.’s debt was less than its stock equity.

表14-4列出了道琼斯公用事业平均指数中的15只成分股。为了进行比较，表14-5也给出了从纽约证券交易所股票名单中随机选取的15只公用事业股票的类似情况。

In Table 14-4 we present a résumé of the 15 issues in the Dow Jones public-utility average. For comparison, Table 14-5 gives a similar picture of a random selection of fifteen other utilities taken from the New York Stock Exchange list.

1972年伊始，防御型投资者拥有相当广泛的公用事业普通股选择，每一支都能满足我们对业绩和价格的要求。这些公司提供了他从普通股投资中所能获得的一切。与道琼斯工业平均指数所代表的知名工业公司相比，这些公司的历史增长记录几乎同样出色，而且年度业绩波动较小——两者的市盈率和资产价格都更低。股息回报率也明显更高。对于保守型投资者来说，公用事业公司作为受监管的垄断企业的地位无疑利大于弊。根据法律，它们有权收取足够优惠的费率，以吸引持续扩张所需的资本，这意味着可以对膨胀的成本进行充分的补偿。尽管监管流程通常繁琐且可能拖沓，但这并没有阻止公用事业公司在数十年的时间里从不断增长的投资中获得公平的回报。

As 1972 began the defensive investor could have had quite a wide choice of utility common stocks, each of which would have met our requirements for both performance and price. These companies offered him everything he had a right to demand from simply chosen common-stock investments. In comparison with prominent industrial companies as represented by the DJIA, they offered almost as good a record of past growth, plus smaller fluctuations in the annual figures—both at a lower price in relation to earnings and assets. The dividend return was significantly higher. The position of the utilities as regulated monopolies is assuredly more of an advantage than a disadvantage for the conservative investor. Under law they are entitled to charge rates sufficiently remunerative to attract the capital they need for their continuous expansion, and this implies adequate offsets to inflated costs. While the process of regulation has often been cumbersome and perhaps dilatory, it has not prevented the utilities from earning a fair return on their rising invested capital over many decades.

对于防御型投资者来说，公用事业类股票目前的核心吸引力在于其相对于账面价值的适中价格。这意味着，如果愿意，他可以忽略股市因素，主要将自己视为成熟且盈利良好的企业的部分所有者。市场行情总是在时机成熟时供他利用——无论是在异常诱人的低价买入，还是在价格明显过高时抛售。

For the defensive investor the central appeal of the public-utility stocks at this time should be their availability at a moderate price in relation to book value. This means that he can ignore stockmarket considerations, if he wishes, and consider himself primarily as a part owner of well-established and well-earning businesses. The market quotations are always there for him to take advantage of when times are propitious—either for purchases at unusually attractive low levels, or for sales when their prices seem definitely too high.

公用事业指数的市场记录（已汇总于表14-6中）以及其他类别的指数记录表明，过去这些投资存在充足的盈利可能性。虽然涨幅不如工业指数，但单个公用事业股在大多数时期的价格稳定性都高于其他类别。表中令人震惊的是，工业股和公用事业股的相对市盈率在过去二十年中发生了变化。这些逆转对主动投资者的意义远大于被动投资者。但它们表明，即使是防御性投资组合也应该不时调整，尤其是在所购证券明显涨幅过大，并且可以被价格更合理的证券取代的情况下。唉！还要缴纳资本利得税——对于普通投资者来说，这似乎无异于魔鬼的惩罚。我们的老盟友——经验告诉我们，卖出并缴纳税款总比不卖出并后悔要好。

The market record of the public-utility indexes—condensed in Table 14-6, along with those of other groups—indicates that there have been ample possibilities of profit in these investments in the past. While the rise has not been as great as in the industrial index, the individual utilities have shown more price stability in most periods than have other groups. It is striking to observe in this table that the relative price/earnings ratios of the industrials and the utilities have changed places during the past two decades. These reversals will have more meaning for the active than for the passive investor. But they suggest that even defensive portfolios should be changed from time to time, especially if the securities purchased have an apparently excessive advance and can be replaced by issues much more reasonably priced. Alas! there will be capital-gains taxes to pay—which for the typical investor seems to be about the same as the Devil to pay. Our old ally, experience, tells us here that it is better to sell and pay the tax than not sell and repent.

表 14-4 1971 年 9 月 30 日道琼斯公用事业平均指数中 15 只股票的数据

TABLE 14-4 Data on the Fifteen Stocks in the Dow Jones Utility Average at September 30, 1971

a 1971 年估计数^。

^a Estimated for year 1971.

表 14-5 1971 年 9 月 30 日第二份公用事业股票清单的数据

TABLE 14-5 Data on a Second List of Public-Utility Stocks at September 30, 1971

表 14-6 1948–1970 年各种标准普尔平均指数的价格和市盈率的发展情况。

TABLE 14-6 Development of Prices and Price/Earnings Ratios for Various Standard & Poor’s Averages, 1948–1970.

^a价格为年底的价格。

^a Prices are at the close of the year.

投资金融企业股票

Investing in Stocks of Financial Enterprises

各种各样的企业都可以归类为“金融公司”。这些企业包括银行、保险公司、储蓄贷款协会、信贷和小额贷款公司、抵押贷款公司以及“投资公司”（例如共同基金）。所有这些企业的特点是，它们的资产中以实物形式存在的部分相对较小——例如固定资产和商品库存——但另一方面，大多数类别的短期债务远远超过其股本。因此，金融稳健性问题在这里比在……中更为重要。典型的制造业或商业企业的情况。这反过来又催生了各种形式的监管和监督，其目的和总体效果都是为了防止不健全的财务行为。

A considerable variety of concerns may be ranged under the rubric of “financial companies.” These would include banks, insurance companies, savings and loan associations, credit and small-loan companies, mortgage companies, and “investment companies” (e.g., mutual funds). It is characteristic of all these enterprises that they have a relatively small part of their assets in the form of material things—such as fixed assets and merchandise inventories—but on the other hand most categories have short-term obligations well in excess of their stock capital. The question of financial soundness is, therefore, more relevant here than in the case of the typical manufacturing or commercial enterprise. This, in turn, has given rise to various forms of regulation and supervision, with the design and general result of assuring against unsound financial practices.

广义上讲，金融企业股票的投资业绩与其他类型的普通股相似。表 14-7显示了 1948 年至 1970 年间标准普尔股票价格指数中六类股票的价格变化。1941 年至 1943 年的平均值设为 10，即基准水平。1970 年底的数字介于 9 家纽约银行的 44.3 和 11 个人寿保险股票的 218 之间。在各个子区间，各自的价格走势差异很大。例如，纽约市银行股在 1958 年至 1968 年间表现相当不错；相反，引人注目的人寿保险集团在 1963 年至 1968 年间实际上下跌了。标准普尔指数中众多行业组中的许多（或许是大多数）都存在这种交叉走势。

Broadly speaking, the shares of financial concerns have produced investment results similar to those of other types of common shares. Table 14-7 shows price changes between 1948 and 1970 in six groups represented in the Standard & Poor’s stock-price indexes. The average for 1941–1943 is taken as 10, the base level. The year-end 1970 figures ranged between 44.3 for the 9 New York banks and 218 for the 11 life-insurance stocks. During the sub-intervals there was considerable variation in the respective price movements. For example, the New York City bank stocks did quite well between 1958 and 1968; conversely the spectacular life-insurance group actually lost ground between 1963 and 1968. These cross-movements are found in many, perhaps most, of the numerous industry groups in the Standard & Poor’s indexes.

在这个广泛的投资领域，我们没有什么非常有益的评论可提供——除了建议，在这些集团的公司选择中，应用与收益和账面价值相关的价格算术标准，就像我们对工业和公共事业投资所建议的那样。

We have no very helpful remarks to offer in this broad area of investment—other than to counsel that the same arithmetical standards for price in relation to earnings and book value be applied to the choice of companies in these groups as we have suggested for industrial and public-utility investments.

铁路问题

Railroad Issues

铁路行业的情况与公用事业截然不同。激烈的竞争和严格的监管使铁路运输业遭受重创。（当然，他们的劳动力成本问题也很棘手，但这并非铁路行业独有的问题。）汽车、公共汽车和航空公司抢走了铁路客运业务的大部分份额，使剩余业务利润微薄；卡车则分走了相当一部分货运量。过去50年里，美国超过一半的铁路里程在不同时期破产（或“托管”）。

The railroad story is a far different one from that of the utilities. The carriers have suffered severely from a combination of severe competition and strict regulation. (Their labor-cost problem has of course been difficult as well, but that has not been confined to railroads.) Automobiles, buses, and airlines have drawn off most of their passenger business and left the rest highly unprofitable; the trucks have taken a good deal of their freight traffic. More than half of the railroad mileage of the country has been in bankruptcy (or “trusteeship”) at various times during the past 50 years.

但过去半个世纪，航运业并非一路走低。航运业也曾有过繁荣时期，尤其是在战争年代。尽管普遍面临困境，一些航运公司仍然保持了盈利能力和股息。

But this half-century has not been all downhill for the carriers. There have been prosperous periods for the industry, especially the war years. Some of the lines have managed to maintain their earning power and their dividends despite the general difficulties.

标准普尔指数上涨了七倍从1942年的低点到1968年的高点，与公用事业指数的百分比涨幅相差无几。1970年，我们最重要的铁路公司宾夕法尼亚中央运输公司的破产震惊了金融界。仅仅一两年前，该公司的股价接近其悠久历史上的最高水平，并且连续派息超过120年！（我们在此对这家铁路公司进行简要分析，以说明一位优秀的学生如何能够发现公司发展中的弱点，并建议不要持有其证券。）这场金融灾难严重影响了整个铁路股票市场。

The Standard & Poor’s index advanced sevenfold from the low of 1942 to the high of 1968, not much below the percentage gain in the public-utility index. The bankruptcy of the Penn Central Transportation Co., our most important railroad, in 1970 shocked the financial world. Only a year and two years previously the stock sold at close to the highest price level in its long history, and it had paid continuous dividends for more than 120 years! (here we present a brief analysis of this railroad to illustrate how a competent student could have detected the developing weaknesses in the company’s picture and counseled against ownership of its securities.) The market level of railroad shares as a whole was seriously affected by this financial disaster.

表14-7 1948年至1970年间各类金融公司股票的相对价格变动

Table 14-7 Relative Price Movements of Stocks of Various Types of Financial Companies Between 1948 and 1970

标准普尔股票价格指数的年末数据。1941-1943 年平均值 = 10 ^。

^a Year-end figures from Standard & Poor’s stock-price indexes. Average of 1941–1943 = 10.

对所有类别的证券进行一刀切式的推荐通常是不明智的，而对这类证券的全面谴责也同样令人反感。表14-6中的铁路股票价格记录表明，该类股票作为一个整体经常提供获得巨额利润的机会。（但我们认为，这些巨大的上涨本身就）让我们将我们的建议限制在这一点上：投资者没有令人信服的理由去持有铁路股票；在购买任何股票之前，他应该确保他的钱物有所值，以至于寻找其他东西是不合理的。*

It is usually unsound to make blanket recommendations of whole classes of securities, and there are equal objections to broad condemnations. The record of railroad share prices in Table 14-6 shows that the group as a whole has often offered chances for a large profit. (But in our view the great advances were in themselves largely unwarranted.) Let us confine our suggestion to this: There is no compelling reason for the investor to own railroad shares; before he buys any he should make sure that he is getting so much value for his money that it would be unreasonable to look for something else instead.*

防御型投资者的选择性

Selectivity for the Defensive Investor

每个投资者都希望自己的名单比平均水平更好或更有前景。因此，读者会问，如果他找到一位称职的顾问或证券分析师，他是否应该指望获得真正优厚的投资组合。“毕竟，”他可能会说，“你列出的规则非常简单易懂。一位训练有素的分析师应该能够运用他所有的技能和技术，在道琼斯指数这样显而易见的指标上取得显著进步。如果做不到，他所有的统计数据、计算和权威的判断又有什么用呢？”

Every investor would like his list to be better or more promising than the average. Hence the reader will ask whether, if he gets himself a competent adviser or security analyst, he should not be able to count on being supplied with an investment package of really superior merits. “After all,” he may say, “the rules you have outlined are pretty simple and easygoing. A highly trained analyst ought to be able to use all his skill and techniques to improve substantially on something as obvious as the Dow Jones list. If not, what good are all his statistics, calculations, and pontifical judgments?”

假设，作为一项实际测试，我们要求 100 名证券分析师选出道琼斯平均指数中“最佳”的五只股票，并在 1970 年底购买。很少有人会做出相同的选择，而且许多名单彼此之间会完全不同。

Suppose, as a practical test, we had asked a hundred security analysts to choose the “best” five stocks in the Dow Jones Average, to be bought at the end of 1970. Few would have come up with identical choices and many of the lists would have differed completely from each other.

这并不像乍看起来那么令人惊讶。根本原因是，每只知名股票的当前价格都很好地反映了其财务记录中的显著因素以及对其未来前景的普遍看法。因此，任何分析师认为一只股票比其他股票更值得买入的观点，很大程度上必然源于其个人偏好和预期，或者源于他在评估工作中将重点放在一组因素而不是另一组因素上。如果所有分析师都一致认为某只股票比其他所有股票都好，那么发行的价格将迅速上涨至抵消其先前所有优势的价格。*

This is not so surprising as it may at first appear. The underlying reason is that the current price of each prominent stock pretty well reflects the salient factors in its financial record plus the general opinion as to its future prospects. Hence the view of any analyst that one stock is a better buy than the rest must arise to a great extent from his personal partialities and expectations, or from the placing of his emphasis on one set of factors rather than on another in his work of evaluation. If all analysts were agreed that one particular stock was better than all the rest, that issue would quickly advance to a price which would offset all of its previous advantages.*

我们声称当前价格既反映了已知事实，也反映了未来的预期，旨在强调市场估值的双重基础。与这两种价值要素相对应的是两种截然不同的证券分析方法。诚然，每位称职的分析师都着眼于未来而非回顾过去，并且他意识到，他的工作成果的好坏取决于未来将会发生什么， 而不是 已经发生的事情。然而，未来本身可以用两种不同的方式去看待，可以分别称为 预测（或投射）方式和 保护方式。^*

Our statement that the current price reflects both known facts and future expectations was intended to emphasize the double basis for market valuations. Corresponding with these two kinds of value elements are two basically different approaches to security analysis. To be sure, every competent analyst looks forward to the future rather than backward to the past, and he realizes that his work will prove good or bad depending on what will happen and not on what has happened. Nevertheless, the future itself can be approached in two different ways, which may be called the way of prediction (or projection) and the way of protection.^*

那些强调预测的人会努力相当准确地预测公司未来几年的业绩——尤其是盈利是否会呈现显著且持续的增长。这些结论可能基于对行业供求关系（或产量、价格和成本）等因素的仔细研究，也可能基于对其他因素的仔细研究。它们可能源于对过去增长曲线未来走势的相当幼稚的预测。如果这些权威人士确信相当长期的前景异常乐观，他们几乎总是会推荐购买该股票，而不会过多关注其目前的抛售水平。例如，人们对航空运输类股票的普遍态度就是这样——尽管1946年后航空运输类股票的业绩常常令人沮丧地糟糕，但这种态度仍然持续了很多年。在引言中，我们评论了该行业强劲的价格走势与相对令人失望的盈利记录之间的差异。

Those who emphasize prediction will endeavor to anticipate fairly accurately just what the company will accomplish in future years—in particular whether earnings will show pronounced and persistent growth. These conclusions may be based on a very careful study of such factors as supply and demand in the industry—or volume, price, and costs—or else they may be derived from a rather naïve projection of the line of past growth into the future. If these authorities are convinced that the fairly long-term prospects are unusually favorable, they will almost always recommend the stock for purchase without paying too much regard to the level at which it is selling. Such, for example, was the general attitude with respect to the air-transport stocks—an attitude that persisted for many years despite the distressingly bad results often shown after 1946. In the Introduction we have commented on the disparity between the strong price action and the relatively disappointing earnings record of this industry.

相比之下，那些强调保护的人总是特别关注研究时发行的价格。他们的主要努力是确保标的现值高于市场价格，从而吸收未来不利因素的影响。因此，一般来说，他们不必对公司的长期前景充满热情，而是要对企业能够健康发展抱有合理的信心。

By contrast, those who emphasize protection are always especially concerned with the price of the issue at the time of study. Their main effort is to assure themselves of a substantial margin of indicated present value above the market price—which margin could absorb unfavorable developments in the future. Generally speaking, therefore, it is not so necessary for them to be enthusiastic over the company’s long-run prospects as it is to be reasonably confident that the enterprise will get along.

第一种方法，即预测性方法，也可以称为定性方法，因为它强调前景、管理以及其他不可衡量但非常重要的、属于质量范畴的因素。第二种方法，即保护性方法，可以称为定量或统计方法，因为它强调售价与收益、资产、股息等之间的可衡量关系。顺便说一句，定量方法实际上是证券分析在选择债券和优先股进行投资时所发现的合理观点在普通股领域的延伸。

The first, or predictive, approach could also be called the qualitative approach, since it emphasizes prospects, management, and other nonmeasurable, albeit highly important, factors that go under the heading of quality. The second, or protective, approach may be called the quantitative or statistical approach, since it emphasizes the measurable relationships between selling price and earnings, assets, dividends, and so forth. Incidentally, the quantitative method is really an extension—into the field of common stocks—of the viewpoint that security analysis has found to be sound in the selection of bonds and preferred stocks for investment.

在我们自身的态度和专业工作中，我们始终致力于量化方法。从一开始，我们就希望确保我们的资金能够以具体、可论证的方式获得充足的价值。我们不愿接受未来的前景和承诺，作为对现有价值不足的补偿。这绝不是投资权威人士的标准观点；事实上，大多数人可能认同这样的观点：前景、管理质量、其他无形资产以及“人为因素”远远不能决定我们最终的投资回报。超过了对过去的记录、资产负债表和所有其他冷冰冰的数字的任何研究所提供的指示。

In our own attitude and professional work we were always committed to the quantitative approach. From the first we wanted to make sure that we were getting ample value for our money in concrete, demonstrable terms. We were not willing to accept the prospects and promises of the future as compensation for a lack of sufficient value in hand. This has by no means been the standard viewpoint among investment authorities; in fact, the majority would probably subscribe to the view that prospects, quality of management, other intangibles, and “the human factor” far outweigh the indications supplied by any study of the past record, the balance sheet, and all the other cold figures.

因此，选择“最佳”股票的问题本质上是一个极具争议的问题。我们建议防御型投资者不要去管它。让他更强调分散投资而不是个体选择。顺便说一句，普遍接受的分散投资理念至少在一定程度上否定了选择性的雄心勃勃的主张。如果一个人能够准确无误地选出最佳股票，那么分散投资只会让他亏损。然而，在为防御型投资者建议的四条最普遍的普通股选择规则的范围内（此处），仍有相当大的偏好自由空间。在最坏的情况下，放纵这种偏好应该不会造成损害；除此之外，它可能会为结果带来一些有价值的东西。随着技术发展对公司长期业绩的影响越来越大，投资者不能将其排除在计算之外。在这里，就像在其他地方一样，他必须在忽视和过分强调之间寻求一种平衡。

Thus this matter of choosing the “best” stocks is at bottom a highly controversial one. Our advice to the defensive investor is that he let it alone. Let him emphasize diversification more than individual selection. Incidentally, the universally accepted idea of diversification is, in part at least, the negation of the ambitious pretensions of selectivity. If one could select the best stocks unerringly, one would only lose by diversifying. Yet within the limits of the four most general rules of common-stock selection suggested for the defensive investor (here) there is room for a rather considerable freedom of preference. At the worst the indulgence of such preferences should do no harm; beyond that, it may add something worthwhile to the results. With the increasing impact of technological developments on long-term corporate results, the investor cannot leave them out of his calculations. Here, as elsewhere, he must seek a mean between neglect and overemphasis.

第十四章评论

Commentary on Chapter 14

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

“行动起来”的诱惑是投资者面临的最可怕的诱惑之一。地平线上总有一只青鸟在等待着你。

The temptation to “do something” is one of the worst temptations that investors face. There is always some bluebird on the horizon.

—约翰·C·博格

—John C. Bogle

在第 14 章中，格雷厄姆 (Graham) 弃踢。

In Chapter 14, Graham punts.

虽然格雷厄姆给出了一些关于防御型投资者如何选股的通用指导，但他的本意并非如此。他列出了股票应该满足的七项标准。然而，在本章结尾，他建议防御型投资者不要费心：

Although he gives some general guidelines on how defensive investors can pick stocks, his heart isn’t in it. Graham lists seven criteria that stocks should meet. By the end of the chapter, however, he advises defensive investors not to bother:

……选择“最佳”股票这件事，本质上是一个极具争议的问题。我们给防御型投资者的建议是，别管它。让他更注重分散投资，而不是个股选择。

. . . this matter of choosing the “best” stocks is at bottom a highly controversial one. Our advice to the defensive investor is that he let it alone. Let him emphasize diversification more than individual selection.

因此，如果您符合格雷厄姆对防御型投资者的定义——如果您不愿意或无法投入大量时间和精力来构建投资组合——他认为您根本不必挑选股票。

So, if you meet Graham’s definition of a defensive investor—if you’re unwilling or unable to sink plenty of time and effort into building a portfolio—he doesn’t think you have to pick stocks at all.

但这并不能免除你的所有责任。虽然你不必学习如何选股，但你必须学会如何坚持计划。

That doesn’t absolve you of all responsibilities, though. While you don’t have to learn how to pick stocks, you do have to learn how to stick to a plan.

对抗内心的骗子

Combating Your Inner Con Artist

在第 5 章和第8 章以及随附的评论中，我们已经讨论过经纪业务和社会传染如何合谋将你变成投机者。

We’ve already talked, in Chapters 5 and 8 and the accompanying Commentaries, about how the brokerage business and social contagion can conspire to turn you into a speculator.

但对于任何防御型投资者来说，最终的挑战是防御对抗你内心的骗子。确保你不欺骗自己，是最艰难的斗争。

But the ultimate challenge for any defensive investor is to defend against the con artist inside you. Ensuring that you don’t fool yourself is the hardest struggle of all.

作为防御型投资者，你可以用两种基本方式欺骗自己：

As a defensive investor, you can con yourself in two basic ways:

以为自己知道的比实际上知道的少；
by thinking you know less than you do;
因为你认为自己知道的比你实际知道的多。
by thinking you know more than you do.

如果您对自己的知识和能力缺乏信心，那么您将不敢在只有专家才能成功的市场中进行投资。

If you’re underconfident about your knowledge and abilities, you’ll be afraid to invest at all in what feel like markets where only experts can succeed.

如果你过于自信，你就会把自己视为专家之一，并且过于肯定自己知道未来会发生什么。

If you’re overconfident, you’ll regard yourself as one of those experts and be much too certain that you know what the future holds.

你可以通过遵循格雷厄姆针对防御型投资者的指导方针，并利用指数基金、美元成本平均法和再平衡法，让你的行为处于自动驾驶状态，从而克服缺乏自信的问题^。1

You can overcome underconfidence by following Graham’s guidelines for defensive investors and putting your behavior on autopilot with index funds, dollar-cost averaging, and rebalancing.¹

然而，克服过度自信则更具挑战性。即便在市场上取得几笔大胜——即使纯粹是运气好——过度自信也会削弱你作为防御型投资者的能力。

Conquering overconfidence, however, is a greater challenge. Get a few big wins in the market—even if they came from sheer dumb luck—and overconfidence will undermine your ability to behave like a defensive investor.

满足于防御几乎违背了人性。我们倾向于认为自己对这个常常被随机性所主宰的世界拥有比实际更大的掌控力。我们自以为比实际更了解过去，也相信自己能够比实际更准确地预见未来。

Being content with being defensive is almost a violation of human nature. We tend to think we have more control than we do over a world that’s often ruled by randomness. We believe that we understood the past better than we did and that we will foresee the future more accurately than we can.

几十年前，两位心理学家请西雅图地区的司机对自己的驾驶技术进行评分。他们调查了两组人：一组记录良好，另一组刚刚遭遇事故。以下是部分结果：

Decades ago, two psychologists asked drivers in the Seattle area to rate their skills behind the wheel. They surveyed two groups: some with clean records, and some who had just had an accident. Here’s a sample of the results:

这些司机总共撞毁了28辆自己的车和6辆其他车辆；车上的三名乘客丧生，许多司机自己也遭受了脑震荡和骨折，至少有一人瘫痪。研究人员发现，一名司机表示，他不知道自己驾驶技术有多好，并表示“事故发生时他正在参加一场直线加速赛” ^。2

All told, these drivers had totaled 28 of their own cars and six other vehicles; three of their passengers had been killed, and many of the drivers themselves suffered concussions and broken bones, with at least one being paralyzed. One driver who said he didn’t know how well he was driving, the researchers found, had been “engaged in a drag race contest at the time of the accident.”²

有多少人说他们是糟糕的司机？

How many said they were bad drivers?

零。

Zero.

心理学家有时将这种膨胀的自我评估称为积极幻觉，但其积极程度取决于具体情况。如果你正在约会或求职，高估成功的几率可以给你勇气去冒险，而这可能会改变你的人生。如果你开车或坐飞机，高估自己的技能可能会毁掉甚至结束你的生命。如果你在投资，过度自信可能会毁掉你的财务状况。

Psychologists sometimes call such inflated self-assessments positive illusions, but how positive they are depends on the setting. If you’re going out on a date or applying for a job, overestimating your odds of success can give you the courage to take a risk that could change your life. If you’re driving or flying, overestimating your skills can ruin or end your life. And if you’re investing, overconfidence can wreck your financial life.

表 14-1：驾驶课程

TABLE 14-1: Driving Lessons

在最近遭遇严重车祸的 50 名司机中，有多少……

Among 50 drivers who had recently been in severe auto accidents, how many . . .

否认责任

denied responsibility

三十

承认部分责任

admitted partial responsibility

承认负全部责任

admitted full responsibility

没有汽车保险

had no auto insurance

曾因超速或类似违规行为被传唤

had previously been cited for speeding or similar violations

二十九

承认事故发生前喝过酒

admitted drinking alcohol before the accident

曾因疏忽驾驶、鲁莽驾驶或酒后驾驶而被传唤

had previously been cited for negligent, reckless, or drunk driving

承认至少一次未通过驾驶考试

admitted failing driving tests at least once

驾照至少被吊销过一次

had driver’s license revoked at least once

事故发生后被指控疏忽驾驶

were charged after the accident with negligent driving

事故发生后被指控鲁莽驾驶

were charged after the accident with reckless driving

事故发生后被指控犯有其他罪行

were charged after the accident with other offenses

表示他们当时的驾驶水平“正常”、“通常”、“良好”、“100%”或“非常好”

said their driving at the time was “normal,” “usual,” “good,” “100%,” or “extra good”

三十二

表示他们的驾驶技术不如平常

said they were driving less well than usual

不知道他们开车技术如何

didn’t know how well they were driving

因事故受伤住院期间回答了调查问卷

answered the survey while hospitalized with injuries from the accident

形容自己是“差劲”或“非常差劲”的司机

described themselves as “poor” or “very poor” drivers

来源：Caroline E. Preston 和 Stanley Harris，《交通事故驾驶员心理学》（1965 年）。

Source: Caroline E. Preston and Stanley Harris, “Psychology of Drivers in Traffic Accidents” (1965).

过度自信是指我们的信念与现实之间的冲突。它主要有三种表现形式：高估（认为自己的表现比实际更好）；过度定位（相对于他人，夸大自己的表现）；以及过度精准（即使现实往往充满不确定性和模糊性，我们仍然确信自己知道确切的答案）^。3

Overconfidence is the clash between our beliefs and reality. It takes three main forms: overestimation, thinking our performance is better than it is; overplacement, exaggerating our performance relative to other people’s; and overprecision, being sure we know the exact answer even though reality is so often random and murky.³

一个相关的现象是不切实际的乐观主义，即相信好事更有可能发生在自己身上而不是别人身上。一项针对2000名美国成年人的调查发现，54%的人相信自己死后会上天堂，但只有2%的人预计自己会下地狱，这或许是这种不切实际的乐观主义的终极体现^。4

A related phenomenon is unrealistic optimism, or believing that good things are more likely to happen to ourselves than to others. In perhaps the ultimate expression of unrealistic optimism, one survey of 2,000 American adults found that 54% believe they will go to heaven after they die, but only 2% expect to go to hell.⁴

我是最伟大的

I’m the Greatest

当几乎所有资产都像2021年那样上涨时，你几乎无法抗拒自己已成为一位杰出投资者的印象。难怪“wen moon”（价格何时才能飙升至月球？）和“WAGMI”（我们都会成功）这样的流行语会迅速走红。

When almost all assets go up, as they did in 2021, the impression that you’ve become a brilliant investor can be almost irresistible. No wonder such catchphrases as “wen moon” (when will the price soar to the moon?) and “WAGMI” (we’re all gonna make it) went viral.

你的持仓越多越快，你的自尊心也会越高。很快，你内心的骗子就会在你耳边低语：看看你这手艺有多好！既然你可以通过交易股票、期权和加密货币赚大钱，为什么还要浪费时间辛苦工作呢？

The more and the faster your holdings go up, the higher your self-esteem will, too. Soon, your inner con artist is whispering in your inner ear: Look how good you are at this! Why are you wasting your time slogging away at work when you could be making a killing by trading stocks and options and crypto?

我掌控一切

I’m in Control

另一种自欺欺人的形式是，即使你对情况没有任何影响力，你也感觉自己一切尽在掌握。

Another form of self-deception is feeling as if you’re in control even when you have no influence over the situation.

神经科学家发现，掌控一切的感觉（即使你并非如此）会激活内侧前额叶皮层，这是大脑中一个有助于抑制压力和负面情绪的区域。欺骗自己，让自己相信自己掌控一切，可以抵御你在面对不确定性时可能产生的焦虑^。5

Neuroscientists have found that the feeling of being in control (even if you’re not) activates the medial prefrontal cortex, a region of the brain that helps inhibit stress and negative emotions. Fooling yourself into thinking you’re in charge can fend off the anxiety you would otherwise feel in the face of uncertainty.⁵

如果你在赌博，你可能会吹骰子祈求好运，或者长时间摇晃骰子直到“感觉”正确，或者在需要更大数字时更用力地掷骰子。反复按电梯按钮并不会让它更快到达，但不知何故，它似乎有效果。直到刮刮乐彩票的出现，让玩家感觉自己在创造彩票，州彩票才在美国兴起。

If you’re gambling, you might blow on dice for good luck, shake them longer until they “feel” right, or throw them harder when you need a high number. Pushing the elevator button over and over won’t make it arrive any faster, but somehow it seems to. State lotteries took off in the U.S. only after the advent of scratch-off numbers gave players the sensation that they were creating their own tickets.

几十年前，心理学家艾伦·兰格（Ellen Langer）发现了助长控制幻觉的因素：选择、熟悉度、个人参与度和竞争。了解你的目标并成功实现它同样重要^。6

Decades ago, psychologist Ellen Langer identified the factors that fuel the illusion of control: choice, familiarity, personal involvement, and competition. Knowing your goal and succeeding at it are also important.⁶

这些因素使金融市场成为您内心的骗子可以变出控制幻觉的理想材料：您可以选择投资什么、何时投资以及投资多少；市场就像今天的头条新闻一样熟悉；您可以不停地关注（和交易）您的投资组合；您与数亿人竞争；您的目标是赚钱；即使您不知道自己在做什么，仅凭运气，您有时也会赚钱。

Those factors make the financial markets the ideal material out of which your inner con artist can conjure illusions of control: You choose what, when, and how much to invest; the markets feel as familiar as today’s headlines; you can watch (and trade) your portfolio nonstop; you compete against hundreds of millions of people; your goal is to make money; and you will make money some of the time, even if you have no clue what you’re doing, just by luck alone.

在你几乎无法控制的环境中，很难不高估你所拥有的控制力。

In an environment over which you have little to no control, it’s hard not to overestimate how much control you do have.

看看职业交易员就知道了。在伦敦投资银行的一项研究中，107名交易员玩了一个计算机模拟游戏，他们被告知“可能”可以通过按下键盘上的按钮来控制金融指数的涨跌。事实上，这些按钮对指数的价格没有任何影响。游戏进行四轮后，交易员被问及他们控制了多少。

Just look at professional traders. In a study at investment banks in London, 107 traders played a computer simulation in which they were told they “may” be able to make a financial index go up or down by pressing buttons on their keyboard. In fact, the buttons had no effect on the prices of the index. After four rounds of the game, the traders were asked how much control they’d had.

许多人以为自己至少对市场指数产生了一些影响。事实证明，那些更容易产生这种错觉的人，分析能力更差，对银行利润的贡献更少，年度总薪酬也更低，而且风险管理能力也更差^。7

Many thought they’d exerted at least some influence over the market index. And it turned out that those who were more prone to that illusion had poorer analytical ability, contributed less to their bank’s profits, earned lower total annual compensation, and weren’t as good at managing risk.⁷

当自我提升越过界限变成自欺欺人时，你可能会拒绝接受别人的建议——并且不会将不可避免的损失视为你力不从心的警告，而只是将其视为信号你的成功必将持续下去。自以为掌控力强，最终必然会导致收益低于应有水平。

When self-enhancement crosses the line into self-deception, you are likely to resist taking advice from others—and to treat the inevitable losses not as warnings that you’re out of your depth but only as signals that your success is bound to resume. Believing you have more control than you do is a sure way to end up earning lower returns than you should.

我一直都知道

I Knew It All Along

看看我拍摄的联邦快递信封照片中的细节：

Look at this detail from a photo I took of a FedEx envelope:

图 14-1

FIGURE 14-1

资料来源：Jason Zweig

Source: Jason Zweig

很多人知道，除了字母F、e、d、E和x之外，这个标志里还隐藏着一些东西。但并非每个人都知道。要么你一眼就能发现，要么你根本找不到。

Many people know there’s something embedded in the logo besides the letters F, e, d, E, and x. But not everybody does. Either you spot it instantly, or you can’t find it at all.

再看一遍。你看到什么了吗？

Look again. Do you see anything?

如果没有，请看图 14-2，它只是同一张照片的放大细节。

If not, look at Figure 14-2, which is simply an enlarged detail of the same photo.

现在尝试其他方法。再次查看完整的联邦快递标志，并尝试忽略E和x之间的箭头。尽力重建在看到箭头之前的视觉无知状态。

Now try something else. Look at the full FedEx logo again and try to unsee that arrow between the E and the x. Try as hard as you can to reconstruct your state of visual ignorance before you knew the arrow was there.

你能只看到字母而看不到箭头吗？

Can you see only the letters, without the arrow?

同样地，一旦我们知道了金融市场发生了什么，我们就几乎不可能回忆起我们不知道会发生什么。

In much the same way, once we know what has happened in the financial markets, it becomes all but impossible to recall that we didn’t know what would happen.

如果你欺骗自己认为你知道会发生什么，那么你也会误以为你知道会发生什么。

And fooling yourself into thinking you knew what would happen can delude you into thinking you know what will happen.

心理学家称之为“后视偏差”。它把那些在发生之前看似不可能或不太可能的结果，转化成必然——因为我们现在知道它们确实发生了。正如诺贝尔奖得主丹尼尔·卡尼曼常说的那样，后视偏差“让意外消失”。

Psychologists call this “hindsight bias.” It takes results that seemed improbable or impossible before they happened and transforms them into inevitabilities—because we now know they did happen. As the Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman liked to say, hindsight bias “makes surprises vanish.”

图 14-2

FIGURE 14-2

资料来源：Jason Zweig

Source: Jason Zweig

市场大幅上涨后，你会回想起自己当时预期的涨幅比实际更大。如果市场大幅下跌，你会回想起自己当时比实际更悲观。事后诸葛亮并非十全十美，几乎是盲人摸象^。8

After markets go up sharply, you will recall expecting them to rise more than you did at the time. If they go down steeply, you will remember being more bearish than you were. Hindsight isn’t 20/20; it’s close to legally blind.⁸

这种效应如此强大，以至于那些对未来一年走势一无所知的投资者，在12个月后回顾时，会发现他们预测的市场表现几乎与实际情况完全一致。这又是你内心骗子试图诱使你放弃成为防御型投资者决心的另一种方式：你一直都知道市场即将如何发展！这意味着你知道它接下来会如何发展。趁为时未晚，赶紧行动起来！

The effect is so powerful that investors who had no idea what would unfold over the coming year will look back, 12 months later, and recall that they expected the market to perform almost exactly as it did. It’s yet another way your inner con artist will try to coax you into abandoning your resolve to be a defensive investor: You knew all along what the market was about to do! That means you know what it’s going to do next. Act on it before it’s too late!

后见之明偏差与选择性记忆混合在一起，形成了一种令人陶醉的自我欺骗。回顾你的投资决策，你会发现更有可能“记住”比实际收益更多、损失更少。你内心的骗子会欺骗你，让你误以为你不仅预见到了未来，而且你基于这一预测做出的决策比实际情况更好^。9

Hindsight bias mixes with selective memory to create an intoxicating brew of self-delusion. Look back at your investing decisions and you’re likely to “remember” having even more gains and fewer losses than you did. Your inner con artist tricks you into thinking not only that you foresaw what was coming, but that the decisions you based on that forecast were better than they were.⁹

束缚你内心的骗子

Handcuffing Your Inner Con Artist

您并不是一个聪明的投资者，因为您的持股量刚刚大幅增加。

You aren’t an intelligent investor because your holdings have just gone up a lot.

您是一位聪明的投资者，因为您知道自己的局限性。

You’re an intelligent investor because you know your limitations.

你是一个防御型投资者，因为你已经决定不愿意或无法投入时间和精力，而这却是作为一名进取型投资者取得成功的先决条件。

And you’re a defensive investor because you’ve already decided you aren’t willing or able to commit the time and effort that are the prerequisites for success as an enterprising investor.

过度自信总是泛泛而谈。如果你根据投资组合的市值是否上涨来判断，你很容易自以为是，认为自己是个比实际情况更优秀的投资者。另一方面，具体的问题才是过度自信的致命弱点。当你内心的骗子开始告诉你你是多么出色的投资者时，强迫自己回答以下这些具体的问题：

Overconfidence feasts on generalities. It’s easy to believe you’re a better investor than you are if you take your cues from whether your portfolio’s market value has gone up. On the other hand, specific questions are the kryptonite of overconfidence. When your inner con artist starts telling you how brilliant an investor you are, force yourself to answer concrete inquiries like these:

我的投资组合相对于市场上涨了多少？
How much is my portfolio up relative to the market?
关于这个资产，我到底了解哪些其他人不知道的信息？
What exactly do I know about this asset that most other people don’t?
我是怎么学会的？为什么他们还没学会？
How did I learn it? Why haven’t they learned it?
我能否给出三个详细的理由来说明为什么该资产仍然被低估？
Can I give three detailed reasons why this asset is still undervalued?

依靠具体的问题将使您更接近心理学家唐·摩尔 (Don Moore) 所说的“基于证据的信心”：对您的能力的感觉不是基于一厢情愿的想法，而是基于对现实的客观衡量。

Relying on specific questions will get you closer to what psychologist Don Moore calls “evidence-based confidence”: a sense of your abilities grounded not in wishful thinking but in objective measures of reality.

你的答案可能表明你确实比其他投资者有显著优势，在这种情况下你应该重新定义自己作为一名有进取心的投资者。不过，更有可能的是，当你回答完第三个问题时，你应该已经让肩上的那个小恶魔安静下来了。把他甩开，重新致力于遵循格雷厄姆的指导方针，然后回到你的生活中。

Your answers could demonstrate that you do have a significant edge over other investors, in which case you should redefine yourself as an enterprising investor. More likely, though, by the time you finish answering the third question you should have silenced that little devil on your shoulder. Flick him off, recommit to following Graham’s guidelines, and get back to living your life.

后见之明偏见克星

The Hindsight Bias-Buster

几乎所有投资者，无论是个人投资者还是专业人士，一生中都会对自己的后见之明偏差视而不见。不过，你可以睁开眼睛，正视自己的后见之明偏差。只需追踪你的预测！我称之为“后见之明偏差克星”，每年只需几分钟。

Nearly all investors, individuals and professionals alike, go through life blind to their hindsight bias. You can open your eyes to confront yours, though. Simply track your forecasts! What I call the Hindsight Bias-Buster takes only a few minutes a year.

每年一月，请复印两份以下空白表格，并填写其中一份。然后，在12月31日之后，一旦全年结果出来，请尽可能准确地回忆你最初的预测。不要看填好的表格，把你的回忆写在剩下的空白表格上。然后将你最初的预测与你凭记忆重建的页面进行比较。

Each January, make two copies of the following blank form and fill one out. Then, after December 31, as soon as the full year’s results are available, try to recall your original forecasts as accurately as you can. Without looking at your completed form, write your recollections down on the remaining blank form. Then compare your original predictions against the page where you reconstructed them from memory.

您几乎肯定会发现，您所期望的记忆已经被所发生的事情所扭曲了。

You will almost certainly find that your recollection of what you expected has been skewed by what happened.

您认为 12 月 31 日会发生什么？

On December 31, what do you think will be . . .

...道琼斯工业平均指数的收盘价？

. . . the closing value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average?

_________

...标准普尔 500 指数全年的总回报率是多少？

. . . the total return of the S&P 500 for the calendar year?

______%

...10 年期国债收益率是多少？

. . . the yield on the 10-year Treasury note?

____%

...官方通货膨胀率（消费者物价指数最近 12 个月的变化）？

. . . the official inflation rate (latest 12-month change in Consumer Price Index)?

____%

...比特币的价格是多少？

. . . the price of bitcoin?

$_________

...黄金的价格是多少？

. . . the price of gold?

每盎司_______ 美元

$_______ per oz.

...原油价格如何？

. . . the price of crude oil?

每桶_____美元

$_____ per barrel

...表现最好的主要金融资产？

. . . the best-performing major financial asset?

_____________________

连续几年进行这样的练习，或许就能让你摆脱自以为能够预测市场的错觉，并激发你根据预测采取行动的渴望。（如果你有财务顾问，也让他们这样做。）

Conducting this exercise a few years in a row just might cure you of the delusion that you know how to predict markets—and the itch to act on those predictions. (If you work with financial advisers, have them do it, too.)

第十五章

Chapter 15 进取型投资者的股票选择

Stock Selection for the Enterprising Investor

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

在上一章中，我们讨论了普通股的选择，即从广泛的合格证券类别中选择，防御型投资者可以从中自由构建其或其顾问偏好的任何股票组合，前提是实现充分的分散化。我们在选择过程中主要强调排除——一方面，建议投资者避免所有质量明显较差的股票；另一方面，如果质量最高的股票价格过高，可能存在相当大的投机风险，则建议投资者避免投资。在本章中，我们将面向进取型投资者，探讨进行个别选择的可能性和方法，这些选择可能比整体平均水平更有利可图。

In the previous chapter we have dealt with common-stock selection in terms of broad groups of eligible securities, from which the defensive investor is free to make up any list that he or his adviser prefers, provided adequate diversification is achieved. Our emphasis in selection has been chiefly on exclusions—advising on the one hand against all issues of recognizably poor quality, and on the other against the highest-quality issues if their price is so high as to involve a considerable speculative risk. In this chapter, addressed to the enterprising investor, we must consider the possibilities and the means of making individual selections which are likely to prove more profitable than an across-the-board average.

成功做到这一点的前景如何？委婉地说，如果我们一开始不就此表达一些严重的保留意见，那就太不坦诚了。乍一看，成功选择的理由似乎是不言而喻的。要获得平均水平的结果——例如，相当于道琼斯工业平均指数的表现——不需要任何特殊能力。所需要的只是一个与这30只主要股票相同或相似的投资组合。那么，即使运用一定程度的技巧——源于学习、经验和天赋——也应该有可能获得比道琼斯工业平均指数好得多的结果。

What are the prospects of doing this successfully? We would be less than frank, as the euphemism goes, if we did not at the outset express some grave reservations on this score. At first blush the case for successful selection appears self-evident. To get average results—e.g., equivalent to the performance of the DJIA—should require no special ability of any kind. All that is needed is a portfolio identical with, or similar to, those thirty prominent issues. Surely, then, by the exercise of even a moderate degree of skill—derived from study, experience, and native ability—it should be possible to obtain substantially better results than the DJIA.

然而，大量令人印象深刻的证据表明，即使那些试图做到这一点的人资质最高，也很难做到。证据就在于众多运营多年的投资公司或“基金”的记录。这些基金大多规模庞大，足以聘请业内最优秀的金融或证券分析师。该领域，以及一个足够规模的研究部门的所有其他组成部分。他们的运营费用，如果分摊到其充足的资本中，平均每年约为0.5%，甚至更低。这些成本本身不容小觑；但与1951-1960年间普通股约15%的年回报率，甚至与1961-1970年间6%的年回报率相比，这些成本并不算高。略微高超的选择能力应该很容易克服这一费用障碍，并为基金股东带来更优厚的净收益。

Yet there is considerable and impressive evidence to the effect that this is very hard to do, even though the qualifications of those trying it are of the highest. The evidence lies in the record of the numerous investment companies, or “funds,” which have been in operation for many years. Most of these funds are large enough to command the services of the best financial or security analysts in the field, together with all the other constituents of an adequate research department. Their expenses of operation, when spread over their ample capital, average about one-half of 1% a year thereon, or less. These costs are not negligible in themselves; but when they are compared with the approximately 15% annual overall return on common stocks generally in the decade 1951–1960, and even the 6% return in 1961–1970, they do not bulk large. A small amount of superior selective ability should easily have overcome that expense handicap and brought in a superior net result for the fund shareholders.

然而，总体而言，纯普通股基金在很长一段时间内未能获得与标准普尔500指数或整个市场相当的回报。这一结论已被多项综合研究证实。以下是最新一项涵盖1960年至1968年的研究：*

Taken as a whole, however, the all-common-stock funds failed over a long span of years to earn quite as good a return as was shown on Standard & Poor’s 500-stock averages or the market as a whole. This conclusion has been substantiated by several comprehensive studies. To quote the latest one before us, covering the period 1960–1968:*

从这些结果可以看出，纽约证券交易所股票的随机投资组合，如果每只股票的投资额度相同，其平均表现优于同风险类别的共同基金。低风险和中等风险投资组合的差异相当显著（分别为每年3.7%和2.5%），但高风险投资组合的差异则较小（每年0.2%）。¹

It appears from these results that random portfolios of New York Stock Exchange stocks with equal investment in each stock performed on the average better over the period than did mutual funds in the same risk class. The differences were fairly substantial for the low- and medium-risk portfolios (3.7% and 2.5% respectively per annum), but quite small for the high-risk portfolios (0.2% per annum).¹

正如我们在第九章中指出的那样，这些比较数据绝不会否定投资基金作为金融机构的效用。因为它们确实为所有投资公众提供了在其普通股投资中获得大致平均回报的可能性。由于各种原因，大多数将资金投入自选普通股的公众未能获得如此佳绩。但对于客观观察者而言，这些基金未能超越总体平均水平，这无疑表明，实现这一目标并非易事，实际上极其困难。

As we pointed out in Chapter 9, these comparative figures in no way invalidate the usefulness of the investment funds as a financial institution. For they do make available to all members of the investing public the possibility of obtaining approximately average results on their common-stock commitments. For a variety of reasons, most members of the public who put their money in common stocks of their own choice fail to do nearly as well. But to the objective observer the failure of the funds to better the performance of a broad average is a pretty conclusive indication that such an achievement, instead of being easy, is in fact extremely difficult.

为什么会这样？我们可以想到两种不同的解释，每种解释都可能部分适用。第一种解释是，股票市场实际上不仅反映了公司过去和当前业绩的所有重要事实，还反映了对其未来可以合理形成的任何预期。如果是这样，那么随后发生的各种市场波动——这些波动往往是极端的——必定是无法可靠预见的新发展和概率的结果。这将使价格波动本质上是偶然和随机的。如果上述情况属实，那么证券分析师的工作——无论多么聪明和彻底——都必然在很大程度上是无效的，因为本质上，他试图预测不可预测的事情。

Why should this be so? We can think of two different explanations, each of which may be partially applicable. The first is the possibility that the stock market does in fact reflect in the current prices not only all the important facts about the companies’ past and current performance, but also whatever expectations can be reasonably formed as to their future. If this is so, then the diverse market movements which subsequently take place—and these are often extreme—must be the result of new developments and probabilities that could not be reliably foreseen. This would make the price movements essentially fortuitous and random. To the extent that the foregoing is true, the work of the security analyst—however intelligent and thorough—must be largely ineffective, because in essence he is trying to predict the unpredictable.

证券分析师数量的激增或许是造成这一结果的重要原因。数百甚至数千名专家研究一只重要普通股背后的价值因素，因此人们自然会认为，其当前价格能够很好地反映知情人士对其价值的共识。那些看好这只股票的人，往往出于个人偏好或乐观情绪，而这既可能是对的，也可能是错的。

The very multiplication of the number of security analysts may have played an important part in bringing about this result. With hundreds, even thousands, of experts studying the value factors behind an important common stock, it would be natural to expect that its current price would reflect pretty well the consensus of informed opinion on its value. Those who would prefer it to other issues would do so for reasons of personal partiality or optimism that could just as well be wrong as right.

我们常常将华尔街众多证券分析师的工作与复式桥牌锦标赛上桥牌高手的表现进行比较。前者试图挑选“最有可能获胜”的股票，而后者则力求在每手牌中获得最高分。只有少数人能够同时实现这两个目标。由于所有桥牌选手的专业水平都大致相同，因此最终的胜出者很可能取决于各种“破发”，而非高超的技艺。在华尔街，这种平等的进程得益于业内的共济会精神，在这种精神的推动下，人们在各种各样的聚会上自由地分享想法和发现。这几乎就像在一场类似的桥牌锦标赛上，各种专家们互相监督，对每一手牌的结果进行争论。

We have often thought of the analogy between the work of the host of security analysts on Wall Street and the performance of master bridge players at a duplicate-bridge tournament. The former try to pick the stocks “most likely to succeed”; the latter to get top score for each hand played. Only a limited few can accomplish either aim. To the extent that all the bridge players have about the same level of expertness, the winners are likely to be determined by “breaks” of various sorts rather than superior skill. On Wall Street the leveling process is helped along by the freemasonry that exists in the profession, under which ideas and discoveries are quite freely shared at the numerous get-togethers of various sorts. It is almost as if, at the analogous bridge tournament, the various experts were looking over each other’s shoulders and arguing out each hand as it was played.

第二种可能性则截然不同。或许许多证券分析师的决策受到了某种缺陷的制约。他们处理股票选择问题的基本方法。他们寻找增长前景最佳的行业，以及这些行业中管理最佳且具备其他优势的公司。这意味着，他们会不惜一切代价买入这些行业和公司的股票，无论价格多高；同时，他们会避开前景较差的行业和公司，无论股价多低。如果优质公司的盈利在未来必然会无限期地快速增长，那么这将是唯一正确的做法，因为理论上它们的价值将是无限的。如果前景较差的公司濒临倒闭，无法挽救，那么分析师认为它们无论价格如何都缺乏吸引力，这便是正确的。

The second possibility is of a quite different sort. Perhaps many of the security analysts are handicapped by a flaw in their basic approach to the problem of stock selection. They seek the industries with the best prospects of growth, and the companies in these industries with the best management and other advantages. The implication is that they will buy into such industries and such companies at any price, however high, and they will avoid less promising industries and companies no matter how low the price of their shares. This would be the only correct procedure if the earnings of the good companies were sure to grow at a rapid rate indefinitely in the future, for then in theory their value would be infinite. And if the less promising companies were headed for extinction, with no salvage, the analysts would be right to consider them unattractive at any price.

我们企业风险投资的真相却截然不同。极少有公司能够长期保持高速不间断的增长。大型公司最终走向衰败的也少之又少。大多数公司的历史都充满了沧桑、起伏和相对地位的更迭。在某些公司，“从贫穷到富有再到富裕”的循环几乎是周期性的——这句话曾经是钢铁行业的标准说法——而在其他公司，巨变则被认为是管理的衰败或改善。

The truth about our corporate ventures is quite otherwise. Extremely few companies have been able to show a high rate of uninterrupted growth for long periods of time. Remarkably few, also, of the larger companies suffer ultimate extinction. For most, their history is one of vicissitudes, of ups and downs, of change in their relative standing. In some the variations “from rags to riches and back” have been repeated on almost a cyclical basis—the phrase used to be a standard one applied to the steel industry—for others spectacular changes have been identified with deterioration or improvement of management.

上述探究如何适用于那些希望通过个性化选择获得更佳回报的进取型投资者？首先，这表明他正在承担一项艰巨甚至可能不切实际的任务。本书的读者，无论多么聪明博学，也很难指望他们在投资组合选择方面能比国内顶尖分析师做得更好。但如果股市中相当大一部分股票在标准的分析选择中经常被歧视或完全忽视，那么聪明的投资者或许能够从由此产生的低估中获利。

How does the foregoing inquiry apply to the enterprising investor who would like to make individual selections that will yield superior results? It suggests first of all that he is taking on a difficult and perhaps impracticable assignment. Readers of this book, however intelligent and knowing, could scarcely expect to do a better job of portfolio selection than the top analysts of the country. But if it is true that a fairly large segment of the stock market is often discriminated against or entirely neglected in the standard analytical selections, then the intelligent investor may be in a position to profit from the resultant undervaluations.

但要做到这一点，他必须遵循华尔街并不普遍接受的特定方法，因为那些被广泛接受的方法似乎并不能产生每个人都希望达到的结果。如果在股市中如此专业的头脑中，竟然存在既合理又有效的方法，那真是太奇怪了。而且相对不受欢迎。然而，我们自己的事业和声誉却建立在这个不太可能的事实之上。*

But to do so he must follow specific methods that are not generally accepted on Wall Street, since those that are so accepted do not seem to produce the results everyone would like to achieve. It would be rather strange if—with all the brains at work professionally in the stock market—there could be approaches which are both sound and relatively unpopular. Yet our own career and reputation have been based on this unlikely fact.*

格雷厄姆-纽曼方法总结

A Summary of the Graham-Newman Methods

为了使最后一条陈述更加具体，我们有必要简要介绍一下格雷厄姆·纽曼公司在 1926 年至 1956 年这三十年间所从事的业务类型。^*在我们的记录中，这些业务被分类如下：

To give concreteness to the last statement, it should be worthwhile to give a brief account of the types of operations we engaged in during the thirty-year life of Graham-Newman Corporation, between 1926 and 1956.^* These were classified in our records as follows:

套利：根据重组、合并或类似计划，购买一种证券并同时出售一种或多种可以用该证券交换的其他证券。

Arbitrages: The purchase of a security and the simultaneous sale of one or more other securities into which it was to be exchanged under a plan of reorganization, merger, or the like.

清算：购买股票，在清算公司资产时收到一次或多次现金支付。

Liquidations: Purchase of shares which were to receive one or more cash payments in liquidation of the company’s assets.

选择这两类操作的依据是：(a) 计算出的年回报率为 20% 或更高，以及 (b) 我们判断成功的可能性至少为五分之四。

Operations of these two classes were selected on the twin basis of (a) a calculated annual return of 20% or more, and (b) our judgment that the chance of a successful outcome was at least four out of five.

相关对冲：购买可转换债券或可转换优先股，并同时出售可兑换成普通股的股票。该头寸的建立价格接近平价，也就是说，如果优先股实际需要转换，且操作最终平仓，则最大损失很小。就是这样。但如果普通股的跌幅远大于优先股的跌幅，并且仓位在市场上平仓，那么就会获利。

Related Hedges: The purchase of convertible bonds or convertible preferred shares, and the simultaneous sale of the common stock into which they were exchangeable. The position was established at close to a parity basis—i.e., at a small maximum loss if the senior issue had actually to be converted and the operation closed out in that way. But a profit would be made if the common stock fell considerably more than the senior issue, and the position closed out in the market.

净流动资产（或“廉价”）发行：此处的想法是尽可能多地收购发行量，且每笔收购成本都低于其净流动资产账面价值——即不给工厂账户和其他资产带来任何价值。我们的收购价格通常为此类精简资产价值的三分之二或更低。大多数年份，我们在这方面进行了广泛的多元化投资——至少发行了100种不同的债券。

Net-Current-Asset (or “Bargain”) Issues: The idea here was to acquire as many issues as possible at a cost for each of less than their book value in terms of net-current-assets alone—i.e., giving no value to the plant account and other assets. Our purchases were made typically at two-thirds or less of such stripped-down asset value. In most years we carried a wide diversification here—at least 100 different issues.

我们应该补充一点，我们不时会进行一些大规模的控制型收购，但这些与当前的讨论无关。

We should add that from time to time we had some large-scale acquisitions of the control type, but these are not relevant to the present discussion.

我们密切关注各类操作的业绩。在跟踪这些后续操作后，我们停止了两个范围更广的领域，因为我们发现这两个领域的总体业绩并不令人满意。第一个领域是购买那些根据我们的总体分析看似颇具吸引力的债券，但这些债券的售价无法低于其营运资本价值。第二个领域是“无关”的对冲操作，即买入的证券不能兑换成卖出的普通股。（此类操作与投资公司领域新兴的“对冲基金”群体最近开展的操作大致相同。*我们对这两种情况进行了长达十年或更长时间的业绩研究，结果表明，这些操作的利润不够可靠，也不够“省心”，不足以证明我们继续进行这些操作是合理的。）

We kept close track of the results shown by each class of operation. In consequence of these follow-ups we discontinued two broader fields, which were found not to have shown satisfactory overall results. The first was the purchase of apparently attractive issues—based on our general analysis—which were not obtainable at less than their working-capital value alone. The second were “unrelated” hedging operations, in which the purchased security was not exchangeable for the common shares sold. (Such operations correspond roughly to those recently embarked on by the new group of “hedge funds” in the investment-company field.* In both cases a study of the results realized by us over a period of ten years or more led us to conclude that the profits were not sufficiently dependable—and the operations not sufficiently “headache proof”—to justify our continuing them.

因此，从1939年起，我们的操作仅限于“自偿”型资产、相关对冲、营运资本交易以及一些控制性操作。从那时起，这些类别都给我们带来了相当持续令人满意的业绩，尤其值得注意的是，在熊市中，当我们的“低估债券”表现不佳时，相关对冲却带来了丰厚的利润。

Hence from 1939 on our operations were limited to “self-liquidating” situations, related hedges, working-capital bargains, and a few control operations. Each of these classes gave us quite consistently satisfactory results from then on, with the special feature that the related hedges turned in good profits in the bear markets when our “undervalued issues” were not doing so well.

我们犹豫是否要为大量人群开出自己的饮食处方聪明投资者的智慧。显然，我们所遵循的专业技术并不适合防御型投资者，因为他们本质上是业余爱好者。至于激进型投资者，或许只有极少数人具备将自己严格限制在证券市场相对较小部分所需的气质。大多数积极主动的投资者更倾向于涉足更广泛的投资渠道。他们的天然猎场将是所有符合以下条件的证券：(a) 按照保守的标准来看绝对没有被高估；(b) 看起来比普通普通股更具吸引力（无论是基于其前景还是过往业绩，还是两者兼而有之）。在进行此类选择时，他们最好采用我们为防御型投资者提出的各种质量和价格合理性测试方法。但这些测试方法应该更具灵活性，允许一个因素的显著优势抵消另一个因素的微小劣势。例如，如果一家公司在 1970 年这样的年份出现亏损，并且其平均收益较高且其他重要因素使其股价看起来便宜，那么他可能不会将其排除在外。有进取心的投资者可能会将自己的选择局限于自己看好的行业和公司，但我们强烈建议不要因为这种热情而为股票支付高价（相对于收益和资产而言）。如果他遵循我们在这方面的理念，他更有可能在当前形势不利、短期前景黯淡、低价充分反映当前悲观情绪的情况下，买入重要的周期性企业，例如钢铁股。*

We hesitate to prescribe our own diet for any large number of intelligent investors. Obviously, the professional techniques we have followed are not suitable for the defensive investor, who by definition is an amateur. As for the aggressive investor, perhaps only a small minority of them would have the type of temperament needed to limit themselves so severely to only a relatively small part of the world of securities. Most active-minded practitioners would prefer to venture into wider channels. Their natural hunting grounds would be the entire field of securities that they felt (a) were certainly not overvalued by conservative measures, and (b) appeared decidedly more attractive—because of their prospects or past record, or both—than the average common stock. In such choices they would do well to apply various tests of quality and price-reasonableness along the lines we have proposed for the defensive investor. But they should be less inflexible, permitting a considerable plus in one factor to offset a small black mark in another. For example, he might not rule out a company which had shown a deficit in a year such as 1970, if large average earnings and other important attributes made the stock look cheap. The enterprising investor may confine his choice to industries and companies about which he holds an optimistic view, but we counsel strongly against paying a high price for a stock (in relation to earnings and assets) because of such enthusiasm. If he followed our philosophy in this field he would more likely be the buyer of important cyclical enterprises—such as steel shares perhaps—when the current situation is unfavorable, the near-term prospects are poor, and the low price fully reflects the current pessimism.*

二级公司

Secondary Companies

接下来，为了考察和选择，我们需要关注那些业绩良好、过往记录令人满意，但似乎对公众缺乏吸引力的二级公司。这些公司的表现将与 ELTRA 和 Emhart 类似，以 1970 年的收盘价计算。（参见上文第 13 章。）寻找这类公司的方法有很多。我们想在此尝试一种新颖的方法，并对其中一种选股方法进行相当详细的阐述。我们这样做有两个目的。许多读者可能会发现我们将要采用的方法具有巨大的实用价值，或者它可能会建议一些类似的方法值得尝试。除此之外，我们所做的还可以帮助他们了解普通股的真实世界，并向他们介绍一本现存最引人入胜、最有价值的小册子。它就是《标准普尔股票指南》，每月出版，公众可以通过年度订阅获得。此外，许多经纪公司也会根据客户要求分发该指南。 *

Next in order for examination and possible selection would come secondary companies that are making a good showing, have a satisfactory past record, but appear to hold no charm for the public. These would be enterprises on the order of ELTRA and Emhart at their 1970 closing prices. (See Chapter 13 above.) There are various ways of going about locating such companies. We should like to try a novel approach here and give a reasonably detailed exposition of one such exercise in stock selection. Ours is a double purpose. Many of our readers may find a substantial practical value in the method we shall follow, or it may suggest comparable methods to try out. Beyond that what we shall do may help them to come to grips with the real world of common stocks, and introduce them to one of the most fascinating and valuable little volumes in existence. It is Standard & Poor’s Stock Guide, published monthly, and made available to the general public under annual subscription. In addition many brokerage firms distribute the Guide to their clients (on request).*

本指南的大部分内容涵盖了约230页的精简统计信息，涵盖了4500多家公司的股票。这些信息涵盖了在各交易所上市的所有股票（约3000只），以及约1500只非上市股票。初次甚至第二次了解一家公司所需的大部分信息都收录在本指南中。（我们认为，缺失的重要数据是每股净资产值（或称账面价值），这些信息可以在标准普尔的大型数据册和其他资料中找到。）

The great bulk of the Guide is given over to about 230 pages of condensed statistical information on the stocks of more than 4,500 companies. These include all the issues listed on the various exchanges, say 3,000, plus some 1,500 unlisted issues. Most of the items needed for a first and even a second look at a given company appear in this compendium. (From our viewpoint the important missing datum is the net-asset-value, or book value, per share, which can be found in the larger Standard & Poor’s volumes and elsewhere.)

喜欢玩弄公司数据的投资者会发现，这本《股票指南》能让他如愿以偿。他可以翻开任何一页，眼前便浮现出一幅浓缩版的股市盛衰全景图，其中甚至包含1936年（如有）以来的最高价和最低价。他能找到一些公司，它们的股价从微不足道的低点一路飙升至惊人的高点，涨幅达2000倍。（对于声名显赫的IBM来说，（例如，在那段时期内增长率“仅”为 333 倍。）他会发现（并非例外）一家公司的股价从 3/8 上涨到 68，然后又回落到 3。2^在股息记录栏中，他会发现一笔可以追溯到 1791 年的股息——由罗德岛工业国民银行（最近认为应该更改其古老的公司名称）支付。*如果他看一下1969 年年末的指南，他会读到宾夕法尼亚中央公司（作为宾夕法尼亚铁路的继任者）自 1848 年以来一直在稳定地支付股息；可惜！几个月后它注定要破产。他会发现一家公司的售价仅为其上次报告收益的 2 倍，而另一家公司的售价是其上次报告收益的 99 倍。3^在大多数情况下，他会发现很难从公司名称中区分出业务范围；例如，美国钢铁公司就有三种名称，例如 ITI Corp.（烘焙产品）或 Santa Fe Industries（主要是大型铁路）。他能从形形色色的价格历史、股息和盈利历史、财务状况、资本配置等等中汲取养分。落后的保守主义、毫无特色的平庸公司、最奇特的“主营业务”组合、各种华尔街玩意儿——它们都摆在那里，等待着他细细浏览，或带着严肃的目标去研究。

The investor who likes to play around with corporate figures will find himself in clover with the Stock Guide. He can open to any page and see before his eyes a condensed panorama of the splendors and miseries of the stock market, with all-time high and low prices going as far back as 1936, when available. He will find companies that have multiplied their price 2,000 times from the minuscule low to the majestic high. (For prestigious IBM the growth was “only” 333 times in that period.) He will find (not so exceptionally) a company whose shares advanced from ⅜ to 68, and then fell back to 3.² In the dividend record column he will find one that goes back to 1791—paid by Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island (which recently saw fit to change its ancient corporate name).* If he looks at the Guide for the year-end 1969 he will read that Penn Central Co. (as successor to Pennsylvania Railroad) has been paying dividends steadily since 1848; alas!, it was doomed to bankruptcy a few months later. He will find a company selling at only 2 times its last reported earnings, and another selling at 99 times such earnings.³ In most cases he will find it difficult to tell the line of business from the corporate name; for one U.S. Steel there will be three called such things as ITI Corp. (bakery stuff) or Santa Fe Industries (mainly the large railroad). He can feast on an extraordinary variety of price histories, dividend and earnings histories, financial positions, capitalization setups, and what not. Backward-leaning conservatism, run-of-the-mine featureless companies, the most peculiar combinations of “principal business,” all kinds of Wall Street gadgets and widgets—they are all there, waiting to be browsed over, or studied with a serious objective.

指南会根据最新12个月的数据，在单独的栏目中列出当前的股息收益率和市盈率（如有）。正是这最后一点，引导我们进行普通股的选择。

The Guides give in separate columns the current dividend yields and price/earnings ratios, based on latest 12-month figures, wherever applicable. It is this last item that puts us on the track of our exercise in common-stock selection.

精选股票指南

A Winnowing of the Stock Guide

假设我们寻找一个简单的表面迹象来表明某只股票价格低廉。首先想到的线索是股价相对于近期收益的低迷。让我们初步列出1970年底市盈率为9倍或更低的股票。该数据方便地列在偶数页的最后一列。为了便于说明，我们将选取前20只低市盈率股票；从上市第六期的阿伯丁制造公司（Aberdeen Mfg. Co.）开始，该公司当年收盘价为10.25倍，相当于其报告市盈率的9倍。截至 1970 年 9 月的 12 个月每股收益为 1.25 美元。第二十次发行的股票是美国玉米产品公司，收盘价为 91⁄2，乘数也是 9。

Suppose we look for a simple prima facie indication that a stock is cheap. The first such clue that comes to mind is a low price in relation to recent earnings. Let’s make a preliminary list of stocks that sold at a multiple of nine or less at the end of 1970. That datum is conveniently provided in the last column of the even-numbered pages. For an illustrative sample we shall take the first 20 such low-multiplier stocks; they begin with the sixth issue listed, Aberdeen Mfg. Co., which closed the year at 101⁄4, or 9 times its reported earnings of $1.25 per share for the 12 months ended September 1970. The twentieth such issue is American Maize Products, which closed at 91⁄2, also with a multiplier of 9.

这组股票可能看起来平庸，其中10只股票的售价低于每股10美元。（这一点其实并不重要；它或许——也未必——会提醒防御型投资者不要选择这样的名单，但总的来说，这对进取型投资者来说可能是有利的。）*在进一步研究之前，让我们先计算一些数字。我们的名单大约占了前200只股票的十分之一。基于此，《指南》应该会列出，例如450只股票的市盈率低于10倍。这将为进一步筛选提供大量候选股票。

The group may have seemed mediocre, with 10 issues selling below $10 per share. (This fact is not truly important; it would probably—not necessarily—warn defensive investors against such a list, but the inference for enterprising investors might be favorable on balance.)* Before making a further scrutiny let us calculate some numbers. Our list represents about one in ten of the first 200 issues looked at. On that basis the Guide should yield, say, 450 issues selling at multipliers under 10. This would make a goodly number of candidates for further selectivity.

因此，让我们在清单中附加一些标准，这些标准与我们为防御型投资者提出的标准类似，但不那么严格。我们建议如下：

So let us apply to our list some additional criteria, rather similar to those we suggested for the defensive investor, but not so severe. We suggest the following:

财务状况：（a）流动资产至少为流动负债的 11⁄2 倍，且（b）债务不超过净流动资产的 110%（对于工业公司）。
Financial condition: (a) Current assets at least 11⁄2 times current liabilities, and (b) debt not more than 110% of net current assets (for industrial companies).
盈利稳定性：股票指南涵盖的最近五年无亏损。
Earnings stability: No deficit in the last five years covered in the Stock Guide.
股息记录：部分当前股息。
Dividend record: Some current dividend.
盈利增长：去年的盈利比 1966 年的盈利还多。
Earnings growth: Last year’s earnings more than those of 1966.
价格：低于有形净资产的120%。
Price: Less than 120% net tangible assets.

指南中的盈利数据通常截至1970年9月30日，因此不包括该年末可能表现不佳的季度。但聪明的投资者不能奢求太多——至少一开始不能。另请注意，我们对企业规模没有设定下限。如果谨慎收购，并以集团化的方式进行，小公司或许能够提供足够的安全保障。

The earnings figures in the Guide were generally for those ending September 30, 1970, and thus do not include what may be a bad quarter at the end of that year. But an intelligent investor can’t ask for the moon—at least not to start with. Note also that we set no lower limit on the size of the enterprise. Small companies may afford enough safety if bought carefully and on a group basis.

当我们应用了这五项附加标准后，我们原本的20只候选股票名单就缩减到只有5只。让我们继续搜索，直到《指南》的前450期股票中，我们找到一个包含15只符合我们六项要求的股票的小“投资组合”。（这些股票列于表15-1，并附有一些相关数据。）当然，这组股票仅供参考，并不一定会被我们这位咨询的投资者选中。

When we have applied the five additional criteria our list of 20 candidates is reduced to only five. Let us continue our search until the first 450 issues in the Guide have yielded us a little “portfolio” of 15 stocks meeting our six requirements. (They are set forth in Table 15–1, together with some relevant data.) The group, of course, is presented for illustration only, and would not necessarily have been chosen by our inquiring investor.

事实上，使用我们的方法，用户的选择范围会更加广泛。如果我们的筛选方法应用于《股票指南》中所有 4500 家公司，并且前十分之一的比例始终保持不变，我们最终将选出大约 150 家符合我们所有六项筛选标准的公司。这样，有进取心的投资者就可以依据自己的判断——或者说偏好和偏见——在这份丰富的名单中，从五家公司中挑选一家，进行第三次选择。

The fact is that the user of our method would have had a much wider choice. If our winnowing approach had been applied to all 4,500 companies in the Stock Guide, and if the ratio for the first tenth had held good throughout, we would end up with about 150 companies meeting all six of our criteria of selection. The enterprising investor would then be able to follow his judgment—or his partialities and prejudices—in making a third selection of, say, one out of five in this ample list.

股票指南材料包括“收益和股息排名”，该排名基于过去八年这些因素的稳定性和增长。（因此价格吸引力不在此列。）我们在表 15-1中包含了标准普尔的排名。15 种股票中有 10 种评级为 B+（= 平均），一种（美国玉米）被评为“高”A 级。如果我们的进取投资者想在他的选择中添加第七个机械标准，即只考虑标准普尔评级为平均或更好的质量股票，他可能仍然有大约 100 种这样的股票可供选择。可以说，一组至少具有平均质量、也符合财务状况标准、可以以较低的当前收益乘数和低于资产价值的价格购买的股票应该有望带来令人满意的投资结果。

The Stock Guide material includes “Earnings and Dividend Rankings,” which are based on stability and growth of these factors for the past eight years. (Thus price attractiveness does not enter here.) We include the S & P rankings in our Table 15-1. Ten of the 15 issues are ranked B+ (= average) and one (American Maize) is given the “high” rating of A. If our enterprising investor wanted to add a seventh mechanical criterion to his choice, by considering only issues ranked by Standard & Poor’s as average or better in quality, he might still have about 100 such issues to choose from. One might say that a group of issues, of at least average quality, meeting criteria of financial condition as well, purchasable at a low multiplier of current earnings and below asset value, should offer good promise of satisfactory investment results.

表 15-1 低乘数工业股票投资组合样本

TABLE 15-1 A Sample Portfolio of Low-Multiplier Industrial Stocks

（ 1971 年 12 月 31 日股票指南的前十五期，满足六项要求）

(The First Fifteen Issues in the Stock Guide at December 31, 1971, Meeting Six Requirements)

^a nr = 未排名。

^a n.r. = not ranked.

^b已根据股票分割进行调整。

^b Adjusted for stock split.

选择普通股的单一标准

Single Criteria for Choosing Common Stocks

有疑问的读者可能会问，选择一个优于平均水平的投资组合，能否比我们刚才概述的更简单。能否只使用一个合理的标准——例如低市盈率、高股息回报或较大的资产价值——就能获得良好的收益？我们发现，在过去很长一段时间内，这类方法一直能带来相当好的结果：(a) 购买重要公司（例如道琼斯工业平均指数成分股）的低乘数股票；(b) 选择一组多元化的股票，这些股票的售价低于其净流动资产价值（或营运资本价值）。我们已经指出，1968 年底应用于道琼斯工业平均指数的低乘数标准，如果以 1971 年中期的结果来衡量，效果并不理想。以低于营运资本价值的价格购买普通股的记录并没有这样的坏记录；这里的缺点是，在过去十年的大部分时间里，这样的机会已经枯竭。

An inquiring reader might well ask whether the choice of a better than average portfolio could be made a simpler affair than we have just outlined. Could a single plausible criterion be used to good advantage—such as a low price/earnings ratio, or a high dividend return, or a large asset value? The two methods of this sort that we have found to give quite consistently good results in the longer past have been (a) the purchase of low-multiplier stocks of important companies (such as the DJIA list), and (b) the choice of a diversified group of stocks selling under their net-current-asset value (or working-capital value). We have already pointed out that the low-multiplier criterion applied to the DJIA at the end of 1968 worked out badly when the results are measured to mid-1971. The record of common-stock purchases made at a price below their working-capital value has no such bad mark against it; the drawback here has been the drying up of such opportunities during most of the past decade.

那么其他的选择依据又如何呢？在撰写本书的过程中，我们进行了一系列“实验”，每个实验都基于一个显而易见的标准。所用数据均可在《标准普尔股票指南》中轻松找到。所有实验均假设以1968年的收盘价购入一个包含30只股票的投资组合，并在1971年6月30日对其进行重估。对于其他随机选择，分别适用以下标准：（1）近期收益乘数较低（不仅限于道琼斯工业平均指数成分股）。（2）股息回报率高。（3）股息记录很长。（4）企业规模非常大（以流通股数量衡量）。（5）财务状况良好。（6）每股价格较低。（7）相对于前一高价而言的低价。（8）标准普尔给出的质量评级很高。

What about other bases of choice? In writing this book we have made a series of “experiments,” each based on a single, fairly obvious criterion. The data used would be readily found in the Standard & Poor’s Stock Guide. In all cases a 30-stock portfolio was assumed to have been acquired at the 1968 closing prices and then revalued at June 30, 1971. The separate criteria applied were the following, as applied to otherwise random choices: (1) A low multiplier of recent earnings (not confined to DJIA issues). (2) A high dividend return. (3) A very long dividend record. (4) A very large enterprise, as measured by number of outstanding shares. (5) A strong financial position. (6) A low price in dollars per share. (7) A low price in relation to the previous high price. (8) A high quality-ranking by Standard & Poor’s.

值得注意的是，《股票指南》至少有一栏与上述每项标准相关。这表明出版商认为，每项标准在分析和选择普通股时都至关重要。（正如我们上文指出的，我们希望增加另一个数字：每股净资产值。）

It will be noted that the Stock Guide has at least one column relating to each of the above criteria. This indicates the publisher’s belief that each is of importance in analyzing and choosing common stocks. (As we pointed out above, we should like to see another figure added: the net-asset-value per share.)

我们各种测试得出的最重要的事实与随机购买股票的表现有关。我们用三个包含30只股票的投资组合测试了这一表现，每个投资组合都包含1968年12月31日《股票指南》第一行和1971年8月31日《股票指南》第一行列出的股票。在这两个日期之间，标准普尔综合指数几乎没有变化，而道琼斯工业平均指数下跌了约5%。但我们随机选择的90只股票平均下跌了22%，这还不包括19只从《股票指南》中剔除、可能损失更大的股票。这些比较结果无疑反映了在牛市中，规模较小、质量较差的股票往往被相对高估，不仅在随后的价格暴跌中比质量较好的股票跌幅更大，而且还会推迟其全面复苏——在许多情况下是无限期的。对于明智的投资者来说，在构建投资组合时，应该避免选择质量较差的股票，除非——对于有进取心的投资者来说——这些股票是明显的便宜货。

The most important fact that emerges from our various tests relates to the performance of stocks bought at random. We have tested this performance for three 30-stock portfolios, each made up of issues found on the first line of the December 31, 1968, Stock Guide and also found in the issue for August 31, 1971. Between these two dates the S & P composite was practically unchanged, and the DJIA lost about 5%. But our 90 randomly chosen issues declined an average of 22%, not counting 19 issues that were dropped from the Guide and probably showed larger losses. These comparative results undoubtedly reflect the tendency of smaller issues of inferior quality to be relatively overvalued in bull markets, and not only to suffer more serious declines than the stronger issues in the ensuing price collapse, but also to delay their full recovery—in many cases indefinitely. The moral for the intelligent investor is, of course, to avoid second-quality issues in making up a portfolio, unless—for the enterprising investor—they are demonstrable bargains.

我们从投资组合研究中得到的其他结果可以概括如下：

Other results gleaned from our portfolio studies may be summarized as follows:

在研究的小组中，只有三组表现优于标准普尔综合指数（因此优于道琼斯工业平均指数），即：（1）质量评级最高（A+）的工业股。这些股票在此期间上涨了9.5%，而标准普尔工业股下跌了2.4%，道琼斯工业平均指数下跌了5.6%。（然而，评级为A+的10只公用事业股票下跌了18%，而包含55只股票的标准普尔公用事业指数下跌了14%。）值得注意的是，标准普尔排名在这次测试中表现非常出色。在任何情况下，基于较高排名的投资组合都比基于较低排名的投资组合表现更好。（2）流通股超过5000万股的公司整体上没有变化，而指数则略有下降。（3）奇怪的是，每股价格较高（超过100美元）的股票的综合指数略有上涨（1%）。

Only three of the groups studied showed up better than the S & P composite (and hence better than the DJIA), viz: (1) Industrials with the highest quality ranking (A+). These advanced 91⁄2% in the period against a decline of 2.4% for the S & P industrials, and 5.6% for the DJIA. (However, the ten public-utility issues rated A+ declined 18% against a decline of 14% for the 55-stock S & P public-utility index.) It is worth remarking that the S & P rankings showed up very well in this single test. In every case a portfolio based on a higher ranking did better than a lower-ranking portfolio. (2) Companies with more than 50 million shares outstanding showed no change on the whole, as against a small decline for the indexes. (3) Strangely enough, stocks selling at a high price per share (over 100) showed a slight (1%) composite advance.

在我们进行的各种测试中，我们根据账面价值进行了一项测试，而《股票指南》中并未提供该数字。我们发现——与我们的投资理念相反——那些规模庞大且市值中商誉成分较大的公司，在2.5年的持有期内整体表现非常出色。（“商誉成分”是指股价中超过账面价值的部分。）*我们的“商誉巨头”名单由30只股票组成，每只股票的商誉成分都超过10亿美元，占其市值的一半以上。1968年底，这些商誉项目的总市值超过1200亿美元！尽管市场估值乐观，但从1968年12月到1971年8月，这组股票整体每股价格上涨了15%，在所研究的20多份名单中表现最佳。

Among our various tests we made one based on book value, a figure not given in the Stock Guide. Here we found—contrary to our investment philosophy—that companies that combined major size with a large good-will component in their market price did very well as a whole in the 21⁄2-year holding period. (By “good-will component” we mean the part of the price that exceeds the book value.)* Our list of “good-will giants” was made up of 30 issues, each of which had a good-will component of over a billion dollars, representing more than half of its market price. The total market value of these good-will items at the end of 1968 was more than $120 billions! Despite these optimistic market valuations the group as a whole showed a price advance per share of 15% between December 1968 and August 1971, and acquitted itself best among the 20-odd lists studied.

在投资政策研究中，这样的事实不容忽视。显然，至少，那些兼具规模庞大、过往盈利记录优异、公众对未来盈利持续增长的预期以及过去几年强劲的市场表现的公司，拥有相当可观的 动能。即使以我们的量化标准来看，股价可能显得过高，但潜在的市场动能很可能会或多或少地无限期地延续此类股票的走势。（当然，这种假设并不适用于该类别中的每一只股票。例如，无可争议的善意领袖 IBM 在 30 个月内从 315 跌至 304。）很难判断这种优异的市场表现在多大程度上是由于“真实”或客观的投资价值，在多大程度上是由于长期以来的受欢迎程度。毫无疑问，这两个因素在这里都很重要。显然，善意巨头的长期和近期市场表现都建议建立多元化的普通股投资组合。然而，我们仍然倾向于其他类型的股票，这些股票显示出一系列有利的投资因素，包括至少为市场价格三分之二的资产价值。

A fact like this must not be ignored in a work on investment policies. It is clear that, at the least, a considerable momentum is attached to those companies that combine the virtues of great size, an excellent past record of earnings, the public’s expectation of continued earnings growth in the future, and strong market action over many past years. Even if the price may appear excessive by our quantitative standards the underlying market momentum may well carry such issues along more or less indefinitely. (Naturally this assumption does not apply to every individual issue in the category. For example, the indisputable good-will leader, IBM, moved down from 315 to 304 in the 30-month period.) It is difficult to judge to what extent the superior market action shown is due to “true” or objective investment merits and to what extent to long-established popularity. No doubt both factors are important here. Clearly, both the long-term and the recent market action of the good-will giants would recommend them for a diversified portfolio of common stocks. Our own preference, however, remains for other types that show a combination of favorable investment factors, including asset values of at least two-thirds the market price.

使用其他标准的测试总体上表明，基于单一有利因素的随机列表比为相反因素选择的随机列表表现更好——例如，低乘数发行在此期间的跌幅小于高乘数发行，长期支付股息的股票损失小于1968年底未支付股息的股票。从这个意义上讲，结果支持了我们的建议，即所选股票应满足定量或有形标准的组合。

The tests using other criteria indicate in general that random lists based on a single favorable factor did better than random lists chosen for the opposite factor—e.g., low-multiplier issues had a smaller decline in this period than high-multiplier issues, and long-term dividend payers lost less than those that were not paying dividends at the end of 1968. To that extent the results support our recommendation that the issues selected meet a combination of quantitative or tangible criteria.

最后，我们应该指出，我们榜单的整体表现远逊于标准普尔综合指数的价格记录。后者是根据每家企业的规模加权的，而我们的测试是基于每家公司各取一股股票。显然，标准普尔方法对大型企业的重视程度更高，这显著影响了结果，并再次凸显了它们与“普通”公司相比具有更高的价格稳定性。

Finally we should comment on the much poorer showing made by our lists as a whole as compared with the price record of the S & P composite. The latter is weighted by the size of each enterprise, whereas our tests are based on taking one share of each company. Evidently the larger emphasis given to giant enterprises by the S & P method made a significant difference in the results, and points up once again their greater price stability as compared with “run-of-the-mine” companies.

廉价发行或净流动资产股票

Bargain Issues, or Net-Current-Asset Stocks

在上面讨论的测试中，我们没有纳入以低于净流动资产价值的价格购买30只股票的结果。原因是，在1968年底的《股票指南》中，最多只能找到屈指可数的几只这样的股票。但1970年的股市下跌改变了这一情况，在当年的低股价下，相当多的普通股可以以低于其营运资本价值的价格买到。过去，人们总是觉得，现在仍然觉得，只要能收购一批多元化的股票，就能轻松得多。以低于适用净流动资产的价格出售普通股——扣除所有先前债权，并将固定资产和其他资产计为零——结果应该相当令人满意。根据我们的经验，这种情况持续了30多年——比如1923年至1957年——不包括1930-1932年的真正考验期。

In the tests discussed above we did not include the results of buying 30 issues at a price less than their net-current-asset value. The reason was that only a handful, at most, of such issues would have been found in the Stock Guide at the end of 1968. But the picture changed in the 1970 decline, and at the low prices of that year a goodly number of common stocks could have been bought at below their working-capital value. It always seemed, and still seems, ridiculously simple to say that if one can acquire a diversified group of common stocks at a price less than the applicable net current assets alone—after deducting all prior claims, and counting as zero the fixed and other assets—the results should be quite satisfactory. They were so, in our experience, for more than 30 years—say, between 1923 and 1957—excluding a time of real trial in 1930–1932.

这种方法在1971年初还有意义吗？我们的答案是肯定的。快速浏览一下《股票指南》，就能发现大约50只或更多的股票似乎可以以净流动资产价值或低于净流动资产价值的价格买入。不出所料，其中很多股票在1970年那段艰难的时期表现不佳。即使剔除过去12个月报告净亏损的股票，我们仍然有足够的股票可以组成一个多元化的股票清单。

Has this approach any relevance at the beginning of 1971? Our answer would be a qualified “yes.” A quick runover of the Stock Guide would have uncovered some 50 or more issues that appeared to be obtainable at or below net-current-asset value. As might be expected a good many of these had been doing badly in the difficult year 1970. If we eliminated those which had reported net losses in the last 12-month period we would be still left with enough issues to make up a diversified list.

我们在表15-2中列出了五只股票的数据，这些股票在1970年低点时的售价低于其营运资本价值*。这些数据为思考股价波动的本质提供了一些素材。为什么那些品牌在全国家喻户晓的知名公司，其估值会如此之低——而与此同时，其他公司却……那些公司（当然盈利增长更快）的售价竟然比其资产负债表上显示的金额高出数十亿美元？再次引用“过去”的说法，商誉作为一种无形价值，通常与“商标”联系在一起。诸如床单上的Lady Pepperell、泳衣上的Jantzen和钢笔上的Parker等品牌，都被视为价值不菲的资产。但现在，如果“市场不喜欢一家公司”，那么不仅是知名的商标，还有土地、建筑、机器等等，在市场面前都一文不值。帕斯卡说过：“人心有其理由，但理由却无法理解。” * “心”应为“华尔街”。

We have included in Table 15-2 some data on five issues that sold at less than their working-capital value* at their low prices of 1970. These give some food for reflection on the nature of stock-price fluctuations. How does it come about that well-established companies, whose brands are household names all over the country, could be valued at such low figures—at the same time when other concerns (with better earnings growth of course) were selling for billions of dollars in excess of what their balance sheets showed? To quote the “old days” once more, the idea of good will as an element of intangible value was usually associated with a “trade name.” Names such as Lady Pepperell in sheets, Jantzen in swim suits, and Parker in pens would be considered assets of great value indeed. But now, if the “market doesn’t like a company,” not only renowned trade names but land, buildings, machinery, and what you will, can all count for nothing in its scales. Pascal said that “the heart has its reasons that the reason doesn’t understand.”* For “heart” read “Wall Street.”

表15-2 1970年以净流动资产价值或以下价格出售的知名公司股票

TABLE 15-2 Stocks of Prominent Companies Selling at or Below Net-Current-Asset Value in 1970

另一个对比浮现在我的脑海。当市场行情良好，新股发行热销时，一些质量低劣的股票却出现了。它们很快就找到了买家；其股价往往在发行后就被疯狂抬高，其资产和收益的比率甚至会让IBM、施乐和宝丽来都汗颜。华尔街对这种疯狂习以为常，在股价不可避免的暴跌之前，没有人公开出手阻止。（美国证券交易委员会所能做的，无非是坚持要求信息披露，而投机的公众对此毫不在意，或者在明显违反法律条文后宣布调查，并通常采取各种温和的惩罚措施。）当许多这类规模微小但估值过高的企业从人们的视野中消失，或几乎消失时，人们会以一种颇具哲理的方式将其视为“游戏的一部分”。每个人都发誓不再做这种不可原谅的荒唐事——下次再见。

There is another contrast that comes to mind. When the going is good and new issues are readily salable, stock offerings of no quality at all make their appearance. They quickly find buyers; their prices are often bid up enthusiastically right after issuance to levels in relation to assets and earnings that would put IBM, Xerox, and Polaroid to shame. Wall Street takes this madness in its stride, with no overt efforts by anyone to call a halt before the inevitable collapse in prices. (The SEC can’t do much more than insist on disclosure of information, about which the speculative public couldn’t care less, or announce investigations and usually mild punitive actions of various sorts after the letter of the law has been clearly broken.) When many of these minuscule but grossly inflated enterprises disappear from view, or nearly so, it is all taken philosophically enough as “part of the game.” Everybody swears off such inexcusable extravagances—until next time.

这位温和的读者说，谢谢你的讲解。但是你的“便宜货”呢？真的能在不冒大风险的情况下从中获利吗？是的，只要你能找到足够多的股票，组成一个多元化的投资组合，并且即使它们在你买入后没有上涨，你也不会失去耐心。有时，耐心的必要性可能看起来相当大。在我们之前的版本中，我们冒险举了一个当时还在使用的例子（这里）。交易对象是伯顿-迪克西公司，其股票售价为每股20美元，而其净流动资产价值为每股30美元，账面价值约为每股50美元。这笔交易不可能立即获利。但在1967年8月，所有股东都收到了53.325美元的报价，很可能刚好是账面价值。如果一位耐心的股东在1964年3月以每股20美元的价格买入这些股票，那么3.5年后的利润将达到165%，非复利年回报率为47%。根据我们的经验，大多数廉价股票都没有花那么长时间就能获得丰厚的利润，也没有这么高的收益率。在我们撰写本文时，如果想了解当时的类似情况，请参阅下文关于国民普雷斯托工业公司的讨论。

Thanks for the lecture, says the gentle reader. But what about your “bargain issues”? Can one really make money in them without taking a serious risk? Yes indeed, if you can find enough of them to make a diversified group, and if you don’t lose patience if they fail to advance soon after you buy them. Sometimes the patience needed may appear quite considerable. In our previous edition we hazarded a single example (here) which was current as we wrote. It was Burton-Dixie Corp., with stock selling at 20, against net-current-asset value of 30, and book value of about 50. A profit on that purchase would not have been immediate. But in August 1967 all the shareholders were offered 533⁄4 for their shares, probably at just about book value. A patient holder, who had bought the shares in March 1964 at 20, would have had a profit of 165% in 31⁄2 years—a noncompounded annual return of 47%. Most of the bargain issues in our experience have not taken that long to show good profits—nor have they shown so high a rate. For a somewhat similar situation, current as we write, see our discussion of National Presto Industries below, here.

特殊情况或“锻炼”

Special Situations or “Workouts”

我们先简单谈谈这个领域，因为理论上来说，它应该被纳入进取型投资者的运营计划中。上文已对此进行了评论。这里我们将提供一些此类案例，并进一步探讨它如何为思想开放、思维敏锐的投资者提供一些帮助。

Let us touch briefly on this area, since it is theoretically includable in the program of operations of an enterprising investor. It was commented upon above. Here we shall supply some examples of the genre, and some further remarks on what it appears to offer an open-minded and alert investor.

1971 年初，出现了三种这样的情况，概括如下：

Three such situations, among others, were current early in 1971, and they may be summarized as follows:

情形 1。Borden 's 收购 Kayser-Roth。1971 年 1 月，Borden 公司宣布计划以 11⁄3 股自有股票换取 1 股 Kayser-Roth 股票，从而获得 Kayser-Roth（“多元化服装”）的控制权。第二天，交易活跃。Borden 收盘价为 26，Kayser-Roth 收盘价为 28。如果一个“经营者”以这些价格买入 300 股 Kayser-Roth 股票并卖出 400 股 Borden 股票，并且交易后来按照宣布的条款完成，他将获得约 24% 的利润，扣除佣金和其他一些项目。假设交易在六个月内完成，他的最终利润率可能达到每年 40% 左右。

SITUATION 1. Acquisition of Kayser-Roth by Borden’s. In January 1971 Borden Inc. announced a plan to acquire control of Kayser-Roth (“diversified apparel”) by giving 11⁄3 shares of its own stock in exchange for one share of Kayser-Roth. On the following day, in active trading. Borden closed at 26 and Kayser-Roth at 28. If an “operator” had bought 300 shares of Kayser-Roth and sold 400 Borden at these prices and if the deal were later consummated on the announced terms, he would have had a profit of some 24% on the cost of his shares, less commissions and some other items. Assuming the deal had gone through in six months, his final profit might have been at about a 40% per annum rate.

情况2。 1970年11月，国民饼干公司提出以11美元现金收购奥罗拉塑料公司的控股权。当时该公司股价约为8.5美元；当月收盘价为9美元，年底仍维持在该水平。此处显示的毛利润最初约为25%，但受未完成交易风险和时间因素的影响。

SITUATION 2. In November 1970 National Biscuit Co. offered to buy control of Aurora Plastics Co. at $11 in cash. The stock was selling at about 81⁄2; it closed the month at 9 and continued to sell there at year-end. Here the gross profit indicated was originally about 25%, subject to the risks of nonconsummation and to the time element.

情况 3. Universal-Marion 公司已停止营业该公司要求股东批准解散公司。财务主管表示，普通股的账面价值约为每股28.5美元，其中很大一部分处于流动状态。1970年，该股收于每股21.5美元，这意味着如果在清算过程中实现账面价值，毛利润可能超过30%。

SITUATION 3. Universal-Marion Co., which had ceased its business operations, asked its shareholders to ratify dissolution of the concern. The treasurer indicated that the common stock had a book value of about $281⁄2 per share, a substantial part of which was in liquid form. The stock closed 1970 at 211⁄2, indicating a possible gross profit here, if book value was realized in liquidation, of more than 30%.

如果这种以多元化经营为基础、分散风险的业务能够带来比如说 20% 或更高的年利润，那么它们无疑就不仅仅是值得的了。由于本书并非讨论“特殊情况”，我们不会深入探讨这一业务的细节——因为这确实是一门生意。让我们指出近年来这方面的两个相互矛盾的发展。一方面，与 10 年前相比，可供选择的交易数量大幅增加。这是企业通过各种收购等方式实现业务多元化的狂热所致。1970 年，“合并公告”的数量累计约为 5,000 起，低于 1969 年的 6,000 多起。这些交易所涉及的总金额高达数十亿美元。也许在这 5,000 条公告中只有一小部分可以为特殊情况的人提供购买股票的明确机会，但这一小部分仍然足以让他忙于研究、挑选和选择。

If operations of this kind, conducted on a diversified basis for spreading the risk, could be counted to yield annual profits of, say, 20% or better, they would undoubtedly be more than merely worthwhile. Since this is not a book on “special situations,” we are not going into the details of the business—for it really is a business. Let us point out two contradictory developments there in recent years. On the one hand the number of deals to choose from has increased enormously, as compared with, say, ten years ago. This is a consequence of what might be called a mania of corporations to diversify their activities through various types of acquisitions, etc. In 1970 the number of “merger announcements” aggregated some 5,000, down from over 6,000 in 1969. The total money values involved in these deals amounted to many, many billions. Perhaps only a small fraction of the 5,000 announcements could have presented a clear-cut opportunity for purchase of shares by a special-situations man, but this fraction was still large enough to keep him busy studying, picking, and choosing.

另一方面，越来越多的已宣布的并购交易最终未能完成。在这种情况下，预期的利润当然无法实现，反而可能带来或多或少的损失。失败的原因有很多，包括反垄断干预、股东反对、“市场条件”变化、进一步研究的不利迹象、无法就细节达成一致等等。当然，这里的诀窍在于运用经验判断，挑选最有可能成功的交易，以及即使失败损失也最小的交易。

The other side of the picture is that an increasing proportion of the mergers announced failed to be consummated. In such cases, of course, the aimed-for profit is not realized, and is likely to be replaced by a more or less serious loss. Reasons for nonsuccess are numerous, including antitrust intervention, shareholder opposition, change in “market conditions,” unfavorable indications from further study, inability to agree on details, and others. The trick here, of course, is to have the judgment, buttressed by experience, to pick the deals most likely to succeed and also those which are likely to occasion the smallest loss if they fail.

对上述例子的进一步评论

Further Comment on the Examples Above

KAYSER-ROTH。该公司董事们已经（在1971年1月）拒绝了Borden的提议，当时本章写道。如果操作立即“撤销”，包括佣金在内的总损失将达到凯瑟-罗斯股票成本的12%左右。

KAYSER-ROTH. The directors of this company had already rejected (in January 1971) the Borden proposal when this chapter was written. If the operation had been “undone” immediately the overall loss, including commissions, would have been about 12% of the cost of the Kayser-Roth shares.

奥罗拉塑料公司。由于该公司1970年的业绩不佳，收购条款经过重新谈判，价格降至10.5美元。股份于5月底支付。该公司的年回报率约为25%。

AURORA PLASTICS. Because of the bad showing of this company in 1970 the takeover terms were renegotiated and the price reduced to 101⁄2. The shares were paid for at the end of May. The annual rate of return realized here was about 25%.

环球-马里昂。该公司迅速进行了初始分配，以现金和股票形式分配，每股约7美元，将投资额降至约14.5美元。然而，随后市场价格跌至13美元，使清算的最终结果令人怀疑。

UNIVERSAL-MARION. This company promptly made an initial distribution in cash and stock worth about $7 per share, reducing the investment to say 141⁄2. However the market price fell as low as 13 subsequently, casting doubt on the ultimate outcome of the liquidation.

假设上述三个例子能够代表1971年“期权或套利”机会的整体情况，那么，如果只是随机地进行交易，显然并不具有吸引力。如今，这比以往任何时候都更需要专业人士的参与，他们需要具备必要的经验和判断力。

Assuming that the three examples given are fairly representative of “workout or arbitrage” opportunities as a whole in 1971, it is clear that they are not attractive if entered into upon a random basis. This has become more than ever a field for professionals, with the requisite experience and judgment.

我们凯瑟-罗斯的例子还有一个有趣的侧面。1971年末，股价跌破20美元，而博登的股价为25美元，根据换股要约条款，凯瑟-罗斯的股价相当于33美元。看来，要么是董事们犯了一个重大错误，拒绝了这次机会，要么是凯瑟-罗斯的股价在市场上被严重低估了。这值得证券分析师深入研究。

There is an interesting sidelight on our Kayser-Roth example. Late in 1971 the price fell below 20 while Borden was selling at 25, equivalent to 33 for Kayser-Roth under the terms of the exchange offer. It would appear that either the directors had made a great mistake in turning down that opportunity or the shares of Kayser-Roth were now badly undervalued in the market. Something for a security analyst to look into.

第十五章评论

Commentary on Chapter 15

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

危险意识绝不能消失：

The sense of danger must not disappear:

路途确实又短又陡，

The way is certainly both short and steep,

无论从这里看起来多么缓慢；

However gradual it looks from here;

如果你愿意的话可以看看，但你必须跳下去。

Look if you like, but you will have to leap.

—WH 奥登¹

—W. H. Auden¹

如果你是一位积极进取的投资者，试图寻找那些定价错误却能带来高回报的股票，那么你将面临一项很少有人能成功做到的挑战。通过挑选个股持续跑赢大盘极其困难。

If you’re an enterprising investor trying to find mispriced stocks that can earn superior returns, you’re taking on a challenge few people ever succeed at. Consistently beating the market by picking individual stocks is extraordinarily difficult.

这就是为什么你应该只把分析精力投入到少数几个决策上。大多数股票的定价通常不会错到需要费力去研究它们的定价到底错到什么程度。

That’s why you should put your analytical energies into making only a few decisions. Most stocks won’t usually be mispriced enough to justify the effort of researching how mispriced they are.

大豆投资

SOYA Investing

沃伦·巴菲特认为，如果投资者一生中所有的交易都能记录在一张有20个孔的打孔卡上，他们的境况会更好。他们做出的每一个投资决策都会用掉其中一个孔。“他们一辈子想不出20个好主意，”巴菲特曾说，“他们可能只会想出5个、3个或7个，而你或许能靠这5个、3个或7个想法致富。但你不可能每天都想出一个好主意就致富。”

According to Warren Buffett, investors would be better off if all the trades of their lifetime had to fit on one punch card with 20 punches on it. Every investment decision they make would use up one of the punches. “They aren’t going to get 20 great ideas in their lifetime,” Buffett has said. “They’re going to get five, or three, or seven, and you can get rich off five, or three, or seven. But what you can’t get rich doing is trying to get one every day.”

巴菲特的长期商业伙伴查理·芒格更直白地表达了同样的想法。芒格说，大多数时候，你应该“坐着等着“市场先生”罕见地发疯的时候，你就等着。（为了礼貌起见，我将芒格的想法缩写为“SOYA”。）虽然你不应该边等待边交易，但你应该学习：不断研究行业，阅读年报，并列出一份观察名单，列出如果股价暴跌你想持有的几只股票。2^迟早——也许是几年甚至几十年后——它们会暴跌。到那时，也只有到那时，你才应该买入——而且要积极买入。

Buffett’s longtime business partner, Charlie Munger, described the same idea more bluntly. Most of the time, Munger said, you should “sit on your ass” waiting for one of the rare occasions when Mr. Market goes crazy. (For politeness, I’ll abbreviate Munger’s idea as “SOYA.”) Although you shouldn’t be trading while you wait, you should be learning: continually studying industries, reading annual reports, and compiling a watchlist of a few stocks you’d like to own if their prices plunge.² Sooner or later—perhaps years or even decades later—they will. Then, and only then, should you buy—and buy aggressively.

与此同时，将大部分资金投入股票指数基金；这样，在等待特定机会的同时，您将一直参与市场的整体增长。

In the meantime, keep most of your money in a stock index fund; that way, while you wait for a specific opportunity, you’ll participate all along in the general growth of the market.

因此，成为一名 SOYA 投资者与人们对进取型投资者的普遍误解相反：你不是频繁交易，而是几乎从不交易。

To be a SOYA investor is thus the opposite of the common misconception of what an enterprising investor does: Instead of trading frequently, you almost never do.

通过尽量减少你的活动，你可以最大限度地提高赚钱的可能性。

By minimizing your activity, you maximize your probability of making money.

首先，照照镜子

First, Look in the Mirror

正如已故共同股票基金经理马克斯·海涅（Max Heine）常说的那样：“条条大路通耶路撒冷。” 您可以通过以下方式成为一名有进取心的投资者：

As Max Heine, the late manager of the Mutual Shares stock fund, liked to say, “There are many roads to Jerusalem.” You can be an enterprising investor by seeking:

当今最便宜的“深度价值”股票，即使按照格雷厄姆的标准也是便宜的；
today’s cheapest, “deep value” stocks, bargains even by Graham’s standards;
由于坏消息的影响，优秀的公司股价也不错；
great companies at good prices, thanks to bad news;
明日超级股票，这些公司很少以低价交易，但具有长期高增长潜力^。3
tomorrow’s superstocks, companies that seldom trade cheaply but have the potential for high long-term growth.³

选择哪一种取决于你的性格。你的进取心强弱不如你进取心强。你喜欢在二手店淘便宜货，并利用信用卡积分最大化吗？那么深度价值投资或许更适合你。精神。你是那种避开人群、不信任大众意见的人吗？那么，深入研究那些受到坏消息重创的公司或许会对你有所帮助。你喜欢大胆押注，追求潜在的巨额收益吗？那么，超级股票或许很适合你。

Which you choose depends on your temperament. How enterprising you are matters less than how you are enterprising. Do you enjoy hunting for bargains in thrift shops and working the system to maximize reward points on your credit cards? Then deep value may suit your spirit. Are you the kind of person who shuns the crowd and distrusts popular opinion? Then you may do well digging into companies battered by bad news. Do you like making bold bets in the pursuit of potentially big gains? Then superstocks may be a good fit for you.

无论您尝试哪种进取方法，您都必须遵守格雷厄姆的戒律，严守纪律，与众不同。

No matter which enterprising approach you try, you must live by Graham’s commandments to be disciplined and different.

廉价地下室

The Bargain Basement

如果您想要深度价值，您可以购买所谓的“因子”或“智能贝塔”基金，该基金持有数十或数百只股票，这些股票通过了一系列廉价的统计障碍，例如较低的市销率、收益和账面价值。

If you want deep value, you could buy a so-called “factor” or “smart-beta” fund that holds dozens or hundreds of stocks that clear a set of statistical hurdles of cheapness, such as low ratios of price to sales, earnings, and book value.

但成为一名进取型投资者的重点在于，你愿意并且能够投入时间和精力，力求超越，而不是把工作委托给陌生人。对于防御型投资者来说，购买价值型基金是明智之举，但对于进取型投资者来说，这很可能让他们感到焦虑不安，难以满足。

But the whole point of being an enterprising investor is that you’re willing and able to commit time and effort in the attempt to outperform—rather than delegating the work to strangers. Buying a value fund makes sense for a defensive investor but is likely to leave an enterprising investor antsy and unsatisfied.

格雷厄姆衡量最深层价值的标准是，一只股票的定价是否低于标的公司的净流动资产价值。这意味着，股价低于公司现金、应收账款、存货和其他易于出售的资产减去所有负债后的价值。

Graham’s measure of deepest value was whether a stock is priced under the net current asset value of the underlying business. That means the shares trade below what the company’s cash, accounts receivable, inventories, and other readily salable assets are worth, minus all liabilities.

费城投资公司 AJO Vista 的数据显示，截至 2023 年底，大约 3,100 只定期交易的美国股票中，有 80 只（约占总数的 2.5%）的股价低于净流动资产价值。

As of late 2023, 80 out of roughly 3,100 regularly traded U.S. stocks—about 2.5% of the total—were priced at less than net current asset value, according to AJO Vista, an investment firm in Philadelphia.

这些公司大多是交易量低的小型初创生物技术或制药公司；典型的机构投资者不会投资它们。然而，一个有进取心的个人投资者可以构建一个包含所有80家公司的投资组合；如果其中一家公司发现了一种重要的新药，或者一些公司被更大的公司收购，即使大多数公司衰落或破产，这个投资组合也可能表现良好^。4

Most were tiny start-up biotechnology or pharmaceutical firms that traded in low volume; the typical institutional investor won’t touch them. An enterprising individual, however, could build a portfolio of all 80; if one of the companies discovers a major new drug, or some get bought by larger firms, the portfolio might do well even if most of the companies fade or go under.⁴

你也可以关注“微型股”，即股票总市值低于1亿美元的公司。在这方面，大多数机构也难以竞争。

You could also focus on “microcaps,” companies whose shares have a total market value of less than $100 million. Here, too, most institutions can’t compete.

否则，在美国和许多发达市场，深度价值股票极其稀缺——至少在下一个熊市最终创造出一批新的深度价值股票之前是如此。

Otherwise, in the U.S. and many developed markets, deep-value stocks are remarkably scarce—at least until the next bear market finally creates a new crop of them.

当机会来临时，听起来就像危险

When Opportunity Knocks, It Sounds Like Danger

当一家公司遭遇令人震惊的挫折（产品失败、战略失误、高管更替）或经济陷入混乱时，比如 2008-09 年或 2020 年，股票最有可能被严重错误定价。

Stocks are most likely to be severely mispriced when a company has an alarming setback—the failure of a product, a strategic stumble, turnover of top executives—or when the economy is in chaos, as in 2008–09 or 2020.

这种过度反应往往会导致估值过低。矛盾的是，当感知风险上升时，实际风险往往会下降。对更高风险的感知会导致价格下跌；而更低的价格则创造了未来更高回报的潜力。

Such overreactions often create undervaluation. Paradoxically, when perceived risk goes up, actual risk often goes down. The perception of higher risk creates lower prices; lower prices create the potential for superior future returns.

最重要的是，对一家企业或整个股票市场的冲击会分散人们对最重要的问题的注意力，从而创造价值：这家公司是否有可能在未来几年持续产生更多的现金？

Above all, shocks to a business or to the whole stock market create value by distracting attention from the most important question: Is this company likely to be able to produce consistently greater quantities of cash in the years to come?

以WW Grainger公司为例，该公司是一家维修设备批发分销商。2017年4月，在亚马逊(Amazon.com)的激烈竞争下，Grainger突然宣布将“全面”降价。Grainger警告称，由于降价，其2017年的盈利可能比此前预测低9%至12%。

Consider W. W. Grainger, Inc., a wholesale distributor of maintenance and repair equipment. In April 2017, under fierce competition from Amazon.com, Grainger suddenly announced it would slash its prices “across the board.” Because of the price cuts, warned Grainger, its earnings in 2017 would likely be 9% to 12% lower than previously forecast.

这让“市场先生”非常愤怒。

That set Mr. Market’s hair on fire.

格兰杰股价当天暴跌11%，并持续数月。今年7月，该公司宣布第二季度利润同比下降43%。从2017年2月的峰值到当年8月最终触底，格兰杰的市值蒸发了近40%。

Grainger’s stock plunged 11% that day and kept dropping for months. In July, the company announced that its second-quarter profits were down 43% from a year earlier. Between its peak in February 2017 and when it finally hit bottom that August, nearly 40% of Grainger’s stock-market value had been vaporized.

那你的生意怎么样？它的价值损失了三分之一以上吗？

What about the business? Had that lost over a third of its value?

格兰杰的客户并没有大规模流失。他们也没有继续涌向亚马逊；相反，他们从以专业服务和可靠配送而闻名的格兰杰购买了更多产品。由于格兰杰在其集中式仓库中储存了更多库存，以满足大量在线购物者的需要，因此无需扩大本地分店数量，这有助于保持高利润。

Grainger’s customers didn’t flee en masse. Nor did they continue flocking to Amazon; instead, they bought even more from Grainger, which was renowned for expert service and reliable delivery. Stocking more in its centralized warehouses to supply the rush of online buyers, Grainger didn’t need to expand its number of local branches, helping to keep its profits high.

编剧

Screenwriting

使用 Koyfin、FinViz、Finchat.io、Finbox、TIKR 或 Yahoo Finance 等网站和应用程序上的免费股票筛选器，您可以设置过滤器来识别符合各种条件的公司组^。1

Using the free stock screeners at websites and apps such as Koyfin, FinViz, Finchat.io, Finbox, TIKR, or Yahoo Finance, you can set filters to identify groups of companies that meet various criteria.¹

秉承格雷厄姆的精神，你可以筛选低负债、低市盈率 (P/E) 和市净率 (P/B)，以及高股息收益率的公司。如果你正在寻找超级股票（参见此处），你可以设置筛选条件，识别净营运现金流、资产回报率和投资资本回报率不断上升的公司。（记住要计算三到五年的平均结果。）²

In Graham’s spirit, you could screen for low debt and low price/earnings (P/E) and price/book (P/B) ratios, as well as high dividend yields. If you’re looking for superstocks (see here), you could set filters to identify firms with rising net operating cash flow, return on assets, and return on invested capital. (Remember to average the results over three to five years.)²

第一次进行股票筛选，发现一些闻所未闻、看起来非常划算的公司时，你可能会觉得自己很聪明。但你不太可能发现一大批未被专业投资者发现的优秀公司，这些专业投资者拥有超级计算机、人工智能和数百万美元的研究预算，整天都在市场上搜寻。

You’ll probably feel pretty clever the first time you run a stock screen and come up with companies you’ve never heard of that look like incredible bargains. But it’s highly unlikely you’ve turned up a motherlode of great companies undiscovered by any of the professional investors, backed by supercomputers, artificial intelligence, and multimillion-dollar research budgets, who scour the markets all day long.

这就是为什么您不应该将股票筛选的结果视为买入清单；它是您可以作为 SOYA 投资者研究和监控的公司观察名单，等待它们变得便宜。

That’s why you shouldn’t think of the result of your stock screen as a buy list; it’s a watchlist of companies you can study and monitor as a SOYA investor, waiting for them to become cheap.

¹股票筛选器也可在 AAII.com、Morningstar.com 和 YCharts.com 上以相对较低的订阅费用使用。大多数大型经纪公司在其网站或应用程序上提供股票筛选器。此外，将人工智能应用于投资分析的工具正在迅速普及，但质量参差不齐。在注册使用任何筛选器之前，请确保您确信该工具不会诱使您频繁交易。

¹ Stock screeners are also available for relatively low subscription fees at AAII.com, Morningstar.com, and YCharts.com. Most major brokerage firms offer stock screeners on their websites or apps. Also, tools that apply artificial intelligence to investment analysis are rapidly proliferating but uneven in quality. Before signing up to use any screener, be sure you’re comfortable the tool isn’t designed to goad you into frequent trading.

²你筛选的标准越多，最终生成的列表变得过于武断和脆弱而无法使用的可能性就越大。比如说，如果你使用了13个不同的标准，而筛选结果却不起作用，那么你很难确定应该调整或剔除这13个标准中的哪些。简单的预测模型往往比复杂的预测模型效果更好（Robyn M. Dawes，“决策中不当线性模型的稳健之美”，bit.ly/3PQp5xy）。少即是多！

² The more criteria you screen for, the higher the odds that the resulting list will end up too arbitrary and brittle to be useful. If you use, say, 13 different criteria and the screen turns out not to work, good luck figuring out which of the 13 you should adjust or eliminate. Simple prediction models tend to work better than complex ones (Robyn M. Dawes, “The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision Making,” bit.ly/3PQp5xy). Less is more!

2018年，格兰杰的销售额较2017年增长8%；净利润增长33%；净经营现金流保持稳定。公司始终保持盈利。（参见表15-1）

In 2018, Grainger’s sales rose 8% over 2017; net income climbed 33%; its net operating cash flow held steady. All along, the company stayed profitable. (See Table 15-1.)

在市场对格兰杰降价反应过度后的五年里，该股年均上涨 22.2%，年均涨幅超过标准普尔 500 指数 6.8 个百分点。

Over the five years after Mr. Market’s overreaction to Grainger’s price cuts, the stock gained an annual average of 22.2%, outperforming the S&P 500 by 6.8 percentage points annually.

到2023年，似乎有必要提出一个问题：格兰杰的盈利是否过高？如果真有的话。它的回报率如此之高，以至于怀疑者可能会怀疑，该公司没有向股东返还更多过剩资本，是否对股东不公平^。5

By 2023, it seemed fair to ask whether Grainger was, if anything, too profitable. It was earning such high returns that a skeptic might wonder whether the company was treating its shareholders unfairly by not returning more of its excess capital to them.⁵

反应过度

Overreaction

当市场对公司或世界正在发生的事情反应过度时，有进取心的投资者可以自由地尝试进行交易的另一方。

An enterprising investor is free to try taking the other side of the trade when Mr. Market overreacts to what’s going on at a company or in the world.

看看2008-2009年全球金融危机期间Fair Isaac Corp.的遭遇。Fair Isaac的软件提供FICO信用评分，用于对寻求借款或购房的消费者进行评级。

Look at what happened to Fair Isaac Corp. during the global financial crisis of 2008–09. Fair Isaac’s software provides the FICO credit scores that rate consumers seeking to borrow money or buy a house.

从2006年11月的巅峰到2009年3月的低谷，Fair Isaac的股价下跌了76%。此后，该股市盈率仅为销售额的1倍，账面价值的1倍略高，现金流的4倍，以及收益的9倍——这些指标自2006年以来均下跌了约三分之二。

From their zenith in November 2006 to their low in March 2009, Fair Isaac’s shares fell 76%. After that, the stock was valued at only one times sales, slightly over one times book value, four times cash flow, and nine times earnings—down, on each of those measures, by about two-thirds since 2006.

业务是否遭受同样严重的打击？

Was the business battered as badly?

从2006年12月31日结束的巅峰季度到2009年3月31日结束的信贷紧缩最严重季度，Fair Isaac的销售额下降了23%，净利润暴跌了43%。然而，在此期间，其投资资本回报率和资产回报率分别仅下降了约25%，而由于Fair Isaac积极回购股票，其股本回报率几乎没有下降。

Between its peak quarter ended December 31, 2006, and the depths of the credit crunch in the quarter ended March 31, 2009, Fair Isaac’s sales shrank by 23%, and its net income shriveled by 43%. Yet, over that period, its return on invested capital and return on assets fell only about 25% apiece, while its return on equity barely dropped at all as Fair Isaac aggressively repurchased shares.

表 15-1： Grainger 的游戏规则改变者

TABLE 15-1: Game Changer for Grainger

来源：FactSet。

Source: FactSet.

与此同时，经营净现金流增长超过10%。

Meanwhile, net cash flow from operations rose more than 10%.

自 2009 年 3 月触底以来的十年间，Fair Isaac 的股价上涨了 2,400% 以上，年均增长率为 38.2%，比标准普尔 500 指数平均每年高出 20.6 个百分点。

Over the decade after it hit bottom in March 2009, Fair Isaac’s stock gained more than 2,400%, growing at an average of 38.2% annually—crushing the S&P 500 by an average of 20.6 percentage points per year.

另一个例子：

Another example:

2020 年 2 月和 3 月，在新冠疫情恐慌最严重期间，NVR, Inc. 的股价下跌了 45.1%，远低于标准普尔 500 指数。

In February and March 2020, during the worst of the panic over the Covid pandemic, NVR, Inc.’s stock dropped 45.1%—much worse than the S&P 500.

NVR 是美国最大的房屋建筑商之一。如果新冠疫情持续数年或导致数千万美国人死亡（就像疫情初期看起来有可能出现的那样），那么住房需求就会崩溃。

NVR is one of the largest homebuilders in the U.S. If Covid lasted for years or killed tens of millions of Americans, as seemed possible in the pandemic’s early days, demand for homes would collapse.

但如果 Covid 确实持续数年并导致数千万人死亡，那么你面临的问题将比损失你可能投入 NVR 股票的所有资金要大得多。

But if Covid did last for years and kill tens of millions, you would have much bigger problems than losing whatever money you might have put into NVR’s stock.

NVR 长期以来一直盈利颇丰，在之前 20 年中，有 15 年的投资资本回报率远高于平均水平，仅在 2008-2009 年金融危机后的房地产市场低迷期间有所下滑。

NVR had long been exceptionally profitable, with a return on invested capital that ran far above average in 15 of the preceding 20 years—slipping only during the housing slump that followed the 2008–09 financial crisis.

2020年全年，NVR的销售额和净收入略有增长，净营业收入增长7%，创下历史新高。

For the full year 2020, NVR’s sales and net income rose slightly, and its net operating income went up 7% to what then was an all-time high.

从 2020 年市场低点到 2023 年底，NVR 的股价上涨了 222%，远远超过标准普尔 500 指数 127% 的涨幅。

From the market’s low in 2020 through the end of 2023, NVR’s stock gained 222%, far outpacing the 127% gain of the S&P 500.

是什么让超级股票如此超级

What Makes Superstocks Super

许多人认为，表现最好的股票几乎全部来自科技行业。但回顾过去30年里表现最好的30只超级股票——每只股票的累计总回报率都远超10,000%——就会发现事实并非如此。

Many people believe the highest-performing stocks come almost entirely from the technology industry. A look at the top 30 superstocks of the past 30 years—each with cumulative total returns of well over 10,000%—shows that isn’t true.

硅片和手机都在名单上，游泳池、二手车、烟草和警用设备也在名单上。

Silicon and cell phones are on the list, but so are swimming pools, used cars, tobacco, and equipment for cops.

警告：表15.2中许多公司的盈利能力似乎已开始下降。盲目地选择过去的赢家并不能带来未来的赢家。

A warning: Profitability at many of the firms in Table 15.2 already seems to be fading. You can’t get future winners by just blindly picking past winners.

这些股票在过去30年里获得如此高回报的原因之一是它们出乎华尔街的意料。大多数分析师和专业投资者都希望获得他们所谓的“持续”盈利增长：利润随着时间的推移平稳增长。真正的世界如此混乱且难以预测，没有哪家公司能够每个季度都实现利润增长，也没有人能够准确预测企业盈利的精确度。然而，华尔街却偏爱那些屡屡“达到预期”的公司。

One reason these stocks earned such high returns over the past 30 years is that they caught Wall Street by surprise. Most analysts and professional investors want what they call “consistent” earnings growth: profits that rise smoothly and steadily over time. The real world is so messy and unpredictable that no company can increase its profits every single quarter—and no one can reliably forecast corporate earnings to the penny. Nevertheless, Wall Street loves companies that repeatedly “meet expectations.”

表 15-2：超级股票

TABLE 15-2: Superstocks

公司

Company

1994年1月1日至2023年12月31日累计总回报

Cumulative total return, 1/1/1994–12/31/2023

商业

Business

怪物饮料公司

Monster Beverage Corp.

210,588%

能量饮料

energy drinks

亚马逊

Amazon.com

155,073%

在线零售和计算

online retailing & computing

NVIDIA公司

NVIDIA Corp.

131,500%

计算机硬件和软件

computer hardware & software

苹果公司

Apple Inc.

89,085%

智能手机和电脑

smartphones & computers

NVR公司

NVR Inc.

71,699%

房屋建筑

homebuilding

泳池公司

Pool Corp.

57,572%

游泳池用品和设备

swimming pool supplies & equipment

HEICO公司

HEICO Corp.

55,427%

航空和电子

aviation & electronics

Axon企业公司

Axon Enterprise Inc.

45,155%

警用装备

police equipment

罗斯商店公司

Ross Stores Inc.

44,932%

零售服装店

retail clothing stores

Netflix公司

Netflix Inc.

40,594%

娱乐

entertainment

Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp.

39,511%

技术服务

technology services

库珀公司

Cooper Companies Inc.

37,529%

隐形眼镜和医疗器械

contact lenses & medical devices

费尔艾萨克公司

Fair Isaac Corp.

36,728%

财务软件和信用评分

financial software & credit scoring

巴尔赫姆公司

Balchem Corp.

35,382%

人类营养、动物饲料和工业化学品

human nutrition, animal feed & industrial chemicals

米德尔比公司

Middleby Corp.

34,609%

食品服务和设备

food service & equipment

科帕特公司

Copart Inc.

32,064%

网上车辆拍卖

online vehicle auctions

瑞思迈公司

ResMed Inc.

30,161%

医疗器械

medical devices

百健公司

Biogen Inc.

29,200%

生物技术

biotechnology

吉利德科学公司

Gilead Sciences Inc.

28,973%

生物技术

biotechnology

Vector集团有限公司

Vector Group Ltd.

27,056%

香烟和房地产

cigarettes & real estate

奥莱利汽车公司

O’Reilly Automotive Inc.

26,109%

汽车零部件

auto parts

老道明货运公司

Old Dominion Freight Line Inc.

24,072%

卡车运输

trucking

微软公司

Microsoft Corp.

23,924%

软件

software

Watsco公司

Watsco Inc.

23,419%

空调

air-conditioning

Adobe公司

Adobe Inc.

22,458%

软件

software

相干公司

Coherent Corp.

22,187%

激光与电子

lasers & electronics

Badger Meter公司

Badger Meter Inc.

21,945%

水表及设备

water meters & equipment

AAON公司

AAON Inc.

21,154%

空调

air-conditioning

国家饮料公司

National Beverage Corp.

20,955%

苏打水和其他饮料

sparkling water & other beverages

Intuit公司

Intuit Inc.

19,581%

软件

software

资料来源：证券价格研究中心。

Source: Center for Research in Security Prices.

超级股票尤其在早期，会严重颠覆预期。它们并非像机器人一样自动增长。它们增长速度很快——但时断时续，波动幅度很大。

Especially in their earlier years, superstocks wreak havoc with expectations. They don’t grow like automatons. They grow fast—but in fits and starts and huge swings.

如果您试图识别下一个超级股票，您应该寻找质量和数量优势的结合。

If you’re trying to identify the next superstock, you should look for a mix of qualitative and quantitative advantages.

超级股票：

Superstocks:

管理人员关注的是未来五到十年而不是未来三个月的情况，因此他们不关心实现平稳的季度盈利增长或引导分析师的预期；
have managers who focus five to 10 years into the future rather than on the next three months, so they don’t bother producing smooth quarterly earnings growth or guiding analysts’ expectations;
拥有抵御竞争对手的“护城河”：难以超越的流程、产品、服务、网络或技术，使客户变得坚定忠诚；⁶
have “moats” that defend them against competitors: processes, products, services, networks, or technologies so hard to surpass that customers become steadfastly loyal;⁶
产生越来越多的现金，即使他们的净收入没有持续增长（格雷厄姆建议平均三到五年的利润的原因之一）；
generate growing amounts of cash, even if their net income doesn’t consistently rise (one reason Graham suggests averaging profits over three to five years);
通常不是矿业或能源公司等大宗商品生产商，也很少出现在航空、化工和酒店等周期性行业中；
usually aren’t commodity producers like mining or energy companies and seldom are found among cyclical industries such as airlines, chemicals, and hotels;
企业的增长不是通过收购，而是通过调查，不断地审视自己的产品、服务和技术，寻找从现有业务中提取收入的新方法。
grow not by acquisition but by inquisition, constantly interrogating their products, services, and technologies to find new ways of extracting revenue from existing lines of business.

在上市后的前 18 个季度里，亚马逊亏损了 29 亿美元，因为创始人杰夫·贝佐斯用他自己的话说，做出了“大胆而非胆怯的投资决策……[出于]长期市场领导地位的考虑，而不是短期盈利能力的考虑或华尔街的短期反应”。

Over its first 18 quarters as a publicly traded company, Amazon lost $2.9 billion as founder Jeff Bezos made, in his own words, “bold rather than timid investment decisions . . . [for] long-term market leadership considerations rather than short-term profitability considerations or short-term Wall Street reactions.”

Balchem Corp. 是一家超级股票，30年来累计涨幅达35,382%，甚至远远超过了微软。该公司开发了包裹营养物质和矿物质的技术。几十年前，该公司的一位工程师发现，其营养盐可以防止粘土吸收过多的水分。多年后，水力压裂开采石油和天然气，才将这项古老技术转化为 Balchem 的新市场，为其带来了数千万美元的额外收入^。1

Balchem Corp., a superstock whose cumulative gain of 35,382% over 30 years vastly outperformed even Microsoft, develops techniques to coat nutrients and minerals. Decades ago, one of its engineers observed that its nutritional salts might prevent clay from absorbing too much water. Years went by before fracking for oil and gas turned that old technology into a new market for Balchem, producing tens of millions of dollars in additional revenue.¹

¹ Jason Zweig，“过去30年最好的股票？你从未听说过”，bit.ly/3PorE8C，以及“如何获得华尔街无法获得的巨大收益”，bit.ly/3ZtVKw0。更多关于如何识别可持续高增长公司的信息，请参阅Bruce Greenwald等著《价值投资：从格雷厄姆到巴菲特及以后》（Wiley出版社，2021年），第6-8章。

¹ Jason Zweig, “The Best Stock of the Last 30 Years? You’ve Never Heard of It,” bit.ly/3PorE8C, and “How You Can Get Big Gains That Wall Street Can’t,” bit.ly/3ZtVKw0. For more on identifying companies with sustainably high growth, see Bruce Greenwald et al., Value Investing: From Graham to Buffett and Beyond (Wiley, 2021), Chapters 6–8.

无形资产

The Intangibles

经济学家约翰·伯尔·威廉姆斯 (John Burr Williams) 在 1938 年写道：“股票的价值仅仅取决于你能从中获得的收益”——即它预计未来能产生的所有净现金的当前价值。7^这就是为什么沃伦·巴菲特长期以来一直强调“增长始终是价值计算的一个组成部分”。

The economist John Burr Williams wrote in 1938, “a stock is worth only what you can get out of it”—the value, today, of all the net cash it can be expected to generate in the future.⁷ That’s why Warren Buffett has long emphasized that “growth is always a component in the calculation of value.”

在格雷厄姆的时代，铁路、汽车、化工和钢铁等行业占据主导地位。价值主要来自于公司资产负债表上的有形或实物资产：房地产、工厂、制造设备及其他设备。

In Graham’s day, industries such as railroads, automobiles, chemicals, and steel dominated. Value came largely from the tangible or physical assets on a company’s balance sheet: its real estate, factories, and manufacturing and other equipment.

如今，软件、医疗保健、金融和消费行业占据主导地位。价值通常主要来自于那些在公司损益表中被列为费用的无形资产：软件开发、员工培训、广告和市场营销、专利、许可证、商标以及其他形式的知识产权。

Nowadays, software, health care, financial, and consumer industries dominate. Value often comes largely from intangible assets that may be treated as expenses on a company’s income statement: software development, employee training, advertising and marketing, patents, licenses, trademarks, and other forms of intellectual property.

苹果的标志、外观、软件和品牌名称都不是实体的但它们的价值无比巨大。可口可乐的标志性形象、亚马逊的订单处理和配送物流系统，以及谷歌的信息搜索、组织和显示算法，都同样价值不菲——所有这些都是数十亿美元投入广告、人力资本和研发的成果。

Apple’s logo, look, software, and brand name aren’t physical objects, but they are immensely valuable. So are Coca-Cola’s iconic image, Amazon’s logistical system for filling and delivering orders, and Google’s algorithms for searching, organizing, and displaying information—all the result of pouring billions of dollars into advertising, human capital, and research and development.

无形资产的兴起提醒我们一个始终不变的真理：价值只是一个估值——或者，如果你的分析是理性诚实的，那么它只是一个估值范围。未来充满不确定性，遥远的未来更加不确定，而确定一家公司最重要部分的价值是一门不精确的科学。

The rise of intangibles is a reminder of what’s always been true: Value is only an estimate—or, if your analysis is intellectually honest, a range of estimates. The future is uncertain, the distant future is more uncertain, and determining what the most important parts of a company are worth is an imprecise science.

投资资本回报率

Return on Invested Capital

如果你把公司看作一个活的有机体，那么投资资本回报率就是衡量其现金在其循环系统中如何流动的重要诊断工具。从几年的平均水平来看，收入是否在增长？现金流是否被转移到了对有机体生存和发展并非至关重要的领域？这家公司是否从一开始就没有创造足够的利润？这家公司是否正在大量流失现金？

If you think of a company as a living organism, return on invested capital is a vital diagnostic tool for measuring how cash flows through its circulatory system. Averaged over several years, is income growing? Are cash flows being diverted to areas that aren’t essential for the survival and growth of the organism? Is the company not generating enough profit in the first place? Is the business hemorrhaging cash?

您可以通过多种方式计算 ROIC，但最简单的形式是：

You can calculate ROIC several ways, but in its simplest form it is:

税后净营业收入除以投资资本的账面价值（股权加债务减超额现金）。

net operating income after tax, divided by the book value of invested capital (equity plus debt, minus excess cash).

并非所有公司都选择在其财务披露中报告投资资本回报率 (ROIC)，但第三方数据提供商提供了多种版本的指标。美国大多数行业的长期典型投资资本回报率约为 9%。

Not all companies choose to report ROIC in their financial disclosures, but various versions of the measure are available from third-party data providers. The long-term typical return on invested capital, across most industries in the U.S., is roughly 9%.

较高的或稳步上升的ROIC不仅表明企业的盈利能力正在增强，也表明其管理者善于识别有利可图的机会并为其配置资本。根据无形资产调整ROIC是一个关键步骤，需要进行详细的分析^。8

A high or steadily rising ROIC suggests not only that a business is becoming more profitable but also that its managers are good at identifying lucrative opportunities and allocating capital to them. Adjusting ROIC for intangibles is a key step that requires detailed analysis.⁸

看看过去 30 年的超级股票之一 Pool Corp.：

Look at one of the superstocks of the past 30 years, Pool Corp.:

图 15-1：低俗生意带来高回报

FIGURE 15-1: High Returns from a Low-Brow Business

资料来源：FactSet、摩根士丹利。

Sources: FactSet, Morgan Stanley.

注：未针对无形资产进行调整。

Note: Not adjusted for intangibles.

尽管Pool的业务并不光鲜，只是分销游泳池用品，但该公司的投资回报率——除了2009年全球金融危机期间——足以让软件或在线零售等更知名的行业羡慕不已。尤其是在早期，投资回报率的增长速度超过了Pool股票的估值；在20世纪90年代末，其股价远低于市场平均市盈率。当时Pool规模较小，关注的分析师寥寥无几，机构投资者也寥寥无几。（到2009年末，Pool的增长势头令人瞩目，以至于Pool的估值可以说被高估了。）

Despite its unglamorous business of distributing swimming-pool supplies, this company generated returns on invested capital—except in 2009, during the global financial crisis—that would be the envy of more-prestigious industries such as software or online retailing. And especially in the earlier years, ROIC rose faster than the valuation of Pool’s shares; in the late 1990s, its stock sold for well below the market’s average price/earnings ratio. Pool then was small, followed by few analysts, and sparsely owned by institutional investors. (By the end of the period, its growth had become so impressive that Pool was arguably overvalued.)

如果有进取心的个人有机会在华尔街赶上之前识别出超级股票，那么这个机会很可能出现在与 Pool 类似的公司中。

If there’s an opportunity for enterprising individuals to identify superstocks before Wall Street catches on, it’s probably at companies that resemble Pool.

冷静下来

Cool Your Jets

不过，别自欺欺人。你今天就能识别出明天的超级股票，而且即使中期出现令人震惊的下跌，你也能坚持足够长的时间，直到它们成为超级股票，这种可能性微乎其微。

Don’t fool yourself, though. The odds are extremely low that you will be able to identify tomorrow’s superstocks today—and that you will be able to hold on long enough, despite shocking interim declines, for them to become super.

在1926年至2022年间可追踪回报的28,114只美国股票中，超过16,000只（近59%）在其整个历史中为投资者亏损。只有966只股票（占总数的3.4%）贡献了整个美国股市的累计净收益。在这近一个世纪的时间里，投资者创造的全部财富中，近三分之一来自仅有的25只股票，不到所有公司的0.09%。全球其他股市也呈现出类似的结果^。9

Of the 28,114 U.S. stocks whose returns can be tracked between 1926 and 2022, more than 16,000—nearly 59%—lost money for investors over their full histories. Only 966 stocks—3.4% of the total—accounted for the cumulative net gain of the entire U.S. stock market. And just under one-third of all the wealth created for investors over that nearly century-long period came from only 25 stocks—less than 0.09% of all the companies. Other stock markets worldwide show similar results.⁹

事实上，从1926年到2022年的所有10年间，典型股票的表现累计落后于整体市场27.1个百分点，平均每年落后超过两个百分点。这2%的滞后意味着，个股投资者通常会因为选择不将所有资金都投入整个市场而牺牲股票平均长期回报率的五分之一左右。

In fact, over all 10-year periods from 1926 through 2022, the typical stock underperformed the total market by a cumulative 27.1 percentage points, or an average of more than two percentage points annually. That 2% lag means investors in individual stocks typically sacrifice about one-fifth of the average long-term rate of return on stocks by choosing not to keep all their money in the entire market.

在20年的时间里，任何一支股票的投资价值低于其在市场投资组合中应有价值一半的可能性接近三分之一。只有0.55%的股票最终成为长期收益超过市场1000%或更多的巨额赢家^。10

Over 20-year periods, the chance that an investment in any given stock will be worth less than half as much as it would have been in the market portfolio is nearly one-in-three. Only 0.55% of stocks turn out to be huge winners that beat the market by 1,000% or more over the long run.¹⁰

试图寻找下一只超级股票就像购买一张彩票，有机会在未来几年或几十年中赢得巨额头奖——但这也要求你在购买之前以及持有期间仔细分析风险。

Trying to find the next superstock is like buying a lottery ticket that offers a remote shot at a giant jackpot years or decades into the future—but that also requires you to analyze the risks intensively before you buy it and for as long as you own it.

企业的优势

The Upside of Enterprise

面对如此漫长而令人沮丧的困难，自己尝试挑选个股是否有意义？

Against such long and discouraging odds, does it make any sense to try picking individual stocks yourself?

可以。

It can.

虽然你不太可能成功挑选出表现优异的个股，但这并非不可能。你可能很有技巧，也可能只是运气好^。11

Although you aren’t likely to succeed at picking individual stocks that will outperform, it isn’t impossible. You might be skillful. Or you might just be lucky.¹¹

成功甚至不需要优异的表现。

Nor is outperformance even necessary for success.

只要您遵循格雷厄姆的程序指南和芒格的 SOYA 原则，您就可以在等待进取机会的同时从其余投资组合中获得可观的回报 - 如果您确实找到了一些机会，那么您可以等待看看它们是否表现出色。

So long as you follow Graham’s procedural guidelines and Munger’s SOYA principle, you will earn decent returns on the rest of your portfolio while you wait for enterprising opportunities—and, if you do find some, while you wait to see if they outperform.

成为一名有进取心的投资者即使不能带来常规的优异表现，也能带来心理上的回报。

Being an enterprising investor can also deliver psychological rewards even if it doesn’t deliver conventional outperformance.

如果你只是业余爱好下棋、踢足球或打篮球，那么仅仅因为自己永远无法像马格努斯·卡尔森、基利安·姆巴佩或勒布朗·詹姆斯那样优秀就放弃，那真是太愚蠢了。同样地，成为一名有进取心的投资者也可以充满乐趣，提升你的技能，还能让你有机会与你喜欢的人共度时光——即使你永远无法战胜市场。

If you play recreational chess or soccer or basketball, it would be foolish to quit just because you’ll never be as good as Magnus Carlsen or Kylian Mbappé or LeBron James. In much the same way, being an enterprising investor can be fun, improve your skills, and enable you to spend time with people you like—even if you’re never able to beat the market.

更重要的是，从头开始研究股票的纪律将提高你的分析工具，鼓励你独立思考，培养你延迟满足的能力，并加深你对好企业和好想法与坏企业和好想法之间的区别的洞察力。

What’s more, the discipline of studying stocks from the ground up will sharpen your analytical tools, encourage you to think independently, cultivate your ability to defer gratification, and deepen your insights into what separates good businesses—and good ideas—from bad.

这些习惯可以让你终生受益，即使你挑选的股票没有一只表现优异。

Those habits can pay enormous dividends your whole life long, even if none of the stocks you pick ever turn out to be super.

第十六章

Chapter 16 可转换债券及认股权证

Convertible Issues and Warrants

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

近年来，可转换债券和优先股在优先融资领域占据着主导地位。与此同时，股票期权认股权证（即以约定价格认购普通股的长期权利）也日益增多。目前，标准普尔股票指南中引用的优先股中，超过一半都享有转换特权，1968年至1970年间，大部分公司债券融资也享有转换特权。美国证券交易所至少有60个不同系列的股票期权认股权证在交易。1970年，纽约证券交易所首次上市长期认股权证，赋予以每股52美元的价格认购3140万股美国电话公司股票的权利。如今，在“贝尔妈妈”的引领下，必将有更多新的认股权证制造者加入。（正如我们稍后将指出的，它们在多个意义上都是捏造的。） *

Convertible bonds and preferred stocks have been taking on a predominant importance in recent years in the field of senior financing. As a parallel development, stock-option warrants—which are long-term rights to buy common shares at stipulated prices—have become more and more numerous. More than half the preferred issues now quoted in the Standard & Poor’s Stock Guide have conversion privileges, and this has been true also of a major part of the corporate bond financing in 1968–1970. There are at least 60 different series of stock-option warrants dealt in on the American Stock Exchange. In 1970, for the first time in its history, the New York Stock Exchange listed an issue of long-term warrants, giving rights to buy 31,400,000 American Tel. & Tel. shares at $52 each. With “Mother Bell” now leading that procession, it is bound to be augmented by many new fabricators of warrants. (As we shall point out later, they are a fabrication in more than one sense.)*

总体而言，可转换债券的重要性远高于认股权证，因此我们将首先讨论可转换债券。从投资者的角度来看，主要有两个方面需要考虑。首先，它们在投资机会和风险方面如何排序？其次，它们的存在如何影响相关普通股的价值？

In the overall picture the convertible issues rank as much more important than the warrants, and we shall discuss them first. There are two main aspects to be considered from the standpoint of the investor. First, how do they rank as investment opportunities and risks? Second, how does their existence affect the value of the related common-stock issues?

据称，可转换债券对投资者和发行公司都特别有利。投资者可以获得债券或优先股的优质保护，此外有机会参与普通股价值的大幅上涨。发行人能够以适中的利率或优先股股息成本筹集资金，如果预期的繁荣成为现实，发行人可以通过将优先债务转换为普通股来摆脱它。因此，这笔交易的双方都将获得异常丰厚的回报。

Convertible issues are claimed to be especially advantageous to both the investor and the issuing corporation. The investor receives the superior protection of a bond or preferred stock, plus the opportunity to participate in any substantial rise in the value of the common stock. The issuer is able to raise capital at a moderate interest or preferred dividend cost, and if the expected prosperity materializes the issuer will get rid of the senior obligation by having it exchanged into common stock. Thus both sides to the bargain will fare unusually well.

显然，前述段落肯定在某些地方言过其实，因为你不可能仅凭巧妙的手段就达成对双方都更有利的交易。为了换取转换特权，投资者通常会放弃一些重要的品质或收益，或两者兼而有之。1相反，^如果公司因为转换特权而以较低的成本获得资金，那么它就等于放弃了普通股股东对未来增值的部分权利。关于这个问题，正反两方都提出了一些棘手的论点。可以得出的最安全的结论是，可转换债券与任何其他形式的证券一样，其形式本身既不能保证其吸引力，也不能保证其不具吸引力。这个问题将取决于围绕具体债券的所有事实。*

Obviously the foregoing paragraph must overstate the case somewhere, for you cannot by a mere ingenious device make a bargain much better for both sides. In exchange for the conversion privilege the investor usually gives up something important in quality or yield, or both.¹ Conversely, if the company gets its money at lower cost because of the conversion feature, it is surrendering in return part of the common shareholders’ claim to future enhancement. On this subject there are a number of tricky arguments to be advanced both pro and con. The safest conclusion that can be reached is that convertible issues are like any other form of security, in that their form itself guarantees neither attractiveness nor unattractiveness. That question will depend on all the facts surrounding the individual issue.*

然而，我们确实知道，在牛市后期发行的可转换债券整体而言注定会产生不尽人意的结果。（不幸的是，过去大多数可转换债券的融资都是在如此乐观的时期进行的。）从时机本身来看，不良后果必然不可避免，因为股市的大幅下跌必然会大大降低转换特权的吸引力，而且常常还会让人对债券本身的潜在安全性产生怀疑。为了进行整体说明，我们将保留第一版中使用的示例，即1946年发行的可转换优先股和普通（不可转换）优先股的相对价格行为，1946年是牛市的最后一年，之后是1949年开始的非凡牛市。

We do know, however, that the group of convertible issues floated during the latter part of a bull market are bound to yield unsatisfactory results as a whole. (It is at such optimistic periods, unfortunately, that most of the convertible financing has been done in the past.) The poor consequences must be inevitable, from the timing itself, since a wide decline in the stock market must invariably make the conversion privilege much less attractive—and often, also, call into question the underlying safety of the issue itself. As a group illustration we shall retain the example used in our first edition of the relative price behavior of convertible and straight (nonconvertible) preferreds offered in 1946, the closing year of the bull market preceding the extraordinary one that began in 1949.

1967 年至 1970 年期间的情况很难进行比较，因为那几年几乎没有发行新的不可转换债券。但很容易证明，1967 年 12 月至 1970 年 12 月期间可转换优先股的平均价格跌幅大于普通股整体的跌幅（后者仅下跌 5%）。此外，1968 年 12 月至 1970 年 12 月期间，可转换债券的表现似乎比传统的普通股要差得多，表16-2中每种债券 20 只的样本就证明了这一点。这些比较表明，可转换证券作为优先发行债券的质量相对较差，而且与普通股挂钩，除了投机热潮期间，普通股的表现都差于大盘。当然，这些观察结果并不适用于所有可转换债券。尤其是在1968年和1969年，相当多实力雄厚的公司利用发行可转换债券来应对即使是一流债券也过高的利率。但值得注意的是，在我们20只可转换优先股样本中，只有一只股票上涨，14只股票大幅下跌。*

A comparable presentation is difficult to make for the years 1967–1970, because there were virtually no new offerings of nonconvertibles in those years. But it is easy to demonstrate that the average price decline of convertible preferred stocks from December 1967 to December 1970 was greater than that for common stocks as a whole (which lost only 5%). Also the convertibles seem to have done quite a bit worse than the older straight preferred shares during the period December 1968 to December 1970, as is shown by the sample of 20 issues of each kind in Table 16-2. These comparisons would demonstrate that convertible securities as a whole have relatively poor quality as senior issues and also are tied to common stocks that do worse than the general market except during a speculative upsurge. These observations do not apply to all convertible issues, of course. In 1968 and 1969 particularly, a fair number of strong companies used convertible issues to combat the inordinately high interest rates for even first-quality bonds. But it is noteworthy that in our 20-stock sample of convertible preferreds only one showed an advance and 14 suffered bad declines.*

表 16-1 1946 年新发行优先股的价格记录

TABLE 16-1 Price Record of New Preferred-Stock Issues Offered in 1946

表16-2 1970年12月与1968年12月优先股、普通股和认股权证的价格记录

TABLE 16-2 Price Record of Preferred Stocks, Common Stocks, and Warrants, December 1970 versus December 1968

（基于每期 20 份的随机样本）

(Based on Random Samples of 20 Issues Each)

（标准普尔 500 种普通股综合指数下跌 11.3%。）

(Standard & Poor’s composite index of 500 common stocks declined 11.3%.)

从这些数据中得出的结论并非可转换债券本身不如不可转换或“直接”证券那么受欢迎。在其他条件相同的情况下，情况恰恰相反。但我们清楚地看到，在实践中，其他条件并不相同，而附加转换特权往往——或许是普遍情况——暴露了该债券缺乏真正的投资价值。

The conclusion to be drawn from these figures is not that convertible issues are in themselves less desirable than nonconvertible or “straight” securities. Other things being equal, the opposite is true. But we clearly see that other things are not equal in practice and that the addition of the conversion privilege often—perhaps generally—betrays an absence of genuine investment quality for the issue.

当然，可转换优先股确实比同一家公司的普通股更安全——也就是说，它最终损失本金的风险更小。因此，那些购买新可转换债券而非相应普通股的人，在某种程度上是合乎逻辑的。但在大多数情况下，以当时的现行价格，购买普通股从一开始就不是什么明智的选择，而用可转换优先股来替代并没有充分改善情况。此外，很多购买可转换债券的人，对普通股并无特殊兴趣或信心——也就是说，他们当时从未想过购买普通股——但他们却被一种看似理想的组合所吸引：优先认购权加上接近当前市场的转换特权。在许多情况下，在某些情况下，这种组合效果很好，但统计数据似乎表明，它更有可能成为一个陷阱。

It is true, of course, that a convertible preferred is safer than the common stock of the same company—that is to say, it carries smaller risk of eventual loss of principal. Consequently those who buy new convertibles instead of the corresponding common stock are logical to that extent. But in most cases the common would not have been an intelligent purchase to begin with, at the ruling price, and the substitution of the convertible preferred did not improve the picture sufficiently. Furthermore, a good deal of the buying of convertibles was done by investors who had no special interest or confidence in the common stock—that is, they would never have thought of buying the common at the time—but who were tempted by what seemed an ideal combination of a prior claim plus a conversion privilege close to the current market. In a number of instances this combination has worked out well, but the statistics seem to show that it is more likely to prove a pitfall.

关于可转换债券的所有权，大多数投资者都未能意识到一个特殊问题。即使出现盈利，也会带来一个两难的境地。持有者应该在小幅上涨时卖出吗？还是应该持有以待大幅上涨？如果发行被赎回——普通股大幅上涨时经常发生这种情况——他应该当时卖出，还是转换成普通股并继续持有？*

In connection with the ownership of convertibles there is a special problem which most investors fail to realize. Even when a profit appears it brings a dilemma with it. Should the holder sell on a small rise; should he hold for a much bigger advance; if the issue is called—as often happens when the common has gone up considerably—should he sell out then or convert into and retain the common stock?*

让我们具体谈谈。你以100的价格买入一张利率为6%的债券，可以以25的价格转换为股票——也就是说，每1000美元的债券可以转换为40股股票。股价涨到30，使得债券价值至少达到120，因此以125的价格出售。你要么卖出，要么持有。如果你持有，期待更高的价格，那么你基本上相当于普通股股东，因为如果股价下跌，你的债券也会下跌。保守的人可能会说，超过125，他的持仓就变得过于投机了，因此他会卖出，并获得令人满意的25%的利润。

Let us talk in concrete terms. You buy a 6% bond at 100, convertible into stock at 25—that is, at the rate of 40 shares for each $1,000 bond. The stock goes to 30, which makes the bond worth at least 120, and so it sells at 125. You either sell or hold. If you hold, hoping for a higher price, you are pretty much in the position of a common shareholder, since if the stock goes down your bond will go down too. A conservative person is likely to say that beyond 125 his position has become too speculative, and therefore he sells and makes a gratifying 25% profit.

到目前为止，一切都很好。但再进一步说说。很多情况下，持有者以125美元的价格卖出，普通股价格继续上涨，带动可转换债券价格上涨，投资者就会体验到那种过早抛售债券的人才会经历的奇特痛苦。下一次，他决定以150美元或200美元的价格继续持有。债券价格涨到140美元，他却没有卖出。然后市场崩盘，他的债券价格跌至80美元。他又一次做错了。

So far, so good. But pursue the matter a bit. In many cases where the holder sells at 125 the common stock continues to advance, carrying the convertible with it, and the investor experiences that peculiar pain that comes to the man who has sold out much too soon. The next time, he decides to hold for 150 or 200. The issue goes up to 140 and he does not sell. Then the market breaks and his bond slides down to 80. Again he has done the wrong thing.

除了做出这些错误猜测所带来的精神痛苦（而且这些猜测似乎几乎不可避免）之外，可转换债券的操作还存在一个真正的算术缺陷。可以假设，在很多持有的债券中，以25%或30%的利润率出售的严格而统一的策略将获得最佳效果。这将标志着利润的上限，并且只有在那些表现良好的债券上才能实现。但是，如果——看起来确实如此——这些债券通常缺乏足够的基础证券，并且往往在牛市后期发行和购买，那么其中相当一部分将无法升至125美元，但不会失败。当市场向下时，债券就会崩溃。因此，可转换债券中的巨大机会在实践中被证明是虚幻的，总体而言，其巨额损失（至少是暂时的）与同等规模的收益一样多。

Aside from the mental anguish involved in making these bad guesses—and they seem to be almost inevitable—there is a real arithmetical drawback to operations in convertible issues. It may be assumed that a stern and uniform policy of selling at 25% or 30% profit will work out best as applied to many holdings. This would then mark the upper limit of profit and would be realized only on the issues that worked out well. But, if—as appears to be true—these issues often lack adequate underlying security and tend to be floated and purchased in the latter stages of a bull market, then a goodly proportion of them will fail to rise to 125 but will not fail to collapse when the market turns downward. Thus the spectacular opportunities in convertibles prove to be illusory in practice, and the overall experience is marked by fully as many substantial losses—at least of a temporary kind—as there are gains of similar magnitude.

由于1950年至1968年的牛市持续时间异常长，可转换债券整体上在大约18年的时间里表现良好。但这仅仅意味着绝大多数普通股获得了巨额上涨，而大多数可转换债券也能够分享其中的红利。投资可转换债券的稳健性只能通过其在股市下跌时期的表现来检验——而总体而言，这总是令人失望的。

Because of the extraordinary length of the 1950–1968 bull market, convertible issues as a whole gave a good account of themselves for some 18 years. But this meant only that the great majority of common stocks enjoyed large advances, in which most convertible issues were able to share. The soundness of investment in convertible issues can only be tested by their performance in a declining stock market—and this has always proved disappointing as a whole.

在我们1949年的第一版中，我们举例说明了当可转换债券价格上涨时“该如何处理”这一特殊问题。我们认为它仍然值得在此提及。与我们的许多参考文献一样，它基于我们自己的投资实践。我们是一个“精选小组”的成员，主要由投资基金组成，参与了Eversharp公司以票面价格私募发行的4.5%可转换债券，这些债券可以每股40美元的价格转换为普通股。该股票迅速上涨至65.5%，然后（在二拆三拆股之后）上涨至相当于88美元的价格。后者的价格使得可转换债券的价值不低于220美元。在此期间，两次发行的债券均以小幅溢价赎回；因此它们几乎全部转换为普通股，这些普通股被一些最初购买债券的投资基金持有。价格随即开始大幅下跌，1948年3月，股价一度跌至7.38美元。这意味着债券发行的价值仅为 27，或者说损失了原价的 75%，而不是盈利 100% 以上。

In our first edition (1949) we gave an illustration of this special problem of “what to do” with a convertible when it goes up. We believe it still merits inclusion here. Like several of our references it is based on our own investment operations. We were members of a “select group,” mainly of investment funds, who participated in a private offering of convertible 41⁄2% debentures of Eversharp Co. at par, convertible into common stock at $40 per share. The stock advanced rapidly to 651⁄2, and then (after a three-for-two split) to the equivalent of 88. The latter price made the convertible debentures worth no less than 220. During this period the two issues were called at a small premium; hence they were practically all converted into common stock, which was retained by a number of the original investment-fund buyers of the debentures. The price promptly began a severe decline, and in March 1948 the stock sold as low as 7⅜. This represented a value of only 27 for the debenture issues, or a loss of 75% of the original price instead of a profit of over 100%.

这个故事的真正意义在于，一些最初的购买者将债券转换成股票，并在股价大幅下跌期间持有。他们这样做违背了华尔街的一句古老格言：“永远不要转换可转换债券”。为什么会有这个建议？因为一旦转换，你就失去了优先获得利息和获得丰厚利润机会的战略组合。你可能已经从投资者变成了投机者，而且往往是在不景气的时候（因为股价已经大幅上涨）。如果“永远不要转换可转换债券”“可转换债券”是个好规则，那么这些经验丰富的基金经理怎么会把持有的Eversharp债券换成股票，最终导致令人尴尬的亏损呢？答案无疑是，他们被公司前景的热情以及股票“利好的市场表现”冲昏了头脑。华尔街有一些审慎的原则；问题是，它们总是在最需要的时候被遗忘。因此，老派人士还有另一句名言：“照我说的做，而不是照我做的做。”

The real point of this story is that some of the original purchasers converted their bonds into the stock and held the stock through its great decline. In so doing they ran counter to an old maxim of Wall Street, which runs: “Never convert a convertible bond.” Why this advice? Because once you convert you have lost your strategic combination of prior claimant to interest plus a chance for an attractive profit. You have probably turned from investor into speculator, and quite often at an unpropitious time (because the stock has already had a large advance). If “Never convert a convertible” is a good rule, how came it that these experienced fund managers exchanged their Eversharp bonds for stock, to their subsequent embarrassing loss? The answer, no doubt, is that they let themselves be carried away by enthusiasm for the company’s prospects as well as by the “favorable market action” of the shares. Wall Street has a few prudent principles; the trouble is that they are always forgotten when they are most needed. Hence that other famous dictum of the old-timers: “Do as I say, not as I do.”

因此，我们对新发行的可转换债券总体持怀疑态度。我们在此的意思是，正如在其他类似观察中一样，投资者在购买之前应该三思而后行。在如此严苛的审查之后，他可能会发现一些难以拒绝的优质发行。当然，理想的组合是拥有强担保的可转换债券，可以兑换成本身就颇具吸引力的普通股，且发行价仅略高于当前市场价格。偶尔也会出现符合这些要求的新发行债券。然而，由于证券市场的性质，你更有可能在已经发展到有利地位的旧发行债券中找到这样的机会，而不是在新发行的债券中。（如果新发行的债券确实实力雄厚，它不太可能享有良好的转换特权。）

Our general attitude toward new convertible issues is thus a mistrustful one. We mean here, as in other similar observations, that the investor should look more than twice before he buys them. After such hostile scrutiny he may find some exceptional offerings that are too good to refuse. The ideal combination, of course, is a strongly secured convertible, exchangeable for a common stock which itself is attractive, and at a price only slightly higher than the current market. Every now and then a new offering appears that meets these requirements. By the nature of the securities markets, however, you are more likely to find such an opportunity in some older issue which has developed into a favorable position rather than in a new flotation. (If a new issue is a really strong one, it is not likely to have a good conversion privilege.)

标准型可转换债券在发行中给予和保留之间的微妙平衡，在美国电话电报公司（AT&T）融资中被广泛使用，充分体现了这种债券的良好表现。1913年至1957年间，该公司至少发行了九次可转换债券，其中大部分是通过向股东授予认购权的方式发行的。可转换债券对公司来说具有重要的优势，因为它吸引了比股票发行更广泛的买家群体，因为这类债券受到许多拥有巨额资源但其中一些机构无权购买股票的金融机构的青睐。债券的利息回报通常不到相应股票股息收益率的一半——这一因素是为了抵消债券持有人的优先索偿权而计算的。由于该公司在40年间（从1919年到1959年股票分割）一直维持9美元的股息率，最终几乎所有可转换债券都转换为普通股。因此，这些可转换债券的买家多年来一直表现良好——但不如一开始就购买普通股那么好。这个例子证明了美国电话电报公司的稳健性，但并未证明可转换债券的内在吸引力。为了证明可转换债券在实践中表现良好，我们需要列举一些即使普通股表现不佳，但可转换债券仍然表现良好的案例。这样的例子并不难找到。

The fine balance between what is given and what is withheld in a standard-type convertible issue is well illustrated by the extensive use of this type of security in the financing of American Telephone & Telegraph Company. Between 1913 and 1957 the company sold at least nine separate issues of convertible bonds, most of them through subscription rights to shareholders. The convertible bonds had the important advantage to the company of bringing in a much wider class of buyers than would have been available for a stock offering, since the bonds were popular with many financial institutions which possess huge resources but some of which were not permitted to buy stocks. The interest return on the bonds has generally been less than half the corresponding dividend yield on the stock—a factor that was calculated to offset the prior claim of the bondholders. Since the company maintained its $9 dividend rate for 40 years (from 1919 to the stock split in 1959) the result was the eventual conversion of virtually all the convertible issues into common stock. Thus the buyers of these convertibles have fared well through the years—but not quite so well as if they had bought the capital stock in the first place. This example establishes the soundness of American Telephone & Telegraph, but not the intrinsic attractiveness of convertible bonds. To prove them sound in practice we should need to have a number of instances in which the convertible worked out well even though the common stock proved disappointing. Such instances are not easy to find.

可转换发行对普通股地位的影响

Effect of Convertible Issues on the Status of the Common Stock

在很多情况下，可转换债券的发行与并购或新收购相关。这类金融运作中最引人注目的例子或许是NVF Corp.发行近1亿美元的5%可转换债券（含认股权证），以换取Sharon Steel Co.的大部分普通股。这笔非同寻常的交易将在下文（此处）讨论。通常，这笔交易会导致普通股每股收益的预计增长；股价上涨不仅是因为所谓的收益增加，也是因为管理层展现了其活力、进取心以及为股东创造更多利润的能力。但有两个抵消因素，其中一个在乐观的市场中几乎被忽视，而另一个则完全被忽视。第一个因素是普通股当前和未来收益的实际稀释，这些稀释是由新的转换权算术产生的。这种稀释可以通过以下方式量化：取近期收益或假设其他数字，然后计算如果所有可转换股份或债券都实际转换后的调整后每股收益。在大多数公司中，每股收益因此减少并不显著。但也有不少例外，而且这些例外可能会以令人不安的速度增长。快速扩张的“企业集团”一直是可转换股票骗局的主要实践者。在表16-3中，我们列出了七家拥有大量可转换或认股权证发行股票的公司。*

In a large number of cases convertibles have been issued in connection with mergers or new acquisitions. Perhaps the most striking example of this financial operation was the issuance by the NVF Corp. of nearly $100,000,000 of its 5% convertible bonds (plus warrants) in exchange for most of the common stock of Sharon Steel Co. This extraordinary deal is discussed below (here). Typically the transaction results in a pro forma increase in the reported earnings per share of common stock; the shares advance in response to their larger earnings, so-called, but also because the management has given evidence of its energy, enterprise, and ability to make more money for the shareholders. But there are two offsetting factors, one of which is practically ignored and the other entirely so in optimistic markets. The first is the actual dilution of the current and future earnings on the common stock that flows arithmetically from the new conversion rights. This dilution can be quantified by taking the recent earnings, or assuming some other figures, and calculating the adjusted earnings per share if all the convertible shares or bonds were actually converted. In the majority of companies the resulting reduction in per-share figures is not significant. But there are numerous exceptions to this statement, and there is danger that they will grow at an uncomfortable rate. The fast-expanding “conglomerates” have been the chief practitioners of convertible legerdemain. In Table 16-3 we list seven companies with large amounts of stock issuable on conversions or against warrants.*

表16-3 1969年底可转换债券及认股权证发行量较大的公司（单位：千股）

TABLE 16-3 Companies with Large Amounts of Convertible Issues and Warrants at the End of 1969 (Shares in Thousands)

^a包括“特殊库存”。

^a Includes “special stock.”

^b 1970 年底。

^b At end of 1970.

指示从普通股转换为优先股

Indicated Switches from Common into Preferred Stocks

比如在1956年之前的几十年里，同一家公司的普通股收益率高于优先股；如果优先股的转换权接近市场价格，情况尤其如此。目前情况通常相反。因此，有相当数量的可转换优先股明显比相关的普通股更具吸引力。普通股持有者将低级股转换为高级股，不会有任何损失，反而能获得重要的优势。

For decades before, say, 1956, common stocks yielded more than the preferred stocks of the same companies; this was particularly true if the preferred stock had a conversion privilege close to the market. The reverse is generally true at present. As a result there are a considerable number of convertible preferred stocks which are clearly more attractive than the related common shares. Owners of the common have nothing to lose and important advantages to gain by switching from their junior shares into the senior issue.

示例：Studebaker-Worthington 公司在 1970 年底提出了一个典型案例。当时，普通股的售价为 57 美元，而发行价为 5 美元的可转换优先股的最终价格为 87.5 美元。每股优先股可兑换 1.5 股普通股，当时价值 85.5 美元。这对优先股的购买者来说意味着一笔不小的资金差额。但普通股的年股息为 1.2 美元（1.5 股为 1.8 美元），而优先股的年股息为 5 美元。因此，最初的不利因素价格差异很可能在不到一年的时间内弥补，此后一段时间内，优先股的股息收益率可能会显著高于普通股。但当然，最重要的是普通股股东将通过转换获得更高的地位。在1968年和1970年的低点，优先股的售价比1.5股普通股高出15个基点。其转换特权保证了其售价永远不会低于普通股^。2

EXAMPLE: A typical example was presented by Studebaker-Worthington Corp. at the close of 1970. The common sold at 57, while the $5 convertible preferred finished at 871⁄2. Each preferred share is exchangeable for 11⁄2 shares of common, then worth 851⁄2. This would indicate a small money difference against the buyer of the preferred. But dividends are being paid on the common at the annual rate of $1.20 (or $1.80 for the 11⁄2 shares), against the $5 obtainable on one share of preferred. Thus the original adverse difference in price would probably be made up in less than a year, after which the preferred would probably return an appreciably higher dividend yield than the common for some time to come. But most important, of course, would be the senior position that the common shareholder would gain from the switch. At the low prices of 1968 and again in 1970 the preferred sold 15 points higher than 11⁄2 shares of common. Its conversion privilege guarantees that it could never sell lower than the common package.²

股票期权认股权证

Stock-Option Warrants

让我们先直言不讳。我们认为股票期权认股权证的近期发展近乎一场骗局，一个现存的威胁，以及一场潜在的灾难。它们凭空创造了巨大的美元“价值”。除了误导投机者和投资者之外，它们没有任何存在的借口。它们应该被法律禁止，或者至少被严格限制在公司总市值的一小部分。*

Let us mince no words at the outset. We consider the recent development of stock-option warrants as a near fraud, an existing menace, and a potential disaster. They have created huge aggregate dollar “values” out of thin air. They have no excuse for existence except to the extent that they mislead speculators and investors. They should be prohibited by law, or at least strictly limited to a minor part of the total capitalization of a company.*

为了在一般历史和文学作品中寻找类比，我们推荐读者参考《浮士德》（第二部分）的部分，歌德在其中描述了纸币的发明。作为华尔街历史上一个不祥的先例，我们不妨提一下美国对外电力公司的认股权证。1929年，该公司的市值超过10亿美元，尽管它们只是出现在公司资产负债表的脚注中。到1932年，这10亿美元缩水至800万美元，1952年，这些认股权证在公司资本重组中被一笔勾销——尽管该公司仍然有偿付能力。

For an analogy in general history and in literature we refer the reader to the section of Faust (part 2), in which Goethe describes the invention of paper money. As an ominous precedent in Wall Street history, we may mention the warrants of American & Foreign Power Co., which in 1929 had a quoted market value of over a billion dollars, although they appeared only in a footnote to the company’s balance sheet. By 1932 this billion dollars had shrunk to $8 million, and in 1952 the warrants were wiped out in the company’s recapitalization—even though it had remained solvent.

最初，股票期权认股权证偶尔会附加在债券发行上，通常相当于部分转换权。它们的数量并不重要，因此并无害处。20世纪20年代末，它们的使用范围扩大，伴随而来的是许多其他金融滥用行为，但它们在很长一段时间内都销声匿迹了。此后，它们注定会再次出现，就像那些劣币一样。自1967年以来，它们已成为人们熟知的“金融工具”。事实上，为大型银行的附属公司筹集资金，已经形成了一套标准程序，即通过出售等量普通股和认股权证，以相同价格购买更多普通股。例如： 1971年，克利夫信托房地产投资者公司（CleveTrust Realty Investors）以每单位20美元的价格出售了250万股这种普通股（或“受益权股份”）和认股权证的组合。

Originally, stock-option warrants were attached now and then to bond issues, and were usually equivalent to a partial conversion privilege. They were unimportant in amount, and hence did no harm. Their use expanded in the late 1920s, along with many other financial abuses, but they dropped from sight for long years thereafter. They were bound to turn up again, like the bad pennies they are, and since 1967 they have become familiar “instruments of finance.” In fact a standard procedure has developed for raising the capital for new real-estate ventures, affiliates of large banks, by selling units of an equal number of common shares and warrants to buy additional common shares at the same price. Example: In 1971 CleveTrust Realty Investors sold 2,500,000 of these combinations of common stock (or “shares of beneficial interest”) and warrants, for $20 per unit.

让我们思考一下这种财务结构究竟涉及什么。通常情况下，当公司董事认为以这种方式筹集资金是可取的，普通股发行人拥有优先认购额外普通股的权利。这种所谓的“优先认购权”是构成普通股所有权的价值要素之一，其他权利包括收取股息、参与公司发展以及选举董事的权利。当发行单独的认股权证以认购额外资本时，该行为会带走普通股固有价值的一部分，并将其转移到单独的证书中。类似的做法也可以通过发行单独的证书来实现，例如收取股息的权利（有限期或无限期）、分享企业出售或清算收益的权利，或投票权。那么，为什么要将这些认购权证作为原始资本结构的一部分呢？原因很简单，因为人们不熟悉财务。他们没有意识到，持有未清偿认股权证的普通股价值会低于持有未清偿认股权证的普通股价值。因此，股票和认股权证的组合通常比单独持有股票更能获得更高的市场价格。需要注意的是，通常的公司报告中，每股收益的计算（或曾经计算）并未适当考虑未偿认股权证的影响。其结果当然是夸大了收益与公司市值之间的真实关系。*

Let us consider for a moment what is really involved in this financial setup. Ordinarily, a common-stock issue has the first right to buy additional common shares when the company’s directors find it desirable to raise capital in this manner. This so-called “preemptive right” is one of the elements of value entering into the ownership of common stock—along with the right to receive dividends, to participate in the company’s growth, and to vote for directors. When separate warrants are issued for the right to subscribe additional capital, that action takes away part of the value inherent in an ordinary common share and transfers it to a separate certificate. An analogous thing could be done by issuing separate certificates for the right to receive dividends (for a limited or unlimited period), or the right to share in the proceeds of sale or liquidation of the enterprise, or the right to vote the shares. Why then are these subscription warrants created as part of the original capital structure? Simply because people are inexpert in financial matters. They don’t realize that the common stock is worth less with warrants outstanding than otherwise. Hence the package of stock and warrants usually commands a better price in the market than would the stock alone. Note that in the usual company reports the per-share earnings are (or have been) computed without proper allowance for the effect of outstanding warrants. The result is, of course, to overstate the true relationship between the earnings and the market value of the company’s capitalization.*

最简单、也可能是最好的方法认股权证存在的意义在于将其市场价值等值部分添加到普通股股本中，从而提高每股“真实”市场价格。如果发行了大量认股权证以出售优先证券，通常会假设股票支付所得用于赎回相关债券或优先股，从而进行调整。这种方法无法充分考虑认股权证通常高于可行权价值的“溢价价值”。在表16-4中，我们比较了1970年国民通用公司（National General Corp.）案例中两种计算方法的效果。

The simplest and probably the best method of allowing for the existence of warrants is to add the equivalent of their market value to the common-share capitalization, thus increasing the “true” market price per share. Where large amounts of warrants have been issued in connection with the sale of senior securities, it is customary to make the adjustment by assuming that the proceeds of the stock payment are used to retire the related bonds or preferred shares. This method does not allow adequately for the usual “premium value” of a warrant above exercisable value. In Table 16-4 we compare the effect of the two methods of calculation in the case of National General Corp. for the year 1970.

公司本身是否从这些认股权证的发行中获益，即它们在某种程度上确保公司在需要额外资本时获得资金？完全不是。通常情况下，公司无法要求认股权证持有人在认股权证到期前行使其权利，从而为公司提供新的资本。与此同时，如果公司想要筹集额外的普通股资金，就必须以通常的方式向股东发行股票——这意味着发行价格略低于现行市场价格。认股权证在这种运作中毫无帮助；它们只会让情况更加复杂，因为它们经常要求公司下调认购价格。我们再次强调，大量发行股票期权认股权证毫无意义，除了制造虚假的市场价值。

Does the company itself derive an advantage from the creation of these warrants, in the sense that they assure it in some way of receiving additional capital when it needs some? Not at all. Ordinarily there is no way in which the company can require the warrant-holders to exercise their rights, and thus provide new capital to the company, prior to the expiration date of the warrants. In the meantime, if the company wants to raise additional common-stock funds it must offer the shares to its shareholders in the usual way—which means somewhat under the ruling market price. The warrants are no help in such an operation; they merely complicate the situation by frequently requiring a downward revision in their own subscription price. Once more we assert that large issues of stock-option warrants serve no purpose, except to fabricate imaginary market values.

歌德在创作《浮士德》时所熟悉的纸币，是臭名昭著的法国指券。它曾被誉为一项伟大的发明，最终注定要贬值——就像价值数十亿美元的美国及外国权力权证一样。*诗人的一些言论同样适用对一项或另一项发明很有帮助——例如以下内容（Bayard Taylor 翻译）：

The paper money that Goethe was familiar with, when he wrote his Faust, were the notorious French assignats that had been greeted as a marvelous invention, and were destined ultimately to lose all of their value—as did the billion dollars’ worth of American & Foreign Power warrants.* Some of the poet’s remarks apply equally well to one invention or another—such as the following (in Bayard Taylor’s translation):

浮士德：想象力的最高飞翔

FAUST: Imagination in its highest flight

用尽全力却无法完全掌握。

Exerts itself but cannot grasp it quite.

梅菲斯特（发明家）：如果有人需要硬币，经纪人已经准备好了。

MEPHISTOPHELES (the inventor): If one needs coin the brokers ready stand.

愚者（最后）：“魔法纸……”！

THE FOOL (finally): The magic paper . . . !

表16-4 大量流通认股权证普通股的“真实市场价格”和调整后市盈率的计算

TABLE 16-4 Calculation of “True Market Price” and Adjusted Price/Earnings Ratio of a Common Stock with Large Amounts of Warrants Outstanding

请注意，扣除特殊费用后，该公司的计算结果是每股收益增加，市盈率下降。这显然是荒谬的。按照我们建议的方法，稀释的结果是大幅提高市盈率，这也是理所当然的。

Note that, after special charges, the effect of the company’s calculation is to increase the earnings per share and reduce the P/E ratio. This is manifestly absurd. By our suggested method the effect of the dilution is to increase the P/E ratio substantially, as it should be.

实用后记

Practical Postscript

认股权证的罪孽在于“诞生”。*一旦诞生，它们就如同其他证券形式一样运作，既提供获利的机会，也提供亏损的机会。几乎所有较新的认股权证都有效期有限——通常为五到十年。较旧的认股权证通常是永久性的，它们多年来的价格历史很可能令人瞩目。

The crime of the warrants is in “having been born.”* Once born they function as other security forms, and offer chances of profit as well as of loss. Nearly all the newer warrants run for a limited time—generally between five and ten years. The older warrants were often perpetual, and they were likely to have fascinating price histories over the years.

例如：记录簿显示，三洲公司（Tri-Continental Corp.）的认股权证（其发行日期可追溯至1929年）在大萧条时期的售价仅为微不足道的1/32美元。然而，其价格却从低谷一路飙升至1969年的75.32美元，涨幅高达约242,000%。（认股权证的售价随后远高于股票本身；这种情况在华尔街通过股票分割等技术手段实现时很常见。）最近的一个例子是Ling-Temco-Vought认股权证，其在1971年上半年从2.5美元上涨至12.5美元，随后又回落至4美元。

EXAMPLE: The record books will show that Tri-Continental Corp. warrants, which date from 1929, sold at a negligible 1/32 of a dollar each in the depth of the depression. From that lowly estate their price rose to a magnificent 753⁄4 in 1969, an astronomical advance of some 242,000%. (The warrants then sold considerably higher than the shares themselves; this is the kind of thing that occurs on Wall Street through technical developments, such as stock splits.) A recent example is supplied by Ling-Temco-Vought warrants, which in the first half of 1971 advanced from 21⁄2 to 121⁄2—and then fell back to 4.

毫无疑问，有时在认股权证上可以进行精明的操作，但这太过技术性，不便在此讨论。我们可以说，认股权证的售价往往高于与债券或优先股的转换特权相关的相应市场成分。从这个意义上讲，出售附带认股权证的债券，而不是通过发行可转换债券来创造同等的稀释因素，是有道理的。如果认股权证总额相对较小，则无需过于认真地看待其理论层面；如果认股权证发行量相对于流通股本而言较大，则可能表明该公司的优先股本过重。它应该增发普通股。因此，我们抨击认股权证作为一种金融机制的主要目的并非谴责其在中等规模债券发行中的使用，而是反对肆意制造这种巨额“纸币”怪物。

No doubt shrewd operations can be carried on in warrants from time to time, but this is too technical a matter for discussion here. We might say that warrants tend to sell relatively higher than the corresponding market components related to the conversion privilege of bonds or preferred stocks. To that extent there is a valid argument for selling bonds with warrants attached rather than creating an equivalent dilution factor by a convertible issue. If the warrant total is relatively small there is no point in taking its theoretical aspect too seriously; if the warrant issue is large relative to the outstanding stock, that would probably indicate that the company has a top-heavy senior capitalization. It should be selling additional common stock instead. Thus the main objective of our attack on warrants as a financial mechanism is not to condemn their use in connection with moderate-size bond issues, but to argue against the wanton creation of huge “paper-money” monstrosities of this genre.

第16章评论

Commentary on Chapter 16

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

我通过期权交易，送两个孩子上了哈佛。可惜，他们是我的经纪人的孩子。

I put two children through Harvard by trading options. Unfortunately, they were my broker’s children.

—华尔街老笑话¹

—old Wall Street joke¹

如今，美国大多数可转换债券都是私下交易的：只有机构投资者在首次发行时才被允许购买，之后可能只有最富有的个人才能购买。即便如此，大多数经纪商仍不愿向个人投资者提供可转换债券，因为他们担心监管和法律责任。（不过，专门从事可转换债券的共同基金和ETF却随处可见。）²

Today, most convertible bonds in the U.S. trade privately: Only institutional investors are permitted to buy them when first issued, and only the wealthiest individuals might be able to buy them later. Even then, most brokers are reluctant to offer convertibles to individual investors for fear of regulatory and legal liability. (Mutual funds and ETFs specializing in convertibles are widely available, however.)²

尽管格雷厄姆在第十六章中对可转换证券和认股权证提出了诸多批评，但他从未想过要警告投资者谨慎对待股票期权——直到1973年，股票期权才以标准化形式在全国交易所交易。如今，数百万人都在交易股票期权。许多人几乎不了解期权；有些人明智地使用它们；而另一些人则肆意滥用它们。

For all the criticism about convertible securities and warrants that Graham includes in Chapter 16, it never would have occurred to him to warn investors to be cautious about stock options—which weren’t even traded in standardized form on a national exchange until 1973. Today, millions of people trade them. Many barely understand options; some use them wisely; others abuse them recklessly.

为什么要支付保费

Why You Pay the Premium

期权（源于拉丁语optio，意为“选择”）赋予您在指定日期以指定价格买卖某项资产（通常是股票或市场指数）的权利。买入期权称为看涨期权；卖出期权称为看跌期权。（可转换债券是一种具有公司普通股看涨期权的公司债务。）

An option—from the Latin optio, “choice”—gives you the right to buy or sell an asset, usually a stock or market index, at a specified price on a fixed date. An option to buy is known as a call; an option to sell is a put. (A convertible bond is a kind of corporate debt featuring a call option on the company’s common stock.)

期权是一种保险；这也是您支付的价格被称为“期权费”的原因之一。您可以投保以防范损失风险、错失收益的风险，或在预定价格范围内特定上行或下行波动的风险。

Options are a form of insurance; that’s one reason the price you pay for them is called a “premium.” You can insure against the risk of losses, the risk of missing out on gains, or the risk of specific upward or downward fluctuations within a predetermined price range.

期权重塑风险和回报。买入热门股票的看涨期权，如果该股票快速上涨，你的收益（百分比）将远高于你持有该股票本身的收益——但如果股价下跌、上涨幅度不够大或上涨速度不够快，你的期权价值可能会归零。卖出你已持有股票的看涨期权，你可以降低股价下跌造成的损失风险——但如果股价最终大幅上涨，你将错失其未来的大部分收益。同样，看跌期权以及看跌期权和看涨期权的组合，也会重塑标的股票或其他资产的风险和回报。

Options reshape risks and returns. Buy call options on a hot stock, and you will make much more, percentage-wise, than you would on the stock itself if it goes up a lot in a hurry—but the value of your options can go to zero if the stock goes down, doesn’t go up enough, or doesn’t go up soon enough. Sell call options on a stock you already own, and you reduce the risk of loss from a fall in its price—but, if the stock ends up rising sharply instead, you’ll miss out on most of its future gains. Likewise, put options, and combinations of puts and calls, reshape the risk and reward of an underlying stock or other asset.

由于期权有到期日，且其价格取决于其他资产的波动，因此期权很少是一种“一劳永逸”的投资。期权交易只适合有进取心的投资者。

Because they expire and their price depends on the fluctuations of another asset, options are seldom a “set-it-and-forget-it” investment. Options trading is for enterprising investors only.

弗吉尼亚州麦克莱恩投资咨询公司Vest Financial的首席研究顾问乔安妮·希尔表示：“你必须进行真正深入的风险分析，才能成功地将期权作为持有股票的替代方案，或将其作为收入目标或重塑回报。很少有人有时间和专业知识，能够独立投入期权策略或期权投机。”

“You have to be involved in really deep risk analysis to use options successfully as an alternative to owning a stock or for targeting income or for reshaping returns,” says Joanne Hill, chief adviser of research at Vest Financial, an investment-advisory firm in McLean, Virginia. “It’s rare to find individuals who have the time and expertise to devote to an options strategy or an options speculation on their own.”

不过，人们常常认为他们知道。

It’s common to find people who think they do, though.

为什么你的经纪应用程序不断提醒你交易期权

Why Your Brokerage App Keeps Nagging You to Trade Options

您可以直接交易期权，也可以购买利用期权来管理风险或产生收益的基金。关于直接交易期权，首先要明白的是，华尔街有巨大的动机鼓励您这样做。

You can trade options directly or buy funds that use them to manage risk or generate income. The first thing to understand about trading options directly is that Wall Street has a gigantic incentive to get you to do it.

不久前，你买入共同基金，经纪商能赚5%甚至更多；你买入（或卖出）股票，经纪商能赚1%甚至更多。然而，在指数基金、ETF以及迅猛发展的科技的激烈竞争下，这些高额佣金已经逐渐消失。

Not long ago, brokers could earn 5% or more when you bought a mutual fund and 1% or more when you bought (or sold) a stock. After fierce competition from index funds, ETFs, and lightning-fast technology, those high commissions have withered away.

然而，在期权交易中，经纪公司仍然赚得盆满钵满。做市商，也就是促成交易的公司，给经纪商的报酬要高得多。期权订单处理权的回扣比股票订单处理权的回扣要高。而且，与股票不同，期权的到期日通常最多为几个月。这意味着你必须反复交易才能维持相同的仓位，每次都能为你的经纪人带来更多收益。

On options, however, brokerage firms still make a killing. Market makers, the firms that facilitate trades, pay brokers much bigger kickbacks for the right to handle orders on options than on stocks. And, unlike stocks, options expire—usually in a few months at most. That means you have to trade repeatedly to maintain the same position, generating more money for your broker every time.

如图16.1所示，2023 年上半年，Robinhood 从客户的期权交易中获得了 2.6 亿美元的收入。这一收入是股票交易收入的五倍，尽管客户的股票交易频率是股票交易频率的两倍半。

As Figure 16.1 shows, in the first six months of 2023, Robinhood took in $260 million in revenue on its customers’ trades in options. That was five times more than on stock transactions, even though customers traded stocks two and a half times more often.

难怪经纪公司不断缠着客户尝试期权交易。这是他们从你身上赚大钱的最佳途径。

No wonder brokerage firms are constantly badgering customers to try trading options. It’s their best option for making a lot of money off you.

不了解规则的赌博

Gambling Without Knowing the Rules

对于经纪行业来说幸运的是，许多人对期权交易了解不多，甚至不知道自己不了解。

Fortunately for the brokerage industry, many people don’t know much about options trading—and don’t even know they don’t.

2021年末对2800多名美国投资者进行的一项调查发现，近七分之一的投资者曾交易过期权。其中，62%的人错误地回答了一个本应简单到令人尴尬的问题：

A survey of more than 2,800 U.S. investors in late 2021 found that almost one in seven had traded options. Among them, 62% incorrectly answered what should have been an embarrassingly easy question:

图 16-1：费用来源

FIGURE 16-1: Where the Fees Are

资料来源：Robinhood。

Source: Robinhood.

注：2023年上半年数据。

Note: Data for first half of 2023.

图 16-2：失败是一种选择

FIGURE 16-2: Failure Is an Option

来源：FINRA基金会。

Source: FINRA Foundation.

这里描述的期权赋予您以 50 美元购买当前交易价格为 40 美元的股票的权利。由于现在花 50 美元购买原本只需 40 美元就能买到的东西毫无意义，所以没有人会从您那里购买该期权，因此它到期时将毫无价值。其价值为 0 美元。

The option described here gives you the right to pay $50 for a stock that’s trading at $40. Because it makes no sense to pay $50 today for something you can get for $40, no one will buy this option from you, so it will expire worthless. Its value is $0.

然而，在所有进行过期权交易的受访者中，近一半的人认为这个期权值10美元。他们选错这个答案的可能性是从未进行过期权交易的人的三倍。他们也不太可能承认自己不知道。

Yet nearly half of all the survey respondents who had traded options thought this one is worth $10. They were three times more likely to pick that wrong answer than people who had never traded options. They were also much less likely to admit they didn’t know.

如果你连这么简单的问题都答不出来，却去交易期权，就好比你以为“四条”指的是任何一手牌中有4的牌，却还指望在扑克牌里赢一样。你不仅仅是在赌博，你甚至连规则都不懂，就去赌博。

Trading options when you can’t answer a question this easy is like expecting to win at poker if you think “four of a kind” means any hand with a 4 card in it. You aren’t just gambling. You’re gambling without even knowing the rules.

这些风险行为因零日到期期权（即“0DTE”）的日益流行而加剧，这些期权在交易当天到期，使其波动性最大化。押注股票或指数在当天收盘时是涨是跌，几乎是金融市场上最纯粹的风险。如果你的预测正确，那么当天收盘时你的资金将翻数倍。如果你的预测错误，那么你可能会很快血本无归。如果你碰巧赢了，这当然令人兴奋，但你还不如打赌下一滴雨会落在挡风玻璃的哪个位置。

These risky behaviors have been exacerbated by the surging popularity of zero-days-to-expiration or “0DTE” options, which expire the same day you trade, giving them maximum volatility. Betting your money on whether a stock or index will go up or down by the end of the day is as close to unadulterated risk as you can get in the financial markets. If you turn out to be right, you’ll make many times your money by the end of the same day. If you’re wrong, you can lose all your money just as fast. It’s thrilling—if you happen to win—but you might as well be betting on where the next raindrop will land on a windshield.

快速交易，快速亏损

Fast Trades, Fast Losses

沃伦·巴菲特曾写道：“市场就像上帝一样，帮助自助者。但与上帝不同的是，市场不会原谅那些不知所措的人。”

“The market, like the Lord, helps those who help themselves,” Warren Buffett has written. “But, unlike the Lord, the market does not forgive those who know not what they do.”

荷兰一家网上经纪公司对超过 26,000 名进行期权交易的个人进行了研究，发现在计入交易成本后，他们的回报率比同一家公司只交易股票的客户要低——每月低 2.75 个百分点。

A study of more than 26,000 individuals who traded options at a Dutch online brokerage found that, after accounting for the costs of trading, their returns were worse than those of customers at the same firm who only traded stocks—by 2.75 percentage points per month.

研究人员最近估计，2019 年 11 月至 2021 年 6 月期间，美国个人在期权交易中总共损失了 21 亿美元。在此期间，他们还承担了 73 亿美元的经纪费用——这是一种极其浪费的财富从普通民众向华尔街的转移。

Researchers recently estimated that individuals lost a total of $2.1 billion trading options in the U.S. between November 2019 and June 2021. Along the way, they incurred $7.3 billion in brokerage costs—a massively wasteful transfer of wealth from Main Street to Wall Street.

最近的一项研究发现，2010 年至 2021 年间，围绕公司盈利公告进行期权押注的散户交易者平均损失了 5% 至 9%，约合 30 亿美元^。3

Between 2010 and 2021, retail traders placing option bets around companies’ earnings announcements lost an average of 5% to 9%, or approximately $3 billion, a recent study found.³

这并不意味着期权交易毫无意义。它只是意味着，只有当期权能够实现其他资产无法实现的特定目标时，你才应该交易它们。期权的税率不同，经纪成本更高，并且需要比其他投资更严格的监控，因此它们需要突破更高的门槛。

None of this means trading options never makes sense. It does mean you should trade them only when they can accomplish specific goals that other assets can’t. Options are taxed differently, carry steeper brokerage costs, and require more vigilant monitoring than other investments, so they need to clear a higher hurdle.

发现备兑看涨期权

Uncovering Covered Calls

保守的期权策略与您持有的股票相结合，可以降低风险、产生收益，或两者兼而有之。当您出售已持有股票的看涨期权时，您可以将其未来不确定的回报转化为当前的确定收益。您预先赚取的期权费有助于缓冲任何短期价格下跌。作为交换，您放弃了参与股票未来超过一定水平的收益的权利。

Conservative options strategies, when combined with a stock you own, can reduce risk, generate income, or both. When you sell call options on a stock you already own, you transform its uncertain returns in the future into certain income in the present. The premiums you earn upfront help cushion against any short-term decline in price. In exchange, you give up the right to participate in the stock’s future gains beyond a certain level.

卖出或“写入”备兑看涨期权最适合那些能产生中等回报的股票或指数。如果股价大幅下跌，卖出看涨期权的收益将无法弥补所有损失。如果股价最终大幅上涨，看涨期权的买家可能会以执行价格低价买入股票；这样一来，除非您以亏损的价格买回期权，否则您将错失未来任何盈利的机会。由于大多数投资者持有股票的主要原因是为了抓住未来的增长机会，因此错失机会将是一个重大的损失。

Selling, or “writing,” covered calls will work best on a stock or index that generates a moderate return. If the shares fall sharply, the income from selling the call options won’t make up for all the loss. If the shares end up rising steeply, the buyer of the call could take the stock away from you cheaply at the strike price; you then will miss out on the potential for any future gains unless you buy the options back at a loss. Since the main reason most investors own stocks is to capture future growth, missing out on it is a major drawback.

不过，如果股票波动幅度较小，卖出备兑看涨期权可以获得稳定的收益，同时降低单独持有股票的风险。您可以选择与股票目标价一致的执行价格；股票备兑的执行价格越高，您的前期保费收入就越低，但您的盈利潜力就越大。

If the stock fluctuates in a narrow band, though, selling covered calls will generate consistent income while reducing the risk of holding the stock alone. You can choose a strike price consistent with your target price for the stock; the higher the strike price at which the stock is covered, the lower your upfront premium income, but the greater your potential for gain.

在2022年股票和债券市场均遭受重创之后，备兑看涨期权基金却一路飙升。摩根大通股票溢价收益ETF (JPMorgan Equity Premium Income ETF) 从2022年初到2023年底，从投资者手中吸纳了惊人的260亿美元新资金；其姊妹基金摩根大通纳斯达克股票溢价收益ETF (JPMorgan Nasdaq Equity Premium Income ETF) 则吸纳了80亿美元。

After stocks and bonds alike took a beating in 2022, covered-call funds took off. JPMorgan Equity Premium Income ETF gathered a staggering $26 billion in new money from investors from the beginning of 2022 through the end of 2023; its sibling, JPMorgan Nasdaq Equity Premium Income ETF, took in $8 billion.

这类基金，以及一般的备兑看涨期权，通常都能兑现承诺：你从股票中获得大部分收益，同时减少损失，并获得更多收益。所谓的“缓冲”基金，采用其他期权策略，将股票指数敞口与看跌期权和看涨期权相结合，牺牲了获得巨额收益的可能性，以降低大幅下跌的风险。它们也消除了投资者亲自交易期权的需要。

Such funds, and covered-call writing in general, have usually delivered as promised: You get much of the gains from stocks, with less of the losses and more income along the way. So-called “buffered” funds, using other options strategies, combine exposure to a stock index with put and call options, sacrificing the potential for big gains in exchange for reducing the risk of big declines. They also eliminate the need for investors to trade the options themselves.

然而，降低股票风险的其他方法更便宜、更简单。

However, other ways of reducing the risk of stocks are cheaper and simpler.

自2021年以来，利率大幅上涨，货币市场共同基金、短期美国国债和定期存款证的收益率达到5%甚至更高。这意味着，20%的现金配置可以使全股票投资组合的回报率增加一个百分点。除了持有股票外，没有比持有更多现金更安全、更简单的创收方式了。

Interest rates have jumped since 2021, enabling you to earn 5% or more on money-market mutual funds, short-term U.S. Treasury bills, and certificates of deposit. That means a 20% allocation to cash adds one percentage point to the return of an all-stock portfolio. No method of generating income is safer or simpler than holding more cash alongside your stocks.

或者，你可以每月出售一小部分股票，从你的股票投资组合中获得更多收入。在美国，出售所得将按最高资本利得税率（约 20%）征税（或者，如果你亏本出售一些头寸，甚至可以减少你的税单）。出售备兑看涨期权的收入通常要缴纳更高的税率。

Alternatively, you could extract more income from your stock portfolio by selling a small portion every month. In the U.S., the proceeds would be taxable at the maximum capital-gains rate of about 20% (or, if you sell some positions at a loss, would even reduce your tax bill). Income from selling covered calls is typically taxed at a much higher rate.

何时选择期权

When to Opt for Options

以下是一些假设情景，其中的选择可能很有意义。

Here are some hypothetical scenarios in which options can make good sense.

您想预留大约 10 万到 16 万美元，用于支付 15 个月后的房子首付。您拥有 200 股礼来公司股票。2023 年末的某个时候，该股票的交易价格约为每股 600 美元，总价值略高于 12 万美元。您可以以 7,000 美元的价格卖出 200 股看涨期权，这些期权可在 15 个月后行使，执行价为 800 美元。同时，您可以以 7,000 美元的价格买入 200 股看跌期权，这些期权可在 15 个月后行使，执行价为 500 美元。您无法以每股超过 800 美元的价格出售，但您确保了——在您没有净成本的情况下——您不必以低于 500 美元的价格出售。无论股票价格如何，您都已锁定 100,000 至 160,000 美元之间的最终税前价值。
You want to set aside roughly $100,000 to $160,000 to make a down payment on a house 15 months in the future. You own 200 shares of Eli Lilly and Co. At one point in late 2023, the stock traded at about $600 per share—worth a total of slightly more than $120,000. You could sell calls on 200 shares, exercisable 15 months in the future at a strike price of $800, for $7,000. At the same time, you could buy puts on 200 shares, exercisable at the same time at a strike price of $500, for $7,000. You won’t be able to sell for more than $800 a share, but you’ve ensured—at no net cost to you—that you won’t have to sell for less than $500. You’ve locked in a final pre-tax value of between $100,000 and $160,000 no matter what the stock does.
您的姑姑刚刚去世；她在遗嘱中留给您价值10万美元的标准普尔500指数基金股份。您将在六个月后收到这些股份，并希望将其捐赠给您最喜爱的慈善机构。为了确保捐赠总额不低于10万美元，您可以购买标准普尔500指数的看跌期权。您需要支付几千美元的期权费，如果市场上涨，您将损失这笔费用。作为交换，您可以确定，六个月后您捐赠的价值不会低于10万美元。
Your aunt has just died; in her will, she left you shares in an S&P 500 index fund worth $100,000. You will receive the shares in six months and would like to donate them to your favorite charity. To ensure that the amount of your gift totals no less than $100,000, you can buy puts on the S&P 500. You’ll pay an option premium of a few thousand dollars, which you’ll lose if the market goes up. In exchange, you have the certainty of knowing that the value of your donation six months from now can’t fall below $100,000.
如果您想用您的“疯狂资金账户”进行投机（参见第一章的评论），那么购买您想持有的股票的看涨期权可能是值得的。由于100股期权的溢价远低于直接购买100股，您可以投入更少的资金获得更高的百分比收益。然而，这种策略会产生高昂的经纪费用，并且需要频繁交易和密切监控。如果股价下跌而不是上涨，或者涨幅不够大，您可能会损失100%的期权溢价。更糟糕的是，如果期权交易的刺激让您变成了投机者，您甚至可能会失去投资者的身份。
If you want to speculate in your mad-money account (see the Commentary on Chapter 1), buying a call option on a stock you want to own could be worthwhile. Because the premium for options on 100 shares costs much less than buying the 100 shares outright, you could earn a greater percentage gain while committing less capital. However, this strategy incurs high brokerage costs and requires frequent trading and keen monitoring. You risk losing 100% of your option premium if the stock goes down instead of up—or if it doesn’t go up enough. Even worse, you risk losing your identity as an investor if the adrenaline rush of options trading turns you into a speculator.

第十七章

Chapter 17 四个极具启发性的案例

Four Extremely Instructive Case Histories

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

标题中的“极端”一词带有双关意味，因为这些历史事件代表了近年来华尔街各种极端的境况。它们对所有与股市和债券市场有密切联系的人都具有指导意义，也发出了严厉的警告——不仅对普通投资者和投机者，而且对专业人士、证券分析师、基金经理、信托账户管理人，甚至对向企业提供贷款的银行家，都具有警示作用。本文将回顾四家公司，以及它们所代表的不同极端情况，如下：

The word “extremely” in the title is a kind of pun, because the histories represent extremes of various sorts that were manifest on Wall Street in recent years. They hold instruction, and grave warnings, for everyone who has a serious connection with the world of stocks and bonds—not only for ordinary investors and speculators but for professionals, security analysts, fund managers, trust-account administrators, and even for bankers who lend money to corporations. The four companies to be reviewed, and the different extremes that they illustrate, are:

宾夕法尼亚中央铁路公司。所有持有该系统债券或股票的人，都忽视了金融疲软最基本的预警信号，这是一个极端的例子。一家摇摇欲坠的巨头的股票市场价格却高得离谱。

Penn Central (Railroad) Co. An extreme example of the neglect of the most elementary warning signals of financial weakness, by all those who had bonds or shares of this system under their supervision. A crazily high market price for the stock of a tottering giant.

Ling-Temco-Vought 公司。这是快速但不健全的“帝国建设”的一个极端例子，其最终崩溃几乎是必然的；但无差别的银行贷款却助长了这一趋势。

Ling-Temco-Vought Inc. An extreme example of quick and unsound “empire building,” with ultimate collapse practically guaranteed; but helped by indiscriminate bank lending.

NVF 公司是企业收购的一个极端例子，一家小公司吸收了另一家规模为其七倍的公司，背负了巨额债务，并采用了一些令人吃惊的会计手段。

NVF Corp. An extreme example of one corporate acquisition, in which a small company absorbed another seven times its size, incurring a huge debt and employing some startling accounting devices.

AAA企业。一家小型公司公开发行股票融资的极端案例；其价值仅基于“特许经营”这个神奇的词，其他几乎一无是处，并由重要的证券交易所赞助。在股票出售后的两年内，该公司就破产了，而其最初被高估的价格在不理性的股市中翻了一番。

AAA Enterprises. An extreme example of public stock-financing of a small company; its value based on the magic word “franchising,” and little else, sponsored by important stock-exchange houses. Bankruptcy followed within two years of the stock sale and the doubling of the initial inflated price in the heedless stock market.

宾夕法尼亚中央大学案

The Penn Central Case

这是美国资产规模和总收入最高的铁路公司。1970年，该公司的破产震惊了金融界。该公司大部分债券发行都已违约，并一度面临彻底放弃运营的危险。其发行的证券价格大幅下跌，普通股从1968年86.5美元的高位跌至1970年的5.5美元的低位。（这些股票在重组中几乎肯定会被彻底抛售。）*

This is the country’s largest railroad in assets and gross revenues. Its bankruptcy in 1970 shocked the financial world. It has defaulted on most of its bond issues, and has been in danger of abandoning its operations entirely. Its security issues fell drastically in price, the common stock collapsing from a high level of 86½ as recently as 1968 to a low of 5½ in 1970. (There seems little doubt that these shares will be wiped out in reorganization.)*

我们的基本观点是，运用最简单的证券分析规则和最简单的稳健投资标准，早在宾夕法尼亚中央铁路系统破产之前——当然是在1968年——就暴露出其根本缺陷，当时其股价处于1929年后的最高水平，其发行的大部分债券都可以以同等价格兑换成票面利率相同、担保良好的公用事业债券。以下是一些评论：

Our basic point is that the application of the simplest rules of security analysis and the simplest standards of sound investment would have revealed the fundamental weakness of the Penn Central system long before its bankruptcy—certainly in 1968, when the shares were selling at their post-1929 record, and when most of its bond issues could have been exchanged at even prices for well-secured public-utility obligations with the same coupon rates. The following comments are in order:

1. 标准普尔债券指南显示，该系统的利息费用在1967年为1.91倍，在1968年为1.98倍。我们的教科书《证券分析》规定，铁路债券的最低覆盖率是税前5倍，按常规利率计算的税后2.9倍。据我们所知，这些标准的有效性从未受到任何投资机构的质疑。根据我们对税后收益的要求，宾夕法尼亚中央铁路公司未达到安全要求。但我们的税后要求是基于5倍的税前比率，即在债券利息后扣除常规所得税。就宾夕法尼亚中央铁路公司而言，它在过去11年里没有缴纳任何所得税！因此，其税前利息费用覆盖率不到2倍——与我们保守的5倍要求相比，这个数字完全不够。

1. In the S & P Bond Guide the interest charges of the system are shown to have been earned 1.91 times in 1967 and 1.98 times in 1968. The minimum coverage prescribed for railroad bonds in our textbook Security Analysis is 5 times before income taxes and 2.9 times after income taxes at regular rates. As far as we know the validity of these standards has never been questioned by any investment authority. On the basis of our requirements for earnings after taxes, the Penn Central fell short of the requirements for safety. But our after-tax requirement is based on a before-tax ratio of five times, with regular income tax deducted after the bond interest. In the case of Penn Central, it had been paying no income taxes to speak of for the past 11 years! Hence the coverage of its interest charges before taxes was less than two times—a totally inadequate figure against our conservative requirement of 5 times.

2. 该公司如此长时间未缴纳所得税的事实应该引起人们对其报告收益真实性的严重质疑。

2. The fact that the company paid no income taxes over so long a period should have raised serious questions about the validity of its reported earnings.

3. 宾夕法尼亚中央铁路系统的债券本可以在1968年和1969年兑换成安全性更高的债券，且价格和收益都不会受到影响。例如，1969年，1994年到期的宾夕法尼亚州铁路4.5先令债券（宾夕法尼亚中央铁路的一部分）的收益率范围为61至74.5倍，而1994年到期的宾夕法尼亚电力公司4.3 ^/ 8^先令债券的收益率范围为64.1 ^/ 4^至72.1 ^/ 4^倍。1968年，这家公用事业公司的税前利息收入为4.20倍，而宾夕法尼亚中央铁路系统仅为1.98倍；1969年，后者的相对表现持续恶化。显然，这种兑换是必要的，对于宾夕法尼亚中央铁路债券持有人来说，这将是救命稻草。（1970 年底，铁路 4 ¹ ⁄ ⁴先令债券违约，售价仅为 18½ 美元，而公用事业 4 ³ ⁄ ⁸先令债券收于 66½ 美元。）

3. The bonds of the Penn Central system could have been exchanged in 1968 and 1969, at no sacrifice of price or income, for far better secured issues. For example, in 1969, Pennsylvania RR 4½s, due 1994 (part of Penn Central) had a range of 61 to 74½, while Pennsylvania Electric Co. 4³⁄⁸s, due 1994, had a range of 64¹⁄⁴ to 72¹⁄⁴. The public utility had earned its interest 4.20 times before taxes in 1968 against only 1.98 times for the Penn Central system; during 1969 the latter’s comparative showing grew steadily worse. An exchange of this sort was clearly called for, and it would have been a lifesaver for a Penn Central bondholder. (At the end of 1970 the railroad 4¹⁄⁴s were in default, and selling at only 18½, while the utility’s 4³⁄⁸s closed at 66½.)

4. 宾夕法尼亚中央铁路公司1968年公布的每股收益为3.80美元；当年其股价高达86.5美元，相当于每股收益的24倍。但任何一位资深分析师都会怀疑，在无需缴纳任何所得税的情况下，这种报告的收益究竟有多“真实”。

4. Penn Central reported earnings of $3.80 per share in 1968; its high price of 86½ in that year was 24 times such earnings. But any analyst worth his salt would have wondered how “real” were earnings of this sort reported without the necessity of paying any income taxes thereon.

5. 1966年，新合并的公司*公布的每股“收益”为6.80美元——受此影响，普通股后来涨至86.5美元的峰值。这意味着其股权估值超过20亿美元。当时，这些买家中有多少人知道，如此可观的收益是在1971年为合并产生的“成本和损失”而额外计提的2.75亿美元（即每股12美元）之前？华尔街真是个奇妙的仙境，一家公司可以在一个地方宣布每股6.80美元的“利润”，在另一个地方宣布每股12美元的特殊“成本和损失”，股东和投机者们却欣喜若狂！^*

5. For 1966 the newly merged company* had reported “earnings” of $6.80 a share—in reflection of which the common stock later rose to its peak of 86½. This was a valuation of over $2 billion for the equity. How many of these buyers knew at the time that the so lovely earnings were before a special charge of $275 million or $12 per share to be taken in 1971 for “costs and losses” incurred on the merger? O wondrous fairyland of Wall Street where a company can announce “profits” of $6.80 per share in one place and special “costs and losses” of $12 in another, and shareholders and speculators rub their hands with glee!^*

6. 铁路分析师早就知道与利润更高的铁路公司相比，宾夕法尼亚中央铁路的运营状况非常糟糕。例如，1968年，其运输率仅为47.5%，而其邻居诺福克和西部铁路公司仅为35.2%。*

6. A railroad analyst would have long since known that the operating picture of the Penn Central was very bad in comparison with the more profitable roads. For example, its transportation ratio was 47.5% in 1968 against 35.2% for its neighbor, Norfolk & Western.*

7. 过程中发生了一些奇怪的交易，会计结果也很奇怪。1^细节过于复杂，不便在此详述。

7. Along the way there were some strange transactions with peculiar accounting results.¹ Details are too complicated to go into here.

结论：更好的管理是否能挽救宾夕法尼亚中央铁路的破产，或许尚有争议。但毫无疑问，最迟在1968年之后，宾夕法尼亚中央铁路系统的任何债券和股票都不应留在任何由合格的证券分析师、基金经理、信托主管或投资顾问监管的证券账户中。寓意： 证券分析师在研究股市走势、预测未来、进行复杂的数学计算或进行费用全免的实地考察之前，应该先做好自己的基本工作。^*

CONCLUSION: Whether better management could have saved the Penn Central bankruptcy may be arguable. But there is no doubt whatever that no bonds and no shares of the Penn Central system should have remained after 1968 at the latest in any securities account watched over by competent security analysts, fund managers, trust officers, or investment counsel. Moral: Security analysts should do their elementary jobs before they study stock-market movements, gaze into crystal balls, make elaborate mathematical calculations, or go on all-expense-paid field trips.^*

凌特姆科沃特公司

Ling-Temco-Vought Inc.

这是一个疯狂扩张和债台高筑的故事，最终导致巨额亏损和一系列财务问题。正如这类案例中常见的情况一样，一个金发少年，或者说“年轻天才”，对这个伟大帝国的建立及其可耻的衰落负有主要责任；但其他人也难辞其咎。^*

This is a story of head-over-heels expansion and head-over-heels debt, ending up in terrific losses and a host of financial problems. As usually happens in such cases, a fair-haired boy, or “young genius,” was chiefly responsible for both the creation of the great empire and its ignominious downfall; but there is plenty of blame to be accorded others as well.^*

通过列出 1958 年至 1970 年间五年的简明损益表和资产负债表项目，可以概括 Ling-Temco-Vought 的兴衰。表 17-1就是这样的。第一列显示的是公司 1958 年起步时的简朴景象，当时的销售额仅为 700 万美元。下一列给出了 1960 年的数据；企业在短短两年内增长了 20 倍，但规模仍然相对较小。然后是鼎盛时期 1967 年和 1968 年，销售额再次增长了 20 倍，达到 28 亿美元，而债务则从 4400 万美元飙升至惊人的 16.53 亿美元。1969 年，公司进行了新的收购，债务进一步大幅增加（达到 18.65 亿美元！），严重的麻烦也随之而来。扣除非常项目后，该年度报告的亏损额巨大；股价从1967年的169.5美元的高点跌至24美元的低点；这位年轻的天才被取代，不再担任公司负责人。1970年的业绩更加糟糕。该公司报告的最终净亏损接近7000万美元；股价跌至7.1/8美元的低点^，其^最大笔债券的报价一度仅为可怜的15美分。该公司的扩张政策被彻底扭转，各种重要权益被投放到市场上，并且在减少巨额债务方面取得了一些进展。

The rise and fall of Ling-Temco-Vought can be summarized by setting forth condensed income accounts and balance-sheet items for five years between 1958 and 1970. This is done in Table 17-1. The first column shows the company’s modest beginnings in 1958, when its sales were only $7 million. The next gives figures for 1960; the enterprise had grown twentyfold in only two years, but it was still comparatively small. Then came the heyday years to 1967 and 1968, in which sales again grew twentyfold to $2.8 billion with the debt figure expanding from $44 million to an awesome $1,653 million. In 1969 came new acquisitions, a further huge increase in debt (to a total of $1,865 million!), and the beginning of serious trouble. A large loss, after extraordinary items, was reported for the year; the stock price declined from its 1967 high of 169½ to a low of 24; the young genius was superseded as the head of the company. The 1970 results were even more dreadful. The enterprise reported a final net loss of close to $70 million; the stock fell away to a low price of 7¹⁄⁸, and its largest bond issue was quoted at one time at a pitiable 15 cents on the dollar. The company’s expansion policy was sharply reversed, various of its important interests were placed on the market, and some headway was made in reducing its mountainous obligations.

我们表格中的数字非常有说服力，几乎无需评论。以下是一些评论：

The figures in our table speak so eloquently that few comments are called for. But here are some:

1. 公司的扩张期并非一帆风顺。1961年，公司出现了小幅运营亏损，但显然决定将所有可能的费用和储备金都计入业绩不佳的年份，这一做法后来在1970年的许多报告中都有所体现。*这些费用总计约1300万美元，超过了前三年净利润的总和。现在，公司已经准备好在1962年公布“创纪录的盈利”了，等等。

1. The company’s expansion period was not without an interruption. In 1961 it showed a small operating deficit, but—adopting a practice that was to be seen later in so many reports for 1970—evidently decided to throw all possible charges and reserves into the one bad year.* These amounted to a round $13 million, which was more than the combined net profits of the preceding three years. It was now ready to show “record earnings” in 1962, etc.

表 17-1 Ling-Temco-Vought Inc.，1958–1970 年（单位：百万美元，每股收益除外）

TABLE 17-1 Ling-Temco-Vought Inc., 1958–1970 (In Millions of Dollars Except Earned Per Share)

* 不包括债务折扣作为资产，并扣除赎回价值的优先股。

* Excluding debt-discount as an asset and deducting preferred stock at redemption value.

* 已发布。cr .：贷方。dr .：借方。def .：赤字。

* As published. cr.: credit. dr.: debit. def.: deficit.

2. 1966年底，公司有形净资产为每股普通股7.66美元（根据二拆三的拆股方案调整）。因此，1967年的市场价格达到了当时报告资产价值的22倍（！）。1968年底，资产负债表显示，380万股普通股和AA类股票的可用资金为2.86亿美元，约合每股77美元。但如果我们扣除优先股的全部价值，并剔除商誉项目和巨额债券折价“资产”，^*普通股将剩余1300万美元——每股仅3美元。这笔有形权益被随后几年的亏损抵消了。

2. At the end of 1966 the net tangible assets are given as $7.66 per share of common (adjusted for a 3-for-2 split). Thus the market price in 1967 reached 22 times (!) its reported asset value at the time. At the end of 1968 the balance sheet showed $286 million available for 3,800,000 shares of common and Class AA stock, or about $77 per share. But if we deduct the preferred stock at full value and exclude the good-will items and the huge bond-discount “asset,”^* there would remain $13 million for the common—a mere $3 per share. This tangible equity was wiped out by the losses of the following years.

3. 1967年末，我们两家最受尊敬的银行以每股111美元的价格发行了60万股Ling-Temco-Vought股票。当时股价最高曾达到169.5美元。不到三年，股价就跌至7.1 ^/ 8^美元。

3. Toward the end of 1967 two of our best-regarded banking firms offered 600,000 shares of Ling-Temco-Vought stock at $111 per share. It had been as high as 169½. In less than three years the price fell to 7¹⁄⁸.

4. 1967年底，银行贷款已达1.61亿美元，一年后更是飙升至4.14亿美元——这本应是一个令人担忧的数字。此外，长期债务高达12.37亿美元。到1969年，总债务已达18.69亿美元。百万。这可能是任何时间任何地点工业公司债务总额中最大的一个，唯一的例外是坚不可摧的新泽西标准石油公司。

4. At the end of 1967 the bank loans had reached $161 million, and a year later they stood at $414 million—which should have been a frightening figure. In addition, the long-term debt amounted to $1,237 million. By 1969 combined debt reached a total of $1,869 million. This may have been the largest combined debt figure of any industrial company anywhere and at any time, with the single exception of the impregnable Standard Oil of N.J.

5、1969年和1970年的亏损远远超过公司成立以来的总利润。

5. The losses in 1969 and 1970 far exceeded the total profits since the formation of the company.

寓意：凌-特姆科-沃特事件引发我们思考的主要问题是，商业银行家们是如何被说服在公司扩张时期向其提供如此巨额贷款的。1966年及之前，该公司的利息支出覆盖率不符合保守标准，流动资产与流动负债的比率以及股权与总债务的比率也不符合保守标准。但在接下来的两年里，银行又为公司预付了近4亿美元，用于进一步的“多元化”。这对银行来说并非好事，对公司股东的影响更是雪上加霜。如果凌-特姆科-沃特事件能够阻止商业银行在未来助纣为虐，最终或许能带来一些好处。*

MORAL: The primary question raised in our mind by the Ling-Temco-Vought story is how the commercial bankers could have been persuaded to lend the company such huge amounts of money during its expansion period. In 1966 and earlier the company’s coverage of interest charges did not meet conservative standards, and the same was true of the ratio of current assets to current liabilities and of stock equity to total debt. But in the next two years the banks advanced the enterprise nearly $400 million additional for further “diversification.” This was not good business for them, and it was worse in its implications for the company’s shareholders. If the Ling-Temco-Vought case will serve to keep commercial banks from aiding and abetting unsound expansions of this type in the future, some good may come of it at last.*

NVF 收购莎朗·斯蒂尔 (Sharon Steel)（收藏品）

The NVF Takeover of Sharon Steel (A Collector’s Item)

1968年底，NVF公司拥有460万美元的长期债务、1740万美元的股本、3100万美元的销售额和50.2万美元的净利润（扣除37.4万美元的特别贷项）。其业务被描述为“硫化纤维和塑料”。管理层决定收购Sharon钢铁公司，该公司拥有4300万美元的长期债务、1.01亿美元的股本、2.19亿美元的销售额和292.9万美元的净利润。因此，该公司希望收购的这家公司规模是NVF的七倍。1969年初，NVF向Sharon钢铁公司发出了收购其全部股份的要约。每股条款为票面金额70美元的NVF次级5%债券，到期日为1994年，另加以每股22美元的价格认购1.5股NVF股票的认股权证。Sharon管理层极力抵制此次收购，但徒劳无功。NVF根据要约收购了Sharon 88%的股票，因此发行了价值1.02亿美元的5%债券和认股权证，以换取2,197,000股。如果该要约全部生效，那么合并后的企业在1968年的负债将达到1.63亿美元，有形股本仅为220万美元，销售额为2.5亿美元。净收益问题可能有些复杂，但该公司随后将其列为每股NVF股票净亏损50美分（扣除特别抵扣前），每股净收益为3美分（扣除特别抵扣后）。*

At the end of 1968 NVF Company was a company with $4.6 million of long-term debt, $17.4 million of stock capital, $31 million of sales, and $502,000 of net income (before a special credit of $374,000). Its business was described as “vulcanized fiber and plastics.” The management decided to take over the Sharon Steel Corp., which had $43 million of long-term debt, $101 million of stock capital, $219 million of sales, and $2,929,000 of net earnings. The company it wished to acquire was thus seven times the size of NVF. In early 1969 it made an offer for all the shares of Sharon. The terms per share were $70 face amount of NVF junior 5% bonds, due 1994, plus warrants to buy 1½ shares of NVF stock at $22 per share of NVF. The management of Sharon strenuously resisted this takeover attempt, but in vain. NVF acquired 88% of the Sharon stock under the offer, issuing therefore $102 million of its 5% bonds and warrants for 2,197,000 of its shares. Had the offer been 100% operative the consolidated enterprise would, for the year 1968, have had $163 million in debt, only $2.2 million in tangible stock capital, $250 million of sales. The net-earnings question would have been a bit complicated, but the company subsequently stated them as a net loss of 50 cents per share of NVF stocks, before an extraordinary credit, and net earnings of 3 cents per share after such credit.*

第一条评论：在1969年的所有收购中，这无疑是财务失衡最为严重的一次。收购方承担了一项新的、头重脚轻的债务责任，并将其1968年的计算收益从盈利转为亏损。这一举措对公司财务状况造成的损害体现在，新发行的5%债券在发行当年的售价未超过面值的42美分。这表明人们对债券的安全性和公司的未来存在严重疑虑；然而，管理层实际上利用了债券价格，为公司节省了约100万美元的年度所得税，具体细节将在下文中说明。

FIRST COMMENT: Among all the takeovers effected in the year 1969 this was no doubt the most extreme in its financial disproportions. The acquiring company had assumed responsibility for a new and top-heavy debt obligation, and it had changed its calculated 1968 earnings from a profit to a loss into the bargain. A measure of the impairment of the company’s financial position by this step is found in the fact that the new 5% bonds did not sell higher than 42 cents on the dollar during the year of issuance. This would have indicated grave doubt of the safety of the bonds and of the company’s future; however, the management actually exploited the bond price in a way to save the company annual income taxes of about $1,000,000 as will be shown.

1968年的报告是在沙龙掌权后发布的，它简要概述了该党的业绩，并追溯到年底。报告包含两项最不寻常的内容：

The 1968 report, published after the Sharon takeover, contained a condensed picture of its results, carried back to the year-end. This contained two most unusual items:

1. 有一项资产被列为“递延债务费用”，金额为 58,600,000 美元。这笔金额大于全部“股东权益”，即 40,200,000 美元。

1. There is listed as an asset $58,600,000 of “deferred debt expense.” This sum is greater than the entire “stockholders’ equity,” placed at $40,200,000.

2. 然而，股东权益中未包括一项价值 20,700,000 美元的项目，该项目被指定为“超出 Sharon 投资成本的权益超额”。

2. However, not included in the shareholders’ equity is an item of $20,700,000 designated as “excess of equity over cost of investment in Sharon.”

第二条评论：如果我们将债务费用从资产中剔除（这似乎很难算作资产），并将另一项计入股东权益（它通常应该归入股东权益），那么我们将得到 NVF 股票更现实的有形权益表，即 2,200,000 美元。因此，这笔交易的第一个影响是将 NVF 的“实际权益”从 17,400,000 美元减少到 2,200,000 美元，或从每股 23.71 美元减少到每股 3 美元左右，共计 731,000 股。此外，NVF 股东还授予其他人以低于 1968 年收盘价 6 个点的价格购买 3.5 倍额外股份的权利。认股权证的初始市场价值当时约为每股 12 美元，对于参与购买的人来说，总计约为 3000 万美元。事实上，认股权证的市场价值远远超过了 NVF 流通股票的总市场价值——这再次证明了该交易具有“尾巴摇狗”的性质。

SECOND COMMENT: If we eliminate the debt expense as an asset, which it hardly seems to be, and include the other item in the shareholders’ equity (where it would normally belong), then we have a more realistic statement of tangible equity for NVF stock, viz., $2,200,000. Thus the first effect of the deal was to reduce NVF’s “real equity” from $17,400,000 to $2,200,000 or from $23.71 per share to about $3 per share, on 731,000 shares. In addition the NVF shareholders had given to others the right to buy 3½ times as many additional shares at six points below the market price at the close of 1968. The initial market value of the warrants was then about $12 each, or a total of some $30 million for those involved in the purchase offer. Actually, the market value of the warrants well exceeded the total market value of the outstanding NVF stock—another evidence of the tail-wagging-the-dog nature of the transaction.

会计花招

The Accounting Gimmicks

当我们从这份备考资产负债表翻到下一年度报告时，我们发现了几项看似奇怪的分录。除了基本利息支出（高达750万美元）外，还扣除了179.5万美元的“递延债务摊销”。但这最后一笔款项几乎被下一行一项非常不寻常的损益项目抵消了：“股权摊销超过子公司投资成本：165万美元”。在其中一个脚注中，我们发现了一项我们所知的其他报告中都没有出现的分录：部分股本被指定为“与收购等相关发行的认股权证的公平市场价值，2212.9万美元”。

When we pass from this pro forma balance sheet to the next year’s report we find several strange-appearing entries. In addition to the basic interest expense (a hefty $7,500,000), there is deducted $1,795,000 for “amortization of deferred debt expense.” But this last is nearly offset on the next line by a very unusual income item indeed: “amortization of equity over cost of investment in subsidiary: Cr. $1,650,000.” In one of the footnotes we find an entry, not appearing in any other report that we know of: Part of the stock capital is there designated as “fair market value of warrants issued in connection with acquisition, etc., $22,129,000.”

这些条目究竟是什么意思？1969 年报告的描述性文字中甚至没有提及任何一条。训练有素的证券分析师必须像侦探一样，自己去解开这些谜团。他发现，其根本目的是利用 5% 债券的低初始价格来获取税收优势。例如对这一巧妙安排感兴趣的读者，我们在附录 6 中列出了我们的解决方案（参见 2003 年版第 576 页）。

What on earth do all these entries mean? None of them is even referred to in the descriptive text of the 1969 report. The trained security analyst has to figure out these mysteries by himself, almost in detective fashion. He finds that the underlying idea is to derive a tax advantage from the low initial price of the 5% debentures. For readers who may be interested in this ingenious arrangement we set forth our solution in Appendix 6 (see p. 576 of the 2003 edition).

其他不寻常物品

Other Unusual Items

1. 1969年收盘后不久，该公司以每股9.38美元的价格买入了不少于65万份认股权证。考虑到以下因素，这笔交易显得尤为惊人：（a）NVF公司年末现金仅70万美元，1970年到期的债务为440万美元（显然，购买这些认股权证的600万美元是借来的）；（b）该公司买入这些认股权证时，其5%利率的债券售价不到面值的40%——这通常预示着未来将面临财务困境——这相当于“纸币”。

1. Right after the close of 1969 the company bought in no less than 650,000 warrants at a price of $9.38 each. This was extraordinary when we consider that (a) NVF itself had only $700,000 in cash at the year-end, and had $4,400,000 of debt due in 1970 (evidently the $6 million paid for the warrants had to be borrowed); (b) it was buying in this warrant “paper money” at a time when its 5% bonds were selling at less than 40 cents on the dollar—ordinarily a warning that financial difficulties lay ahead.

2. 为了部分抵消这一损失，该公司赎回了价值510万美元的债券以及25.3万份认股权证，换取了等量的普通股。之所以能够做到这一点，是因为受证券市场波动的影响，人们以低于40美元的价格出售5%的债券，而普通股的平均售价为13.5美元，且不支付股息。

2. As a partial offset to this, the company had retired $5,100,000 of its bonds along with 253,000 warrants in exchange for a like amount of common stock. This was possible because, by the vagaries of the securities markets, people were selling the 5% bonds at less than 40 while the common sold at an average price of 13½, paying no dividend.

3. 该公司不仅计划向员工出售股票，还计划向员工出售更多认股权证来购买股票。与股票购买一样，认股权证的首付比例为5%，其余部分在未来多年内支付。据我们所知，这是唯一一个这样的员工认股权证购买计划。会不会很快有人发明并分期出售购买股票的权利，等等？

3. The company had plans in operation not only for selling stock to its employees, but also for selling them a larger number of warrants to buy the stock. Like the stock purchases the warrants were to be paid for 5% down and the rest over many years in the future. This is the only such employee-purchase plan for warrants that we know of. Will someone soon invent and sell on installments a right to buy a right to buy a share, and so on?

4. 1969年，新控股的沙龙钢铁公司（Sharon Steel Co.）改变了计算养老金成本的方法，并降低了折旧率。这些会计变更使NVF的稀释前报告收益每股增加了约1美元。

4. In the year 1969 the newly controlled Sharon Steel Co. changed its method of arriving at its pension costs, and also adopted lower depreciation rates. These accounting changes added about $1 per share to the reported earnings of NVF before dilution.

5. 1970年底，《标准普尔股票指南》报告称，NVF股票的市盈率仅为2倍，是该指南涵盖的4500多只股票中最低的。正如华尔街的一句老话所说，这“如果属实，就很重要”。该比率是基于该年8.3/4美元的收盘价和截至1970年9月的12个^月每股^5.38美元的计算“收益”得出的。（使用（当时股价仅为收益的1.6倍。）但这一比率并未计入巨大的稀释因素*，也未计入1970年最后一个季度实际实现的负面业绩。当全年数据最终公布时，每股收益仅为2.03美元（未计入稀释因素），每股收益为1.80美元（稀释后）。另需注意的是，当时股票和认股权证的总市价约为1400万美元，而债券债务为1.35亿美元——这确实是一个非常微薄的股权状况。

5. At the end of 1970 Standard & Poor’s Stock Guide reported that NVF shares were selling at a price/earnings ratio of only 2, the lowest figure for all the 4,500-odd issues in the booklet. As the old Wall Street saying went, this was “important if true.” The ratio was based on the year’s closing price of 8³⁄⁴ and the computed “earnings” of $5.38 per share for the 12 months ended September 1970. (Using these figures the shares were selling at only 1.6 times earnings.) But this ratio did not allow for the large dilution factor,* nor for the adverse results actually realized in the last quarter of 1970. When the full year’s figures finally appeared, they showed only $2.03 per share earned for the stock, before allowing for dilution, and $1.80 per share on a diluted basis. Note also that the aggregate market price of the stock and warrants on that date was about $14 million against a bonded debt of $135 million—a skimpy equity position indeed.

AAA企业

AAA Enterprises

历史

History

大约15年前，一位名叫威廉姆斯的大学生开始销售移动房屋（当时称为“拖车”）。^* 1965年，他成立了自己的公司。当年，他的移动房屋销售额达580万美元，税前利润为6.1万美元。1968年，他加入了“特许经营”运动，开始以自己的公司名义向他人出售移动房屋的销售权。他还萌生了一个绝妙的想法，利用自己的移动房屋作为办公室，从事所得税申报业务。他成立了一家名为“美国税务先生”的子公司，当然，开始将特许经营权出售给其他人，以使用这个想法和名称。他将公司股份数量增加到 2,710,000 股，并准备发行股票。他发现我们最大的证券交易所之一以及其他证券交易所愿意承办这笔交易。1969 年 3 月，他们以每股 13 美元的价格向公众发售了 500,000 股 AAA 企业股票。其中，300,000 股由威廉姆斯先生个人账户出售，200,000 股由公司账户出售，为其资源增加了 2,400,000 美元。股票价格迅速翻倍至 28，即股权价值 8400 万美元，而账面价值为 4,200,000 美元，最高报告收益为 690,000 美元。因此，该股票的售价是其当前（也是最高）每股收益的 115 倍。毫无疑问，威廉姆斯先生选择AAA企业这个名字，是为了让它在电话簿和黄页中名列前茅。一个附带的结果是，他的公司注定会成为标准普尔股票指南中的第一个名字。就像阿布·本·阿德姆的公司一样，它引领了所有其他公司。*这也为它被选为1969年新融资和“热点问题”的悲惨例子提供了一个特殊的理由。

About 15 years ago a college student named Williams began selling mobile homes (then called “trailers”).^* In 1965 he incorporated his business. In that year he sold $5,800,000 of mobile homes and earned $61,000 before corporate tax. By 1968 he had joined the “franchising” movement and was selling others the right to sell mobile homes under his business name. He also conceived the bright idea of going into the business of preparing income-tax returns, using his mobile homes as offices. He formed a subsidiary company called Mr. Tax of America, and of course started to sell franchises to others to use the idea and the name. He multiplied the number of corporate shares to 2,710,000 and was ready for a stock offering. He found that one of our largest stock-exchange houses, along with others, was willing to handle the deal. In March 1969 they offered the public 500,000 shares of AAA Enterprises at $13 per share. Of these, 300,000 were sold for Mr. Williams’s personal account and 200,000 were sold for the company account, adding $2,400,000 to its resources. The price of the stock promptly doubled to 28, or a value of $84 million for the equity, against a book value of, say, $4,200,000 and maximum reported earnings of $690,000. The stock was thus selling at a tidy 115 times its current (and largest) earnings per share. No doubt Mr. Williams had selected the name AAA Enterprises so that it might be among the first in the phone books and the yellow pages. A collateral result was that his company was destined to appear as the first name in Standard & Poor’s Stock Guide. Like Abou Ben Adhem’s, it led all the rest.* This gives a special reason to select it as a harrowing example of 1969 new financing and “hot issues.”

评论：这对威廉姆斯先生来说不算坏事。他卖出的30万股股票在1968年12月的账面价值为18万美元，但他却因此净赚了20倍，足足360万美元。承销商和分销商扣除费用后，各自分得了50万美元。

COMMENT: This was not a bad deal for Mr. Williams. The 300,000 shares he sold had a book value in December of 1968 of $180,000 and he netted therefor 20 times as much, or a cool $3,600,000. The underwriters and distributors split $500,000 between them, less expenses.

1. 对于卖方的客户来说，这笔交易似乎不太划算。在通过增资操作增加股权后，他们被要求支付约十倍于股票账面价值的费用。他们用自己的钱把每股价格从59美分涨到了1.35美元。*在1968年达到顶峰之前，该公司的最高收益曾低至每股7美分。当然，他们制定了雄心勃勃的未来计划——但公众却被要求提前支付巨额费用，才能实现这些令人期盼的计划。

1. This did not seem so brilliant a deal for the clients of the selling houses. They were asked to pay about ten times the book value of the stock, after the bootstrap operation of increasing their equity per share from 59 cents to $1.35 with their own money.* Before the best year 1968, the company’s maximum earnings had been a ridiculous 7 cents per share. There were ambitious plans for the future, of course—but the public was being asked to pay heavily in advance for the hoped-for realization of these plans.

2. 尽管如此，该股股价在首次发行后不久就翻了一番，任何一位经纪公司客户都能从中获利。这一事实是否改变了上市计划？还是说，这种可能性的提前发生是否免除了最初发行该股的分销商对此次公开发行及其后续发行的责任？这个问题很难回答，但值得华尔街和政府监管机构认真思考。^*

2. Nonetheless, the price of the stock doubled soon after original issuance, and any one of the brokerage-house clients could have gotten out at a handsome profit. Did this fact alter the flotation, or did the advance possibility that it might happen exonerate the original distributors of the issue from responsibility for this public offering and its later sequel? Not an easy question to answer, but it deserves careful consideration by Wall Street and the government regulatory agencies.^*

后续历史

Subsequent History

随着资本的扩张，AAA企业又涉足了两项业务。1969年，它开设了一家地毯零售连锁店，并收购了一家生产移动房屋的工厂。前九个月的业绩报告并不算出色，但比前一年略有好转——每股22美分，而前一年为14美分。接下来几个月发生的事情简直令人难以置信。公司亏损4,365,000美元，即每股1.49美元。这笔亏损耗尽了融资前的所有资本，加上出售股票所得的全部2,400,000美元，以及1969年前九个月报告盈利的三分之二。最后，公司只剩下可怜的242,000美元，即每股8美分。公众股东在七个月前购买新股时仅支付了13美元。尽管如此，1969年收盘时，该公司股价仍以8.1 ^/ 8^的出价收盘，或者说，公司估值超过2500万美元。

With its enlarged capital AAA Enterprises went into two additional businesses. In 1969 it opened a chain of retail carpet stores, and it acquired a plant that manufactured mobile homes. The results reported for the first nine months were not exactly brilliant, but they were a little better than the year before—22 cents a share against 14 cents. What happened in the next months was literally incredible. The company lost $4,365,000, or $1.49 per share. This consumed all its capital before the financing, plus the entire $2,400,000 received on the sale of stock plus two-thirds of the amount reported as earned in the first nine months of 1969. There was left a pathetic $242,000, or 8 cents per share, of capital for the public shareholders who had paid $13 for the new offering only seven months before. Nonetheless the shares closed the year 1969 at 8¹⁄⁸ bid, or a “valuation” of more than $25 million for the company.

进一步评论：1. 该公司在1969年1月至9月期间实际盈利68.6万美元，而随后三个月却亏损436.5万美元，这实在令人难以置信。9月30日的报告存在一些令人遗憾、严重且令人愤慨的错误。

FURTHER COMMENT: 1. It is too much to believe that the company had actually earned $686,000 from January to September 1969 and then lost $4,365,000 in the next three months. There was something sadly, badly, and accusingly wrong about the September 30 report.

2. 当年8.1/8美元的收盘价，^比13^美元的初始发行价或随后“热门股”上涨至28美元的高价更能体现股市价格的完全不顾后果。后者的报价至少是基于热情和希望——与现实和常识完全不符，但至少可以理解。这家公司年末估值2500万美元，而这家公司已经损失了所有资本，只剩下微不足道的剩余，即将面临完全破产的境地，对于它来说，“热情”或“希望”都只是苦涩的讽刺。（诚然，年末数据在12月31日之前尚未公布，但与公司合作的华尔街公司需要每月提供运营报表，并相当准确地了解公司的发展情况。）

2. The year’s closing price of 8¹⁄⁸ bid was even more of a demonstration of the complete heedlessness of stock-market prices than were the original offering price of 13 or the subsequent “hot-issue” advance to a high bid of 28. These latter quotations at least were based on enthusiasm and hope—out of all proportion to reality and common sense, but at least comprehensible. The year-end valuation of $25 million was given to a company that had lost all but a minuscule remnant of its capital, for which a completely insolvent condition was imminent, and for which the words “enthusiasm” or “hope” would be only bitter sarcasms. (It is true the year-end figures had not been published by December 31, but it is the business of Wall Street houses associated with a company to have monthly operating statements and a fairly exact idea of how things are going.)

最终章

Final Chapter

1970年上半年，公司报告称又亏损了100万美元。现在，它出现了巨额的资本赤字。威廉姆斯先生提供的贷款总额高达250万美元，才使公司免于破产。此后似乎没有发布任何进一步的声明，直到1971年1月，AAA企业最终申请破产。月底，该股的报价仍为每股50美分，相当于全部发行价150万美元，这显然不过是一张墙纸的价值。我们的故事到此结束。

For the first half of 1970 the company reported a further loss of $1 million. It now had a good-sized capital deficit. It was kept out of bankruptcy by loans made by Mr. Williams, up to a total of $2,500,000. No further statements seem to have been issued, until in January 1971 AAA Enterprises finally filed a petition in bankruptcy. The quotation for the stock at month-end was still 50 cents a share bid, or $1,500,000 for the entire issue, which evidently had no more than wallpaper value. End of our story.

道德与问题：投机的公众是不可救药的。从财务角度来说，他们数不过来。只要有某种“行动”正在进行，他们就会不惜一切代价地购买任何东西。当某种潮流盛行时，任何与“特许经营”、计算机、电子、科学、技术或其他任何事物相关的公司都会被他们所吸引。我们的读者，各位明智的投资者，当然不会犯下如此愚蠢的错误。但问题依然存在：负责任的投资机构是否应该恪守信用，避免与此类企业有任何瓜葛？这些企业十有八九都注定要失败。（作者1914年进入华尔街时的情况确实如此。相比之下，尽管进行了各种改革和管控，但在接下来的57年里，“华尔街”的道德标准似乎不但没有提高，反而下降了。）除了目前仅限于要求在招股说明书中列明所有重要相关事实的权力之外，证券交易委员会是否应该被赋予其他权力来保护公众？是否应该汇编并以醒目的方式公布各种类型公开发行的统计数据？每一份招股说明书，或许还有每一份原始发行的销售确认书，是否都应该包含某种正式保证，保证发行价格与市场上同类发行的现行价格没有实质性偏差？在我们撰写本期之际，一场旨在改革华尔街弊端的运动正在进行中。在新股发行领域实施有意义的改革将会非常困难，因为这些弊端很大程度上源于公众自身的疏忽和贪婪。但此事值得长期而仔细的考量。*

MORAL AND QUESTIONS: The speculative public is incorrigible. In financial terms it cannot count beyond 3. It will buy anything, at any price, if there seems to be some “action” in progress. It will fall for any company identified with “franchising,” computers, electronics, science, technology, or what have you, when the particular fashion is raging. Our readers, sensible investors all, are of course above such foolishness. But questions remain: Should not responsible investment houses be honor-bound to refrain from identifying themselves with such enterprises, nine out of ten of which may be foredoomed to ultimate failure? (This was actually the situation when the author entered Wall Street in 1914. By comparison it would seem that the ethical standards of the “Street” have fallen rather than advanced in the ensuing 57 years, despite all the reforms and all the controls.) Could and should the SEC be given other powers to protect the public, beyond the present ones which are limited to requiring the printing of all important relevant facts in the offering prospectus? Should some kind of box score for public offerings of various types be compiled and published in conspicuous fashion? Should every prospectus, and perhaps every confirmation of sale under an original offering, carry some kind of formal warranty that the offering price for the issue is not substantially out of line with the ruling prices for issues of the same general type already established in the market? As we write this edition a movement toward reform of Wall Street abuses is under way. It will be difficult to impose worthwhile changes in the field of new offerings, because the abuses are so largely the result of the public’s own heedlessness and greed. But the matter deserves long and careful consideration.*

第17章评论

Commentary on Chapter 17

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

坚定不移地考虑所有证据，是抵御流行观点摇摆不定的极端倾向的唯一方法。这条建议看似简单，实际上却难以遵循。

An unflinching determination to take the whole evidence into account is the only method of preservation against the fluctuating extremes of fashionable opinion. This advice seems so easy, and is in fact so difficult to follow.

—阿尔弗雷德·诺斯·怀特黑德¹

—Alfred North Whitehead¹

秉承格雷厄姆的精神，让我们来思考一下“代表近年来华尔街各种极端情况”的四家公司。如同格雷厄姆最初的例子一样，这些公司也“对所有与投资有密切关系的人都具有指导意义和严肃警告”。

In Graham’s spirit, let’s consider four companies that “represent extremes of various sorts that were manifest on Wall Street in recent years.” Like Graham’s original examples, these also “hold instruction, and grave warnings, for everyone who has a serious connection” with investing.

这四家公司及其所代表的极端情况如下：

The four companies, and the extremes they exemplify, are:

尼古拉公司（Nikola Corp.），一家被过度炒作的公司，身处一个被过度炒作的行业。随着股价飙升，投机者们忽视了公司周围飘扬的危险信号。尼古拉的主打产品——一款电动卡车——被证实是假货；其创始人被判犯有欺诈罪。

Nikola Corp., an overhyped firm in an overhyped industry. As the stock roared higher, speculators ignored the red flags fluttering around the company. Nikola’s main product, an electric truck, turned out to be fake; its founder was convicted of fraud.

Peloton Interactive Inc.，一家专注于家庭健身的股票，其股价在短期内一度飙升，交易员们甚至将其推向了高潮。2020年疫情期间，似乎没有人会再出门或去健身房了。当生活恢复正常时——一切正常！——Peloton 逐渐衰落。

Peloton Interactive Inc., a home-exercise stock in a short-term boom that traders extrapolated to the moon. In the 2020 pandemic, it felt as if no one would ever leave home or go to a gym again. When life normalized—as it normally does!—Peloton petered out.

维珍银河控股公司 (Virgin Galactic Holdings Inc.)，一家由查马斯·帕里哈皮蒂亚 (Chamath Palihapitiya) 创办的特殊目的收购公司，他是模因股狂热的幕后操纵者。他和其他内部人士获利数亿美元。外部人士则损失了 80% 以上的资金。

Virgin Galactic Holdings Inc., a special-purpose acquisition company promoted by Chamath Palihapitiya, a ubiquitous pied piper for the meme-stock mania. He and other insiders reaped hundreds of millions of dollars. Outsiders lost more than 80% of their money.

雅宝公司（Albemarle Corp.）是一家老牌特种化学品生产商，卷入了一场新的投机风潮。它成了交易员们抛售的烫手山芋，试图抢购任何可能从新兴技术需求激增中获益的股票。但后来，它却遭遇了冷遇。

Albemarle Corp., an old-time specialty-chemicals producer that got swept up in a new speculation. It became a hot potato tossed around by traders trying to grab any stock that might benefit from surging demand for a trendy technology. Then it went cold.

没有卡车

No Truck with That

尼古拉（Nikola）声称即将生产使用氢燃料电池运输货物的电动卡车。该公司于2020年6月4日上市，当时数百万因新冠疫情被隔离的人们疯狂交易，就像内裤着火了一样。该公司股价在三天内飙升了136%。在每股79.73美元的峰值下，尼古拉的市值一度超过300亿美元，使其市值一度超过福特汽车公司和菲亚特克莱斯勒汽车公司（现为Stellantis NV），这两家公司是全球最大的汽车制造商。然而，尼古拉没有收入，亏损数千万美元，而且一辆汽车都没卖出去，甚至连开发都没开发出来。

Nikola purported to be on the verge of producing electric trucks that could haul freight using hydrogen fuel cells. It went public on June 4, 2020, when millions of people locked down in quarantine from Covid were trading as if their underpants were on fire. The stock shot up 136% in three days. At their peak of $79.73, the market capitalization of Nikola’s shares surpassed $30 billion, briefly making the company more valuable than Ford Motor Co. or Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (now Stellantis N.V.), two of the largest carmakers in the world. Yet Nikola had no revenues, was bleeding tens of millions of dollars in losses, and had not sold—or even developed—a single vehicle.

仅仅三个月后，投资公司兴登堡研究公司（Hindenburg Research）就在网上发布了一份令人震惊的报告，指控尼古拉创始人特雷弗·米尔顿（Trevor Milton）十多年来撒谎，并导致公司经营失败。报告指出，一段尼古拉卡车在高速公路上高速行驶的视频，实际上是卡车仅靠重力滑下山坡的影片。兴登堡声称，这辆车无法自行行驶，而且尼古拉几乎没有自己的电池或氢动力技术。

Only three months later, investment firm Hindenburg Research published a devastating online report alleging more than a decade of lies and business failures by Nikola’s founder, Trevor Milton. It demonstrated that a video of Nikola’s truck driving down a highway at high speed was, in fact, a film of the truck coasting down a hill powered only by gravity. The vehicle couldn’t propel itself, and Nikola had very little of its own battery or hydrogen technology, Hindenburg alleged.

尼古拉股价两天内暴跌24%，跌破35美元。很快，美国证券交易委员会和司法部就展开了调查。《华尔街日报》报道称，尼古拉声称正在研发自主电池，但长期以来一直在秘密计划从外部供应商处采购。

Nikola’s stock fell 24% in two days, sinking below $35. Soon the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice were investigating. The Wall Street Journal reported that Nikola, which claimed to be developing its own batteries, had long been secretly planning to obtain them from an outside supplier.

即便如此，尼古拉仍然是罗宾汉（Robinhood）上最受欢迎的股票之一，一度有超过20万名交易员持有该股。在米尔顿激进推文的煽动下，散户投机者帮助支撑了股价，使其股价连续数月保持在20美元以上，甚至在2020年11月回升至34.50美元。

Even so, Nikola remained among the most popular stocks on Robinhood, where more than 200,000 traders had owned it at one point. Egged on by Milton’s aggressive tweets, individual speculators helped prop up the stock price, which remained above $20 for months and even recovered to $34.50 in November 2020.

从 2020 年到 2022 年，尼古拉的销售额仅为 5100 万美元，却损失了 15 亿美元。

From 2020 through 2022, Nikola lost $1.5 billion on a mere $51 million in sales.

2022年10月，特雷弗·米尔顿因证券欺诈和电信欺诈被判罪。他被判处四年联邦监禁^。1

In October 2022, Trevor Milton was convicted of securities fraud and wire fraud. He was sentenced to four years in federal prison.¹

到 2023 年底，尼古拉股价已跌至 90 美分以下，较上市第一天下跌 98% ^。2

By year-end 2023, Nikola’s stock had sunk below 90 cents, down 98% from its first day of trading.²

后期周期投资

Late-Cycle Investing

高科技自行车和健身公司Peloton Interactive, Inc.于2019年9月首次公开募股（IPO），并在招股说明书中宣称，其有望吸引4500万美国家庭成为其“会员”或付费客户。这意味着美国每三个家庭中就有一个家庭会成为会员。

For its initial public offering in September 2019, Peloton Interactive, Inc., the high-tech bike and exercise company, declared in its prospectus that it could land 45 million U.S. households as “members” or paying customers. That would be one out of every three households in the country.

几个月后，这个大胆的目标在许多投机者看来似乎可行。2020年疫情期间，数百万沉迷于运动的人因为隔离而变得焦躁不安——而他们政府刺激计划的资金充裕。花 2,495 美元买一辆可以在自己家里安全使用、还能连接直播视频课程的健身车，感觉并不算奢侈。

A few months later, that audacious goal seemed plausible to many speculators. Millions of people who were hooked on exercise were going stir crazy from quarantine during the 2020 pandemic—and they were awash in cash from government stimulus checks. Spending $2,495 for an exercise bike you could use in the safety of your own home—and connect to live-streaming video classes—didn’t feel like an extravagance.

图 17-1：失速

FIGURE 17-1: Stalled Out

来源：FactSet。

Source: FactSet.

截至2020年7月，Peloton积压了超过10万辆自行车的订单。其市值达到380亿美元，与在线零售商巨头eBay Inc.的市值大致相当，尽管eBay过去12个月的销售额约为Peloton的六倍。

By July 2020, Peloton had a backlog of orders for more than 100,000 bikes. Its stock-market value hit $38 billion, roughly as large as eBay Inc., the giant online retailer, even though eBay’s sales over the previous 12 months were approximately six times greater.

2020年全年，Peloton的股价上涨了434%。

For the full year 2020, Peloton’s stock rose 434%.

Peloton 和那些追捧其股票的投机者坚称，即使疫情结束后，人们仍然更倾向于在家锻炼。“当你说‘走出疫情后恢复正常’时，我们并没有看到这种情况，”联合创始人约翰·福利 (John Foley) 在 2020 年 9 月的一次财报电话会议上宣称。但到了 2021 年年中，经济开始重新开放，消费者开始走出家门，重返健身房。一旦解除封锁，人们就不再想独自在家骑动感单车挥汗如雨了。

Peloton and the speculators who rode its stock insisted that even after the pandemic ended, people would still prefer to exercise at home. “When you say ‘normalize coming out of Covid,’ we don’t see that,” cofounder John Foley proclaimed during an earnings call in September 2020. But by mid-2021, the economy was reopening, and consumers were getting out—and going back to the gym. Once they were no longer locked down, people no longer wanted to sweat at home alone on a stationary bicycle.

华尔街有句名言：“趋势是你的朋友。”但当趋势结束时，它就不再是你的朋友了。

Wall Street has a saying, “The trend is your friend.” But it isn’t your friend when it comes to an end.

Peloton 在 2021 年和 2022 年共亏损 39 亿美元。到 2023 年，该公司的会员人数仅为 650 万，远低于其最初 4500 万的目标。

Peloton lost a combined $3.9 billion in 2021 and 2022. By 2023, the company had only 6.5 million members—far below its original target of 45 million.

在 2020 年大幅上涨之后，该股在 2021 年下跌了 76%，2022 年又下跌了 78%，2023 年下跌了 23%。

After its huge gain in 2020, the stock lost 76% in 2021, another 78% in 2022, and 23% in 2023.

如果您在 2020 年初向 Peloton 投资 10,000 美元，那么到 2023 年底，您将只剩下不到 2,150 美元。

Had you invested $10,000 in Peloton at the beginning of 2020, by the end of 2023 you would have had less than $2,150 left.

截至 2023 年底，二手 Peloton 自行车在 eBay 上的售价低至 300 美元^。3

As of late 2023, used Peloton bikes were offered for sale on eBay for as little as $300.³

与处女不同

Unlike a Virgin

维珍银河控股公司（Virgin Galactic Holdings, Inc.）最初以 Social Capital Hedosophia Holdings Corp. 这个响亮的名字而闻名，是一家太空旅行公司，于 2019 年 10 月首次公开募股，开盘价为每股 12.34 美元。

Virgin Galactic Holdings, Inc., originally known by the grandiloquent name of Social Capital Hedosophia Holdings Corp., is a space-travel company that launched its initial public offering of stock in October 2019 at an opening price of $12.34 per share.

维珍银河的IPO是通过与一家特殊目的收购公司（SPAC）达成的，该公司由“SPAC之王”查马斯·帕里哈皮蒂亚领导。这位亿万富翁、前Facebook高管经常用民粹主义言论、吹嘘公司潜力以及吹嘘自身交易的自吹自擂，煽动其100多万Twitter粉丝疯狂购买股票。

Virgin Galactic’s IPO came through a deal with a special purpose acquisition company, led by “SPAC King” Chamath Palihapitiya. The billionaire and former Facebook executive regularly whipped his more than 1 million Twitter followers into a buying frenzy with populist rants, boasts about the potential of his companies, and chest-thumping posts about his own trading.

图 17-2：降档

FIGURE 17-2: Downshifting

来源：FactSet。

Source: FactSet.

投机者们被这位魅力十足的“影响者”煽动，盲目追逐维珍银河的股票，却完全忽视了其业务的基本面。该股日成交量常常高达1000万股，有时甚至超过5000万股。

Riled up by a charismatic “influencer,” speculators blindly chased Virgin Galactic’s stock and blithely ignored the fundamentals of its underlying business. The stock often traded 10 million shares per day, sometimes more than 50 million.

到 2021 年 2 月，该公司股价飙升两倍多，达到 59 美元。这使得该公司的总市值达到约 140 亿美元。

The shares skyrocketed, more than tripling to $59 by February 2021. That gave the company a total market value of approximately $14 billion.

买家以这个价格买到了什么？

What did buyers get for that price?

想象一下市场先生说：“想买我的公司吗？它在 2020 年的支出高达 1.17 亿美元，只卖出了价值 23.8 万美元的产品和服务，最终损失了2.73亿美元。你花140亿美元买下它。

Imagine Mr. Market saying, “Wanna buy my business? It racked up $117 million in expenses in 2020, sold only $238,000 worth of our products and services, and ended up losing $273 million. It’s yours for $14 billion.”

你会接受他的那笔交易吗？

Would you take him up on that deal?

在社交媒体最有害的时期，这种情况确实发生了。

With social media at its most toxic, that’s exactly what happened.

效果如何？

How did it work out?

维珍银河的股价在 2021 年初飙升之后，到 2023 年底，其业务亏损已达 12.5 亿美元。在 2023 年 10 月的低点附近，其股票市值已跌至约 5.5 亿美元，较峰值下跌了 96%。

After its shares hit the stratosphere in early 2021, Virgin Galactic’s business generated $1.25 billion in losses by late 2023. Near its low in October 2023, its stock-market value had sunk to roughly $550 million—down 96% from its peak.

帕里哈皮蒂亚曾怂恿众多散户购买维珍银河的股票，但他早已抛售了股票。在股价接近顶峰时，他抛售了大部分股票——这些股票是他作为内部人士以低价购入的——获利至少1.66亿美元^。4

Palihapitiya, who goaded so many individuals into buying Virgin Galactic stock, had long since dumped it. He reaped at least $166 million in profit by selling most of his shares—which he’d bought at bargain prices as an insider—when the stock was near its zenith.⁴

图 17-3：空间案例

FIGURE 17-3: Space Case

来源：FactSet。

Source: FactSet.

先热后冷

Hot, Then Not

雅宝公司 (Albemarle Corp.) 的历史可以追溯到 1887 年成立的一家造纸公司。后来，它转变为锂、溴和其他化学品的生产商。

Albemarle Corp.’s history dates back to a paper company founded in 1887. It later morphed into a producer of lithium, bromine, and other chemicals.

雅宝公司的增长速度并不快；2020 年初，其销售额并不比 2011 年高。就在 2017 年，锂仅占净销售额的三分之一。

Albemarle wasn’t a fast grower; its sales were no higher in early 2020 than they had been in 2011. As recently as 2017, lithium accounted for only a third of net sales.

随后，电动汽车电池市场的蓬勃发展刺激了锂的需求，未来增长预期也随之爆发。2019年，雅宝锂销售额增长近11%；2020年，其股价飙升102%。2021年，其锂销售额增长19%，股价再次上涨58%。

Then the growing market for electric-vehicle batteries sparked demand for lithium, and expectations of future growth exploded. In 2019, Albemarle’s sales of lithium grew nearly 11%; in 2020, the stock shot up 102%. In 2021, its lithium sales rose 19%, and the shares jumped another 58%.

截至 2021 年底，Albemarle 的股价为销售额的 8 倍多、收益的 218 倍，是该公司历史上最高的股价。

By the end of 2021, Albemarle’s stock was trading at more than eight times sales and 218 times earnings—far and away the most expensive in the company’s history.

随着锂矿产量过剩，锂价在 2022 年 10 月至 2023 年底期间暴跌逾一半。Albemarle 股价在 2022 年下跌 7%，2023 年更是暴跌 33%。如果你在 2019 年初锂价炒作升温时买入 Albemarle 的股票，到 2023 年底，你的收益将略低于尽管 Albemarle 在 2020 年和 2021 年取得了巨额收益，但其盈利能力比投资指数基金要好。

As a glut of lithium poured out of mines, the price for the metal crumpled by more than half between October 2022 and late 2023. Albemarle’s stock fell 7% in 2022 and a grim 33% in 2023. If you’d bought Albemarle at the beginning of 2019 as the lithium hype was heating up, by the end of 2023 you would have earned slightly less than if you’d invested in an index fund—despite Albemarle’s huge gains in 2020 and 2021.

图 17-4：往返月球

FIGURE 17-4: To the Moon—and Back

来源：FactSet。

Source: FactSet.

2023 年末，该股的交易价格不到销售额的三倍，不到收益的七倍——接近雅宝历史上的最低价格。

In late 2023, the stock was trading at less than three times sales and under seven times earnings—close to the cheapest in Albemarle’s history.

雅宝越贵，市场先生就越喜欢它。后来，市场先生却损失惨重——雅宝越便宜，市场先生就越讨厌它。

The more expensive Albemarle became, the more Mr. Market adored it. Then he got burned—and the cheaper it got, the more he hated it.

骑虎难下

Riding the Tiger

正如格雷厄姆所说，“投机的公众是不可救药的。” 2023年8月，越南电动汽车制造商VinFast Auto Ltd.公开发行股票。似乎没有人从中吸取任何教训。在又一次IPO狂潮中，VinFast的股价在不到两周的时间内上涨了八倍多，达到每股93美元，总市值一度达到1900亿美元。这相当于福特汽车公司和通用汽车公司市值总和的两倍，尽管VinFast在美国仅售出740辆汽车，并且每天亏损约700万美元。

As Graham says, “the speculative public is incorrigible.” In August 2023, a Vietnamese electric-vehicle maker, VinFast Auto Ltd., sold shares to the public. It was as if no one had learned anything. In yet another IPO frenzy, Vinfast’s stock went up more than eight-fold to $93 per share in less than two weeks, briefly hitting a total market capitalization of $190 billion. That was twice the market value of Ford Motor Co. and General Motors Co. combined, even though Vinfast had sold only 740 vehicles in the U.S. and was losing about $7 million a day.

在接下来的两个月里，该股下跌了 90% 以上。

Over the next two months the stock fell more than 90%.

自从公司和市场存在以来，投机者就一直走向极端——他们对某只股票一无所知，只知道其他人也在买入；他们无视最明显的警示信号；将短期趋势推断到永恒；为了天上的馅饼付出几乎无限的代价。人性不变，有些人会永远追逐贪婪的梦想。

For as long as companies and markets have existed, speculators have gone to extremes—buying when they know nothing about a stock except that other people are buying it, ignoring the most obvious warning signs, extrapolating short-term trends into eternity, paying almost infinite prices for slices of pie in the sky. Human nature doesn’t change, and some people will chase dreams of greed until the end of time.

你应该加入他们吗？

Should you join them?

如果有人在尼古拉、Peloton、维珍银河或阿尔伯马尔股价上涨初期买入，然后在绝对峰值时卖出，本来可以赚很多钱。但这就像爬到一只野虎背上，紧紧抓住它，直到它以每小时40英里的速度奔跑，然后跳下来，毫发无损。

Someone who bought Nikola, Peloton, Virgin Galactic, or Albemarle at the beginning of their run-ups and sold at the absolute peak could have made a lot of money. But that’s like climbing onto the back of a wild tiger, hanging on until it’s sprinting 40 miles per hour, and hopping off without getting mauled.

地球上的某个地方，有人也许能够做到这一点。

Somewhere on earth, someone might be able to do that.

但是那些认为自己可以做到的投机者们是在自欺欺人——如果你认为你可以通过购买热门股票并在为时已晚之前套现而致富，那么你也是在自欺欺人。

But the hordes of speculators who thought they could were kidding themselves—and so are you if you think you can get rich by riding hot stocks and cashing out before it’s too late.

第十八章

Chapter 18 八对公司比较

A Comparison of Eight Pairs of Companies

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

本章将尝试一种新颖的阐述方式。我们将选取八对在证券交易所股票名单上相邻或接近相邻的公司，以具体生动的方式展现企业在性格、财务结构、政策、业绩和变迁方面的多样性，以及近年来金融领域投资和投机态度的多样性。在每次比较中，我们仅对那些具有特殊意义和重要性的方面进行评论。

In this chapter we shall attempt a novel form of exposition. By selecting eight pairs of companies which appear next to each other, or nearly so, on the stock-exchange list we hope to bring home in a concrete and vivid manner some of the many varieties of character, financial structure, policies, performance, and vicissitudes of corporate enterprises, and of the investment and speculative attitudes found on the financial scene in recent years. In each comparison we shall comment only on those aspects that have a special meaning and import.

第一对：房地产投资信托（商店、办公室、工厂等）和纽约房地产股权公司（房地产投资；一般建筑）

Pair I: Real Estate Investment Trust (stores, offices, factories, etc.) and Realty Equities Corp. of New York (real estate investment; general construction)

在第一次比较中，我们放弃了其他两家公司所使用的字母顺序。这对我们来说意义非凡，因为一方面，它似乎概括了传统处理他人资金的方式中所有合理、稳定且总体上良好之处；另一方面，另一家公司则呈现出当今企业运营中常见的鲁莽扩张、金融花招和过山车式的波动。这两家公司名称相似，多年来一直并列在美国证券交易所的股票名单上。它们的股票代码——REI 和 REC——很容易被混淆。但其中一家是一家稳重的新英格兰信托公司，由三位受托人管理，运营历史可追溯至近一个世纪，而且自 1889 年以来，该公司一直持续支付股息。它始终保持着同样审慎的投资方式，将扩张速度限制在适中水平，将债务限制在易于管理的范围内。*

In this first comparison we depart from the alphabetical order used for the other pairs. It has a special significance for us, since it seems to encapsulate, on the one hand, all that has been reasonable, stable, and generally good in the traditional methods of handling other people’s money, in contrast—in the other company—with the reckless expansion, the financial legerdemain, and the roller-coaster changes so often found in present-day corporate operations. The two enterprises have similar names, and for many years they appeared side by side on the American Stock Exchange list. Their stock-ticker symbols—REI and REC—could easily have been confused. But one of them is a staid New England trust, administered by three trustees, with operations dating back nearly a century, and with dividends paid continuously since 1889. It has kept throughout to the same type of prudent investments, limiting its expansion to a moderate rate and its debt to an easily manageable figure.*

另一家是典型的纽约突飞猛进型企业，八年间，其资产从620万美元暴增至1.54亿美元，负债也以相同比例增长；该公司从普通的房地产业务转型为多元化企业，包括两条赛马场、74家电影院、三家文学代理机构、一家公关公司、酒店、超市，以及一家大型化妆品公司（该公司于1970年破产）26%的股权。^*与这家商业企业集团相匹配的是各种相应的公司模式，包括：

The other is a typical New York-based sudden-growth venture, which in eight years blew up its assets from $6.2 million to $154 million, and its debts in the same proportion; which moved out from ordinary real-estate operations to a miscellany of ventures, including two racetracks, 74 movie theaters, three literary agencies, a public-relations firm, hotels, supermarkets, and a 26% interest in a large cosmetics firm (which went bankrupt in 1970).^* This conglomeration of business ventures was matched by a corresponding variety of corporate devices, including the following:

优先股有权获得每年 7 美元的股息，但票面价值仅为 1 美元，每股承担 1 美元的负债。
A preferred stock entitled to $7 annual dividends, but with a par value of only $1, and carried as a liability at $1 per share.
普通股的标称价值为 2,500,000 美元（每股 1 美元），但扣除 209,000 股重新收购股票的成本 5,500,000 美元后，这一价值被抵消了。
A stated common-stock value of $2,500,000 ($1 per share), more than offset by a deduction of $5,500,000 as the cost of 209,000 shares of reacquired stock.
三个系列的股票期权认股权证，总共授予购买 1,578,000 股的权利。
Three series of stock-option warrants, giving rights to buy a total of 1,578,000 shares.
至少有六种不同的债务，包括抵押贷款、债券、公开持有的票据、应付银行票据、“应付票据、贷款和合同”以及应付小企业管理局的贷款，1969 年 3 月总额超过 1 亿美元。此外，它还有通常的税款和应付账款。
At least six different kinds of debt obligations, in the form of mortgages, debentures, publicly held notes, notes payable to banks, “notes, loans, and contracts payable,” and loans payable to the Small Business Administration, adding up to over $100 million in March 1969. In addition it had the usual taxes and accounts payable.

我们首先来看看这两家企业在1960年的一些数据（表18-1A）。我们发现，信托公司的股票在市场上的售价是普通股总价值的九倍。信托公司的相对负债较小，而且负债率更高。净值与毛值之比为 1.00，但普通股价格相对于每股收益而言较高。

Let us present first a few figures of the two enterprises as they appeared in 1960 (Table 18-1A). Here we find the Trust shares selling in the market for nine times the aggregate value of Equities stock. The Trust enterprise had a smaller relative debt and a better ratio of net to gross, but the price of the common was higher in relation to per-share earnings.

表 18-1A 1960 年房地产投资信托与房地产股票公司对比

TABLE 18-1A Pair 1. Real Estate Investment Trust vs. Realty Equities Corp. in 1960

房地产投资信托

Real Estate Investment Trust

纽约房地产股票公司

Realty Equities Corp. of New York

总收入

Gross revenues

3,585,000 美元

$ 3,585,000

1,484,000 美元

$1,484,000

净利

Net income

485,000

15万

150,000

每股收益

Earned per share

.66

.47

每股股息

Dividend per share

没有任何

none

.10

每股账面价值

Book value per share

20美元。

$20.

4美元。

$4.

价格范围

Price range

20–12

5⅜–4¾

总资产

Total assets

22,700,000美元

$22,700,000

6,200,000 美元

$6,200,000

总负债

Total liabilities

7,400,000

5,000,000

普通股账面价值

Book value of common

15,300,000

1,200,000

普通股平均市值

Average market value of common

12,200,000

1,360,000

表18-1B展示了大约八年后的情况。信托“保持了其一贯的平静基调”，收入和每股收益均增长了约四分之三。*但房地产股票公司却已蜕变成一个丑陋而脆弱的怪物。

In Table 18-1B we present the situation about eight years later. The Trust had “kept the noiseless tenor of its way,” increasing both its revenues and its per-share earnings by about three-quarters.* But Realty Equities had been metamorphosed into something monstrous and vulnerable.

表 18-1B 对 1。

TABLE 18-1B Pair 1.

^a有多种认股权证，可以以不同的价格认购1,600,000股或更多股份。上市发行的认股权证售价为每份30.5美元。

^a There were warrants to buy 1,600,000 or more shares at various prices. A listed issue sold at 30½ per warrant.

^b作为一家房地产信托，该企业 1968 年无需缴纳联邦所得税。

^b As a realty trust, this enterprise was not subjected to Federal income tax in 1968.

华尔街对这些形形色色的发展作何反应？答案是尽可能少地关注信托，而大量关注房地产股票。1968年，房地产股票的股价从10美元飙升至37.5美元，上市认股权证的股价从6美元飙升至36.5美元，合计售出242万股。与此同时，信托股价则在温和的成交量下，从20美元缓慢上涨至30.25美元。1969年3月的房地产股票资产负债表显示，其资产价值仅为每股3.41美元，不到当年最高价的十分之一。信托股票的账面价值为20.85美元。

How did Wall Street react to these diverse developments? By paying as little attention as possible to the Trust and a lot to Realty Equities. In 1968 the latter shot up from 10 to 37¾ and the listed warrants from 6 to 36½, on combined sales of 2,420,000 shares. While this was happening the Trust shares advanced sedately from 20 to 30¼ on modest volume. The March 1969 balance sheet of Equities was to show an asset value of only $3.41 per share, less than a tenth of its high price that year. The book value of the Trust shares was $20.85.

第二年，股票市场形势明显不容乐观，股价跌至9.5美元。1970年3月的报告出炉时，股东们肯定大吃一惊，因为他们得知公司净亏损1320万美元，合每股5.17美元——几乎抹去了他们之前微薄的股本。（这个灾难性的数字包括了880万美元用于未来投资损失的储备金。）尽管如此，董事们还是勇敢地（？）宣布在财年结束后立即派发5美分的额外股息。但更大的麻烦接踵而至。公司的审计师拒绝对1969-70年的财务报表进行认证，股票也因此被暂停在美国证券交易所交易。在场外交易市场，买入价跌至每股2美元以下。

The next year it became clear that all was not well in the Equities picture, and the price fell to 9½. When the report for March 1970 appeared the shareholders must have felt shell-shocked as they read that the enterprise had sustained a net loss of $13,200,000, or $5.17 per share—virtually wiping out their former slim equity. (This disastrous figure included a reserve of $8,800,000 for future losses on investments.) Nonetheless the directors had bravely (?) declared an extra dividend of 5 cents right after the close of the fiscal year. But more trouble was in sight. The company’s auditors refused to certify the financial statements for 1969–70, and the shares were suspended from trading on the American Stock Exchange. In the over-the-counter market the bid price dropped below $2 per share.*

1969年后，房地产投资信托基金（REIT）的股价波动较为典型。1970年的最低点为16.5美元，1971年初回升至26.5 ^/ 6^美元。最新公布的每股收益为1.50美元，股价略高于其1970年的账面价值21.60美元。该基金在1968年创下历史新高时，其发行价可能略高，但股东们一直得到了受托人的诚实和良好的服务。房地产股票（Realty Equities）的情况则截然不同，而且令人遗憾。

Real Estate Investment Trust shares had typical price fluctuations after 1969. The low in 1970 was 16½, with a recovery to 26⁵⁄⁶ in early 1971. The latest reported earnings were $1.50 per share, and the stock was selling moderately above its 1970 book value of $21.60. The issue may have been somewhat overpriced at its record high in 1968, but the shareholders have been honestly and well served by their trustees. The Realty Equities story is a different and a sorry one.

第二对：空气产品和化学品公司（工业和医用气体等）和空气减量公司（工业气体和设备；化学品）

Pair 2: Air Products and Chemicals (industrial and medical gases, etc.) and Air Reduction Co. (industrial gases and equipment; chemicals)

与第一对相比，这两对在名称和业务范围上都更加相似。因此，它们之间的比较属于证券分析中的常规类型，而我们其他的几对则更具异质性。^* “产品”是指空气产品公司比“Reduction”成立时间晚，1969 年的发行量还不到后者的一半。*尽管如此，其股票发行总额比空气减量公司的股票高出 25%。如表 18-2所示，原因既在于空气减量公司更高的盈利能力，也在于其更强劲的增长记录。我们在这里发现了“质量”表现更好的典型后果。空气产品公司的市盈率为其最新收益的 16.5 倍，而空气减量公司仅为 9.1 倍。此外，空气产品公司的售价远高于其资产支持，而空气减量公司的购买价格仅为其账面价值的 75%。^*空气减量公司支付的股息更为慷慨；但这可以被视为反映了空气产品公司更希望保留其收益。此外，空气减量公司的营运资金状况更为宽裕。（关于这一点，我们可以指出，一家盈利的公司总是可以通过某种形式的永久性融资来稳固其当前状况。但按照我们的标准，空气产品公司的债券发行有些过度。）

Even more than our first pair, these two resemble each other in both name and line of business. The comparison they invite is thus of the conventional type in security analysis, while most of our other pairs are more heteroclite in nature.^* “Products” is a newer company than “Reduction,” and in 1969 had less than half the other’s volume.* Nonetheless its equity issues sold for 25% more in the aggregate than Air Reduction’s stock. As Table 18-2 shows, the reason can be found both in Air Reduction’s greater profitability and in its stronger growth record. We find here the typical consequences of a better showing of “quality.” Air Products sold at 16½ times its latest earnings against only 9.1 times for Air Reduction. Also Air Products sold well above its asset backing, while Air Reduction could be bought at only 75% of its book value.^* Air Reduction paid a more liberal dividend; but this may be deemed to reflect the greater desirability for Air Products to retain its earnings. Also, Air Reduction had a more comfortable working-capital position. (On this point we may remark that a profitable company can always put its current position in shape by some form of permanent financing. But by our standards Air Products was somewhat overbonded.)

如果分析师被要求在两家公司之间做出选择，他毫不费力地得出结论：空气产品公司的前景比空气减少公司（Air Reduction）更光明。但这是否使得空气产品公司在其相对高得多的价格下更具吸引力呢？我们怀疑这个问题是否能够得到明确的答案。一般来说，华尔街在考虑时将“质量”置于“数量”之上，或许大多数证券分析师都会选择“更好”但价格更高的空气产品公司，而不是“更差”但价格更低的空气减少公司。这种偏好是否正确，更有可能取决于不可预测的未来，而不是任何可论证的投资原则。在这种情况下，空气减少公司似乎属于低乘数类别的重要公司。如果如上文提到的研究^* 似乎表明，该集团整体的业绩可能比高乘数股票表现更好，那么从逻辑上讲，Air Reduction 应该优先考虑——但仅限于多元化运营的一部分。（此外，对个别公司进行深入研究也可能使分析师得出相反的结论；但这必须是出于过去业绩表现之外的原因。）

If the analyst were called on to choose between the two companies he would have no difficulty in concluding that the prospects of Air Products looked more promising than those of Air Reduction. But did this make Air Products more attractive at its considerably higher relative price? We doubt whether this question can be answered in a definitive fashion. In general Wall Street sets “quality” above “quantity” in its thinking, and probably the majority of security analysts would opt for the “better” but dearer Air Products as against the “poorer” but cheaper Air Reduction. Whether this preference is to prove right or wrong is more likely to depend on the unpredictable future than on any demonstrable investment principle. In this instance, Air Reduction appears to belong to the group of important companies in the low-multiplier class. If, as the studies referred to above^* would seem to indicate, that group as a whole is likely to give a better account of itself than the high-multiplier stocks, then Air Reduction should logically be given the preference—but only as part of a diversified operation. (Also, a thorough-going study of the individual companies could lead the analyst to the opposite conclusion; but that would have to be for reasons beyond those already reflected in the past showing.)

表 18-2 对 2。

TABLE 18-2 Pair 2.

^a假设优先股转换。

^a Assuming conversion of preferred stock.

后续：在1970年的股市崩盘中，空气产品公司（Air Products）的表现优于空气减量公司（Air Reduction），前者下跌了16%，后者下跌了24%。然而，减量公司在1971年初实现了更强劲的反弹，股价较1969年的收盘价上涨了50%，而空气产品公司仅为30%。在这种情况下，低乘数发行的股票至少在当时占据了优势。*

SEQUEL: Air Products stood up better than Air Reduction in the 1970 break, with a decline of 16% against 24%. However, Reduction made a better comeback in early 1971, rising to 50% above its 1969 close, against 30% for Products. In this case the low-multiplier issue scored the advantage—for the time being, at least.*

第三对：美国家庭用品公司（药品、化妆品、家用产品、糖果）和美国医院供应公司（医院用品和设备分销商和制造商）

Pair 3: American Home Products Co. (drugs, cosmetics, household products, candy) and American Hospital Supply Co. (distributor and manufacturer of hospital supplies and equipment)

1969 年底，这两家公司都是“价值 10 亿美元的商誉”公司，分别代表着快速增长且利润丰厚的“健康产业”的不同部分。我们将它们分别称为家庭公司和医院公司。表 18-3列出了这两家公司的精选数据。它们具有以下共同的优点：出色的增长，自 1958 年以来没有出现过挫折（即 100% 的盈利稳定性）；以及强劲的财务状况。截至 1969 年底，医院公司的增长率远高于家庭公司。另一方面，家庭公司的销售额和资本盈利能力都远远高于家庭公司。^*（事实上，1969 年医院公司的资本收益率相对较低——仅为 9.7%——这引出了一个耐人寻味的问题：尽管它过去的销售额和盈利增长率令人瞩目，但当时它是否真的是一家利润丰厚的企业。）

These were two “billion-dollar good-will” companies at the end of 1969, representing different segments of the rapidly growing and immensely profitable “health industry.” We shall refer to them as Home and Hospital, respectively. Selected data on both are presented in Table 18-3. They had the following favorable points in common: excellent growth, with no setbacks since 1958 (i.e., 100% earnings stability); and strong financial condition. The growth rate of Hospital up to the end of 1969 was considerably higher than Home’s. On the other hand, Home enjoyed substantially better profitability on both sales and capital.^* (In fact, the relatively low rate of Hospital’s earnings on its capital in 1969—only 9.7%—raises the intriguing question whether the business then was in fact a highly profitable one, despite its remarkable past growth rate in sales and earnings.)

如果将比较价格纳入考量，Home 的当前（或过去）收益和股息的性价比要高得多。Home 的账面价值非常低，这体现了普通股分析中的一个基本模糊性或矛盾之处。一方面，这意味着该公司的回报率很高其资本——这通常是实力和繁荣的象征。另一方面，这意味着以当前价格购买的投资者尤其容易受到公司盈利状况任何重大不利变化的影响。由于Hospital在1969年的售价是其账面价值的四倍以上，因此这两家公司都必须遵守这一警示。

When comparative price is taken into account, Home offered much more for the money in terms of current (or past) earnings and dividends. The very low book value of Home illustrates a basic ambiguity or contradiction in common-stock analysis. On the one hand, it means that the company is earning a high return on its capital—which in general is a sign of strength and prosperity. On the other, it means that the investor at the current price would be especially vulnerable to any important adverse change in the company’s earnings situation. Since Hospital was selling at over four times its book value in 1969, this cautionary remark must be applied to both companies.

表 18-3 对 3。

TABLE 18-3 Pair 3.

结论：我们的观点是，这两家公司在当前股价下都过于“昂贵”，以至于投资者如果遵循我们保守的选择思路，就不会考虑它们。但这并不意味着这两家公司缺乏承诺。问题在于，它们的股价包含了太多的“承诺”，而实际业绩却不足。就这两家企业而言，1969年的股价反映了近50亿美元的商誉估值。需要多少年的优异未来盈利才能以股息或有形资产的形式“兑现”这些商誉因素？

CONCLUSIONS: Our clear-cut view would be that both companies were too “rich” at their current prices to be considered by the investor who decides to follow our ideas of conservative selection. This does not mean that the companies were lacking in promise. The trouble is, rather, that their price contained too much “promise” and not enough actual performance. For the two enterprises combined, the 1969 price reflected almost $5 billion of good-will valuation. How many years of excellent future earnings would it take to “realize” that good-will factor in the form of dividends or tangible assets?

短期后果： 1969年底，市场显然对“医院”的盈利前景看好，而非“家庭”，因为前者的乘数几乎是后者的两倍。结果却是，这只备受青睐的股票在1970年收益出现微幅下滑，而“家庭”却实现了8%的可观收益。“医院”的市场价格对这一年令人失望的表现做出了显著反应。1971年2月，它的售价为32美元——较1969年的收盘价下跌了约30%——而“家庭”的报价略高于其同期水平。*

SHORT-TERM SEQUEL: At the end of 1969 the market evidently thought more highly of the earnings prospects of Hospital than of Home, since it gave the former almost twice the multiplier of the latter. As it happened the favored issue showed a microscopic decline in earnings in 1970, while Home turned in a respectable 8% gain. The market price of Hospital reacted significantly to this one-year disappointment. It sold at 32 in February 1971—a loss of about 30% from its 1969 close—while Home was quoted slightly above its corresponding level.*

第四对：H & R Block, Inc.（所得税服务）和 Blue Bell, Inc.（工作服、制服等制造商）

Pair 4: H & R Block, Inc. (income-tax service) and Blue Bell, Inc., (manufacturers of work clothes, uniforms, etc.)

这两家公司作为纽约证券交易所的新面孔，代表着两种截然不同的成功故事。蓝钟公司在竞争激烈的行业中艰难起步，最终成为行业中最重要的力量。其盈利受行业状况影响有所波动，但自1965年以来的增长令人印象深刻。该公司的业务可以追溯到1916年，其连续派息记录可追溯到1923年。1969年底，股市对蓝钟公司的发行毫无热情，其市盈率仅为11倍，而标准普尔综合指数则约为17倍。

These companies rub shoulders as relative newcomers to the New York Stock Exchange, where they represent two very different genres of success stories. Blue Bell came up the hard way in a highly competitive industry, in which eventually it became the largest factor. Its earnings have fluctuated somewhat with industry conditions, but their growth since 1965 has been impressive. The company’s operations go back to 1916 and its continuous dividend record to 1923. At the end of 1969 the stock market showed no enthusiasm for the issue, giving it a price/earnings ratio of only 11, against about 17 for the S & P composite index.

相比之下，H&R Block 的崛起可谓迅猛。该公司首次公布的数据仅追溯到 1961 年，当年营收 61 万美元，利润 8.3 万美元。但八年后，也就是我们比较的日期，其营收已飙升至 5360 万美元，净利润达到 630 万美元。当时，股市对……的态度这位业绩出色的人看起来欣喜若狂。1969年收盘时，施乐股价为每股55美元，是其上一财年盈利的100多倍——这当然是迄今为止最高的盈利。3亿美元的股票总市值几乎是其股票背后有形资产的30倍。*这在严肃的股市估值史上几乎是闻所未闻的。（当时，IBM的市盈率约为账面价值的9倍，而施乐的市盈率约为账面价值的11倍。）

By contrast, the rise of H & R Block has been meteoric. Its first published figures date only to 1961, in which year it earned $83,000 on revenues of $610,000. But eight years later, on our comparison date, its revenues had soared to $53.6 million and its net to $6.3 million. At that time the stock market’s attitude toward this fine performer appeared nothing less than ecstatic. The price of 55 at the close of 1969 was more than 100 times the last reported 12-months’ earnings—which of course were the largest to date. The aggregate market value of $300 million for the stock issue was nearly 30 times the tangible assets behind the shares.* This was almost unheard of in the annals of serious stock-market valuations. (At that time IBM was selling at about 9 times and Xerox at 11 times book value.)

我们的表18-4以美元数字和比率的形式，列出了Block和Blue Bell在估值对比中的巨大差异。诚然，Block的单位资本盈利能力是Blue Bell的两倍，而且过去五年（几乎从零开始）的盈利百分比增长也高得多。但作为一家股份制企业，Blue Bell的售价还不到Block总价值的三分之一，尽管Blue Bell的业务量是Block的四倍，股票收益是Block的2.5倍，有形投资是Block的5.5倍，股息收益率也是Block的九倍。

Our Table 18-4 sets forth in dollar figures and in ratios the extraordinary discrepancy in the comparative valuations of Block and Blue Bell. True, Block showed twice the profitability of Blue Bell per dollar of capital, and its percentage growth in earnings over the past five years (from practically nothing) was much higher. But as a stock enterprise Blue Bell was selling for less than one-third the total value of Block, although Blue Bell was doing four times as much business, earning 2½ times as much for its stock, had 5½ times as much in tangible investment, and gave nine times the dividend yield on the price.

指示性结论：一位经验丰富的分析师会认为 Block 势头强劲，意味着未来增长前景极佳。他或许会对所得税服务领域的激烈竞争风险有所顾虑，因为 Block 实现了丰厚的资本回报率。1^但考虑到雅芳产品等优秀公司在竞争激烈的领域持续取得成功，他会犹豫是否要预测 Block 的增长曲线会迅速趋于平缓。他主要担心的是，该公司 3 亿美元的估值是否已经充分评估甚至高估了人们对这家优秀企业所能合理预期的价值。相比之下，分析师应该毫不犹豫地推荐 Blue Bell，认为它是一家定价相当保守的优秀公司。

INDICATED CONCLUSIONS: An experienced analyst would have conceded great momentum to Block, implying excellent prospects for future growth. He might have had some qualms about the dangers of serious competition in the income-tax-service field, lured by the handsome return on capital realized by Block.¹ But mindful of the continued success of such outstanding companies as Avon Products in highly competitive areas, he would have hesitated to predict a speedy flattening out of the Block growth curve. His chief concern would be simply whether the $300 million valuation for the company had not already fully valued and perhaps overvalued all that one could reasonably expect from this excellent business. By contrast the analyst should have had little difficulty in recommending Blue Bell as a fine company, quite conservatively priced.

1971 年3月的后续。1970年的近乎恐慌导致比蓝钟股价低了约三分之一，比布洛克股价低了约三分之一。两家公司随后都加入了股市的强势复苏。布洛克股价在1971年2月升至75美元，但蓝钟涨幅更大，达到109美元（在二拆三之后）。显然，截至1969年底，蓝钟比布洛克更值得买入。但布洛克股价能够从明显虚高的估值上涨约35%这一事实，表明分析师和投资者对蓝钟的谨慎态度。投资者必须通过言语或行动来低估优秀的公司，无论其报价看起来有多高。*

SEQUEL TO MARCH 1971. The 1970 near-panic lopped one-quarter off the price of Blue Bell and about one-third from that of Block. Both then joined in the extraordinary recovery of the general market. The price of Block rose to 75 in February 1971, but Blue Bell advanced considerably more—to the equivalent of 109 (after a three-for-two split). Clearly Blue Bell proved a better buy than Block as of the end of 1969. But the fact that Block was able to advance some 35% from that apparently inflated value indicates how wary analysts and investors must be to sell good companies short—either by word or deed—no matter how high the quotation may seem.*

表 18-4 对 4。

Table 18-4 Pair 4.

^a假设优先股转换。

^a Assuming conversion of preferred stock.

第五对：国际香精香料公司（为其他企业生产香精等）和国际收割机公司（卡车制造商、农用机械、建筑机械）

Pair 5: International Flavors & Fragrances (flavors, etc., for other businesses) and International Harvester Co. (truck manufacturer, farm machinery, construction machinery)

这种比较应该会带来不止一个惊喜。每个人都知道国际收割机公司，它是道琼斯工业平均指数 30 家巨头之一。^*有多少读者听说过纽约证券交易所上市的收割机公司的隔壁是国际香精香料公司？然而，令人惊讶的是，1969 年底国际香精香料公司的总市值竟然高于收割机公司——7.47 亿美元对 7.1 亿美元。如果考虑到收割机公司的股本是香精香料公司的 17 倍，年销售额是香精香料公司的 27 倍，那就更令人惊讶了。事实上，仅在三年前，收割机公司的净利润还高于香精香料公司 1969 年的销售额！如此巨大的差距是如何形成的？答案就在两个神奇的词中：盈利能力和增长。香精香料公司在两个类别中都表现出色，而收割机公司则令人失望。

This comparison should carry more than one surprise. Everyone knows of International Harvester, one of the 30 giants in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.^* How many of our readers have even heard of International Flavors & Fragrances, next-door neighbor to Harvester on the New York Stock Exchange list? Yet, mirabile dictu, IFF was actually selling at the end of 1969 for a higher aggregate market value than Harvester—$747 million versus $710 million. This is more amazing when one reflects that Harvester had 17 times the stock capital of Flavors and 27 times the annual sales. In fact, only three years before, the net earnings of Harvester had been larger than the 1969 sales of Flavors! How did these extraordinary disparities develop? The answer lies in the two magic words: profitability and growth. Flavors made a remarkable showing in both categories, while Harvester left everything to be desired.

表18-5讲述了这个故事。我们发现，Flavors的销售额利润高达14.3%（所得税前为23%），而Harvester仅为2.6%。同样，Flavors的股本利润为19.7%，而其资本充足率不足。收获者公司盈利5.5%。五年内，Flavors公司的净利润几乎翻了一番，而收获者公司的净利润却几乎停滞不前。1969年至1959年期间，两者的比较结果也大体相同。这些业绩差异导致了典型的股市估值差异。1969年，Flavors公司的市盈率为其最新报告收益的55倍，而收获者公司仅为其10.7倍。相应地，Flavors公司的估值为其账面价值的10.4倍，而收获者公司的售价则比其净资产折价了41% 。

The story is told in Table 18-5. Here we find Flavors with a sensational profit of 14.3% of sales (before income tax the figure was 23%), compared with a mere 2.6% for Harvester. Similarly, Flavors had earned 19.7% on its stock capital against an inadequate 5.5% earned by Harvester. In five years the net earnings of Flavors had nearly doubled, while those of Harvester practically stood still. Between 1969 and 1959 the comparison makes similar reading. These differences in performance produced a typical stock-market divergence in valuation. Flavors sold in 1969 at 55 times its last reported earnings, and Harvester at only 10.7 times. Correspondingly, Flavors was valued at 10.4 times its book value, while Harvester was selling at a 41% discount from its net worth.

表 18-5 对 5。

TABLE 18-5 Pair 5.

评论与结论：首先要指出的是，Flavors 的市场成功完全基于其核心业务的发展，与近年来华尔街常见的公司间交易、收购计划、头重脚轻的资本结构以及其他常见的做法均无关联。该公司始终坚持其利润丰厚的业务，这几乎就是它的全部故事。Harvester 的业绩引发了一系列完全不同的问题，但这些问题也与“高级金融”无关。为什么这么多伟大的公司即使在多年的普遍繁荣时期也变得相对无利可图？如果企业的盈利不足以证明股东的投资是合理的，那么即使业务规模超过 25 亿美元又有什么意义呢？我们无法为这个问题开出解决方案。但我们坚持认为，不仅管理层，普通股东也应该意识到这个问题的存在，并且需要最优秀的人才和最大的努力来解决这个问题。*从普通股选择的角度来看，这两只股票都不符合我们关于稳健、合理有吸引力且价格适中的投资标准。Flavors 是一家典型的辉煌成功但估值过高的公司；而 Harvester 的表现则过于平庸，即使以折扣价来看也缺乏吸引力。（毫无疑问，在价格合理的同类股票中，还有更有价值的股票可供选择。）

COMMENT AND CONCLUSIONS: The first thing to remark is that the market success of Flavors was based entirely on the development of its central business, and involved none of the corporate wheeling and dealing, acquisition programs, top-heavy capitalization structures, and other familiar Wall Street practices of recent years. The company has stuck to its extremely profitable knitting, and that is virtually its whole story. The record of Harvester raises an entirely different set of questions, but these too have nothing to do with “high finance.” Why have so many great companies become relatively unprofitable even during many years of general prosperity? What is the advantage of doing more than $2½ billion of business if the enterprise cannot earn enough to justify the shareholders’ investment? It is not for us to prescribe the solution of this problem. But we insist that not only management but the rank and file of shareholders should be conscious that the problem exists and that it calls for the best brains and the best efforts possible to deal with it.* From the standpoint of common-stock selection, neither issue would have met our standards of sound, reasonably attractive, and moderately priced investment. Flavors was a typical brilliantly successful but lavishly valued company; Harvester’s showing was too mediocre to make it really attractive even at its discount price. (Undoubtedly there were better values available in the reasonably priced class.)

1971年之后：1969年底，Harvester的低价使其在1970年的股市崩盘中免受进一步大幅下跌的影响。当时它仅下跌了10%。而Flavors则表现得更为脆弱，跌至45美元，跌幅达30%。在随后的反弹中，两家公司都上涨，远高于1969年的收盘价，但Harvester很快又回落至25美元的水平。

SEQUEL TO 1971: The low price of Harvester at the end of 1969 protected it from a large further decline in the bad break of 1970. It lost only 10% more. Flavors proved more vulnerable and declined to 45, a loss of 30%. In the subsequent recovery both advanced, well above their 1969 close, but Harvester soon fell back to the 25 level.

第六对：麦格劳·爱迪生（公用事业和设备；家庭用品）麦格劳·希尔公司（书籍、电影、教学系统；杂志和报纸出版商；信息服务）

Pair 6: McGraw Edison (public utility and equipment; housewares) McGraw-Hill, Inc. (books, films, instruction systems; magazine and newspaper publishers; information services)

这对名字如此相似的公司——有时我们称之为爱迪生和希尔——是两家在截然不同领域取得成功的大型企业。我们选择1968年12月31日作为比较日期，如表18-6所示。两家公司的发行价大致相同，但由于希尔的市值更大，其估值约为爱迪生的两倍。这种差异似乎有些令人惊讶，因为爱迪生的销售额高出约50%，净利润高出四分之一。结果我们发现，关键比率——收益乘数——希尔的收益是爱迪生的两倍多。这种现象似乎主要可以解释为市场对图书出版公司股票持续表现出的强烈热情和偏好，其中一些公司是在20世纪60年代后期上市的。*

This pair with so similar names—which at times we shall call Edison and Hill—are two large and successful enterprises in vastly different fields. We have chosen December 31, 1968, as the date of our comparison, developed in Table 18-6. The issues were selling at about the same price, but because of Hill’s larger capitalization it was valued at about twice the total figure of the other. This difference should appear somewhat surprising, since Edison had about 50% higher sales and one-quarter larger net earnings. As a result, we find that the key ratio—the multiplier of earnings—was more than twice as great for Hill as for Edison. This phenomenon seems explicable chiefly by the persistence of a strong enthusiasm and partiality exhibited by the market toward shares of book-publishing companies, several of which had been introduced to public trading in the later 1960s.*

事实上，到1968年底，这种热情显然有些过度了。希尔公司股价在1967年曾跌至56美元，是1966年刚刚公布的创纪录收益的40多倍。但1967年出现了小幅下跌，1968年又进一步下跌。因此，当时35的高乘数被应用于一家利润已连续两年下滑的公司。尽管如此，该股的估值仍是其有形资产的八倍多，表明其商誉成分已接近10亿美元！因此，这一价格似乎印证了——用约翰逊博士的名言来说——“希望战胜了经验”。

Actually, by the end of 1968 it was evident that this enthusiasm had been overdone. The Hill shares had sold at 56 in 1967, more than 40 times the just-reported record earnings for 1966. But a small decline had appeared in 1967 and a further decline in 1968. Thus the current high multiplier of 35 was being applied to a company that had already shown two years of receding profits. Nonetheless the stock was still valued at more than eight times its tangible asset backing, indicating a good-will component of not far from a billion dollars! Thus the price seemed to illustrate—in Dr. Johnson’s famous phrase—“The triumph of hope over experience.”

相比之下，相对于（较高的）总体市场水平以及公司的整体业绩和财务状况，麦格劳爱迪生的报价似乎比较合理。

By contrast, McGraw Edison seemed quoted at a reasonable price in relation to the (high) general market level and to the company’s overall performance and financial position.

1971年初的后续：麦格劳-希尔的盈利持续下滑，持续到1969年和1970年，先是跌至每股1.02美元，随后又跌至每股0.82美元。1970年5月的股市崩盘中，其股价惨跌至10美元，不到两年前的五分之一。此后，股价有所回升，但1971年5月24美元的高点仍然……仅为1968年收盘价的60%。麦格劳·爱迪生的表现则更好一些——1970年跌至22%，1971年5月完全回升至41.5%。*

SEQUEL TO EARLY 1971: The decline of McGraw-Hill’s earnings continued through 1969 and 1970, dropping to $1.02 and then to $.82 per share. In the May 1970 debacle its price suffered a devastating break to 10—less than a fifth of the figure two years before. It had a good recovery thereafter, but the high of 24 in May 1971 was still only 60% of the 1968 closing price. McGraw Edison gave a better account of itself—declining to 22 in 1970 and recovering fully to 41½ in May 1971.*

表 18-6 对 6。

TABLE 18-6 Pair 6.

^a假设优先股转换。

^a Assuming conversion of preferred stock.

麦格劳-希尔公司依然是一家强劲繁荣的公司。但其股价历史——正如许多其他案例一样——体现了华尔街通过其无节制的乐观和悲观情绪波动所造成的此类股票的投机风险。

McGraw-Hill continues to be a strong and prosperous company. But its price history exemplifies—as do so many other cases—the speculative hazards in such stocks created by Wall Street through its undisciplined waves of optimism and pessimism.

第七对：National General Corp.（一家大型企业集团）和 National Presto Industries（多种电器、军械）

Pair 7: National General Corp. (a large conglomerate) and National Presto Industries (diverse electric appliances, ordnance)

这两家公司之所以值得比较，主要是因为它们差异很大。我们姑且称它们为“通用”和“普雷斯托”。我们选择1968年底作为研究对象，因为通用在1969年进行的减值使得当年的数据过于模糊。通用业务范围广泛的全部内容在前一年尚无法体现，但它已经足够庞大，符合任何人的口味。《股票指南》中的简要描述是“全国连锁影院；电影和电视制作；储蓄贷款协会；图书出版”。此外，当时或之后还可以添加“保险、投资银行、唱片、音乐出版、计算机服务、房地产——以及Performance Systems Inc.（最近更名为Minnie Pearl's Chicken System Inc.）的35%股份”。普雷斯托也曾推行多元化经营计划，但与通用相比，规模确实不大。它最初是压力锅的领先制造商，后来涉足其他各种家用电器。截然不同的是，该公司还承接了美国政府的多项军械合同。

These two companies invite comparison chiefly because they are so different. Let us call them “General” and “Presto.” We have selected the end of 1968 for our study, because the write-offs taken by General in 1969 made the figures for that year too ambiguous. The full flavor of General’s far-flung activities could not be savored the year before, but it was already conglomerate enough for anyone’s taste. The condensed description in the Stock Guide reads “Nation-wide theatre chain; motion picture and TV production, savings and loan assn., book publishing.” To which could be added, then or later, “insurance, investment banking, records, music publishing, computerized services, real estate—and 35% of Performance Systems Inc. (name recently changed from Minnie Pearl’s Chicken System Inc.).” Presto had also followed a diversification program, but in comparison with General it was modest indeed. Starting as the leading maker of pressure cookers, it had branched out into various other household and electric appliances. Quite differently, also, it took on a number of ordnance contracts for the U.S. government.

我们的表18-7总结了1968年底各公司的财务状况。Presto的资本结构极其简单——只有1,478,000股普通股，市价5,800万美元。相比之下，General的普通股数量是Presto的两倍多，此外还发行了可转换优先股，三份认股权证，认股权证要求发行大量普通股，发行了一笔巨额可转换债券（刚刚发行，用于换取一家保险公司的股票），以及一大笔不可转换债券。所有这些加起来，Presto的市值为5.34亿美元（不包括即将发行的可转换债券），加上这笔债券，总市值为7.5亿美元。尽管National General的市值远超Presto，但其在Presto财年的总业务量却远低于Presto，其净利润仅为Presto的75%。

Our Table 18-7 summarizes the showing of the companies at the end of 1968. The capital structure of Presto was as simple as it could be—nothing but 1,478,000 shares of common stock, selling in the market for $58 million. Contrastingly, General had more than twice as many shares of common, plus an issue of convertible preferred, plus three issues of stock warrants calling for a huge amount of common, plus a towering convertible bond issue (just given in exchange for stock of an insurance company), plus a goodly sum of nonconvertible bonds. All this added up to a market capitalization of $534 million, not counting an impending issue of convertible bonds, and $750 million, including such issue. Despite National General’s enormously greater capitalization, it had actually done considerably less gross business than Presto in their fiscal years, and it had shown only 75% of Presto’s net income.

表 18-7 第 7 对。

TABLE 18-7 Pair 7.

^a假设优先股转换。

^a Assuming conversion of preferred stock.

^b根据认股权证的市场价格进行调整。

^b Adjusted for market price of warrants.

确定通用公司普通股资本的真实市值，对证券分析师来说是一个有趣的问题，对任何以比纯粹赌博更严肃的心态对该股票感兴趣的人都具有重要意义。相对较小的4.5美元可转换优先股，可以通过假设其在合适的市场价格水平上转换为普通股来轻松处理。我们在表18-7中已经进行了这一假设。但认股权证需要不同的处理方式。在计算“完全稀释”基准时，公司假设所有认股权证均已行使，并将所得款项用于偿还债务，并使用余额以市场价格回购普通股。这些假设实际上对1968年的每股收益几乎没有影响——稀释前后的每股收益均为1.51美元。我们认为这种处理方式不合逻辑，也不切实际。我们认为，认股权证代表“普通股组合”的一部分，其市值是普通股资本部分“有效市值”的一部分。（请参阅此处对此问题的讨论。）将认股权证的市场价格添加到普通股市场价格中这种简单的技术对1968年底国民通用保险公司的业绩产生了根本性的影响，正如表18-7中的计算所示。事实上，普通股的“真实市场价格”竟然是报价的两倍多。因此，1968年收益的真实乘数也增加了一倍多——达到了69倍这个本质上荒谬的数字。“普通股等价物”的总市值因此变为4.13亿美元，是其所示有形资产的三倍多。

The determination of the true market value of General’s common-stock capitalization presents an interesting problem for security analysts and has important implications for anyone interested in the stock on any basis more serious than outright gambling. The relatively small $4½ convertible preferred can be readily taken care of by assuming its conversion into common, when the latter sells at a suitable market level. This we have done in Table 18-7. But the warrants require different treatment. In calculating the “full dilution” basis the company assumes exercise of all the warrants, and the application of the proceeds to the retirement of debt, plus use of the balance to buy in common at the market. These assumptions actually produced virtually no effect on the earnings per share in calendar 1968—which were reported as $1.51 both before and after allowance for dilution. We consider this treatment illogical and unrealistic. As we see it, the warrants represent a part of the “common-stock package” and their market value is part of the “effective market value” of the common-stock part of the capital. (See our discussion of this point here.) This simple technique of adding the market price of the warrants to that of the common has a radical effect on the showing of National General at the end of 1968, as appears from the calculation in Table 18-7. In fact the “true market price” of the common stock turns out to be more than twice the quoted figure. Hence the true multiplier of the 1968 earnings is more than doubled—to the inherently absurd figure of 69 times. The total market value of the “common-stock equivalents” then becomes $413 million, which is over three times the tangible assets shown therefor.

与普雷斯托（Presto）的数据相比，这些数据显得更加反常。有人不禁要问，普雷斯托的估值怎么可能只有其当前收益的6.9倍，而通用的乘数却高达近10倍。普雷斯托的所有比率都相当令人满意——事实上，增长数据令人生疑。我们这样说的意思是，该公司无疑从其战争工作中获得了丰厚的收益，股东应该做好在和平时期利润有所下降的准备。但总的来说，普雷斯托满足了所有而通用公司则具有 20 世纪 60 年代末典型的“企业集团”的所有特征，充满了企业的小玩意和浮夸的姿态，但缺乏市场报价背后的实质性价值。

These figures appear the more anomalous when comparison is made with those of Presto. One is moved to ask how could Presto possibly be valued at only 6.9 times its current earnings when the multiplier for General was nearly 10 times as great. All the ratios of Presto are quite satisfactory—the growth figure suspiciously so, in fact. By that we mean that the company was undoubtedly benefiting considerably from its war work, and the shareholders should be prepared for some falling off in profits under peacetime conditions. But, on balance, Presto met all the requirements of a sound and reasonably priced investment, while General had all the earmarks of a typical “conglomerate” of the late 1960s vintage, full of corporate gadgets and grandiose gestures, but lacking in substantial values behind the market quotations.

后果： 1969 年，通用公司继续推行多元化政策，债务有所增加。但它损失了数百万美元，主要是在明尼珍珠鸡交易中的投资价值。最终数字显示，税前亏损 7200 万美元，税后亏损 4640 万美元。1969 年，股价跌至 16.5 美元，1970 年更是低至 9 美元（仅为 1968 年最高价 60 美元的 15%）。1970 年的收益为每股摊薄收益 2.33 美元，1971 年股价回升至 28.5 美元。1969 年和 1970 年，国民普雷斯托公司的每股收益均有所增加，标志着利润连续 10 年增长。尽管如此，其股价在 1970 年的崩溃中跌至 21.5 美元。这个数字很有意思，因为它还不到上次报告收益的四倍，也低于当时该股票的净流动资产。1971年末，我们发现国民普雷斯托的股价上涨了60%，达到34倍，但这些比率仍然令人震惊。扩大后的营运资本仍然与当前股价大致相当，而当前股价仅为上次报告收益的5.5倍。如果投资者现在能找到十只这样的股票进行多元化投资，他就能确信获得令人满意的结果。*

SEQUEL: General continued its diversification policy in 1969, with some increase in its debt. But it took a whopping write-off of millions, chiefly in the value of its investment in the Minnie Pearl Chicken deal. The final figures showed a loss of $72 million before tax credit and $46.4 million after tax credit. The price of the shares fell to 16½ in 1969 and as low as 9 in 1970 (only 15% of its 1968 high of 60). Earnings for 1970 were reported as $2.33 per share diluted, and the price recovered to 28½ in 1971. National Presto increased its per-share earnings somewhat in both 1969 and 1970, marking 10 years of uninterrupted growth of profits. Nonetheless its price declined to 21½ in the 1970 debacle. This was an interesting figure, since it was less than four times the last reported earnings, and less than the net current assets available for the stock at the time. Late in 1971 we find the price of National Presto 60% higher, at 34, but the ratios are still startling. The enlarged working capital is still about equal to the current price, which in turn is only 5½ times the last reported earnings. If the investor could now find ten such issues, for diversification, he could be confident of satisfactory results.*

第 8 对：Whiting Corp.（物料搬运设备）和 Willcox & Gibbs（小型企业集团）

Pair 8: Whiting Corp. (materials-handling equipment) and Willcox & Gibbs (small conglomerate)

这两家公司在美国证券交易所的股票名单上，虽然实力相近，但彼此并不相近。表18-8A中的对比，让人不禁怀疑华尔街是否是一个理性的机构。销售额和收益都较小的那家公司，其有形资产也只有普通股的一半，但其总价值却约为另一家公司的四倍。估值较高的那家公司即将公布一份大额报告。扣除特殊费用后的亏损；它已经十三年没有支付过股息了。另一家公司长期以来盈利记录良好，自1936年以来一直持续支付股息，目前的股息收益率在整个普通股公司中名列前茅。为了更生动地展现两家公司业绩的差异，我们在表18-8B中附上了1961年至1970年的收益和股价记录。

This pair are close but not touching neighbors on the American Stock Exchange list. The comparison—set forth in Table 18-8A—makes one wonder if Wall Street is a rational institution. The company with smaller sales and earnings, and with half the tangible assets for the common, sold at about four times the aggregate value of the other. The higher-valued company was about to report a large loss after special charges; it had not paid a dividend in thirteen years. The other had a long record of satisfactory earnings, had paid continuous dividends since 1936, and was currently returning one of the highest dividend yields in the entire common-stock list. To indicate more vividly the disparity in the performance of the two companies we append, in Table 18-8B, the earnings and price record for 1961–1970.

表 18-8A 对 8。

Table 18-8A Pair 8.

^a在特殊费用之前。定义：赤字。

^a Before special charge. def.: deficit.

表 18-8B Whiting 和 Willcox & Gibbs 的十年价格和收益记录

TABLE 18-8B Ten-Year Price and Earnings Record of Whiting and Willcox & Gibbs

^{于 4 月 30 日之后结束的年度}。

^a Year ended following April 30.

这两家公司的历史，与本文主要介绍的大型企业相比，为我们展现美国中型企业的发展提供了有趣的视角。惠廷公司成立于1896年，至少已有75年历史。它似乎一直忠实地专注于物料搬运业务，并在过去的几十年里取得了不俗的业绩。威尔科克斯和吉布斯公司的历史甚至更久远——可以追溯到1866年——并且长期以来一直是业内著名的工业缝纫机制造商。在过去的十年里，它采取了一项看似颇为古怪的多元化战略。一方面，它拥有数量惊人的子公司（至少24家），生产种类繁多的产品；另一方面，按照华尔街的通常标准，整个集团的规模也微不足道。

The history of the two companies throws an interesting light on the development of medium-sized businesses in this country, in contrast with much larger-sized companies that have mainly appeared in these pages. Whiting was incorporated in 1896, and thus goes back at least 75 years. It seems to have kept pretty faithfully to its materials-handling business and has done quite well with it over the decades. Willcox & Gibbs goes back even farther—to 1866—and was long known in its industry as a prominent maker of industrial sewing machines. During the past decade it adopted a policy of diversification in what seems a rather outlandish form. For on the one hand it has an extraordinarily large number of subsidiary companies (at least 24), making an astonishing variety of products, but on the other hand the entire conglomeration adds up to mighty small potatoes by usual Wall Street standards.

惠廷的盈利发展颇具特色我们的业务重点。数据显示，股价从1960年的每股41美分稳步增长至1968年的3.63美元，增幅相当惊人。但这些数字并不能保证这种增长将永远持续下去。随后，股价在截至1971年1月的12个月内跌至仅1.77美元，这或许仅仅反映了整体经济放缓。但股价反应剧烈，从1968年的最高点（43.5美元）到1969年收盘下跌了约60%。我们的分析表明，这些股票代表着一项稳健且具有吸引力的二级发行投资——适合有进取心的投资者作为此类投资群体的一部分。

The earnings developments in Whiting are rather characteristic of our business concerns. The figures show steady and rather spectacular growth from 41 cents a share in 1960 to $3.63 in 1968. But they carried no assurance that such growth must continue indefinitely. The subsequent decline to only $1.77 for the 12 months ended January 1971 may have reflected nothing more than the slowing down of the general economy. But the stock price reacted in severe fashion, falling about 60% from its 1968 high (43½) to the close of 1969. Our analysis would indicate that the shares represented a sound and attractive secondary-issue investment—suitable for the enterprising investor as part of a group of such commitments.

后续：威尔科克斯和吉布斯公司（ Willcox & Gibbs）在1970年出现了小幅运营亏损。其股价大幅下跌至4.5美元的低点，并在1971年2月以典型的趋势回升至9.5美元。从统计数据来看，很难证明该价格的合理性。惠廷公司（Whiting）的跌幅相对较小，1970年跌至16.75^美元。^（以这个价格，其股价几乎相当于其股票的流动资产。）截至1971年7月，其每股收益保持在1.85美元。1971年初，股价上涨至24.5美元，这个价格看似合理，但按照我们的标准，已不再是“便宜货”。*

SEQUEL: Willcox & Gibbs showed a small operating loss for 1970. Its price declined drastically to a low of 4½, recovering in typical fashion to 9½ in February 1971. It would be hard to justify that price statistically. Whiting had a relatively small decline, to 16³⁄⁴ in 1970. (At that price it was selling at just about the current assets alone available for the shares.) Its earnings held at $1.85 per share to July 1971. In early 1971 the price advanced to 24½, which seemed reasonable enough but no longer a “bargain” by our standards.*

一般观察

General Observations

这些用于比较的股票的选择带有某种预谋，因此不能说它们代表了普通股的随机横截面。此外，这些股票仅限于工业板块，公用事业、运输公司和金融企业等重要领域并未出现。但它们在规模、业务线以及定性和定量方面差异很大，足以清晰地反映普通股投资者面临的选择。

The issues used in these comparisons were selected with some malice aforethought, and thus they cannot be said to present a random cross-section of the common-stock list. Also they are limited to the industrial section, and the important areas of public utilities, transportation companies, and financial enterprises do not appear. But they vary sufficiently in size, lines of business, and qualitative and quantitative aspects to convey a fair idea of the choices confronting an investor in common stocks.

价格与指示价值之间的关系在不同情况下也存在很大差异。大多数情况下，那些拥有更佳增长记录和更高盈利能力的公司，其出售价格往往高于当期收益——这通常合乎逻辑。具体差异是否市盈率是否被事实“证明”——或者未来发展将如何证明——这个问题无法给出肯定的答案。另一方面，我们确实有不少例子可以做出有价值的判断。这些例子几乎涵盖了所有那些在基本稳健性存疑的公司中市场活动活跃的案例。这类股票不仅具有投机性——这意味着其内在风险——而且在很多时候，它们过去和现在都明显被高估了。其他股票的价值似乎超过了它们的价格，受到相反的市场态度（我们称之为“投机不足”）的影响，或因收益缩水而导致的过度悲观情绪的影响。

The relationship between price and indicated value has also differed greatly from one case to another. For the most part the companies with better growth records and higher profitability have sold at higher multipliers of current earnings—which is logical enough in general. Whether the specific differentials in price/earnings ratios are “justified” by the facts—or will be vindicated by future developments—cannot be answered with confidence. On the other hand we do have quite a few instances here in which a worthwhile judgment can be reached. These include virtually all the cases where there has been great market activity in companies of questionable underlying soundness. Such stocks not only were speculative—which means inherently risky—but a good deal of the time they were and are obviously overvalued. Other issues appeared to be worth more than their price, being affected by the opposite sort of market attitude—which we might call “underspeculation”—or by undue pessimism because of a shrinkage in earnings.

表 18-9 16 只普通股的部分价格波动（根据 1970 年的股票分割进行调整）

TABLE 18-9 Some Price Fluctuations of Sixteen Common Stocks (Adjusted for Stock Splits Through 1970)

^{1970 年既有高峰}也有低谷。

^a High and low both in 1970.

^1959年至 1960 年。

^b 1959 to 1960.

表18-9提供了本章所涵盖股票价格波动的一些数据。其中大多数股票在1961年至1962年以及1969年至1970年期间均大幅下跌。显然，投资者必须为未来股市中此类不利的市场走势做好准备。表18-10列出了1958年至1970年期间麦格劳-希尔普通股的逐年波动情况。值得注意的是，在过去13年中，每年股价都至少上涨或下跌了三到两年。（就国民总指数而言，每两年至少出现一次上涨和下跌，涨幅也至少达到这一水平。）

In Table 18-9 we provide some data on the price fluctuations of the issues covered in this chapter. Most of them had large declines between 1961 and 1962, as well as from 1969 to 1970. Clearly the investor must be prepared for this type of adverse market movement in future stock markets. In Table 18-10 we show year-to-year fluctuations of McGraw-Hill common stock for the period 1958–1970. It will be noted that in each of the last 13 years the price either advanced or declined over a range of at least three to two from one year to the next. (In the case of National General fluctuations of at least this amplitude both upward and downward were shown in each two-year period.)

^{表 18-10 麦格劳-希尔 1958–1971年}的年度波动

TABLE 18-10. Large Year-to-Year Fluctuations of McGraw-Hill, 1958–1971^a

^a价格未根据股票分割进行调整。

^a Prices not adjusted for stock-splits.

在研究本章材料的库存清单时，我们再次对通常的证券分析的目标以及我们认为可靠且有回报的目标。大多数证券分析师试图选择那些未来能够展现最佳表现的股票，主要考虑市场行为，但也考虑盈利发展。坦率地说，我们怀疑这样做是否能取得令人满意的结果。我们对分析师工作的偏好是，他应该寻找那些能够合理自信地判断价格远低于价值的例外或少数案例。他应该能够以足够的专业技能完成这项工作，从而多年来取得令人满意的平均业绩。

In studying the stock list for the material in this chapter, we were impressed once again by the wide difference between the usual objectives of security analysis and those we deem dependable and rewarding. Most security analysts try to select the issues that will give the best account of themselves in the future, in terms chiefly of market action but considering also the development of earnings. We are frankly skeptical as to whether this can be done with satisfactory results. Our preference for the analyst’s work would be rather that he should seek the exceptional or minority cases in which he can form a reasonably confident judgment that the price is well below value. He should be able to do this work with sufficient expertness to produce satisfactory average results over the years.

第18章评论

Commentary on Chapter 18

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

在人类努力的领域中，很少有像金融世界这样，历史如此不重要的。过去的经验，即使只是记忆的一部分，也会被那些缺乏洞察力去欣赏当下不可思议奇迹的人视为原始的避难所。

There can be few fields of human endeavor in which history counts for so little as in the world of finance. Past experience, to the extent that it is part of memory at all, is dismissed as the primitive refuge of those who do not have the insight to appreciate the incredible wonders of the present.

—约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷斯¹

—John Kenneth Galbraith¹

在第 18 章中，格雷厄姆比较并对比了八对具有相似名称或股票代码的公司。

In Chapter 18, Graham compares and contrasts eight pairs of companies with similar names or ticker symbols.

他的主要教训是什么？

His main lesson?

股票没有好坏之分，只有好股价和坏股价。一家公司的股价越高，想买的人就越多；股价越便宜，想持有的人就越少。同一只股票在不同时期，既可能便宜，也可能昂贵。

There’s no such thing as a good or bad stock. There are only good or bad stock prices. The higher a company’s stock price goes, the more people will want to buy it; the cheaper a stock gets, the less anyone will want to own it. The same stock at different times can be either cheap or expensive.

让我们集中讨论一下近期市场的八个比较，看看格雷厄姆对它们有何看法。

Let’s zero in on eight comparisons from recent markets and see what Graham might have thought about them.

第一对：AMC Entertainment Holdings Inc.（电影院）和 AMETEK, Inc.（电子和电气设备）

Pair 1: AMC Entertainment Holdings Inc. (movie theaters) and AMETEK, Inc. (electronics and electrical devices)

2021-22 年，AMC 成为了“模因股”的化身：一家增长前景黯淡、负债累累的连锁影院，而大批投机者出于阴谋论的动机对其进行哄抬。理论，并故意对基础业务的健康状况视而不见。

In 2021–22, AMC personified a “meme stock”: a movie-theater chain with pallid prospects for growth, dangerous amounts of debt—and swarms of speculators bidding it up, motivated by conspiracy theories and willfully blind to the ailing health of the underlying business.

“这笔交易与基本面无关。根本无关，”一位AMC影迷在2021年7月表示。他认为，这些网络投机者自称“猿人”，以此炫耀他们对传统分析的蔑视，他们会利用集体购买力推高股价——而且上涨空间几乎是无限的。

“This isn’t a trade about fundamentals. It’s just not,” one AMC fan said in July 2021. He argued that the “apes,” as the online speculators called themselves to flaunt their scorn for traditional analysis, would use their collective buying power to drive up the share price—and the upside was almost unlimited.

猿猴们发誓，他们会“HODL”（持股待毙），直到“MOASS”（所有空头挤压的始祖）出现。在“MOASS”中，对冲基金和其他做空AMC的专业投资者将被迫买入，股价将飙升至10万美元甚至更高，猿猴们将一夜暴富。

The apes swore they would HODL, or hold on for dear life, until the MOASS, the mother of all short squeezes. In the MOASS, hedge funds and other professional investors betting against AMC would be forced to buy, the stock would soar to $100,000 or more, and the apes would be rich.

而在2021年初不到五个月的时间里，猿人推动AMC的股价上涨了惊人的3050%。

And in less than five months in early 2021, the apes pushed AMC’s stock price up an astounding 3,050%.

阿美特克（AMETEK）是一家为航空航天、国防、自动化和医疗客户提供设备的公司，该公司没有大批“猿人”来提振其股价。同期，阿美特克股价上涨了14%，相比之下，涨幅微不足道。

AMETEK, which supplies equipment to aerospace, defense, automation, and medical customers, had no army of apes to boost its shares. Over the same period, AME rose 14%, piddling by comparison.

然而，AMC 在 2021 年濒临破产，而 AME 却是一家盈利能力相当不错的企业。

Yet AMC was at death’s door in 2021, whereas AME was a reasonably profitable business.

自 2017 年以来，AMC 的销售额缩水了一半，仅获得微薄的年度利润，债务翻了一番，并且现金大量流失。

Since 2017, AMC’s sales had shrunk by half, it had earned only one paltry annual profit, its debt had doubled, and it was hemorrhaging cash.

AME 的销售额和收益稳步增长，债务适中，现金充足。

At AME, sales and earnings had grown steadily, debt was moderate, and cash was plentiful.

MOASS 从未实现。AMC 的股价在 2022 年下跌了 76%，2023 年全年又下跌了 83%。一些在底部买入、在顶部卖出的人赚了一大笔钱。无数人在顶部买入，最终却惨遭杀害。

The MOASS never came to pass. AMC’s shares lost 76% in 2022 and another 83% for the full year 2023. A few folks who bought AMC at the bottom and sold at the top made a killing. Countless others bought at the top and got killed.

➸要点：短期来看，基本面通常并不重要。但长期来看，基本面总是重要的^。2

➸ The point: In the short run, fundamentals often don’t matter. In the long run, they always do.²

表 18-1： AMC与AME

TABLE 18-1: AMC vs. AME

注：已发行股份，完全稀释；营运资本等于流动资产减去流动负债；自由现金流等于经营活动产生的现金流减去固定资本支出。阴影单元格中的数据为截至2023年9月30日的12个月数据。

Notes: Shares outstanding, fully diluted; working capital equals current assets minus current liabilities; free cash flow equals flow from operations minus fixed capital expenditures. Figures in shaded cells are for the 12 months ended 9/30/23.

资料来源：公司、FactSet。

Sources: The companies, FactSet.

第二对：Arcimoto Inc.（电动汽车）和 Arconic Corp.（铝）

Pair 2: Arcimoto Inc. (electric vehicles) and Arconic Corp. (aluminum)

2020年，Arcimoto这家生产名为Fun Utility Vehicle（“FUV®”）的三轮电动摩托车的微型制造商股价上涨了720%以上。该公司首席执行官出现在无数播客和在线视频中，经常兴高采烈地开着FUV四处飞驰，敦促交易员抢购该公司的股票。

In 2020, shares of Arcimoto, the minuscule manufacturer of a three-wheeled electric motorcycle called the Fun Utility Vehicle (“FUV®”), rose more than 720%. Its CEO appeared on countless podcasts and online videos, often gleefully whizzing around in an FUV, urging traders to snap up the stock.

一旦交易员将其标记为“下一个特斯拉”，Arcimoto 的股票就会受到巨大的冲击。

Once traders labeled it “the next Tesla,” Arcimoto’s stock got an electrifying jolt.

然而，阿西莫托的生意却一团糟。

Arcimoto’s business, however, was a mess.

2020 年，该公司仅向客户交付了 97 辆零售汽车。那一年，该公司的销售额仅为 200 万美元，但净亏损却高达 1800 万美元。

It delivered only 97 retail vehicles to customers in 2020. That year, the business generated a negligible $2 million in sales, but $18 million in net losses.

Arcimoto 声称拥有“数千份预订单”。但它在 2021 年仅交付了 192 辆零售汽车，2022 年交付了 228 辆。

Arcimoto claimed to have “thousands of pre-orders.” But it managed to deliver only 192 retail vehicles in 2021 and 228 in 2022.

该公司从 2021 年到 2023 年共亏损 1.44 亿美元。该股在 2021 年下跌了 41%，2022 年下跌了 98%，2023 年又下跌了 74%。

The company lost a combined $144 million from 2021 through 2023. The stock fell 41% in 2021, 98% in 2022 and another 74% in 2023.

Arconic 也因各种原因而不稳定。

Arconic was volatile, too, for different reasons.

2019年2月，其母公司宣布将生产铝制品的Arconic Corp.分拆为一家独立公司。一年后，全球经济因抗击新冠疫情而陷入停摆。Arconic的新股于2020年愚人节当天开始交易。

In February 2019, its corporate parent announced that Arconic Corp., which manufactures aluminum products, would be spun off as a separate company. A year later, the global economy locked down to combat the Covid pandemic. Arconic’s new stock began trading on April Fool’s Day 2020.

由于全球制造业停滞不前，供应链受阻，工业对铝的需求急剧下降。Arconic作为一家独立公司成立后的前三个月，其销售额较去年同期暴跌38%，利润也从500万美元骤降至9200万美元的亏损。

With manufacturing stalled and supply chains choked around the world, industrial demand for aluminum was imploding. In Arconic’s first three months as a standalone company, its sales would plummet 38% from the same period one year earlier, and it swung from a $5 million profit to a $92 million loss.

4月1日，该股下跌54%。第二天，又下跌了11%。

The stock fell 54% on April 1. The next day, it sank another 11%.

正如购买 Arcimoto 的人过分夸大了其前景一样，抛售 Arconic 的人也过分夸大了其问题。

Just as the people buying Arcimoto overextrapolated its promise, the people dumping Arconic overextrapolated its problems.

该公司进行了债务再融资，节省了现金，并削减了数亿美元的成本。随着隔离措施的解除和铝需求的恢复，Arconic 的销售额出现反弹，营业收入也大幅增长。到 2021 年 6 月，Arconic 的股价达到 38 美元，较去年的低点上涨了 500% 以上。

The company refinanced its debt, conserved cash, and cut hundreds of millions of dollars in costs. As quarantines lifted and demand for aluminum recovered, Arconic’s sales rebounded and its operating income shot up. By June 2021, Arconic’s shares hit $38, up more than 500% from their low the year before.

2023 年 8 月，Arconic 被阿波罗全球管理公司 (Apollo Global Management) 领导的财团以每股 30 美元的价格收购。

In August 2023, Arconic was acquired for $30 per share by a group led by Apollo Global Management.

➸要点：长期来看，高回报并非源于高预期。通常，高回报源于悲观预期的逆转。

➸ The point: In the long run, high returns don’t come from great expectations. Often, they come from the reversal of gloomy expectations.

第三对：Bed Bath & Beyond（家居用品）和 Best Buy（家用电子产品）

Pair 3: Bed Bath & Beyond (housewares) and Best Buy (home electronics)

2021年，受雄性激素毒害的模因股狂热氛围需要时间才能消散。在接下来的至少两年里，大批散户投资者周期性地通过协同买入，将股价推高，无论标的公司是否有价值。为了惩罚那些做空公司的专业投资者，这些交易员一直希望制造“轧空”现象，迫使专业人士买入，从而推动股价进一步飙升。

The testosterone-poisoned atmosphere of 2021’s meme-stock mania took time to clear. For at least two more years, hordes of individual traders periodically sent stocks skyrocketing in bursts of coordinating buying, regardless of whether the underlying businesses were worth anything. Seeking to punish professional investors for betting against companies, these traders kept hoping to create “short squeezes” that would force the pros to buy and send a stock soaring even higher.

Bed Bath & Beyond 的业务已无可挽回。截至 2021 年 2 月的财年，销售额总计 92 亿美元，下降了 17%。较上年同期有所下降，且低于公司九年前的水平。Bed Bath 在过去三年亏损了 9 亿美元，其总负债在十年内几乎增加了两倍。由于线上业务疲软，新冠疫情导致门店关闭，该公司的业务遭受重创。

As a business, Bed Bath & Beyond was beyond repair. In its fiscal year ended February 2021, sales totaled $9.2 billion—down 17% from the year before and below the company’s total nine years earlier. Bed Bath had lost $900 million in the prior three years, and its total liabilities had nearly tripled in 10 years. With a weak online presence, the company’s business was crushed when Covid shuttered its stores.

图 18-1：洗澡……以及之后

FIGURE 18-1: Taking a Bath . . . and Beyond

来源：FactSet。

Source: FactSet.

更糟糕的是，自2012年以来，Bed Bath斥资高达83亿美元回购股票，价格往往超过每股40美元。到2022年底，该股已跌破4美元。

Worse, since 2012, Bed Bath had spent an astounding $8.3 billion buying back its stock at prices often exceeding $40 per share. By late 2022 the stock had sunk below $4.

Bed Bath解雇了首席执行官，首席财务官自杀，公司在12个月内耗费了约10亿美元现金。其财务报表警告称，BBBY可能无法生存下去。

Bed Bath had fired its CEO, its chief financial officer had committed suicide, and the company had burned through roughly $1 billion of cash in 12 months. Its financial statements warned that BBBY might not survive.

对此，投机者纷纷买入该股票。

In response, speculators bought the stock en masse.

2023 年 5 月，有人表示：“我认为，即使 Bed Bath & Beyond 破产了，它仍然是股市上最好的交易之一。你可以叫我阴谋论者。”

“I think that Bed Bath & Beyond, even in bankruptcy, is one of the best deals in the stock market,” one said in May 2023. “You can call me a conspiracy theorist.”

从2021年到2023年9月Bed Bath股票最终停牌，交易员们一次又一次地涌入该股，理由是他们制造了一个又一个的谣言：让我们报复那些对冲基金！企业家瑞安·科恩会拯救这家公司！破产不会让股票一文不值！

Again and again from 2021 until Bed Bath’s shares finally stopped trading in September 2023, traders piled into the stock based on one confabulation after another: Let’s get revenge on those hedge funds! Entrepreneur Ryan Cohen will rescue the company! Bankruptcy won’t make the shares worthless!

但当Bed Bath于2023年4月申请破产保护后，对冲基金笑到了最后。科恩仅仅几个月后就卖掉了他所有的股份。所有股份在2023年9月全部作废，变得一文不值。

But the hedge funds had the last laugh after Bed Bath filed for bankruptcy protection in April 2023. Cohen sold his entire stake after only a few months. All the shares were extinguished, worthless, in September 2023.

与此同时，另一家零售商百思买（股票代码：BBY）却步履维艰。其线上销售表现坚挺，随着疫情消退后经济重启，消费者也掀起了疯狂消费的浪潮。截至2022年1月的财年，百思买的销售额、净利润和每股收益均创下历史新高。

At the same time, another retailer, Best Buy (ticker symbol: BBY), kept plodding along. Its online sales held up, and its customers went on a spending binge as the economy reopened after the pandemic faded. Best Buy’s sales, net income, and earnings per share hit record highs in the year ending in January 2022.

2022年下半年和2023年，由于通货膨胀和利率上升的影响，百思买的业务陷入低迷。在2019年上涨66%、2020年和2021年实现适度正增长之后，百思买的股价在2022年下跌了21%，2023年又下跌了2%。

Later in 2022 and in 2023, Best Buy’s business slumped as inflation and higher interest rates hit home. After rising 66% in 2019 and moderately positive gains in 2020 and 2021, Best Buy’s stock dropped 21% in 2022 and another 2% in 2023.

但 BBY 的投资者表现比 BBBY 的投资者好得多，因为他们没有追逐近期的热门回报，没有追求惩罚他人的幻想，也没有假装破产会给他们带来财富。

But BBY’s investors fared far better than BBBY’s, because they weren’t chasing recent hot returns, pursuing a fantasy of punishing other people, or pretending that bankruptcy would shower them with wealth.

➸重点：即使破产了，你也能感觉到一只股票会让你致富，但你的感觉无法改变事实。此外，如果别人赚的钱比你多，你也不会损失一分钱，股市的职责也不是平衡所有人的财富。对冲基金经理可以成为亿万富翁，但他们不会从你那里拿走这些钱，除非你选择与他们做交易。

➸ The point: You can feel that a stock is going to make you rich even in bankruptcy, but your feelings can’t change the facts. Furthermore, you aren’t one penny poorer if someone else is making more money than you, and it isn’t the job of the stock market to equalize everyone’s wealth. Hedge-fund managers can become billionaires, but they aren’t taking that money from you unless you choose to be on the other side of the trade from them.

第四对：H&R Block（报税）和 Block, Inc.（在线支付）

Pair 4: H&R Block (tax preparation) and Block, Inc. (online payments)

从1973年初（格雷厄姆撰写本章的最后一个版本）到2013年初，H&R Block的股价惊人地上涨了625倍——市值翻了四番。从长远来看，只有不到2.5%的美国公司实现了这一壮举。3^然而，这其中大部分发生在前几年。从2013年初到2023年底，H&R Block的年均回报率为8.7%，远低于标准普尔500指数13%的年均回报率。

Between early 1973, when Graham wrote his last version of this chapter, and early 2013, H&R Block’s stock rose a remarkable 625-fold—quintupling in value four times, a feat achieved over the long run by fewer than 2.5% of all U.S. companies.³ Most of that came in the earlier years, however. Between early 2013 and the end of 2023, H&R Block gained an average of 8.7% annually, well behind the 13% average annual return of the S&P 500.

来自在线报税工具和美国国税局（IRS）免费文件（Free File，允许人们自行报税）的竞争，减缓了H&R Block公司的增长速度，使其从洪流变成涓涓细流。2022年和2023年，约有48%的美国纳税人自行报税，高于2012-13年的约34%。一些人使用H&R Block自己的在线工具，但也有许多人使用竞争对手的服务。

Competition from online tax-preparation tools and the Internal Revenue Service’s Free File, which enables people to do their own tax returns, helped slow H&R Block’s growth from a torrent to a trickle. About 48% of U.S. taxpayers filed their own returns in 2022 and 2023, up from roughly 34% in 2012–13. Some used H&R Block’s own online tools to do that, but many others used competing services.

部分原因是，在 2018 年至 2023 财年期间，H&R Block 的收入仅从 32 亿美元增长至 35 亿美元，净收入从 6.25 亿美元缩减至 5.6 亿美元。

Partly as a result, between its fiscal years 2018 and 2023, H&R Block’s revenue grew only from $3.2 billion to $3.5 billion, and its net income shrank from $625 million to $560 million.

随着业务增长放缓，H&R Block 的股价——十年前市盈率超过 20 倍——在 2023 年底仅为其过去 12 个月市盈率的 9 倍。这远低于市场整体 21 倍市盈率的估值。

As the growth of the business slowed, the stock—valued richly at more than 20 times earnings a decade earlier—traded in late 2023 for only nine times H&R Block’s earnings over the previous 12 months. That was much cheaper than the overall market’s valuation of 21 times earnings.

Block, Inc.（前身为 Square, Inc.）为小型企业提供支持——甚至农贸市场的商贩们可以用智能手机或平板电脑接受信用卡付款。这种电子魔法让华尔街眼花缭乱。2021年，Square更名为Block，部分原因是为了呼应推动加密货币发展的区块链技术。

Block, Inc., formerly Square, Inc., enables small businesses—even vendors at farmers’ markets—to use a smartphone or tablet to take credit-card payments. That’s the kind of electronic magic that dazzles Wall Street. In 2021, Square changed its name to Block, partly to evoke the blockchain technology that facilitates cryptocurrencies.

该公司于2015年11月首次公开发行股票，发行价为每股9美元。不到三年后，股价飙升至每股99美元。仅在2020年，其股价就上涨了248%。

The company initially sold stock to the public in November 2015 at $9 per share. Less than three years later, the stock hit $99. In 2020 alone, the shares gained 248%.

根据 FactSet 的数据，到 2020 年底，Block, Inc. 的股价市盈率已超过 550 倍。

By late 2020, Block, Inc.’s shares were trading at more than 550 times earnings, according to FactSet.

为什么？与H&R Block不同，Block公司发展迅速。2015年，该公司销售额12亿美元，净亏损2.12亿美元，到2020年，销售额已达95亿美元，净利润达2.13亿美元。

Why? Unlike H&R Block, Block, Inc. was booming. It grew from $1.2 billion in sales and a net loss of $212 million in 2015 to $9.5 billion in sales and a net profit of $213 million in 2020.

但没有哪家公司能够长期保持这样的增长势头。2022年，Block Inc. 的收入持平，亏损5.41亿美元。该股在2021年下跌了26%，2022年下跌了61%，到2023年10月，已下跌近38%。然而，在最后两个月，随着比特币的飙升，Block Inc. 股价惊人地反弹，全年收盘上涨23%。

But no company can keep growing like that for long. In 2022, Block, Inc.’s revenue flatlined, and it lost $541 million. The stock fell 26% in 2021, 61% in 2022, and by the following October had lost nearly 38% in 2023. Then it made an astonishing comeback in the final two months, closing up 23% for the full year as bitcoin soared.

与此同时，尽管 H&R Block 远不如昔日辉煌，但其已实现反弹，2021 年回报率为 49%，2022 年回报率为 55%，2023 年回报率为 37%。

Meanwhile, although H&R Block is far from its former glory, it bounced back, returning 49% in 2021, 55% in 2022, and 37% in 2023.

图 18-2：砧板

FIGURE 18-2: Chopping Block

来源：FactSet。

Source: FactSet.

到 2023 年底，你在 Block, Inc. 上的盈利将是 H&R Block 上的盈利的三倍多，但你必须经受住包括 86% 的惊人跌幅在内的剧烈波动。

By the end of 2023, you would have made more than three times as much on Block, Inc., as on H&R Block, but you would have had to survive a wild ride that included a death-defying 86% drop.

➸重点：如果你为股票支付了过高的价格或者无法忍受坚持下去，那么无论公司发展得多快都没有意义。

➸ The point: It doesn’t matter how fast a company grows if you pay too much for the stock or can’t bear to hang on.

第五对：微软公司（计算机软件）和 MicroStrategy Inc.（比特币）

Pair 5: Microsoft Corp. (computer software) and MicroStrategy Inc. (bitcoin)

尽管两家公司表面上都从事软件业务，但微软是，而微策略主要是作为世界上最大的比特币持有者之一的企业容器。

Although both are ostensibly in the software business, Microsoft is, while MicroStrategy functions mainly as a corporate receptacle for one of the world’s largest holdings of bitcoin.

从2012年到2019年，微策略的收入下降了19%；其现有的数据分析软件业务虽然盈利，但发展停滞。2020年，随着比特币价格的暴涨，首席执行官迈克尔·塞勒开始将微策略充足的现金储备投入比特币。

From 2012 through 2019, MicroStrategy’s revenues declined 19%; its existing data-analytics software business was profitable but stagnant. In 2020, as bitcoin’s price was exploding, CEO Michael Saylor began putting MicroStrategy’s ample cash reserves in bitcoin.

追逐潮流的交易员不仅疯狂买入比特币，还抢购了微策略公司（MicroStrategy）。那一年，微策略公司的股价飙升了172%。

Trend-chasing traders not only binged on bitcoin; they snapped up MicroStrategy, too. That year, MicroStrategy’s shares leaped 172%.

然而，根据微策略公司财务报表中披露的一项会计规则，该公司必须每季度审查其比特币的市值，如果市值低于购买价，则必须减记，从而减少利润。当比特币价格上涨时，微策略公司只有在出售该资产时才能记录收益，而继续持有则不能^。4

However, under an accounting rule disclosed in MicroStrategy’s financial statements, the company had to review the market value of its bitcoin each quarter and write it down—taking a bite out of profits—if it fell below the purchase price. When the value of bitcoin rose, MicroStrategy could record a gain only if it sold the asset, not if it kept holding it.⁴

由于微策略在狂热的市场中以波动的价格购买了比特币，该公司在 2020 年计入了 7100 万美元、2021 年计入了 8.31 亿美元、2022 年计入了 13 亿美元的“数字资产减值损失”。

Because MicroStrategy bought bitcoin at fluctuating prices in a frenzied market, it booked “digital asset impairment losses” of $71 million in 2020, $831 million in 2021, and $1.3 billion in 2022.

这就是该股票表现与比特币表现截然不同的原因之一：

That’s one reason the stock’s performance diverged sharply from bitcoin’s:

表 18-2：硬币与股票

TABLE 18-2: Coin vs. Stock

2020

2021

2022

2023

比特币回报率（%）

Bitcoin return (%)

303.9

59.9

-64.3

156.9

MicroStrategy 股票回报率（%）

MicroStrategy stock return (%)

172.4

40.1

-74.0

346.2

资料来源：道琼斯市场数据、FactSet。

Sources: Dow Jones Market Data, FactSet.

截至2023年底，微策略持有的25亿美元比特币仓位占其34亿美元总资产的四分之三以上。与其说是一家计算机软件公司，不如说它更像是一家对冲基金——但其回报率往往与比特币相差甚远。

As of late 2023, MicroStrategy’s $2.5 billion position in bitcoin made up more than three-quarters of its $3.4 billion in total assets. It was more a hedge fund than a computer software company—but a fund whose returns often sheared away from bitcoin’s.

仅在 2024 年的前 15 个交易日，MicroStrategy 的股价就下跌了 29%，因为美国监管机构最终批准了可直接持有比特币的 ETF，这为 MicroStrategy 在拥有数字货币方面创造了新的竞争。

In just the first 15 trading days of 2024, MicroStrategy’s stock fell 29% as U.S. regulators finally approved ETFs that may hold bitcoin directly—creating new competition for MicroStrategy as a way to own the digital currency.

微软公司则走向了另一个极端：它只顾自己。微软进行了多项大型收购，例如斥资260亿美元收购了求职网站领英(LinkedIn)，斥资690亿美元收购了视频游戏开发商动视暴雪(Activision Blizzard)，并向人工智能集团OpenAI投资了超过100亿美元。但它仍然专注于其在软件领域的主要优势。

Microsoft Corp. is at the other extreme: It minds its own business. Microsoft has made big acquisitions, paying $26 billion for careers website LinkedIn and $69 billion for videogame producer Activision Blizzard, along with a more than $10 billion investment in artificial-intelligence group OpenAI. But it remains focused on its primary strengths in software.

微软采用保守的会计方法，并拥有超过1440亿美元的巨额现金储备，使其成为大型科技公司中最稳定的。然而，其股价却表现灵活，近年来表现优于标准普尔500指数。微软似乎——至少到目前为止——正在对抗几乎所有科技公司随着年龄增长而出现的僵化现象。

Its conservative accounting and vast reserves of more than $144 billion in cash make Microsoft the most stable among gigantic technology firms. Yet its stock has been nimble, outperforming the S&P 500 in most recent years. Microsoft seems—so far, at least—to be defying the sclerosis that strikes nearly all technology firms as they age.

➸重点：如果你想投资一家公司，就买它的股票。如果你想拥有比特币，就买数字货币本身，而不是持有它的公司。

➸ The point: If you want to invest in a company, buy the stock. If you want to own bitcoin, buy the digital currency itself, not a company that holds it.

第六对：NVIDIA Corp.（人工智能计算机芯片）和 Novo Nordisk ADR（制药）

Pair 6: NVIDIA Corp. (artificial-intelligence computer chips) and Novo Nordisk ADR (pharmaceuticals)

如果与流行的新技术相关，即使是最大的股票也会被投机热潮所点燃。

Even the biggest stocks can be inflamed with speculative fever if they’re associated with a trendy new technology.

截至2020年底，生产用于计算机图形、游戏和其他高级用途的芯片的NVIDIA Corp.的估值已超过3300亿美元。诺和诺德曾是丹麦最大的公司，也是全球最大的制药商之一。

By late 2020, NVIDIA Corp., which makes chips for computer graphics, gaming, and other advanced uses, was valued at more than $330 billion. Novo Nordisk was Denmark’s biggest company and one of the world’s largest drug manufacturers.

两项技术突破很快引发了购买恐慌。

Two technological breakthroughs soon set off buying panics.

2022 年 11 月 ChatGPT 发布时，人工智能 (AI) 引起了人们的广泛关注。NVIDIA 是 AI 软件所需芯片的主要生产商。

Artificial intelligence, or AI, captured the popular imagination when ChatGPT was released in November 2022. NVIDIA is the dominant producer of the chips needed to power AI software.

诺和诺德的减肥药 Wegovy 和 Ozempic 在 2021 年用户开始在 Facebook 和 TikTok 上发布有关它们的帖子后迅速走红，而埃隆·马斯克等有影响力的人物也在社交媒体上表示这些药物帮助他们瘦了下来。

And Novo Nordisk’s weight-loss drugs, Wegovy and Ozempic, went viral after users started posting about them in 2021 on Facebook and TikTok—and after influential people like Elon Musk said on social media that the drugs had helped them slim down.

2023 年 5 月，NVIDIA（其股价自年初以来已上涨 109%）预测其季度销售额将达到 110 亿美元，比去年同期增长 64%，远高于华尔街预期的 72 亿美元。

In May 2023, NVIDIA—whose stock was already up 109% since the beginning of the year—forecast that its quarterly sales would hit $11 billion, 64% higher than a year earlier and far above the $7.2 billion that Wall Street had expected.

关注英伟达的分析师们兴奋不已，就像泰勒·斯威夫特演唱会上的青少年一样。一份研究报告写道：“看来新的淘金热即将来临。”另一份报告则表示：“上涨空间之大令人震惊。”英伟达的市值迅速突破1万亿美元。

Analysts following NVIDIA were as giddy as teenagers at a Taylor Swift concert. “It looks like the new gold rush is upon us,” one research note read. “The magnitude of upside is stunning,” said another. NVIDIA’s market value quickly surpassed $1 trillion.

2023年8月，NVIDIA再次震惊华尔街，其销售额和盈利远超分析师预期。其营收较上年翻了一番——对于如此庞大的公司来说，这样的增长率令人瞩目。股价再次飙升，自1月1日以来上涨了230%以上。在巅峰时期，NVIDIA的市盈率超过了过去12个月收益的250倍。

Then, in August 2023, NVIDIA stunned Wall Street again, reporting sales and earnings far above analysts’ forecasts. Its revenue doubled over the prior year—a remarkable rate of growth for so gigantic a company. The stock surged again, up more than 230% since January 1. At its peak, NVIDIA traded at more than 250 times its earnings over the prior 12 months.

2023 年 11 月，NVIDIA 再次超出分析师的预期——但这一次股价下跌，可能是因为其“上行惊喜”不够大。

In November 2023, NVIDIA surpassed analysts’ expectations yet again—but this time the stock tailed down, probably because its “upside surprise” wasn’t big enough.

对于 Novo，华尔街的炒作机器也开足马力：分析师预测，食欲得到控制的消费者会减少购买垃圾食品，体型较瘦的乘客可以为航空公司节省每年 8000 万美元的燃油成本，而需求如果需要大号尺寸衣服的人减少，服装面料的成本可能会下降 20%。

With Novo, too, Wall Street’s hype machine had been hitting on all cylinders: Analysts predicted that consumers with newly controllable appetites would buy much less junk food, thinner passengers could save the typical airline $80 million in annual fuel costs, and demand for clothing fabric could decline by as much as 20% if fewer people needed extra-large sizes.

到 2023 年 8 月，Novo 的股价已达到其前 12 个月收益的 50 倍，几乎是投资者愿意为普通制药股支付的价格的三倍。

By August 2023 Novo traded at 50 times its earnings in the prior 12 months—almost triple what investors were willing to pay for the average pharmaceutical stock.

这些庞然大物还能继续壮大吗？要做到这一点，它们产品的未来市场不仅需要更大，甚至需要比大多数人预期的还要大。

Can these leviathans keep growing larger? For that to happen, the future markets for their products don’t only need to be bigger. They need to be even bigger than most people expect.

➸要点：优秀的公司也可以是优秀的股票——但并非在任何价格下都是如此。你的回报总是等于未来现实减去当前预期——而当前的预期越高，未来实现预期的可能性就越低。

➸ The point: Great companies can be great stocks, too—but not at any price. Your returns always equal future reality minus present expectations—and the higher today’s expectations go, the lower the odds that the future can live up to them.

第七对：特斯拉公司（电动汽车）和 Tetra Tech, Inc.（环境咨询）

Pair 7: Tesla Inc. (electric vehicles) and Tetra Tech, Inc. (environmental consulting)

特斯拉于2010年首次公开发行股票。2012年年中，特斯拉开始交付其豪华电动汽车Model S。首席执行官埃隆·马斯克是一位精力充沛的营销大师，他大力推销这款汽车，评论家们对它赞不绝口，顾客们也蜂拥而至，股价一路飙升。

Tesla first sold shares to the public in 2010. In mid-2012, Tesla began delivering its Model S, a luxury electric vehicle. As CEO Elon Musk, a master marketer with boundless energy, flogged the cars, reviewers raved about them, customers snapped them up, and the stock raced ahead.

早在2013年和2014年，分析师就警告称，特斯拉股价的上涨毫无道理，且不可持续。至少到目前为止，特斯拉让那些怀疑论者看起来像傻瓜。

As early as 2013 and 2014, analysts were warning that the rise in Tesla’s stock was unjustified and unsustainable. So far, at least, Tesla has made skeptics seem like fools.

到2020年12月，特斯拉被纳入标准普尔500指数时，其股价已超过其过去12个月收益的1100倍，比标准普尔500指数本身高出35倍以上。从2011年初到2021年底，标准普尔500指数上涨了360%，而特斯拉股价却上涨了惊人的18400%。

By December 2020, when Tesla was added to the S&P 500 index, its shares were trading at more than 1,100 times its earnings over the previous 12 months—over 35 times more expensive than the S&P 500 itself. From the beginning of 2011 through the end of 2021, a period when the S&P 500 rose 360%, Tesla’s shares gained an astonishing 18,400%.

特斯拉股价最终在2022年暴跌，下跌了65%。但随后迅速回升，在2023年上涨了94%。

Tesla’s stock finally crashed in 2022, falling 65%. But it promptly accelerated again, gaining 94% in 2023.

到2023年底，特斯拉的市值超过7500亿美元，超过了全球大多数主要汽车制造商——法拉利、福特、通用汽车、本田、日产、雷诺、Stellantis、丰田和大众——的市值总和。然而，在2024年的前五个月，特斯拉的股价下跌了28%。

By late 2023, Tesla’s stock-market value exceeded $750 billion, more than most of the world’s major automakers—Ferrari, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Nissan, Renault, Stellantis, Toyota, and Volkswagen—combined. Then, in the first five months of 2024, Tesla’s stock fell 28%.

Tetra Tech 也受益于绿色能源的繁荣，但其与特斯拉一样，Tetra Tech 的增长也同样不温不火。2012 年至 2022 年间，其每股收益增长了约两倍，投资者也纷纷推高了其股价。但咨询和工程服务业务解释起来复杂；合同可能需要数年才能收回成本；而且 Tetra Tech 缺乏像电动汽车那样光鲜亮丽的消费产品，也没有像埃隆·马斯克那样魅力四射、无处不在的 CEO。Tetra Tech 的股票回报率很高——甚至可能高于其业务增长所能带来的回报——但它并没有像特斯拉那样让投资者兴奋不已。

Tetra Tech also benefited from the green-energy boom, but its growth was tepid alongside Tesla’s. Its earnings per share roughly tripled between 2012 and 2022, and investors bid up the stock. But consulting and engineering services are complicated to explain; contracts can take years to pay off; and Tetra Tech lacks a glamorous consumer product like electric cars and a charismatic, ubiquitous CEO like Elon Musk. Tetra Tech’s stock had high returns—perhaps even higher than justified by the growth of the business—but it didn’t thrill investors the way Tesla did.

表 18-3：天空是极限吗？

TABLE 18-3: Is the Sky the Limit?

注：特斯拉的财政年度结束于 12 月 31 日，Tetra Tech 的财政年度结束于 9 月的最后一天或 10 月的第一天。

Notes: Fiscal years end Dec. 31 for Tesla and the last day of September or the first day of October for Tetra Tech.

资料来源：FactSet、SEC.gov、tesla.com。

Sources: FactSet, SEC.gov, tesla.com.

➸要点：无论股票估值看起来有多高，它的上涨时间都能够比最严厉的批评者想象的要长得多。

➸ The point: No matter how overvalued a stock seems, it can keep going up much longer than even its harshest critics can imagine.

第 8 对：Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc.（处方药）和 Valmont Industries, Inc.（工业设备）

Pair 8: Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc. (prescription drugs) and Valmont Industries, Inc. (industrial equipment)

2015年，Valeant看起来像是股市最成功的案例之一。自2010年以来，它已经收购了十多家其他制药公司。收购这些公司后，Valeant迅速抬高价格，有时一夜之间消费者的药价至少上涨了500%。

In 2015, Valeant looked like one of the stock market’s greatest success stories. Since 2010, it had vacuumed up more than a dozen other drug manufacturers. As soon as it acquired these companies, Valeant promptly jacked up prices, sometimes raising the cost to consumers by at least 500% overnight.

然而，Valeant 并非一家健康的公司。它过度依赖借款，为了完成这些收购，负债累累，高达 310 亿美元。在财报中，Valeant 夸耀其蓬勃发展的“现金收益”，这是一种非传统的利润衡量标准，几乎剔除了公司所有主要支出。按照传统会计标准，Valeant 几乎每个季度都在亏损，或者勉强维持收支平衡^。5

Valeant was not a healthy company, however. It binged on borrowed money, racking up $31 billion in debt to make those acquisitions. In its earnings announcements, Valeant boasted about its booming “cash earnings,” an unorthodox measure of profits that excluded almost all the company’s major expenses. By the yardsticks of conventional accounting, Valeant lost money or barely broke even almost every quarter.⁵

华尔街对此视而不见。从2010年到2015年8月，Valeant的股价上涨了近1900%。

Wall Street looked the other way. Valeant’s stock rose nearly 1,900% from 2010 through August 2015.

随后，卖空者和记者报道称，Valeant 一直在通过强制销售的方式夸大其关联公司的收入。国会就 Valeant 是否存在哄抬患者价格的行为举行了听证会。截至 2017 年底，Valeant（现称为 Bausch Health Companies）的股价已从峰值下跌了 97%。

Then short-sellers and journalists reported that Valeant had been using coercive sales at an affiliated firm to inflate its revenue. Congress held hearings on whether Valeant had been price-gouging patients. By the end of 2017, shares in Valeant (now known as Bausch Health Companies) had fallen 97% from their peak.

2020 年，Valeant 支付了 4500 万美元，以和解美国证券交易委员会的会计欺诈民事指控。

In 2020, Valeant paid $45 million to settle civil charges of accounting fraud from the Securities and Exchange Commission.

当瓦伦特公司（Valeant）用数十亿美元的债务和虚假账目稀释其资产时，瓦尔蒙特工业公司（Valmont Industries）却在灌溉麦田。瓦尔蒙特公司生产金属涂层、电线杆和塔架以及灌溉设备。

As Valeant was watering down its assets with billions of dollars in debt and bogus accounting, Valmont Industries was watering wheatfields. Valmont makes metal coatings, utility poles and towers, and irrigation equipment.

Valmont 的利润表现平平且不稳定；2010 年至 2013 年，净利润增长了两倍，但随后三年又下降了 38%。2022 年，Valmont 的净利润比 2013 年下降了 10%。

Valmont’s profits are moderate and sporadic; net earnings tripled from 2010 to 2013, then fell 38% over the next three years. In 2022 Valmont’s net earnings were 10% lower than they had been in 2013.

从 2010 年初到 2023 年底，Valmont 的股价每年平均上涨 9.6%，远低于标准普尔 500 指数 12.9% 的年化回报率。尽管如此，这还是比 Valeant (现为 Bausch) 3.5% 的平均年亏损要好得多。

From early 2010 through the end of 2023, Valmont’s stock gained an average of 9.6% annually, well behind the 12.9% annualized return of the S&P 500. Still, that was much better than the 3.5% average annual loss of Valeant (now Bausch).

➸要点：当一家公司仅通过收购其他公司来实现增长时，通常不会有好结果——你需要用怀疑论者的手术刀来剖析财务报表。

➸ The point: When a company grows only by buying other companies, it often doesn’t end well—and you need to dissect the financial statements with the scalpel of a skeptic.

我们学到了什么？

What have we learned?

格雷厄姆很喜欢那句法语谚语： “变化越多，保持不变的越多”。他几十年前强调的过度行为，与1999-2000年、2010年代中期以及2020-21年的过度行为，只有名称上的不同。

Graham was fond of the French saying Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose (The more things change, the more they stay the same). The excesses he highlighted decades ago differ only in name from the excesses of 1999–2000, the mid-2010s, and 2020–21.

无论你何时何地读到这篇文章，又一场狂热、更多的会计欺诈、最新一轮群体性妄想的爆发，或是一场关于永恒增长的疯狂推断，都迟早会爆发。明白我们曾经经历过这些，将有助于你避免重蹈覆辙。

No matter where or when you’re reading this, another mania, more accounting chicanery, the latest outbreak of mass delusion, or a wild extrapolation of eternal growth is bound to burst out sooner or later. Understanding that we’ve been here before will help you avoid going there yourself.

第十九章

Chapter 19 股东与管理层：股息政策

Shareholders and Managements: Dividend Policy

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

自1934年以来，我们一直在著作中倡导股东以更明智、更积极的态度对待管理层。我们要求他们对那些明显表现出色的员工采取宽容的态度。我们也要求他们在业绩低于预期时要求管理层给出清晰令人满意的解释，并支持改进或罢免明显效率低下的管理层。当业绩（1）本身不令人满意，（2）比其他类似情况的公司业绩更差，以及（3）导致市场价格长期低迷时，股东有权质疑管理层的能力。

Ever since 1934 we have argued in our writings for a more intelligent and energetic attitude by shareholders toward their managements. We have asked them to take a generous attitude toward those who are demonstrably doing a good job. We have asked them also to demand clear and satisfying explanations when the results appear to be worse than they should be, and to support movements to improve or remove clearly unproductive managements. Shareholders are justified in raising questions as to the competence of the management when the results (1) are unsatisfactory in themselves, (2) are poorer than those obtained by other companies that appear similarly situated, and (3) have resulted in an unsatisfactory market price of long duration.

在过去的36年里，广大股东通过明智的行动几乎没有取得任何实际成果。一个明智的斗士——如果有的话——会将此视为他一直在浪费时间的迹象，最好放弃斗争。事实上，我们的事业并没有失败；它被一种外部发展所拯救——这种发展被称为收购或收购要约。我们在第8章中说过，糟糕的管理会导致糟糕的市场价格。低迷的市场价格反过来又吸引了有意多元化经营的公司的注意——而现在这样的公司已经不计其数。无数这样的收购是通过与现有管理层达成协议，或者通过在市场上增持股份来实现的，并且通过超越控制者发出的要约收购。出价通常在合理胜任的管理层管理下的企业价值范围内。因此，在许多情况下，惰性的公众股东得到了“局外人”的救助——有时，这些“局外人”可能是独立行动的富有进取心的个人或团体。

In the last 36 years practically nothing has actually been accomplished through intelligent action by the great body of shareholders. A sensible crusader—if there are any such—would take this as a sign that he has been wasting his time, and that he had better give up the fight. As it happens our cause has not been lost; it has been rescued by an extraneous development—known as take-overs, or take-over bids. We said in Chapter 8 that poor managements produce poor market prices. The low market prices, in turn, attract the attention of companies interested in diversifying their operations—and these are now legion. Innumerable such acquisitions have been accomplished by agreement with the existing managements, or else by accumulation of shares in the market and by offers made over the head of those in control. The price bid has usually been within the range of the value of the enterprise under reasonably competent management. Hence, in many cases, the inert public shareholder has been bailed out by the actions of “outsiders”—who at times may be enterprising individuals or groups acting on their own.

可以说，除了极少数例外，糟糕的管理不会因“公众股东”的行动而改变，而只有个人或紧密集团掌握控制权才能改变。如今，这种情况屡见不鲜，足以让典型的上市公司管理层（包括董事会）意识到，如果其经营业绩和由此产生的市场价格严重不令人满意，就可能成为被成功收购的目标。因此，董事会可能比以往更加意识到其基本职责，即确保公司拥有令人满意的高层管理人员。近年来，公司总裁的更替次数比以往多得多。

It can be stated as a rule with very few exceptions that poor managements are not changed by action of the “public stockholders,” but only by the assertion of control by an individual or compact group. This is happening often enough these days to put the management, including the board of directors, of a typical publicly controlled company on notice that if its operating results and the resulting market price are highly unsatisfactory, it may become the target of a successful take-over move. As a consequence, boards of directors have probably become more alive than previously to their fundamental duty to see that their company has a satisfactory top management. Many more changes of presidents have been seen in recent years than formerly.

并非所有“不尽人意”的公司都从这种发展中受益。此外，这种变化往往发生在长期业绩不佳且未采取补救措施之后，并且依赖于足够多的失望股东低价抛售股份，从而允许精力充沛的外部投资者获得控股权。但认为公众股东真的可以通过支持改善管理和管理政策的举措来自救的想法，已被证明过于不切实际，不值得在本书中进一步阐述。那些有足够勇气在年度股东大会上展现自己存在感的个人股东——通常情况下，这种表现完全是徒劳的——不需要我们关于应该向管理层提出哪些问题的建议。对于其他人来说，这些建议可能毫无意义。尽管如此，让我们以这样的恳求结束本节：股东们应该以开放的心态，认真考虑任何由其他股东发送的、希望改善公司明显不尽人意的管理状况的委托书材料。

Not all companies in the unsatisfactory class have benefited from such developments. Also, the change has often occurred after a long period of bad results without remedial action, and has depended on enough disappointed shareholders selling out at low prices to permit the energetic outsiders to acquire a controlling position in the shares. But the idea that public shareholders could really help themselves by supporting moves for improving management and management policies has proved too quixotic to warrant further space in this book. Those individual shareholders who have enough gumption to make their presence felt at annual meetings—generally a completely futile performance—will not need our counsel on what points to raise with the managements. For others the advice would probably be wasted. Nevertheless, let us close this section with the plea that shareholders consider with an open mind and with careful attention any proxy material sent them by fellow-shareholders who want to remedy an obviously unsatisfactory management situation in the company.

股东及股息政策

Shareholders and Dividend Policy

过去，股息政策是公众或“少数”股东与公司之间经常争论的话题。管理层。一般来说，这些股东希望获得更慷慨的股息，而管理层则更倾向于将盈利留在公司业务中以“增强公司实力”。他们要求股东为了企业的利益和自身未来的长期利益而牺牲当前利益。但近年来，投资者对股息的态度正在发生渐进而显著的变化。如今，支付少量股息而非慷慨股息的基本理由并非公司“需要”这笔钱，而是公司可以通过保留资金用于盈利性扩张，直接且立即地为股东谋利。多年前，通常是实力较弱的公司或多或少地被迫保留利润，而不是像往常一样将60%到75%的利润用于股息。这几乎总是对股票的市场价格产生不利影响。如今，一家实力雄厚且正在成长的企业很可能在投资者和投机者的共同认可下，故意压低股息支付。*

In the past the dividend policy was a fairly frequent subject of argument between public, or “minority,” shareholders and managements. In general these shareholders wanted more liberal dividends, while the managements preferred to keep the earnings in the business “to strengthen the company.” They asked the shareholders to sacrifice their present interests for the good of the enterprise and for their own future long-term benefit. But in recent years the attitude of investors toward dividends has been undergoing a gradual but significant change. The basic argument now for paying small rather than liberal dividends is not that the company “needs” the money, but rather that it can use it to the shareholders’ direct and immediate advantage by retaining the funds for profitable expansion. Years ago it was typically the weak company that was more or less forced to hold on to its profits, instead of paying out the usual 60% to 75% of them in dividends. The effect was almost always adverse to the market price of the shares. Nowadays it is quite likely to be a strong and growing enterprise that deliberately keeps down its dividend payments, with the approval of investors and speculators alike.*

一直以来，都有强有力的理论依据支持将利润再投资于企业，因为这种留存利润可以指望带来可观的收益增长。但也存在一些强有力的反驳，例如：利润“属于”股东，股东有权在审慎管理的范围内获得股息；许多股东需要股息收入来维持生计；他们获得的股息是“真金白银”，而公司留存的利润以后可能会也可能不会转化为股东的有形价值。事实上，这些反驳如此令人信服，以至于股市持续偏向那些慷慨支付股息的公司，而反对那些不支付股息或股息相对较少的公司^。1

There was always a strong theoretical case for reinvesting profits in the business where such retention could be counted on to produce a goodly increase in earnings. But there were several strong counter-arguments, such as: The profits “belong” to the shareholders, and they are entitled to have them paid out within the limits of prudent management; many of the shareholders need their dividend income to live on; the earnings they receive in dividends are “real money,” while those retained in the company may or may not show up later as tangible values for the shareholders. These counter-arguments were so compelling, in fact, that the stock market showed a persistent bias in favor of the liberal dividend payers as against the companies that paid no dividends or relatively small ones.¹

过去20年，“盈利再投资”理论日益盛行。过去的增长记录越好，投资者和投机者就越容易接受低回报。政策。事实确实如此，在许多增长型公司中，股息率——甚至没有任何股息——似乎对市场价格几乎没有影响。*

In the last 20 years the “profitable reinvestment” theory has been gaining ground. The better the past record of growth, the readier investors and speculators have become to accept a low-pay-out policy. So much is this true that in many cases of growth favorites the dividend rate—or even the absence of any dividend—has seemed to have virtually no effect on the market price.*

德州仪器公司（Texas Instruments, Incorporated）的历史就是一个显著的例子。该公司普通股价格从1953年的5美元上涨至1960年的256美元，而每股收益则从43美分上涨至3.91美元，而且没有支付任何股息。（1962年，该公司开始派发现金股息，但到当年，收益已降至2.14美元，股价也大幅下跌至49美元的低点。）

A striking example of this development is found in the history of Texas Instruments, Incorporated. The price of its common stock rose from 5 in 1953 to 256 in 1960, while earnings were advancing from 43 cents to $3.91 per share and while no dividend of any kind was paid. (In 1962 cash dividends were initiated, but by that year the earnings had fallen to $2.14 and the price had shown a spectacular drop to a low of 49.)

另一个极端的例子是高级石油公司（Superior Oil）。1948年，该公司报告每股收益35.26美元，派息3美元，最高股价为235美元。1953年，股息降至1美元，但最高股价却高达660美元。1957年，该公司完全没有派息，股价却高达2000美元！这只不寻常的股票后来在1962年跌至795美元，每股收益49.5美元，派息7.5美元。^*

Another extreme illustration is provided by Superior Oil. In 1948 the company reported earnings of $35.26 per share, paid $3 in dividends, and sold as high as 235. In 1953 the dividend was reduced to $1, but the high price was 660. In 1957 it paid no dividend at all, and sold at 2,000! This unusual issue later declined to 795 in 1962, when it earned $49.50 and paid $7.50.^*

在成长型公司股息政策问题上，投资情绪远未明朗。我们最大的两家公司——美国电话电报公司（American Telephone & Telegraph）和国际商业机器公司（International Business Machines）的案例充分体现了这种相互矛盾的观点。美国电话电报公司（American Telegraph）被视为具有良好增长潜力的股票，这一点从其1961年市盈率25倍的事实可以看出。尽管如此，该公司的现金股息政策仍然是投资和投机的首要考虑因素，其报价甚至对即将提高股息率的传言都做出了积极的回应。另一方面，相对而言，很少有人关注已经支付给IBM 的现金股息，其在 1960 年的最高价时仅产生 0.5% 的股息，而在 1970 年底则为 1.5%。（但在这两种情况下，股票分割都对股市产生了强大的影响。）

Investment sentiment is far from crystallized in this matter of dividend policy of growth companies. The conflicting views are well illustrated by the cases of two of our very largest corporations—American Telephone & Telegraph and International Business Machines. American Tel. & Tel. came to be regarded as an issue with good growth possibilities, as shown by the fact that in 1961 it sold at 25 times that year’s earnings. Nevertheless, the company’s cash dividend policy has remained an investment and speculative consideration of first importance, its quotation making an active response to even rumors of an impending increase in the dividend rate. On the other hand, comparatively little attention appears to have been paid to the cash dividend on IBM, which in 1960 yielded only 0.5% at the high price of the year and 1.5% at the close of 1970. (But in both cases stock splits have operated as a potent stock-market influence.)

市场对现金股息政策的评估似乎正朝着以下方向发展：如果公司不以增长为主要重点，股票就会被归类为“收益股”，股息率则继续保持其长期以来作为市场价格主要决定因素的重要性。另一个极端是，那些被明确认定为快速增长类别的股票，其估值主要基于其未来十年的预期增长率，而现金股息率则或多或少地被排除在外。

The market’s appraisal of cash-dividend policy appears to be developing in the following direction: Where prime emphasis is not placed on growth the stock is rated as an “income issue,” and the dividend rate retains its long-held importance as the prime determinant of market price. At the other extreme, stocks clearly recognized to be in the rapid-growth category are valued primarily in terms of the expected growth rate over, say, the next decade, and the cash-dividend rate is more or less left out of the reckoning.

虽然上述说法可能恰当地描述了当前的趋势，但它绝不是所有普通股的明确指南，或许也不是大多数普通股的明确指南。首先，许多公司处于成长型和非成长型企业之间的中间位置。很难说在这种情况下应该赋予增长因素多大的重要性，而且市场对此的看法可能每年都会发生根本性的变化。其次，要求增长较慢的公司更加慷慨地支付现金股利似乎有些自相矛盾。因为这些公司通常不太景气，而在过去，公司越繁荣，对慷慨和增加的派息的期望就越高。

While the above statement may properly describe present tendencies, it is by no means a clear-cut guide to the situation in all common stocks, and perhaps not in the majority of them. For one thing, many companies occupy an intermediate position between growth and nongrowth enterprises. It is hard to say how much importance should be ascribed to the growth factor in such cases, and the market’s view thereof may change radically from year to year. Secondly, there seems to be something paradoxical about requiring the companies showing slower growth to be more liberal with their cash dividends. For these are generally the less prosperous concerns, and in the past the more prosperous the company the greater was the expectation of both liberal and increasing payments.

我们认为，股东应该要求管理层要么正常地派发盈利——比如说，大约三分之二——要么明确证明再投资利润已带来令人满意的每股收益增长。对于公认的成长型公司，通常可以做出这样的证明。但在许多其他情况下，低派息显然是平均市场价格低于公允价值的原因，在这种情况下，股东完全有权提出质询，甚至可能提出投诉。

It is our belief that shareholders should demand of their managements either a normal payout of earnings—on the order, say, of two-thirds—or else a clear-cut demonstration that the reinvested profits have produced a satisfactory increase in per-share earnings. Such a demonstration could ordinarily be made in the case of a recognized growth company. But in many other cases a low payout is clearly the cause of an average market price that is below fair value, and here the shareholders have every right to inquire and probably to complain.

公司经常被强制执行吝啬的政策，因为其财务状况相对较弱，需要将全部或大部分收益（加上折旧费用）用于偿还债务和增强营运资本状况。在这种情况下，股东对此无话可说——或许除了批评管理层允许公司陷入困境之外。如此不尽如人意的财务状况。然而，一些相对不景气的公司有时会为了扩张业务而压低股息。我们认为，这种政策表面上不合逻辑，需要完整的解释和令人信服的辩护才能让股东接受。从过去的记录来看，没有理由先验地相信，如果一家业绩平平、延续旧有管理模式的公司用自己的资金进行扩张，股东会从中受益。

A niggardly policy has often been imposed on a company because its financial position is relatively weak, and it has needed all or most of its earnings (plus depreciation charges) to pay debts and bolster its working-capital position. When this is so there is not much the shareholders can say about it—except perhaps to criticize the management for permitting the company to fall into such an unsatisfactory financial position. However, dividends are sometimes held down by relatively unprosperous companies for the declared purpose of expanding the business. We feel that such a policy is illogical on its face, and should require both a complete explanation and a convincing defense before the shareholders should accept it. In terms of the past record there is no reason a priori to believe that the owners will benefit from expansion moves undertaken with their money by a business showing mediocre results and continuing its old management.

股票股息和股票分割

Stock Dividends and Stock Splits

投资者务必理解股票股利（正式名称）与股票分割之间的本质区别。后者是对普通股结构的重新表述——通常情况下，将一股股票拆分为两股或三股。新股与过去特定时期再投资的特定收益无关。其目的是为单股股票设定较低的市场价格，大概是因为这种较低的价格区间更容易被新老股东接受。股票分割可以通过技术上所谓的股票股利来实现，这涉及将盈余转入资本账户；也可以通过票面价值的调整来实现，但这不会影响盈余账户。*

It is important that investors understand the essential difference between a stock dividend (properly so-called) and a stock split. The latter represents a restatement of the common-stock structure—in a typical case by issuing two or three shares for one. The new shares are not related to specific earnings reinvested in a specific past period. Its purpose is to establish a lower market price for the single shares, presumably because such lower price range would be more acceptable to old and new shareholders. A stock split may be carried out by what technically may be called a stock dividend, which involves a transfer of sums from earned surplus to capital account; or else by a change in par value, which does not affect the surplus account.*

我们所谓的“适当的股票红利”是指支付给股东的股票红利，以切实证明或代表特定收益已在近期（例如，不超过前两年）内重新投资于公司。目前，公认的做法是，按宣布红利时的近似价值对此类股票红利进行估值，并将等同于该价值的金额从盈余公积转入资本账户。因此，典型股票股利的占比相对较小——大多数情况下不超过5%。本质上，此类股票股利的总体效果与从收益中支付等额现金并同时向股东出售总价值相等的额外股份相同。然而，相比于现金股利与股票认购权的组合（后者几乎是公用事业公司的标准做法），直接股票股利具有重要的税收优势。

What we should call a proper stock dividend is one that is paid to shareholders to give them a tangible evidence or representation of specific earnings which have been reinvested in the business for their account over some relatively short period in the recent past—say, not more than the two preceding years. It is now approved practice to value such a stock dividend at the approximate value at the time of declaration, and to transfer an amount equal to such value from earned surplus to capital accounts. Thus the amount of a typical stock dividend is relatively small—in most cases not more than 5%. In essence a stock dividend of this sort has the same overall effect as the payment of an equivalent amount of cash out of earnings when accompanied by the sale of additional shares of like total value to the shareholders. However, a straight stock dividend has an important tax advantage over the otherwise equivalent combination of cash dividends with stock subscription rights, which is the almost standard practice for public-utility companies.

纽约证券交易所已将25%设定为股票分割和股票股息之间的实际分界线。25%或以上的股票分割无需将其市值从盈余转为资本等等。一些公司，尤其是银行，仍然遵循旧有的做法，宣布任意种类的股票股息——例如，10%的股息，与近期收益无关——这些情况在金融界造成了令人不快的混乱。

The New York Stock Exchange has set the figure of 25% as a practical dividing line between stock splits and stock dividends. Those of 25% or more need not be accompanied by the transfer of their market value from earned surplus to capital, and so forth. Some companies, especially banks, still follow the old practice of declaring any kind of stock dividend they please—e.g., one of 10%, not related to recent earnings—and these instances maintain an undesirable confusion in the financial world.

我们长期以来一直大力倡导系统化且清晰的现金和股票股息支付政策。根据该政策，股票股息将定期支付，以将全部或部分再投资于业务的收益资本化。Purex、政府雇员保险公司以及其他一些公司都已效仿该政策——覆盖100%的再投资收益。*

We have long been a strong advocate of a systematic and clearly enunciated policy with respect to the payment of cash and stock dividends. Under such a policy, stock dividends are paid periodically to capitalize all or a stated portion of the earnings reinvested in the business. Such a policy—covering 100% of the reinvested earnings—has been followed by Purex, Government Employees Insurance, and perhaps a few others.*

大多数学术界人士似乎都反对各种类型的股票分红。他们坚持认为，这些分红不过是纸上谈兵，不会给股东带来任何他们以前没有的东西，而且还会带来不必要的开支和不便。^*我们认为这完全是教条主义的观点，未能考虑到投资的实际和心理现实。诚然，定期的股票红利（比如5%）只会改变所有者投资的“形式”。他现在持有105股，而不是100股；但如果没有股票红利，原来的100股所代表的所有权权益与他现在持有的105股中所代表的相同。然而，这种形式的改变对他来说实际上具有真正重要和价值。如果他希望兑现自己应得的再投资利润份额，他可以通过出售新寄给他的证书来实现，而不必拆分原来的证书。他可以指望105股的现金股息率与之前的100股相同；如果没有股票红利，现金股息率上升5%的可能性几乎为零。*

Stock dividends of all types seem to be disapproved of by most academic writers on the subject. They insist that they are nothing but pieces of paper, that they give the shareholders nothing they did not have before, and that they entail needless expense and inconvenience.^* On our side we consider this a completely doctrinaire view, which fails to take into account the practical and psychological realities of investment. True, a periodic stock dividend—say of 5%—changes only the “form” of the owners’ investment. He has 105 shares in place of 100; but without the stock dividend the original 100 shares would have represented the same ownership interest now embodied in his 105 shares. Nonetheless, the change of form is actually one of real importance and value to him. If he wishes to cash in his share of the reinvested profits he can do so by selling the new certificate sent him, instead of having to break up his original certificate. He can count on receiving the same cash-dividend rate on 105 shares as formerly on his 100 shares; a 5% rise in the cash-dividend rate without the stock dividend would not be nearly as probable.*

定期股票分红政策的优势与公用事业公司通常的做法相比最为明显。公用事业公司通常先支付丰厚的现金分红，然后通过向股东出售额外股票（认购权）收回大部分现金。^*正如我们上文所述，如果股东获得股票分红，而不是像现在这样普遍采用先现金分红再认购股票的组合，那么他们的处境将完全相同——只是他们可以节省原本需要为现金分红缴纳的所得税。那些需要或希望获得最高年度现金收入，而又不想额外购买股票的人，可以通过出售其持有的股票来实现这一目标。股票红利，其方式与现行做法下出售认购权的方式相同。

The advantages of a periodic stock-dividend policy are most evident when it is compared with the usual practice of the public-utility companies of paying liberal cash dividends and then taking back a good part of this money from the shareholders by selling them additional stock (through subscription rights).^* As we mentioned above, the shareholders would find themselves in exactly the same position if they received stock dividends in lieu of the popular combination of cash dividends followed by stock subscriptions—except that they would save the income tax otherwise paid on the cash dividends. Those who need or wish the maximum annual cash income, with no additional stock, can get this result by selling their stock dividends, in the same way as they sell their subscription rights under present practice.

用股票股息取代目前的股票股息加认购权组合，可以节省的所得税总额非常可观。我们敦促公用事业公司进行这项改革，尽管这会对美国财政部产生不利影响，因为我们坚信，对股东实际上并未获得的收益征收第二笔（个人）所得税是极其不公平的，因为公司通过出售股票收回了这笔钱。

The aggregate amount of income tax that could be saved by substituting stock dividends for the present stock-dividends-plus-subscription-rights combination is enormous. We urge that this change be made by the public utilities, despite its adverse effect on the U.S. Treasury, because we are convinced that it is completely inequitable to impose a second (personal) income tax on earnings which are not really received by the shareholders, since the companies take the same money back through sales of stock.

高效的公司会持续更新其设施、产品、簿记、管理培训项目和员工关系。现在是时候考虑更新其主要财务实践了，其中最重要的就是股息政策。

Efficient corporations continuously modernize their facilities, their products, their bookkeeping, their management-training programs, their employee relations. It is high time they thought about modernizing their major financial practices, not the least important of which is their dividend policy.

第十九章评论

Commentary on Chapter 19

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

在极小的事上信实的人，在大事上也信实；在极小的事上不诚实的人，在大事上也同样不诚实。所以，如果你在世上的财富上不诚实，谁会把真正的财富托付给你呢？

Whoever can be trusted with very little can also be trusted with much, and whoever is dishonest with very little will also be dishonest with much. So if you have not been trustworthy in handling worldly wealth, who will trust you with true riches?

—路加福音 16:10-11

—Luke 16: 10–11

在这本书的整个生命周期中，格雷厄姆没有对任何章节进行过比这更大的改动。

Over the lifetime of this book, Graham changed no chapter more than this.

这篇文章原本是“投资者作为企业主”章节的一部分，篇幅近34页。格雷厄姆在文章中敦促聪明的投资者成为聪明的所有者：保持警惕，直言不讳，确保公司管理良好，高管薪酬公平，并保障外部投资者的利益。

It was originally part of a section titled “The Investor as Business Owner,” nearly 34 pages long. In it, Graham urged intelligent investors to become intelligent owners: vigilant and outspoken in ensuring that companies are well-managed, executives fairly paid, and the interests of outside investors safeguarded.

格雷厄姆写道，原则上，“股东作为一个阶层就是国王……他们可以雇佣和解雇管理层，并让他们完全屈服于自己的意志。”

In principle, Graham wrote, “the stockholders as a class are king . . . they can hire and fire managements and bend them completely to their will.”

然而在实践中，

In practice, however,

...股东们完全被打败了。...他们像绵羊一样投票赞成管理层的任何建议，不管管理层的记录有多糟糕。...激励普通美国股东采取任何独立明智行动的唯一方法就是在他脚下放一个爆竹。

. . . the shareholders are a complete washout. . . . They vote in sheeplike fashion for whatever the management recommends and no matter how poor the management’s record. . . . The only way to inspire the average American shareholder to take any independently intelligent action would be by exploding a firecracker under him.

到1971-72年最后一次修订时，格雷厄姆已将讨论内容缩减至几页，几乎全部集中在股息上。激励投资者采取行动的努力想必让他精疲力竭。

By his last revision in 1971–72, Graham had shrunk the discussion to a few pages focused almost entirely on dividends. The effort to incite investors to take action must have exhausted him.

内部人员与外部人员

Insiders versus Outsiders

管理者和所有者之间的紧张关系自资本主义诞生以来就一直存在。如果不加以控制，许多CEO会疯狂收购其他公司，向濒临倒闭的企业投入巨额资金，囤积超过自身所需的资金，并给自己发放巨额奖金，以换取业绩平平。

The tension between managers and owners is as old as capitalism. Left unchecked, many CEOs would binge on buying other companies, pour money into failing businesses, hoard more capital than they need, and pay themselves stupendous bonuses for tepid performance.

事实上，很多人都这么做。

In fact, many do.

几个世纪以前，投资者期望股息率设定在6%到10%的高位，部分原因是为了制衡管理层的权力。通过将现金转移给外部股东，高额股息可以防止管理层私吞或挥霍所有现金。

Centuries ago, investors expected dividends to be set at high rates of 6% to 10%, partly as a check on management’s power. By transferring cash to outside shareholders, high dividends prevented managers from pilfering or frittering it all away.

股票回购，即公司使用多余的现金回购部分股票，似乎也是出于同样的原因。

Buybacks, in which companies use excess cash to repurchase some of their shares, appear to have originated for the same reason.

当今的批评者认为，股票回购让管理层和富豪投资者中饱私囊，他们应该思考一下，如果公司不回购股票，会发生什么情况。

Today’s critics, who contend that buybacks line the pockets of management and fat-cat investors, should ponder what can happen when companies don’t repurchase stock.

20世纪70年代，埃克森美孚凭借飙升的油价获得了巨额利润，开始生产打字机——就在个人电脑彻底摧毁打字机业务之前。美孚石油收购了蒙哥马利·沃德百货公司——就在沃尔玛即将打垮传统零售商的时候。

In the 1970s, bursting with windfall profits from soaring oil prices, Exxon started manufacturing typewriters—right before personal computers wiped that business out. Mobil Oil bought Montgomery Ward department stores—just as Walmart was about to crush traditional retailers.

石油巨头们在与自己无关的领域浪费了数十亿美元。如果这些公司把多余的现金用来回购股票，他们和投资者的境况会好得多。

The oil giants wasted billions of dollars on businesses they had no business getting into. They and their investors would have been much better off if the companies had used that excess cash to buy back shares instead.

作为华尔街首批“激进”投资者之一，格雷厄姆率先发起了一场反对薪酬过高、业绩不佳的公司经理人的斗争。他深知，现金是经理人与投资者之间冲突的核心：

As one of Wall Street’s first “activist” investors, Graham pioneered the fight against overpaid, underachieving corporate managers. He understood that cash is at the heart of the conflict between managers and investors:

管理层……几乎总是希望从所有者那里获得尽可能多的资本，以尽量减少自身的财务问题。因此，如果股东允许——而他们通常也这样做——典型的管理层会使用超过必要水平的资本来运营^。1

[M]anagement . . . almost always wants as much capital from the owners as it can possibly get, in order to minimize its own financial problems. Thus the typical management will operate with more capital than necessary, if the stockholders permit it—which they often do.¹

公司越擅长生产顾客想要的产品，利润就越高。优秀的企业最终积累的现金多到不知该如何利用。

The better companies get at producing what their customers want to buy, the more the profits pile up. Superior businesses eventually accumulate more cash than they know what to do with.

另一方面，苦苦挣扎的企业会紧紧抓住现金不放。“公司前景越不明朗……管理层就越急于将所有现金都留在公司，”格雷厄姆写道。“但股东最好把所有可以安全省下的资金都取出来，因为这些资金如果留在自己口袋里，或者投资到其他地方，对他们来说价值要大得多。” ²

On the other hand, businesses that are struggling will cling to cash for dear life. “The more dubious the company’s prospects . . . the more anxious management is to retain all the cash it can in the business,” Graham wrote. “But the stockholders would be well advised to take out all the capital that can be safely spared, because these funds are much more valuable to them if in their own pockets, or invested elsewhere.”²

回购胡说八道

Buyback Baloney

CEO最重要的任务是将资本配置到最有生产力的用途上。这可能意味着进行资本支出，例如维护和升级工厂，或更换老化的卡车或飞机车队。这可能意味着将剩余资金投入研发，以开发更好的软件、开发有前景的药物，或推出创新的产品或服务。这可能意味着收购另一家公司，以获得其产品、技术或营销实力。这可能意味着雇佣更多员工或提高现有员工的薪酬^。3

The most important task of a CEO is to allocate capital to its most productive use. That could mean making capital expenditures, such as maintaining and upgrading factories or replacing an aging fleet of trucks or airplanes. It could mean pouring surplus cash into research and development to create better software, develop promising drugs, or come up with innovative goods or services. It could mean buying another company to acquire its products, technology, or marketing prowess. It could mean hiring more workers or paying more to the existing staff.³

一旦满足了业务的基本需求，管理者应该如何处理多余的现金？

Once those essential needs of the business are met, what should managers do with excess cash?

除非企业能够有效地利用这些现金，否则管理层应该将现金返还给所有者——无论是通过股息还是回购。

Unless the business can use it productively, management should give the cash back to the owners—either through dividends or buybacks.

这两种选择从根本上来说是相似的。

The two choices are fundamentally similar.

对于股息，您可以决定是否以现金形式保留支付或将其再投资于更多公司股份。

With a dividend, you decide whether to keep the payment in cash or reinvest it in more shares of the company.

通过回购，您可以选择是否接受公司回购股份的要约。如果您接受，您最终将获得现金。如果您不接受，您最终将持有该公司略多的股份，但公司现在的股份数量有所减少。

With a buyback, you choose whether to accept the company’s offer to buy your shares. If you do, you end up with cash. If you don’t, you end up owning a slightly larger stake in a company that now has fewer shares.

图 19-1：回购热潮

FIGURE 19-1: The Buyback Boom

资料来源：标准普尔道琼斯指数。

Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices.

无论哪种情况，公司的资本都会减少，而所有者的资本则会增多，而且部分回报已经从不确定的未来转移到确定的现在。

In either case, the company has less capital, its owners have more, and some of its return has shifted from the uncertain future to the present, where it is certain.

股票回购引发了激烈的争论。从2014年到2023年，美国公司回购了高达6.8万亿美元的股票：

Buybacks have incited furious debate. From 2014 through 2023, U.S. companies repurchased a staggering $6.8 trillion of their own shares:

理论上，公司应该只在股价便宜时回购股票。但实际上，他们几乎总是认为股价便宜。2020年春季，新冠疫情肆虐，股市崩盘，83%的首席财务官认为他们的股票被低估了。然而，在2000年第一季度，也就是历史上最疯狂的市场狂热之一期间，超过80%的首席财务官也认为他们的股票被低估了！总是相信他们的主观意见是愚蠢的想法^。4

In theory, companies should buy back their stock only when it’s cheap. In practice, they almost always think it is. In the spring of 2020, with Covid raging and the stock market crashing, 83% of chief financial officers thought their stock was undervalued. However, more than 80% of CFOs also thought their stock was undervalued in the first quarter of 2000, during one of the wildest market manias in history! Always trusting their subjective opinions would be a dumb idea.⁴

雷曼兄弟控股公司斥资超过 40 亿美元2007 年和 2008 年回购了其股票。2008 年 9 月，雷曼兄弟因对复杂风险的鲁莽押注而破产，引发了大萧条以来最严重的全球金融危机。

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. spent more than $4 billion repurchasing its shares in 2007 and 2008. In September 2008, Lehman went bust from reckless bets on complex risks—precipitating the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression.

花旗集团在 2004 年至 2008 年间回购了超过 200 亿美元的股票，随后需要美国政府提供 450 亿美元的救助才能度过金融危机。

Citigroup Inc. bought back over $20 billion in its shares from 2004 through 2008, then needed a $45 billion bailout from the U.S. government to survive the financial crisis.

正如我们在第18章评论中看到的那样，Bed Bath & Beyond斥资数十亿美元回购股票，最终却申请破产保护。几年前，另一家破产的零售商西尔斯也遭遇了同样的困境。

As we saw in the Commentary on Chapter 18, Bed Bath & Beyond spent billions buying back its stock, only to end up filing for bankruptcy protection. Years earlier, so did Sears, another failed retailer.

您的直觉可能会说：想象一下，如果这些公司没有浪费那么多钱回购股票，他们的业绩会好多少！

Your instinct might be to say: Imagine how much better those companies would have done if they hadn’t wasted all that money buying back their stock!

您的明智判断应该告诉您：想象一下，如果这些公司按照其管理人员的意愿额外花费数十亿美元，可能会造成多大的损失！

Your better judgment should tell you: Imagine how much more damage those companies could have done with billions of extra dollars to spend on their managers’ whims!

如果这些公司没有回购所有股票，他们是否会积攒如此多的现金，从而更加难以向首席执行官支付过高的薪酬？

If the companies hadn’t repurchased all that stock, wouldn’t they have been wallowing in so much cash that the temptation to overpay their CEOs would have been even greater?

不管批评者怎么说，首席执行官通过回购获得巨额薪酬增长的证据是缺乏说服力的；进行回购的公司股票价格也没有大幅上涨。

Despite what the critics say, the evidence that CEOs get giant boosts in pay from buybacks is unpersuasive; nor do the stocks of companies doing repurchases get big pops in price.

认为首席执行官们正在削减资本支出和研发资金来为股票回购提供资金的说法也是空洞的；尽管股票回购激增，但这些承诺却升至历史新高^。5

The argument that CEOs are starving capital expenditures and research and development to fund buybacks is also hollow; those commitments have risen to record highs despite the surge in share repurchases.⁵

回购的底线

The Bottom Line on Buybacks

归根结底，回购既不是好事也不是坏事。

The bottom line is that buybacks are neither good nor evil.

它们只是一种工具。

They’re simply a tool.

就像锤子既可以用来建房，也可以用来拆房一样，回购既可以起到建设性的作用，也可以起到破坏性的作用。当公司没有更好的用途时，回购是分配剩余现金的有效工具；但如果公司不顾自身未来的警示信号，肆意回购股票，那么回购就成了破坏性工具。

Just as you can use a hammer either to build a house or knock it down, buybacks can be either constructive or destructive. They are an effective tool to distribute surplus cash when a company has no better use for it—but a damaging tool when the company repurchases shares with reckless disregard for warning signs about its own future.

盲目反对所有回购毫无意义，盲目赞扬也同样不合理。作为一名明智的投资者，你必须根据实际情况评估任何公司的回购：股价有多便宜？增长前景有多光明？公司是否在借钱来为回购提供资金？回购是否仅仅是为了抵消发行新股以支付管理层激励性薪酬？如果公司将这笔钱用于其他用途，公司及其股东的境况是否会更好？

Blindly opposing all buybacks makes no sense. Nor does blindly applauding them. As an intelligent investor, you must assess any company’s buyback based on the circumstances: How cheap is the stock? How bright are the prospects for growth? Is the company borrowing money to finance the buyback? Are the repurchases simply counteracting the issuance of new shares to pay incentive compensation to management? Would the company and its owners be better off if it spent the money for other purposes?

2023年8月，NVIDIA宣布将回购高达250亿美元的股票，许多股东欢呼雀跃。然而，他们本应担忧在NVIDIA历史最高估值附近进行大规模回购是否明智^。6

When, in August 2023, NVIDIA announced that it would repurchase up to $25 billion of stock, many shareowners cheered. Instead, they should have worried about the wisdom of a big buyback near the highest valuations in NVIDIA’s history.⁶

按“绩效”付费

Pay for “Performance”

音乐家和运动员每年可以赚取数千万美元，而且往往成为亿万富翁，因此你不应该自动批评那些赚取类似收入的首席执行官。

With musicians and athletes earning tens of millions of dollars a year and often becoming billionaires, you shouldn’t automatically criticize CEOs earning similar sums.

然而，你始终应该保持怀疑态度。

However, you always should be skeptical.

以华纳兄弟探索公司（WBD）为例。

Consider Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc. (WBD).

在其首席执行官大卫·扎斯拉夫 (David Zaslav) 精心策划的几次收购之后，WBD 拥有 CNN、DC Comics、探索频道、美食频道、HBO、华纳兄弟电影和电视工作室以及其他娱乐资产。

After several acquisitions orchestrated by its CEO, David Zaslav, WBD consists of CNN, DC Comics, Discovery Channel, Food Network, HBO, the Warner Bros. movie and television studios, and other entertainment assets.

该公司于2008年底以探索传播公司（Discovery Communications, Inc.）的名义上市。首次公开募股（IPO）后的头五年，公司股价一路飙升，年均涨幅达46%，而同期标准普尔500指数的平均涨幅仅为18%。在经历了如此辉煌的开局之后，董事会在2014年向扎斯拉夫支付了总计1.56亿美元的薪酬——而探索传播公司也正是在这一年开始走下坡路，至今已持续了十年。

The company went public, as Discovery Communications, Inc., in late 2008. In the first five years after that IPO, the stock was on fire, gaining an average of 46% annually while the S&P 500 averaged 18%. After that blazing start, the board of directors awarded Zaslav $156 million in total compensation in 2014—the year Discovery began a decline that, so far, has lasted a decade.

2010 年代和 2020 年代初，在线和移动流媒体对传统网络和工作室造成了严重破坏。

In the 2010s and early 2020s, online and mobile streaming wreaked havoc on traditional networks and studios.

尽管WBD开局火爆，但从IPO到2023年底，其股票年均回报率仅为2%，比美国股市低了可怜的8.6个百分点。如果在WBD投资1万美元，在此期间，其收益将攀升至略高于13,400美元；而如果在标准普尔500指数中投资1万美元，则飙升至近42,500美元。

Despite its hot start, from its IPO to the end of 2023 WBD’s stock returned an annual average of 2%, trailing the U.S. stock market by an abysmal 8.6 percentage points annually. A $10,000 investment in WBD would have crept up to just over $13,400 over that period; the same amount in the S&P 500 burgeoned to nearly $42,500.

尽管华纳兄弟探索公司的收入在此期间增长了10倍以上，但其净收入却起伏不定；2022年，华纳兄弟探索公司亏损74亿美元。到2023年底，其债务已达450亿美元。

Although Warner Bros. Discovery’s revenues rose more than 10-fold over that period, its net income jolted up and down; in 2022, WBD lost $7.4 billion. By late 2023 it was carrying $45 billion of debt.

WBD 的股价表现略优于竞争对手派拉蒙全球和狮门娱乐，但明显逊于另外两家媒体巨头康卡斯特公司和华特迪士尼公司。

WBD’s shares performed slightly better than rivals Paramount Global and Lions Gate Entertainment, but significantly worse than Comcast Corp. or Walt Disney Co., two other media giants.

尽管如此，从 2009 年到 2022 年底，WBD 首席执行官扎斯拉夫的潜在薪酬总额为 9.56 亿美元，实际收入超过 7.5 亿美元^。7

Nevertheless, from 2009 through the end of 2022, Zaslav, the CEO of WBD, earned $956 million in total potential compensation—and took home more than $750 million.⁷

表 19-1：这就是演艺界

TABLE 19-1: That’s Showbusiness

年 Year	华纳兄弟探索股票总回报率（%） Total return, Warner Bros. Discovery stock (%)	标普500指数总回报率（%） S&P 500 total return (%)	WBD 总市值（百万美元） WBD total market capitalization ($ millions)	华纳兄弟探索频道首席执行官总薪酬（美元） Total compensation for Warner Bros. Discovery CEO ($)
2009 2009	116.6 116.6	26.5 26.5	13,065 13,065	11,655,850 11,655,850
2010 2010	36.0 36.0	15.1 15.1	17,764 17,764	42,589,296 42,589,296
2011 2011	1.8 1.8	2.1 2.1	16,511 16,511	52,404,119 52,404,119
2012 2012	54.9 54.9	16.0 16.0	25,094 25,094	49,932,867 49,932,867
2013 2013	42.4 42.4	32.4 32.4	34,920 34,920	33,349,798 33,349,798
2014 2014	-25.4 -25.4	13.7 13.7	16,567 16,567	156,077,912 156,077,912
2015 2015	-22.6 -22.6	1.4 1.4	12,166 12,166	32,377,346 32,377,346
2016 2016	2.7 2.7	12.0 12.0	11,457 11,457	37,192,354 37,192,354
2017 2017	-18.4 -18.4	21.8 21.8	8,639 8,639	42,247,984 42,247,984
2018 2018	10.5 10.5	-4.4 -4.4	13,112 13,112	129,499,005 129,499,005
2019 2019	32.3 32.3	31.5 31.5	17,352 17,352	45,843,912 45,843,912
2020 2020	-8.1 -8.1	18.4 18.4	14,804 14,804	37,710,462 37,710,462
2021 2021	-21.8 -21.8	28.7 28.7	12,005 12,005	246,573,481 246,573,481
2022 2022	-59.7 -59.7	-18.1 -18.1	23,036 23,036	39,288,458 39,288,458
华纳兄弟探索频道首席执行官累计薪酬（美元） Cumulative compensation for Warner Bros. Discovery CEO ($)	956,742,844 956,742,844
年化总回报率（%） Annualized total return (%)	1.9 1.9	13.1 13.1

年

Year

华纳兄弟探索股票总回报率（%）

Total return, Warner Bros. Discovery stock (%)

标普500指数总回报率（%）

S&P 500 total return (%)

WBD 总市值（百万美元）

WBD total market capitalization ($ millions)

华纳兄弟探索频道首席执行官总薪酬（美元）

Total compensation for Warner Bros. Discovery CEO ($)

2009

116.6

26.5

13,065

11,655,850

2010

36.0

15.1

17,764

42,589,296

2011

1.8

2.1

16,511

52,404,119

2012

54.9

16.0

25,094

49,932,867

2013

42.4

32.4

34,920

33,349,798

2014

-25.4

13.7

16,567

156,077,912

2015

-22.6

1.4

12,166

32,377,346

2016

2.7

12.0

11,457

37,192,354

2017

-18.4

21.8

8,639

42,247,984

2018

10.5

-4.4

13,112

129,499,005

2019

32.3

31.5

17,352

45,843,912

2020

-8.1

18.4

14,804

37,710,462

2021

-21.8

28.7

12,005

246,573,481

2022

-59.7

-18.1

23,036

39,288,458

华纳兄弟探索频道首席执行官累计薪酬（美元）

Cumulative compensation for Warner Bros. Discovery CEO ($)

956,742,844

年化总回报率（%）

Annualized total return (%)

1.9

13.1

资料来源：WBD 代理声明、FactSet。

Sources: WBD proxy statements, FactSet.

WBD 2023 年的代理声明称，以股票形式向高管支付薪酬有助于“使高管的利益与股东的利益保持一致”，并且扎斯拉夫作为首席执行官的“卓越表现”包括“超额完成了为其制定的战略目标”。（在 2022 年股价下跌近 60% 后，董事会决定不再向他发放“任何额外或超额奖金”。）

WBD’s 2023 proxy statement said that paying top management with stock helps “align our executives’ interests with those of our stockholders” and that Zaslav’s “exceptional performance” as CEO included “over-delivery of the strategic objectives established for him.” (After the stock fell nearly 60% in 2022, the board decided not to award him “any additional or above-target bonus.”)

扎斯拉夫的累积薪酬很大一部分基于一种名为“调整后 OIBDA”的创新利润衡量指标。该公司将股票薪酬支出重新计入该收入指标中——因此，WBD 支付给高管的股票越多，调整后 OIBDA 就越高。而调整后 OIBDA 的增长正是首席执行官获得奖励的因素之一。

Much of Zaslav’s cumulative compensation was based on an inventive measure of profits called Adjusted OIBDA. The company adds the expense of stock-based compensation back into that measure of its income—so the more WBD pays its top executives in stock, the higher adjusted OIBDA goes. And an increase in adjusted OIBDA is one of the things the CEO gets rewarded for.

正如我们在第 12 章的评论中看到的那样，这种安排并不罕见，而且其愚蠢的逻辑已经变得如此华尔街将其视为正常现象，尽管正如 Zion Research Group 的 David Zion 所说，“这完全是错误的”。

As we saw in the Commentary on Chapter 12, this sort of arrangement is far from unusual, and its daffy logic has become so common that Wall Street treats it as normal—even though, as David Zion of Zion Research Group says, “it’s flat-out wrong.”

如果您觉得业绩平平却薪水过高——这确实应该！——那就行使您的权利吧。收到年度代理声明时，不要仅仅投票反对不公平的薪酬计划。要投票反对每一位董事的连任。他们批准了这项计划。您至少应该表达一下您的不满。

If what seems like excessive pay for unimpressive performance bothers you—as it should!—then exercise your rights. When you receive the annual proxy statement, don’t merely vote against an unfair compensation plan. Vote against the reelection of every single director. They approved the plan. The least you can do is voice your disapproval of them.

您还可以参加公司的年度股东大会并发表意见。在美国，您可以通过在SEC的EDGAR数据库（sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/n-px）中搜索您的共同基金和ETF的N-PX表格文件，查看其对薪酬方案的投票情况。您还可以尝试使用Civex、iconikapp.com和Troop等应用程序和在线工具，寻找并联合志同道合的投资者^。8

You can also attend the company’s annual meeting and speak out. In the U.S., you can check how your mutual funds and ETFs voted on pay packages by searching their Form N-PX filings at the SEC’s EDGAR database (sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/n-px). And you can try seeking out and banding together with like-minded investors using apps and online tools such as Civex, iconikapp.com, and Troop.⁸

一旦你买了股票，你不仅要努力成为一个聪明的投资者，更要努力成为一个聪明的股东。这意味着你有责任维护自己的权利。

Once you buy a stock, you must seek to be not only an intelligent investor, but also an intelligent owner. That means you have a responsibility to assert your rights.

奖励正确的事情

Rewarding the Right Things

为了降低因业绩不佳而支付过高薪酬的风险，公司应该如何激励管理层？

To reduce the risk of overpaying for underperformance, how should a company incentivize its management?

在好市多批发公司 (Costco Wholesale Corp.)，高管的奖金主要取决于销售额和税前收入的增长目标——这两项标准指标很难被操纵。

At Costco Wholesale Corp., executives’ bonuses depend primarily on hitting targets for growth in sales and pre-tax income—two standard measures that are difficult to manipulate.

保险公司 Markel Corp. 根据每股账面价值的增长和五年内股票的总回报来确定激励薪酬。

Markel Corp., an insurance company, bases incentive compensation on the growth in per-share book value and the total return of the stock over five years.

在埃克森美孚公司，高管的激励性薪酬大多以特殊股权形式发放，但股权所有权受到限制；50% 的股权在 5 年后归属，另一半的股权在 10 年后归属。这种激励机制旨在奖励那些专注于长期目标的人。

At ExxonMobil Corp., most incentive pay for top executives is in special shares with restricted ownership rights; 50% vest after five years, the other half after 10 years. That rewards focusing on long-term goals.

投资者应该预期绩效薪酬应该基于对公司健康和增长状况的简单、清晰的衡量标准，而非会计欺诈。长期业绩应该远高于短期业绩。而且，绩效门槛不应该逐年变得更容易逾越。

Investors should expect pay for performance to be based on simple, clear measurements of the health and growth of the business—not on accounting chicanery. Multiyear results should weigh much more heavily than the short term. And performance hurdles shouldn’t get easier to clear from year to year.

几十年前，格雷厄姆主张用以下标准来衡量公司管理者的成功：投资资本回报率、净利润率以及销售额和净收入的增长率。每个指标都应该与同行业其他公司进行比较。我尚不清楚有哪家公司会以如此合理的标准来制定激励性薪酬，但董事会应该考虑采纳格雷厄姆的建议^。1

Decades ago, Graham advocated measuring the success of corporate managers with these criteria: return on invested capital, net profit margin, and the rate of growth in sales and net income. Each should be compared to that of other companies in the same industry. I’m not aware of any company that bases its incentive compensation on such sensible standards, but boards of directors should consider following Graham’s advice.¹

¹本杰明·格雷厄姆和戴维·多德，《证券分析》（麦格劳-希尔，1951年），第581-583页。衡量公司业绩与同行业其他公司之间的比较至关重要，因为公司业绩往往更多地取决于运气而非管理层的战略。例如，当利率下降时，即使首席执行官能力有限，大多数房屋建筑商仍能蓬勃发展。只有那些公司业绩多年来远超行业平均水平的高管才应该获得高额激励性薪酬。

¹ Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, Security Analysis (McGraw-Hill, 1951), pp. 581–83. Measuring performance against other companies in the same industry is vital, since corporate results are often driven more by luck than by management’s strategies. When interest rates fall, for example, most homebuilders will thrive even if their CEOs are barely competent. Only those executives whose firms did significantly better than the industry average over multiyear periods should be rewarded with big incentive pay.

第二十章

Chapter 20 “安全边际”是投资的核心概念

“Margin of Safety” as the Central Concept of Investment

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

在古老的传说中，智者最终将凡人事务的历史浓缩为一句话：“这一切都会过去。” ^*面对同样的挑战，要将稳健投资的秘诀提炼成三个字，我们大胆地选择了“安全边际”作为座右铭。这条主线贯穿了之前所有关于投资政策的讨论——有时表达得非常明确，有时则不那么直接。现在，让我们尝试在一个相关的论证中简要地追溯一下这一思想。

In the old legend the wise men finally boiled down the history of mortal affairs into the single phrase, “This too will pass.”^* Confronted with a like challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, MARGIN OF SAFETY. This is the thread that runs through all the preceding discussion of investment policy—often explicitly, sometimes in a less direct fashion. Let us try now, briefly, to trace that idea in a connected argument.

所有经验丰富的投资者都认识到，安全边际的概念对于选择稳健的债券和优先股至关重要。例如，一家铁路公司应该在几年内，使其债券的收益超过其总固定费用的五倍（税前），才能使其债券符合投资级债券的资格。这种过去超过利息要求的收益能力构成了安全边际，它可以用来保护投资者在未来净收入下降的情况下免受损失或困扰。（安全边际也可以用其他方式表示，例如，用百分比表示）收入或利润可能会在利息消失后的余额之前下降——但基本思想是一样的。）

All experienced investors recognize that the margin-of-safety concept is essential to the choice of sound bonds and preferred stocks. For example, a railroad should have earned its total fixed charges better than five times (before income tax), taking a period of years, for its bonds to qualify as investment-grade issues. This past ability to earn in excess of interest requirements constitutes the margin of safety that is counted on to protect the investor against loss or discomfiture in the event of some future decline in net income. (The margin above charges may be stated in other ways—for example, in the percentage by which revenues or profits may decline before the balance after interest disappears—but the underlying idea remains the same.)

债券投资者并不期望未来的平均收益与过去相同；如果他确信这一点，那么要求的保证金可能很小。他也不会在很大程度上依赖于自己对未来收益是否会比过去大幅改善或恶化的判断。如果他真的依赖这些判断，他就必须根据精心预测的损益表来衡量他的保证金，而不是强调过去记录中显示的保证金。在这里，安全边际的作用本质上就是使对未来的准确估计变得不必要。如果安全边际很大，那么只需假设未来收益不会远低于过去，投资者就能感到自己有足够的保障，免受时间变迁的影响。

The bond investor does not expect future average earnings to work out the same as in the past; if he were sure of that, the margin demanded might be small. Nor does he rely to any controlling extent on his judgment as to whether future earnings will be materially better or poorer than in the past, if he did that, he would have to measure his margin in terms of a carefully projected income account, instead of emphasizing the margin shown in the past record. Here the function of the margin of safety is, in essence, that of rendering unnecessary an accurate estimate of the future. If the margin is a large one, then it is enough to assume that future earnings will not fall far below those of the past in order for an investor to feel sufficiently protected against the vicissitudes of time.

或者，可以通过比较企业总价值与债务金额来计算债券的安全边际。（优先股发行也可以进行类似的计算。）如果企业负债1000万美元，而其实际价值为3000万美元，那么在债券持有人遭受损失之前，其价值至少在理论上有缩水三分之二的空间。这部分额外价值，或称“缓冲”，高于债务的金额，可以用多年期次级股发行的平均市场价格来估算。由于平均股价通常与平均盈利能力相关，因此“企业价值”与债务的差额以及收益与费用的差额在大多数情况下会产生类似的结果。

The margin of safety for bonds may be calculated, alternatively, by comparing the total value of the enterprise with the amount of debt. (A similar calculation may be made for a preferred-stock issue.) If the business owes $10 million and is fairly worth $30 million, there is room for a shrinkage of two-thirds in value—at least theoretically—before the bondholders will suffer loss. The amount of this extra value, or “cushion,” above the debt may be approximated by using the average market price of the junior stock issues over a period of years. Since average stock prices are generally related to average earning power, the margin of “enterprise value” over debt and the margin of earnings over charges will in most cases yield similar results.

关于安全边际概念应用于“固定价值投资”的讨论就到这里。它能推广到普通股领域吗？可以，但需要进行一些必要的修改。

So much for the margin-of-safety concept as applied to “fixed-value investments.” Can it be carried over into the field of common stocks? Yes, but with some necessary modifications.

在某些情况下，普通股可能被认为是稳健的，因为它的安全边际与优质债券一样大。例如，当一家公司只发行普通股，而在经济萧条时期，其售价低于可以安全发行的债券数量时，就会出现这种情况。^*这就是一位主持人的观点在1932-33年的低价位，投资者可以买入资金雄厚的工业公司。在这种情况下，投资者可以获得债券带来的安全边际，以及普通股固有的更高收益和本金增值的所有机会。（他唯一缺少的是坚持要求支付股息“否则”的法律权力——但与他的优势相比，这只是一个小小的缺点。）在这种情况下购买的普通股将提供理想的安全性和盈利机会的组合，尽管这种情况并不常见。作为这种情况的一个相当近期的例子，让我们再次提到国民普雷斯托工业公司的股票，该公司在1972年的总企业价值为4300万美元。凭借其近期1600万美元的税前利润，该公司可以轻松支持这笔债券。

There are instances where a common stock may be considered sound because it enjoys a margin of safety as large as that of a good bond. This will occur, for example, when a company has outstanding only common stock that under depression conditions is selling for less than the amount of bonds that could safely be issued against its property and earning power.^* That was the position of a host of strongly financed industrial companies at the low price levels of 1932–33. In such instances the investor can obtain the margin of safety associated with a bond, plus all the chances of larger income and principal appreciation inherent in a common stock. (The only thing he lacks is the legal power to insist on dividend payments “or else”—but this is a small drawback as compared with his advantages.) Common stocks bought under such circumstances will supply an ideal, though infrequent, combination of safety and profit opportunity. As a quite recent example of this condition, let us mention once more National Presto Industries stock, which sold for a total enterprise value of $43 million in 1972. With its $16 million of recent earnings before taxes the company could easily have supported this amount of bonds.

对于在正常情况下购买用于投资的普通股，安全边际在于预期盈利能力远高于债券的现行利率。在之前的版本中，我们用以下图表阐明了这一点：

In the ordinary common stock, bought for investment under normal conditions, the margin of safety lies in an expected earning power considerably above the going rate for bonds. In former editions we elucidated this point with the following figures:

假设一个典型案例，盈利能力为股价的9%，债券利率为4%，那么股票买家每年将获得平均5%的利润。部分超额部分将以股息的形式支付给他；即使他已经花掉了，这部分利润也计入了他的整体投资收益。未分配的余额将重新投资于公司业务。在许多情况下，此类再投资收益未能相应地提升其股票的盈利能力和价值。（这就是为什么市场总是倾向于更慷慨地评估以股息形式支付的收益，而不是保留在公司业务中的收益。）但是，如果从整体上看，公司通过再投资收益实现的盈余增长与公司价值增长之间存在着相当密切的联系。

Assume in a typical case that the earning power is 9% on the price and that the bond rate is 4%; then the stockbuyer will have an average annual margin of 5% accruing in his favor. Some of the excess is paid to him in the dividend rate; even though spent by him, it enters into his overall investment result. The undistributed balance is reinvested in the business for his account. In many cases such reinvested earnings fail to add commensurately to the earning power and value of his stock. (That is why the market has a stubborn habit of valuing earnings disbursed in dividends more generously than the portion retained in the business.) But, if the picture is viewed as a whole, there is a reasonably close connection between the growth of corporate surpluses through reinvested earnings and the growth of corporate values.

在十年期间，股票盈利能力超过债券利息的部分通常可达到支付价格的 50%。这个数字足以提供一个非常真实的安全边际——在有利条件下，这将避免或减少损失。如果在 20 只或更多股票的分散化名单中，每只股票都具备这样的边际，那么在“相当正常的情况”下获得有利结果的概率就会非常大。这就是为什么投资代表性普通股的策略不需要很高的洞察力和远见就能成功的原因。如果以多年来的市场平均水平进行购买，那么支付的价格应该带有足够的安全边际保证。对投资者的风险在于将购买集中在市场的高端，或者购买非代表性的普通股，这些股票的盈利能力下降的风险高于平均水平。

Over a ten-year period the typical excess of stock earning power over bond interest may aggregate 50% of the price paid. This figure is sufficient to provide a very real margin of safety—which, under favorable conditions, will prevent or minimize a loss. If such a margin is present in each of a diversified list of twenty or more stocks, the probability of a favorable result under “fairly normal conditions” becomes very large. That is why the policy of investing in representative common stocks does not require high qualities of insight and foresight to work out successfully. If the purchases are made at the average level of the market over a span of years, the prices paid should carry with them assurance of an adequate margin of safety. The danger to investors lies in concentrating their purchases in the upper levels of the market, or in buying nonrepresentative common stocks that carry more than average risk of diminished earning power.

我们认为，1972年条件下普通股投资的根本问题在于，在“典型情况下”，现在的盈利能力远低于发行价的9%。^*假设一位防御型投资者通过集中精力于大型公司中低乘数的股票，现在可以以12倍的近期市盈率购入股票，即盈利回报率为成本回报率的8.33%。他可以获得约4%的股息收益率，并将4.33%的成本再投资于公司业务。基于此，十年期股票盈利能力超过债券利息的差额仍然太小，不足以构成足够的安全边际。因此，我们认为，即使是在多元化的稳健普通股组合中，现在也存在着真正的风险。股票。这些风险或许会被这些股票的盈利潜力完全抵消；事实上，投资者可能别无选择，只能承担这些风险——否则，他可能面临更大的风险，只能持有以不断贬值的美元支付的固定债权。尽管如此，投资者最好还是认识到，并尽可能理性地接受，过去那种既有良好的盈利潜力，又有较小的最终风险的投资组合，对他来说已经不再可行。^*

As we see it, the whole problem of common-stock investment under 1972 conditions lies in the fact that “in a typical case” the earning power is now much less than 9% on the price paid.^* Let us assume that by concentrating somewhat on the low-multiplier issues among the large companies a defensive investor may now acquire equities at 12 times recent earnings—i.e., with an earnings return of 8.33% on cost. He may obtain a dividend yield of about 4%, and he will have 4.33% of his cost reinvested in the business for his account. On this basis, the excess of stock earning power over bond interest over a ten-year basis would still be too small to constitute an adequate margin of safety. For that reason we feel that there are real risks now even in a diversified list of sound common stocks. The risks may be fully offset by the profit possibilities of the list; and indeed the investor may have no choice but to incur them—for otherwise he may run an even greater risk of holding only fixed claims payable in steadily depreciating dollars. Nonetheless the investor would do well to recognize, and to accept as philosophically as he can, that the old package of good profit possibilities combined with small ultimate risk is no longer available to him.^*

然而，为优质股票支付过高价格的风险——尽管这的确存在——并非普通证券买家面临的主要风险。多年的观察告诉我们，投资者的主要损失来自于在商业环境良好时购买劣质证券。购买者将当前的良好收益视为“盈利能力”，并认为繁荣与安全同义。正是在那些年，劣质债券和优先股可以以接近票面价值的价格向公众出售，因为它们的收益回报略高，或者具有极具吸引力的转换特权。同样，在那时，凭借两三年的优异增长，一些不知名公司的普通股也可以以远高于实际投资的价格发行。

However, the risk of paying too high a price for good-quality stocks—while a real one—is not the chief hazard confronting the average buyer of securities. Observation over many years has taught us that the chief losses to investors come from the purchase of low-quality securities at times of favorable business conditions. The purchasers view the current good earnings as equivalent to “earning power” and assume that prosperity is synonymous with safety. It is in those years that bonds and preferred stocks of inferior grade can be sold to the public at a price around par, because they carry a little higher income return or a deceptively attractive conversion privilege. It is then, also, that common stocks of obscure companies can be floated at prices far above the tangible investment, on the strength of two or three years of excellent growth.

这些证券未能提供任何意义上的足够安全边际。利息费用和优先股股息的覆盖率必须经过多年的测试，最好包括一段业绩不佳的时期，例如1970-71年。如果普通股收益要成为盈利能力的指标，通常也需要经过同样的测试。因此，大多数以好天气价格购得的好天气投资，注定会在前景阴云密布时遭遇令人不安的价格下跌——而且往往来得更早。投资者也不能满怀信心地指望最终会出现复苏——尽管在一定比例的案例中确实会出现复苏——因为他从来没有真正的安全边际来帮助他度过逆境。

These securities do not offer an adequate margin of safety in any admissible sense of the term. Coverage of interest charges and preferred dividends must be tested over a number of years, including preferably a period of subnormal business such as in 1970–71. The same is ordinarily true of common-stock earnings if they are to qualify as indicators of earning power. Thus it follows that most of the fair-weather investments, acquired at fair-weather prices, are destined to suffer disturbing price declines when the horizon clouds over—and often sooner than that. Nor can the investor count with confidence on an eventual recovery—although this does come about in some proportion of the cases—for he has never had a real safety margin to tide him through adversity.

成长股的投资理念在某种程度上与并且在一定程度上违反了安全边际原则。成长股买家依赖高于过去平均水平的预期盈利能力。因此，可以说，他在计算安全边际时，用这些预期盈利代替了过去的记录。在投资理论中，没有理由认为精心估算的未来盈利会比单纯的过去记录更不可靠；事实上，证券分析越来越倾向于对未来进行有效评估。因此，成长股方法可以提供与普通投资一样可靠的安全边际——前提是，对未来的计算是保守的，并且相对于支付的价格而言，其边际令人满意。

The philosophy of investment in growth stocks parallels in part and in part contravenes the margin-of-safety principle. The growth-stock buyer relies on an expected earning power that is greater than the average shown in the past. Thus he may be said to substitute these expected earnings for the past record in calculating his margin of safety. In investment theory there is no reason why carefully estimated future earnings should be a less reliable guide than the bare record of the past; in fact, security analysis is coming more and more to prefer a competently executed evaluation of the future. Thus the growth-stock approach may supply as dependable a margin of safety as is found in the ordinary investment—provided the calculation of the future is conservatively made, and provided it shows a satisfactory margin in relation to the price paid.

成长股投资计划的风险就在于此。对于这类受青睐的股票，市场往往会设定一个无法通过保守的未来收益预测得到充分保护的价格。（谨慎投资的基本原则是，所有估值，如果与过往业绩不同，都必须至少略微低估。）安全边际始终取决于支付的价格。在某个价格下，安全边际会很大；在某个更高的价格下，安全边际会很小；在某个更高的价格下，安全边际会消失。如果正如我们所建议的，大多数成长股的平均市场水平过高，无法为买家提供足够的安全边际，那么在该领域，简单的多元化购买策略可能无法令人满意。需要特别的远见和判断力，以便明智的个人选择能够克服此类股票整体惯常市场水平所固有的风险。

The danger in a growth-stock program lies precisely here. For such favored issues the market has a tendency to set prices that will not be adequately protected by a conservative projection of future earnings. (It is a basic rule of prudent investment that all estimates, when they differ from past performance, must err at least slightly on the side of understatement.) The margin of safety is always dependent on the price paid. It will be large at one price, small at some higher price, nonexistent at some still higher price. If, as we suggest, the average market level of most growth stocks is too high to provide an adequate margin of safety for the buyer, then a simple technique of diversified buying in this field may not work out satisfactorily. A special degree of foresight and judgment will be needed, in order that wise individual selections may overcome the hazards inherent in the customary market level of such issues as a whole.

当我们将安全边际的概念应用于低估或廉价证券领域时，它变得更加明显。根据定义，这里指的是价格与指示价值或估价之间存在一个有利的差额。这个差额就是安全边际。它可以用来吸收误算或运气不佳的影响。廉价证券的买家尤其看重投资抵御不利发展的能力。因为在大多数情况下，他们对公司的前景并不真正抱有信心。诚然，如果前景确实不容乐观，无论价格多低，投资者都会选择回避该证券。但低估证券领域涵盖了众多公司——或许占了所有公司中的大多数——这些股票的未来前景既不看好也不看淡。如果这些股票是在低价买入的，即使盈利能力略有下降，也未必会妨碍投资取得令人满意的回报。安全边际也就达到了应有的作用。

The margin-of-safety idea becomes much more evident when we apply it to the field of undervalued or bargain securities. We have here, by definition, a favorable difference between price on the one hand and indicated or appraised value on the other. That difference is the safety margin. It is available for absorbing the effect of miscalculations or worse than average luck. The buyer of bargain issues places particular emphasis on the ability of the investment to withstand adverse developments. For in most such cases he has no real enthusiasm about the company’s prospects. True, if the prospects are definitely bad the investor will prefer to avoid the security no matter how low the price. But the field of undervalued issues is drawn from the many concerns—perhaps a majority of the total—for which the future appears neither distinctly promising nor distinctly unpromising. If these are bought on a bargain basis, even a moderate decline in the earning power need not prevent the investment from showing satisfactory results. The margin of safety will then have served its proper purpose.

多样化理论

Theory of Diversification

安全边际的概念与分散投资原则之间存在着密切的逻辑联系。两者相互关联。即使投资者拥有有利的边际，单个证券的表现也可能不佳。因为边际只能保证投资者获利的机会大于亏损的机会，并不能保证亏损的发生。但随着此类承诺数量的增加，利润总额超过亏损总额的可能性就越大。这就是保险承保业务的简单基础。

There is a close logical connection between the concept of a safety margin and the principle of diversification. One is correlative with the other. Even with a margin in the investor’s favor, an individual security may work out badly. For the margin guarantees only that he has a better chance for profit than for loss—not that loss is impossible. But as the number of such commitments is increased the more certain does it become that the aggregate of the profits will exceed the aggregate of the losses. That is the simple basis of the insurance-underwriting business.

分散投资是保守型投资的既定原则。投资者如此普遍地接受这一原则，实际上表明他们接受了安全边际原则，而分散投资是安全边际原则的伴随物。用轮盘赌的算术可以更生动地说明这一点。如果一个人在一个数字上押1美元，赢了就能获得35美元的利润，但输的概率却是37比1。他的“安全边际为负”。对他来说，分散投资是愚蠢的。他押的数字越多，最终获利的机会就越小。如果他经常在每个数字上（包括0和00）押1美元，那么每次转动轮盘他肯定会损失2美元。但假设赢家获得的利润是39美元而不是35美元。那么他就拥有了一个虽小但很重要的安全边际。因此，他押的数字越多，获利的机会就越大。他只需在所有数字上各下注 1 美元，就能确保每次旋转都能赢 2 美元。（顺便说一句，这两个例子实际上描述的是轮盘上 0 和 00 的玩家和庄家各自的位置。）^*

Diversification is an established tenet of conservative investment. By accepting it so universally, investors are really demonstrating their acceptance of the margin-of-safety principle, to which diversification is the companion. This point may be made more colorful by a reference to the arithmetic of roulette. If a man bets $1 on a single number, he is paid $35 profit when he wins—but the chances are 37 to 1 that he will lose. He has a “negative margin of safety.” In his case diversification is foolish. The more numbers he bets on, the smaller his chance of ending with a profit. If he regularly bets $1 on every number (including 0 and 00), he is certain to lose $2 on each turn of the wheel. But suppose the winner received $39 profit instead of $35. Then he would have a small but important margin of safety. Therefore, the more numbers he wagers on, the better his chance of gain. And he could be certain of winning $2 on every spin by simply betting $1 each on all the numbers. (Incidentally, the two examples given actually describe the respective positions of the player and proprietor of a wheel with 0 and 00.)^*

投资与投机的标准

A Criterion of Investment versus Speculation

由于投资没有一个普遍接受的统一定义，权威人士有权随意定义。他们中的许多人否认投资和投机这两个概念之间存在任何实用或可靠的区别。我们认为这种怀疑是不必要的，而且有害。它之所以有害，是因为它助长了许多人天生就倾向于追求股市投机的刺激和风险。我们建议，可以充分利用安全边际的概念，将其作为区分投资操作和投机操作的试金石。

Since there is no single definition of investment in general acceptance, authorities have the right to define it pretty much as they please. Many of them deny that there is any useful or dependable difference between the concepts of investment and of speculation. We think this skepticism is unnecessary and harmful. It is injurious because it lends encouragement to the innate leaning of many people toward the excitement and hazards of stock-market speculation. We suggest that the margin-of-safety concept may be used to advantage as the touchstone to distinguish an investment operation from a speculative one.

或许大多数投机者都相信，当他们冒险时，胜算很大，因此他们可能会声称在操作过程中存在安全边际。每个人都觉得自己的买入时机成熟，或者认为自己的技巧比大众高超，又或者认为自己的顾问或系统值得信赖。但这些说法难以令人信服。它们基于主观判断，缺乏任何有利证据或确凿的推理支持。我们非常怀疑，那些根据自己对市场上涨或下跌的预测押注的人，是否真的能够获得安全边际的保护（安全边际这个词在任何意义上都是如此）。

Probably most speculators believe they have the odds in their favor when they take their chances, and therefore they may lay claim to a safety margin in their proceedings. Each one has the feeling that the time is propitious for his purchase, or that his skill is superior to the crowd’s, or that his adviser or system is trustworthy. But such claims are unconvincing. They rest on subjective judgment, unsupported by any body of favorable evidence or any conclusive line of reasoning. We greatly doubt whether the man who stakes money on his view that the market is heading up or down can ever be said to be protected by a margin of safety in any useful sense of the phrase.

相比之下，投资者的安全边际概念——正如本章前面所阐述的——则基于简单明确的统计数据算术推理。我们也相信，实际投资经验也充分支持了这一概念。这种基本的量化方法在未来未知的条件下，无法保证能够持续取得良好的效果。但同样，我们也没有理由对此感到悲观。

By contrast, the investor’s concept of the margin of safety—as developed earlier in this chapter—rests upon simple and definite arithmetical reasoning from statistical data. We believe, also, that it is well supported by practical investment experience. There is no guarantee that this fundamental quantitative approach will continue to show favorable results under the unknown conditions of the future. But, equally, there is no valid reason for pessimism on this score.

因此，总而言之，我们认为，真正的投资必须有真正的安全边际。真正的安全边际是能够通过数字、有说服力的推理以及大量实际经验来证明的。

Thus, in sum, we say that to have a true investment there must be present a true margin of safety. And a true margin of safety is one that can be demonstrated by figures, by persuasive reasoning, and by reference to a body of actual experience.

投资概念的延伸

Extension of the Concept of Investment

为了完成我们对安全边际原则的讨论，我们现在必须进一步区分常规投资和非常规投资。常规投资适用于典型的投资组合。这类投资通常包括美国政府债券和高等级、派息的普通股。我们还添加了州和市政债券，供那些能够充分享受其免税特性的人投资。此外，还包括优质公司债券，因为它们的收益率远高于美国储蓄债券。

To complete our discussion of the margin-of-safety principle we must now make a further distinction between conventional and unconventional investments. Conventional investments are appropriate for the typical portfolio. Under this heading have always come United States government issues and high-grade, dividend-paying common stocks. We have added state and municipal bonds for those who will benefit sufficiently by their tax-exempt features. Also included are first-quality corporate bonds when, as now, they can be bought to yield sufficiently more than United States savings bonds.

非常规投资只适合有进取心的投资者。它们涵盖的范围很广。其中最广泛的是二级公司被低估的普通股，当这些股票的售价低于其标价的三分之二或更低时，我们建议购买。除此之外，通常还有各种各样的中级公司债券和优先股可供选择，因为它们的售价非常低，甚至可以以远低于其标价的价格买到。在这种情况下，普通投资者倾向于将这些证券称为投机性证券，因为在他们看来，缺乏一级评级就等同于缺乏投资价值。

Unconventional investments are those that are suitable only for the enterprising investor. They cover a wide range. The broadest category is that of undervalued common stocks of secondary companies, which we recommend for purchase when they can be bought at two-thirds or less of their indicated value. Besides these, there is often a wide choice of medium-grade corporate bonds and preferred stocks when they are selling at such depressed prices as to be obtainable also at a considerable discount from their apparent value. In these cases the average investor would be inclined to call the securities speculative, because in his mind their lack of a first-quality rating is synonymous with a lack of investment merit.

我们认为，足够低的价格可以将一只质量平庸的证券转化为一个合理的投资机会——前提是买家信息灵通、经验丰富，并且进行了充分的多元化投资。因为，如果价格足够低，能够创造相当大的安全边际，那么这只证券就符合我们的投资标准。我们最喜欢的例子来自房地产债券领域。在20世纪20年代，价值数十亿美元的此类债券以票面价格出售，并被广泛推荐为合理的投资。其中很大一部分债券的价值与债务之间的差额非常小，实际上具有高度的投机性。本质上来说。在20世纪30年代的大萧条时期，大量此类债券违约，价格暴跌——有些甚至跌至面值10美分以下。当时，那些曾以票面价格推荐这些债券作为安全投资的顾问们，却又拒绝购买它们，认为它们是最具投机性、最不具吸引力的票据。但事实上，约90%的价格下跌，使得许多此类证券变得极具吸引力，而且相当安全——因为它们的真实价值是市场报价的四五倍。^*

It is our argument that a sufficiently low price can turn a security of mediocre quality into a sound investment opportunity—provided that the buyer is informed and experienced and that he practices adequate diversification. For, if the price is low enough to create a substantial margin of safety, the security thereby meets our criterion of investment. Our favorite supporting illustration is taken from the field of real-estate bonds. In the 1920s, billions of dollars’ worth of these issues were sold at par and widely recommended as sound investments. A large proportion had so little margin of value over debt as to be in fact highly speculative in character. In the depression of the 1930s an enormous quantity of these bonds defaulted their interest, and their price collapsed—in some cases below 10 cents on the dollar. At that stage the same advisers who had recommended them at par as safe investments were rejecting them as paper of the most speculative and unattractive type. But as a matter of fact the price depreciation of about 90% made many of these securities exceedingly attractive and reasonably safe—for the true values behind them were four or five times the market quotation.^*

购买这些债券实际上带来了通常所说的“巨额投机利润”，但这并不妨碍它们在低价时具有真正的投资价值。这笔“投机”利润是购买者因其异常精明的投资而获得的回报。它们可以被恰当地称为投资机会，因为仔细的分析会表明，其价值超过价格的部分提供了巨大的安全边际。因此，我们上文提到的这类“顺风顺水的投资”是导致幼稚证券买家严重亏损的主要因素，而对于那些经验丰富的操作者来说，它们很可能提供许多可靠的获利机会，因为他们可能会在之后以几乎与自身价格相近的价格买入这些债券。^*

The fact that the purchase of these bonds actually resulted in what is generally called “a large speculative profit” did not prevent them from having true investment qualities at their low prices. The “speculative” profit was the purchaser’s reward for having made an unusually shrewd investment. They could properly be called investment opportunities, since a careful analysis would have shown that the excess of value over price provided a large margin of safety. Thus the very class of “fair-weather investments” which we stated above is a chief source of serious loss to naïve security buyers is likely to afford many sound profit opportunities to the sophisticated operator who may buy them later at pretty much his own price.^*

我们对投资操作的定义涵盖了所有“特殊情况”，因为购买行为始终基于周密的分析，且该分析承诺的回报将高于实际支付的价格。同样，每个个案都存在风险因素，但这些因素已在计算中得到考虑，并被纳入多元化操作的整体结果中。

The whole field of “special situations” would come under our definition of investment operations, because the purchase is always predicated on a thoroughgoing analysis that promises a larger realization than the price paid. Again there are risk factors in each individual case, but these are allowed for in the calculations and absorbed in the overall results of a diversified operation.

为了将这一讨论推向逻辑极端，我们可能会建议建立一个可防御的投资运作通过购买一组以历史低价出售的“普通股期权认股权证”所代表的无形价值。（此例旨在引起人们的震惊。）^*这些认股权证的全部价值取决于相关股票未来可能上涨至期权价格之上的可能性。目前，它们没有可行使价值。然而，由于所有投资都基于合理的未来预期，因此，从数学概率的角度来看待这些认股权证是恰当的，即未来某个牛市将导致其指示价值和价格大幅上涨。这样的研究很可能会得出这样的结论：此类操作的收益远大于损失，最终获利的可能性远大于最终亏损的可能性。如果真是这样，那么即使在这种不起眼的证券形式中也存在安全边际。一个足够有进取心的投资者可以将期权认股权证操作纳入他的非常规投资组合中^。1

To carry this discussion to a logical extreme, we might suggest that a defensible investment operation could be set up by buying such intangible values as are represented by a group of “common-stock option warrants” selling at historically low prices. (This example is intended as somewhat of a shocker.)^* The entire value of these warrants rests on the possibility that the related stocks may some day advance above the option price. At the moment they have no exercisable value. Yet, since all investment rests on reasonable future expectations, it is proper to view these warrants in terms of the mathematical chances that some future bull market will create a large increase in their indicated value and in their price. Such a study might well yield the conclusion that there is much more to be gained in such an operation than to be lost and that the chances of an ultimate profit are much better than those of an ultimate loss. If that is so, there is a safety margin present even in this unprepossessing security form. A sufficiently enterprising investor could then include an option-warrant operation in his miscellany of unconventional investments.¹

总结

To Sum Up

投资最明智的时候，往往是最具 商业头脑的。令人惊讶的是，许多精明的商人试图在华尔街经营，却完全无视他们在各自事业中取得成功的所有可靠原则。然而，每一份公司证券，首先都应该被看作是对特定企业的所有权或债权。如果一个人试图从证券买卖中获利，那么他就是在进行一场他自己的商业冒险，如果想要成功，就必须按照公认的商业原则来经营。

Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike. It is amazing to see how many capable businessmen try to operate in Wall Street with complete disregard of all the sound principles through which they have gained success in their own undertakings. Yet every corporate security may best be viewed, in the first instance, as an ownership interest in, or a claim against, a specific business enterprise. And if a person sets out to make profits from security purchases and sales, he is embarking on a business venture of his own, which must be run in accordance with accepted business principles if it is to have a chance of success.

这些原则中第一个也是最明显的一条是“了解你在做什么——了解你的业务”。对于投资者来说，这意味着：不要试图从证券中获取“商业利润”——即超过正常利息和股息收入的回报——除非你对证券价值的了解程度与你计划生产或经营的商品价值的了解程度一样多。

The first and most obvious of these principles is, “Know what you are doing—know your business.” For the investor this means: Do not try to make “business profits” out of securities—that is, returns in excess of normal interest and dividend income—unless you know as much about security values as you would need to know about the value of merchandise that you proposed to manufacture or deal in.

第二条商业原则是：“不要让任何人经营你的企业，除非（1）你能以足够的谨慎和理解来监督他的表现，或（2）你有非常充分的理由对他的诚信和能力充满信心。”对于投资者来说，这条规则应该决定他在何种条件下允许别人决定如何使用他的资金。

A second business principle: “Do not let anyone else run your business, unless (1) you can supervise his performance with adequate care and comprehension or (2) you have unusually strong reasons for placing implicit confidence in his integrity and ability.” For the investor this rule should determine the conditions under which he will permit someone else to decide what is done with his money.

第三条商业原则是：“除非可靠的计算表明，任何业务，例如制造或交易某种商品，都有相当大的机会获得合理的利润，否则不要进行此类业务。尤其要远离那些收益极低、损失巨大的投资。” 对于有进取心的投资者来说，这意味着他的盈利操作不应基于乐观，而应基于算术。对于每个投资者来说，这意味着，当他将收益限制在较小数额时——至少像以前投资传统债券或优先股那样——他必须要求有令人信服的证据证明他没有冒着损失本金很大一部分的风险。

A third business principle: “Do not enter upon an operation—that is, manufacturing or trading in an item—unless a reliable calculation shows that it has a fair chance to yield a reasonable profit. In particular, keep away from ventures in which you have little to gain and much to lose.” For the enterprising investor this means that his operations for profit should be based not on optimism but on arithmetic. For every investor it means that when he limits his return to a small figure—as formerly, at least, in a conventional bond or preferred stock—he must demand convincing evidence that he is not risking a substantial part of his principal.

第四条商业规则更为积极：“要有勇气运用你的知识和经验。如果你根据事实得出结论，并且你知道你的判断是正确的，那就采取行动——即使其他人可能会犹豫或持不同意见。”（你不会因为大众不同意你的观点而对或错。你之所以正确，是因为你的数据和推理是正确的。）同样，在证券领域，在掌握了 足够的知识并做出了经过检验的判断之后，勇气就成为至高无上的美德。

A fourth business rule is more positive: “Have the courage of your knowledge and experience. If you have formed a conclusion from the facts and if you know your judgment is sound, act on it—even though others may hesitate or differ.” (You are neither right nor wrong because the crowd disagrees with you. You are right because your data and reasoning are right.) Similarly, in the world of securities, courage becomes the supreme virtue after adequate knowledge and a tested judgment are at hand.

幸运的是，对于典型的投资者来说，他并不一定需要将这些品质运用到他的投资中才能获得成功。该计划——前提是他将自己的野心限制在能力范围内，并将自己的活动限制在安全狭窄的标准防御性投资范围内。获得 令人满意的 投资结果比大多数人意识到的要容易；获得 卓越的 投资结果却比看起来要难。

Fortunately for the typical investor, it is by no means necessary for his success that he bring these qualities to bear upon his program—provided he limits his ambition to his capacity and confines his activities within the safe and narrow path of standard, defensive investment. To achieve satisfactory investment results is easier than most people realize; to achieve superior results is harder than it looks.

第20章评论

Commentary on Chapter 20

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

有老飞行员，也有勇敢的飞行员。但没有老而勇敢的飞行员。

There are old pilots, and there are bold pilots. But there are no old, bold pilots.

—飞行教练中的传统说法¹

—traditional saying among flight instructors¹

拥有安全边际是聪明投资者与普通投资者的区别所在。

Having a margin of safety is what distinguishes an intelligent investor from the crowd.

大多数大型客机都有两个发动机，但即使其中一个发动机出现故障，也能安全飞行很长时间。工程师们设计摩天大楼的结构部件时，力求承受超出其实际承受能力的重量。一座原本需要承受40吨重量的桥梁，最终却只能承受70吨或80吨的重量。

Most large passenger jets have two engines, but can safely fly for extended periods if one fails. Engineers design the structural components of skyscrapers to withstand more weight than they are ever likely to experience. A bridge required to bear a load of 40 tons is built to hold 70 or 80 tons.

飞机、建筑物和桥梁都预先做好了预防措施。因此，航空旅行非常安全，高层建筑几乎不会倒塌，大型桥梁可以承载数百万辆汽车。我们理所当然地认为它们的安全系数是一定的。

Precaution is prepackaged into aircraft, buildings, and bridges. As a result, air travel is remarkably safe, tall buildings almost never collapse, and major bridges can carry millions of vehicles. We take their margin of safety for granted.

“始终取决于付出的代价”

“Always Dependent on the Price Paid”

当你投资时，安全边际最简单的衡量标准是企业价值（V）减去股票价格（P）：

When you invest, the simplest measure of the margin of safety is the value of the business (V) minus the price of the stock (P):

MoS = V – P

当企业价值超过股票价格时，安全边际为正。当股票价格高于企业价值时，安全边际为负^。2

When the value of the business exceeds the price of the stock, the margin of safety is positive. When the price of the stock is higher than the value of the business, the margin of safety is negative.²

“安全边际总是取决于支付的价格，”格雷厄姆说道，“在某个价格下，安全边际会很大；在某个更高的价格下，安全边际会很小；在某个更高的价格下，安全边际会消失。”

“The margin of safety is always dependent on the price paid,” says Graham. “It will be large at one price, small at some higher price, nonexistent at some still higher price.”

为了生动地说明当前价格如何影响未来回报，让我们看看几年前如果你在安全边际为负数或不那么极端的时候购买了亚马逊，会发生什么情况。

For a vivid example of how current price affects future returns, let’s look at what would have happened, years ago, if you had bought Amazon.com either when the margin of safety was deeply negative or when it was less extreme.

想象一下，你在1999年12月10日投资了亚马逊，当时其股价创下了历史新高。这家雄心勃勃的年轻公司放弃了最初的图书销售业务，每天亏损数百万美元。然而，继1998年上涨近970%之后，1999年迄今为止，该股又上涨了99%。由于亚马逊没有盈利，你无法用市盈率来衡量其股价。但当时亚马逊的股价是其上一年销售额的15倍多，比全球最大零售商沃尔玛的市盈率高出10倍。正如格雷厄姆所说，对亚马逊而言，“未来的计算”并非“保守计算”。

Imagine you invested in Amazon on December 10, 1999, when the stock hit what then was its all-time high. Branching out from its original specialty of selling books, the ambitious young company was losing millions of dollars a day. Yet, after rising nearly 970% in 1998, the stock was up another 99% so far in 1999. Because it had no earnings, you couldn’t use a price/earnings ratio to estimate how expensive Amazon was. But the stock was selling for more than 15 times the company’s sales over the prior year—a ratio 10 times higher than that of Walmart, the world’s largest retailer. For Amazon, “the calculation of the future,” as Graham put it, was not being “conservatively made.”

如果你当时买入了亚马逊，相信它会成为历史上最伟大的增长型公司之一，那你绝对没错。但由于它没有安全边际，你会不得不等待 10 年——并且一路亏损 94%！ ——才在最后获得哪怕是微薄的利润：

Had you bought Amazon then, convinced that it would become one of the greatest growth companies in history, you would have been absolutely right. But because it had no margin of safety, you would have had to wait 10 years—and survive a 94% loss along the way!—to make even a modest profit at the very end:

图 20-1：漫长的十年

FIGURE 20-1: Ten Long Years

来源：FactSet。

Source: FactSet.

现在想象一下，你等到2001年9月28日才买入亚马逊的股票，当时互联网股暴跌，股价跌至谷底。当时，该公司的亏损已经收窄，前四个季度的销售额几乎比1999年12月的水平翻了一番。但股价却惨不忍睹：现在你只能以0.74的市销率买到亚马逊的股票，这还不到沃尔玛的一半，尽管亚马逊的增长速度远快于沃尔玛。这家互联网零售商的安全边际比以前要小得多。

Now imagine you waited to buy Amazon until September 28, 2001, when it hit rock bottom after internet stocks crashed. The company’s losses had narrowed, and its sales over the previous four quarters had nearly doubled from their level in December 1999. But the stock had been trashed: Now you could buy Amazon for a price/sales ratio of only 0.74, or less than half that of Walmart, even though Amazon was growing far faster. The internet retailer’s margin of safety was much less negative than before.

您的投资将在接下来的10年内增长35倍以上：

Your investment would have boomed more than 35-fold over the following 10 years:

图 20-2：更好的十年

FIGURE 20-2: Ten Better Years

来源：FactSet。

Source: FactSet.

这些例子都是假设的；你需要难以置信的运气才能在股票处于绝对峰值或最低点的确切日期买入。

These examples are hypothetical; you would have needed unbelievable luck to buy on the exact date when the stock was either at its absolute peak or at its lowest point.

但这些规则是完全现实的：

But these rules are perfectly realistic:

在股票价格昂贵时买入会降低您的安全边际。
Buying when a stock is expensive reduces your margin of safety.
在价格极其昂贵时购买会将您的安全边际降至零。
Buying whenever it’s extraordinarily expensive reduces your margin of safety to zero.
只要价格便宜就买入，可以增加你的安全边际。
And buying whenever it’s cheap increases your margin of safety.

您将获得什么

What You Get

从这个角度来看，安全边际本身就是回报的来源。在股价便宜时买入一家公司，正的安全边际将提高你的回报。在股价低时买入同一家公司成本高昂，而负的安全边际会降低你的回报。如果股价过高，导致安全边际为负值，即使公司未来几年业绩良好，你也可能会亏损。

Viewed this way, the margin of safety is itself a source of return. Buy a business when the stock is cheap, and that positive margin of safety will raise your return. Buy the same business when the stock is expensive, and that negative margin of safety will reduce your return. If an excessively high stock price makes the margin of safety extremely negative, you can lose money even if the business thrives for years to come.

这就是格雷厄姆所说的“价格是你付出的，价值是你得到的”的意思，沃伦·巴菲特如是说。

That’s what Graham meant when he said, according to Warren Buffett, “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.”

对股票的预期越高，其最终利润实现的时间越远，你应该寻求的安全边际就越大——因为即使是最轻微的暂时增长下滑也会压垮股票。

The higher the expectations for a stock and the further into the future its eventual profits may materialize, the wider the margin of safety you should seek—because even the slightest interim decline in growth can crush the stock.

试想一下：以25%的平均年增长率投资100美元，30年后它将价值80,779美元。以20%的平均年增长率投资100美元，30年后它将“只”价值23,738美元。投资者为25%的预期长期增长率付出的代价将远远高于为20%的预期长期增长率付出的代价——尽管这两种结果都十分惊人且极其罕见。（参见图20-3。）

Think of it this way: Invest $100 at a 25% average annual growth rate, and it will be worth $80,779 thirty years from now. Invest $100 at a 20% average annual growth rate, and it will be worth “only” $23,738 in three decades. Investors will pay a lot more for an expected long-term growth rate of 25% than for 20%—even though either would be a spectacular, and extraordinarily rare, result. (See Figure 20-3.)

分散你的赌注到时间和空间

Spreading Your Bets Over Time and Space

当今的投资者拥有格雷厄姆时代所不具备的优势：他们可以轻松、廉价且广泛地实现多元化投资。

Today’s investors have an advantage they didn’t in Graham’s day: They can diversify easily, cheaply, and widely.

你可以通过以下方式实现多元化

You can diversify over time by

持续数年甚至数十年的稳定投资——消除了在不合适的时机买入（或卖出）过多的风险^。3
investing steadily for years and decades—eliminating the risk that you will buy (or sell) too much at an inopportune moment.³

你可以通过指数基金实现多元化投资

You can diversify across space in index funds that

持有数百甚至数千只股票，从而降低对一只或多只持股的安全边际估计可能错误的风险；
hold hundreds, even thousands, of stocks, mitigating the risk that your estimate of the margin of safety for one or more of your holdings might be wrong;
持有不熟悉的股票和家喻户晓的股票，让你有机会获得丰厚的回报，就像来自意想不到的来源的惊喜一样；
hold unfamiliar stocks along with household names, exposing you to the serendipity of great returns that can come like happy surprises from unexpected sources;
持有来自世界各地的股票，降低投资过度集中于本国股票的风险。
hold stocks from around the world, reducing the risk of being overconcentrated in your home country’s stocks.

图 20-3：远大前程

FIGURE 20-3: Great Expectations

资料来源：作者的计算。

Source: Author’s calculations.

将部分资金以现金、债券和其他资产的形式持有，可以降低股票表现不佳单独损害您的业绩的风险。

And keeping some of your money in cash, bonds, and other assets lowers the risk that poor performance in stocks alone will harm your results.

随着你的个人决策逐渐成为广泛投资组合中的一小部分，多元化投资会为它们提供一定的安全边际。错误不会摧毁你：即使你在一项占你总投资组合（比如说）5%的投资上损失了100%，你仍然有95%的资金剩余，而且这些资金广泛分布在全球市场上。另一方面，任何特定持股的潜在上涨空间都是无限的：如果一只只占你投资组合5%的股票或基金上涨了1000%，而你其余持股保持不变，你仍然会获得50%的收益。

As your individual decisions become a small part of a broad portfolio over time, diversification drapes a margin of safety around them. A mistake can’t destroy you: Even if you lose 100% on an investment that amounts to (say) 5% of your total portfolio, you still have 95% of your money left, and it’s spread widely across the world’s markets. On the other hand, the potential upside of any given holding is unbounded: If a stock or fund that’s only 5% of your portfolio goes up 1,000% and the rest of your holdings go nowhere, you will still gain 50%.

通常，只有少数几只股票占据了指数基金的大部分价值，例如印度的信实工业和印孚瑟斯，以及中国的腾讯控股和阿里巴巴集团。即使在美国，近年来追踪标准普尔500指数等主要指数的基金的几乎所有回报也都仅由少数几只股票推动，包括亚马逊、苹果、微软和英伟达。如果一个指数的几乎所有表现都来自其中极少数几只股票，那么分散化收益就会被稀释。

Often, only a few stocks account for much of the value of an index fund, as with Reliance Industries and Infosys in India and Tencent Holdings and Alibaba Group in China. Even in the U.S., nearly all the returns of funds that follow major indexes like the S&P 500 have been driven in recent years by only a handful of stocks, including Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, and NVIDIA. If almost all of an index’s performance comes from very few of its stocks, that dilutes the diversification benefit.

然而，当最大仓位出现波动时，指数基金中的其他持股至少应该能够提供一定的回旋能力，尽管过去美国市场往往更加集中于最大的股票，但它仍然蓬勃发展^。4

However, the other holdings in an index fund should provide at least some ability to zig when the biggest positions zag, and the U.S. market has thrived even though it has often been even more concentrated in the largest stocks in the past.⁴

关于多元化，最重要的一点是要明白，如果市场上涨时你所有的资产都上涨，那你就错了。那么，当市场下跌时，它们肯定也会一起下跌。一个在市场繁荣时完全由赢家组成的投资组合，在市场低迷时也可能完全由输家组成。多元化的最终目的就是降低风险。所以，如果你在市场上涨时不持有任何输家，那么在市场下跌时你也不会持有任何赢家。

The most important thing to understand about diversification is that you’re doing it wrong if all your assets rise together when markets go up. Then they will surely all fall together when markets go down. A portfolio consisting entirely of winners in good times is also likely to consist entirely of losers in bad times. And the whole purpose of diversification is to reduce risk. So, if you don’t own any losers during up markets, you won’t own any winners during down markets.

反过来，这意味着一个高度多元化的投资组合应该总是至少部分令人失望，尽管这些失望应该来自不同时期的不同投资。即使你能够投资一个假设的投资组合，该投资组合是事后诸葛亮构建的，持有长期表现最佳的资产组合，你仍然会在很多短期内亏损。正如分析师兼投资者布莱恩·波特诺伊（Brian Portnoy）常说的那样：“多元化意味着总是不得不说对不起。” ⁵

This, in turn, means that a well-diversified portfolio should always be at least partly disappointing, although the disappointments should come from different investments at different times. Even if you had been able to invest in a hypothetical portfolio constructed with perfect hindsight to hold the exact combination of assets that performed best over the long term, you still would have lost money over many short-term periods. As analyst and investor Brian Portnoy likes to say, “Diversification means always having to say you’re sorry.”⁵

多元化投资并非总是令人愉悦，但随着时间的推移，它会带来益处。这种安全边际并非免费。你付出的代价是短期的心理痛苦，而你获得的好处是长期的经济收益。

Diversification will not feel good all the time, but it will feel good over time. This margin of safety isn’t free. The price you pay is short-term psychological pain; the benefit you get is long-term financial gain.

超级预测

Superforecasting

要成为一名聪明的投资者，你不仅需要外部安全边际来保护自己免受市场先生不当行为的影响，还需要内部安全边际来保护自己免受自身损失。

To be an intelligent investor, you need not only an external margin of safety to protect yourself from Mr. Market’s misbehavior but also an internal margin of safety to protect yourself from yourself.

当今投资界的一大福气同时也是一大祸害：信息自由、即时、无限地获取。这很好，因为它让你更接近世界上最伟大的投资者。但这也很可怕，因为新信息增强你的信念远多于增加你的知识；任何与你既有信念相呼应的新信息都会加深你对自己观点正确性的确信。

One of the blessings of today’s investment world is also a curse: Information is freely, instantaneously, boundlessly available. That’s great, since it puts you in a position closer to the biggest investors in the world. It’s also terrible, since new information adds much more to your conviction than to your knowledge; any fresh trivia echoing what you already believe will deepen your certainty that your views are correct.

你遇到的信息越多，证实你的观点，你就越不会觉得有必要去寻找反驳的信息。大量的“证据”会阻止你去寻找不同意见，即使这些意见显然也应该很多。

The more information you encounter confirming your views, the less you will feel the need to seek out disconfirming information. The abundance of “proof” will discourage you from looking for dissenting views, even though it should be obvious that they must be abundant, too.

围绕您自己的判断建立安全边际的最佳方法是将您的预测从猜测转变为正式的过程。

The best way to build a margin of safety around your own judgments is to convert your forecasts from guesstimates to a formal process.

任何人都可以——所有有进取心的投资者都应该——在线报名参加“良好判断公开赛”。这项预测竞赛还包含一个培训项目，可以帮助人们根除许多可能阻碍良好决策的常见错误。（请访问 GJOpen.com/training

注册并查看培训材料；免费。）

Anyone can—and all enterprising investors should—sign up online to participate in the Good Judgment Open. This forecasting competition also features a training program that can uproot many of the common errors that threaten to strangle good decision-making. (Go to GJOpen

.com/training to register and view the training materials; it’s free.)

宾夕法尼亚大学心理学家、该项目联合负责人菲利普·泰特洛克 (Philip Tetlock) 表示，“良好判断力”项目训练人们将自己的观点“视为需要检验的假设，而不是需要守护的宝藏”。

The Good Judgment project trains people to think of their own opinions “as hypotheses to be tested, not treasures to be guarded,” says Philip Tetlock, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania and coleader of the program.

他说，因为大多数人“下结论太快，改变想法又太慢”，所以这个项目旨在迫使预测者“对自己的想法和做法毫不留情地诚实”。这可以让你成为泰特洛克所说的超级预测者——如果你愿意投入必要的时间和精力的话。

Because most people are “too quick to make up their minds and too slow to change them,” he says, the project is designed to force forecasters to be “ruthlessly honest about why they think what they do.” That can turn you into what Tetlock calls a superforecaster—if you are willing to invest the necessary time and energy into the effort.

首先要审查你的信息来源。确保你吸收了各种证据——不仅包括支持性和正面的证据，也包括质疑性和负面的证据，泰特洛克称之为“均衡的认知饮食”。

Start by auditing your sources of information. Make sure you’re taking in all kinds of evidence—not only supportive and positive, but also skeptical and negative, what Tetlock calls “a balanced cognitive diet.”

然后建立一个参考类别。不要把这家公司（或任何资产）视为一个特例，而是将其归类为一个类别的成员：所有同行业的公司，所有依赖在这种战略下，所有处于类似发展阶段的公司、所有最近更换了首席执行官的公司，或其他任何构成公平比较群体的公司。

Then establish a reference class. Instead of thinking of this company (or any asset) as a unique case, classify it as a member of a category: all the companies in the same industry, all that depend on this type of strategy, all those at a similar phase of development, all that have recently replaced their CEO, or whatever constitutes a fair group for comparison.

接下来，确定基准离婚率——参考类别的平均历史经验，使用可用的最长期数据。考虑一个日常生活中的例子。你可以通过观察一对新婚夫妇的幸福程度来估计他们离婚的可能性，但你应该意识到（在美国）婚后十年的离婚率约为40%。然后根据你对这对夫妇的了解，上下调整基准离婚率。

Next, determine the base rate—the average historical experience for the reference class, using the longest-term data available. Consider an example from daily life. You could estimate the likelihood that a newlywed couple will divorce by observing how happy they seem, but you should estimate it by realizing that (in the U.S.) the divorce rate in the first decade of marriage is approximately 40%. Then adjust that base rate up or down by what you know about this couple.

同样，如果您正在考虑投资首次公开募股 (IPO)，您可以简单地将公司过去的增长率推断到不确定的未来。相反，您应该确定所有 IPO 的平均回报率，该数据可在 bit.ly/417ESfh 上轻松获取。该长期基准回报率至少比整体股市回报率低 1.5 个百分点。然后根据该特定企业的具体特征进行上调或下调。

Likewise, if you’re thinking of investing in an initial public offering, you could simply extrapolate the company’s past growth rate into the indefinite future. Instead, you should determine the average return of all IPOs, readily available at bit.ly/417ESfh. That long-term base rate is at least 1.5 percentage points lower than the return of the overall stock market. Then adjust that up or down based on the specific characteristics of this particular business.

使用你的核对清单（参见第11章的注释），确保你的预测基于一致的标准。要具体且具有概率性：“我有80%的把握，这家公司的盈利将在未来五年翻一番。” 记录下你的理由：这种增长是来自新产品、国际销售、价格上涨还是其他因素？这样，你以后不仅能判断你的预测是否正确，还能判断你的预测是否基于正确的理由。

Use your checklist (see the Commentary on Chapter 11) to ensure you base your forecasts on consistent criteria. Be specific and probabilistic: “I’m 80% certain that this company’s earnings will double in the next five years.” Record your reasoning: Will that growth come from new products, international sales, price increases, or elsewhere? This way, you’ll later be able to tell not only whether you were right but whether you were right for the right reasons.

现在考虑相反的情况。你需要什么信息才能证明你的预测不会成真？找出这些信息，吸收它们，并评估它是否足以证明你改变预测的合理性。

Now consider the opposite. What information would you need in order to prove that your prediction won’t come true? Seek it out, soak it up, and evaluate whether it justifies changing your forecast.

接下来，根据新信息更新和修改你的观点。因为你着眼于长远的未来，所以你的所有估计都是粗略的，所以你的预测必须保持灵活性。

Next, update and revise your views as new information becomes available. Because you’re focused on the long-term future, all your estimates are rough, so your forecasts must stay flexible.

预测不是一个事件；它是一个连续的过程，包括泰特洛克所说的尝试、失败、分析、调整和再次尝试。正如亚马逊创始人杰夫·贝佐斯所说：“经常正确的人经常改变主意。” ⁶

A forecast isn’t an event; it’s a continuous process that consists of what Tetlock calls trying, failing, analyzing, adjusting, and trying again. As Amazon.com founder Jeff Bezos has said, “People who are right a lot change their mind a lot.”⁶

遵循伟大投资者查理·芒格提出的“过高、过低、击中”原则。芒格喜欢说，在炮兵训练中，新兵会先瞄准目标，先超过目标，再低于目标，最后击中目标！芒格在估值方面也遵循了同样的做法，故意先高估，再低估，最后击中目标！对新信息的开放态度是命中目标的关键。

Follow the principle that the great investor Charlie Munger called “over, under, kapow.” Munger liked to say that in artillery training, military recruits would bracket a target by overshooting it, undershooting it, and then hitting it with a kapow! Munger followed the same practice in estimating values, deliberately oversizing, undersizing, and then kapow! Being open to new information is the key component of being able to hit the target.

泰特洛克说，反复练习这些超级预测程序，直到它们成为一种习惯，是一种“重塑自我”的方式。经过足够多的、有纪律的重复练习，你就会逐渐习惯于超越直觉和情绪化的反应，并用深思熟虑的决定取而代之^。7

Repeatedly practicing these superforecasting procedures until they become routine is a way of “mentally rewiring yourself,” says Tetlock. With enough disciplined repetition, overriding your intuitive, emotional responses and replacing them with deliberative decisions will come to feel natural.⁷

何时放手

When to Cut Loose

创造安全边际的终极方法是卖出：如果你判断错误，卖出可以让你免于倾家荡产。然而，庆幸与后悔之间只有一线之隔。你卖出的股票或资产可能跌至零，在这种情况下你及时退出；也可能持续上涨，在这种情况下，你将错失潜在的巨额收益。

The ultimate way to create a margin of safety is by selling: If you were wrong, selling out keeps you from being wiped out. However, only a fine line separates counting your blessings from kicking yourself. The stock or asset you sell could go to zero, in which case you got out just in time—or it could go up and keep going, in which case you’ll miss out on potentially gigantic gains.

以下是确定出售是否合理的几种方法。

Here are a few ways to determine whether selling makes sense.

回顾。每当股票、基金或其他资产的价格低于你购买时的固定金额时，你都会自动重新审视你最初的买入理由，看看这些理由是否仍然成立。许多经纪公司允许你提前设置此类价格预警。将这些阈值设定在你认为重要的区间——例如25%、33%和50%——将迫使你在卖出前三思。

Review. Whenever a stock, fund, or other asset drops a fixed amount below what you paid, automatically revisit your original reasons for buying to see whether they still hold. Many brokerage firms allow you to set such price alerts in advance. Pinning these thresholds at intervals you consider significant—25%, 33%, and 50%, for example—will compel you to think before you sell.

重新评估。如果你在更高价格时看好这项资产，那么现在价格下跌了，你难道不应该更看好它吗？其他一切都同等条件下，更低的价格意味着更大的安全边际——除非企业价值也下降了。这需要单独评估——以企业及其运营为中心，而不是以股市及其疯狂为中心。问问自己：这家企业的基本面发生了哪些变化，导致股价下跌？判断应该基于公司本身的事实，而不是市场观点。如果事实发生了变化，那么你应该卖出。

Reappraise. If you liked this asset at a higher price, shouldn’t you like it more now that the price has fallen? All else being equal, a lower price means a wider margin of safety—unless the value of the business has also dropped. That requires a separate appraisal—centered on the business and its operations, not on the stock market and its madness. Ask yourself: What has changed about the fundamentals of this business that could justify this decline in the stock price? Base that judgment on facts about the company, not opinions in the market. If the facts have changed, then you should sell.

重新定价。查一下你最初支付的价格。除以10，然后问问自己，如果你支付的价格低得多，你是否愿意继续持有。如果答案是否定的，你肯定应该卖掉。

Reprice. Look up what you originally paid. Divide it by 10 and ask whether, if you had paid that much lower price, you would be willing to hold on. If the answer is no, you definitely should sell.

反思。对所有反对你的人发火，这肯定表明你的投资论点可能是错误的。深刻的理解是冷静自信，而不是敏感和防御。如果你发现自己在嘲笑或攻击批评者，请控制自己并问自己：我为什么生气？我生气不是因为他们错了，而是因为我错了吗？强迫自己回过头来重新分析。

Reflect. Getting angry at everyone who disagrees with you is a sure sign that your investment thesis might be wrong. Deep understanding is calmly confident, never touchy and defensive. If you find yourself mocking or sniping at critics, catch yourself and ask: What am I angry about? Could I be angry not because they’re wrong, but because I am? Force yourself to go back and redo your analysis.

重新思考。最后，亏本出售很难，因为它迫使你直面并承认错误。与其如此，不如把它看作一个机会：在美国，你每年最多可以从应税收入中扣除3000美元的损失。你还可以利用出售来改善你的投资组合多元化。想象一下，你发现自己对某只股票的分析是错误的。卖掉它，然后将收益投资于一个多元化的持股，比如一只全股票指数基金。通过把你的资金分散到所有股票上，你就能逐步提高你的安全边际。

Reframe. Finally, selling at a loss is hard because it compels you to face up, and fess up, to making a mistake. Frame it instead as an opportunity: In the U.S., you can deduct up to $3,000 of your losses from your taxable income annually. You can also use a sale to improve your diversification. Imagine that you decide that your analysis of a particular stock was wrong. Sell it, then invest the proceeds in a widely diversified holding like a total stock-market index fund. By spreading a little more of your money across all stocks, you incrementally increase your margin of safety.

终于安全了

Safe at Last

许多自称投资者的人，无论他们是纯粹的投机者，还是真诚地尝试进行明智的投资，从不考虑安全边际。聪明的投资者总是会考虑的。这是因为成功不仅仅取决于赚钱，还取决于避免损失。如果你建立了安全边际，你的投资组合就会因你的正确决策而繁荣，而不会被你的错误决策所摧毁。

Many people who call themselves investors, whether they are sheer speculators or honestly trying to invest intelligently, never factor in a margin of safety. Intelligent investors always do. That’s because success doesn’t depend only on making money. It depends also on avoiding loss. If you build in a margin of safety, your portfolio will prosper from your good decisions without being destroyed by your bad ones.

拥有安全边际是遵循本书概述的规则、政策和程序。保持安全边际意味着你已经成功地为成为一名明智的投资者奠定了坚实的基础。

Having a margin of safety is the natural and inevitable result of following the rules, policies, and procedures we’ve outlined in this book. Maintaining a margin of safety means you’ve successfully laid the foundations, brick by brick, for being an intelligent investor.

帕斯卡的赌注

Pascal’s Wager

法国数学家兼神学家布莱斯·帕斯卡（1623-1662）认为，仅凭逻辑不可能证明——或者证伪——上帝的存在。那么，你该如何决定是否相信呢？帕斯卡将这个问题比作一场赌注，询问赌徒的输赢。“让我们权衡一下[赌]上帝存在的得与失，”他写道。“……赢了就赢得一切，输了也一无所获。”

The French mathematician and theologian Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) argued that it isn’t possible, with logic alone, to prove—or disprove—that God exists. How, then, should you decide whether to believe? Framing the question as a wager, Pascal asked what the gambler stands to win or lose. “Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved in [betting] that God exists,” he wrote. “. . . If you win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing.”

正如投资作家彼得·伯恩斯坦 (Peter L. Bernstein) 在 2003 年解释帕斯卡赌注时所说：

As the investing writer Peter L. Bernstein explained Pascal’s Wager in 2003:

假设你假装上帝存在，过着品德高尚、禁欲的生活，而实际上上帝并不存在。你或许会错过人生中的一些美好，但终将获得回报。现在假设你假装上帝不存在，过着充满罪恶、自私和欲望的生活，而实际上上帝存在。在你相对短暂的一生中，你或许享受过快乐和刺激，但当审判日到来时，你就麻烦大了。

Suppose you act as though God is and [you] lead a life of virtue and abstinence, when in fact there is no god. You will have passed up some goodies in life, but there will be rewards. Now suppose you act as though God is not and spend a life of sin, selfishness, and lust when in fact God is. You may have had fun and thrills during the relatively brief duration of your lifetime, but when the day of judgment rolls around you are in big trouble.

按照帕斯卡的赌注来制定决策，不仅能帮助你关注如果做对了你能获得多少利益，还能帮助你关注如果做错了你会损失多少。

Framing decisions in the light of Pascal’s Wager helps you focus not only on how much you stand to gain from being right, but on how much you stand to lose if you turn out to be wrong.

后果至少和概率一样重要。你或许能承受收益，但你未必能承受损失。

Consequences are at least as important as probabilities. You will survive your gains, but you might not be able to survive your losses.

在所有投资决策中建立安全边际是避免错误后果的最佳保障。

Building a margin of safety into all your investing decisions is the best insurance against the consequences of being wrong.

在您余下的投资生涯中，以格雷厄姆为指导，即使是市场先生也无法将这座堡垒从地基上推倒。

For the rest of your investing lifetime, with Graham as your guide, not even Mr. Market will be able to knock that fortress off its foundations.

后记

Postscript

本杰明·格雷厄姆

by Benjamin Graham

我们非常了解两位合伙人，他们一生中的大部分时间都在华尔街管理着自己和他人的资金。一些惨痛的经历告诉他们，与其试图赚取全世界的财富，不如谨慎谨慎地谨慎行事。他们建立了一套相当独特的证券运营方法，将良好的盈利可能性与合理的估值相结合。他们规避任何看似定价过高的股票，并且会迅速抛售那些已经涨到他们认为不再有吸引力的价格水平的股票。他们的投资组合始终保持着良好的多元化，涵盖了超过一百种不同的股票。凭借这种方式，他们在多年的市场波动中依然表现良好；他们接受管理的数百万资金平均每年回报率约为20%，客户也对他们的业绩非常满意^。

We know very well two partners who spent a good part of their lives handling their own and other people’s funds on Wall Street. Some hard experience taught them it was better to be safe and careful rather than to try to make all the money in the world. They established a rather unique approach to security operations, which combined good profit possibilities with sound values. They avoided anything that appeared overpriced and were rather too quick to dispose of issues that had advanced to levels they deemed no longer attractive. Their portfolio was always well diversified, with more than a hundred different issues represented. In this way they did quite well through many years of ups and downs in the general market; they averaged about 20% per annum on the several millions of capital they had accepted for management, and their clients were well pleased with the results.^*

本书初版出版的那一年，合伙人的基金获得了一个机会，可以收购一家成长型企业的一半股权。由于某种原因，当时该行业在华尔街并不具有吸引力，这笔交易已被不少重要的投资机构拒绝。但两人对这家公司的潜力印象深刻；对他们来说，决定性的因素是，相对于当前的盈利和资产价值，收购价格适中。合伙人最终完成了这笔收购，收购金额为美元占其基金的五分之一左右。他们与这个新兴的商业利益紧密相连，并因此蓬勃发展。^*

In the year in which the first edition of this book appeared an opportunity was offered to the partners’ fund to purchase a half-interest in a growing enterprise. For some reason the industry did not have Wall Street appeal at the time and the deal had been turned down by quite a few important houses. But the pair was impressed by the company’s possibilities; what was decisive for them was that the price was moderate in relation to current earnings and asset value. The partners went ahead with the acquisition, amounting in dollars to about one-fifth of their fund. They became closely identified with the new business interest, which prospered.^*

事实上，公司业绩斐然，股价上涨至收购价的两百倍甚至更多。这一涨幅远远超过了实际利润的增长，而且几乎从一开始，股价就显得远高于合伙人自身的投资标准。但由于他们将公司视为某种“家族企业”，因此尽管股价飙升，他们仍然持有大量股份。他们基金中的许多参与者也采取了同样的做法，凭借对这家公司以及后来组建的附属公司的持股，他们成为了百万富翁。^*

In fact it did so well that the price of its shares advanced to two hundred times or more the price paid for the half-interest. The advance far outstripped the actual growth in profits, and almost from the start the quotation appeared much too high in terms of the partners’ own investment standards. But since they regarded the company as a sort of “family business,” they continued to maintain a substantial ownership of the shares despite the spectacular price rise. A large number of participants in their funds did the same, and they became millionaires through their holding in this one enterprise, plus later-organized affiliates.^*

讽刺的是，这项投资决策所带来的利润总额，远远超过了合伙人在各自专业领域20年广泛经营、大量调查、无休止思考和无数个人决策所实现的所有其他投资决策的总和。

Ironically enough, the aggregate of profits accruing from this single investment decision far exceeded the sum of all the others realized through 20 years of wide-ranging operations in the partners’ specialized fields, involving much investigation, endless pondering, and countless individual decisions.

这个故事对聪明的投资者有什么寓意吗？一个显而易见的道理是，在华尔街赚钱和保住钱的方法有很多种。另一个不那么明显的道理是，一次幸运的机遇，或者一次极其精明的决定——我们能分辨出来吗？将它们区分开来？——或许比终生努力更有价值。1^但在运气或关键决策的背后，通常必须有充分的准备和训练有素的能力。一个人需要具备足够的造诣和认知能力，这样这些机会才会敲响他的大门。他必须拥有手段、判断力和勇气来利用它们。

Are there morals to this story of value to the intelligent investor? An obvious one is that there are several different ways to make and keep money in Wall Street. Another, not so obvious, is that one lucky break, or one supremely shrewd decision—can we tell them apart?—may count for more than a lifetime of journeyman efforts.¹ But behind the luck, or the crucial decision, there must usually exist a background of preparation and disciplined capacity. One needs to be sufficiently established and recognized so that these opportunities will knock at his particular door. One must have the means, the judgment, and the courage to take advantage of them.

当然，我们无法保证所有多年来始终保持审慎和警觉的明智投资者都能获得同样精彩的体验。我们不会以JJ Raskob在开篇嘲笑的那句口号“人人都能致富”作为结束。但金融领域充满了各种有趣的可能性，聪明且富有进取心的投资者应该能够在这场“三环马戏团”中找到乐趣和利润。精彩刺激是必然的。

Of course, we cannot promise a like spectacular experience to all intelligent investors who remain both prudent and alert through the years. We are not going to end with J. J. Raskob’s slogan that we made fun of at the beginning: “Everybody can be rich.” But interesting possibilities abound on the financial scene, and the intelligent and enterprising investor should be able to find both enjoyment and profit in this three-ring circus. Excitement is guaranteed.

后记评论

Commentary on the Postscript

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

人类的幸福并非来自偶尔发生的大好运气，而是来自每天都会发生的小恩惠。

Human Felicity is produc’d not so much by great Pieces of good Fortune that seldom happen, as by little Advantages that occur every day.

—本杰明·富兰克林¹

—Benjamin Franklin¹

最后，本书中的建议不仅仅是关于你想成为哪种投资者。

In the end, the advice in this book isn’t only about what kind of investor you want to become.

这也与你想成为什么样的人有关。

It’s also about what kind of person you want to become.

您希望投资主要是一种努力还是一种娱乐？

Do you want investing to be primarily an endeavor or entertainment?

您是否希望将低成本、即时交易和无限信息视为需要不断履行的义务，还是视为尽可能少调用的选项？

Do you want to treat low costs, instantaneous trading, and limitless information as obligations to be constantly acted on, or as options to be invoked as rarely as possible?

你想追随每一种预感和直觉吗？还是想遵循那些能让你随着时间的推移而不断精进的政策、流程和规则？

Do you want to chase every hunch and gut feeling? Or do you want to follow policies, procedures, and rules that will give you growing mastery with the passage of time?

您想生活在盲目的自我欺骗中，还是想通过投资来更加诚实地认识自己的优势和劣势？

Do you want to live in blind self-delusion, or do you want to use investing as a means of becoming more honest about your strengths and weaknesses?

你想一辈子像疯子一样交易吗？还是想把投资视为一种获得宁静的方式？

Do you want to spend the rest of your life trading like a maniac? Or do you want to treat investing as a way to achieve serenity?

你想让你的决定和情绪被数百万陌生人操控吗？你想让市场先生告诉你该怎么想吗？还是你想独立思考？

Do you want your decisions and emotions to be held hostage by millions of strangers? Do you want Mr. Market to tell you what to think? Or do you want to think for yourself?

这些选择是你们自己的，而不是别人的。现在你们知道我和格雷厄姆希望你们走哪条路了。

These choices are yours, not other people’s, to make. And you know by now which path Graham and I want you to take.

Jason Zweig 致谢

Acknowledgments from Jason Zweig

我感谢《华尔街日报》的 David Reilly、Charles Forelle、Marie Beaudette、Liz Harris 和 Emma Tucker慷慨地给予我时间来撰写这本书。

I thank David Reilly, Charles Forelle, Marie Beaudette, Liz Harris, and Emma Tucker of the Wall Street Journal for so graciously giving me the time away to work on this book.

我非常感谢 Hollis Heimbouch、Kirby Sandmeyer 以及 HarperCollins 的全体员工，感谢他们细致而出色的工作，让这个新版本得以问世。

I’m grateful to Hollis Heimbouch, Kirby Sandmeyer, and the entire staff at HarperCollins for their meticulous and brilliant work in bringing this new edition to life.

这些人慷慨地提供了分析、批评、数据、反馈或观点（大致按字母顺序排列）：Amy Arnott 和 Jeff Ptak，晨星公司；Ted Aronson、Jesse Barnes 和 John Jacques，AJO Vista；William Bernstein，Efficient Frontier Advisors；Hank Bessembinder，亚利桑那州立大学；Laurence Black，Index Standard；沃伦·巴菲特；Deborah Fuhr，ETFGI；Pranav Ghai，Calcbench；Roy Haya，Fort Point Capital Partners；Joanne Hill，Cboe Vest；Matt Hougan，Bitwise Asset Management；Elisabeth Kashner，FactSet；Paul Marsh，伦敦商学院；Michael Mauboussin，Counterpoint Global；Don Moore，加州大学伯克利分校；Nina Munk，感谢他将我带入了意外的发现之路；Jeremy Perler 和 Yoni Engelhart，Schilit Forensics；Antti Petajisto，布鲁克林投资集团；证券价格研究中心的 Alex Poukchanski 和 Diane Roman；耶鲁大学的 Robert Shiller；标准普尔道琼斯指数的 Howard Silverblatt；Strategas 证券的 Todd Sohn；哥伦比亚大学珍本与手稿图书馆的 Jocelyn Wilk；Impactive Capital 的 Lauren Taylor Wolfe；沃顿研究数据服务部的 Jun Wu。

In rough alphabetical order, these people generously provided analysis, criticism, data, feedback, or perspective: Amy Arnott and Jeff Ptak, Morningstar; Ted Aronson, Jesse Barnes, and John Jacques, AJO Vista; William Bernstein, Efficient Frontier Advisors; Hank Bessembinder, Arizona State University; Laurence Black, the Index Standard; Warren Buffett; Deborah Fuhr, ETFGI; Pranav Ghai, Calcbench; Roy Haya, Fort Point Capital Partners; Joanne Hill, Cboe Vest; Matt Hougan, Bitwise Asset Management; Elisabeth Kashner, FactSet; Paul Marsh, London Business School; Michael Mauboussin, Counterpoint Global; Don Moore, University of California, Berkeley; Nina Munk, for delivering me into serendipity’s path; Jeremy Perler and Yoni Engelhart, Schilit Forensics; Antti Petajisto, Brooklyn Investment Group; Alex Poukchanski and Diane Roman, Center for Research in Security Prices; Robert Shiller, Yale University; Howard Silverblatt, S&P Dow Jones Indices; Todd Sohn, Strategas Securities; Jocelyn Wilk, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University; Lauren Taylor Wolfe, Impactive Capital; Jun Wu, Wharton Research Data Service.

最重要的是，我要感谢我的妻子：她做了所有的事情，就是没有做这件事，所以我只能做这件事。

Above all, I thank my wife: She did everything but this so I could do nothing but this.

附录

Appendixes

1. 格雷厄姆和多德斯维尔的超级投资者

1. The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville

沃伦·E·巴菲特

by Warren E. Buffett

编者注：本文为1984年在哥伦比亚大学纪念本杰明·格雷厄姆和大卫·L·多德合著《证券分析》五十周年演讲的编辑稿。这本专题著作首次介绍了后来在《聪明的投资者》中得到推广的理念。巴菲特的文章对格雷厄姆的追随者如何运用其价值投资方法在股市取得非凡成就进行了精彩的研究。

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is an edited transcript of a talk given at Columbia University in 1984 commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Security Analysis, written by Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd. This specialized volume first introduced the ideas later popularized in The Intelligent Investor. Buffett’s essay offers a fascinating study of how Graham’s disciples have used Graham’s value investing approach to realize phenomenal success in the stock market.

格雷厄姆和多德“寻找相对于价格具有显著安全边际的价值”的证券分析方法是否已经过时？如今许多编写教科书的教授都认为是的。他们认为，股票市场是有效的；也就是说，股价反映了关于公司前景和经济状况的所有已知信息。这些理论家认为，不存在被低估的股票，因为聪明的证券分析师会利用所有可用信息来确保价格始终合理。那些似乎年复一年跑赢大盘的投资者只是运气好而已。“如果价格完全反映可用信息，那么这种投资技巧就不存在了，”一位当今的教科书作者写道。

Is the Graham and Dodd “look for values with a significant margin of safety relative to prices” approach to security analysis out of date? Many of the professors who write textbooks today say yes. They argue that the stock market is efficient; that is, that stock prices reflect everything that is known about a company’s prospects and about the state of the economy. There are no undervalued stocks, these theorists argue, because there are smart security analysts who utilize all available information to ensure unfailingly appropriate prices. Investors who seem to beat the market year after year are just lucky. “If prices fully reflect available information, this sort of investment adeptness is ruled out,” writes one of today’s textbook authors.

嗯，也许吧。但我想向你们介绍一群年复一年跑赢标准普尔500指数的投资者。假设他们纯粹是偶然的，那么最不值得研究。此次研究的关键在于，这些赢家我都很熟悉，并且预先被认定为优秀投资者，最近一次被认定是在十五年前。如果没有这个条件——也就是说，如果我今天早上刚刚从数千条记录中搜索出几个名字给你——我建议你现在就此打住。我要补充一点，所有这些记录都经过了审计。我还要补充一点，我认识许多与这些经理人投资的人，这些参与者多年来收到的支票与所述的记录相符。

Well, maybe. But I want to present to you a group of investors who have, year in and year out, beaten the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index. The hypothesis that they do this by pure chance is at least worth examining. Crucial to this examination is the fact that these winners were all well known to me and pre-identified as superior investors, the most recent identification occurring over fifteen years ago. Absent this condition—that is, if I had just recently searched among thousands of records to select a few names for you this morning—I would advise you to stop reading right here. I should add that all these records have been audited. And I should further add that I have known many of those who have invested with these managers, and the checks received by those participants over the years have matched the stated records.

在开始这项考察之前，我想请大家想象一下一场全国性的抛硬币比赛。假设明天早上有2.25亿美国人起床，我们让他们每人下注1美元。他们清晨日出时出门，每个人都预测抛硬币的结果。如果预测正确，他们就能从预测错误的人那里赢得1美元。每天输的人都会被淘汰，第二天，赌注会随着之前所有赢的钱都押上而增加。在10个早晨进行10次抛硬币后，美国大约会有22万人连续10次预测正确。他们每人将赢得略高于1000美元的奖金。

Before we begin this examination, I would like you to imagine a national coin-flipping contest. Let’s assume we get 225 million Americans up tomorrow morning and we ask them all to wager a dollar. They go out in the morning at sunrise, and they all call the flip of a coin. If they call correctly, they win a dollar from those who called wrong. Each day the losers drop out, and on the subsequent day the stakes build as all previous winnings are put on the line. After ten flips on ten mornings, there will be approximately 220,000 people in the United States who have correctly called ten flips in a row. They each will have won a little over $1,000.

现在，这群人可能会开始有点得意忘形，毕竟人之常情。他们或许会尽量保持谦虚，但在鸡尾酒会上，他们偶尔会向有吸引力的异性透露自己的技巧，以及他们为翻转领域带来了哪些非凡的见解。

Now this group will probably start getting a little puffed up about this, human nature being what it is. They may try to be modest, but at cocktail parties they will occasionally admit to attractive members of the opposite sex what their technique is, and what marvelous insights they bring to the field of flipping.

假设赢家从输家那里得到适当的奖励，再过十天，我们将有 215 个人连续 20 次成功预测抛硬币的结果，通过这种练习，每个人都将一美元变成了 100 多万美元。损失了 2.25 亿美元，赢得了 2.25 亿美元。

Assuming that the winners are getting the appropriate rewards from the losers, in another ten days we will have 215 people who have successfully called their coin flips 20 times in a row and who, by this exercise, each have turned one dollar into a little over $1 million. $225 million would have been lost, $225 million would have been won.

到那时，这群人真的会疯掉。他们可能会写书，说是《我如何在二十天内，每天早上工作三十秒，把一美元变成一百万美元》。更糟糕的是，他们可能会开始乘飞机到全国各地参加高效抛硬币的研讨会，并反驳那些持怀疑态度的教授：“如果做不到，为什么会有我们215个人？”

By then, this group will really lose their heads. They will probably write books on “How I Turned a Dollar into a Million in Twenty Days Working Thirty Seconds a Morning.” Worse yet, they’ll probably start jetting around the country attending seminars on efficient coin-flipping and tackling skeptical professors with, “If it can’t be done, why are there 215 of us?”

但随后一些商学院教授可能会粗鲁地提出这样一个事实：如果 2.25 亿只猩猩进行过类似的练习，结果也大同小异——215 只自负的猩猩连续 20 次获胜。

But then some business school professor will probably be rude enough to bring up the fact that if 225 million orangutans had engaged in a similar exercise, the results would be much the same—215 egotistical orangutans with 20 straight winning flips.

然而，我认为我将要举的例子存在一些重要的区别。首先，如果 (a) 你选取了2.25亿只猩猩，其分布与美国人口大致相同；如果 (b) 20天后剩下215只优胜者；如果 (c) 你发现其中40只来自奥马哈的某个动物园，那么你肯定发现了一些问题。所以，你可能会去问问动物园管理员，他给猩猩喂了什么，它们是否有特殊的运动，读了什么书，以及其他一些谁知道的事情。也就是说，如果你发现了任何真正非凡的成功集中现象，你或许应该看看能否找出一些可能成为致病因素的异常特征的集中现象。

I would argue, however, that there are some important differences in the examples I am going to present. For one thing, if (a) you had taken 225 million orangutans distributed roughly as the U.S. population is; if (b) 215 winners were left after 20 days; and if (c) you found that 40 came from a particular zoo in Omaha, you would be pretty sure you were on to something. So you would probably go out and ask the zookeeper about what he’s feeding them, whether they had special exercises, what books they read, and who knows what else. That is, if you found any really extraordinary concentrations of success, you might want to see if you could identify concentrations of unusual characteristics that might be causal factors.

科学探究自然遵循这样的模式。如果你试图分析一种罕见癌症的可能病因——比如说，美国每年有1500例——你发现其中400例发生在蒙大拿州的某个矿业小镇，你肯定会对那里的水质、患者的职业或其他变量非常感兴趣。你知道400例癌症发生在一个小区域并非偶然。你不一定知道致病因素，但你会知道去哪里寻找。

Scientific inquiry naturally follows such a pattern. If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer—with, say, 1,500 cases a year in the United States—and you found that 400 of them occurred in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables. You know that it’s not random chance that 400 come from a small area. You would not necessarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search.

我向你保证，除了地理起源之外，还有其他方法可以定义起源。除了地理起源之外，还有我所说的知识起源。我想你会发现，投资界中，相当一部分成功的抛硬币者来自一个非常小的知识村落，这个村落可以被称为“格雷厄姆和多德镇”。成功者的聚集，其原因根本无法用偶然性来解释，而这些原因都可以追溯到这个特殊的知识村落。

I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography. In addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an intellectual origin. I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville. A concentration of winners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to this particular intellectual village.

某些情况甚至可能使这种专注变得无关紧要。也许100个人只是在模仿某个极具说服力的人物抛硬币的叫法。当他叫出正面时，100个追随者会自动以同样的方式叫出硬币。如果领导者是最后剩下的215人之一，那么100人来自同一知识阶层这一事实就毫无意义了。你只是把一个案例认定为100个案例。同样，假设你生活在一个父权制社会，每个人美国家庭恰好由十名成员组成。进一步假设父权文化如此强大，以至于当2.25亿人在第一天出门时，每个家庭成员都会响应父亲的号召。那么，在20天结束后，你将有215名获胜者，而你会发现他们只来自21.5个家庭。一些天真的人可能会说，这表明遗传因素是抛硬币成功的一个重要原因。但当然，这毫无意义，因为这仅仅意味着你没有215个个人获胜者，而是21.5个随机分布的家庭获胜。

Conditions could exist that would make even that concentration unimportant. Perhaps 100 people were simply imitating the coin-flipping call of some terribly persuasive personality. When he called heads, 100 followers automatically called that coin the same way. If the leader was part of the 215 left at the end, the fact that 100 came from the same intellectual origin would mean nothing. You would simply be identifying one case as a hundred cases. Similarly, let’s assume that you lived in a strongly patriarchal society and every family in the United States conveniently consisted of ten members. Further assume that the patriarchal culture was so strong that, when the 225 million people went out the first day, every member of the family identified with the father’s call. Now, at the end of the 20-day period, you would have 215 winners, and you would find that they came from only 21.5 families. Some naïve types might say that this indicates an enormous hereditary factor as an explanation of successful coin-flipping. But, of course, it would have no significance at all because it would simply mean that you didn’t have 215 individual winners, but rather 21.5 randomly distributed families who were winners.

我想探讨的这群成功投资者，都有一个共同的智识领袖——本杰明·格雷厄姆。然而，离开这位智识领袖的子弟们，却以截然不同的方式预测着他们的“抛售”。他们去了不同的地方，买卖了不同的股票和公司，但他们的综合业绩却无法用随机性来解释。当然，这更不能用“他们预测的抛售数完全相同，是因为有一位领袖发出信号”来解释。这位智识领袖仅仅阐述了预测硬币的智识理论，但每个学生都决定了各自运用该理论的方式。

In this group of successful investors that I want to consider, there has been a common intellectual patriarch, Ben Graham. But the children who left the house of this intellectual patriarch have called their “flips” in very different ways. They have gone to different places and bought and sold different stocks and companies, yet they have had a combined record that simply can’t be explained by random chance. It certainly cannot be explained by the fact that they are all calling flips identically because a leader is signaling the calls to make. The patriarch has merely set forth the intellectual theory for making coin-calling decisions, but each student has decided on his own manner of applying the theory.

格雷厄姆和多德的投资者们的共同理念是：他们寻找企业价值与其在市场上小部分股份价格之间的差异。本质上，他们利用这些差异，而不像有效市场理论家那样关心股票是在周一还是周四买入，是在一月还是七月等等。顺便说一句，当商人购买企业时——这正是我们的格雷厄姆和多德投资者通过流通股票进行的——我怀疑许多人不会根据交易发生的日期或月份来做出购买决定。如果在周一还是周五购买一家企业的全部股份没有任何区别，我不明白为什么学者们会花费大量时间和精力去研究购买同一家企业的小部分股份是否会有所不同。不用说，我们的格雷厄姆和多德投资者不会讨论贝塔系数、资本资产定价模型或证券收益的协方差。这些都不是研究的课题。他们对此毫无兴趣。事实上，大多数人很难定义这些术语。投资者只关注两个变量：价格和价值。

The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this: they search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially, they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist’s concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday, or whether it is January or July, etc. Incidentally, when businessmen buy businesses—which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the medium of marketable stocks—I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week or the month in which the transaction is going to occur. If it doesn’t make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday, I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those same businesses. Our Graham & Dodd investors, needless to say, do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model, or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact, most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focus on two variables: price and value.

我总是觉得很奇怪，这么多研究都是关于价格和成交量行为的，这可是图表分析师的活儿。你能想象仅仅因为上周和前周股价大幅上涨，就买下整只股票吗？当然，大量研究价格和成交量变量的原因是，在计算机时代，关于它们的数据几乎无穷无尽。这不一定是因为这类研究有什么用处；只是因为数据就在那里，而且学者们已经努力学习了处理这些数据所需的数学技能。一旦掌握了这些技能，不去使用它们似乎就是一种罪过，即使使用起来没有任何用处或负面效果。正如一位朋友所说，对于一个拿着锤子的人来说，所有东西看起来都像钉子。

I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior, the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked up substantially last week and the week before? Of course, the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now, in the age of computers, there are almost endless data available about them. It isn’t necessarily because such studies have any utility; it’s simply that the data are there and academicians have worked hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

我认为，我们认定的这个拥有共同知识渊博的群体值得研究。顺便说一句，尽管学术界对价格、成交量、季节性、市值规模等变量对股票表现的影响进行了大量的研究，但并没有证据表明，有人对研究这群异常集中的价值导向型赢家的策略感兴趣。

I think the group that we have identified by a common intellectual home is worthy of study. Incidentally, despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price, volume, seasonality, capitalization size, etc., upon stock performance, no interest has been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentration of value-oriented winners.

我开始这项研究，首先要追溯到1954年至1956年在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司工作的四个人。当时只有四个人——我不是从成千上万的人中挑选出来的。我上完本杰明·格雷厄姆的课后，曾提出免费去格雷厄姆-纽曼公司工作，但他以估值过高为由拒绝了我。他非常重视价值投资！经过一番缠扰，他终于雇用了我。当时公司有三位合伙人，还有四个人处于“小白”级别。这四个人都在1955年至1957年公司解散期间离开了公司，其中三位至今仍能找到工作记录。

I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation from 1954 through 1956. There were only four—I have not selected these names from among thousands. I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after I took Ben Graham’s class, but he turned me down as overvalued. He took this value stuff very seriously! After much pestering he finally hired me. There were three partners and four of us at the “peasant” level. All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up, and it’s possible to trace the record of three.

第一个例子（见表1）是沃尔特·施洛斯（Walter Schloss）。沃尔特从未上过大学，但在纽约金融学院（New York Institute of Finance）参加了本杰明·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）的夜校课程。沃尔特于1955年离开格雷厄姆-纽曼公司，并在28年的时间里取得了此处所示的业绩。

The first example (see Table 1) is that of Walter Schloss. Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years.

在我告诉“亚当·斯密”关于沃尔特的事情后，他在《超级金钱》（1972 年）一书中写道：

Here is what “Adam Smith”—after I told him about Walter—wrote about him in Supermoney (1972):

他没有任何人脉，也没有渠道获取有用的信息。华尔街几乎没有人认识他，他也没有任何想法。他只是查阅手册里的数据，然后把年度报告寄给他，仅此而已。

He has no connections or access to useful information. Practically no one in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports, and that’s about it.

在我看来，沃伦在介绍我认识[施洛斯]时，也曾这样描述自己：“他从不忘记自己在管理别人的钱，这强化了他一贯的对损失的强烈厌恶。” 他为人正直，对自己的认知也很现实。对他来说，金钱是真实的，股票也是真实的——正因如此，“安全边际”原则才如此吸引他。

In introducing me to [Schloss] Warren had also, to my mind, described himself. “He never forgets that he is handling other people’s money and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss.” He has total integrity and a realistic picture of himself. Money is real to him and stocks are real—and from this flows an attraction to the “margin of safety” principle.

沃尔特的投资组合极其多元化，目前持有超过 100 只股票。他知道如何识别那些售价远低于私人持有者价值的证券。这就是他所做的一切。他不担心现在是不是一月，不担心是不是星期一，也不担心是不是选举年。他只是说，如果一家企业价值 1 美元，而我能以 40 美分的价格买到它，那么我可能会遇到一些好事。他一遍又一遍地重复这句话。他持有的股票比我多得多，而且对企业的潜在性质远不感兴趣：我似乎对沃尔特没有太大的影响力。这是他的优势之一；没有人能对他产生太大的影响。

Walter has diversified enormously, owning well over 100 stocks currently. He knows how to identify securities that sell at considerably less than their value to a private owner. And that’s all he does. He doesn’t worry about whether it’s January, he doesn’t worry about whether it’s Monday, he doesn’t worry about whether it’s an election year. He simply says, if a business is worth a dollar and I can buy it for 40 cents, something good may happen to me. And he does it over and over and over again. He owns many more stocks than I do—and is far less interested in the underlying nature of the business: I don’t seem to have very much influence on Walter. That’s one of his strengths; no one has much influence on him.

第二个案例是汤姆·纳普，他也曾与我一起在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司工作。战前，汤姆在普林斯顿大学主修化学；战后归来，他成了一名海滩流浪汉。后来有一天，他读到戴夫·多德在哥伦比亚大学开设了一门夜校投资课程。汤姆修读了这门非学分课程，他对投资产生了浓厚的兴趣，于是他考入哥伦比亚商学院，并在那里获得了MBA学位。他又选修了多德的课程，也选修了本杰明·格雷厄姆的课程。顺便说一句，35年后，我打电话给汤姆，想了解一下这起事件中涉及的一些事实，结果又在海滩上找到了他。唯一的区别是，现在他拥有了这片海滩！

The second case is Tom Knapp, who also worked at Graham-Newman with me. Tom was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war; when he came back from the war, he was a beach bum. And then one day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Columbia. Tom took it on a noncredit basis, and he got so interested in the subject from taking that course that he came up and enrolled at Columbia Business School, where he got the MBA degree. He took Dodd’s course again, and took Ben Graham’s course. Incidentally, 35 years later I called Tom to ascertain some of the facts involved here and I found him on the beach again. The only difference is that now he owns the beach!

1968年，汤姆·纳普（Tom Knapp）和同样是格雷厄姆信徒的艾德·安德森（Ed Anderson）以及一两位志同道合的伙伴创立了特威迪·布朗合伙公司（Tweedy, Browne Partners），他们的投资业绩如表2所示。特威迪·布朗合伙公司凭借着广泛的多元化投资积累了如此佳绩。他们偶尔会收购企业的控制权，但被动投资的业绩与控制权投资的业绩相当。

In 1968 Tom Knapp and Ed Anderson, also a Graham disciple, along with one or two other fellows of similar persuasion, formed Tweedy, Browne Partners, and their investment results appear in Table 2. Tweedy, Browne built that record with very wide diversification. They occasionally bought control of businesses, but the record of the passive investments is equal to the record of the control investments.

表3描述了1957年组建巴菲特合伙公司的第三位成员。他做的最好的事情就是在1969年退出。从那时起，从某种意义上说，伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司在某些方面一直是合伙公司的延续。我无法给出一个我认为能够公平衡量伯克希尔投资管理水平的指数。但我认为，无论你如何看待它，它都令人满意。

Table 3 describes the third member of the group who formed Buffett Partnership in 1957. The best thing he did was to quit in 1969. Since then, in a sense, Berkshire Hathaway has been a continuation of the partnership in some respects. There is no single index I can give you that I would feel would be a fair test of investment management at Berkshire. But I think that any way you figure it, it has been satisfactory.

表4显示了红杉基金的业绩记录，该基金的管理人是我在1951年在本杰明·格雷厄姆的课上认识的比尔·鲁安。从哈佛商学院毕业后，他去了华尔街。后来，他意识到自己需要接受真正的商业教育，于是他来到哥伦比亚大学选修本的课程，我们于1951年初在那里相识。从1951年到1970年，比尔的业绩记录远高于平均水平，尽管他投资的资金相对较小。当我结束巴菲特合伙企业的经营时，我问比尔是否愿意设立一个基金来管理我们所有的合伙人，于是他设立了红杉基金。他设立这个基金的时机很糟糕，就在我准备辞职的时候。他直接进入了两级市场，克服了所有那些为价值导向型投资者带来相对业绩的困难。我很高兴地说，我的合伙人不仅留下了他，而且还追加了资金，取得了令人满意的结果。

Table 4 shows the record of the Sequoia Fund, which is managed by a man whom I met in 1951 in Ben Graham’s class, Bill Ruane. After getting out of Harvard Business School, he went to Wall Street. Then he realized that he needed to get a real business education so he came up to take Ben’s course at Columbia, where we met in early 1951. Bill’s record from 1951 to 1970, working with relatively small sums, was far better than average. When I wound up Buffett Partnership I asked Bill if he would set up a fund to handle all our partners, so he set up the Sequoia Fund. He set it up at a terrible time, just when I was quitting. He went right into the two-tier market and all the difficulties that made for comparative performance for value-oriented investors. I am happy to say that my partners, to an amazing degree, not only stayed with him but added money, with the happy result shown.

这里没有后见之明。比尔是我向合伙人推荐的唯一一个人，我当时就说，如果他的年化收益率能比标准普尔指数高出4个百分点，那就算得上是稳健的业绩了。比尔的业绩远超这个数字，他管理的资金规模也越来越大。这让事情变得困难得多。规模是业绩的基石，这是毫无疑问的。规模越大，并不意味着你不能做得比平均水平更好，只是利润率会缩小。如果你真的做到了，你管理着两万亿美元，而这恰好是整个经济体中股票估值的总额，别以为你的业绩会比平均水平更好！

There’s no hindsight involved here. Bill was the only person I recommended to my partners, and I said at the time that if he achieved a four-point-per-annum advantage over the Standard & Poor’s, that would be solid performance. Bill has achieved well over that, working with progressively larger sums of money. That makes things much more difficult. Size is the anchor of performance. There is no question about it. It doesn’t mean you can’t do better than average when you get larger, but the margin shrinks. And if you ever get so you’re managing two trillion dollars, and that happens to be the amount of the total equity evaluation in the economy, don’t think that you’ll do better than average!

我应该补充一点，在我们迄今为止查看的记录中，整个时期内，这些投资组合几乎没有重复。这些人根据价格和价值之间的差异来选择证券，但他们的选择方式截然不同。沃尔特最大的持股对象是哈德逊纸浆造纸公司、杰多高地煤炭公司、纽约陷阱岩公司等巨头，以及所有其他……即使是偶尔读读商业版的读者，也会立刻想到这一点。特威迪·布朗的股票选择在知名度方面甚至远低于这个水平。另一方面，比尔也曾与大公司合作过。这些投资组合之间的重叠度非常非常低。这些记录并不反映一个人预测了反转，然后五十个人在他身后跟着喊同样的话。

I should add that in the records we’ve looked at so far, throughout this whole period there was practically no duplication in these portfolios. These are men who select securities based on discrepancies between price and value, but they make their selections very differently. Walter’s largest holdings have been such stalwarts as Hudson Pulp & Paper and Jeddo Highland Coal and New York Trap Rock Company and all those other names that come instantly to mind to even a casual reader of the business pages. Tweedy Browne’s selections have sunk even well below that level in terms of name recognition. On the other hand, Bill has worked with big companies. The overlap among these portfolios has been very, very low. These records do not reflect one guy calling the flip and fifty people yelling out the same thing after him.

表5是我一位哈佛法学院毕业生朋友的业绩记录，他创办了一家大型律师事务所。大约在1960年，我遇到他，告诉他，法律作为一种爱好很好，但他可以做得更好。他创办的合伙企业与沃尔特的完全相反。他的投资组合集中在极少数几种证券上，因此业绩波动性更大，但同样基于价值折价策略。他愿意接受业绩波动更大的高峰和低谷，而且他恰好是一位全身心投入专注的人，其成果也显而易见。顺便提一句，这份业绩记录属于查理·芒格，他曾长期与我合作经营伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司。然而，在他经营合伙企业时，他的投资组合几乎与我以及前面提到的其他人完全不同。

Table 5 is the record of a friend of mine who is a Harvard Law graduate, who set up a major law firm. I ran into him in about 1960 and told him that law was fine as a hobby but he could do better. He set up a partnership quite the opposite of Walter’s. His portfolio was concentrated in very few securities and therefore his record was much more volatile but it was based on the same discount-from-value approach. He was willing to accept greater peaks and valleys of performance, and he happens to be a fellow whose whole psyche goes toward concentration, with the results shown. Incidentally, this record belongs to Charlie Munger, my partner for a long time in the operation of Berkshire Hathaway. When he ran his partnership, however, his portfolio holdings were almost completely different from mine and the other fellows mentioned earlier.

表6是查理·芒格一位好友的记录——他也是非商学院出身——南加州大学数学专业。毕业后，他去了IBM工作，做了一段时间的IBM销售员。我找到查理之后，查理又去找他。这恰好是里克·格林的记录。里克在1965年至1983年期间，标准普尔指数的复合收益率为316%，而格林的收益率却高达22200%。或许是因为他缺乏商学院教育，所以他认为这个数字具有统计学意义。

Table 6 is the record of a fellow who was a pal of Charlie Munger’s—another non–business school type—who was a math major at USC. He went to work for IBM after graduation and was an IBM salesman for a while. After I got to Charlie, Charlie got to him. This happens to be the record of Rick Guerin. Rick, from 1965 to 1983, against a compounded gain of 316 percent for the S&P, came off with 22,200 percent, which, probably because he lacks a business school education, he regards as statistically significant.

这里插播一点：对我来说，用40美分买一美元钞票的想法要么立刻被人们接受，要么根本就无法接受，这真是太不可思议了。这就像接种疫苗一样。如果一个人不能立刻被它吸引，我发现，即使你跟他聊了好几年，给他看各种记录，也没有任何效果。他们似乎就是无法理解这个概念，尽管它很简单。像里克·格林这样没有接受过正规商业教育的人，也能立刻理解价值投资方法，而且五分钟后就能运用它。我从未见过有人在十年的时间里逐渐接受这种方法。这似乎与智商或学术训练无关。它需要瞬间的认知，否则就毫无意义。

One sidelight here: it is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately with people or it doesn’t take at all. It’s like an inoculation. If it doesn’t grab a person right away, I find that you can talk to him for years and show him records, and it doesn’t make any difference. They just don’t seem able to grasp the concept, simple as it is. A fellow like Rick Guerin, who had no formal education in business, understands immediately the value approach to investing and he’s applying it five minutes later. I’ve never seen anyone who became a gradual convert over a ten-year period to this approach. It doesn’t seem to be a matter of IQ or academic training. It’s instant recognition, or it is nothing.

表七是斯坦·珀尔米特的记录。斯坦是密歇根大学文科专业的学生，也是博泽尔·雅各布斯广告公司的合伙人。我们碰巧在奥马哈的同一栋楼里。1965年，他发现我的生意比他好，于是离开了广告业。同样，斯坦只用了五分钟就接受了价值投资方法。

Table 7 is the record of Stan Perlmeter. Stan was a liberal arts major at the University of Michigan who was a partner in the advertising agency of Bozell & Jacobs. We happened to be in the same building in Omaha. In 1965 he figured out I had a better business than he did, so he left advertising. Again, it took five minutes for Stan to embrace the value approach.

沃尔特·施洛斯拥有的股票，珀尔米特并不拥有。比尔·鲁安拥有的股票，他也不拥有。这些都是珀尔米特独立记录的。但珀尔米特每次买入股票，都是因为他觉得回报比付出的多。这是他唯一想的事情。他不看季度盈利预测，不看明年的盈利，不考虑今天是星期几，他不在乎任何投资研究怎么说，他对价格动量、成交量什么的都不感兴趣。他只是在问：这家公司值多少钱？

Perlmeter does not own what Walter Schloss owns. He does not own what Bill Ruane owns. These are records made independently. But every time Perlmeter buys a stock it’s because he’s getting more for his money than he’s paying. That’s the only thing he’s thinking about. He’s not looking at quarterly earnings projections, he’s not looking at next year’s earnings, he’s not thinking about what day of the week it is, he doesn’t care what investment research from any place says, he’s not interested in price momentum, volume, or anything. He’s simply asking: What is the business worth?

表8和表9是我参与过的两只养老基金的记录。它们并非从我参与过的数十只养老基金中挑选出来的；它们是仅有的两只受我影响的基金。在这两只基金中，我都引导它们选择了以价值为导向的基金经理。很少有养老基金是从价值的角度进行管理的。表8是华盛顿邮报公司的养老基金。几年前，它与一家大型银行合作，我建议他们最好选择以价值为导向的基金经理。

Table 8 and Table 9 are the records of two pension funds I’ve been involved in. They are not selected from dozens of pension funds with which I have had involvement; they are the only two I have influenced. In both cases I have steered them toward value-oriented managers. Very, very few pension funds are managed from a value standpoint. Table 8 is the Washington Post Company’s Pension Fund. It was with a large bank some years ago, and I suggested that they would do well to select managers who had a value orientation.

正如你所见，自从他们做出改变以来，总体而言，他们一直处于前百分之一的位置。《华盛顿邮报》告诉经理们，至少要将25%的资金投入债券市场，但这未必是这些经理们的选择。所以我把债券业绩也算进去，只是为了说明这群人对债券并不特别精通。他们不会说自己精通。即使有25%的资金投入了他们不擅长的领域，他们仍然在基金管理领域名列前茅。《华盛顿邮报》的经历涵盖的时间并不长，但它确实代表了三位未被追溯识别的经理的许多投资决策。

As you can see, overall they have been in the top percentile ever since they made the change. The Post told the managers to keep at least 25 percent of these funds in bonds, which would not have been necessarily the choice of these managers. So I’ve included the bond performance simply to illustrate that this group has no particular expertise about bonds. They wouldn’t have said they did. Even with this drag of 25 percent of their fund in an area that was not their game, they were in the top percentile of fund management. The Washington Post experience does not cover a terribly long period but it does represent many investment decisions by three managers who were not identified retroactively.

表9是FMC公司基金的业绩记录。我本人不管理该基金的任何资金，但在1974年，我确实影响了他们选择价值导向型基金经理的决定。在此之前，他们选择基金经理的方式与大多数大型公司大致相同。现在他们在贝克尔对养老基金进行的调查中，按规模计算，在“转向”价值投资方法之后的一段时间内，FMC 位居第一。去年，他们有八位股票经理，任期超过一年。其中七位的累计业绩优于标准普尔指数。去年，这八位经理的业绩均优于标准普尔指数。目前，FMC 基金在此期间的中值业绩与实际业绩之间的净差额为 2.43 亿美元。FMC 将此归因于他们在选择经理方面的思维模式。这些经理不一定是我选择的经理，但他们有一个共同点，那就是根据价值选择证券。

Table 9 is the record of the FMC Corporation fund. I don’t manage a dime of it myself but I did, in 1974, influence their decision to select value-oriented managers. Prior to that time they had selected managers much the same way as most larger companies. They now rank number one in the Becker survey of pension funds for their size over the period of time subsequent to this “conversion” to the value approach. Last year they had eight equity managers of any duration beyond a year. Seven of them had a cumulative record better than the S&P. All eight had a better record last year than the S&P. The net difference now between a median performance and the actual performance of the FMC fund over this period is $243 million. FMC attributes this to the mindset given to them about the selection of managers. Those managers are not the managers I would necessarily select but they have the common denominator of selecting securities based on value.

这就是格雷厄姆-多德维尔的九位“抛硬币者”的记录。我并非事后诸葛亮地从成千上万的人中挑选出他们。我也不是在向你们背诵一群彩票中奖者的名字——在他们中奖之前我从未听说过他们。我多年前就根据他们的投资决策框架挑选了这些人。我知道他们受过什么教育，此外，我对他们的智力、性格和气质也有一些个人了解。重要的是要明白，这群人承担的风险远低于平均水平；请注意他们在大盘疲软时期的记录。虽然他们的风格差异很大，但从本质上讲，这些投资者买的是企业本身，而不是股票。他们中的一些人有时会买下整个企业。更多的时候，他们只是购买企业的一小部分。无论是买下企业的全部股份还是一小部分股份，他们的态度都是一样的。有些人持有包含数十只股票的投资组合；而另一些人则专注于少数几只股票。但所有这些都利用了企业市场价格与其内在价值之间的差异。

So these are nine records of “coin-flippers” from Graham-and-Doddsville. I haven’t selected them with hindsight from among thousands. It’s not like I am reciting to you the names of a bunch of lottery winners—people I had never heard of before they won the lottery. I selected these men years ago based upon their framework for investment decision-making. I knew what they had been taught and additionally I had some personal knowledge of their intellect, character, and temperament. It’s very important to understand that this group has assumed far less risk than average; note their record in years when the general market was weak. While they differ greatly in style, these investors are, mentally, always buying the business, not buying the stock. A few of them sometimes buy whole businesses. Far more often they simply buy small pieces of businesses. Their attitude, whether buying all or a tiny piece of a business, is the same. Some of them hold portfolios with dozens of stocks; others concentrate on a handful. But all exploit the difference between the market price of a business and its intrinsic value.

我确信市场存在诸多低效之处。这些格雷厄姆和多德维尔式的投资者成功地利用了价格与价值之间的差距。当一只股票的价格能够受到华尔街“羊群效应”的影响，而价格是由最情绪化、最贪婪或最沮丧的人设定的时，很难说市场定价总是理性的。事实上，市场价格常常是荒谬的。

I’m convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a “herd” on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.

关于风险和回报，我想说一件很重要的事情。有时风险和回报是正相关的。如果有人对我说：“我这里有一把六发左轮手枪，而且我把一颗子弹塞进去。你为什么不直接旋转一下再扣一次呢？如果你活下来，我会给你100万美元。”我会拒绝——也许会说100万美元不够。然后他可能会给我500万美元，让我扣动两次扳机——这才是风险和回报之间的正相关关系！

I would like to say one important thing about risk and reward. Sometimes risk and reward are correlated in a positive fashion. If someone were to say to me, “I have here a six-shooter and I have slipped one cartridge into it. Why don’t you just spin it and pull it once? If you survive, I will give you $1 million.” I would decline—perhaps stating that $1 million is not enough. Then he might offer me $5 million to pull the trigger twice—now that would be a positive correlation between risk and reward!

价值投资则恰恰相反。如果你以60美分的价格购买一张1美元的钞票，其风险比以40美分的价格购买一张1美元的钞票更高，但后者的预期回报也更高。价值投资组合的潜在回报越大，风险就越小。

The exact opposite is true with value investing. If you buy a dollar bill for 60 cents, it’s riskier than if you buy a dollar bill for 40 cents, but the expectation of reward is greater in the latter case. The greater the potential for reward in the value portfolio, the less risk there is.

举个简单的例子：1973年，华盛顿邮报公司在市场上的售价为8000万美元。当时，你可以把这些资产卖给十个买家中的任何一个，价格至少在4亿美元左右，甚至可能更高。该公司旗下拥有《华盛顿邮报》、《新闻周刊》以及几家主要市场的电视台。这些资产如今价值20亿美元，所以那些愿意出4亿美元的人并不算疯。

One quick example: The Washington Post Company in 1973 was selling for $80 million in the market. At the time, that day, you could have sold the assets to any one of ten buyers for not less than $400 million, probably appreciably more. The company owned the Post, Newsweek, plus several television stations in major markets. Those same properties are worth $2 billion now, so the person who would have paid $400 million would not have been crazy.

现在，如果股价进一步下跌，估值从8000万美元跌至4000万美元，其贝塔系数就会更高。对于那些认为贝塔系数衡量风险的人来说，更低的价格反而会使其风险更高。这真是爱丽丝梦游仙境。我一直想不通，为什么用4000万美元购买价值4亿美元的房产比用8000万美元购买更危险。事实上，如果你购买一批这样的证券，并且对企业估值有所了解，那么用8000万美元购买4亿美元基本上没有风险，尤其是如果你以每笔800万美元的价格购买10笔价值4000万美元的资产。由于你手中没有这4亿美元，所以你想确保与诚实且能力相当强的人合作，但这并非难事。

Now, if the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40 million instead of $80 million, its beta would have been greater. And to people who think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never been able to figure out why it’s riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million than $80 million. And, as a matter of fact, if you buy a group of such securities and you know anything at all about business valuation, there is essentially no risk in buying $400 million for $80 million, particularly if you do it by buying ten $40 million piles for $8 million each. Since you don’t have your hands on the $400 million, you want to be sure you are in with honest and reasonably competent people, but that’s not a difficult job.

你还必须具备足够的知识，才能对标的企业的价值做出非常粗略的估计。但你不会精打细算。这就是本杰明·格雷厄姆所说的安全边际。你不会试图用8000万美元收购价值8300万美元的企业。你会给自己留出巨大的安全边际。你建桥时，你坚持认为它能承载3万磅的重量，但你只会驾驶1万磅的卡车通过。同样的原则也适用于投资。

You also have to have the knowledge to enable you to make a very general estimate about the value of the underlying businesses. But you do not cut it close. That is what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety. You don’t try and buy businesses worth $83 million for $80 million. You leave yourself an enormous margin. When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you only drive 10,000-pound trucks across it. And that same principle works in investing.

总而言之，你们当中一些比较有商业头脑的人大家可能想知道我为什么要写这篇文章。越来越多的人皈依价值投资方法，必然会缩小价格与价值之间的差距。我只能告诉你，自从本杰明·格雷厄姆和戴夫·多德撰写《证券分析》以来，这个秘密已经公开了50年，然而在我实践价值投资的35年里，我却没有看到任何趋势。似乎人类有一种固执的本性，喜欢把简单的事情复杂化。学术界，如果说有什么不同的话，那就是在过去30年里，实际上已经放弃了价值投资的教学。这种情况很可能会持续下去。船只将继续环游世界，但地平说协会仍将蓬勃发展。市场上的价格和价值之间将继续存在巨大的差距，而那些阅读格雷厄姆和多德著作的人将继续繁荣昌盛。

In conclusion, some of the more commercially minded among you may wonder why I am writing this article. Adding many converts to the value approach will perforce narrow the spreads between price and value. I can only tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis, yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years that I’ve practiced it. There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult. The academic world, if anything, has actually backed away from the teaching of value investing over the last 30 years. It’s likely to continue that way. Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.

表 1–9 如下：

Tables 1–9 follow:

表 1 Walter J. Schloss

TABLE 1 Walter J. Schloss

表 2 Tweedy，Browne Inc.

TABLE 2 Tweedy, Browne Inc.

^*包括标准普尔 500 综合指数和道琼斯工业平均指数支付的股息。

^* Includes dividends paid for both Standard, & Poor’s 500 Composite Index and Dow Jones Industrial Average.

表 3 巴菲特合伙有限公司

TABLE 3 Buffett Partnership, Ltd.

表 4 红杉基金公司

TABLE 4 Sequoia Fund, Inc.

^*包括被视为再投资的股息（对于红杉基金则为资本收益分配）。

^* Includes dividends (and capital gains distributions in the case of Sequoia Fund) treated as though reinvested.

^*由于再投资股息的计算存在差异，这些数据与表 1 中的标准普尔数据略有不同。

^* These figures differ slightly from the S&P figures in Table 1 because of a difference in calculation of reinvested dividends.

表 5 查尔斯·芒格

TABLE 5 Charles Munger

表 6 Pacific Partners, Ltd.

TABLE 6 Pacific Partners, Ltd.

表 7 Perlmeter 投资

TABLE 7 Perlmeter Investments

表 8 华盛顿邮报公司，Master Trust，1983 年 12 月 31 日

TABLE 8 The Washington Post Company, Master Trust, December 31, 1983

^*年化

^* Annualized

排名表明该基金相对于 AC Becker 体系的表现。

Rank indicates the fund’s performance against the A.C. Becker universe.

排名以百分位数表示：1 = 最佳表现，100 = 最差。

Rank is stated as a percentile: 1 = best performance, 100 = worst.

表 9 FMC 公司养老基金，年回报率（百分比）

TABLE 9 FMC Corporation Pension Fund, Annual Rate of Return (Percent)

2. 普通股的新投机¹

2. The New Speculation in Common Stocks¹

我要说的这些，将反映我在华尔街多年的经验，以及随之而来的各种体验。这其中包括不断出现的新情况或新氛围，这些新情况或新氛围挑战着经验本身的价值。诚然，经济学、金融学和证券分析区别于其他实践学科的因素之一，就是过去现象作为现在和未来的指导，其有效性尚不确定。然而，在我们至少研究并理解过去的经验教训之前，我们没有权利拒绝它们。我今天的演讲，就是为了在有限的领域内努力理解这一点——具体来说，是试图指出，在我们对普通股投资和投机的基本态度中，现在和过去之间存在着一些截然不同的关系。

What I shall have to say will reflect the spending of many years in Wall Street, with their attendant varieties of experience. This has included the recurrent advent of new conditions, or a new atmosphere, which challenge the value of experience itself. It is true that one of the elements that distinguish economics, finance, and security analysis from other practical disciplines is the uncertain validity of past phenomena as a guide to the present and future. Yet we have no right to reject the lessons of the past until we have at least studied and understood them. My address today is an effort toward such understanding in a limited field—in particular, an endeavor to point out some contrasting relationships between the present and the past in our underlying attitudes toward investment and speculation in common stocks.

首先，我先来概括一下我的论点。过去，普通股的投机因素几乎完全存在于公司内部；这些因素源于不确定性、波动性因素、行业固有的弱点，或是公司自身的结构。当然，这些投机因素仍然存在；但可以说，它们已被一系列我将要提到的长期发展显著削弱。然而，作为一种报复，一种新的、重要的投机因素从公司外部被引入了普通股领域。它来自股票购买者及其顾问——主要是我们这些证券分析师——的态度和观点。这种态度可以用一句话来概括：主要强调未来预期。

Let me start with a summary of my thesis. In the past the speculative elements of a common stock resided almost exclusively in the company itself; they were due to uncertainties, or fluctuating elements, or downright weaknesses in the industry, or the corporation’s individual setup. These elements of speculation still exist, of course; but it may be said that they have been sensibly diminished by a number of long-term developments to which I shall refer. But in revenge a new and major element of speculation has been introduced into the common-stock arena from outside the companies. It comes from the attitude and viewpoint of the stock-buying public and their advisers—chiefly us security analysts. This attitude may be described in a phrase: primary emphasis upon future expectations.

对在座的各位来说，没有什么比普通股的估值和定价主要基于公司预期未来业绩这一观点更合乎逻辑、更自然的了。然而，这个看似简单的概念却蕴含着许多悖论和陷阱。首先，它抹杀了投资与投机之间长期以来根深蒂固的界限。字典中说，“投机”一词源于拉丁语“specula”，意为“瞭望者”。因此，投机者比其他人更早地预见到未来的发展。但如今，如果投资者精明或明智，他也必须对未来有所警惕，或者更确切地说，他已经进入了一个与投机者打交道的普通瞭望者行列。

Nothing will appear more logical and natural to this audience than the idea that a common stock should be valued and priced primarily on the basis of the company’s expected future performance. Yet this simple-appearing concept carries with it a number of paradoxes and pitfalls. For one thing, it obliterates a good part of the older, well-established distinctions between investment and speculation. The dictionary says that “speculate” comes from the Latin “specula,” a lookout. Thus it was the speculator who looked out and saw future developments coming before other people did. But today, if the investor is shrewd or well advised, he too must have his lookout on the future, or rather he mounts into a common lookout where he rubs elbows with the speculator.

其次，我们发现，在大多数情况下，拥有最佳投资特质（即最佳信用评级）的公司最有可能吸引最多的普通股投机兴趣，因为每个人都认为这些公司的未来前景光明。第三，未来前景的概念，尤其是未来持续增长的概念，促使人们运用高等数学公式来确定受青睐股票的现值。但是，精确的公式与高度不精确的假设相结合，几乎可以用来确定，或者更确切地说，可以用来证明，对于真正优秀的股票，人们所期望的任何价值，无论其价值有多高。然而，矛盾的是，仔细考察这一事实本身就意味着，对于一家特定的成长型公司，没有哪个价值，或者合理狭窄的价值范围，能够被依赖来确立和维持；因此，有时市场可能会将增长成分的估值定得非常低。

Secondly, we find that, for the most part, companies with the best investment characteristics—i.e., the best credit rating—are the ones which are likely to attract the largest speculative interest in their common stocks, since everyone assumes they are guaranteed a brilliant future. Thirdly, the concept of future prospects, and particularly of continued growth in the future, invites the application of formulas out of higher mathematics to establish the present value of the favored issues. But the combination of precise formulas with highly imprecise assumptions can be used to establish, or rather to justify, practically any value one wishes, however high, for a really outstanding issue. But, paradoxically, that very fact on close examination will be seen to imply that no one value, or reasonably narrow range of values, can be counted on to establish and maintain itself for a given growth company; hence at times the market may conceivably value the growth component at a strikingly low figure.

回到我对普通股中旧投机因素和新投机因素的区分，我们可以用两个看似古怪却又方便的词来描述它们：内生和外生。让我用1911年至1913年美国罐头公司和宾夕法尼亚铁路公司的一些数据，来简要说明一下旧式投机性普通股，它与投资性股票的区别。（这些数据摘自本杰明·格雷厄姆和大卫·L·多德合著的《证券分析》，麦格劳-希尔出版社，1940年，第2-3页。）

Returning to my distinction between the older and newer speculative elements in common stock, we might characterize them by two outlandish but convenient words, viz.: endogenous and exogenous. Let me illustrate briefly the old-time speculative common stock, as distinguished from an investment stock, by some data relating to American Can and Pennsylvania Railroad in 1911–1913. (These appear in Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd, Security Analysis, McGraw-Hill, 1940, pp. 2–3.)

在这三年里，“宾夕法尼亚”的股价波动范围仅在53至65之间，相当于其同期平均收益的12.2至15倍。该公司盈利稳定，派发着可靠的3美元股息，投资者确信其背后有远超50美元面值的有形资产作为支撑。相比之下，美国罐头公司的股价波动在9至47之间；其收益在7美分至8.86美元之间；股价与三年平均收益的比率在1.9倍至10倍之间；该公司根本没有派息；经验丰富的投资者很清楚，100美元面值的普通股只不过是未披露的“水分”，因为优先股的发行价超过了其可获得的有形资产。因此，美国罐头公司的普通股是典型的投机性股票，因为当时美国罐头公司是一个波动且不确定的行业中的投机性资本企业。实际上，美国罐头公司的长期业绩要辉煌得多。宾夕法尼亚铁路的未来；但当时的投资者或投机者不仅没有怀疑到这一事实，而且即使怀疑到了，投资者也很可能将其放在一边，认为这与 1911 年至 1913 年的投资政策和计划基本上无关。

In those three years the price range of “Pennsy” moved only between 53 and 65, or between 12.2 and 15 times its average earnings for the period. It showed steady profits, was paying a reliable $3 dividend, and investors were sure that it was backed by well over its par of $50 in tangible assets. By contrast, the price of American Can ranged between 9 and 47; its earnings between 7 cents and $8.86; the ratio of price to the three-year average earnings moved between 1.9 times and 10 times; it paid no dividend at all; and sophisticated investors were well aware that the $100 par value of the common represented nothing but undisclosed “water,” since the preferred issue exceeded the tangible assets available for it. Thus American Can common was a representative speculative issue, because American Can Company was then a speculatively capitalized enterprise in a fluctuating and uncertain industry. Actually, American Can had a far more brilliant long-term future than Pennsylvania Railroad; but not only was this fact not suspected by investors or speculators in those days, but even if it had been it would probably have been put aside by the investors as basically irrelevant to investment policies and programs in the years 1911–1913.

现在，为了让大家了解长期投资前景的重要性是如何随着时间推移而演变的。我想以我们最引人注目的大型工业企业——国际商业机器公司（IBM）为例，该公司去年的销售额达到了10亿美元，跻身少数几家公司之列。请允许我在此介绍一两段自传，以便为这篇原本会略带冰冷数字的文章增添一些个人色彩。1912年，我大学辍学一个学期，负责美国运通公司（US Express Company）的一个研究项目。我们着手研究一项拟议中的革命性新型快递费率计算系统对收入的影响。为此，我们使用了当时的计算-制表-记录公司（Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company）出租的所谓霍勒瑞斯（Hollerith）机器。这些机器包括卡片打孔机、卡片分类机和制表机——当时商界几乎对这些工具一无所知，它们的主要应用领域是人口普查局。我于1914年进入华尔街，第二年又购买了C.-T.-R.公司的债券和普通股。公司在纽约证券交易所上市。我对那家公司怀有一种感情，而且我自认为是他们产品的技术专家，因为我是少数见过并使用过他们产品的金融人士之一。所以在1916年初，我找到了公司负责人AN先生，向他指出，C.-T.-R.股票的售价在45美元左右（共10.5万股）；它在1915年的盈利为6.50美元；它的账面价值（当然，包括一些非独立无形资产）为130美元；它已经开始派发3美元的股息；而且我对公司的产品和前景评价颇高。AN先生同情地看着我。 “本，”他说，“别再跟我提那家公司了。我连碰都碰不了。（他最喜欢的说法。）它6%的债券现在卖到80多美元，根本卖不出去。那股票怎么可能好呢？大家都知道，它除了水什么也没有。”（词汇表：在那个年代，这可是极尽贬义之能事。意思是资产负债表上的资产账户是虚构的。许多工业公司——尤其是美国钢铁公司——尽管面值100美元，但实际上却只是一滴水，隐藏在虚增的工厂账户中。由于他们除了盈利能力和未来前景之外“一无所有”，任何有自尊心的投资者都不会再考虑他们。

Now, to expose you to the development through time of the importance of long-term prospects for investments. I should like to use as my example our most spectacular giant industrial enterprise—none other than International Business Machines, which last year entered the small group of companies with $1 billion of sales. May I introduce one or two autobiographical notes here, in order to inject a little of the personal touch into what otherwise would be an excursion into cold figures? In 1912 I had left college for a term to take charge of a research project for U.S. Express Company. We set out to find the effect on revenues of a proposed revolutionary new system of computing express rates. For this purpose we used the so-called Hollerith machines, leased out by the then Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company. They comprised card punches, card sorters, and tabulators—tools almost unknown to businessmen, then, and having their chief application in the Census Bureau. I entered Wall Street in 1914, and the next year the bonds and common stock of C.-T.-R. Company were listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Well, I had a kind of sentimental interest in that enterprise, and besides I considered myself a sort of technological expert on their products, being one of the few financial people who had seen and used them. So early in 1916 I went to the head of my firm, known as Mr. A. N., and pointed out to him that C.-T.-R. stock was selling in the middle 40s (for 105,000 shares); that it had earned $6.50 in 1915; that its book value—including, to be sure, some nonsegregated intangibles—was $130; that it had started a $3 dividend; and that I thought rather highly of the company’s products and prospects. Mr. A. N. looked at me pityingly. “Ben,” said he, “do not mention that company to me again. I would not touch it with a ten-foot pole. [His favorite expression.] Its 6 per cent bonds are selling in the low 80s and they are no good. So how can the stock be any good? Everybody knows there is nothing behind it but water.” (Glossary: In those days that was the ultimate of condemnation. It meant that the asset account of the balance sheet was fictitious. Many industrial companies—notably U.S. Steel—despite their $100 par, represented nothing but water, concealed in a written-up plant account. Since they had “nothing” to back them but earning power and future prospects, no self-respecting investor would give them a second thought.)

我回到了统计学家的小隔间，成了一个受过良好教育的年轻人。AN先生不仅经验丰富、事业有成，而且极其精明。他对计算-制表-记录（Computing-Tabulating-Recording）的全面谴责给我留下了深刻的印象，以至于我这辈子都没买过它的股票，即使在1926年它更名为国际商业机器公司（International Business Machines）之后也没有买过。

I returned to my statistician’s cubbyhole, a chastened young man. Mr. A. N. was not only experienced and successful, but extremely shrewd as well. So much was I impressed by his sweeping condemnation of Computing-Tabulating-Recording that I never bought a share of it in my life, not even after its name was changed to International Business Machines in 1926.

现在让我们回顾一下1926年更名后的同一家公司，那一年的股市相当高涨。当时，该公司首次在资产负债表中披露了商誉项目，金额相当可观，高达1360万美元。AN是对的。1915年，普通股背后的所谓权益几乎每一美元都化为乌有。然而，自那时起，在TL Watson, Sr.的领导下，该公司取得了令人瞩目的业绩。其净利润从69.1万美元增长至370万美元，增长了五倍多，这一百分比增幅超过了其后任何十一年期间的增幅。它为普通股积累了可观的有形权益，并将其按3.6比1的比例拆分。它为新股设定了3美元的股息率，而新股的收益为6.39美元。你或许会认为，1926年的股市会对一家拥有如此悠久增长历史和如此强劲交易地位的公司充满热情。让我们拭目以待。当年的股价区间最低为31美元，最高为59美元。平均股价为45美元时，其市盈率和股息收益率与1915年相同，分别为7倍和6.7%。最低股价为31美元时，其股价与其有形账面价值相差不大，从这一点来看，其定价比11年前保守得多。

Now let us take a look at the same company with its new name in 1926, a year of pretty high stock markets. At that time it first revealed the good-will item in its balance sheet, in the rather large sum of $13.6 million. A. N. had been right. Practically every dollar of the so-called equity behind the common in 1915 had been nothing but water. However, since that time the company had made an impressive record under the direction of T. L. Watson, Sr. Its net had risen from $691,000 to $3.7 million—over fivefold—a greater percentage gain than it was to make in any subsequent eleven-year period. It had built up a nice tangible equity for the common, and had split it 3.6 for one. It had established a $3 dividend rate for the new stock, while earnings were $6.39 thereon. You might have expected the 1926 stock market to have been pretty enthusiastic about a company with such a growth history and so strong a trade position. Let us see. The price range for that year was 31 low, 59 high. At the average of 45 it was selling at the same 7-times multiplier of earnings and the same 6.7 per cent dividend yield as it had done in 1915. At its low of 31 it was not far in excess of its tangible book value, and in that respect was far more conservatively priced than eleven years earlier.

这些数据充分表明，直到 20 世纪 20 年代牛市的顶峰时期，旧式投资观点依然存在。此后发生的事情可以用 IBM 历史上的十年间隔来概括。1936 年，净值扩大到 1926 年的两倍，平均乘数从 7 升至 17.5。1936 年至 1946 年，收益为 2.5 倍，但 1946 年的平均乘数仍为 17.5。随后，增长速度加快。1956 年的净值几乎是 1946 年的 4 倍，平均乘数升至 32.5。去年，随着净值方面，如果不计算外国子公司的未合并权益，乘数再次上升至平均 42。

These data illustrate, as well as any can, the persistence of the old-time investment viewpoint until the culminating years of the bull market of the 1920s. What has happened since then can be summarized by using ten-year intervals in the history of IBM. In 1936 net expanded to twice the 1926 figures, and the average multiplier rose from 7 to 17½. From 1936 to 1946 the gain was 2½ times, but the average multiplier in 1946 remained at 17½. Then the pace accelerated. The 1956 net was nearly 4 times that of 1946, and the average multiplier rose to 32½. Last year, with a further gain in net, the multiplier rose again to an average of 42, if we do not count the unconsolidated equity in the foreign subsidiary.

当我们仔细研究这些近期价格数据时，我们会发现它们与四十年前的数据存在一些有趣的相似之处和对比。工业企业资产负债表中曾经弥漫的丑闻式“水分”，如今已被全部挤出——先是通过信息披露，然后是通过减记。但股市——投资者和投机者自己——又将另一种“水分”注入了估值。当IBM现在以其账面价值的7倍而不是收益的7倍出售时，其效果实际上与它根本没有账面价值是一样的。或者，账面价值的一小部分可以被视为股价中一种较小的优先股成分，其余部分则代表着与旧时投机者完全一样的承诺，他们购买伍尔沃斯或美国钢铁公司的普通股，完全是因为它们拥有盈利能力和未来前景。

When we examine these recent price figures with care we see some interesting analogies and contrasts with those of forty years earlier. The one-time scandalous water, so prevalent in the balance sheets of industrial companies, has all been squeezed out—first by disclosure and then by writeoffs. But a different kind of water has been put back into the valuation by the stock market—by investors and speculators themselves. When IBM now sells at 7 times its book value, instead of 7 times earnings, the effect is practically the same as if it had no book value at all. Or the small book-value portion can be considered as a sort of minor preferred-stock component of the price, the rest representing exactly the same sort of commitment as the old-time speculator made when he bought Woolworth or U.S. Steel common entirely for their earning power and future prospects.

顺便提一下，在IBM从7倍市盈率跃升至40倍市盈率的30年间，我所说的大型工业企业的许多内生投机性因素趋于消失，或至少大幅减弱。它们的财务状况稳健，资本结构保守：它们的管理远比以往更加专业，甚至更加诚实。此外，全面披露的要求也消除了多年前的一个重要投机因素——源于无知和神秘的因素。

It is worth remarking, in passing, that in the thirty years which saw IBM transformed from a 7-times earnings to a 40-times earnings enterprise, many of what I have called the endogenous speculative aspects of our large industrial companies have tended to disappear, or at least to diminish greatly. Their financial positions are firm, their capital structures conservative: they are managed far more expertly, and even more honestly, than before. Furthermore, the requirements of complete disclosure have removed one of the important speculative elements of years ago—that derived from ignorance and mystery.

这里再扯点个人题外话。我早年在华尔街投资时，最喜欢的神秘股票之一是纽约联合燃气公司（现为联合爱迪生公司）。它旗下拥有盈利颇丰的纽约爱迪生公司，但只公布了从这家公司获得的股息，而不是全部收益。爱迪生公司未公布的收益，为这只股票增添了神秘感和“隐藏价值”。令我惊讶的是，我发现这些秘密数据实际上每年都提交给纽约州公共服务委员会。查阅记录，在杂志文章中展示联合燃气公司的真实收益，这很容易。（顺便说一句，利润增长并不惊人。）当时我的一位老朋友对我说：“本，你可能认为自己很有能力提供这些缺失的数据，但华尔街正在……没什么好感谢的。还有谜团的联合天然气公司比以前的谜团更有趣，也更有价值。你们这些什么事都想插手的年轻人会毁了华尔街的。

Another personal digression here. In my early years in the Street one of the favorite mystery stocks was Consolidated Gas of New York, now Consolidated Edison. It owned as a subsidiary the profitable New York Edison Company, but it reported only dividends received from this source, not its full earnings. The unreported Edison earnings supplied the mystery and the “hidden value.” To my surprise I discovered that these hush-hush figures were actually on file each year with the Public Service Commission of the state. It was a simple matter to consult the records and to present the true earnings of Consolidated Gas in a magazine article. (Incidentally, the addition to profits was not spectacular.) One of my older friends said to me then: “Ben, you may think you are a great guy to supply those missing figures, but Wall Street is going to thank you for nothing. Consolidated Gas with the mystery is both more interesting and more valuable than ex-mystery. You youngsters who want to stick your noses into everything are going to ruin Wall Street.”

诚然，当时为投机之火提供大量燃料的三个“M”如今已几乎消失。它们是神秘感、操纵和（微薄的）利润。但我们证券分析师自己也在创建估值方法，这些方法本身就具有很强的投机性，几乎可以取代那些旧的投机因素。我们现在不是有自己的“3M”——正是明尼苏达矿业与制造公司——而这只普通股不是完美地体现了新旧投机的对比吗？考虑几个数字。去年，当 MM&M 普通股以 101 的价格出售时，市场对其的估值是 1956 年收益的 44 倍，而 1957 年恰好没有出现任何增长。企业本身的估值为 17 亿美元，其中 2 亿美元由净资产覆盖，而足足 15 亿美元代表了市场对“商誉”的评估。我们不知道商誉估值是如何计算出来的；我们确实知道，几个月后市场将这一估值下调了约4.5亿美元，约合30%。显然，准确计算像这样一家优秀公司的无形资产成分是不可能的。这遵循着一种数学规律：商誉或未来盈利能力因素越重要，企业的真实价值就越不确定，因此普通股的内在投机性就越强。

It is true that the three M’s which then supplied so much fuel to the speculative fires have now all but disappeared. These were Mystery, Manipulation, and (thin) Margins. But we security analysts have ourselves been creating valuation approaches which are so speculative in themselves as to pretty well take the place of those older speculative factors. Do we not have our own “3M’s” now—none other than Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company—and does not this common stock illustrate perfectly the new speculation as contrasted with the old? Consider a few figures. When M. M. & M. common sold at 101 last year the market was valuing it at 44 times 1956 earnings, which happened to show no increase to speak of in 1957. The enterprise itself was valued at $1.7 billion, of which $200 million was covered by net assets, and a cool $1½ billion represented the market’s appraisal of “good will.” We do not know the process of calculation by which that valuation of good will was arrived at; we do know that a few months later the market revised this appraisal downward by some $450 million, or about 30 per cent. Obviously it is impossible to calculate accurately the intangible component of a splendid company such as this. It follows as a kind of mathematical law that the more important the good will or future earning-power factor the more uncertain becomes the true value of the enterprise, and therefore the more speculative inherently the common stock.

当我们将过去与现在进行比较时，或许应该认识到这些无形资产的估值中出现了一个至关重要的差异。一代人或更久以前，无形资产的估值应比有形资产更为保守，这是一条标准规则，无论是在平均股价中，还是在正式或法律估值中，都得到了认可。一家优秀的工业公司可能需要其有形资产（通常以债券和优先股为代表）的收益率在6%到8%之间；但其超额收益，或由此产生的无形资产，则会以15%的基准进行估值。（你可以在1911年伍尔沃斯公司优先股和普通股的首次发行中找到这些比率，以及在众多其他人。）但自 20 世纪 20 年代以来发生了什么？基本上，这些关系现在可能完全相反。现在，一家公司通常必须从其普通股中获得 10% 的收益，才能在平均市场上以全额账面价值出售。但其超过 10% 的资本超额收益通常比支持市场账面价值所需的基本收益估值更宽松，或乘数更高。因此，一家股权收益为 15% 的公司很可能以收益的 13.5 倍或其净资产的两倍出售。这意味着，资本收益的第一个 10% 仅估价 10 倍，但接下来的 5% - 过去被称为“超额部分” - 实际上估价 20 倍。

It may be well to recognize a vital difference that has developed in the valuation of these intangible factors, when we compare earlier times with today. A generation or more ago it was the standard rule, recognized both in average stock prices and in formal or legal valuations, that intangibles were to be appraised on a more conservative basis than tangibles. A good industrial company might be required to earn between 6 per cent and 8 per cent on its tangible assets, represented typically by bonds and preferred stock; but its excess earnings, or the intangible assets they gave rise to, would be valued on, say, a 15 per cent basis. (You will find approximately these ratios in the initial offering of Woolworth preferred and common stock in 1911, and in numerous others.) But what has happened since the 1920s? Essentially the exact reverse of these relationships may now be seen. A company must now typically earn about 10 per cent on its common equity to have it sell in the average market at full book value. But its excess earnings, above 10 per cent on capital, are usually valued more liberally, or at a higher multiplier, than the base earnings required to support the book value in the market. Thus a company earning 15 per cent on the equity may well sell at 13½ times earnings, or twice its net assets. This would mean that the first 10 per cent earned on capital is valued at only 10 times, but the next 5 per cent—what used to be called the “excess”—is actually valued at 20 times.

现在，估值程序的这种逆转是有逻辑原因的，这与新近对增长预期的重视有关。那些获得高资本回报率的公司之所以获得如此宽容的估值，不仅是因为其本身良好的盈利能力及其相关的相对稳定性，或许更令人信服的是，高资本回报率通常与良好的增长记录和前景相伴而生。因此，如今高利润公司真正值得关注的，并非是过去狭隘意义上的信誉，即知名品牌和盈利业务，而是它们对未来利润增长的预期。

Now there is a logical reason for this reversal in valuation procedure, which is related to the newer emphasis on growth expectations. Companies that earn a high return on capital are given these liberal appraisals not only because of the good profitability itself, and the relative stability associated with it, but perhaps even more cogently because high earnings on capital generally go hand in hand with a good growth record and prospects. Thus what is really paid for nowadays in the case of highly profitable companies is not the good will in the old and restricted sense of an established name and a profitable business, but rather their assumed superior expectations of increased profits in the future.

这让我想到了对普通股估值新态度的另外一两个数学方面，我将仅以简短的建议形式略作探讨。如果如许多测试所示，收益乘数倾向于随着盈利能力的提高而增加——即随着账面价值回报率的提高——那么这一特征的算术后果是，价值倾向于与收益的平方成正比，而与账面价值成反比。因此，在一个重要且非常现实的意义上，有形资产已成为平均市值的拖累因素，而非其来源。举一个远非极端的例子。如果A公司每股收益4美元，账面价值20美元；B公司每股收益4美元，账面价值100美元，那么A公司几乎肯定会以更高的乘数出售，因此价格也高于B公司——

比如A公司股票60美元，B公司股票35美元。因此，可以毫不夸张地说，B公司每股80美元的较大资产是每股25美元的原因。较低的市场价格，因为每股收益被认为是相等的。

This brings me to one or two additional mathematical aspects of the new attitude toward common-stock valuations, which I shall touch on merely in the form of brief suggestions. If, as many tests show, the earnings multiplier tends to increase with profitability—i.e., as the rate of return on book value increases—then the arithmetical consequence of this feature is that value tends to increase directly as the square of the earnings, but inversely the book value. Thus in an important and very real sense tangible assets have become a drag on average market value rather than a source thereof. Take a far from extreme illustration. If Company A earns $4 a share on a $20 book value, and Company B also $4 a share on $100 book value, Company A is almost certain to sell at a higher multiplier, and hence at higher price than Company B—

say $60 for Company A shares and $35 for Company B shares. Thus it would not be inexact to declare that the $80 per share of greater assets for Company B are responsible for the $25 per share lower market price, since the earnings per share are assumed to be equal.

但比上述更重要的是数学与股票估值新方法之间的普遍关系。考虑到以下三个要素：(a) 对收益增长率的乐观假设，(b) 对未来足够长的预测，以及 (c) 复利的神奇运作——瞧！证券分析师仿佛获得了一种新的点金石，可以对一只真正“好股票”得出或证明任何理想的估值。我最近在《分析师杂志》上发表的一篇文章中评论了高等数学在牛市中的流行，并引用了大卫·杜兰德对成长股价值计算与著名的彼得堡悖论之间惊人相似之处的阐述。彼得堡悖论两百多年来一直困扰着数学家，令他们困惑不已。我想在这里指出的是，数学与普通股投资态度之间存在一个特殊的悖论，即：数学通常被认为能够产生精确可靠的结果；但在股票市场，数学越复杂深奥，我们由此得出的结论就越不确定，也越带有投机性。在44年的华尔街经验和研究中，我从未见过对普通股价值或相关投资政策的可靠计算，超越简单的算术或最基本的代数。每当引入微积分或高等代数，你都可以将其视为一个警告信号，表明操作者试图用理论取代经验，通常也是为了给投机披上投资的伪装。

But more important than the foregoing is the general relationship between mathematics and the new approach to stock values. Given the three ingredients of (a) optimistic assumptions as to the rate of earnings growth, (b) a sufficiently long projection of this growth into the future, and (c) the miraculous workings of compound interest—lo! the security analyst is supplied with a new kind of philosopher’s stone which can produce or justify any desired valuation for a really “good stock.” I have commented in a recent article in the Analysts’ Journal on the vogue of higher mathematics in bull markets, and quoted David Durand’s exposition of the striking analogy between value calculations of growth stocks and the famous Petersburg Paradox, which has challenged and confused mathematicians for more than two hundred years. The point I want to make here is that there is a special paradox in the relationship between mathematics and investment attitudes on common stocks, which is this: Mathematics is ordinarily considered as producing precise and dependable results; but in the stock market the more elaborate and abstruse the mathematics the more uncertain and speculative are the conclusions we draw therefrom. In forty-four years of Wall Street experience and study I have never seen dependable calculations made about common-stock values, or related investment policies, that went beyond simple arithmetic or the most elementary algebra. Whenever calculus is brought in, or higher algebra, you could take it as a warning signal that the operator was trying to substitute theory for experience, and usually also to give to speculation the deceptive guise of investment.

在如今经验丰富的证券分析师看来，旧有的普通股投资理念或许显得相当幼稚。当时的重点始终放在我们如今所说的公司或股票的防御性方面——主要是确保其在经济低迷时期能够继续派发不减息的股息。因此，50年前构成标准投资普通股的实力雄厚的铁路股，实际上与近年来的公用事业普通股在投资理念上大同小异。如果过去的记录表明其稳定性，那么主要要求就得到了满足；人们并没有过多地去预测潜在的不利变化。未来。但相反，精明的投资者认为，特别有利的未来前景是值得寻找但不会为之付出代价的东西。

The older ideas of common-stock investment may seem quite naïve to the sophisticated security analyst of today. The great emphasis was always on what we now call the defensive aspects of the company or issue—mainly the assurance that it would continue its dividend unreduced in bad times. Thus the strong railroads, which constituted the standard investment commons of fifty years ago, were actually regarded in very much the same way as the public-utility commons in recent years. If the past record indicated stability, the chief requirement was met; not too much effort was made to anticipate adverse changes of an underlying character in the future. But, conversely, especially favorable future prospects were regarded by shrewd investors as something to look for but not to pay for.

实际上，这意味着投资者无需为更优的长期前景支付任何巨额费用。他几乎无需额外付出任何成本就能获得这些，这作为对他卓越智慧和判断力的回报，他挑选出了最佳公司，而非仅仅选择优秀的公司。对于财务实力、过往盈利记录和股息稳定性都相同的普通股，其股息收益率大致相同。

In effect this meant that the investor did not have to pay anything substantial for superior long-term prospects. He got these, virtually without extra cost, as a reward for his own superior intelligence and judgment in picking the best rather than the merely good companies. For common stocks with the same financial strength, past earnings record, and dividend stability all sold at about the same dividend yield.

这的确是一种短视的观点，但它的巨大优势在于，它使得过去的普通股投资不仅简单，而且基本稳健，利润丰厚。让我最后再谈谈我的个人经历。大约在1920年，我们公司发行了一系列名为《投资者的教训》的小册子。当然，只有像我这样二十多岁、傲慢自大的分析师才能想出如此自鸣得意、妄自尊大的标题。但我在其中一篇论文中曾随口说道：“如果普通股是一项好的投资，那么它也是一次好的投机。” 因为，我推断，如果一只普通股如此稳健，几乎没有亏损风险，那么它通常也一定拥有极好的未来盈利机会。这的确是一个完全正确甚至有价值的发现，但它之所以正确，只是因为当时无人关注。几年后，当公众意识到普通股作为长期投资的历史价值时，它们很快就失去了任何投资价值，因为公众的热情创造了价格水平，剥夺了他们内在的安全边际，从而将他们赶出了投资阶层。当然，钟摆又摆到了另一个极端，我们很快看到一位最受尊敬的权威人士（在1931年）宣称，任何普通股都不能成为投资。

This was indeed a shortsighted point of view, but it had the great advantage of making common-stock investment in the old days not only simple but also basically sound and highly profitable. Let me return for the last time to a personal note. Somewhere around 1920 our firm distributed a series of little pamphlets entitled Lessons for Investors. Of course it took a brash analyst in his middle twenties like myself to hit on so smug and presumptuous a title. But in one of the papers I made the casual statement that “if a common stock is a good investment it is also a good speculation.” For, reasoned I, if a common stock was so sound that it carried very little risk of loss it must ordinarily be so good as to possess excellent chances for future gains. Now this was a perfectly true and even valuable discovery, but it was true only because nobody paid any attention to it. Some years later, when the public woke up to the historical merits of common stocks as long-term investments, they soon ceased to have any such merit, because the public’s enthusiasm created price levels which deprived them of their built-in margin of safety, and thus drove them out of the investment class. Then, of course, the pendulum swung to the other extreme, and we soon saw one of the most respected authorities declaring (in 1931) that no common stock could ever be an investment.

当我们以更客观的角度看待这段长期经历时，我们会发现投资者对资本收益而非收入的态度变化中存在着另一组悖论。说过去的普通股投资者对资本收益不太感兴趣，这似乎是老生常谈。他们几乎完全是为了安全和收益而买入，而让投机者去关注价格上涨。今天，我们可能会说，经验更丰富、更精明的人对投资者而言，他对股息回报的关注度越低，对长期增值的兴趣就越浓厚。然而，有人可能会反常地认为，正因为旧时的投资者不关注未来的资本增值，他们实际上就保证了自己一定会获得增值，至少在工业股领域是如此。相反，如今的投资者如此关注未来，以至于他们已经提前为此付出了高昂的代价。因此，他们经过大量研究和精心预测的结果可能真的发生了，但仍然不会给他带来任何利润。如果结果未能达到预期，他实际上可能会面临严重的暂时性甚至永久性的损失。

When we view this long-range experience in perspective we find another set of paradoxes in the investor’s changing attitude toward capital gains as contrasted with income. It seems a truism to say that the old-time common-stock investor was not much interested in capital gains. He bought almost entirely for safety and income, and let the speculator concern himself with price appreciation. Today we are likely to say that the more experienced and shrewd the investor, the less attention he pays to dividend returns, and the more heavily his interest centers on long-term appreciation. Yet one might argue, perversely, that precisely because the old-time investor did not concentrate on future capital appreciation he was virtually guaranteeing to himself that he would have it, at least in the field of industrial stocks. And, conversely, today’s investor is so concerned with anticipating the future that he is already paying handsomely for it in advance. Thus what he has projected with so much study and care may actually happen and still not bring him any profit. If it should fail to materialize to the degree expected he may in fact be faced with a serious temporary and perhaps even permanent loss.

1958年的分析师能从这种将过去与现在联系起来的态度中学到什么教训呢？我再次借用我1920年那本小册子的浮夸标题。有人可能会说，这些教训没什么价值。我们可以怀旧地回顾过去的美好时光，那时我们只为现在付出，而未来可以不劳而获——简直是“除了天堂还有这一切”的结合。我们悲伤地摇着头，喃喃自语：“那些日子一去不复返了。”投资者和证券分析师不是已经吃了分别善恶前景的智慧之树的果实吗？这样做，他们不是永远地把自己驱逐出了那个可以以合理价格从灌木丛中摘取有前景的普通股的伊甸园吗？我们是否注定总是要冒着这样的风险：要么为优质和有前景的股票支付不合理的高价，要么为看似合理的价格却买到劣质和有前景的股票？

What lessons—again using the pretentious title of my 1920 pamphlet—can the analyst of 1958 learn from this linking of past with current attitudes? Not much of value, one is inclined to say. We can look back nostalgically to the good old days when we paid only for the present and could get the future for nothing—an “all this and Heaven too” combination. Shaking our heads sadly we mutter, “Those days are gone forever.” Have not investors and security analysts eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil prospects? By so doing have they not permanently expelled themselves from that Eden where promising common stocks at reasonable prices could be plucked off the bushes? Are we doomed always to run the risk either of paying unreasonably high prices for good quality and prospects, or of getting poor quality and prospects when we pay what seems a reasonable price?

看起来确实如此。然而，即使是这种悲观的困境，也难以确定。最近，我对这家巨头企业——通用电气——的长期历史做了一些研究——这受到了他们最近发布的1957年报告中那张引人注目的59年收益和股息图表的启发。这些数据对于知识渊博的分析师来说并非毫无意外。首先，它们表明，在1947年之前，通用电气的增长相当温和，而且相当不规律。1946年的每股收益（经调整后）仅比1902年高出30%——52美分对40美分——而且在此期间，没有一年的收益比1902年的收益翻了一番。然而，市盈率却从1910年和1916年的9倍上升到1936年和1946年的29倍。当然，有人可能会说，1946年的乘数至少表明了众所周知，精明投资者的先见之明。我们分析师当时能够预见到未来十年即将到来真正辉煌的增长时期。或许如此。但你们中的一些人还记得，第二年，也就是1947年，通用电气的每股收益创下了令人印象深刻的新高，但市盈率也出现了大幅下降。在32美元的低点（1拆3之前）时，通用电气的市盈率实际上仅为其当前市盈率的9倍，而当年的平均股价仅为其市盈率的10倍左右。在短短的12个月里，我们的水晶球显然被云层遮住了。

It certainly looks that way. Yet one cannot be sure even of that pessimistic dilemma. Recently, I did a little research in the long-term history of that towering enterprise, General Electric—stimulated by the arresting chart of fifty-nine years of earnings and dividends appearing in their recently published 1957 Report. These figures are not without their surprises for the knowledgeable analyst. For one thing they show that prior to 1947 the growth of G. E. was fairly modest and quite irregular. The 1946 earnings, per share adjusted, were only 30 per cent higher than in 1902—52 cents versus 40 cents—and in no year of this period were the 1902 earnings as much as doubled. Yet the price-earnings ratio rose from 9 times in 1910 and 1916 to 29 times in 1936 and again in 1946. One might say, of course, that the 1946 multiplier at least showed the well-known prescience of shrewd investors. We analysts were able to foresee then the really brilliant period of growth that was looming ahead in the next decade. Maybe so. But some of you remember that the next year, 1947, which established an impressive new high for G.E.’s per-share earnings, was marked also by an extraordinary fall in the price-earnings ratio. At its low of 32 (before the 3-for-1 split) G.E. actually sold again at only 9 times its current earnings and its average price for the year was only about 10 times earnings. Our crystal ball certainly clouded over in the short space of twelve months.

这一惊人的逆转仅仅发生在十一年前。这让我对分析师们普遍持有的观点——即知名且前景光明的公司现在总是会以高市盈率出售——的可靠性产生了一些怀疑——这其实是投资者的基本事实，他们或许会接受并喜欢它。我无意在这一点上武断。我只能说，我的想法还没有定论，你们每个人都必须自己去尝试去解决。

This striking reversal took place only eleven years ago. It casts some little doubt in my mind as to the complete dependability of the popular belief among analysts that prominent and promising companies will now always sell at high price-earnings ratios—that this is a fundamental fact of life for investors and they may as well accept and like it. I have no desire at all to be dogmatic on this point. All I can say is that it is not settled in my mind, and each of you must seek to settle it for yourself.

但在总结发言中，我可以就各类普通股的市场结构，就其投资和投机特性而言，做出一些明确的说明。过去，普通股的投资特性与企业本身的投资特性大致相同或成比例，这可以通过其信用评级来很好地衡量。债券或优先股的收益率越低，普通股就越有可能满足所有令人满意的投资标准，购买普通股所涉及的投机因素也越小。普通股的投机性评级与公司投资评级之间的这种关系，可以用一条从左到右下降的直线来表示。但现在，我会将这张图描述为U形。左侧是公司本身具有投机性且信用评级较低的地方，而普通股的投机性当然很高，就像过去一样。然而，在最右边，当一家公司因为其过去的记录和未来的前景都令人印象深刻而拥有最高的信用评级时，我们发现股票市场倾向于或多或少地持续地通过简单的高价将高度投机的因素引入普通股，从而承担相当大的风险。

But in my concluding remarks I can say something definite about the structure of the market for various types of common stocks, in terms of their investment and speculative characteristics. In the old days the investment character of a common stock was more or less the same as, or proportionate with, that of the enterprise itself, as measured quite well by its credit rating. The lower the yield on its bonds or preferred, the more likely was the common to meet all the criteria for a satisfactory investment, and the smaller the element of speculation involved in its purchase. This relationship, between the speculative ranking of the common and the investment rating of the company, could be graphically expressed pretty much as a straight line descending from left to right. But nowadays I would describe the graph as U-shaped. At the left, where the company itself is speculative and its credit low, the common stock is of course highly speculative, just as it has always been in the past. At the right extremity, however, where the company has the highest credit rating because both its past record and future prospects are most impressive, we find that the stock market tends more or less continuously to introduce a highly speculative element into the common shares through the simple means of a price so high as to carry a fair degree of risk.

说到这里，我忍不住要引用一段最近在莎士比亚的一首十四行诗中发现的、虽然略显夸张，但出人意料地贴切的引文。这段引文如下：

At this point I cannot forbear introducing a surprisingly relevant, if quite exaggerated, quotation on the subject which I found recently in one of Shakespeare’s sonnets. It reads:

难道我没有见过那些执着于形式和恩惠的人吗？

Have I not seen dwellers on form and favor

支付过多的租金会造成所有损失甚至更多吗？

Lose all and more by paying too much rent?

回到我想象中的图表，它位于中心区域，普通股购买中的投机因素往往会达到最低水平。在这个区域，我们可以找到许多历史悠久、实力雄厚的公司，它们过去的增长记录与国民经济的增长速度相符，未来前景也似乎与之相符。除了牛市的上行区间外，这类普通股在大多数时候都能以相对于其内在价值而言较为适中的价格买到。事实上，由于目前投资者和投机者都倾向于关注更具吸引力的股票，我冒昧地认为，这些处于中间位置的股票的售价总体上往往低于其独立可确定的价值。因此，它们拥有一个安全边际，而这些安全边际是由同样的市场偏好和偏见所创造的，而这些偏好和偏见往往会破坏更有前景的股票的安全边际。此外，在如此众多的公司中，有足够的空间对过去的记录进行深入分析，并在未来前景方面做出明智的选择，此外，还可以加上多样化赋予的更高安全保证。

Returning to my imaginary graph, it would be the center area where the speculative element in common-stock purchases would tend to reach its minimum. In this area we could find many well-established and strong companies, with a record of past growth corresponding to that of the national economy and with future prospects apparently of the same character. Such common stocks could be bought at most times, except in the upper ranges of a bull market, at moderate prices in relation to their indicated intrinsic values. As a matter of fact, because of the present tendency of investors and speculators alike to concentrate on more glamorous issues, I should hazard the statement that these middle-ground stocks tend to sell on the whole rather below their independently determinable values. They thus have a margin-of-safety factor supplied by the same market preferences and prejudices which tend to destroy the margin of safety in the more promising issues. Furthermore, in this wide array of companies there is plenty of room for penetrating analysis of the past record and for discriminating choice in the area of future prospects, to which can be added the higher assurance of safety conferred by diversification.

当法厄同坚持要驾驶太阳战车时，他那位经验丰富的父亲给了这位新手一些建议，但后者未能听从，为此付出了代价。奥维德用三个词概括了福玻斯·阿波罗的忠告：

When Phaëthon insisted on driving the chariot of the Sun, his father, the experienced operator, gave the neophyte some advice which the latter failed to follow—to his cost. Ovid summed up Phoebus Apollo’s counsel in three words:

中鹮

Medius tutissimus ibis

走中间路线最安全

You will go safest in the middle course

我认为这一原则对投资者及其证券分析顾问来说都适用。

I think this principle holds good for investors and their security analyst advisers.

3. 科技公司投资

3. Technological Companies as Investments

1971年中期，标准普尔服务中列出了约200家以Compu-、Data、Electro-、Scien-、Techno-开头的公司。其中约有一半属于计算机行业。这些公司均在市场上交易或已申请公开发行股票。

In the Standard & Poor’s services in mid-1971 there were listed about 200 companies with names beginning with Compu-, Data, Electro-, Scien-, Techno-. About half of these belonged to some part of the computer industry. All of them were traded in the market or had made applications to sell stock to the public.

1971 年 9 月的标准普尔股票指南中共出现了 46 家这样的公司。其中，26 家报告亏损，只有 6 家每股收益超过 1 美元，只有 5 家支付股息。

A total of 46 such companies appeared in the S & P Stock Guide for September 1971. Of these, 26 were reporting deficits, only six were earning over $1 per share, and only five were paying dividends.

1968年12月的《股票指南》中，出现了45家技术名称相似的公司。追溯这份名单的后续情况，如1971年9月的《股票指南》所示，我们发现了以下发展：

In the December 1968 Stock Guide there had appeared 45 companies with similar technological names. Tracing the sequel of this list, as shown in the September 1971 Guide, we find the following developments:

评论：几乎可以肯定的是，许多未列入1968年《指南》的科技公司，其后续业绩比入选的那些公司更差；此外，从名单中剔除的12家公司的表现也比保留下来的公司更差。这些样本所呈现的令人痛心的结果，无疑合理地反映了整个“科技”类股票的质量和价格历史。IBM和其他几家公司的巨大成功必然会引发其领域内新股的大量公开发行，而这些新股的巨额亏损几乎是必然的。

COMMENT: It is virtually certain that the many technological companies not included in the Guide in 1968 had a poorer subsequent record than those that were included; also that the 12 companies dropped from the list did worse than those that were retained. The harrowing results shown by these samples are no doubt reasonably indicative of the quality and price history of the entire group of “technology” issues. The phenomenal success of IBM and a few other companies was bound to produce a spate of public offerings of new issues in their fields, for which large losses were virtually guaranteed.

笔记

Notes

引言：本书的预期目标

Introduction: What This Book Expects to Accomplish

1 .“函件股票”是指未在美国证券交易委员会 (SEC) 注册出售的股票，买方需提供函件说明购买该股票是为了投资。

1. “Letter stock” is stock not registered for sale with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and for which the buyer supplies a letter stating the purchase was for investment.

2 .以上是穆迪对AAA债券和工业股的数据。

2. The foregoing are Moody’s figures for AAA bonds and industrial stocks.

第一章投资与投机：聪明投资者的预期结果

Chapter 1. Investment versus Speculation: Results to Be Expected by the Intelligent Investor

1 .本杰明·格雷厄姆、大卫·L·多德、西德尼·科特尔和查尔斯·塔瑟姆，麦格劳·希尔出版，第 4 版，1962 年。1934年版《证券分析》的传真件于 1996 年再版（麦格劳·希尔出版）。

1. Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, Sidney Cottle, and Charles Tatham, McGraw-Hill, 4th. ed., 1962. A fascimile copy of the 1934 edition of Security Analysis was reissued in 1996 (McGraw-Hill).

2 .这段话摘自劳伦斯·张伯伦 1931 年出版的《投资与投机》。

2. This is quoted from Investment and Speculation, by Lawrence Chamberlain, published in 1931.

3 .在美联储委员会所做的调查中。

3. In a survey made by the Federal Reserve Board.

4 .1965年版，第8页。

4. 1965 edition, p. 8.

5 .我们假设典型投资者的最高税率为股息税为 40%，资本利得税为 20%。

5. We assume here a top tax bracket for the typical investor of 40% applicable to dividends and 20% applicable to capital gains.

第二章投资者与通货膨胀

Chapter 2. The Investor and Inflation

1 .本文写于尼克松总统1971年8月实施价格和工资“冻结”政策以及随后实施的“第二阶段”调控体系之前。这些重要的发展似乎证实了上述观点。

1. This was written before President Nixon’s price-and-wage “freeze” in August 1971, followed by his “Phase 2” system of controls. These important developments would appear to confirm the views expressed above.

2 .标准普尔指数包含 425 只工业股票，其收益率约为资产价值的 11.5%，部分原因是该指数包含了规模庞大、利润丰厚的 IBM，而 IBM 并不在道琼斯工业平均指数 30 成分股之列。

2. The rate earned on the Standard & Poor’s index of 425 industrial stocks was about 11½% on asset value—due in part to the inclusion of the large and highly profitable IBM, which is not one of the DJIA 30 issues.

3 .美国电话电报公司 1971 年发布的图表显示，1970 年住宅电话服务的收费比 1960 年略低。

3. A chart issued by American Telephone & Telegraph in 1971 indicates that the rates charged for residential telephone services were somewhat less in 1970 than in 1960.

4 .据 1970 年 10 月《华尔街日报》报道。

4. Reported in the Wall Street Journal, October 1970.

第三章百年股市史：1972年初的股价水平

Chapter 3. A Century of Stock-Market History: The Level of Stock Prices in Early 1972

1 .标准普尔和道琼斯指数分别针对公用事业和交通运输（主要是铁路）公司制定了各自的平均指数。自1965年以来，纽约证券交易所一直计算一个指数来反映其所有上市普通股的走势。

1. Both Standard & Poor’s and Dow Jones have separate averages for public utilities and transportation (chiefly railroad) companies. Since 1965 the New York Stock Exchange has computed an index representing the movement of all its listed common shares.

2 .由芝加哥大学证券价格研究中心在查尔斯·E·梅里尔基金会的资助下制作。

2. Made by the Center for Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago, under a grant from the Charles E. Merrill Foundation.

3 .这篇文章最初写于1971年初，当时道琼斯工业平均指数为940点。一项详细的研究证实了华尔街普遍持有的相反观点，该研究得出了1975年道琼斯工业平均指数的估值中值为1520点。这相当于1971年中期的折现值，比如1200点。1972年3月，道琼斯工业平均指数在跌至798点后再次回升至940点。格雷厄姆再次说对了。他提到的那项“详细研究”过于乐观了整整十年：道琼斯工业平均指数直到1985年12月13日才收于1520点上方！

3. This was first written in early 1971 with the DJIA at 940. The contrary view held generally on Wall Street was exemplified in a detailed study which reached a median valuation of 1520 for the DJIA in 1975. This would correspond to a discounted value of, say, 1200 in mid-1971. In March 1972 the DJIA was again at 940 after an intervening decline to 798. Again, Graham was right. The “detailed study” he mentions was too optimistic by an entire decade: The Dow Jones Industrial Average did not close above 1520 until December 13, 1985!

第四章一般投资组合政策：防御型投资者

Chapter 4. General Portfolio Policy: The Defensive Investor

1 .某些工业收入债券（Industrial Revenue Bonds）虽然在金融创新中相对较新，但可以获得更高的免税收益，同时兼具足够的安全性。这类债券尤其受到有进取心的投资者的青睐。

1. A higher tax-free yield, with sufficient safety, can be obtained from certain Industrial Revenue Bonds, a relative newcomer among financial inventions. They would be of interest particularly to the enterprising investor.

第五章防御型投资者与普通股

Chapter 5. The Defensive Investor and Common Stocks

1 . 《成功投资的实用公式》， Wilfred Funk, Inc.，1953 年。

1. Practical Formulas for Successful Investing, Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1953.

2 .在当今投资决策的数学方法中，用平均价格变动或“波动率”来定义“风险”已成为标准做法。例如，参见理查德·A·布雷利（Richard A. Brealey）所著的《风险与回报导论》（麻省理工学院出版社，1969年）。我们认为，这种使用“风险”一词的做法对于合理的投资决策弊大于利，因为它过于强调市场波动。

2. In current mathematical approaches to investment decisions, it has become standard practice to define “risk” in terms of average price variations or “volatility.” See, for example, An Introduction to Risk and Return, by Richard A. Brealey, The M.I.T. Press, 1969. We find this use of the word “risk” more harmful than useful for sound investment decisions—because it places too much emphasis on market fluctuations.

3 .1971 年，道琼斯工业平均指数中的所有 30 家公司均达到了这一标准。

3. All 30 companies in the DJIA met this standard in 1971.

第六章进取型投资者的投资组合策略：消极方法

Chapter 6. Portfolio Policy for the Enterprising Investor: Negative Approach

1 .1970年，密尔沃基铁路公司出现巨额赤字。该公司暂停了其收益债券的利息支付，5%的发行价格跌至10美元。

1. In 1970 the Milwaukee road reported a large deficit. It suspended interest payments on its income bonds, and the price of the 5% issue fell to 10.

2 .例如：Cities Service 发行的 6 美元优先股，不支付股息，1937 年的最低售价为每股 15 美元，1943 年则为每股 27 美元，当时累积收益已达到每股 60 美元。1947 年，该优先股以每股 196.50 美元的 3% 债券的形式赎回，最高售价为每股 186 美元。

2. For example: Cities Service $6 first preferred, not paying dividends, sold at as low as 15 in 1937 and at 27 in 1943, when the accumulations had reached $60 per share. In 1947 it was retired by exchange for $196.50 of 3% debentures for each share, and it sold as high as 186.

3 .美国国家经济研究局（NBER）指导下的一项详尽的统计研究表明，事实确实如此。格雷厄姆指的是W. Braddock Hickman的著作《公司债券质量与投资者经验》（普林斯顿大学出版社，1958年）。希克曼的著作后来启发了德崇证券的迈克尔·米尔肯，他向信用评级低于标准的公司提供大量高收益融资，从而引发了20世纪80年代末的杠杆收购和敌意收购热潮。

3. An elaborate statistical study carried on under the direction of the National Bureau of Economic Research indicates that such has actually been the case. Graham is referring to W. Braddock Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience (Princeton University Press, 1958). Hickman’s book later inspired Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham Lambert to offer massive high-yield financing to companies with less than sterling credit ratings, helping to ignite the leveraged-buyout and hostile takeover craze of the late 1980s.

4 .标准普尔股票指南中选取了41只此类股票作为代表，结果显示其中5只股票跌幅达90%或以上，30只股票跌幅超过一半，而所有股票跌幅均在三分之二左右。而那些未列入股票指南的股票，整体跌幅无疑更大。

4. A representative sample of 41 such issues taken from Standard & Poor’s Stock Guide shows that five lost 90% or more of their high price, 30 lost more than half, and the entire group about two-thirds. The many not listed in the Stock Guide undoubtedly had a larger shrinkage on the whole.

第七章进取型投资者的投资组合政策：积极的一面

Chapter 7. Portfolio Policy for the Enterprising Investor: The Positive Side

1 .例如，请参阅露西尔·汤姆林森 (Lucile Tomlinson) 的《成功投资的实用公式》；以及西德尼·科特尔 (Sidney Cottle) 和 WT 惠特曼 (WT Whitman) 的《投资时机：公式方法》，均于 1953 年出版。

1. See, for example, Lucile Tomlinson, Practical Formulas for Successful Investing; and Sidney Cottle and W. T. Whitman, Investment Timing: The Formula Approach, both published in 1953.

2 .一家业绩平平的公司，仅仅因为其支持者预期其未来业绩会优于平均水平，就不能被称为成长型公司或“成长股”，这无疑会造成混淆。它只是一家“有前途的公司”。格雷厄姆提出了一个微妙但重要的观点：如果成长股的定义是未来会蓬勃发展的公司，那么这根本就不是一个定义，而只是一厢情愿的想法。这就像在赛季结束前称一支运动队为“冠军”。这种一厢情愿的想法至今仍然存在；在共同基金中，“成长型”投资组合将其持股描述为具有“高于平均水平的增长潜力”的公司，或者“盈利增长前景良好”。更准确的定义或许是，每股净收益连续至少五年年均增长至少15%的公司。（过去符合此定义并不保证公司未来也能达到此标准。）

2. A company with an ordinary record cannot, without confusing the term, be called a growth company or a “growth stock” merely because its proponent expects it to do better than the average in the future. It is just a “promising company.” Graham is making a subtle but important point: If the definition of a growth stock is a company that will thrive in the future, then that’s not a definition at all, but wishful thinking. It’s like calling a sports team “the champions” before the season is over. This wishful thinking persists today; among mutual funds, “growth” portfolios describe their holdings as companies with “above-average growth potential” or “favorable prospects for earnings growth.” A better definition might be companies whose net earnings per share have increased by an annual average of at least 15% for at least five years running. (Meeting this definition in the past does not ensure that a company will meet it in the future.)

3 .见表7-1。

3. See Table 7-1.

4 .华尔街有两句古老的谚语劝诫人们进行此类销售：“树无足长于天”和“牛可以赚钱，熊可以赚钱，但猪永远赚不到钱”。

4. Here are two age-old Wall Street proverbs that counsel such sales: “No tree grows to Heaven” and “A bull may make money, a bear may make money, but a hog never makes money.”

5 .有两项研究可供参考。第一项由我们的学生HG Schneider完成，涵盖1917年至1950年，并于1951年6月发表在《金融杂志》上。第二项由纽约证券交易所成员Drexel Firestone完成，涵盖1933年至1969年。经其许可，本文提供数据。

5. Two studies are available. The first, made by H. G. Schneider, one of our students, covers the years 1917–1950 and was published in June 1951 in the Journal of Finance. The second was made by Drexel Firestone, members of the New York Stock Exchange, and covers the years 1933–1969. The data are given here by their kind permission.

6 .请参阅此处，了解 1971 年存在的三个特殊情况的示例。

6. See here, for three examples of special situations existing in 1971.

第八章投资者与市场波动

Chapter 8. The Investor and Market Fluctuations

1 .或许，除非是以合理的价格水平开始的平均成本计划。

1. Except, perhaps, in dollar-cost averaging plans begun at a reasonable price level.

2 .但根据道氏理论权威罗伯特·罗斯的说法，1966 年 12 月和 1970 年 12 月出现的最后两个买入信号远低于之前的卖出点。

2. But according to Robert M. Ross, authority on the Dow theory, the last two buy signals, shown in December 1966 and December 1970, were well below the preceding selling points.

3 .债券和优先股的最高评级是穆迪的Aaa、Aa和A，标准普尔的AAA、AA和A。此外，还有其他评级，最低至D。

3. The top three ratings for bonds and preferred stocks are Aaa, Aa, and A, used by Moody’s, and AAA, AA, A by Standard & Poor’s. There are others, going down to D.

4 .这一理念在欧洲已经得到一些采用，例如，意大利国有电力能源公司在其 1980 年到期的“担保浮动利率贷款票据”中就采用了这一理念。1971 年 6 月，该公司在纽约发布广告称，未来六个月的年利率为 8.1%。

4. This idea has already had some adoptions in Europe—e.g., by the state-owned Italian electric-energy concern on its “guaranteed floating rate loan notes,” due 1980. In June 1971 it advertised in New York that the annual rate of interest paid thereon for the next six months would be 8⅛%.

多伦多道明银行于 1971 年 6 月发行的“7%–8% 债券”就包含这样一种灵活的安排，该债券于 1991 年到期。债券在 1976 年 7 月之前支付 7%，此后支付 8%，但持有人可以选择在 1976 年 7 月收回本金。

One such flexible arrangement was incorporated in The Toronto-Dominion Bank’s “7%–8% debentures,” due 1991, offered in June 1971. The bonds pay 7% to July 1976 and 8% thereafter, but the holder has the option to receive his principal in July 1976.

第九章投资基金的投资

Chapter 9. Investing in Investment Funds

1 .销售费用普遍以包含该费用的售价的百分比表示，这使得其看起来比按净资产价值计算的要低。我们认为这是一种与这个受人尊敬的行业不相符的销售技巧。

1. The sales charge is universally stated as a percentage of the selling price, which includes the charge, making it appear lower than if applied to net asset value. We consider this a sales gimmick unworthy of this respectable industry.

2 . 《资金经理》， GE Kaplan 和 C. Welles 著，（兰登书屋，1969 年）。

2. The Money Managers, by G. E. Kaplan and C. Welles, (Random House, 1969).

3 .请参阅此处“字母股票”的定义。

3. See definition of “letter stock” here.

4 .1852 年首次出版的一本书名。该书描述了“南海泡沫”、郁金香狂热以及历史上的其他投机狂潮。1932 年，该书由伯纳德·M·巴鲁克重印，他可能是近代唯一一位持续成功的投机者。评语：这就像马被偷后锁上马厩门一样。查尔斯·麦凯的《非凡的大众妄想和群体疯狂》（Metro Books，2002 年）首次出版于 1841 年。这本书既不是轻松的读物，也并非总是严格准确，它广泛地探讨了为什么很多人常常相信非常愚蠢的事情 — — 比如，铁可以变成金子，魔鬼最常在星期五晚上出现，以及有可能在股市上快速致富。如需更真实的描述，请参阅爱德华·钱斯勒的《魔鬼夺走最后的胜利》（Farrar, Straus & Giroux，1999 年）；如果想看得更轻松一些，可以尝试阅读罗伯特·门舍尔 (Robert Menschel) 的《市场、暴民和混乱：从现代角度看群体的疯狂》 (Wiley 2002)。

4. Title of a book first published in 1852. The volume described the “South Sea Bubble,” the tulip mania, and other speculative binges of the past. It was reprinted by Bernard M. Baruch, perhaps the only continuously successful speculator of recent times, in 1932. Comment: That was locking the stable door after the horse was stolen. Charles Mackay’s Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (Metro Books, 2002) was first published in 1841. Neither a light read nor always strictly accurate, it is an extensive look at how large numbers of people often believe very silly things—for instance, that iron can be transmuted into gold, that demons most often show up on Friday evenings, and that it is possible to get rich quick in the stock market. For a more factual account, consult Edward Chancellor’s Devil Take the Hindmost (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999); for a lighter take, try Robert Menschel’s Markets, Mobs, and Mayhem: A Modern Look at the Madness of Crowds (Wiley 2002).

第十章投资者及其顾问

Chapter 10. The Investor and His Advisers

1 .考试由特许金融分析师协会（Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts）组织，该协会是金融分析师联合会（Financial Analysts Federation）的一个分支机构。该联合会目前拥有超过5万名会员。

1. The examinations are given by the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts, which is an arm of the Financial Analysts Federation. The latter now embraces constituent societies with over 50,000 members.

2 .纽约证券交易所实施了一些严格的估值规则（称为“折扣”），旨在最大限度地减少这种危险，但显然这些规则并没有起到足够的作用。

2. The NYSE had imposed some drastic rules of valuation (known as “haircuts”) designed to minimize this danger, but apparently they did not help sufficiently.

3 .现在，新发行的股票只能通过根据美国证券交易委员会规则准备的招股说明书进行销售。该文件必须披露有关发行和发行人的所有相关事实，足以让谨慎的投资者了解所发行证券的具体性质。但所需数据通常使招股说明书篇幅过长。普遍认为，只有一小部分购买新股的个人会仔细阅读招股说明书。因此，他们仍然主要不是根据自己的判断行事，而是根据出售证券的公司的判断，或根据个别销售人员或客户经理的推荐行事。

3. New offerings may now be sold only by means of a prospectus prepared under the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission. This document must disclose all the pertinent facts about the issue and issuer, and it is fully adequate to inform the prudent investor as to the exact nature of the security offered him. But the very copiousness of the data required usually makes the prospectus of prohibitive length. It is generally agreed that only a small percentage of individuals buying new issues read the prospectus with thoroughness. Thus they are still acting mainly not on their own judgment but on that of the house selling them the security or on the recommendation of the individual salesman or account executive.

第 11 章面向普通投资者的证券分析：一般方法

Chapter 11. Security Analysis for the Lay Investor: General Approach

1 .我们的教科书《证券分析》（由本杰明·格雷厄姆、大卫·多德、西德尼·科特尔和查尔斯·塔瑟姆编著，麦格劳-希尔出版，第 4 版，1962 年）保留了 1934 年最初选定的标题，但涵盖了金融分析的大部分范围。

1. Our textbook, Security Analysis by Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, Sidney Cottle, and Charles Tatham (McGraw-Hill, 4th ed., 1962), retains the title originally chosen in 1934, but it covers much of the scope of financial analysis.

2 .与查尔斯·麦戈尔里克 (Charles McGolrick) 合作，Harper & Row，1964 年，由 HarperBusiness 于 1998 年重新发行。

2. With Charles McGolrick, Harper & Row, 1964, reissued by HarperBusiness, 1998.

3 .这些数据来自纽约一家大型债券公司 Salomon Bros.。

3. These figures are from Salomon Bros., a large New York bond house.

4 .至少大多数证券分析师和投资者不会这么做。杰出的分析师能够提前预测哪些公司可能值得深入研究，并且具备进行深入研究的条件和能力，他们或许能够持续成功地开展这项工作。有关这种方法的详情，请参阅菲利普·费舍尔（Philip Fisher）的《普通股与非凡利润》（Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits）， Harper & Row出版社，1960年。

4. At least not by the great body of security analysts and investors. Exceptional analysts, who can tell in advance what companies are likely to deserve intensive study and have the facilities and capability to make it, may have continued success with this work. For details of such an approach see Philip Fisher, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, Harper & Row, 1960.

5 . 这里我们提出了一个将乘数与预期增长率联系起来的公式。

5. Here we set forth a formula relating multipliers to the rate of expected growth.

6 .克莱斯勒股价的飙升无疑部分源于 1963 年发生的两次一拆二的股票分割——这对于一家大公司来说是史无前例的现象。20 世纪80 年代初，在李·艾柯卡的带领下，克莱斯勒实现了三连冠，从破产边缘复苏，成为美国表现最好的股票之一。然而，识别能够带领公司伟大复兴的经理人并不像看起来那么容易。1996 年，艾尔·邓拉普在重组斯科特纸业公司（并将其股价在 18 个月内推高了 225%）后接管了阳光公司，华尔街称赞他无异于耶稣再临。邓拉普后来被证明是个骗子，他使用不正当的会计手段和虚假的财务报表来误导阳光公司的投资者，包括雇用他的受人尊敬的基金经理迈克尔·普莱斯和迈克尔·斯坦哈特。欲了解邓拉普职业生涯的深入剖析，请参阅约翰·A·伯恩 (John A. Byrne) 的《电锯惊魂》 (HarperCollins, 1999)。

6. Part of the fireworks in the price of Chrysler was undoubtedly inspired by two two-for-one stock splits taking place in the single year 1963—an unprecedented phenomenon for a major company. In the early 1980s, under Lee Iacocca, Chrysler did a three-peat, coming back from the brink of bankruptcy to become one of the best-performing stocks in America. However, identifying managers who can lead great corporate comebacks is not as easy as it seems. When Al Dunlap took over Sunbeam Corp. in 1996 after restructuring Scott Paper Co. (and driving its stock price up 225% in 18 months), Wall Street hailed him as little short of the Second Coming. Dunlap turned out to be a sham who used improper accounting and false financial statements to mislead Sunbeam’s investors—including the revered money managers Michael Price and Michael Steinhardt, who had hired him. For a keen dissection of Dunlap’s career, see John A. Byrne, Chainsaw (HarperCollins, 1999).

7 .请注意，我们并不是说这个公式给出了成长股的“真实价值”，而只是说它近似于流行的更复杂的计算结果。

7. Note that we do not suggest that this formula gives the “true value” of a growth stock, but only that it approximates the results of the more elaborate calculations in vogue.

第十二章每股收益需要考虑的事项

Chapter 12. Things to Consider About Per-Share Earnings

1 .我们建议的处理认股权证稀释的方法如下。我们倾向于将认股权证的市场价值视为普通股当前市场价格的补充。

1. Our recommended method of dealing with the warrant dilution is discussed below. We prefer to consider the market value of the warrants as an addition to the current market price of the common stock as a whole.

第十三章四家上市公司的比较

Chapter 13. A Comparison of Four Listed Companies

1 .1972 年 3 月，埃默里以 1971 年收益的 64 倍的价格出售！

1. In March 1972, Emery sold at 64 times its 1971 earnings!

第14章防御型投资者的股票选择

Chapter 14. Stock Selection for the Defensive Investor

1 .由于多年来多次股票分割等因素，1972 年初道琼斯工业平均指数的实际平均价格约为每股 53 美元。

1. Because of numerous stock splits, etc., through the years, the actual average price of the DJIA list was about $53 per share in early 1972.

2 .1960年，29家工业企业中，只有两家公司的流动资产未能达到流动负债的两倍，只有两家公司的净流动资产未能超过其负债。到1970年12月，每类企业的数量从2家增加到12家。

2. In 1960 only two of the 29 industrial companies failed to show current assets equal to twice current liabilities, and only two failed to have net current assets exceeding their debt. By December 1970 the number in each category had grown from two to twelve.

3 .但请注意，从1970年12月到1972年初，它们的市场表现加起来比道琼斯工业平均指数还要差。这再次证明，没有任何系统或公式能够保证获得更优的市场结果。我们的要求只是“保证”投资组合的购买者物有所值。

3. But note that their combined market action from December 1970 to early 1972 was poorer than that of the DJIA. This demonstrates once again that no system or formula will guarantee superior market results. Our requirements “guarantee” only that the portfolio-buyer is getting his money’s worth.

4 .因此，我们必须排除大多数天然气管道股，因为这些企业背负着巨额债券。这种设定的合理性在于购买合同的底层结构“保证”了债券的偿付；但对于防御型投资者而言，这里的考量可能过于复杂。

4. As a consequence we must exclude the majority of gas pipeline stocks, since these enterprises are heavily bonded. The justification for this setup is the underlying structure of purchase contracts which “guarantee” bond payments; but the considerations here may be too complicated for the needs of a defensive investor.

第十五章进取型投资者的股票选择

Chapter 15. Stock Selection for the Enterprising Investor

1 . 共同基金与其他机构投资者：新视角， I. Friend、M. Blume 和 J. Crockett，麦格劳-希尔出版社，1970 年。我们应该补充一点，我们所研究的许多基金在 1966 年至 1970 年期间的业绩略优于标准普尔 500 股票综合指数，且明显优于道琼斯工业平均指数。

1. Mutual Funds and Other Institutional Investors: A New Perspective, I. Friend, M. Blume, and J. Crockett, McGraw-Hill, 1970. We should add that the 1966–1970 results of many of the funds we studied were somewhat better than those of the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock composite and considerably better than those of the DJIA.

2 .个人注：早在该公司股票市场火爆之前，作者就曾担任其“财务副总裁”，年薪高达3000美元。当时，该公司真正从事的是烟花爆竹业务。1929年初，格雷厄姆成为美国最大的烟花生产商Unexcelled Manufacturing Co.的财务副总裁。Unexcelled后来成为一家多元化的化学公司，如今已不再以独立的形式存在。

2. Personal note: Many years before the stock-market pyrotechnics in that particular company the author was its “financial vice-president” at the princely salary of $3,000 per annum. It was then really in the fireworks business. In early 1929, Graham became a financial vice president of Unexcelled Manufacturing Co., the nation’s largest producer of fireworks. Unexcelled later became a diversified chemical company and no longer exists in independent form.

3 .指南并未显示高于 99 的乘数。大多数此类乘数都是数学上的异常，是由略高于零点的收益引起的。

3. The Guide does not show multipliers above 99. Most such would be mathematical oddities, caused by earnings just above the zero point.

第十六章可转换债券及认股权证

Chapter 16. Convertible Issues and Warrants

1 .1971年11月，福特汽车金融公司同时发行了两期债券，充分说明了这一点。其中一期债券为20年期不可转换债券，收益率为7.5%。另一期债券为25年期债券，其债权次序低于第一期债券，收益率仅为4.5%；但该债券可转换为福特汽车股票，当时其股价为68.5%。为了获得转换特权，买方放弃了40%的收入，并接受了次级债权人的地位。

1. This point is well illustrated by an offering of two issues of Ford Motor Finance Co. made simultaneously in November 1971. One was a 20-year nonconvertible bond, yielding 7½%. The other was a 25-year bond, subordinated to the first in order of claim and yielding only 4½%; but it was made convertible into Ford Motor stock, against its then price of 68½. To obtain the conversion privilege the buyer gave up 40% of income and accepted a junior-creditor position.

2 .请注意，1971年末，Studebaker-Worthington普通股的售价低至38美元，而5美元优先股的售价则在77美元左右。因此，当年的利差从2个点扩大到20个点，再次证明了这种转换的必要性，以及股市忽视算术的倾向。（顺便说一句，1970年12月优先股相对于普通股的微小溢价已经被其更高的股息弥补了。）

2. Note that in late 1971 Studebaker-Worthington common sold as low as 38 while the $5 preferred sold at or about 77. The spread had thus grown from 2 to 20 points during the year, illustrating once more the desirability of such switches and also the tendency of the stock market to neglect arithmetic. (Incidentally the small premium of the preferred over the common in December 1970 had already been made up by its higher dividend.)

第十七章四个极富启发性的案例

Chapter 17. Four Extremely Instructive Case Histories

1 .例如，请参阅 AJ Briloff 博士在 1971 年 1 月 11 日的《巴伦周刊》上发表的文章“六旗降半旗” 。

1. See, for example, the article “Six Flags at Half Mast,” by Dr. A. J. Briloff, in Barron’s, January 11, 1971.

第十八章八对公司的比较

Chapter 18. A Comparison of Eight Pairs of Companies

1 .读者可能还记得， AAA Enterprises 曾试图进入这个行业，但很快就失败了。格雷厄姆在这里一个深刻而矛盾的观察：一家公司赚的钱越多，就越有可能面临新的竞争，因为其高回报清楚地表明，赚钱很容易。反过来，新的竞争会导致价格下跌和利润缩水。这一关键点被过度热情的互联网股票买家忽视了，他们相信早期的赢家会永远保持优势。

1. The reader will recall from here that AAA Enterprises tried to enter this business, but quickly failed. Here Graham is making a profound and paradoxical observation: The more money a company makes, the more likely it is to face new competition, since its high returns signal so clearly that easy money is to be had. The new competition, in turn, will lead to lower prices and smaller profits. This crucial point was overlooked by overenthusiastic internet stock buyers, who believed that early winners would sustain their advantage indefinitely.

第十九章股东与管理层：股息政策

Chapter 19. Shareholders and Managements: Dividend Policy

1 .分析研究表明，在典型情况下，一美元股息对市场价格的正向影响是一美元未分配收益的四倍。这一点在1950年之前的数年里得到了公用事业集团的充分体现。低派息率的股票以较低的收益乘数出售，由于其股息在之后提前发放，因此被证明是极具吸引力的买入选择。自1950年以来，该行业的派息率更加统一。

1. Analytical studies have shown that in the typical case a dollar paid out in dividends had as much as four times the positive effect on market price as had a dollar of undistributed earnings. This point was well illustrated by the public-utility group for a number of years before 1950. The low-payout issues sold at low multipliers of earnings, and proved to be especially attractive buys because their dividends were later advanced. Since 1950 payout rates have been much more uniform for the industry.

第二十章 “安全边际”作为投资的核心概念

Chapter 20. “Margin of Safety” as the Central Concept of Investment

1 .这一论点得到了 Paul Hallingby, Jr. 的支持，他在《分析师期刊》 1947 年第三季度发表的一篇文章《股票认购权证的投机机会》中写道。

1. This argument is supported by Paul Hallingby, Jr., “Speculative Opportunities in Stock-Purchase Warrants,” Analysts’ Journal, third quarter 1947.

后记

Postscript

1 .诚实意味着必须承认，这笔交易差点失败，因为合伙人希望确保收购价能100%被资产价值覆盖。未来3亿美元甚至更多的市场收益，可能源于5万美元的会计项目。他们侥幸得到了他们坚持的东西。

1. Veracity requires the admission that the deal almost fell through because the partners wanted assurance that the purchase price would be 100% covered by asset value. A future $300 million or more in market gain turned on, say, $50,000 of accounting items. By dumb luck they got what they insisted on.

附录

Appendixes

1 .1958 年 5 月，本杰明·格雷厄姆在美国金融分析师协会全国联合会年会上的演讲。

1. Address of Benjamin Graham before the annual Convention of the National Federation of Financial Analysts Societies, May 1958.

指数

Index

为了与索引所基于的印刷版保持一致，我们开发了一种针对此数字版的特定分页格式。如果您正在使用的应用程序支持此功能，则此索引中标注的页码应会对齐。然而，目前并非所有数字设备都支持此功能。因此，我们建议您使用设备的搜索功能来查找特定条目。

A specific form of pagination for this digital edition has been developed to match the print edition from which the index was created. If the application you are reading this on supports this feature, the page references noted in this index should align. At this time, however, not all digital devices support this functionality. Therefore, we encourage you to please use your device’s search capabilities to locate a specific entry.

注：斜体页码表示图表和表格。

Note: Page numbers in italics indicate figures and tables.

A. & P.参见大西洋与太平洋茶叶公司。

A. & P. see Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.

AAA 企业，144–145、420、431–435、433n

AAA Enterprises, 144–145, 420, 431–435, 433n

AAII，386

AAII, 386

AAON公司，391

AAON Inc., 391

阿伯丁制造公司，370–371，373

Aberdeen Mfg. Co., 370–371, 373

客户经理。参见“客户经纪人”

account executives. see “customers’ brokers”

会计实务。另见特定公司

accounting practices. see also specific company

“大浴缸”/“厨房水槽”，426n

“big bath”/“kitchen sink,” 426n

病例史，420，422，422n，423

case histories about, 420, 422, 422n, 423

和股息，491–492，491n

and dividends, 491–492, 491n

以及 GAAP 规则，307–315、484n5

and GAAP rules, 307–315, 484n5

和市场波动，199n

and market fluctuations, 199n

和每股收益，295–306，297n

and per-share earnings, 295–306, 297n

铁路，170

railroads, 170

和股票分割，491–492，491n

and stock splits, 491–492, 491n

收购。参见合并与收购；接管；特定公司

acquisitions. see mergers and acquisitions; takeovers; specific company

主动投资者。参见进取型投资者

active investor. see aggressive investors

动视暴雪，480

Activision Blizzard, 480

Adobe公司，391

Adobe Inc., 391

建议。另请参阅来源类型

advice. see also type of source

对于激进的投资者，247，259

for aggressive investors, 247, 259

基本论点，247

basic thesis about, 247

对于防御型投资者，117–118、132–133、247–248、259

for defensive investors, 117–118, 132–133, 247–248, 259

对于防御型投资者来说，348–349

and for defensive investors, 348–349

费用/佣金，247，250–251，254，258，260–265，266n3

fees/commissions for, 247, 250–251, 254, 258, 260–265, 266n3

格雷厄姆的观点，246–259

Graham’s views about, 246–259

并采访潜在的顾问，265–268

and interviewing potential advisers, 265–268

投资与投机，19，26-28

and investments vs. speculation, 19, 26–28

知道你需要什么，264–265

knowing what you need, 264–265

和顾问的作用，246

and role of adviser, 246

来源，246–259

sources of, 246–259

和猜测，559

and speculation, 559

以及顾问的信任和核实，264，266n2

and trust and verification of advisers, 264, 266n2

茨威格的评论，260–268

Zweig’s comments about, 260–268

Aetna维护公司，144–145

Aetna Maintenance Co., 144–145

附属基金，224

Affiliated Fund, 224

激进的投资者

aggressive investors

特点，6，134，158，161n，176

characteristics of, 6, 134, 158, 161n, 176

定义，134n

definition of, 134n

“不要”为，134–145，146–156

“dont’s” for, 134–145, 146–156

“该做的” 157–179, 180–184

“do’s” for, 157–179, 180–184

期望，27–33，259

expectations for, 27–33, 259

投资与投机，17-33

and investments vs. speculation, 17–33

混合进攻和防御，176–177, 178–179

and mixing aggressive and defensive, 176–177, 178–179

和过度自信，359–360

and overconfidence, 359–360

投资组合，104，134–145，146–156，157–179，180–184

portfolio for, 104, 134–145, 146–156, 157–179, 180–184

和优先股，99、134、135-138、135n、139-141、142-143、167-168、174、176-178、366

and preferred stocks, 99, 134, 135–138, 135n, 139–141, 142–143, 167–168, 174, 176–178, 366

心理学，367–368

psychology of, 367–368

推荐字段，164–176

recommended fields for, 164–176

返回，27–33，90

return for, 27–33, 90

和风险，104–105

and risk, 104–105

规则，176–179

rules for, 176–179

安全分析，362–381

security analysis for, 362–381

股票选择，362–381，382–397

stock selection for, 362–381, 382–397

AI.参见人工智能 (AI)

AI. see artificial intelligence (AI)

航空公司，6、6n、7、30、309、347–348、349–350

airlines, 6, 6n, 7, 30, 309, 347–348, 349–350

空气产品和化学品公司，448–451，450，451n，468

Air Products & Chemicals Inc., 448–451, 450, 451n, 468

空气减压公司，448–451，450，451n，468

Air Reduction Co., 448–451, 450, 451n, 468

AJO Vista，384

AJO Vista, 384

阿拉巴马天然气公司，344

Alabama Gas Co., 344

阿尔巴-瓦尔多斯派，373

Alba-Waldensian, 373

阿尔伯马尔公司，437，442–443，442

Albemarle Corp., 437, 442–443, 442

阿尔伯特公司，373

Albert’s Inc., 373

ALCOA。参见美国铝业公司（ALCOA）

ALCOA. see Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA)

阿勒格尼电力公司，344

Allegheny Power Co., 344

联合化学公司，278，281，337，338

Allied Chemical Co., 278, 281, 337, 338

联合磨坊，373

Allied Mills, 373

另类资产，106，147-149

alternative assets, 106, 147–149

美国铝业公司（ALCOA），278，295-306，337，338

Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), 278, 295–306, 337, 338

亚马逊网站、20n、390、392、394、519–522、520、521、524、527

Amazon.com, 20n, 390, 392, 394, 519–522, 520, 521, 524, 527

AMC娱乐控股公司，41，42，128，216，471-472，473，503n19

AMC Entertainment Holdings Inc., 41, 42, 128, 216, 471–472, 473, 503n19

美国外国电力公司，407，409

American & Foreign Power Co., 407, 409

美国品牌公司，337，338

American Brands Co., 337, 338

美国罐头公司，278，337，338，340，341，559-561

American Can Co., 278, 337, 338, 340, 341, 559–561

美国电力公司，343

American Electric Power Co., 343

美国金融集团，464n

American Financial Group, 464n

美国燃气电力公司，97–98

American Gas & Electric Co., 97–98

美国家庭用品公司，451–453，452，453n，468

American Home Products Co., 451–453, 452, 453n, 468

美国医院供应公司，451–453、452、453n、468

American Hospital Supply Co., 451–453, 452, 453n, 468

美国国际集团，183

American International Group, 183

美国机械与铸造厂，300n

American Machine & Foundry, 300n

美国玉米产品，371–372，373

American Maize Products, 371–372, 373

美国橡胶塑料公司，373

American Rubber & Plastics Co., 373

美国冶炼和精炼公司，373

American Smelting & Refining Co., 373

美国证券交易所，197，398，444，448，448n

American Stock Exchange, 197, 398, 444, 448, 448n

美国电话电报，67、136、174、196-197、278、285、336、337、338、340、341、344、398、404、489

American Telephone & Telegraph, 67, 136, 174, 196–197, 278, 285, 336, 337, 338, 340, 341, 344, 398, 404, 489

美国烟草公司，278

American Tobacco Co., 278

美国水务公司，344

American Water Works, 344

AMETEK公司，471–472，473

AMETEK, Inc., 471–472, 473

AMF公司，300n

AMF Corp., 300n

蟒蛇，169，278，337，338，340，341，373

Anaconda, 169, 278, 337, 338, 340, 341, 373

分析师。参见财务分析师

analysts. see financial analysts

安德森，埃德，540

Anderson, Ed, 540

安德森克莱顿公司，373

Anderson Clayton Co., 373

愤怒，217

anger, 217

年度收益乘数，285

annual earnings multipliers, 285

年度会议，487

annual meetings, 487

年度报告，292，292n5

annual reports, 292, 292n5

年金，146n2，264–265

annuities, 146n2, 264–265

焦虑，217

anxiety, 217

苹果公司，390，393-394，524

Apple Inc., 390, 393–394, 524

欣赏，23–25，52，136

appreciation, 23–25, 52, 136

应用程序、交易

apps, trading

嵌入成本，127n7

embedded costs in, 127n7

并寻找投资社区，503，503n19

and finding investing community, 503, 503n19

作为一种赌博式的投资工具，125–126

as a gamblified investing tool, 125–126

和投资短视，153

and investing myopia, 153

负和博弈，126–127

negative-sum game, 126–127

和股票筛选器，386

and stock screeners, 386

套利, 31, 32n, 174–175, 176, 366, 380–381

arbitrages, 31, 32n, 174–175, 176, 366, 380–381

阿彻丹尼尔斯米德兰，373

Archer-Daniels-Midland, 373

Arcimoto公司，474–475

Arcimoto Inc., 474–475

Arconic公司，474–475

Arconic Corp., 474–475

亚里士多德，76岁

Aristotle, 76

ARK创新，244–245，245

ARK Innovation, 244–245, 245

人工智能（AI），261，481

artificial intelligence (AI), 261, 481

艺术品，55

artwork, 55

“仿佛”语句。参见备考报表

“as if” statements. see pro forma statements

资产配置。另见多元化

asset allocation. see also diversification

50-50计划，5，91–93，158–159

50-50 plan of, 5, 91–93, 158–159

和激进的投资者，134，158–159

and aggressive investors, 134, 158–159

防御型投资者，20–28，90–93

and defensive investors, 20–28, 90–93

股票市场的历史和预测，75

and history and forecasting of stock market, 75

和通货膨胀，47–48

and inflation, 47–48

以及机构投资者，190

and institutional investors, 190

投资与投机，10

and investments vs. speculation, 10

和市场波动，190，193

and market fluctuations, 190, 193

战术，190

tactical, 190

资产支持。参见账面价值

asset backing. see book value

资产。另请参阅资产配置；特定公司

assets. see also asset allocation; specific company

替代方案，106，147–149

alternative, 106, 147–149

年均60n4

average annual, 60n4

金融资本，59

financial capital, 59

人力资本，59

human capital, 59

通货膨胀，59–60

inflation and, 59–60

每股收益，302n，305n

and per-share earnings, 302n, 305n

物质资本，59

physical capital, 59

和安全分析，270，273–274

and security analysis, 270, 273–274

以及针对激进投资者的股票选择，367、369、371–372、374、375–376、377n 、377、378

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 367, 369, 371–372, 374, 375–376, 377n, 377, 378

以及防御性投资者的股票选择，323–324、334、335、340–342、341、345、350–351

and stock selection for defensive investors, 323–324, 334, 335, 340–342, 341, 345, 350–351

管理资产规模（AUM），261–262

assets under management (AUM), 261–262

投资管理与研究协会，269n

Association for Investment Management and Research, 269n

AT&T Corp.参见美国电话电报公司

AT&T Corp. see American Telephone & Telegraph

艾奇逊、托皮卡和圣达菲，136、202–203、205

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, 136, 202–203, 205

大西洋城电力公司，344

Atlantic City Electric Co., 344

资产管理规模 ( AUM)。参见管理资产规模 (AUM)

AUM. see assets under management (AUM)

Aurora Plastics Co.，379，380-381

Aurora Plastics Co., 379, 380–381

Avco公司，406

Avco Corp., 406

雅芳产品，454

Avon Products, 454

Axon企业公司，390

Axon Enterprise Inc., 390

巴布森金融服务，247–248

Babson’s Financial Service, 247–248

Badger Meter Inc.，391

Badger Meter Inc., 391

巴格达铜矿，373

Bagdad Copper, 373

平衡基金，230

balanced funds, 230

资产负债表，196–197、273–274、302n、317、322–323、350–351、378。另请参阅特定公司

balance sheets, 196–197, 273–274, 302n, 317, 322–323, 350–351, 378. see also specific company

资产负债表价值。参见账面价值

balance-sheet value. see book value

Balchem公司，390，393

Balchem Corp., 390, 393

鲍德温（指定打击），373

Baldwin (D.H.), 373

巴尔的摩燃气电力公司，344

Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 344

信孚银行，227n

Bankers Trust, 227n

银行贷款资金，106

bank-loan funds, 106

班克曼-弗里德，萨姆，149

Bankman-Fried, Sam, 149

美国银行公司，370n

Bank of America Corp., 370n

南华克银行，141n

Bank of Southwark, 141n

破产。另见特定公司

bankruptcy. see also specific company

和激进的投资者，144–145，174–176，370

and aggressive investors, 144–145, 174–176, 370

经纪公司，254–255

of brokerage houses, 254–255

病例史，420–435，421n

case histories about, 420–435, 421n

防御性投资者，100–101，347–348

and defensive investors, 100–101, 347–348

以及股票市场的历史和预测，70

and history and forecasting of stock market, 70

和投资基金，227

and investment funds, 227

和市场波动，3–4，4n

and market fluctuations, 3–4, 4n

和价格，421n

and price, 421n

铁路，3–4, 4n, 347–348, 370, 421n

of railroads, 3–4, 4n, 347–348, 370, 421n

和安全分析，275–276

and security analysis, 275–276

银行。另请参阅银行类型或特定银行

banks. see also type of bank or specific bank

和建议，256–258，259

and advice, 256–258, 259

和债券估值，206

and bond valuation, 206

作为企业贷款人，420

as corporate lenders, 420

以及证券的交付和接收，256–257，256n

and delivery and receipt of securities, 256–257, 256n

和股息，491–492

and dividends, 491–492

投资，345–346

investing in, 345–346

和投资基金，227

and investment funds, 227

和新产品，257

and new offerings, 257

和房地产企业，408

and real estate ventures, 408

防御型投资者的股票选择，347

and stock selection for defensive investors, 347

信托部门，4、27–28、225、227、247–248

trust departments of, 4, 27–28, 225, 227, 247–248

便宜货

bargains

和激进的投资者，134–135、157、158、167–174、176、177–179、366n、367、374、376–379

and aggressive investors, 134–135, 157, 158, 167–174, 176, 177–179, 366n, 367, 374, 376–379

和债券，167–168，174

and bonds, 167–168, 174

和普通股，167–174, 177–178

and common stock, 167–174, 177–178

防御性投资者，90，97，336

and defensive investors, 90, 97, 336

定义，167–168，177–178

definition of, 167–168, 177–178

投资与投机，32–33

and investments vs. speculation, 32–33

和安全边际，510–511

and margin of safety, 510–511

和市场波动，198，202–203

and market fluctuations, 198, 202–203

和优先股，167–168，174

and preferred stocks, 167–168, 174

在二级公司，171–174、173n、177–179

in secondary companies, 171–174, 173n, 177–179

和价值，177–178

and value, 177–178

博士伦公司，234

Bausch & Lomb Co., 234

博士伦健康公司，485

Bausch Health Companies, 485

百特医疗保健公司，453n

Baxter Healthcare Corp., 453n

熊市

bear markets

和激进的投资者，140n，367–368

and aggressive investors, 140n, 367–368

防御型投资者，90

and defensive investors, 90

以及股票市场的历史和预测，65–72、74、80–81、206

and history and forecasting of stock market, 65–72, 74, 80–81, 206

和市场波动，189–190，190n，206

and market fluctuations, 189–190, 190n, 206

“超越市场/平均水平”，第 9-10 页、第 76 页、第 120-121 页、第 159-160 页、第 159n 页、第 230-231 页、第 362-363 页、第 535-536 页

“beating the market/average,” 9–10, 76, 120–121, 159–160, 159n, 230–231, 362–363, 535–536

Bed Bath & Beyond Inc.，41，42，128，475–477，475，499

Bed Bath & Beyond Inc., 41, 42, 128, 475–477, 475, 499

比利时刚果债券，138–139

Belgian Congo bonds, 138–139

本杰明·格雷厄姆联名账户，366n

Benjamin Graham Joint Account, 366n

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司，215，302n，541，542

Berkshire Hathaway, 215, 302n, 541, 542

伯恩斯坦，彼得·L.，529

Bernstein, Peter L., 529

伯恩斯坦，威廉，2n，84，110

Bernstein, William, 2n, 84, 110

百思买，475–477，475

Best Buy, 475–477, 475

伯利恒钢铁，278，337，338

Bethlehem Steel, 278, 337, 338

杰夫·贝佐斯，392，527

Bezos, Jeff, 392, 527

贾斯汀·比伯，154

Bieber, Justin, 154

大本钟商店，373

Big Ben Stores, 373

宾克斯制造公司，373

Binks Manufacturing Co., 373

Biogen公司，391

Biogen Inc., 391

生物技术股票，384

biotechnology stocks, 384

比特币，63–64，479–480

bitcoin, 63–64, 479–480

黑莓有限公司，42

Blackberry Ltd, 42

空白支票公司，155

blank-check companies, 155

Block公司，477–479，478

Block, Inc., 477–479, 478

彭博美国综合债券指数，238

Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index, 238

蓝钟公司，453–456，454n ，455，468

Blue Bell, Inc., 453–456, 454n, 455, 468

布卢菲尔德供应公司，373

Bluefield Supply Co., 373

中银集团，451n

BOC Group, 451n

博格尔，约翰，238

Bogle, John, 238

债券基金，230，272n

bond funds, 230, 272n

债券指南（标准普尔），421

Bond Guide (Standard & Poor’s), 421

债券。另请参阅债券基金；可转换债券；特定公司或债券类型

bonds. see also bond funds; convertible issues; specific company or type of bond

和建议，248，250，257，259

and advice, 248, 250, 257, 259

和激进的投资者，134–136、135n、136n、139–141、157、167–168、174、174–178

and aggressive investors, 134–136, 135n, 136n, 139–141, 157, 167–168, 174, 174–178

和资产配置，10、20-28、90-93

and asset allocation, 10, 20–28, 90–93

和讨价还价，167–168，174

and bargains, 167–168, 174

呼吁，98–99，139–140

calls on, 98–99, 139–140

普通股相比，5n，17–28，56，190

common stocks compared with, 5n, 17–28, 56, 190

以及可转换债券和认股权证，206-207、400、406、407、409、411-412

and convertible issues and warrants, 206–207, 400, 406, 407, 409, 411–412

优惠券，99、99n、135、135n、136、139–140

coupons for, 99, 99n, 135, 135n, 136, 139–140

“覆盖范围”，284

“coverage” for, 284

违约，89–90，174，275–276，421，514

defaults on, 89–90, 174, 275–276, 421, 514

防御型投资者，20–28、90–101、106、113n、114、114n、119、121–122、176–177、333、336、350–351

and defensive investors, 20–28, 90–101, 106, 113n, 114, 114n, 119, 121–122, 176–177, 333, 336, 350–351

折扣，136n

discount, 136n

苦恼，158n

distressed, 158n

和多样化，272n

and diversification, 272n

收入，272–276

earnings on, 272–276

以及格雷厄姆的商业原则，515–516

and Graham’s business principles, 515–516

以及股票市场的历史和预测，70、75、76、77、78、84-85

and history and forecasting of stock market, 70, 75, 76, 77, 78, 84–85

I债券，61

I bonds, 61

通货膨胀和，5，24–25，47，48，50–51，56

inflation and, 5, 24–25, 47, 48, 50–51, 56

通胀挂钩，61–62

inflation-linked, 61–62

利息，2、3、5、20–28、70、76、77、78、90、94–95、96、99、99n 、114、121–122、135n、203–208、507–509、508n

interest on, 2, 3, 5, 20–28, 70, 76, 77, 78, 90, 94–95, 96, 99, 99n, 114, 121–122, 135n, 203–208, 507–509, 508n

和投资基金，230，234-235

and investment funds, 230, 234–235

投资与投机，17-21

and investments vs. speculation, 17–21

长期和短期，92–93，106，185

long- and short-term, 92–93, 106, 185

和安全边际，505–506、507、508–509、508n、512–513

and margin of safety, 505–506, 507, 508–509, 508n, 512–513

和市场波动，185、189–190、203–208

and market fluctuations, 185, 189–190, 203–208

和新产品，8，139–141

and new offerings, 8, 139–141

价格，21–23，136，136n，203–208

price of, 21–23, 136, 136n, 203–208

96、206、207、272n、336n 的评级

ratings for, 96, 206, 207, 272n, 336n

和风险，272–276

and risk, 272–276

投资银行家的作用，256

and role of investment bankers, 256

安全，272–276

safety of, 272–276

二年级，135–138, 139–140

second-grade, 135–138, 139–140

和安全分析，270，272-276，282-283，286n

and security analysis, 270, 272–276, 282–283, 286n

按面值出售，137–138

selling at par, 137–138

和企业规模，273–274

and size of enterprise, 273–274

税收和，20–24，92–93，94，95，96，97，97n，100，157，512–513

taxes and, 20–24, 92–93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 97n, 100, 157, 512–513

类型，92–99

types of, 92–99

产量, 5, 8–9, 25–26, 78, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97–98, 99, 114, 114n, 135, 138–139, 189–190, 203–208, 399, 568–569

yield on, 5, 8–9, 25–26, 78, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97–98, 99, 114, 114n, 135, 138–139, 189–190, 203–208, 399, 568–569

书籍，55

books, 55

账面价值。另请参阅特定公司

book value. see also specific company

和激进的投资者，278、366、369-370、374、375n、379

and aggressive investors, 278, 366, 369–370, 374, 375n, 379

防御性投资者， 334、335、337、338-339、340、341、342

and defensive investors, 334, 335, 337, 338–339, 340, 341, 342

和市场波动，194–197，194n，199n

and market fluctuations, 194–197, 194n, 199n

和每股收益，305–306，305n，565

and per-share earnings, 305–306, 305n, 565

资本回报率，451n

and return on capital, 451n

Borden公司，379，380–381

Borden Inc., 379, 380–381

无聊猿游艇俱乐部 NFT，154

Bored Ape Yacht Club NFT, 154

布兰森，理查德，154

Branson, Richard, 154

桥牌玩家类比，364–365

bridge players analogy, 364–365

百时美施贵宝公司，309

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 309

经纪公司。另请参阅网上交易；特定公司

brokerage firms. see also online trading; specific firm

和建议，117–118、246、250–253、251n、254–255、259、260–264

and advice, 117–118, 246, 250–253, 251n, 254–255, 259, 260–264

佣金，85，85n5

commissions, 85, 85n5

折扣，251n

discount, 251n

费用/佣金，117–118，127n7，153，414–417，415

fees/commissions of, 117–118, 127n7, 153, 414–417, 415

财务困境，4，4n，254–255

financial troubles of, 4, 4n, 254–255

全方位服务，251n

full-service, 251n

保证金账户，20n

margin accounts with, 20n

在线，39

online, 39

和期权交易，414–417

and options trading, 414–417

防御性投资者的投资组合政策，117–118，120–121

and portfolio policy for defensive investors, 117–118, 120–121

和股票筛选器，386

and stock screeners, 386

交易量，254–255

volume of trades in, 254–255

网站，182–183

websites, 182–183

经纪交易，交付，255–256，256n

brokerage transactions, delivery of, 255–256, 256n

布鲁克林联合煤气公司，344

Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 344

布鲁克斯，约翰，254n

Brooks, John, 254n

布朗，艾略特，149n5

Brown, Eliot, 149n5

缓冲基金，418

buffered funds, 418

巴菲特，沃伦·E.另请参阅伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

Buffett, Warren E. see also Berkshire Hathaway

价格与价值之间的差异，522

on difference between price and value, 522

和多样化，279n

and diversification, 279n

持久优势，293

on durable advantages, 293

和 GEICO，531n

and GEICO, 531n

关于智能投资，14

on intelligent investing, 14

关于长期投资，87

on investing for the long run, 87

在市场上，417

on the market, 417

每股收益 313

on per-share earnings, 313

价格方面，538-539

on price, 538-539

风险，544-545

on risk, 544-545

序言，xiii–xiv

preface by, xiii–xiv

以及大豆投资，382–383

and SOYA investing, 382–383

“格雷厄姆和多德斯维尔的超级投资者”演讲，535–558

“Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville” talk by, 535–558

关于股票估值，64，535

on valuing stocks, 64, 535

巴菲特合伙有限公司，541，550

Buffett Partnership, Ltd., 541, 550

牛市

bull markets

和便宜货，171，173–174，177–178

and bargains, 171, 173–174, 177–178

特征，140–141，189–190

characteristics of, 140–141, 189–190

和普通股，565–566

and common stock, 565–566

以及可转换债券和认股权证，399–400，403

and convertible issues and warrants, 399–400, 403

以及与经纪公司的交易，139–140，254–255

and dealings with brokeragefirms, 139–140, 254–255

死亡/结束，142–143，206

death/end of, 142–143, 206

防御型投资者，104

and defensive investors, 104

历史和预测，65–73, 74, 76, 78, 206

history and forecasting of, 65–73, 74, 76, 78, 206

长度，190n

length of, 190n

和市场波动，54–55、171、189–190、190n、193、206

and market fluctuations, 54–55, 171, 189–190, 190n, 193, 206

和新产品，140–141、140n、142–145

and new offerings, 140–141, 140n, 142–145

和绩效基金，226–227

and performance funds, 226–227

以及针对激进投资者的投资组合政策，140–141、140n、142–145、171、173–174、177–178

and portfolio policy for aggressive investors, 140–141, 140n, 142–145, 171, 173–174, 177–178

美国劳工统计局，86n1

Bureau of Labor Statistics, 86n1

伯灵顿北方铁路，348n

Burlington Northern Railroad, 348n

伯顿迪克西公司，379

Burton-Dixie Corp., 379

乔治·W·布什，495

Bush, George W., 495

商业

business

购买，544

buying the, 544

了解你的，515–516

knowing your, 515–516

“商人的投资”，136–137

“businessman’s investment,” 136–137

商业原则，格雷厄姆，515–516

business principles, Graham’s, 515–516

股票回购，497–500，498

buybacks of shares, 497–500, 498

低买高卖法，189–190

buy-low-sell-high approach, 189–190

流行语，投资，173n

buzzwords, investing, 173n

Calcbench，311

Calcbench, 311

卡拉汉，丹，293n7，394n7

Callahan, Dan, 293n7, 394n7

看涨期权和看涨期权，98–99，139–140，400n，401–402，402n，413–414，417–419

calls and call options, 98–99, 139–140, 400n, 401–402, 402n, 413–414, 417–419

CAPE比率，81–83，81

CAPE ratio, 81–83, 81

资本，52–53、59、303、305n、399、408。另请参阅资本收益；资本化；投资资本回报率（ROIC）；特定公司

capital, 52–53, 59, 303, 305n, 399, 408. see also capital gains; capitalization; return on invested capital (ROIC); specific company

资本收益，75，221，345，567-568

capital gains, 75, 221, 345, 567–568

大写，123，123n，229–230，276–277，279–283，317，370，407，408，409

capitalization, 123, 123n, 229–230, 276–277, 279–283, 317, 370, 407, 408, 409

职业学院，234

Career Academy, 234

卡罗来纳电力与照明公司，344

Carolina Power & Light Co., 344

案例历史

case histories

格雷厄姆对八对公司的比较，444–470

Graham’s comparison of eight pairs of companies, 444–470

格雷厄姆对四个“极具启发性”的讨论，420–435

Graham’s discussion of four “extremely instructive,” 420–435

Zweig 对八对公司的比较，471–485

Zweig’s comparison of eight pairs of companies, 471–485

茨威格对四个“极具启发性”的讨论，436–443

Zweig’s discussion of four “extremely instructive,” 436–443

现金/“现金等价物”，22–24，106

cash/“cash equivalents,” 22–24, 106

Caughran，Brett，292n4

Caughran, Brett, 292n4

中央哈德逊天然气和电力公司，344

Central Hudson Gas and Electric Co., 344

伊利诺伊中部电力公司，344

Central Illinois Light Co., 344

中央缅因电力公司，344

Central Maine Power Co., 344

股票证书，194，194n，493，493n

certificates, stock, 194, 194n, 493, 493n

存款证明，97–98

certificates of deposit, 97–98

注册财务规划师（CFP），263

Certified Financial Planner (CFP), 263

注册会计师（CPA），263

Certified Public Accountant (CPA), 263

慈善机构，47，47n

charitable institutions, 47, 47n

特许金融分析师（CFA），253，253n，263

Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), 253, 253n, 263

大通曼哈顿银行，448n

Chase Manhattan Bank, 448n

清单，291–294

checklists, 291–294

化学公司，279–280，280n，281

chemical companies, 279–280, 280n, 281

芝加哥、密尔沃基、圣保罗和太平洋债券，136

Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Bonds, 136

芝加哥和西北铁路公司，302n

Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co., 302n

中国股市，435n

China, stock market in, 435n

克莱斯勒公司，166、167、168、169、278、280、337、338、340

Chrysler Corp., 166, 167, 168, 169, 278, 280, 337, 338, 340

辛辛那提燃气电力公司，344

Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 344

花旗集团，499

Citigroup Inc, 499

Civex，503

Civex, 503

克利夫兰电气公司，343

Cleveland Electric Co., 343

CleveTrust房地产投资者，408

CleveTrust Realty Investors, 408

封闭式基金，141n，221，230，231-235，493n

closed-end funds, 141n, 221, 230, 231–235, 493n

三叶草健康投资公司，42

Clover Health Investments Corp., 42

煤炭，64

coal, 64

可口可乐，394

Coca-Cola, 394

Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp.，390

Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp., 390

科恩，瑞安，476

Cohen, Ryan, 476

相干公司，391

Coherent Corp., 391

Coinbase Global Inc.，42

Coinbase Global Inc., 42

抛硬币，536，537，538

coin flipping, 536, 537, 538

硬币买卖，55

coins, buying and selling, 55

哥伦比亚天然气系统，343

Columbia Gas System, 343

商业银行，97–98，225，246，258，427，427n

commercial banks, 97–98, 225, 246, 258, 427, 427n

商品、通货膨胀和 64

commodities, inflation and, 64

普通股。另请参阅具体主题

common stock. see also specific topic

和建议，257，259

and advice, 257, 259

对于激进的投资者，135、137、139–140、157–179、362–381

for aggressive investors, 135, 137, 139–140, 157–179, 362–381

和资产配置，10，90-93，158-159

and asset allocation, 10, 90–93, 158–159

债券比较，5n，17–28，56，190

bonds compared with, 5n, 17–28, 56, 190

特点，158

characteristics of, 158

对于防御型投资者，20–28、90–101、113–123、124–133、176–177、323–324、333、334–351

for defensive investors, 20–28, 90–101, 113–123, 124–133, 176–177, 323–324, 333, 334–351

股息，20–21，100，114–115，274n，282–283，319–320，565–566，567，568

dividends on, 20–21, 100, 114–115, 274n, 282–283, 319–320, 565–566, 567, 568

收入，115，276–289，564–565

earnings on, 115, 276–289, 564–565

预期增长（1963年和1969年），285

expected growth (1963 and 1969) of, 285

总体长期前景，279–280

general long-term prospects for, 279–280

一般性意见，321–322

general observations on, 321–322

作为成长股，116–117, 159–160, 283–287, 510

as growth stock, 116–117, 159–160, 283–287, 510

以及股票市场的历史和预测，70、73、74、75、76、78

and history and forecasting of stock market, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78

通货膨胀，47–56

inflation and, 47–56

投资价值，113–115

investment merits of, 113–115

投资规则，176–179

investment rules for, 176–179

投资与投机，17-21

and investments vs. speculation, 17–21

投资者的个人情况，以及119–121

investor’s personal situation and, 119–121

作为“初级股票发行”，274n

as “junior stock issues,” 274n

和安全边际，506–511，567，570

and margin of safety, 506–511, 567, 570

和市场波动，185、186、189–190、191–193、195–197、197、199–200、201

and market fluctuations, 185, 186, 189–190, 191–193, 195–197, 197, 199–200, 201

表现，222–223

performance of, 222–223

投资组合变动，117–118

portfolio changes in, 117–118

价格下跌，3

price decline in, 3

价格记录，400

price record of, 400

公众对 18–19 岁、18n 岁的态度

public attitude toward, 18–19, 18n

返回，114，363

return on, 114, 363

和风险，19–20，121–122，380

and risk, 19–20, 121–122, 380

安全分析，270，273–274，276–289，316–324

security analysis of, 270, 273–274, 276–289, 316–324

选择，114–115，135，137，139–140，157，159，160，161–162，167–168，170，176–179，333，334–351

selection of, 114–115, 135, 137, 139–140, 157, 159, 160, 161–162, 167–168, 170, 176–179, 333, 334–351

估值，276–279，565–566

valuation of, 276–279, 565–566

价值线预测（1967-1969）约278

Value Line Forecast (1967-1969) about, 278

联邦爱迪生公司，343

Commonwealth Edison Co., 343

公司。另见案例历史；公司；二级公司；特定公司

companies. see also case histories; corporations; secondary companies; specific company

年度报告，292，292n5

annual reports, 292, 292n5

性格的变化，199–200

change in character of, 199–200

八对的比较，444–470，471–485

comparison of eight pairs of, 444–470, 471–485

比较列出的四个，316–324，436–443

comparison of four listed, 316–324, 436–443

和 GAAP 规则，307–315

and GAAP rules, 307–315

关于一般观察，467–470

general observations about, 467–470

投资者关系，162，164n，199-200

investors’ relationship with, 162, 164n, 199–200

“大型、知名的保守派资助”，122–123

“large, prominent conservatively financed,” 122–123

大量可转换债券发行（1969 年），406

with large amounts of convertible issues (1969), 406

二线，192–193，192n

second-line, 192–193, 192n

不受欢迎的大，164–168，169

unpopular large, 164–168, 169

薪酬，股票型，312–315，314

compensation, stock-based, 312–315, 314

计算机行业，6–7, 29, 173–174, 173n, 434–435

computer industry, 6–7, 29, 173–174, 173n, 434–435

圆锥磨坊，377

Cone Mills, 377

康塞科，424n

Conseco, 424n

企业集团，3，405

conglomerates, 3, 405

联合爱迪生，343，562–564

Consolidated Edison, 343, 562–564

纽约联合煤气公司，562–564

Consolidated Gas of New York, 562–564

联合天然气公司，343

Consolidated Natural Gas Co., 343

联合铁路公司（Conrail），423n

Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail), 423n

联合煤炭，280

Consolidation Coal, 280

消费者电力公司，344

Consumers Power Co., 344

美国消费者研究委员会，263

Consumers’ Research Council of America, 263

控制，幻觉，355–357

control, illusion of, 355–357

可转换债券。另见认股权证；特定公司

convertible issues. see also warrants; specific company

和激进的投资者，135，366

and aggressive investors, 135, 366

防御性投资者，91、98、100-101

and defensive investors, 91, 98, 100–101

格雷厄姆的讨论，398–407

Graham’s discussion about, 398–407

和市场波动，206–207

and market fluctuations, 206–207

每股收益，300–301、302–303、405、408、410

and per-share earnings, 300–301, 302–303, 405, 408, 410

茨威格的评论，413–414

Zweig’s comments about, 413–414

库珀公司，390

Cooper Companies Inc., 390

Copart 公司，391

Copart Inc., 391

公司债券

corporate bonds

和积极的投资者，135n

and aggressive investors, 135n

可转换债券及认股权证，398

and convertible issues and warrants, 398

防御性投资者，93、96、336n

and defensive investors, 93, 96, 336n

和股息，22–23

and dividends, 22–23

和通货膨胀，50

and inflation, 50

和投资基金，234–235

and investment funds, 234–235

和安全边际，512–513

and margin of safety, 512–513

和市场波动，199–200，203–208

and market fluctuations, 199–200, 203–208

返回，399n

return on, 399n

和安全分析，272，272n

and security analysis, 272, 272n

公司。另见公司；公司债券；特定公司

corporations. see also companies; corporate bonds; specific corporation

年度报告，292，292n5

annual reports, 292, 292n5

债务，53–54，135

debt of, 53–54, 135

以及债券价格波动，207–208

and fluctuations in bond prices, 207–208

和 GAAP 规则，307–315

and GAAP rules, 307–315

治理，202–204，203n

governance of, 202–204, 203n

投资者关系，162，164n，199-200

investor’s relationship with, 162, 164n, 199–200

“规模大、知名、资金保守”，122–123、191–192

“large, prominent, conservatively financed,” 122–123, 191–192

误导性报道，229–230

misleading reporting by, 229–230

税收，100，177–178

taxes on, 100, 177–178

不受欢迎的大，164–168，169

unpopular large, 164–168, 169

好市多批发公司，503

Costco Wholesale Corp., 503

成本。参见费用/成本；费用/佣金

costs. see expenses/costs; fees/commissions

优惠券，99，99n，135，135n，136，139–140

coupons, 99, 99n, 135, 135n, 136, 139–140

勇气，投资者美德，16

courage, investor virtue of, 16

新冠疫情，38–39, 106, 218, 389, 436, 437, 438–439, 476, 498

Covid pandemic, 38–39, 106, 218, 389, 436, 437, 438–439, 476, 498

考尔斯委员会，65，66

Cowles Commission, 65, 66

崩盘，股市

crash, stock market

1929年，第188页，第229–230页

of 1929, 188, 229–230

1987年，141n

of 1987, 141n

2000年，141n，280n，435n

of 2000, 141n, 280n, 435n

2007-09年，87

of 2007–09, 87

2020 年，498

of 2020, 498

和人类大脑，218–219

and the human brain, 218–219

信贷公司，投资，345–346

credit companies, investing in, 345–346

信用评级，135，161–162，568–569

credit ratings, 135, 161–162, 568–569

标准保险公司，531n

Criterion Insurance Co., 531n

人群传染，128–132

crowd contagion, 128–132

加密货币，39、40、63–64、148–149

cryptocurrencies, 39, 40, 63–64, 148–149

CSX公司，348n，423n

CSX Corp., 348n, 423n

C.-T.-R. 公司，560–562

C.-T.-R. Co., 560–562

《我们的崇拜》（布朗和法雷尔），149n5

The Cult of We (Brown & Farrell), 149n5

好奇心，投资者的美德，14-15

curiosity, investor virtue of, 14–15

斯蒂芬·库里，154

Curry, Stephen, 154

“客户经纪人”，250–251、252–253、259

“customers’ brokers,” 250–251, 252–253, 259

“爸爸最了解”，489n

“Daddy-Knows-Best,” 489n

戴维斯，克里斯托弗，183

Davis, Christopher, 183

戴维斯顾问公司，183

Davis Advisors, 183

理查德·道金斯（Richard Dawkins） 41岁

Dawkins, Richard, 41

代顿电力与照明公司，344

Dayton Power & Light Co., 344

债务。另见债券；特定公司或债券类型

debt. see also bonds; specific company or type of bond

以及激进的投资者，371

and aggressive investors, 371

公司，53–54，135

corporate, 53–54, 135

和防御性投资者，334、335、338–339、341

and defensive investors, 334, 335, 338–339, 341

和股息，490–491

and dividends, 490–491

新兴市场，106

of emerging markets, 106

美国政府的限制，95，97

limit on, of U.S. government, 95, 97

保证金债务，151

margin debt, 151

和安全边际，506

and margin of safety, 506

公用事业，334

of public utilities, 334

和库存选择，334、335、338–339、341、371

and selection of stock, 334, 335, 338–339, 341, 371

去积累，80–81

decumulation, 80–81

迪尔公司，174

Deere & Co., 174

默认值

defaults

和便宜货，174

and bargains, 174

关于债券，89–90，174，275–276，421，514

on bonds, 89–90, 174, 275–276, 421, 514

以及针对激进投资者的投资组合政策，138–139，158n，174

and portfolio policy for aggressive investors, 138–139, 158n, 174

防御型投资者

defensive investors

特征，5–6

characteristics of, 5–6

定义，20–21

definition of, 20–21

与进取型投资者相比，104–105

vs. enterprising investors, 104–105

排除，176–178

exclusions for, 176–178

期望，20–28

expectations for, 20–28

和通货膨胀，47-56

and inflation, 47–56

以及内心的骗子，352–361

and the inner con artist, 352–361

投资与投机，17-28

and investments vs. speculation, 17–28

和安全边际，508–509，516–517

and margin of safety, 508–509, 516–517

和市场波动，195–197

and market fluctuations, 195–197

混合进攻和防御，176–177, 178–179

and mixing aggressive and defensive, 176–177, 178–179

投资组合，90–101，103–106，109–111，112，113–123，124–133

portfolio for, 90–101, 103–106, 109–111, 112, 113–123, 124–133

返回，20–28，24n，25–26，176–177

return for, 20–28, 24n, 25–26, 176–177

和风险承受能力，102–105

and risk tolerance, 102–105

规则，176–178

rules for, 176–178

和安全分析，282–283，333–351

and security analysis, 282–283, 333–351

选择性，348–351

selectivity for, 348–351

股票选择，333–351，371n

stock selection for, 333–351, 371n

通货紧缩，51

deflation, 51

退市股票，371n

delisted stocks, 371n

德玛瓦电力公司，344

Delmarva Power & Electric Co., 344

德尔托纳县，234

Deltona Co., 234

分母盲目性，262n1

denominator blindness, 262n1

司法部，437

Department of Justice, 437

折旧，300–301，490–491

depreciation, 300–301, 490–491

大萧条（1930年代），72、137–138、152、171、199–200、411–412、514

Depression (1930s), 72, 137–138, 152, 171, 199–200, 411–412, 514

底特律爱迪生公司，343

Detroit Edison Co., 343

钻石，55

diamonds, 55

稀释。另见特定公司

dilution. see also specific company

可转换债券及认股权证，405、410、411-412

and convertible issues and warrants, 405, 410, 411–412

和每股收益，296–299、297n、300–301、302–303

and per-share earnings, 296–299, 297n, 300–301, 302–303

董事，408，487

directors, 408, 487

纪律，投资者美德，15

discipline, investor virtue of, 15

Discord，128

Discord, 128

折扣经纪公司，251n

discount brokerage firms, 251n

探索传播公司，500–501

Discovery Communications, Inc., 500–501

多样化

diversification

和激进的投资者，366、372–376、377、378–379

and aggressive investors, 366, 372–376, 377, 378–379

和另类资产，55–56

and alternative assets, 55–56

防御性投资者，114–115，333，350–351

and defensive investors, 114–115, 333, 350–351

和退市股票，371n

and delisted stocks, 371n

和 ETF，241–242

and ETFs, 241–242

以及格雷厄姆的门徒，540

and Graham’s disciples, 540

重要性，530

importance of, 530

和安全边际，508–509, 510, 511, 512n, 514, 514–515, 522–524, 523

and margin of safety, 508–509, 510, 511, 512n, 514, 514–515, 522–524, 523

和市场波动，212

and market fluctuations, 212

和安全分析，272n，277，279，279n

and security analysis, 272n, 277, 279, 279n

股息。另见收益率；特定公司或证券类型

dividends. see also yield; specific company or type of security

学术批评，492–493，492n

academic criticism of, 492–493, 492n

和建议，247

and advice, 247

和便宜货，167–168，170，173–174

and bargains, 167–168, 170, 173–174

以及四家上市公司的比较，319–320，329

and comparison of four listed companies, 319–320, 329

累积或非累积，100

cumulative or noncumulative, 100

和收入，492–493

and earnings, 492–493

以及对防御型投资者的预期，20–26，24n

and expectations for defensive investors, 20–26, 24n

固定，100

fixed, 100

格雷厄姆的评论，487–494

Graham’s comments about, 487–494

和增长，488–489，490–491

and growth, 488–489, 490–491

以及股票市场的历史和预测， 65、67、69、71、72、76、77、78

and history and forecasting of stock market, 65, 67, 69, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78

通货膨胀，48、50、52、54-55

inflation and, 48, 50, 52, 54–55

以及投资者与管理层关系，487–494，489n

and investor-management relations, 487–494, 489n

和安全边际，507，508–509，515–516

and margin of safety, 507, 508–509, 515–516

和市场波动，188、189–190、198、201、203

and market fluctuations, 188, 189–190, 198, 201, 203

概述，487–494

overview about, 487–494

以及“派息率”，283n，488n

and “payout ratio,” 283n, 488n

和表演（1871-1970），71

and performance (1871-1970), 71

以及针对激进投资者的投资组合政策，135n、137–138、167–168、170、173–174

and portfolio policy for aggressive investors, 135n, 137–138, 167–168, 170, 173–174

以及防御性投资者的投资组合政策，92、99、100、100n、114–115、116–117、118–119、121–122

and portfolio policy for defensive investors, 92, 99, 100, 100n, 114–115, 116–117, 118–119, 121–122

和价格，488–489，492n

and price, 488–489, 492n

适当的股票，491–492

proper stock, 491–492

付款记录，114–115

record of paying, 114–115

再投资，487–491

reinvestment of, 487–491

二级公司，173–174

of secondary companies, 173–174

和安全分析，272，274n，276–277，282–283，286–287，286n

and security analysis, 272, 274n, 276–277, 282–283, 286–287, 286n

特别，492n

special, 492n

和猜测，487、488–489、565–566、567、568

and speculation, 487, 488–489, 565–566, 567, 568

以及针对激进投资者的股票选择，370、371–372、374、375–376

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 370, 371–372, 374, 375–376

以及防御性投资者的股票选择， 322–323、334、335、336、337、338–339、340–342、347–348、350–351

and stock selection for defensive investors, 322–323, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338–339, 340–342, 347–348, 350–351

股票分割和，491–494，491n

stock split and, 491–494, 491n

税收，20–24，100，283n，493–494

taxes on, 20–24, 100, 283n, 493–494

迪克森，理查德，47n

Dixon, Richard, 47n

Dodd, David, 540.另请参阅《证券分析》（Graham 和 Dodd）

Dodd, David, 540. see also Security Analysis (Graham and Dodd)

狗狗币，40

Dogecoin, 40

“道琼斯狗股”，165，165n

“Dogs of the Dow,” 165, 165n

美元成本平均法，2、26–28、75、118–119、119n、132–133、190、522n3

dollar-cost averaging, 2, 26–28, 75, 118–119, 119n, 132–133, 190, 522n3

多尔西，帕特，293n7

Dorsey, Pat, 293n7

网络股，173n

dot.com stocks, 173n

陶氏化学公司，301

Dow Chemical Co., 301

道琼斯工业平均指数 (DJIA)。另见具体公司

Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). see also specific company

激进投资者，137、160、161、164–165、165–166、165n 、172、362、372–376

aggressive investors and, 137, 160, 161, 164–165, 165–166, 165n, 172, 362, 372–376

和便宜货，172

and bargains, 172

“最佳”股票，348–349

“best” stocks in, 348–349

以及四家上市公司的比较，318，318，321–322

and comparison of four listed companies, 318, 318, 321–322

防御型投资者，92、114–115、118–119、333、336–340、340–342、348–349

defensive investors and, 92, 114–115, 118–119, 333, 336–340, 340–342, 348–349

以及普通股的股息回报率，20–21

and dividend return on common stocks, 20–21

20世纪70年代初，4，72-79

in early 1970s, 4, 72–79

以及对投资者的期望，21-27、26n、32、33

and expectations for investors, 21–27, 26n, 32, 33

增长，284–286

growth of, 284–286

和成长股，160

and growth stocks, 160

以及股票市场的历史和预测，66、67、70-73、74、75、76、78、79、1069

and history and forecasting of stock market, 66, 67, 70–73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 1069

通货膨胀和 50, 51–55, 56

inflation and, 50, 51–55, 56

和投资基金，225、226–227、235n

and investment funds, 225, 226–227, 235n

和市场波动，188–189、190n、191–193、196–197、197、198、204

and market fluctuations, 188–189, 190n, 191–193, 196–197, 197, 198, 204

每股收益，303–306

and per-share earnings, 303–306

以及拉斯科布的处方，2

and Raskob’s prescription, 2

崛起（1915-1970），50

rise of (1915-1970), 50

和安全分析，278、279–280、281、282–283、285、287–288

and security analysis, 278, 279–280, 281, 282–283, 285, 287–288

和股票选择，333、336–342、348–349、362、372–376

and selection of stocks, 333, 336–342, 348–349, 362, 372–376

以及不受欢迎的大公司，164–166，165n

and unpopular large companies, 164–166, 165n

股票收益率（2003），5n

yield of stocks (2003) on, 5n

“道氏理论”，3，32，188–189，191–192

“Dow Theory,” 3, 32, 188–189, 191–192

DraftKings Inc.，42

DraftKings Inc., 42

德鲁，丹尼尔，297n

Drew, Daniel, 297n

德崇证券，165n，427n

Drexel Burnham Lambert, 165n, 427n

德雷克塞尔·费尔斯通公司，165，165n

Drexel Firestone Co., 165, 165n

德雷福斯基金，224

Dreyfus Fund, 224

制药业，29

drug industry, 29

双重用途基金，221–222，221n

dual-purpose funds, 221–222, 221n

杜邦、Glore、Forgan & Co.，254n

Du Pont, Glore, Forgan & Co., 254n

杜邦公司, 278 , 281 , 337 , 338

Du Pont Co., 278, 281, 337, 338

持久优势，293

durable advantages, 293

Durand，David，195n，565–566

Durand, David, 195n, 565–566

“赚钱能力”，52–53、506、506n、507–509、510、511、563–564

“earning power,” 52–53, 506, 506n, 507–509, 510, 511, 563–564

收益。另见“盈利能力”；每股收益；市盈率；特定公司或证券类型

earnings. see also “earning power”; per-share earnings; price/earnings ratio; specific company or type of security

平均303–306

average, 303–306

和讨价还价，167–170，174

and bargains, 167–170, 174

关于资本基金，303，305n

on capital funds, 303, 305n

债务和资本利润（1950-1969），53

debt and profits on capital (1950-1969), 53

和股息，492–493

and dividends, 492–493

以及对投资者的期望，24n、25–26、32

and expectations for investors, 24n, 25–26, 32

隐藏真相，426n

hiding true, 426n

以及股票市场的历史和预测， 65、69、71、72、76、77、78

and history and forecasting of stock market, 65, 69, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78

通货膨胀，49，51-55

inflation and, 49, 51–55

和安全边际，506，508n，509-510

and margin of safety, 506, 508n, 509–510

和市场波动，196–197, 198

and market fluctuations, 196–197, 198

和表演（1871-1970），71

and performance (1871-1970), 71

每股收益，300–301

and per-share earnings, 300–301

以及针对激进投资者的投资组合政策，135、136、137、140–141、161–162、164–165、166、167–170、173–174、174

and portfolio policy for aggressive investors, 135, 136, 137, 140–141, 161–162, 164–165, 166, 167–170, 173–174, 174

防御性投资者的投资组合政策，115，115n，116-117

and portfolio policy for defensive investors, 115, 115n, 116–117

真实的，422

real, 422

和安全分析， 270、272、276–277、279–280、281、282–284、284、285、286–287

and security analysis, 270, 272, 276–277, 279–280, 281, 282–284, 284, 285, 286–287

和猜测，564–565

and speculation, 564–565

以及针对激进投资者的股票选择，367–368, 370, 371–372, 374, 375–376, 378

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 367–368, 370, 371–372, 374, 375–376, 378

以及防御性投资者的股票选择，322–323、334、335、338–339、340–342、349–351

and stock selection for defensive investors, 322–323, 334, 335, 338–339, 340–342, 349–351

和超级股票，389–396

and superstocks, 389–396

收入覆盖测试，272–276

earnings-covered test, 272–276

伊士曼柯达公司，278，325-332，330-331，337，338

Eastman Kodak Co., 278, 325–332, 330–331, 337, 338

eBay公司，439

eBay Inc., 439

爱迪生电灯公司，20n

Edison Electric Light Co., 20n

爱德华七世（英国国王），298，298n

Edward VII (king of Great Britain), 298, 298n

“有效市场假说”（EMH），348–349，349n，365–366，366n

“efficient markets hypothesis” (EMH), 348–349, 349n, 365–366, 366n

电动自动灯公司，316

Electric Autolite Co., 316

电子行业，29，173–174，173n，322–323，434–435

electronics industry, 29, 173–174, 173n, 322–323, 434–435

礼来公司，309

Eli Lilly & Co., 309

ELTRA公司，316–324

ELTRA Corp., 316–324

爱默生，拉尔夫·沃尔多，380–381

Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 380–381

艾默生电气公司，316–324、320n、325–332、330n、330–331

Emerson Electric Co., 316–324, 320n, 325–332, 330n, 330–331

埃默里航空货运，316–324，322n

Emery Air Freight, 316–324, 322n

Emhart公司，316–324，369

Emhart Corp., 316–324, 369

埃米纳姆，154

Eminem, 154

员工购买计划，429–430，431n

employee-purchase plans, 429–430, 431n

员工薪酬，312–315，314 。另见经理/管理

employees, compensation for, 312–315, 314. see also managers/management

捐赠基金，150–151，190，215，227，227n

endowment funds, 150–151, 190, 215, 227, 227n

劲量控股公司，325–332，330–331

Energizer Holdings Inc., 325–332, 330–331

恩尼斯，理查德，150

Ennis, Richard, 150

安然公司，421n，427n

Enron Corp., 421n, 427n

进取型投资者。另见进取型投资者

enterprising investors. see also aggressive investors

股票选择，382–397

stock selection for, 382–397

EPS.参见每股收益

EPS. see per-share earnings

厄布，克劳德·B.，60n4

Erb, Claude B., 60n4

伊利铁路，297n

Erie Railroad, 297n

ESG基金，242–244

ESG funds, 242–244

ETFGI，241

ETFGI, 241

伦理学，250–251，251n，257，269

ethics, 250–251, 251n, 257, 269

e投睿，125

eToro, 125

埃弗夏普公司，403

Eversharp Co., 403

基于证据的信心，359–360

evidence-based confidence, 359–360

精确科学公司，325–332，330–331

Exact Sciences Corp., 325–332, 330–331

交易所交易基金（ETF），236、238n2、239–242

exchange-traded funds (ETFs), 236, 238n2, 239–242

费用/成本。另见费用/佣金

expenses/costs. see also fees/commissions

经商之道，302n

of doing business, 302n

和 GAAP 规则，307–315

and GAAP rules, 307–315

共同基金，362–363

of mutual funds, 362–363

每股收益 302n

and per-share earnings, 302n

研究，362–363

of research, 362–363

以及针对激进投资者的股票选择，362–363

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 362–363

交易，349n，371n

of trading, 349n, 371n

埃克森美孚公司，496，504

ExxonMobil Corp., 496, 504

Faber，Meb，292n4

Faber, Meb, 292n4

Facebook，131，162n

Facebook, 131, 162n

要素基金，384–385

factor funds, 384–385

Fair Isaac 公司，387，389，390

Fair Isaac Corp., 387, 389, 390

“顺境投资”，514

“fair-weather investments,” 514

法利，威廉，302n

Farley, William, 302n

法雷尔，莫琳，149n5

Farrell, Maureen, 149n5

浮士德（歌德），409–411

Faust (Goethe), 409–411

费德斯县，234

Fedders Co., 234

联邦储备委员会，2n，18n，50，121–122

Federal Reserve Board, 2n, 18n, 50, 121–122

反馈，290-291

feedback, 290-291

费用/佣金。另见费用/成本

fees/commissions. see also expenses/costs

寻求建议，247、250–251、254、258、260–265、266n3

for advice, 247, 250–251, 254, 258, 260–265, 266n3

对于激进投资者，146–150，146n2，147

for aggressive investors, 146–150, 146n2, 147

经纪公司，117–118，127n7，153

of brokerage firms, 117–118, 127n7, 153

投资基金，221，221n，231n，237，238n2

of investment funds, 221, 221n, 231n, 237, 238n2

和 IPO，140n

and IPOs, 140n

和市场波动，196–197

and market fluctuations, 196–197

和期权交易，414–417，415

and options trading, 414–417, 415

和投资组合变化，117–118

and portfolio changes, 117–118

和交易应用程序，127n7

and trading apps, 127n7

富达基金，224

Fidelity Funds, 224

富达麦哲伦基金，241

Fidelity Magellan Fund, 241

受托人，264

fiduciaries, 264

50-50计划，5，91-93，158-159

50-50 plan, 5, 91–93, 158–159

金融分析师。另见证券分析

financial analysts. see also securities analysis

和建议，250–251、251n、252–253、259

and advice, 250–251, 251n, 252–253, 259

集体智慧，366n

collective intelligence of, 366n

共识意见，363–364

consensus opinion of, 363–364

创造估值，563–564, 565–566

as creating valuation, 563–564, 565–566

选择方法的缺陷，364–365

flaw in approach to selection by, 364–365

功能，250–251，252n，253，363–364

functions of, 250–251, 252n, 253, 363–364

投资与投机，26-28

and investments vs. speculation, 26–28

和安全边际，510

and margin of safety, 510

和市场波动，187，202–203

and market fluctuations, 187, 202–203

要求，252–253

requirements for, 252–253

的作用，250–251，269–270

role of, 250–251, 269–270

和猜测，559、563–564、565–566、570

and speculation, 559, 563–564, 565–566, 570

和激进投资者的股票选择，362，363–364

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 362, 363–364

防御型投资者的股票选择，348–349

and stock selection for defensive investors, 348–349

金融资本，59

financial capital, 59

财务状况。另请参阅特定公司

financial condition. see also specific company

和普通股，282–283

and common stock, 282–283

和股息，490–491

and dividends, 490–491

和激进投资者的股票选择，370，371–372，374

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 370, 371–372, 374

防御型投资者的股票选择，322–323、334、335、336

and stock selection for defensive investors, 322–323, 334, 335, 336

金融危机（2008-09），100n，106，236

financial crisis (2008–09), 100n, 106, 236

金融机构/行业，139–140、257、345–346、405n。另请参阅机构类型或具体机构

financial institutions/industry, 139–140, 257, 345–346, 405n. see also type of institution or specific institution

金融市场的历史和预测，1-2、10、23n、54、54n、65-79。另见股票市场

financial markets, history and forecasting of, 1–2, 10, 23n, 54, 54n, 65–79. see also stock market

财务规划师，258n

financial planners, 258n

财务状况及四家上市公司比较，319，328–329

financial position, and comparison of four listed companies, 319, 328–329

财务报告。参见财务报表；具体报告

financial reports. see financial statements; specific report

金融服务组织/行业，248–250

financial service organizations/industry, 248–250

财务报表，229–230，429–430。另请参阅每股收益；证券分析；报告类型

financial statements, 229–230, 429–430. see also per-share earnings; security analysis; type of report

芬博克斯，386

Finbox, 386

Finchat.io，386

Finchat.io, 386

FinViz，386

FinViz, 386

费舍尔，劳伦斯，67n

Fisher, Lawrence, 67n

费舍尔，菲利普A.，293n7

Fisher, Philip A., 293n7

固定价值投资，505–506。另见投资类型

fixed-value investments, 505–506. see also type of investment

佛罗里达房地产崩盘，144–145

Florida real estate, collapse of, 144–145

波动，市场

fluctuations, market

以及激进的投资者，32

and aggressive investors, 32

和资产配置，193

and asset allocation, 193

债券价格，203–208

in bond prices, 203–208

账面价值和，194–197，194n，199n

book value and, 194–197, 194n, 199n

和人类大脑，217–219

and the human brain, 217–219

以及低买高卖的方法，189–190

and buy-low-sell-high approach, 189–190

防御型投资者，186

and defensive investors, 186

例如，196–201，229n

example of, 196–201, 229n

和预测，186–189，187n，202–203，206

and forecasting, 186–189, 187n, 202–203, 206

和公式投资计划，191–192，191n

and formula investment plans, 191–192, 191n

作为投资决策的指导，186–189

as guide to investment decisions, 186–189

历史（1871-1972），4，65-72

history of (1871-1972), 4, 65–72

和投资者，185–219

and investors, 185–219

投资者投资组合，191–193

of investor’s portfolio, 191–193

管理人员和，202–204

managers and, 202–204

摩根的评论，54，54n

Morgan’s comments about, 54, 54n

以及市场先生的寓言，200–201，209–219

and Mr. Market parable, 200–201, 209–219

时机和定价，186–189，202–203

timing and pricing of, 186–189, 202–203

和估价，185、186、191–193、207

and valuation, 185, 186, 191–193, 207

FMC公司，543–544, 557–558

FMC Corp., 543–544, 557–558

福利，约翰，439

Foley, John, 439

财务报表脚注，300，429-430

footnotes to financial statements, 300, 429–430

强制出售股票，199–200

forced sale of stock, 199–200

福特汽车公司，443

Ford Motor Co., 443

预测

forecasting

和建议，248–250

and advice, 248–250

以及激进的投资者，363–364

and aggressive investors, 363–364

防御性投资者，349–350，349n

and defensive investors, 349–350, 349n

外国股票/债券，135、138–139、176–178、233–234

foreign stocks/bonds, 135, 138–139, 176–178, 233–234

和股票市场的历史，72–79

and history of stock market, 72–79

通货膨胀，48，50，54，54n

of inflation, 48, 50, 54, 54n

投资与投机，23n

and investments vs. speculation, 23n

和市场波动，186–189，187n，202–203，206

and market fluctuations, 186–189, 187n, 202–203, 206

以及拉斯科布的处方，2

and Raskob’s prescription, 2

可靠性，10

reliability of, 10

和安全分析，270，271n，276-279，280n，286-288

and security analysis, 270, 271n, 276–279, 280n, 286–288

和库存选择，349–350，349n，363–364

and selection of stock, 349–350, 349n, 363–364

和猜测，568

and speculation, 568

不可预测的，363–364

the unpredictable, 363–364

公式投资/交易，26–28，91–93，188–189。另见具体公式

formula investing/trading, 26–28, 91–93, 188–189. see also specific formula

公式计划/计划器，191–192，191n

formula plans/planners, 191–192, 191n

配方奶粉的时机，158–159

formula timing, 158–159

财富 500 强榜单，424n

Fortune 500 list, 424n

四季护理，234

Four Seasons Nursing, 234

“特许经营”公司，173–174、173n、420、431–435

“franchise” companies, 173–174, 173n, 420, 431–435

欺诈，229–230，407，427n，448n

fraud, 229–230, 407, 427n, 448n

法国指券，409，409n

French assignats, 409, 409n

Friend-Blume-Crockett研究，363

Friend-Blume-Crockett study, 363

朋友或亲戚的建议，258

friends or relatives, advice from, 258

织布机的果实，302n

Fruit of the Loom, 302n

FTX，148–149

FTX, 148–149

FuelCell Energy Inc.，42

FuelCell Energy Inc., 42

基本投资公司，224

Fundamental Investments Co., 224

基金行业。参见投资基金

fund industry. see investment funds

GAAP。参见公认会计原则 (GAAP)

GAAP. see generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)

高尔顿，弗朗西斯，129

Galton, Francis, 129

“赌徒谬误”，456n

“gambler’s fallacy,” 456n

赌博, 18n, 19–20, 37, 195n, 356, 463, 511, 512n

gambling, 18n, 19–20, 37, 195n, 356, 463, 511, 512n

赌博化投资工具，125–127

gamblified investing tools, 125–127

和期权交易，416–417

and options trading, 416–417

GameStop Corp. ，41、42、128、216–217

GameStop Corp., 41, 42, 128, 216–217

Gawande，Atul，292n4

Gawande, Atul, 292n4

GEICO。请参阅政府雇员保险公司。

GEICO. see Government Employees Insurance Co.

通用美国投资者，234–235

General American Investors, 234–235

通用电气公司，54–55、161–162、278、285、337、338

General Electric Co., 54–55, 161–162, 278, 285, 337, 338

通用食品公司，278，337，338

General Foods Corp., 278, 337, 338

公认会计原则（GAAP），307–315，484n5

generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), 307–315, 484n5

通用汽车公司， 2，168，278，281，285，337，338，443

General Motors Corp., 2, 168, 278, 281, 285, 337, 338, 443

吉利德科学公司，391

Gilead Sciences Inc., 391

约翰·沃尔夫冈·冯·歌德，409–411

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 409–411

黄金，购买，55，55n，60–61，60n3

gold, buying, 55, 55n, 60–61, 60n3

Goodbody & Co.，254n

Goodbody & Co., 254n

《善意判断》开篇，525–527

Good Judgment Open, 525–527

商誉，374，375–376，375n，378，424–426，451，563–564

goodwill, 374, 375–376, 375n, 378, 424–426, 451, 563–564

固特异轮胎公司，278，337，338

Goodyear Tire Co., 278, 337, 338

谷歌，217，394

Google, 217, 394

戈登·迈伦，84岁

Gordon, Myron, 84

戈登方程，24n，84

Gordon equation, 24n, 84

政府雇员金融公司，531n

Government Employees Financial Corp., 531n

政府雇员保险公司（GEICO），221n，492–493，531n

Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO), 221n, 492–493, 531n

格雷厄姆，本杰明

Graham, Benjamin

巴菲特的致敬，xiv-xv

Buffett’s tribute to, xiv–xv

商业原则，515–516

business principles of, 515–516

投资定义，18，34，34n2

definition of investment of, 18, 34, 34n2

门徒，535–558

disciples of, 535–558

预测，23–24，24n

forecasts of, 23–24, 24n

误判，48–50，50n

misjudgments of, 48–50, 50n

照片，十六

photo, xvi

茨威格的评论，xviii-xxi

Zweig’s comments about, xviii–xxi

格雷厄姆-纽曼公司，221n，366-368，366n，531n，539

Graham-Newman Corp., 221n, 366–368, 366n, 531n, 539

Graham-Newman 方法总结，366–368

Graham-Newman methods, summary of, 366–368

格兰杰（ WW），385，387，388

Grainger (W.W.), 385, 387, 388

大西洋和太平洋茶叶公司，196–201，199n

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 196–201, 199n

贪婪，193，434–435，435n

greed, 193, 434–435, 435n

Groupon公司，309

Groupon, Inc., 309

增长。另见特定公司

growth. see also specific company

平均303–306

average, 303–306

过去利率的计算，303–306

calculation of past rate of, 303–306

和普通股，408

and common stock, 408

以及四家上市公司的比较，319，327–328

and comparison of four listed companies, 319, 327–328

定义，159

definition of, 159

和股息，488–489，490–491

and dividends, 488–489, 490–491

和成长股，221–222

and growth stocks, 221–222

股票市场的历史和预测，73

and history and forecasting of stock market, 73

和安全边际，508–509，510

and margin of safety, 508–509, 510

和市场波动，9，195n

and market fluctuations, 9, 195n

共同基金，160n，161n ， 161，221n

mutual funds for, 160n, 161n, 161, 221n

和每股收益，303–306，305n

and per-share earnings, 303–306, 305n

以及针对激进投资者的投资组合政策，158、159–160、160n、180–184

and portfolio policy for aggressive investors, 158, 159–160, 160n, 180–184

防御性投资者的投资组合政策，114–115、116–117、123

and portfolio policy for defensive investors, 114–115, 116–117, 123

和风险，161–162

and risk, 161–162

和安全分析，270，271，271n，282-287

and security analysis, 270, 271, 271n, 282–287

减速，305n

slow down in, 305n

推测，564–566

speculative, 564–566

以及针对激进投资者的股票选择，364–365, 370, 371–372, 375–376, 378

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 364–365, 370, 371–372, 375–376, 378

以及防御性投资者的股票选择，323–324、333、334、335–336、338–339、340–342、341、349–350

and stock selection for defensive investors, 323–324, 333, 334, 335–336, 338–339, 340–342, 341, 349–350

和投资者类型，6-8

and types of investors, 6–8

格林，里克，542

Guerin, Rick, 542

海湾与西部公司，406

Gulf & Western Inc., 406

H & R Block公司，453–456，455，468，477–479，478

H&R Block, Inc., 453–456, 455, 468, 477–479, 478

哈里森，亚瑟，86n1

Harrison, Arthur, 86n1

哈特，凯文，154

Hart, Kevin, 154

哈维，坎贝尔 R.，60n4

Harvey, Campbell R., 60n4

海登·斯通公司，254n

Hayden, Stone & Co., 254n

哈兹利特，威廉，298n

Hazlitt, William, 298n

对冲基金，14n3，106，147-149，152

hedge funds, 14n3, 106, 147–149, 152

对冲

hedging

以及积极的投资者，366

and aggressive investors, 366

以及对投资者的期望，25n、31、32n

and expectations for investors, 25n, 31, 32n

和通货膨胀，55-56

and inflation, 55–56

和投资基金，221n，230–231

and investment funds, 221n, 230–231

“相关”和“不相关”，366–368，367n

“related” and “unrelated,” 366–368, 367n

HEICO公司，390

HEICO Corp., 390

海涅，马克斯，383

Heine, Max, 383

放牧，544

herding, 544

高收益债券。参见垃圾债券

high-yield bonds. see junk bonds

希尔，乔安妮，414

Hill, Joanne, 414

兴登堡研究，437

Hindenburg Research, 437

后见之明偏差，357–359，360–361

hindsight bias, 357–359, 360–361

霍加斯，罗宾，290–291

Hogarth, Robin, 290–291

Horizon Corp.，234

Horizon Corp., 234

敌意收购，32n，427n

hostile takeovers, 32n, 427n

美国住房和城市发展部（HUD），97n

Housing and Urban Development (HUD), U.S. Department of, 97n

休斯顿电力公司，343

Houston Light & Power Co., 343

“多少钱？”问题，8-9

“How much?” question, 8–9

HP 公司，311–312, 312

HP Inc., 311–312, 312

哈德逊纸浆和造纸公司，541

Hudson Pulp & Paper, 541

人力资本，59

human capital, 59

选择中的“人为因素”，350–351

“human factor” in selection, 350–351

谦逊，投资者的美德，15，151

humility, investor virtue of, 15, 151

IBM。参见国际商业机器公司（IBM）

IBM. see International Business Machines (IBM)

I债券，61

I bonds, 61

iconikapp.com，503

iconikapp.com, 503

影响力资本，308

Impactive Capital, 308

收入，137，248，307–315，508–509，567–568。另请参阅特定公司

income, 137, 248, 307–315, 508–509, 567–568. see also specific company

收入债券，100–101，137

income bonds, 100–101, 137

所得税。参见税项

income tax. see taxes

独立性，投资者美德，15，151

independence, investor virtue of, 15, 151

指数基金。另见交易所交易基金 (ETF)

index funds. see also exchange-traded funds (ETFs)

防御性投资者，109，333n

and defensive investors, 109, 333n

和安全边际，524

and margin of safety, 524

和安全分析，279n

and security analysis, 279n

美国股市总额的 333n

of total U.S. stock market, 333n

类型，238–241，240

types of, 238–241, 240

工业债券，157，273–274，275–276，284

industrial bonds, 157, 273–274, 275–276, 284

罗德岛工业国民银行，370，370n

Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island, 370, 370n

工业股票，345，372–376

industrial stocks, 345, 372–376

行业。另请参阅安全类型

industry. see also type of security

分析，276–288

analysis of, 276–288

防御型投资者，21–22、24–25、24n、25n、114–115、349n

and defensive investors, 21–22, 24–25, 24n, 25n, 114–115, 349n

以及股票市场的历史和预测，48，50，54，54n

and history and forecasting of stock market, 48, 50, 54, 54n

通货膨胀，3、22–23、47–56、282–283

inflation, 3, 22–23, 47–56, 282–283

和货币幻觉，57–58

and money illusion, 57–58

预测增长，6–8，6n

predicting growth of, 6–8, 6n

和价格，49

and price, 49

以及防止……21–22、55–56

and protection against, 21–22, 55–56

以及 Raskob 的处方，2n

and Raskob’s prescription, 2n

回报/收益率，50，54，56

and returns/yield, 50, 54, 56

和风险，47n，55，56

and risk, 47n, 55, 56

和幸存者偏差，86

and survivorship bias, 86

和税收，50

and taxes, 50

影响者，153–155，440

influencers, 153–155, 440

印孚瑟斯公司，524

Infosys, 524

首次公开募股（IPO），139–141、140n、143n、146n2、147、154、258n、297n、432–433、433n。另请参阅特定公司

initial public offerings (IPOs), 139–141, 140n, 143n, 146n2, 147, 154, 258n, 297n, 432–433, 433n. see also specific company

机构投资者，115、190、210-214、211、212n2、213、253n 、413

institutional investors, 115, 190, 210–214, 211, 212n2, 213, 253n, 413

保险公司，177–178，206，207–208，493n，511

insurance companies, 177–178, 206, 207–208, 493n, 511

无形资产，393–394

intangible assets, 393–394

聪明的投资者

intelligent investors

务实，515–516

as businesslike, 515–516

和安全边际，518–529

and margin of safety, 518–529

美德，14–16

virtues of, 14–16

利息。另请参阅特定公司或证券类型

interest. see also specific company or type of security

和激进的投资者，135、135n、136、137、140–141、161–162、174

and aggressive investors, 135, 135n, 136, 137, 140–141, 161–162, 174

和便宜货，174

and bargains, 174

化合物，565–566

compound, 565–566

防御型投资者，90、94–95、96、98、99、99n、100–101、114、121–122、349n

and defensive investors, 90, 94–95, 96, 98, 99, 99n, 100–101, 114, 121–122, 349n

以及对投资者的期望，20–28，32

and expectations for investors, 20–28, 32

固定，207

fixed, 207

以及股票市场的历史和预测，70，76，77，78

and history and forecasting of stock market, 70, 76, 77, 78

通货膨胀，54，55

inflation and, 54, 55

和安全边际，508–509，508n

and margin of safety, 508–509, 508n

和安全分析，272，284，286-287，286n

and security analysis, 272, 284, 286–287, 286n

和税收，100–101

and taxes, 100–101

国际商业机器公司（IBM），6、7、73、116–117、161–162、195、234、285、369、376、378、454、489、560–563、571

International Business Machines (IBM), 6, 7, 73, 116–117, 161–162, 195, 234, 285, 369, 376, 378, 454, 489, 560–563, 571

国际财务报告准则（IFRS），308n2

International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 308n2

国际香精香料，456–458，456n ，457，468

International Flavors & Fragrances, 456–458, 456n, 457, 468

国际收割机公司，278，285，337，338，456–458，456n，457，458n，468

International Harvester Co., 278, 285, 337, 338, 456–458, 456n, 457, 458n, 468

国际镍业，278，296，337，338

International Nickel, 278, 296, 337, 338

国际纸业公司，278，337，339

International Paper Co., 278, 337, 339

国际电话电报公司，406

International Telephone & Telegraph, 406

互联网公司，258n，433n，435n

internet companies, 258n, 433n, 435n

Intuit公司，391

Intuit Inc., 391

反向基金，241

inverse funds, 241

投资银行/银行家

investment banks/bankers

和建议，246，256-258

and advice, 246, 256–258

和激进的投资者，140–142，143n，173n

and aggressive investors, 140–142, 143n, 173n

IPO，433n，434–435

IPOs, 433n, 434–435

和华尔街改革，434–435，435n

and reform of Wall Street, 434–435, 435n

作用，256–258

role of, 256–258

美国投资公司，224

Investment Company of America, 224

投资咨询公司，19、26-28、247-249、258

investment counseling firms, 19, 26–28, 247–249, 258

投资基金。另见封闭式基金；共同基金；ETF

investment funds. see also closed-end funds; mutual funds; ETFs

关于的建议，223，225

advice about, 223, 225

和激进的投资者，161，362–364

and aggressive investors, 161, 362–364

目的/宗旨，221–223

aim/purpose of, 221–223

和平衡基金投资，234–235

and balanced fund investments, 234–235

银行运营，4，227

bank-operated, 4, 227

封闭式与开放式，231–235

closed end vs. open end, 231–235

和普通股，222–223, 225, 229–230, 234–235

and common stock, 222–223, 225, 229–230, 234–235

防御性投资者，27–28，230，345–346

and defensive investors, 27–28, 230, 345–346

股息，221，231–232

dividends on, 221, 231–232

和收入，221，225–226

and earnings, 221, 225–226

费用/成本，221，221n，231n

expenses/costs of, 221, 221n, 231n

格雷厄姆的评论，220–235

Graham’s comments about, 220–235

和成长股，7，221–222

and growth stocks, 7, 221–222

和“热门”股票，6-7n

and “hot” stocks, 6–7n

影响，130n11

influences on, 130n11

和利息，221

and interest, 221

经理，4，222–226

managers of, 4, 222–226

销售方法，221

method of sale of, 221

数量，230

number of, 230

估值过高、投机性投资，4-5

overvalued, speculative investments of, 4–5

表现，222–226，230–231

performance of, 222–226, 230–231

关于的问题，221–222

questions about, 221–222

registration of, 230

监管，230–231

regulation of, 230–231

返回，234–235

return on, 234–235

和风险，225–227，230–231

and risk, 225–227, 230–231

选择，345–346，362–364

selection of, 345–346, 362–364

税收，234–235

taxes on, 234–235

类型/分类，221–222，230

type/classification of, 221–222, 230

茨威格的评论，236–245

Zweig’s comments about, 236–245

投资运营，34-35

investment operations, 34–35

投资政策声明（IPS），107-108

investment policy statement (IPS), 107–108

投资。另请参阅具体主题

investments. see also specific topic

传统与非传统，512–513

conventional and nonconventional, 512–513

定义，512

definition of, 512

期望，20–33

expectations for, 20–33

“天气晴朗” 514

“fair-weather,” 514

格雷厄姆的评论，17–33，513–517

Graham’s comments about, 17–33, 513–517

格雷厄姆的定义，18，34，34n2

Graham’s definition of, 18, 34, 34n2

长期的重要性，560–562

importance of long-term, 560–562

大笔金钱，541

of large sums of money, 541

自 1964 年以来发生了重大变化，20–23

major change since 1964 in, 20–23

安全边际作为核心概念，505–517

margin of safety as central concept, 505–517

机会，514，530–532

opportunities for, 514, 530–532

推测与，10，17-33，35-46，512-513

speculation vs., 10, 17–33, 35–46, 512–513

茨威格的评论，34–46

Zweig’s comments about, 34–46

投资者。另见投资者类型

investors. see also type of investor

主动和被动，109

active and passive, 109

行动主义，458，458n，496

activism of, 458, 458n, 496

和娱乐投资，37

and amusement investing, 37

清单，291–294

checklists for, 291–294

控制行为，23n

controlling behavior of, 23n

勇气，516–517

courage of, 516–517

防守，89

defensive, 89

纪律，23n，190n

discipline of, 23n, 190n

和股息，487–494

and dividends, 487–494

情绪，8，18，190n，217–218

emotions of, 8, 18, 190n, 217–218

并努力投资，37

and endeavor investing, 37

进取，104–105

enterprising, 104–105

期望，20–33，24n

expectations for, 20–33, 24n

格雷厄姆的评论，486–494

Graham’s comments about, 486–494

缺乏经验，127

inexperienced, 127

通货膨胀，47–56

inflation and, 47–56

讽刺的情况，349n

ironical situation of, 349n

经理/管理层，486–494

managers/management, 486–494

术语含义，17-21

meaning of term, 17–21

混合进攻和防御，176–177, 178–179

as mixed aggressive and defensive, 176–177, 178–179

新手，39–41

novice, 39–41

在线社区，131–132

online communities for, 131–132

以及其他人的错误，199–200

and other people’s mistakes, 199–200

和过度自信，352–361

and overconfidence, 352–361

个人情况，119–121

personal situation of, 119–121

预测行为，23n

prediction behavior of, 23n

心理学，8，51，109–110，119，192–193

psychology of, 8, 51, 109–110, 119, 192–193

“鲁莽”，18

“reckless,” 18

与公司的关系，162，164n，199–200

relationship with company of, 162, 164n, 199–200

自我挫败行为，12–13

self-defeating behavior of, 12–13

自我认知，106

self-knowledge of, 106

投机者区别于，1–2，10，17–33，35–46，201–203

speculators distinguished from, 1–2, 10, 17–33, 35–46, 201–203

类型，5–6

types of, 5–6

和不确定性，88

and uncertainty, 88

价值观，242–244

values of, 242–244

故意无知，40–41

willfully ignorant, 40–41

茨威格的评论，495–504

Zweig’s comments about, 495–504

投资者股票基金，224

Investors Stock Fund, 224

首次公开募股(IPO)。参见首次公开募股

IPOs. see initial public offerings

IPS。参见投资政策声明 (IPS)

IPS. see investment policy statement (IPS)

ITI公司，370

ITI Corp., 370

Jacob（Ryan）互联网基金，229n

Jacob (Ryan) Internet Fund, 229n

Jantzen Inc. ，377，378

Jantzen Inc., 377, 378

杰多高地煤炭，541

Jeddo Highland Coal, 541

约翰斯·曼维尔公司，278，337，339

Johns Manville Corp., 278, 337, 339

摩根大通股票溢价收益ETF，418

JPMorgan Equity Premium Income ETF, 418

摩根大通纳斯达克股票溢价收益ETF，418

JPMorgan Nasdaq Equity Premium Income ETF, 418

初级股票发行。参见普通股

junior stock issues. see common stock

垃圾债券，97，97n，427n

junk bonds, 97, 97n, 427n

卡尼曼，丹尼尔，358

Kahneman, Daniel, 358

卡普兰，GE，229

Kaplan, G.E., 229

卡普，莫里斯，448n

Karp, Morris, 448n

卡什纳，伊丽莎白，241–242

Kashner, Elisabeth, 241–242

Kayos公司，445n

Kayos, Inc., 445n

Kayser-Roth公司，379，380–381

Kayser-Roth Co., 379, 380–381

凯克家族，489n

Keck family, 489n

凯恩斯，约翰·梅纳德，134n

Keynes, John Maynard, 134n

金资源公司，234

King Resources Co., 234

基茨，迈克尔，262

Kitces, Michael, 262

克纳普，汤姆，540

Knapp, Tom, 540

科伊芬，386

Koyfin, 386

兰格，艾伦，356

Langer, Ellen, 356

诉讼，176，176n

lawsuits, 176, 176n

学习环境，290–291

learning environments, 290–291

雷曼兄弟控股公司，498–499

Lehman Brothers Holdings, 498–499

雷曼公司，234–235

Lehman Corp., 234–235

《投资者的教训》（格雷厄姆），567，568

Lessons for Investors (Graham), 567, 568

LetsMakeAPlan.org，264

LetsMakeAPlan.org, 264

字母纸，3，3n，220–221，220n，229–230

letter stocks, 3, 3n, 220–221, 220n, 229–230

杠杆作用，282–283

leverage, 282–283

杠杆收购，32n，427n

leveraged buyouts, 32n, 427n

杠杆基金，241

leveraged funds, 241

负债，334、340-342、341、371、377n .另见特定公司

liabilities, 334, 340–342, 341, 371, 377n. see also specific company

人寿保险， 90，118–119，347

life insurance, 90, 118–119, 347

Ling-Temco-Vought Inc.，4n ，406，411–412，420，423–427，423n

Ling-Temco-Vought Inc., 4n, 406, 411–412, 420, 423–427, 423n

LinkedIn，480

LinkedIn, 480

清算，31，366–367

liquidations, 31, 366–367

流动性，199–200，297n

liquidity, 199–200, 297n

锂，64

lithium, 64

负荷资金，221

load funds, 221

孤独，218

loneliness, 218

长期资本管理有限公司，14

Long-Term Capital Management L.P., 14

卢米斯，卡罗尔，293n7

Loomis, Carol, 293n7

洛兹敦汽车公司，42

Lordstown Motors Corp., 42

洛里，詹姆斯·H.，67n

Lorie, James H., 67n

损失。另见特定公司

losses. see also specific company

“结转”，302n

“carrying forward,” 302n

以及格雷厄姆对投资的定义，34n2

and Graham’s definition of investment, 34n2

和安全边际，508–509，511

and margin of safety, 508–509, 511

和每股收益，299、300–301、302n

and per-share earnings, 299, 300–301, 302n

低乘数股票，372–376，449，508–509

low-multiplier stocks, 372–376, 449, 508–509

LTV公司，424n

LTV Corp., 424n

Lubin，Melanie Senter，267n6

Lubin, Melanie Senter, 267n6

朗讯科技公司，183

Lucent Technologies Inc., 183

运气，356，397n11，532

luck, 356, 397n11, 532

林奇，彼得，241

Lynch, Peter, 241

麦金托什，詹姆斯，243

Mackintosh, James, 243

“疯狂金钱”账户，20，46，294n8，419

“mad money” account, 20, 46, 294n8, 419

经理/管理层

managers/management

补偿，312–315，314，503–504

compensation for, 312–315, 314, 503–504

权限，280，486

competence of, 280, 486

可转换债券和认股权证，405

and convertible issues and warrants, 405

和股息，487–491

and dividends, 487–491

格雷厄姆的评论，486–494

Graham’s comments about, 486–494

投资基金，222–226，237–238，279n

of investment funds, 222–226, 237–238, 279n

投资者关系，486–494

investor’s relations with, 486–494

和市场波动，202–204

and market fluctuations, 202–204

每股收益，300–301

and per-share earnings, 300–301

穷人，487

poor, 487

和安全分析，280

and security analysis, 280

以及针对激进投资者的股票选择，364–365

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 364–365

茨威格的评论，495–504

Zweig’s comments about, 495–504

曼哈顿基金公司，226–229

Manhattan Fund, Inc., 226–229

保证金账户，20，20n，47n，189–190，254–255

margin accounts, 20, 20n, 47n, 189–190, 254–255

保证金债务，151

margin debt, 151

安全边际，10，285，335，505–529，508n ， 512n，535，545，567，570

margin of safety, 10, 285, 335, 505–529, 508n, 512n, 535, 545, 567, 570

马克尔公司，504

Markel Corp., 504

麻省投资信托，224

Massachusetts Investment Trust, 224

财务规划师（MFP），263

Master Financial Planner (MFP), 263

数学，565–566

mathematics, 565–566

美泰公司，234

Mattel Inc., 234

莫布森，迈克尔·J.，129n9、293n7、394n7、497n3

Mauboussin, Michael J., 129n9, 293n7, 394n7, 497n3

麦克斯韦汽车公司，280

Maxwell Motors Co., 280

麦克斯韦尔·泰尔瓦格，263

Maxwell Tailwagger, 263

麦考密克收割机公司，456n

McCormick Harvesting Machine Co., 456n

麦格劳·爱迪生，459–461，459n ，460，468

McGraw Edison, 459–461, 459n, 460, 468

麦格劳-希尔公司，136，459–461，459n ，460，468，469，469

McGraw-Hill, Inc., 136, 459–461, 459n, 460, 468, 469, 469

麦夸里，爱德华，86岁

McQuarrie, Edward, 86

模因股票，41、42–44、128、216、471–472

meme stocks, 41, 42–44, 128, 216, 471–472

Mergenthaler Linotype 企业，316

Mergenthaler Linotype Enterprises, 316

并购

mergers and acquisitions

和激进的投资者，174–175，366–367，375n，379

and aggressive investors, 174–175, 366–367, 375n, 379

和案例历史，420、422、422n、424、424n

and case histories, 420, 422, 422n, 424, 424n

投资与投机，31，32n

and investments vs. speculation, 31, 32n

美林证券，254n，400n

Merrill Lynch & Co., 254n, 400n

元平台，162n

Meta Platforms, 162n

微型股，385

microcaps, 385

微软公司，313，314，391，393，479–480，480，524

Microsoft Corp., 313, 314, 391, 393, 479–480, 480, 524

MicroStrategy Inc. ，43，479–480，480

MicroStrategy Inc., 43, 479–480, 480

米德尔比公司，390

Middleby Corp., 390

米勒，默顿，492n

Miller, Merton, 492n

米尔顿，特雷弗，437–438

Milton, Trevor, 437–438

明科，巴里，431n

Minkow, Barry, 431n

米妮·珀尔鸡肉系统公司，461，464

Minnie Pearl’s Chicken System Inc., 461, 464

护城河，392

moats, 392

美孚机油 489n、496

Mobil Oil, 489n, 496

莫迪利亚尼，弗朗哥，492n

Modigliani, Franco, 492n

“基金经理”，229，230-231

“money managers,” 229, 230–231

垄断，340–342

monopolies, 340–342

怪物饮料公司，390

Monster Beverage Corp., 390

蒙哥马利·沃德，496

Montgomery Ward, 496

穆迪投资服务，96，248-249

Moody’s Investment Service, 96, 248–249

Moomoo，39岁

Moomoo, 39

摩尔，唐，359

Moore, Don, 359

摩根，JP，54岁，54n

Morgan, J.P., 54, 54n

摩根担保银行，227n

Morgan Guaranty Bank, 227n

晨星，386

Morningstar, 386

抵押贷款，174，345–346

mortgages, 174, 345–346

市场先生寓言，200–201、209–219、366n、385、387、440–441、525

Mr. Market parable, 200–201, 209–219, 366n, 385, 387, 440–441, 525

美国税务先生，431，431n

Mr. Tax of America, 431, 431n

MSCI 所有国家全球指数，109，238

MSCI All-Country World Index, 109, 238

MSCI全球污染防治指数，243

MSCI Global Pollution Prevention Index, 243

芒格，查尔斯T.（ “查理”），14、215、382–383、397、527、542、552–553

Munger, Charles T. (“Charlie”), 14, 215, 382–383, 397, 527, 542, 552–553

市政债券

municipal bonds

和激进的投资者，135n，157

and aggressive investors, 135n, 157

防御性投资者，93，96

and defensive investors, 93, 96

价格波动，204，206

fluctuations in price of, 204, 206

和猜测，22–23，512–513

and speculation, 22–23, 512–513

马斯克、埃隆、162n、216、481、482、484

Musk, Elon, 162n, 216, 481, 482, 484

共同基金。另见投资基金；特定基金

mutual funds. see also investment funds; specific fund

和激进的投资者，141n，160n，161n，363

and aggressive investors, 141n, 160n, 161n, 363

封闭式基金 vs. 开放式基金，231–235

closed-end funds vs. open-end, 231–235

关闭，231n

closing of, 231n

和公司债券，272n

and corporate bonds, 272n

防御性投资者，26–27、27n、90、97n、345–346

and defensive investors, 26–27, 27n, 90, 97n, 345–346

费用/成本，362–363

expenses/costs of, 362–363

“重点”投资组合，279n

“focused” portfolios of, 279n

和成长股，160n，161n，161

and growth stocks, 160n, 161n, 161

经理，279n

managers of, 279n

和市场波动，6n，7

and market fluctuations, 6n, 7

和新产品，141n

and new offerings, 141n

表现，222–226，236–238，237，363，376n

performance of, 222–226, 236–238, 237, 363, 376n

以及公众对股票的态度，18n

and public attitude about stocks, 18n

registration of, 230

作为“受监管投资公司”（RIC），221n

as “regulated investment company” (RIC), 221n

返回，279n

return on, 279n

及二级公司，173n

and secondary companies, 173n

和安全分析，279n

and security analysis, 279n

和猜测，4-5

and speculation, 4–5

和幸存者偏差，86n1

and survivorship bias, 86n1

税收，221n

taxes on, 221n

类型，221n，230–231

type of, 221n, 230–231

共同股份，383

Mutual Shares, 383

近视，153

myopia, 153

名牌，378

name brands, 378

NAPFA.org，264

NAPFA.org, 264

纳斯达克，87，400n，1359

NASDAQ, 87, 400n, 1359

国家饮料公司，391

National Beverage Corp., 391

国家饼干公司，379

National Biscuit Co., 379

国家收银机，234

National Cash Register, 234

国家通用公司，4n ，406，409，461-464，462，464n ， 468，469

National General Corp., 4n, 406, 409, 461–464, 462, 464n, 468, 469

国家投资者基金，224

National Investors Fund, 224

国家普雷斯托工业公司，169，377，379，461–464，462，464n，468，507

National Presto Industries, 169, 377, 379, 461–464, 462, 464n, 468, 507

全国学生营销公司，227n，234

National Student Marketing Corp., 227n, 234

纳威司达，456n，458n

Navistar, 456n, 458n

净资产价值。参见账面价值

net asset value. see book value

净流动资产。参见营运资本

net current assets. see working capital

Netflix公司，390

Netflix Inc, 390

新社区债券，96，97，157

New Community debentures, 96, 97, 157

纽黑文铁路，275

New Haven Railroad, 275

新住房管理局，97，97n，157

New Housing Authority, 97, 97n, 157

纽曼，杰罗姆，530n，531n

Newman, Jerome, 530n, 531n

纽曼，保罗，445n

Newman, Paul, 445n

新产品。另见首次公开募股

new offerings. see also initial public offerings

和建议，256–257

and advice, 256–257

和激进的投资者，135、139–145、173–178、378

and aggressive investors, 135, 139–145, 173–178, 378

和案例历史，431–435

and case histories, 431–435

普通股，140n，141–145，257

of common stock, 140n, 141–145, 257

防御性投资者，176–177

and defensive investors, 176–177

投资与投机，26–27

and investments vs. speculation, 26–27

和市场波动，189–190

and market fluctuations, 189–190

每股收益 297n

and per-share earnings, 297n

价格：400

and price, 400

以及投资银行家的作用，256–257

and role of investment bankers, 256–257

和估值，173–174

and valuation, 173–174

牛顿，艾萨克，13–14

Newton, Isaac, 13–14

纽约中央铁路，422n

New York Central Railroad, 422n

纽约爱迪生公司，562–564

New York Edison Co., 562–564

纽约证券交易所（NYSE）

New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)

成员的建议，250，252–253，254–255，258，259

advice from members of, 250, 252–253, 254–255, 258, 259

注册公司破产，254

bankruptcy of firms registered with, 254

比较四家上市公司，316–324

comparison of four companies listed on, 316–324

和证券比较，1

and comparison of securities, 1

以及可转换债券和认股权证，407n

and convertible issues and warrants, 407n

“客户经纪人”，注册于 252–253

“customers’ brokers” as registered with, 252–253

以及与经纪公司的交易，138–140，254–255

and dealings with brokerage firms, 138–140, 254–255

和股息，491–492，492n

and dividends, 491–492, 492n

最高价股票，489n

highest-price stock on, 489n

每股收益 299–300

and per-share earnings, 299–300

积极投资者的股票选择，198，363

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 198, 363

防御型投资者的股票选择，340–342

and stock selection for defensive investors, 340–342

和股票分割，491–492

and stock splits, 491–492

库存周转率，254–255

turnover of stock on, 254–255

和第一次世界大战，10

and World War I, 10

纽约 Trap Rock 公司，541

New York Trap Rock Co., 541

NFT。参见非同质化代币 (NFT)

NFTs. see non-fungible tokens (NFTs)

尼亚加拉-莫霍克电力公司，343

Niagara-Mohawk Power Co., 343

“漂亮 50” 股票，322n

“Nifty Fifty” stocks, 322n

尼古拉公司，43，436，437-438，438

Nikola Corp., 43, 436, 437–438, 438

蔚来汽车，43

NIO Inc., 43

尼克松，理查德·M.，50n

Nixon, Richard M., 50n

免佣基金，221，221n，232

no-load funds, 221, 221n, 232

不可转换债券，99–100，135

nonconvertible bonds, 99–100, 135

非同质化代币（NFT），154–156

non-fungible tokens (NFTs), 154–156

非交易房地产，106

non-traded real estate, 106

诺福克和西部，423

Norfolk & Western, 423

诺福克南方铁路，348n，423n

Norfolk Southern Railroad, 348n, 423n

北太平洋铁路，169，204，205

Northern Pacific Railway, 169, 204, 205

西北工业公司，302，302n，406

Northwest Industries Inc., 302, 302n, 406

挪威债券，138–139

Norway bonds, 138–139

诺和诺德ADR，481–482

Novo Nordisk ADR, 481–482

NVF 公司，405、420、427–431、427n、431n

NVF Corp., 405, 420, 427–431, 427n, 431n

NVIDIA公司，390，481-482，500，524

NVIDIA Corp., 390, 481–482, 500, 524

NVR公司，389，390

NVR Inc., 389, 390

石油公司，279–280，280n，281

oil companies, 279–280, 280n, 281

老道明货运公司，391

Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391

在线交易，39，131–132，153

online trading, 39, 131–132, 153

安大略省证券委员会，126

Ontario Securities Commission, 126

OpenAI，480

OpenAI, 480

开放式基金，116–117，231–235，231n。另见共同基金

open-end funds, 116–117, 231–235, 231n. see also mutual funds

机遇，认识，530–532

opportunities, recognizing, 530–532

期权，股票，3，3n，413–419。另请参阅看涨期权和看涨期权；看跌期权；认股权证；特定公司

options, stock, 3, 3n, 413–419. see also calls and call options; put options; warrants; specific company

Oracle公司，312–313, 314

Oracle Corp., 312–313, 314

命令，执行，255–256

orders, execution of, 255–256

奥德韦，菲尔，292n4

Ordway, Phil, 292n4

奥莱利汽车公司，391

O’Reilly Automotive Inc., 391

孤儿股票，383n3

orphan stocks, 383n3

过度自信，353-355

overconfidence, 353-355

高估，5，173–174，250，395。另见特定公司

overvaluation, 5, 173–174, 250, 395. see also specific company

以及激进的投资者，164–165、173–174、367–368

and aggressive investors, 164–165, 173–174, 367–368

关于“赌徒谬误”，456n

“gambler’s fallacy” about, 456n

欧文斯伊利诺伊玻璃公司，278，337，339

Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 278, 337, 339

Ozempic，481

Ozempic, 481

太平洋煤气电力公司，343

Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 343

太平洋合作伙伴有限公司，554

Pacific Partners, Ltd., 554

Palantir Technologies Inc.，43

Palantir Technologies Inc., 43

查马斯·帕里哈皮蒂亚，154, 436, 440–441

Palihapitiya, Chamath, 154, 436, 440–441

格温妮丝·帕特洛，154

Paltrow, Gwyneth, 154

潘汉德尔东部管道公司，343

Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 343

派克笔公司，377，378

Parker Pen Co., 377, 378

帕斯卡，布莱斯，378，529

Pascal, Blaise, 378, 529

“帕斯卡的赌注”，378n，529

“Pascal’s wager,” 378n, 529

耐心，投资者美德，16

patience, investor virtue of, 16

Peloton Interactive Inc. ，43，436，438–439

Peloton Interactive Inc., 43, 436, 438–439

宾夕法尼亚中央铁路，4n，95，275，347-348，370，420，421-423，421n，422n，423n，559-561

Penn Central Railroad, 4n, 95, 275, 347–348, 370, 420, 421–423, 421n, 422n, 423n, 559–561

宾夕法尼亚电力公司，422

Pennsylvania Electric Co., 422

养老基金，150–151，190，427n，543–544。另见特定公司

pension funds, 150–151, 190, 427n, 543–544. see also specific company

人民天然气公司，343

Peoples Gas Co., 343

市盈率。参见市盈率

P/E ratio. see price/earnings ratio

业绩。另见“超越市场/平均水平”；具体公司或证券类型

performance. see also “beating the market/average”; specific company or type of security

和激进的投资者，173n，362–364，374

and aggressive investors, 173n, 362–364, 374

防御性投资者，334，340–342

and defensive investors, 334, 340–342

以及格雷厄姆对投资的定义，34n2

and Graham’s definition of investment, 34n2

成长股，451n

of growth stocks, 451n

和市场波动，199–200

and market fluctuations, 199–200

每股收益，305–306

and per-share earnings, 305–306

二级公司，173n

of secondary companies, 173n

和安全分析，280n ，281，288-289

and security analysis, 280n, 281, 288–289

价值股，451n

of value stocks, 451n

时尚，4

vogue of, 4

绩效基金，221–222，222n，226–231

performance funds, 221–222, 222n, 226–231

性能系统公司，461

Performance Systems Inc., 461

Perlmeter（Stan）投资，543，555

Perlmeter (Stan) Investments, 543, 555

期刊，作为建议来源，246–247

periodicals, as source of advice, 246–247

佩罗，H.罗斯，254n

Perot, H. Ross, 254n

每股收益。另见特定公司

per-share earnings. see also specific company

和普通股，302–303

and common stock, 302–303

以及可转换债券和认股权证，300–301、302–303、405、408、410

and convertible issues and warrants, 300–301, 302–303, 405, 408, 410

防御性投资者，323–324，334，337

and defensive investors, 323–324, 334, 337

和股息，490–491

and dividends, 490–491

格雷厄姆的评论，295–306

Graham’s comments about, 295–306

茨威格的评论，307–315

Zweig’s comments about, 307–315

圣彼得堡悖论，565–566

Petersburg Paradox, 565–566

辉瑞公司，309，453n

Pfizer, Inc., 309, 453n

医药股，384

pharmaceutical stocks, 384

费城电气公司，343

Philadelphia Electric Co., 343

物质资本，59

physical capital, 59

PitchBook 数据, 147

PitchBook Data, 147

PlugPower公司，43

PlugPower Inc., 43

宝丽来，234，378

Polaroid, 234, 378

Pool Corp. ，390，394–395

Pool Corp., 390, 394–395

投资组合。另请参阅资产配置；选择，股票

portfolio. see also asset allocation; selection, stock

对于激进的投资者，104、134–145、146–156、157–179、180–184、362–381

for aggressive investors, 104, 134–145, 146–156, 157–179, 180–184, 362–381

基本特征，90

basic characteristics of, 90

修改为 117–118

changes to, 117–118

和普通股，113–123，124–133

and common stocks, 113–123, 124–133

对于防御型投资者，90–101、103–106、109–111、112、113–123、124–133、323–324、333–351

for defensive investors, 90–101, 103–106, 109–111, 112, 113–123, 124–133, 323–324, 333–351

格雷厄姆的“合适个体”概念，17-33

Graham’s concept of appropriate individual, 17–33

通货膨胀，47–56

inflation and, 47–56

市场波动，以及 191–193

market fluctuations and, 191–193

监控, 184

monitoring, 184

消极发展方式，134–145，146–156

negative approach to development of, 134–145, 146–156

概述，1-11

overview about, 1–11

积极发展方针，157–179，180–184

positive approach to development of, 157–179, 180–184

重新平衡，193

rebalancing of, 193

戴夫·波特诺伊，40岁

Portnoy, Dave, 40

积极的幻想，354–355

positive illusions, 354–355

波斯纳，维克多，427n

Posner, Victor, 427n

贵金属，55

precious metals, 55

预测。参见预测

predictions. see forecasting

“优先购买权”，408

“pre-emptive right,” 408

优先股。另请参阅特定公司

preferred stock. see also specific company

和激进的投资者，99、135-138、135n、139-141、142-143、167-168、174、176-178、366-367

and aggressive investors, 99, 135–138, 135n, 139–141, 142–143, 167–168, 174, 176–178, 366–367

和平衡基金，234–235

and balanced funds, 234–235

和讨价还价，167–168，174

and bargains, 167–168, 174

以及可转换债券和认股权证，399–400、400n 、406、409、411–412

and convertible issues and warrants, 399–400, 400n, 406, 409, 411–412

防御性投资者，90、99-101、121-122、176-177、350-351

and defensive investors, 90, 99–101, 121–122, 176–177, 350–351

股息，99–100，100n，135n，274n，399，508–509

dividends on, 99–100, 100n, 135n, 274n, 399, 508–509

以及格雷厄姆的商业原则，515–516

and Graham’s business principles, 515–516

和通货膨胀，48

and inflation, 48

和投资基金，234–235

and investment funds, 234–235

和安全边际，505、506、508–509、512–513

and margin of safety, 505, 506, 508–509, 512–513

和新产品，140–141、142–143、399–400

and new offerings, 140–141, 142–143, 399–400

每股收益，302–303

and per-share earnings, 302–303

价格波动，206–207

price fluctuations in, 206–207

价格记录，399–400

price record of, 399–400

评分，206

ratings for, 206

建议“覆盖”，284

recommended “coverage” for, 284

和风险，272–276

and risk, 272–276

和安全分析，270，272-276，282-283

and security analysis, 270, 272–276, 282–283

作为优先股票发行，274n

as senior stock issues, 274n

在常见和 405–407 之间切换

switches between common and, 405–407

屈服，568–569

yield on, 568–569

价格。另请参阅升值；便宜货；波动，市场；通货膨胀；市盈率；特定公司

price. see also appreciation; bargains; fluctuations, market; inflation; price/earnings ratio; specific company

和建议，250

and advice, 250

和破产，421n

and bankruptcy, 421n

巴菲特的评论，538–539

Buffett’s comments about, 538–539

真实市场的计算，410

calculation of true market, 410

以及四家上市公司的比较，316–324，320n，323n，329

and comparison of four listed companies, 316–324, 320n, 323n, 329

以及可转换债券和认股权证，399-400，409，410

and convertible issues and warrants, 399–400, 409, 410

普通股下跌，3

decline in common stock, 3

退市股票，371n

of delisted stocks, 371n

和股息，488–489，492n

and dividends, 488–489, 492n

和收入，116，302n

and earnings, 116, 302n

以及对投资者的期望，22–23、23n、30、31

and expectations for investors, 22–23, 23n, 30, 31

关于“赌徒谬误”，456n

“gambler’s fallacy” about, 456n

以及股票市场的历史和预测，65、69、70、71、73、74、77、78、80-81、320

and history and forecasting of stock market, 65, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 78, 80–81, 320

和投资基金，231–232，232，234–235

and investment funds, 231–232, 232, 234–235

以及投资者与管理层的关系，486，487

and investor-management relations, 486, 487

和安全边际，506、508–509、508n、510–511、514–515、514n、519–522

and margin of safety, 506, 508–509, 508n, 510–511, 514–515, 514n, 519–522

和市场波动，21–23，186–189，203–208

and market fluctuations, 21–23, 186–189, 203–208

和股票错误定价，349n，383–387

and mispricing of stock, 349n, 383–387

和新产品，140–141，142–145

and new offerings, 140–141, 142–145

以及针对激进投资者的投资组合政策，4、134–135、136n、160、161、164–166、172、173–174、174–179

and portfolio policy for aggressive investors, 4, 134–135, 136n, 160, 161, 164–166, 172, 173–174, 174–179

防御性投资者的投资组合政策，98、113–117、122、176–177

and portfolio policy for defensive investors, 98, 113–117, 122, 176–177

和风险，122

and risk, 122

和猜测，568

and speculation, 568

以及针对激进投资者的股票选择，363–364、367–368、370、371–372、374、375–376、377

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 363–364, 367–368, 370, 371–372, 374, 375–376, 377

以及防御性投资者的股票选择， 323–324、333、334、335、336、336n、337、340、340–342、341、345、348–350、349n 、350–351

and stock selection for defensive investors, 323–324, 333, 334, 335, 336, 336n, 337, 340, 340–342, 341, 345, 348–350, 349n, 350–351

和时间，186–189

and timing, 186–189

不可预测性，22–23，23n

unpredictability of, 22–23, 23n

和价值，10，31，122，202–203，514–515，539

and value, 10, 31, 122, 202–203, 514–515, 539

批发，76，77

wholesale, 76, 77

价格和工资冻结，50n

price-and-wage freeze, 50n

市盈率。另见特定公司

price/earnings ratio. see also specific company

和便宜货，169

and bargains, 169

计算，161n

calculation of, 161n

CAPE比率，81–83，81

CAPE ratio, 81–83, 81

可转换债券和认股权证，410

and convertible issues and warrants, 410

70n 的定义

definition of, 70n

和成长股，161

and growth stocks, 161

以及股票市场的历史和预测，70，71，76，78

and history and forecasting of stock market, 70, 71, 76, 78

安全边际，519n2

and margin of safety, 519n2

和市场波动，189–190，196–197，198

and market fluctuations, 189–190, 196–197, 198

每股收益，305–306

and per-share earnings, 305–306

积极投资者的投资组合政策，161，161n，169

and portfolio policy for aggressive investors, 161, 161n, 169

防御性投资者的投资组合政策，115、116–117、117n

and portfolio policy for defensive investors, 115, 116–117, 117n

和安全分析，279–280，281，283–284，285

and security analysis, 279–280, 281, 283–284, 285

以及针对激进投资者的股票选择，367–368，370，371

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 367–368, 370, 371

以及防御性投资者的股票选择，323–324、335、336、336n 、338–339、340、341、345

and stock selection for defensive investors, 323–324, 335, 336, 336n, 338–339, 340, 341, 345

市资产比率，335

price-to-assets ratio, 335

首次股票发行，123

primary stock issues, 123

私人信贷基金，147–149，152

private-credit funds, 147–149, 152

私募股权和私募股权基金，106、147–149、152、172

private equity and private-equity funds, 106, 147–149, 152, 172

宝洁公司，278，337

Procter & Gamble, 278, 337

盈利能力。另见具体的盈利能力衡量标准

profitability. see also specific measure of profitability

以及四家上市公司的比较，318–319，327

and comparison of four listed companies, 318–319, 327

确定，451n

determining, 451n

和超级股票，389–396

and superstocks, 389–396

盈利再投资理论，487–493，489n

profitable reinvestment theory, 487–493, 489n

形式（“好像”）陈述，405，422n，429

pro forma (“as if”) statements, 405, 422n, 429

招股说明书，434–435

prospectus, 434–435

公共服务委员会，563–564

Public Service Commission, 563–564

公共服务电力和天然气公司，343

Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 343

公共事业

public utilities

和激进的投资者，176，374

and aggressive investors, 176, 374

和债券，275–276

and bonds, 275–276

债务，334

debt of, 334

作为防御性投资，340–345

as defensive investment, 340–345

防御性投资者，122、334、340–345、347–348

and defensive investors, 122, 334, 340–345, 347–348

股息，491–492，493–494

dividends of, 491–492, 493–494

和通货膨胀，54

and inflation, 54

投资与投机，25-26

and investments vs. speculation, 25–26

和市场波动，9，196–197

and market fluctuations, 9, 196–197

监管，275n

regulation of, 275n

和安全分析，273–274, 275–276, 284

and security analysis, 273–274, 275–276, 284

和选择股票，334, 340–345, 347–348, 374

and selection of stock, 334, 340–345, 347–348, 374

和认购权，493–494

and subscription rights, 493–494

公用事业控股公司法（1935年），275n

Public Utility Holding Company Act (1935), 275n

Purex公司，492–493

Purex Co., 492–493

普特南成长基金，224

Putnam Growth Fund, 224

看跌期权，413–414

put options, 413–414

quicken.com，159n

quicken.com, 159n

“报价”价值/损失，19

“quotational” value/loss, 19

报价，市场，73n，194–196，199–200，201，202–203

quotations, market, 73n, 194–196, 199–200, 201, 202–203

铁路。另见特定铁路

railroads. see also specific railroad

和激进的投资者，137，174–176

and aggressive investors, 137, 174–176

破产，3–4，4n，347–348，370，421，421n

bankruptcy of, 3–4, 4n, 347–348, 370, 421, 421n

和便宜货，174

and bargains, 174

债券，173–176，273–274，275–276，284，421，422，505

bonds of, 173–176, 273–274, 275–276, 284, 421, 422, 505

防御性投资者，100–101、122、345、347–348、348n

and defensive investors, 100–101, 122, 345, 347–348, 348n

和市场波动，3–4，4n，347

and market fluctuations, 3–4, 4n, 347

和安全分析，273–274, 275–276, 284

and security analysis, 273–274, 275–276, 284

和猜测，566–567

and speculation, 566–567

兰德尔，科特，227n

Randell, Cort, 227n

快速美国，406

Rapid American, 406

拉斯科布，约翰J.，1–2，2n

Raskob, John J., 1–2, 2n

债券评级，96、206、207、272n、336n

rating, of bonds, 96, 206, 207, 272n, 336n

雷亚·詹姆斯，182

Rea, James, 182

Rea-Graham基金，182

Rea-Graham fund, 182

房地产，55–56，62，106，147–149，199–200，408，409n，513–514

real estate, 55–56, 62, 106, 147–149, 199–200, 408, 409n, 513–514

房地产投资信托公司，444–448，446，449，468

Real Estate Investment Trust Company, 444–448, 446, 449, 468

纽约房地产股票公司，444–448、445n、446、448n、468

Realty Equities Corp. of New York, 444–448, 445n, 446, 448n, 468

再平衡，109–111，112，193

rebalancing, 109–111, 112, 193

Reddit，128

Reddit, 128

再投资

reinvestment

防御性投资者，114

and defensive investors, 114

和股息，487–491，489n，490–493

and dividends, 487–491, 489n, 490–493

和安全边际，508–509

and margin of safety, 508–509

积极投资者的投资组合，173–174

and portfolio for aggressive investors, 173–174

房地产投资信托基金(REITs)。参见房地产投资信托基金

REITs. see Real Estate Investment Trusts

信实工业，524

Reliance Industries, 524

研究，161n，253n，349n，362–363

research, 161n, 253n, 349n, 362–363

研究与开发（R&D），300–301

research and development (R&D), 300–301

ResMed公司，391

ResMed Inc., 391

重组费用，311–312，424–426，426n

restructuring charges, 311–312, 424–426, 426n

零售债券，284

retail bonds, 284

退休计划。参见养老金计划；具体计划

retirement plans. see pension plans; specific plan

回报。另请参阅股息；利息；业绩；投资资本回报率 (ROIC)；收益率；特定公司或证券类型

return. see also dividends; interest; performance; return on invested capital (ROIC); yield; specific company or type of security

总计，25–26

aggregate, 25–26

对于激进的投资者，27–33, 90, 136, 174–175, 363, 366–367, 379

for aggressive investors, 27–33, 90, 136, 174–175, 363, 366–367, 379

年平均24n，33，113n

average annual, 24n, 33, 113n

复合年化，60n4

compound annualized, 60n4

对于防御型投资者，20–28、24n、90、92、93、97、113n、114、121–122、176–178

for defensive investors, 20–28, 24n, 90, 92, 93, 97, 113n, 114, 121–122, 176–178

几何平均值，60n4

geometric mean, 60n4

以及格雷厄姆的商业原则，515–516

and Graham’s business principles, 515–516

格雷厄姆的评论，17-33

Graham’s comments about, 17–33

以及格雷厄姆对投资的定义，34n2

and Graham’s definition of investment, 34n2

股票市场的历史和预测，67，78，81-84，85

and history and forecasting of stock market, 67, 78, 81–84, 85

和通货膨胀，50，54

and inflation, 50, 54

投资与投机，17，18n

and investment vs. speculation, 17, 18n

和安全边际，521–522

and margin of safety, 521–522

测量，451n

measures of, 451n

以及公众对股票的态度，18n

and public attitude about stocks, 18n

根据 Raskob 的处方，2

on Raskob’s prescription, 2

和风险，90

and risk, 90

和安全分析，279n

and security analysis, 279n

茨威格的评论，35–46，45n

Zweig’s comments about, 35–46, 45n

投资资本回报率（ROIC），394–395，395

return on invested capital (ROIC), 394–395, 395

收益债券，95

revenue bonds, 95

Riot区块链公司，43

Riot Blockchain Inc., 43

风险。另请参阅特定公司或证券类型

risk. see also specific company or type of security

和激进投资者，31、134n、135n、136–137、152、156、161–162、161n、164–168、174–176、180、184、363、378–379

and aggressive investors, 31, 134n, 135n, 136–137, 152, 156, 161–162, 161n, 164–168, 174–176, 180, 184, 363, 378–379

巴菲特的评论，544–545

Buffett’s comments about, 544–545

和看涨期权，417–419

and call options, 417–419

防御性投资者，90、97n、102–105、113、114–115、114n、116–117、121–122

and defensive investors, 90, 97n, 102–105, 113, 114–115, 114n, 116–117, 121–122

和有进取心的投资者，384n4

and enterprising investors, 384n4

以及格雷厄姆的商业原则，515–516

and Graham’s business principles, 515–516

股票市场的历史和预测，84–88

and history and forecasting of stock market, 84–88

和通货膨胀，47n，55，56

and inflation, 47n, 55, 56

投资与投机，19–20，20n

and investment vs. speculation, 19–20, 20n

和安全边际，508，508–509，514–515，514n

and margin of safety, 508, 508–509, 514–515, 514n

和市场波动，185，212-213，214n6

and market fluctuations, 185, 212–213, 214n6

和期权交易，415–417

and options trading, 415–417

和价格，122

and price, 122

和回报/奖励，90，544–545

and return/reward, 90, 544–545

和安全分析，272–276

and security analysis, 272–276

和卖空，456n

and short selling, 456n

和猜测，567

and speculation, 567

和价值，122

and value, 122

茨威格的评论，533

Zweig’s comments about, 533

Rivian Automotive Inc.，43岁

Rivian Automotive Inc., 43

罗宾汉，39，125，126，127n7，437

Robinhood, 39, 125, 126, 127n7, 437

机器人顾问，261

robo-advisors, 261

罗戈津斯基，海梅，40岁

Rogozinski, Jaime, 40

罗斯商店公司，390

Ross Stores Inc., 390

罗斯，艾伦，263

Roth, Allan, 263

罗斯柴尔德家族，32，32n

Rothschild family, 32, 32n

轮盘赌，511，512n

roulette, 511, 512n

罗斯公司，234

Rouse Corp., 234

鲁安·比尔，541，542，543

Ruane, Bill, 541, 542, 543

“72规则”，116n，286n

“Rule of 72,” 116n, 286n

“对立律”，204，204n

“rule of opposites,” 204, 204n

悲伤，218

sadness, 218

“原则安全”，17

“safety of principle,” 17

债券安全测试，272–276

safety tests, for bonds, 272–276

Salesforce，313

Salesforce, 313

旧金山房地产投资者，445n

San Francisco Real Estate Investors, 445n

圣达菲工业公司，370

Santa Fe Industries, 370

桑塔亚那，乔治，1

Santayana, Geoge, 1

储蓄账户，22–23，55，75，98

savings accounts, 22–23, 55, 75, 98

储蓄和贷款协会，345–346

savings and loan associations, 345–346

储蓄银行，90，98

savings banks, 90, 98

储蓄债券，22–23，61，207

savings bonds, 22–23, 61, 207

撒克逊工业，234

Saxon Industries, 234

沃尔特·J ·施洛斯，539–540、541–542、543、547–548

Schloss, Walter J., 539–540, 541–542, 543, 547–548

编剧，386

screenwriting, 386

斯卡德、史蒂文斯和克拉克，248

Scudder, Stevens & Clark, 248

西尔斯罗巴克公司，278，304，304，337，339，499

Sears Roebuck Co., 278, 304, 304, 337, 339, 499

SEC.参见证券交易委员会

SEC. see Securities and Exchange Commission

二级公司，5、123、171–174、173n、176–179、192–193、192n、282–283、369–370、512–513

secondary companies, 5, 123, 171–174, 173n, 176–179, 192–193, 192n, 282–283, 369–370, 512–513

证券，交付和接收，255–256，256n

securities, delivery and receipt of, 255–256, 256n

证券交易委员会（SEC）

Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC)

和 GAAP 规则，308

and GAAP rules, 308

和 GEICO，531n

and GEICO, 531n

和对冲基金，367n

and hedge funds, 367n

调查，437

investigations by, 437

和投资基金，221n，230

and investment funds, 221n, 230

和 IPO，434–435

and IPOs, 434–435

和字母股票，3n

and letter-stocks, 3n

和共同基金，116–117

and mutual funds, 116–117

和新问题，378

and new issues, 378

和NVF-Sharon钢表壳，427n

and NVF-Sharon Steel case, 427n

和房地产股票案，448n

and Realty Equities case, 448n

经纪公司监管，229–230，254

regulation of brokerage firms by, 229–230, 254

公用事业监管，275n

regulation of public utilities by, 275n

和安全分析，275–276，275n

and security analysis, 275–276, 275n

网站，292n5

website for, 292n5

证券投资者保护公司（SIPC），256

Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC), 256

证券分析。另见案例历史；金融分析师；每股收益；选择，股票；证券类型

security analysis. see also case histories; financial analysts; per-share earnings; selection, stock; type of security

和建议，248–249

and advice, 248–249

对于激进的投资者来说，362–381

for aggressive investors, 362–381

以及四家上市公司的比较，316–324

and comparison of four listed companies, 316–324

和成长股，283–287

and growth stocks, 283–287

每股收益，295–306

and per-share earnings, 295–306

预测/定性方法，349–351，349n

prediction/qualitative approach to, 349–351, 349n

保护/量化方法，349n，350–351

protection/quantitative approach to, 349n, 350–351

和风险，272–276

and risk, 272–276

以及普通股投机，568

and speculation in common stocks, 568

技术，270，271，271n

techniques for, 270, 271, 271n

以及两部分评估过程，305–306

and two-part appraisal process, 305–306

和估值，270–271

and valuation, 270–271

茨威格的评论，290–294

Zweig’s comments about, 290–294

《证券分析》（格雷厄姆和多德），17，272，421，535，546，559–560

Security Analysis (Graham and Dodd), 17, 272, 421, 535, 546, 559–560

安全分析师。参见财务分析师

security analyst. see financial analysts

安全和分析

security and analysis

和大写，276–277

and capitalization, 276–277

特征，271

characteristics of, 271

以及四家上市公司的比较，316–324

and comparison of four listed companies, 316–324

概念，269–270

concept of, 269–270

对于防御型投资者，282–283，333–351

for defensive investors, 282–283, 333–351

和预测，270，271n，276-279，280n，286-288

and forecasting, 270, 271n, 276–279, 280n, 286–288

和成长股，270，271

and growth stocks, 270, 271

Seidt，Andrea，267n6

Seidt, Andrea, 267n6

选择，股票。另请参阅资产配置

selection, stock. see also asset allocation

并被大量人采用，191n

and adoption of schemes by large numbers of people, 191n

对于激进的投资者，29–30，362–381

for aggressive investors, 29–30, 362–381

和讨价还价问题，376–379

and bargain issues, 376–379

以及道琼斯工业平均指数中的“最佳”股票，348–349

and “best” stocks in DJIA, 348–349

和桥牌选手的类比，364–365

and bridge player analogy, 364–365

标准，323–324，334–351，371–372

criteria for, 323–324, 334–351, 371–372

对于防御型投资者，323–324、333–361、371n

for defensive investors, 323–324, 333–361, 371n

对于有进取心的投资者来说，382–397

for enterprising investors, 382–397

Graham-Newman 方法，366–368

Graham-Newman methods for, 366–368

格雷厄姆的评论，335–336，362–381

Graham’s comments about, 335–336, 362–381

格雷厄姆的标准，352，353

Graham’s criteria for, 352, 353

“人为因素”，350–351

“human factor” in, 350–351

长期和短期，28–29, 30

for long- and short-term, 28–29, 30

以及低乘数工业股票，372–376

and low-multiplier industrial stocks, 372–376

和市场波动，196–197，202–203

and market fluctuations, 196–197, 202–203

“选出赢家”，76

“pick the winners,” 76

预测/定性方法，349–350，349n

prediction/qualitative approach to, 349–350, 349n

保护/量化方法，333–334，349–351，349n

protection/quantitative approach to, 333–334, 349–351, 349n

普通股规则，114–115，117–118

rules for common stock, 114–115, 117–118

和二级公司，369–370

and secondary companies, 369–370

单一标准，372–376

single criteria for, 372–376

和特殊情况，379–381

and special situation, 379–381

和选股“系统”，40–41

and stock-picking “systems,” 40–41

茨威格的评论，352–361

Zweig’s comments about, 352–361

销售和安全边际，527–528

selling, and margin of safety, 527–528

红杉基金, 541, 551

Sequoia Fund, 541, 551

股票回购，参见股票回购

share repurchases, see buybacks of shares

股东。参见投资者

shareholders. see investors

沙龙钢铁公司，405，427–431，427n

Sharon Steel Co., 405, 427–431, 427n

罗伯特·席勒（Robert Shiller） 82岁

Shiller, Robert, 82

短路，18–19，29，31，31n，367n，456n

shorting, 18–19, 29, 31, 31n, 367n, 456n

杰里米·西格尔，2n，47n，84–85

Siegel, Jeremy, 2n, 47n, 84–85

企业规模，322–323、334、335、336、371–372、374、375–376

size of enterprise, 322–323, 334, 335, 336, 371–372, 374, 375–376

怀疑论，投资者美德，15，151

skepticism, investor virtue of, 15, 151

小型企业管理局，445

Small Business Administration, 445

智能贝塔基金，384–385

smart-beta funds, 384–385

智能手机，153

smartphones, 153

亚当·史密斯 (539–540)

Smith, Adam, 539–540

史密斯，沃尔特·白金汉，86n1

Smith, Walter Buckingham, 86n1

社会资本 Hedosophia 控股公司，439

Social Capital Hedosophia Holdings Corp., 439

社交媒体，128、130–131、216、440–441

social media, 128, 130–131, 216, 440–441

南加州爱迪生公司，343

Southern California Edison, 343

南海公司，14

South Sea Co., 14

大豆投资（坐下），382–383，397

SOYA (sit on your ass) investing, 382–383, 397

SPAC。参见特殊目的收购公司 (SPAC)

SPACs. see special-purpose acquisition companies (SPACs)

斯伯丁英国, 300

Spalding United Kingdom, 300

特别费用，296、297-299、300-301、304、410、422 。另请参阅特定公司

special charges, 296, 297–299, 300–301, 304, 410, 422. see also specific company

特殊目的收购公司（SPAC），153–156，155

special-purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), 153–156, 155

特殊情况。参见“锻炼”

special situations. see “workouts”

猜测

speculation

和建议，248–249、251–252、256、257、559

and advice, 248–249, 251–252, 256, 257, 559

和激进的投资者，141n，143–144，161–162，166，173，176，378

and aggressive investors, 141n, 143–144, 161–162, 166, 173, 176, 378

和便宜货，173

and bargains, 173

投机者的行为生命周期，36

behavioral life cycle of the speculator, 36

好处，20n

benefits of, 20n

和案例历史，431–435

and case histories, 431–435

可转换债券和认股权证，400，403

and convertible issues and warrants, 400, 403

和人群传染，128–132

and crowd contagion, 128–132

防御型投资者，90、113、115、116-117、119、128-130

and defensive investors, 90, 113, 115, 116–117, 119, 128–130

和股息，487、488–489

and dividends, 487, 488–489

期望，22–33

expectations from, 22–33

格雷厄姆的评论，17–33，559–560

Graham’s comments about, 17–33, 559–560

股票市场的历史和预测，74，81-84

and history and forecasting of stock market, 74, 81–84

和通货膨胀，47

and inflation, 47

和影响者，440

and influencers, 440

聪明，20

intelligent, 20

投资区别于，1–2，10，17–33，35–46，201–203，512–513

investing distinguished from, 1–2, 10, 17–33, 35–46, 201–203, 512–513

和投资基金，4–5，222–223，225–227，230–231

and investment funds, 4–5, 222–223, 225–227, 230–231

和安全边际，512–514

and margin of safety, 512–514

和市场波动，4–5、185、186、187–188、189–190、195

and market fluctuations, 4–5, 185, 186, 187–188, 189–190, 195

和新产品，141n，143–144，378

and new offerings, 141n, 143–144, 378

和经纪公司的问题，255

and problems of brokeragefirms, 255

以及拉斯科布的处方，2

and Raskob’s prescription, 2

投资银行家的作用，256

and role of investment bankers, 256

和安全分析，282–283

and security analysis, 282–283

茨威格的评论，35，37–38，45–46

Zweig’s comments about, 35, 37–38, 45–46

斯宾诺莎，巴鲁克，191–192

Spinoza, Baruch, 191–192

分割，股票，489，491–494，491n

splits, stock, 489, 491–494, 491n

Square公司，478

Square, Inc., 478

稳定性，178–179，319，327，334，335，371–372。另见波动性

stability, 178–179, 319, 327, 334, 335, 371–372. see also volatility

邮票，稀有，55

stamps, rare, 55

标准普尔。另见股票指南；具体公司

Standard & Poor’s. see also Stock Guide; specific company

500指数，44

500 index, 44

和建议，248

and advice, 248

和便宜货，170，172–173

and bargains, 170, 172–173

债券评级，96，421

bond ratings by, 96, 421

以及可转换债券和认股权证，398，400n

and convertible issues and warrants, 398, 400n

和股息，283n

and dividends, 283n

以及对投资者的期望，26–27，26n，27n

and expectations for investors, 26–27, 26n, 27n

以及格雷厄姆的门徒，535–536，541，542，544

and Graham’s disciples, 535–536, 541, 542, 544

以及股票市场的历史和预测，65–72、76、77、81–84

and history and forecasting of stock market, 65–72, 76, 77, 81–84

和通货膨胀，50

and inflation, 50

和投资基金，223、225、226–227、230–231、232、235n 、238

and investment funds, 223, 225, 226–227, 230–231, 232, 235n, 238

成分公司上市，319

listing of constituent companies in, 319

和市场波动，189–190，205，208

and market fluctuations, 189–190, 205, 208

以及1970年5月的惨败，460n

and May 1970 debacle, 460n

和共同基金，224

and mutual funds, 224

和激进投资者的投资组合，160，161，170，172–173

and portfolio for aggressive investors, 160, 161, 170, 172–173

防御性投资者的投资组合，109，113n

and portfolio for defensive investors, 109, 113n

市盈率，70n，81–83，81价格记录来自，401

and price/earnings ratio, 70n, 81–83, 81price record from, 401

和“二线公司”，192–193，192n

and “second-line companies,” 192–193, 192n

和安全分析，283n，287–288

and security analysis, 283n, 287–288

以及针对激进投资者的股票选择，198、363、369–373、374、376

and stock selection for aggressive investors, 198, 363, 369–373, 374, 376

防御型投资者的股票选择，340、345、346、347–348、347

and stock selection for defensive investors, 340, 345, 346, 347–348, 347

科技公司，571

and technology companies, 571

网站，192n

website for, 192n

加利福尼亚标准石油公司，169–170, 278 , 281 , 336, 337 , 339

Standard Oil of California, 169–170, 278, 281, 336, 337, 339

新泽西标准石油，278，281，337，339，427

Standard Oil of New Jersey, 278, 281, 337, 339, 427

州债券，22–23、96、248、512–513

state bonds, 22–23, 96, 248, 512–513

钢铁行业，168，364–365，369

steel industry, 168, 364–365, 369

股票。另请参阅普通股；优先股；特定股票或股票板块

stock. see also common stock; preferred stock; specific stock or sector of stock

“除名”，371n

“delisting of,” 371n

好与坏，514n

good and bad, 514n

团体购买方式，181–182

group approach to buying, 181–182

“选择”方法，148

method of “selecting,” 148

错误，183–184

mistakes, 183–184

防御型投资者的投资组合，109–111，112

and portfolio for defensive investors, 109–111, 112

公众对 18–19 岁、18n 岁的态度

public attitude about, 18–19, 18n

再平衡，109–111，112

rebalancing, 109–111, 112

流动率，254–255

turnover rate of, 254–255

监视列表，182–183

watchlists, 182–183

“浇水”，297n

“watered,” 297n

股票经纪人。参见经纪公司

stockbrokers. see brokerage firms

股票/股权比率，273–274

stock/equity ratio, 273–274

股票指南（标准普尔），144–145、170、340、369–373、369n、374、377、398、430、461、571

Stock Guide (Standard & Poor’s), 144–145, 170, 340, 369–373, 369n, 374, 377, 398, 430, 461, 571

股东。参见投资者

stockholders. see investors

股票市场。另请参阅金融市场

stock market. see also financial market

1972 年水平，72–79

1972 level in, 72–79

在中国，435n

in China, 435n

新冠疫情带来的收益，39–40

Covid pandemic gains, 39–40

和人群传染，128–132

and crowd contagion, 128–132

轻松赚钱的方法，191n

easy ways to make money in, 191n

出错了，198–200

as going wrong, 198–200

历史和预测，1、2、10、23n、54、54n、65–79、80–88

history and forecasting of, 1, 2, 10, 23n, 54, 54n, 65–79, 80–88

市场下滑，80–81

market declines, 80–81

模因股票，41，42-44

meme stocks, 41, 42–44

正和博弈，127

positive-sum game, 127

结构，569–570

structure of, 569–570

作为一个恶劣的学习环境，291

as a wicked learning environment, 291

股票

stocks

通货膨胀，62–63

inflation and, 62–63

与袜子类比，81

vs. socks analogy, 81

股票筛选器，386

stock screeners, 386

《长期股票》（西格尔），84-85

Stocks for the Long Run (Siegel), 84–85

压力，218

stress, 218

斯图贝克-沃辛顿公司，406–407

Studebaker-Worthington Corp., 406–407

认购权，493–494，493n

subscription rights, 493–494, 493n

Sundial Growers Inc.，43

Sundial Growers Inc., 43

超级预测，525–527

superforecasting, 525–527

《高级油》，489，490–491

Superior Oil, 489, 490–491

超级股票，389–396

superstocks, 389–396

“肯定的事情”，514n

“sure things,” 514n

幸存者偏差，85，86，151

survivorship bias, 85, 86, 151

斯文森，大卫，149

Swensen, David, 149

Swift ＆ Co. ，278，337，339，340，341

Swift & Co., 278, 337, 339, 340, 341

收购，427–431，427n，486–487。另见特定公司

takeovers, 427–431, 427n, 486–487. see also specific company

有形资产价值。参见账面价值

tangible-asset value. see book value

tastytrade，125

tastytrade, 125

税。另见特定公司

taxes. see also specific company

和激进的投资者，135，157

and aggressive investors, 135, 157

资本利得税，75，345

on capital gains, 75, 345

关于公司，100，177–178

on corporations, 100, 177–178

防御性投资者，92–97，97n，100–101，349n

and defensive investors, 92–97, 97n, 100–101, 349n

关于股息，100，283n，491–492，493–494

on dividends, 100, 283n, 491–492, 493–494

以及对投资者的期望，21–24、25–26、33

and expectations for investors, 21–24, 25–26, 33

股票市场的历史和预测，75

and history and forecasting of stock market, 75

和通货膨胀，50，54

and inflation, 50, 54

和利息，100–101

and interest, 100–101

和安全边际，512–513

and margin of safety, 512–513

和市场波动，203–208

and market fluctuations, 203–208

和每股收益，299、300–301、302–303、302n

and per-share earnings, 299, 300–301, 302–303, 302n

和安全分析，273–274，283n，284

and security analysis, 273–274, 283n, 284

“技术方法”，2-3

“technical approaches,” 2–3

科技股。另见具体公司

technology stocks. see also specific company

和激进的投资者，29，173n

and aggressive investors, 29, 173n

以及可转换债券和认股权证，405n

and convertible issues and warrants, 405n

和股息，489n

and dividends, 489n

股票市场的历史和预测，87

and history and forecasting of stock market, 87

和安全边际，514n

and margin of safety, 514n

和安全分析，280n，287–288

and security analysis, 280n, 287–288

和超级股票，389

and superstocks, 389

电信股票，280n，435n，514n

telecommunications stocks, 280n, 435n, 514n

提词器公司，234

Teleprompter Corp., 234

电传公司，234

Telex Corp., 234

腾讯控股，524

Tencent Holdings, 524

天纳克，456n

Tenneco, 456n

特斯拉公司，162n，243，482–484，483

Tesla Inc., 162n, 243, 482–484, 483

泰特洛克，菲利普，525，526

Tetlock, Philip, 525, 526

Tetra Tech公司，482–484，483

Tetra Tech, Inc., 482–484, 483

德士古，278，281，337，339

Texaco, 278, 281, 337, 339

德州仪器，489

Texas Instruments, 489

Theranos公司，148–149

Theranos Inc., 148–149

3M公司，563–564

3M Co., 563–564

TIKR，386

TIKR, 386

TikTok，131，481

TikTok, 131, 481

时机，158–159，186–189，202–203

timing, 158–159, 186–189, 202–203

通胀保值债券。参见国库通胀保值证券

TIPS. see Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities

托宾，詹姆斯，215

Tobin, James, 215

汤姆林森，露西尔，118–119

Tomlinson, Lucile, 118–119

商品名。参见品牌名称

trade names. see brand names

交易

trades

成本，302n，349n，371n

costs of, 302n, 349n, 371n

退市股票，371n

of delisted stocks, 371n

赌博化，125–127

gamblification of, 125–127

长期和短期，126–127

long- and short-term, 126–127

在线，39

online, 39

体积，254–255

volume of, 254–255

“市场交易”，29

“trading in the market,” 29

陈丹尼（Tran, Danny） 41岁

Tran, Danny, 41

特灵公司，300–301

Trane Co., 300–301

国债，请参阅美国国债

Treasury bonds, see U.S. Treasury bonds

通胀保值国债（TIPS），25n，61–62，62n6，207n

Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), 25n, 61–62, 62n6, 207n

三大陆公司，411–412

Tri-Continental Corp., 411–412

503部队

Troop, 503

信任，223，225

trust, 223, 225

信托公司，27–28，258

trust companies, 27–28, 258

信托基金，4、47、90、225-226、233、247-248

trust funds, 4, 47, 90, 225–226, 233, 247–248

Tweedy Browne Partners ， 540，541–542，549

Tweedy Browne Partners, 540, 541–542, 549

Twitter，128，131

Twitter, 128, 131

两部分评估流程，288–289，305–306

two-part appraisal process, 288–289, 305–306

泰科国际有限公司，424n

Tyco International Ltd., 424n

不确定性，88

uncertainty, 88

无意识的偏见，217–218

unconscious bias, 217–218

低估，250，498n4

undervaluation, 250, 498n4

和激进的投资者，31、33、168、171、173–174、176、367–368、383–387

and aggressive investors, 31, 33, 168, 171, 173–174, 176, 367–368, 383–387

和便宜货，168，171，173–174

and bargains, 168, 171, 173–174

巴菲特的评论，535

Buffett’s comments about, 535

和安全边际，510–511，512–513

and margin of safety, 510–511, 512–513

承销，256–258，432–433，511。另请参阅特定公司或承销商

underwriting, 256–258, 432–433, 511. see also specific company or underwriter

联合碳化物公司，278，337，339

Union Carbide Co., 278, 337, 339

联合太平洋铁路，348n

Union Pacific Railroad, 348n

联合内衣，302n

Union Underwear, 302n

联合累积基金，224

United Accumulative Fund, 224

联合飞机公司，278，337，339

United Aircraft Co., 278, 337, 339

“单位”，408n

“units,” 408n

环球马里恩公司，379，380–381

Universal Marion Co., 379, 380–381

密歇根大学，18n

University of Michigan, 18n

不受欢迎的大公司，164–168，169

unpopular large companies, 164–168, 169

不切实际的乐观主义，355

unrealistic optimism, 355

美国债券（储蓄除外），22–23、95–96、97、119

U.S. bonds (other than savings), 22–23, 95–96, 97, 119

美国储蓄债券，93、94–95、96、118–119、120–122、185、206、207、234–235、512–513

U.S. savings bonds, 93, 94–95, 96, 118–119, 120–122, 185, 206, 207, 234–235, 512–513

美国钢铁公司，278，337，339，370

U.S. Steel Corp., 278, 337, 339, 370

美国财政部，495

U.S. Treasury, 495

美国国债，61、95、106、113n

U.S. Treasury bonds, 61, 95, 106, 113n

美国国库券，95–96

U.S. Treasury certificates, 95–96

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc.，484–485

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc., 484–485

Valmont Industries Inc.，484–485

Valmont Industries Inc., 484–485

价值线（投资服务），276–277

Value Line (investment service), 276–277

价值/估价。另见收益；波动；市场；估值过高；市盈率；估值过低；特定公司或证券类型

value/valuation. see also earnings; fluctuations; market; overvaluation; price/earnings ratio; undervaluation; specific company or type of security

和建议，248，250

and advice, 248, 250

和激进的投资者，31、32、137–138、167–168、177–179、366n、377n

and aggressive investors, 31, 32, 137–138, 167–168, 177–179, 366n, 377n

和便宜货，167–168，177–179

and bargains, 167–168, 177–179

巴菲特的评论，538–539

Buffett’s comments about, 538–539

商业与股票市场，194–203

business vs. stock market, 194–203

以及与经纪公司的交易，255

and dealings with brokerage firms, 255

防御性投资者，20–26，120–121，122，349–350

and defensive investors, 20–26, 120–121, 122, 349–350

可靠性，302n，305–306

dependability of, 302n, 305–306

金融分析师创造，563–564

financial analysts as creating, 563–564

股票市场的历史和预测，74，81-84

and history and forecasting of stock market, 74, 81–84

重要性，531

importance of, 531

充气，255

inflated, 255

和通货膨胀，54

and inflation, 54

和投资基金，231–232，232，234

and investment funds, 231–232, 232, 234

和安全边际，512–515

and margin of safety, 512–515

和期权交易，415–416，416

and options trading, 415–416, 416

和每股收益，302–303、302n、304

and per-share earnings, 302–303, 302n, 304

和价格，10，32n，122，202–203，513–515，539

and price, 10, 32n, 122, 202–203, 513–515, 539

以及经纪公司的问题，255

and problems of brokerage firms, 255

“引语”，19

“quotational,” 19

和风险，122

and risk, 122

和安全分析，270–271、273–274、276–279、282–287

and security analysis, 270–271, 273–274, 276–279, 282–287

和库存选择，349–350，366n，377n

and selection of stock, 349–350, 366n, 377n

和猜测，564–565

and speculation, 564–565

和股票分割，491n

and stock splits, 491n

以及两部分评估过程，288–289

and two-part appraisal process, 288–289

先锋集团，238

Vanguard Group, 238

Vector Group Ltd.，391

Vector Group Ltd., 391

风险投资，106

venture capital, 106

风险投资基金，147–149

venture capital funds, 147–149

维雷斯，罗伯特，262

Veres, Robert, 262

维斯特金融，414

Vest Financial, 414

VinFast 汽车有限公司，443

VinFast Auto Ltd., 443

维珍银河控股公司，41，43，436，439–441，440，441

Virgin Galactic Holdings Inc., 41, 43, 436, 439–441, 440, 441

聪明投资者的美德，14-16

virtues of intelligent investors, 14–16

波动性，400n。另见稳定性

volatility, 400n. see also stability

交易量，交易，297n

volume, trading, 297n

华尔街改革，434–435

Wall Street, reform of, 434–435

WallStreetBets，40，216-217

WallStreetBets, 40, 216–217

华尔街日报，29，243，295，301，437

Wall Street Journal, 29, 243, 295, 301, 437

沃尔玛，496，519，520

Walmart, 496, 519, 520

华纳兄弟探索公司，500–502，501，502

Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc, 500–502, 501, 502

认股权证，3、3n、135、296–297、300–301、302–303、398–407、398n、400、405–406、406、407–409、407n 、 408n、514–515。另请参阅特定公司

warrants, 3, 3n, 135, 296–297, 300–301, 302–303, 398–407, 398n, 400, 405–406, 406, 407–409, 407n, 408n, 514–515. see also specific company

华盛顿邮报公司，543–544、545、556

Washington Post Co., 543–544, 545, 556

“加水”的股票，297n

“watered” stock, 297n

Watsco公司，391

Watsco Inc., 391

沃森，TL，Sr.，561–562

Watson, T.L., Sr., 561–562

微牛，125

Webull, 125

韦戈维，481

Wegovy, 481

威尔斯，C.，229

Welles, C., 229

西屋公司，337，339

Westinghouse Corp., 337, 339

西屋电气公司，278

Westinghouse Electric Co., 278

西点佩珀雷尔，377，378

West Point Pepperell, 377, 378

WeWork，148，309

WeWork, 148, 309

怀廷公司，464–467、465、466、467n、468

Whiting Corp., 464–467, 465, 466, 467n, 468

维森伯格金融服务公司, 160, 224 , 232 , 234

Wiesenberger Financial Services, 160, 224, 232, 234

Willcox & Gibbs，464–467，465，466，467n ， 468

Willcox & Gibbs, 464–467, 465, 466, 467n, 468

Williams，Jackie G.，431n，434

Williams, Jackie G., 431n, 434

威廉姆斯，约翰·伯尔，393

Williams, John Burr, 393

威廉姆斯，塞雷娜，154

Williams, Serena, 154

威尔希尔指数，26–27n

Wilshire indexes, 26–27n

无线股票，173n

wireless stocks, 173n

沃尔夫，劳伦·泰勒，308

Wolfe, Lauren Taylor, 308

伍德，凯西，244

Wood, Cathie, 244

伍尔沃斯公司（FW ），278，337，340，341，564–565

Woolworth Company (F.W.), 278, 337, 340, 341, 564–565

营运资金

working capital

和激进的投资者，167–168、170、170n、171、366–368、371、372–379、377n

and aggressive investors, 167–168, 170, 170n, 171, 366–368, 371, 372–379, 377n

防御性投资者，334，340–342

and defensive investors, 334, 340–342

和股息，490–491

and dividends, 490–491

和安全分析，270

and security analysis, 270

“锻炼”，157、158、174–176、379–381、514–515

“workouts,” 157, 158, 174–176, 379–381, 514–515

世通，421n，424n，427n

WorldCom, 421n, 424n, 427n

惠氏，453n

Wyeth, 453n

X，参见Twitter

X, see Twitter

施乐公司，195，283–286，378，454

Xerox Corp., 195, 283–286, 378, 454

雅虎财经，386

Yahoo Finance, 386

耶鲁大学，149–150

Yale University, 149–150

YCharts，386

YCharts, 386

收益率。另请参阅股息；利息；业绩；回报；证券类型

yield. see also dividends; interest; performance; return; type of security

和激进的投资者，135–139，380

and aggressive investors, 135–139, 380

以及可转换债券和认股权证，399，399n，405–406

and convertible issues and warrants, 399, 399n, 405–406

防御型投资者，24–25、90、92–93、94、96、97、98–99、114–115、336

and defensive investors, 24–25, 90, 92–93, 94, 96, 97, 98–99, 114–115, 336

波动，189–190，203–208

fluctuations in, 189–190, 203–208

以及股票市场的历史和预测，71，77，78

and history and forecasting of stock market, 71, 77, 78

和通货膨胀，56

and inflation, 56

和猜测，568–569

and speculation, 568–569

YouTube，217

YouTube, 217

扎斯拉夫，大卫，500–502

Zaslav, David, 500–502

理查德·泽克豪瑟，262n1

Zeckhauser, Richard, 262n1

Zenith广播电台，320–321

Zenith Radio, 320–321

锡安，大卫，502

Zion, David, 502

锡安研究小组，502

Zion Research Group, 502

Zoom 视频通信公司，44，117n

Zoom Video Communications Inc., 44, 117n

扎克伯格，马克，162n

Zuckerberg, Mark, 162n

扎克曼，格雷戈里，212n2

Zuckerman, Gregory, 212n2

茨威格的评论。参见具体主题

Zweig’s comments. see specific topic

ZZZZ 最佳，431n

ZZZZ Best, 431n

关于作者

About the Authors

本杰明·格雷厄姆（1894-1976）是金融分析和价值投资之父，他激励了一代又一代全球最成功的商人。他也是《证券分析》和《财务报表解读》的作者。

BENJAMIN GRAHAM (1894–1976), the father of financial analysis and value investing, has been an inspiration for generations of the world’s most successful businesspeople. He was also the author of Security Analysis and The Interpretation of Financial Statements.

杰森·茨威格是《华尔街日报》的投资专栏作家。他著有探讨投资神经科学的《你的金钱和你的大脑》以及讽刺华尔街词汇的《魔鬼金融词典》。

JASON ZWEIG is an investing columnist for the Wall Street Journal. He is also the author of Your Money and Your Brain, on the neuroscience of investing, and The Devil’s Financial Dictionary, a satirical glossary of Wall Street.

在hc.com上发现优秀的作家、独家优惠等。

Discover great authors, exclusive offers, and more at hc.com.

版权

Copyright

非常感谢允许转载：

Grateful acknowledgment is made for permission to reprint:

“The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville,” by Warren E. Buffett, from the Fall 1984 issue of Hermes, Magazine of Columbia Business School. Reprinted by permission of Hermes, Magazine of Columbia Business School, copyright © 1984 The Trustees of Columbia University and Warren E. Buffett.

沃伦·E·巴菲特的《本杰明·格雷厄姆》，摘自1976年11/12月《金融分析师期刊》。经金融分析师联合会许可转载。

“Benjamin Graham,” by Warren E. Buffett, from the November/December 1976 issue of Financial Analyst Journal. Reprinted by permission of Financial Analysts Federation.

《聪明的投资者》（第三版）。原文：版权所有 © 1973，本杰明·格雷厄姆；新内容：版权所有 © 2024，杰森·茨威格。所有权利均受国际和泛美版权公约保护。支付所需费用后，您即被授予非排他性、不可转让的权利，以在屏幕上访问和阅读本电子书的文本。未经哈珀柯林斯电子书明确书面许可，不得以任何形式或任何手段（无论是电子的还是机械的，无论是已知还是未来发明的）复制、传播、下载、反编译、反向工程或存储或引入任何信息存储和检索系统。

THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR, THIRD EDITION. Original text: copyright © 1973 by Benjamin Graham; new material: Copyright © 2024 by Jason Zweig. All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. By payment of the required fees, you have been granted the nonexclusive, nontransferable right to access and read the text of this e-book on-screen. No part of this text may be reproduced, transmitted, downloaded, decompiled, reverse-engineered, or stored in or introduced into any information storage and retrieval system, in any form or by any means, whether electronic or mechanical, now known or hereafter invented, without the express written permission of HarperCollins e-books.

第一版

FIRST EDITION

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姓名：格雷厄姆，本杰明，1894–1976，作家。| 茨威格，杰森，作家。

Names: Graham, Benjamin, 1894–1976, author. | Zweig, Jason, author.

书名：《聪明的投资者：价值投资的权威书籍》/本杰明·格雷厄姆著；杰森·茨威格著。

Title: The intelligent investor : the definitive book on value investing / Benjamin Graham ; with Jason Zweig.

描述：第三版。| 纽约：Harper Business，HarperCollinsPublishers 的印记，2024 年。| 包括参考书目和索引。|

Description: Third edition. | New York : Harper Business, an Imprint of HarperCollinsPublishers, 2024. | Includes bibliographical references and index. |

标识符：LCCN 2024019180（印刷本）| LCCN 2024019181（电子书）| ISBN 9780063356726（精装本）| ISBN 9780063356733（电子书）

Identifiers: LCCN 2024019180 (print) | LCCN 2024019181 (ebook) | ISBN 9780063356726 (hardcover) | ISBN 9780063356733 (ebook)

主题：LCSH：证券。| 投资。

Subjects: LCSH: Securities. | Investments.

分类：LCC HG4521 .G665 2024（印刷版）| LCC HG4521（电子书）| DDC 332.67/8—dc23/eng/20240716

Classification: LCC HG4521 .G665 2024 (print) | LCC HG4521 (ebook) | DDC 332.67/8—dc23/eng/20240716

LC 记录可访问 https://lccn.loc.gov/2024019180

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024019180

LC 电子书记录可访问 https://lccn.loc.gov/2024019181

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024019181

数字版 2024 年 10 月 ISBN：978-0-06-335673-3

Digital Edition OCTOBER 2024 ISBN: 978-0-06-335673-3

版本 09102024

Version 09102024

印刷版 ISBN：978-0-06-335672-6

Print ISBN: 978-0-06-335672-6

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¹ 《尼日利亚的麻烦》（Heinemann，1984 年），第 42 页。

¹ The Trouble with Nigeria (Heinemann, 1984), p. 42.

²有关这位杰出人物的更多信息，请参阅 Jason Zweig 的《本杰明·格雷厄姆笔记》bit.ly/40XkE7h；超越本杰明·格雷厄姆博客bit.ly/442IEX8；以及本杰明·格雷厄姆的《本杰明·格雷厄姆：华尔街院长回忆录》（麦格劳希尔，1996 年）。

² For more on this remarkable man, see Jason Zweig, “A Note on Benjamin Graham,” bit.ly/40XkE7h; the Beyond Ben Graham blog, bit.ly/442IEX8; and Benjamin Graham, Benjamin Graham: The Memoirs of the Dean of Wall Street (McGraw-Hill, 1996).

³沃伦·巴菲特认为，格雷厄姆从1923年到1956年整个职业生涯的全部回报尚不清楚，但“远超预期”（私人通信，2023年4月14日）。除了格雷厄姆基金的收益外，他的投资者还从政府雇员保险公司（GEICO）的股票中获得了高额回报，格雷厄姆-纽曼公司于1948年7月以特别股息的形式派发了这笔股息。

³ According to Warren Buffett, Graham’s full returns aren’t precisely knowable over his entire career from 1923 through 1956, but were “far more terrific” than usual estimates indicate (personal communication, April 14, 2023). In addition to their gains on Graham’s fund, his investors earned high returns on shares in Government Employees Insurance Co. or GEICO, which Graham-Newman Corp. paid out in July 1948 as a special dividend.

⁴参见第 8 章。

⁴ See Chapter 8.

⁵然而，格雷厄姆的三篇附录，讨论了很久以前的公司和过时的税法，并没有收录在本版中。要查看这些附录，请参阅《聪明的投资者》 2003年修订版。

⁵ However, three of Graham’s appendixes, discussing long-ago companies and obsolete tax rules, aren’t included in this edition. To see those, please reference the 2003 revised edition of The Intelligent Investor.

^*拉斯科布（1879-1950）曾任大型化工公司杜邦公司的董事，以及通用汽车公司的财务委员会主席。金融学教授杰里米·西格尔的计算证实，拉斯科布的计划在20年后将增长到略低于9,000美元，尽管通货膨胀会吞噬掉其中的大部分收益。欲了解拉斯科布对长期股票投资的看法，请参阅投资顾问威廉·伯恩斯坦在bit.ly/3QuKk8H上发表的文章。

^* Raskob (1879–1950) was a director of Du Pont, the giant chemical company, and chairman of the finance committee at General Motors. Calculations by finance professor Jeremy Siegel confirm that Raskob’s plan would have grown to just under $9,000 after 20 years, although inflation would have eaten away much of that gain. For a look at Raskob’s views on long-term stock investing, see the essay by investment adviser William Bernstein at bit.ly/3QuKk8H.

^*格雷厄姆的“简短讨论”分为两部分，分别在这里和这里。有关道氏理论的更多详情，请参阅 bit.ly/4b3xhT8。

^* Graham’s “brief discussion” is in two parts, here and here. For more detail on the Dow theory, see bit.ly/4b3xhT8.

^*共同基金在私下交易中购买“字母股票”，然后立即以更高的公开价格重新估值这些股票（参见格雷厄姆的定义）。这使得这些“高价基金”（go-go fund）在20世纪60年代中期获得了难以维持的高回报。美国证券交易委员会于1969年严厉打击了这种滥用行为，基金投资者不再需要担心。格雷厄姆在第16章中解释了股票期权认股权证。

^* Mutual funds bought “letter stock” in private transactions, then immediately revalued these shares at a higher public price (see Graham’s definition here). That enabled these “go-go” funds to report unsustainably high returns in the mid-1960s. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission cracked down on this abuse in 1969, and it is no longer a concern for fund investors. Graham explains stock-option warrants in Chapter 16.

^*当时美国最大的铁路公司宾夕法尼亚中央运输公司（Penn Central Transportation Co.）于1970年6月21日申请破产保护，这令投资者震惊不已，他们从未预料到这样一家巨头公司会破产（参见此处）。格雷厄姆所指的“过度”负债公司包括凌特姆科沃特公司（Ling-Temco-Vought）和国民通用公司（National General Corp.）（参见此处和此处）。“偿付能力问题”在1968年至1971年间出现，当时几家知名经纪公司相继破产。

^* The Penn Central Transportation Co., then the biggest railroad in the United States, sought bankruptcy protection on June 21, 1970—shocking investors, who had never expected such a giant company to go under (see here). Among the companies with “excessive” debt Graham had in mind were Ling-Temco-Vought and National General Corp. (see here and here). The “problem of solvency” emerged between 1968 and 1971, when several prestigious brokerages went bust.

^*参见第二章。截至2024年初，10年期美国国债收益率为3.9%，而股票（以道琼斯工业平均指数衡量）收益率为1.95%。（请注意，这种关系与格雷厄姆引用的1964年数据并无太大差异。）优质债券的收益在1981年至2020年间稳步下降。

^* See Chapter 2. As of the beginning of 2024, U.S. Treasury bonds maturing in 10 years yielded 3.9%, while stocks (as measured by the Dow Jones Industrial Average) yielded 1.95%. (Note that this relationship is not all that different from the 1964 figures that Graham cites.) The income generated by top-quality bonds fell steadily between 1981 and 2020.

^* “航空运输股”在20世纪40年代末50年代初引发的轰动，堪比半个世纪后的互联网股。当时最热门的共同基金包括航空证券基金和导弹-火箭-喷气发动机及自动化基金。然而，就像它们持有的股票一样，它们最终也成了一场投资灾难。如今，人们普遍认为，航空业在其整个历史上的累计收益均为负值。格雷厄姆的教训并非劝你避免购买航空股，而是劝你永远不要相信任何行业未来都会超越其他所有行业。

^* “Air-transport stocks” generated as much excitement in the late 1940s and early 1950s as internet stocks did a half century later. Among the hottest mutual funds of that era were Aeronautical Securities and the Missiles-Rockets-Jets & Automation Fund. They, like the stocks they owned, turned out to be an investing disaster. It is commonly accepted today that the cumulative earnings of the airline industry over its entire history have been negative. The lesson Graham is driving at is not that you should avoid buying airline stocks, but that you should never succumb to the “certainty” that any industry will outperform all others in the future.

^*有形资产包括公司的实物资产（例如房地产、工厂、设备和库存）以及财务余额（例如现金、短期投资和应收账款）。品牌、版权、专利、特许经营权、商誉和商标等元素不包含在有形资产中。要了解如何计算有形资产价值，请参见此处。

^* Tangible assets include a company’s physical property (like real estate, factories, equipment, and inventories) as well as its financial balances (such as cash, short-term investments, and accounts receivable). Among the elements not included in tangible assets are brands, copyrights, patents, franchises, goodwill, and trademarks. To see how to calculate tangible-asset value, see here.

^*这适用于 Graham 的章节。Jason Zweig 撰写的章节评论有效期至 2024 年初。

^* That applies to Graham’s chapters. The chapter commentaries by Jason Zweig are current through early 2024.

¹ UndervaluedJapan 博客，2020 年 11 月 11 日，bit.ly/43sXdnG。

¹ UndervaluedJapan blog, November 11, 2020, bit.ly/43sXdnG.

² Andrew Odlyzko，《南海泡沫中的牛顿金融灾难》，bit.ly/3psYyvF。

² Andrew Odlyzko, “Newton’s Financial Misadventures in the South Sea Bubble,” bit.ly/3psYyvF.

³对冲基金是指一个资金池，基本上不受监管，为富有的客户进行投资；请参阅第六章的评论。关于长期资本管理公司的倒闭，请参阅罗杰·洛温斯坦的《当天才失败时》（兰登书屋，2000年）。

³ A hedge fund is a pool of money, largely unregulated, that invests for wealthy clients; see the Commentary on Chapter 6. For the collapse of LTCM, see Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed (Random House, 2000).

⁴本杰明·格雷厄姆，《聪明的投资者》（Harper & Row，1949 年），第 4 页。

⁴ Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor (Harper & Row, 1949), p. 4.

⁵ Jason Zweig，《伟大投资者的七大美德》，bit.ly/42MxqWA。

⁵ Jason Zweig, “The Seven Virtues of Great Investors,” bit.ly/42MxqWA.

*格雷厄姆引用的调查结果发表于1948年7月的《美联储公报》。当时，只有4%的人认为普通股的回报率“令人满意”；26%的人认为普通股“不安全”或“赌博”。从1949年到1958年，美国股市创下了历史上最高的十年回报率之一，年均回报率高达18.7%。

* The survey Graham cites was published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1948. Only 4% thought common stock would offer a “satisfactory” return; 26% considered it “not safe” or a “gamble.” From 1949 through 1958, the U.S. stock market earned one of its highest 10-year returns in history, averaging 18.7% annually.

*投机有两个好处：首先，没有投机，创新型年轻公司（例如特斯拉，或者更早时期的爱迪生电灯公司）将无法筹集到发展所需的资金。巨额收益带来的诱人希望，如同润滑创新机器的润滑剂。正如奥利弗·温德尔·霍姆斯大法官在1905年所写，投机也是“社会对可能事件的自我调整”——持续获取信息，使市场能够更新价格。

* Speculation is beneficial on two levels: First, without it, innovative young companies (like Tesla or, in earlier times, the Edison Electric Light Co.) wouldn’t be able to raise the necessary capital for growth. The alluring hope of a huge gain is the grease that lubricates the machinery of innovation. Speculation is also the “self-adjustment of society to the probable,” as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in 1905—the continuous capture of information that enables markets to update prices.

*保证金账户允许您使用从经纪公司借入的资金购买股票。通过借入资金进行投资，当股票上涨时，您可以获得更多收益，但当股票下跌时，您可能会损失惨重。贷款的抵押品是您账户中投资的价值，因此，如果该价值低于规定金额，您必须追加资金。有关保证金的更多信息，请参阅第六章的评论。

* A margin account enables you to buy stocks using money you borrow from the brokerage firm. By investing with borrowed money, you make more when your stocks go up—but you can be wiped out when they go down. The collateral for the loan is the value of the investments in your account—so you must put up more money if that value falls below a required amount. For more on margin, see the Commentary on Chapter 6.

*再读一遍格雷厄姆的这句话，并注意这位最伟大的投资专家是怎么说的：证券价格的未来永远无法预测。当你继续阅读本书时，请注意格雷厄姆告诉你的所有其他内容都是为了帮助你理解这个事实。既然你无法预测市场的行为，你就必须学会如何预测和控制自己的行为。

* Read Graham’s sentence again, and note what this greatest of investing experts is saying: The future of security prices is never predictable. And as you read ahead in the book, notice how everything else Graham tells you is designed to help you grapple with that truth. Since you cannot predict the behavior of the markets, you must learn how to predict and control your own behavior.

*格雷厄姆的预测结果如何？乍一看，似乎非常准确：从1972年初到1981年底，股票的年平均回报率为6.5%。（格雷厄姆没有具体说明他的预测时间段，但他可能打算以10年为时间范围。）然而，在此期间，通货膨胀率高达每年8.6%，吞噬了股票创造的全部收益。在本章的这一部分，格雷厄姆总结了所谓的“戈登方程式”，该方程式认为，股市未来的回报率等于当前股息收益率与预期股息增长率之和。鉴于2024年初的股息收益率低于2%，而长期股息增长率略高于2%，未来约4%的年平均回报率（扣除通货膨胀因素）是合理的。（参见第三章的评论。）

* How well did Graham’s forecast pan out? At first blush, it seems, very well: From the beginning of 1972 through the end of 1981, stocks earned an annual average return of 6.5%. (Graham did not specify the time period for his forecast, but he probably intended a 10-year time horizon.) However, inflation raged at 8.6% annually over this period, eating up the entire gain that stocks produced. In this section of his chapter, Graham is summarizing what is known as the “Gordon equation,” which holds that the stock market’s future rate of return is the sum of the current dividend yield and expected dividend growth. With a yield under 2% in early 2024, and long-term dividend growth of just over 2%, a future average annual return of roughly 4% (after inflation) is plausible. (See the Commentary on Chapter 3.)

*自1997年推出通胀保值债券（TIPS）以来，当通胀上升时，股票不再自动优于债券。与其他债券不同，TIPS的价值往往会在消费者物价指数（CPI）上升时上涨，这通常可以保护投资者免受通胀后的损失。股票没有这样的保证，因此并不能完美地对冲高通胀。（更多详情，请参阅第二章的评论。）

* Since 1997, when Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) were introduced, stocks have no longer been automatically superior to bonds when inflation increases. TIPS, unlike other bonds, tend to rise in value when the Consumer Price Index goes up, generally immunizing the investor against losing money after inflation. Stocks carry no such guarantee and are an imperfect hedge against high rates of inflation. (For more details, see the Commentary on Chapter 2.)

*如今，道琼斯工业平均指数最广泛的替代指数是标准普尔500指数（简称“标普500指数”）和FT Wilshire 5000指数。标普500指数关注约500家大型知名公司，这些公司约占美国股市总市值的80%。FT Wilshire 5000指数追踪几乎所有重要的美国上市公司的回报，总计约3500只；但由于最大的公司占据了该指数的大部分市值，FT Wilshire 5000指数的回报通常与标普500指数非常相似。低成本的指数基金使投资者能够将这些指数中的股票作为单一、便捷的投资组合持有。指数基金在全球范围内均可购买，几乎惠及所有地区的投资者。（参见第九章及其评论。）

* Today, the most widely available alternatives to the Dow Jones Industrial Average are the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index (the “S&P 500”) and the FT Wilshire 5000 index. The S & P focuses on about 500 large, well-known companies that make up about 80% of the total capitalization of the U.S. equity market. The FT Wilshire 5000 follows the returns of nearly every significant, publicly traded stock in America, approximately 3,500 in all; but, since the largest companies account for most of the market value of the index, the return of the FT Wilshire 5000 is usually quite similar to that of the S&P 500. Low-cost index funds enable investors to hold the stocks in these indexes as a single, convenient portfolio. Index funds are available worldwide, to the benefit of investors almost everywhere. (See Chapter 9 and its Commentary.)

*请参阅此处和此处。

* See here and here.

*有关更多详细信息，请参阅第 6 章及其评论。

* For greater detail, see Chapter 6 and its Commentary.

*有关“成熟投资基金”的更多建议，请参阅第九章。由“知名投资顾问公司”进行的“专业管理”将在第十章讨论。“平均成本法”将在第五章解释。

* For more advice on “well-established investment funds,” see Chapter 9. “Professional administration” by “a recognized investment-counsel firm” is discussed in Chapter 10. “Dollar-cost averaging” is explained in Chapter 5.

*参见第 8 章以及第5、8和14 章的评论。

* See Chapter 8 and the Commentaries on Chapters 5, 8, and 14.

* “卖空”（或“做空”）股票是指押注其股价会下跌而不是上涨。做空分为三个步骤：首先，从股票持有者手中借入股票；然后立即卖出借入的股票；最后，用之后买入的股票替换。如果股价下跌，您可以以更低的价格买入替换股票。卖出借入股票的价格与买入替换股票的价格之间的差额就是您的毛利润（扣除股息或利息费用以及经纪费用）。但是，如果股价上涨而不是下跌，您的潜在损失将是无限的——这使得卖空对大多数个人投资者来说过于投机，难以接受。

* In “selling short” (or “shorting”) a stock, you make a bet that its share price will go down, not up. Shorting is a three-step process: First, you borrow shares from someone who owns them; then you immediately sell the borrowed shares; finally, you replace them with shares you buy later. If the stock drops, you will be able to buy your replacement shares at a lower price. The difference between the price at which you sold your borrowed shares and the price you paid for the replacement shares is your gross profit (reduced by dividend or interest charges, along with brokerage costs). However, if the stock goes up in price instead of down, your potential loss is unlimited—making short sales unacceptably speculative for most individual investors.

*进取型投资者获得“优于平均水平的收益”的另一种方式是：在专业投资者恐慌性抛售时挺身而出买入，就像 2000-2002 年、2008-2009 年和 2020 年初发生的那样。在普通民众中，勇气往往比在华尔街更常见。

* Another way enterprising investors can earn “better than average results”: by stepping forward to buy when professional investors are panic-selling, as occurred in 2000–02, 2008–09, and early 2020. Courage is often more common on Main Street than on Wall Street.

* 20世纪80年代末，随着恶意收购和杠杆收购的盛行，华尔街设立了机构套利平台，试图从这些复杂交易的定价失误中获利。这些平台变得如此精通，以至于轻松获利的机会消失了，许多这样的平台也被关闭了。尽管格雷厄姆再次讨论了这一点（参见此处），但这种交易方式对大多数人来说已经不再可行或合适，因为只有数百万美元的交易规模才足以证明每股收益微薄。富有的个人和机构可以通过专门从事并购或“事件”套利的对冲基金来运用这种策略。

* In the late 1980s, as hostile corporate takeovers and leveraged buyouts multiplied, Wall Street set up institutional arbitrage desks to profit from any errors in pricing these complex deals. They became so good at it that the easy profits disappeared and many of these desks have been closed down. Although Graham discusses it again (see here), this sort of trading is no longer feasible or appropriate for most people, since only multimillion-dollar trades are large enough to justify earning a slim profit per share. Wealthy individuals and institutions can utilize this strategy through hedge funds that specialize in merger or “event” arbitrage.

*罗斯柴尔德家族由内森·迈耶·罗斯柴尔德 (Nathan Mayer Rothschild) 领导，是十九世纪欧洲投资银行和经纪业的主导力量。参见尼尔·弗格森 (Niall Ferguson) 著《罗斯柴尔德家族：金钱的先知，1798-1848》 (Viking出版社，1998年)。

* The Rothschild family, led by Nathan Mayer Rothschild, was a dominant power in European investment banking and brokerage in the nineteenth century. See Niall Ferguson, The House of Rothschild: Money’s Prophets, 1798–1848 (Viking, 1998).

¹ “亚当·斯密”， 《金钱游戏》（兰登书屋，1968 年），第 30 页。

¹ “Adam Smith,” The Money Game (Random House, 1968), p. 30.

² 在这里，格雷厄姆有时使用“令人满意的回报”来代替“足够的回报”。

² Here. Graham sometimes used the phrase “satisfactory return” instead of “adequate return.”

³ Gayle Rogers，《推测：从亚里士多德到人工智能的文化史》（哥伦比亚出版社，2021 年）。

³ Gayle Rogers, Speculation: A Cultural History from Aristotle to AI (Columbia, 2021).

⁴ “戴夫·波特诺伊的起源故事”，bit.ly/48SWkqF；Akane Otani，“新股票影响者拥有大量忠实的追随者”，bit.ly/41ZDqfv。

⁴ “The Dave Portnoy Origin Story,” bit.ly/48SWkqF; Akane Otani, “The New Stock Influencers Have Huge—and Devoted—Followings,” bit.ly/41ZDqfv.

⁵对这种疯狂最好的描述是斯宾塞·雅各布 (Spencer Jakab) 的《没有发生的革命》 (Portfolio, 2022)。

⁵ The best account of this madness is Spencer Jakab, The Revolution That Wasn’t (Portfolio, 2022).

⁶ Gunjan Banerji，“业余投资者的撤退”，bit.ly/3F3VKcE。

⁶ Gunjan Banerji, “The Retreat of the Amateur Investors,” bit.ly/3F3VKcE.

⁷而通过持有指数基金赚取股市的“平均”回报，很可能会给你带来远高于平均水平的结果；参见第 9 章的评论。

⁷ And earning the “average” return of the stock market by holding an index fund is likely to give you a result far above average; see the Commentary on Chapter 9.

*到了20世纪90年代末，这条建议——对于拥有永久投资期限的基金会或捐赠基金来说可能适用——已经传播到了寿命有限的个人投资者。金融学教授杰里米·西格尔在其颇具影响力的著作《长线股票》（Stocks for the Long Run） 1994年出版的版本中建议，“敢于冒险”的投资者应该进行保证金投资，即借入超过三分之一的净资产，将135%的资产投入股票。

* By the late 1990s, this advice—which can be appropriate for a foundation or endowment with a perpetual investment horizon—had spread to individual investors, whose life spans are finite. In the 1994 edition of his influential book Stocks for the Long Run, finance professor Jeremy Siegel recommended that “risk-taking” investors should buy on margin, borrowing more than a third of their net worth to sink 135% of their assets into stocks.

*这是格雷厄姆罕见的误判之一。1973年，就在理查德·尼克松总统实施工资和物价管制两年后，通货膨胀率达到8.7%，创下二战结束以来的最高水平。1973年至1982年的十年是美国现代史上通货膨胀最严重的十年，生活成本上涨了一倍多。

* This is one of Graham’s rare misjudgments. In 1973, just two years after President Richard Nixon imposed wage and price controls, inflation hit 8.7%, its highest level since the end of World War II. The decade from 1973 through 1982 was the most inflationary in modern U.S. history, as the cost of living more than doubled.

*请参阅此处。

* See here.

*约翰·皮尔庞特·摩根（John Pierpont Morgan Sr.）是十九世纪末二十世纪初最具影响力的金融家。经常有人问他股市下一步走势如何，摩根给出了一个简短而精准的答案：“它会波动。” 参见让·斯特劳斯（Jean Strouse）著《摩根：美国金融家》（兰登书屋，1999年），第11页。

* John Pierpont Morgan Sr. was the most powerful financier of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Often asked what the stock market would do next, Morgan developed a mercifully short and unfailingly accurate answer: “It will fluctuate.” See Jean Strouse, Morgan: American Financier (Random House, 1999), p. 11.

*有关黄金的更多信息，请参见此处。

* For more on gold, see here.

¹尤吉·贝拉，《瑜伽之书》（Workman，1998 年），第 19 页。

¹ Yogi Berra, The Yogi Book (Workman, 1998), p. 19.

²改编自 Eldar Shafir 等人的《货币幻觉》，bit.ly/45jx0YE。

² Adapted from Eldar Shafir et al., “Money Illusion,” bit.ly/45jx0YE.

³ Claude B. Erb 和 Campbell R. Harvey，《黄金困境》，bit.ly/3Ja7TPF。美国陆军的黄金工资相当于拥有四年经验的上尉的工资，以2023年的黄金价格计算，约为每盎司2000美元。

³ Claude B. Erb and Campbell R. Harvey, “The Golden Dilemma,” bit.ly/3Ja7TPF. Gold equivalent of U.S. Army pay is for a captain with four years’ experience, using a gold price of about $2,000 per ounce, as of 2023.

⁴在本评论中，我将使用“平均年回报率”或“平均年回报率X%”作为非技术性用语来描述几何平均数或复合年化回报率。对于大多数资产而言，其价值的累积变化会随时间推移呈现高度可变的增量；重申几何平均数的增长方式，即认为回报率在整个期间内都以恒定的速率增长。

⁴ Throughout these Commentaries, I will use “average annual return” or “average return of X% annually” as nontechnical wording to describe geometric mean, or compound annualized, returns. For most assets, cumulative changes in value occur in highly variable increments over time; restating that growth as a geometric mean treats the return as if it had occurred at a constant rate throughout the entire period.

⁵更多信息：TreasuryDirect，“I 类债券”，bit.ly/48EDPqJ；TIPSWatch，“I 类债券问答”，bit.ly/47IYf0H；以及 Jason Zweig，“利用 I 类债券对抗失控通胀”，bit.ly/43UbCsY。

⁵ For more: TreasuryDirect, “I Bonds,” bit.ly/48EDPqJ; TIPSWatch, “Q&A on I Bonds,” bit.ly/47IYf0H; and Jason Zweig, “Fight Runaway Inflation with I Bonds,” bit.ly/43UbCsY.

⁶假设您在通胀保值债券 (TIPS) 提供正“实际”收益率（即扣除通胀因素后的收益率）时买入并持有至到期。更多关于通胀保值债券的信息：Bogleheads.org，“国库通胀保值债券”，bit.ly/3JizCxP；E-piphany，“通胀保值债券的运作方式”，bit.ly/3RGxSDE；The Finance Buff，“通胀保值债券：与通胀挂钩的债券”，bit.ly/3Q4hYSh；以及 Allan Roth，“4% 规则变得更容易了”，bit.ly/3JN3lyF。

⁶ That assumes you buy when TIPS offer positive “real,” or after-inflation, yields and that you hold to maturity. For more on TIPS: Bogleheads.org, “Treasury Inflation Protected Security,” bit.ly/3JizCxP; E-piphany, “How TIPS Work,” bit.ly/3RGxSDE; The Finance Buff, “TIPS: Inflation Linked Bonds,” bit.ly/3Q4hYSh; and Allan Roth, “The 4% Rule Just Became a Whole Lot Easier,” bit.ly/3JN3lyF.

⁷ Robert J. Shiller，《非理性繁荣》（普林斯顿大学，2015 年），第 19-28 页；Brent W. Ambrose 等人，“房价和基本面”，bit.ly/46EDkLg。

⁷ Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton, 2015), pp. 19–28; Brent W. Ambrose et al., “House Prices and Fundamentals,” bit.ly/46EDkLg.

⁸请参阅第 3 章的评论以及 Jim O'Shaughnessy 的“通货膨胀与美国债券和股票市场”，bit.ly/3Nscnns。

⁸ See the Commentary on Chapter 3 and Jim O’Shaughnessy, “Inflation and the US Bond and Stock Markets,” bit.ly/3Nscnns.

⁹这些回报是超出现金收益的超额收益。Elroy Dimson 等人，《2023 年全球投资回报年鉴》，bit.ly/3CBJr6l；Henry Neville 等人，《通胀时期的最佳策略》，bit.ly/3Q4bORZ。

⁹ These returns are the excess performance over what cash earned. Elroy Dimson et al., “Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2023,” bit.ly/3CBJr6l; Henry Neville et al., “The Best Strategies for Inflationary Times,” bit.ly/3Q4bORZ.

*该研究是 Lawrence Fisher 和 James H. Lorie 的《普通股投资回报率》，bit.ly/3vwu52P。

* The study was Lawrence Fisher and James H. Lorie, “Rates of Return on Investments in Common Stock,” bit.ly/3vwu52P.

*请参阅此处。

* See here.

*股票或标准普尔500指数等市场平均水平的“市盈率”（P/E）是衡量市场行情的简单工具。如果一家公司过去一年每股净利润为1美元，其股价为每股8.93美元，则其市盈率为8.93；但如果股价为每股69.70美元，则市盈率为69.7。一般而言，市盈率低于10被认为非常低，介于10至20之间被认为偏低至中等，而高于20则被认为价格昂贵。（更多关于市盈率的信息，请参阅第7章和第11章。）

* The “price/earnings ratio” (P/E) of a stock, or of a market average like the S&P 500-stock index, is a simple tool for taking the market’s temperature. If a company earned $1 per share of net income over the past year, and its stock is selling at $8.93 per share, its price/earnings ratio would be 8.93; if, however, the stock is at $69.70, then the P/E would be 69.7. In general, a P/E below 10 is considered very low, between 10 and 20 is considered low to moderate, and greater than 20 is considered expensive. (For more on P/Es, see Chapters 7 and 11.)

*格雷厄姆的术语“报价”是“股价”或“市场价值”的同义词。

* Graham’s term “quotations” is a synonym for “share price” or “market value.”

¹本杰明·格雷厄姆，《不安全世界中的证券》，bit.ly/449pBuT。

¹ Benjamin Graham, “Securities in an Insecure World,” bit.ly/449pBuT.

^2.许多支持 CAPE 作为市场时机工具的人都在作弊：他们查看 CAPE 迄今为止的整个历史平均值，找出过去高于该水平的时期，然后宣称当时股票明显被高估了。但这些过去时期并没有包括 CAPE 随后的历史数据！

² Many proponents of CAPE as a market-timing tool are cheating: They look at CAPE’s average over its full history to the present day, find past periods when it was above that level, and declare that stocks were obviously overvalued then. But those past periods didn’t include CAPE’s subsequent history!

³ Jeremy J. Siegel，《长期股票》（Irwin，1994 年），第 31-33 页；斜体为原文。

³ Jeremy J. Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run (Irwin, 1994), pp. 31–33; italics in original.

⁴ Edward F. McQuarrie，“股票是长期投资吗？有时是，有时不是，”bit.ly/48guZhU。另请参阅Rob Arnott，“债券：何必呢？”，bit.ly/44vcIfS。

⁴ Edward F. McQuarrie, “Stocks for the Long Run? Sometimes Yes. Sometimes No,” bit.ly/48guZhU. See also Rob Arnott, “Bonds: Why Bother?,” bit.ly/44vcIfS.

⁵在此之前，小额交易的经纪佣金可能会超过 5%，而且完全的多元化投资是不可行的，这使得大多数投资者无法获得股票市场的平均回报。

⁵ Until then, brokerage commissions on small trades could exceed 5% and full diversification wasn’t feasible, putting the stock market’s average return out of reach for most investors.

⁶ Jason Zweig，“股市有时需要‘信仰骑士’”，bit.ly/42YKEiC；“别让市场崩盘在终点线上击中你”，bit.ly/3CKOJfW。

⁶ Jason Zweig, “Sometimes the Stock Market Needs ‘Knights of Faith,’” bit.ly/42YKEiC; “Don’t Let a Market Crash Hit You at the Finish Line,” bit.ly/3CKOJfW.

⁷ Elroy Dimson 等人，“非理性乐观主义”，bit.ly/3RWhK0O。

⁷ Elroy Dimson et al., “Irrational Optimism,” bit.ly/3RWhK0O.

*参见格雷厄姆第 2 章的“结论”。

* See Graham’s “Conclusion” to Chapter 2.

*如今，由于共同基金和交易所交易基金的广泛存在，分散了“个人风险”，格雷厄姆对高收益债券的反对意见在很大程度上得到了缓解。

* Graham’s objection to high-yield bonds is largely mitigated today by the widespread availability of mutual funds and exchange-traded funds that spread the “individual risk.”

*由美国住房和城市发展部（HUD）支持的“新住房”债券和“新社区债券”分别自 1974 年和 1983 年以来就没有再发行过。

* The “New Housing” bonds and “New Community debentures,” backed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), have not been issued since 1974 and 1983, respectively.

*不幸的是，近几十年来情况并非如此。

* Unfortunately, this hasn’t been true in recent decades.

* “可赎回”债券可能会被发行人强制回购，通常是在对投资者来说最糟糕的时候。

* A “callable” bond may be forcibly bought back by the issuer, usually at the worst time for the investor.

*债券的“息票”是其利率；“低息”债券支付的利率低于市场平均水平。

* A bond’s “coupon” is its interest rate; a “low-coupon” bond pays a rate of interest income below the market average.

* 2008-2009年金融危机期间，银行发行的优先股给投资者造成了毁灭性的损失。发行人可以随时暂停优先股的股息。

* Preferred stock, overwhelmingly issued by banks, dealt devastating losses to investors during the financial crisis of 2008–09. An issuer may suspend the dividend on preferred stock at any time.

¹ “论推定”，蒙田全集（斯坦福大学，1965 年），第 488 页。

¹ “Of Presumption,” The Complete Essays of Montaigne (Stanford, 1965), p. 488.

²请参阅第5、7、11章及其注释。

² See Chapters 5, 7, 11, and their accompanying Commentaries.

³有关起草 IPS 的更多信息，请参阅 CFA 协会，“个人投资者投资政策声明要素”，bit.ly/3rDrKBn，以及 Bogleheads.org，“投资政策声明”，bit.ly/3NEVjtb。

³ For more on drafting an IPS, see CFA Institute, “Elements of an Investment Policy Statement for Individual Investors,” bit.ly/3rDrKBn, and Bogleheads.org, “Investment Policy Statement,” bit.ly/3NEVjtb.

⁴请参阅第 6 章的评论。

⁴ See the Commentary on Chapter 6.

⁵有关重新平衡，请参见此处；美元成本平均法，第 5 章及其评论；年度支出，第 9 章的评论；清单，第 11 章的评论；“疯狂资金”账户，第 1 章及其附带的评论。

⁵ For rebalancing, see here; dollar-cost averaging, Chapter 5 and its Commentary; annual expenses, the Commentary on Chapter 9; checklists, the Commentary on Chapter 11; “mad-money” accounts, Chapter 1 and its accompanying Commentary.

⁶请参阅第 9 章及其评论，以及 Jason Zweig，“本杰明·格雷厄姆会讨厌指数基金吗？”bit.ly/3qb7iXS。

⁶ See Chapter 9, its Commentary, and Jason Zweig, “Would Benjamin Graham Have Hated Index Funds?,” bit.ly/3qb7iXS.

⁷ Jason Zweig，《你的金钱和你的大脑》（西蒙与舒斯特出版社，2007 年）。

⁷ Jason Zweig, Your Money and Your Brain (Simon and Schuster, 2007).

⁸格雷厄姆还在第 8 章中讨论了他对再平衡的看法。

⁸ Graham also discusses his version of rebalancing in Chapter 8.

⁹有关更深入的讨论，请参阅 William J. Bernstein 的《再平衡红利》bit.ly/3rbDElh。

⁹ For a more advanced discussion, see William J. Bernstein, “The Rebalancing Bonus,” bit.ly/3rbDElh.

¹⁰无论你的目标配置比例是 50/50、60/40、70/30、80/20、90/10、76/24 还是其他任何组合，方法都是一样的。在每种情况下，你都需要卖出足够多的盈利资产，并买入足够多的亏损资产，以回到你的目标。

¹⁰ The same method applies regardless of whether your target allocation is 50/50, 60/40, 70/30, 80/20, 90/10, 76/24, or any other combination. In each case, you would sell enough of the winning asset and buy enough of the loser to get back to your target.

^* 1949年初，过去20年股票的平均年回报率为3.1%，而长期国债的回报率为3.9%。自然而然，1949年成为了买入股票的绝佳时机：在接下来的十年里，标准普尔500指数年均上涨20.1%，是历史上最好的长期回报率之一。

^* At the beginning of 1949, the average annual return produced by stocks over the previous 20 years was 3.1%, versus 3.9% for long-term Treasury bonds. Naturally enough, 1949 turned out to be a fabulous time to buy stocks: Over the next decade, the S&P 500 gained an average of 20.1% annually, one of the best long-term returns in history.

*格雷厄姆此前就此话题发表的评论可见此处。试想一下，他会如何看待20世纪90年代末或2021年的市场——当时，每一次创下新高都被视为进一步“证明”股票是通往财富的无风险之路！

* Graham’s earlier comments on this subject appear here. Just imagine what he would have thought about the markets of the late 1990s or 2021, in which each new record high was considered further “proof” that stocks were the riskless way to wealth!

^*参见第 3 章的评论。

^* See the Commentary on Chapter 3.

^*为什么股票的“高价”会影响其股息收益率？股票收益率是其现金股息与每股普通股价格的比率。如果一家公司在股价为每股100美元时支付2美元的年度股息，其收益率为2%。但如果股价翻倍而股息保持不变，股息收益率将降至1%。1959年，当格雷厄姆在1957年发现的趋势变得众所周知时，大多数华尔街专家宣称这种趋势不可能持续下去。毕竟，既然股票比债券风险更高，那么如果没有额外的股息收入来补偿更大的风险，人们怎么会购买股票呢？专家们认为，债券的收益率最多会在几个月内超过股票，然后情况就会恢复“正常”。除了2008年至2021年之间的短暂时期外，此后债券的收益率一直高于股票。

^* Why do the “high prices” of stocks affect their dividend yields? A stock’s yield is the ratio of its cash dividend to the price of one share of common stock. If a company pays a $2 annual dividend when its stock price is $100 per share, its yield is 2%. But if the stock price doubles while the dividend stays constant, the dividend yield will drop to 1%. In 1959, when the trend Graham spotted in 1957 became noticeable to everyone, most Wall Street pundits declared that it could not possibly last. After all, since stocks are riskier than bonds, why would anyone buy them at all without being able to earn extra dividend income to compensate for the greater risk? The experts argued that bonds would outyield stocks for a few months at most, and then things would revert to “normal.” Except for brief periods between 2008 and 2021, bonds have outyielded stocks ever since.

^*请参阅此处和此处。

^* See here and here.

^*有关多样化的更多信息，请参阅第7章和第14 章的评论。

^* For more on diversification, see the Commentaries on Chapters 7 and 14.

^*当今希望采取此类策略的防御性投资者可以在众多以股息为导向的交易所交易基金中进行选择。

^* Today’s defensive investor who wishes to pursue such a strategy can choose among numerous dividend-oriented exchange-traded funds.

^* “72法则”是一个便捷的思维工具。要估算一笔资金翻倍所需的时间，只需将其假设的增长率除以72即可。例如，如果增长率为6%，那么资金大约需要12年才能翻倍（72除以6=12）。如果增长率为格雷厄姆提到的7.1%，那么一只成长型股票的收益将在10年多一点的时间里翻一番（72/7.1=约10.1年）。

^* The “Rule of 72” is a handy mental tool. To estimate the length of time an amount of money takes to double, simply divide its assumed growth rate into 72. At 6%, for instance, money will double in roughly 12 years (72 divided by 6 = 12). At the 7.1% rate cited by Graham, a growth stock will double its earnings in just over 10 years (72/7.1 = about 10.1 years).

^*格雷厄姆在这里提出了这一点。

^* Graham makes this point here.

^*为了证明格雷厄姆的观察始终正确，不妨看看最近Zoom Video Communications的例子。从2019年初到2020年末，由于新冠疫情期间盈利增长了约30倍，该股从62美元飙升至568美元。随后，随着经济重启，Zoom的利润暴跌，股价在接下来的两年里下跌了近90%。一如既往，越火爆，跌得越惨。

^* To show that Graham’s observations are perennially true, consider the recent example of Zoom Video Communications. From early 2019 through late 2020, the stock soared from $62 to $568 as earnings rose roughly 30-fold during the Covid pandemic. Then, as the economy reopened, Zoom’s profits collapsed, and the stock fell nearly 90% in the next two years. As always, the hotter they are, the harder they fall.

^* “收益乘数”是市盈率的同义词。（参见此处。）

^* “Earnings multiplier” is a synonym for P/E ratios. (See here.)

^*有关美元成本平均法的更多信息，请参阅本章的评论和 Nick Maggiulli 的《继续购买》（Harriman House，2022 年）。

^* For more on dollar-cost averaging, see the Commentary on this chapter and Nick Maggiulli, Just Keep Buying (Harriman House, 2022).

^*要更新格雷厄姆的通货膨胀数据，请将本节中的每个美元金额乘以 8。

^* To update Graham’s figures for inflation, take each dollar amount in this section and multiply it by 8.

^*在当今的美国市场，要被视为大公司，一家公司的总股票价值（或“市值”）应至少为 150 亿美元，或者账面价值和年收入分别至少约为 50 亿美元和 100 亿美元。

^* In today’s U.S. markets, to be considered large, a company should have a total stock value (or “market capitalization”) of at least $15 billion, or book value and annual revenue approximating at least $5 billion and $10 billion, respectively.

¹ Jason Zweig，“为何一位传奇投资者比以往任何时候都更加担忧”，2010 年 5 月 18 日，bit.ly/3tS6V6i。

¹ Jason Zweig, “Why One Legendary Investor Is More Worried Than Ever,” May 18, 2010, bit.ly/3tS6V6i.

² Philip WS Newall 和 Leonardo Weiss-Cohen，“投资的赌博化”，bit.ly/44nZ0KI；Maèva Flayelle 等人，“促进潜在成瘾性网络行为的技术设计特征分类”，bit.ly/3wm9IWC。

² Philip W. S. Newall and Leonardo Weiss-Cohen, “The Gamblification of Investing,” bit.ly/44nZ0KI; Maèva Flayelle et al., “A Taxonomy of Technology Design Features That Promote Potentially Addictive Online Behaviours,” bit.ly/3wm9IWC.

³请参阅第 16 章的评论。

³ See the Commentary on Chapter 16.

⁴ Natasha Dow Schüll，《设计成瘾：拉斯维加斯的机器赌博》（普林斯顿大学出版社，2014 年）；Jason Zweig，“我开始在 Robinhood 上交易热门股票，然后就停不下来了”，bit.ly/3NVuYHw。

⁴ Natasha Dow Schüll, Addiction by Design: Machine Gambling in Las Vegas (Princeton, 2014); Jason Zweig, “I Started Trading Hot Stocks on Robinhood. Then I Couldn’t Stop,” bit.ly/3NVuYHw.

⁵安大略省证券委员会，“零售投资中的数字参与实践”，bit.ly/3rg29hb；Christoph Hüller 等人，“当金融平台游戏化时，消费者的风险偏好会发生变化”，bit.ly/3QcDCCT。

⁵ Ontario Securities Commission, “Digital Engagement Practices in Retail Investing,” bit.ly/3rg29hb; Christoph Hüller et al., “When Financial Platforms Become Gamified, Consumers’ Risk Preferences Change,” bit.ly/3QcDCCT.

⁶ Brad M. Barber 和 Terrance Odean，“交易危及您的财富”，bit.ly/3LZdE49；Fernando Chague 等人，“以日间交易为生？”，bit.ly/45D0qkU；Brad M. Barber 等人，“学习，快还是慢”，bit.ly/3tvNn7n；欧洲证券和市场管理局，bit.ly/45z1kyy。

⁶ Brad M. Barber and Terrance Odean, “Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth,” bit.ly/3LZdE49; Fernando Chague et al., “Day Trading for a Living?,” bit.ly/45D0qkU; Brad M. Barber et al., “Learning, Fast or Slow,” bit.ly/3tvNn7n; European Securities and Markets Authority, bit.ly/45z1kyy.

⁷ Robinhood 等应用程序上所谓的“免费”交易并非免费。虽然你可能无需支付佣金，但成本已包含在价格中。经纪公司可能会从买卖价差中抽取一部分，即最高买入价（任何人出价的最高买入价）与最低卖出价（任何人愿意接受的最低卖出价）之间的差额。他们还会赚取“订单流付款”，这是一种合法但几乎看不见的回扣。

⁷ The so-called “free” trading at apps like Robinhood isn’t free. Although you may not pay a commission, costs are embedded in the price. Brokerage firms may pocket a portion of the bid/ask spread, the difference between the highest bid (the top price at which anyone offers to buy) and the lowest ask (the least anyone will accept to sell). They also earn “payment for order flow,” a legal but almost invisible kickback.

⁸ Francis Galton，《民意调查》，bit.ly/44kPaZY，以及《投票箱》，bit.ly/3PzB9U3；Kenneth Wallis，《重温弗朗西斯·高尔顿的预测竞赛》，bit.ly/443G5Fh。

⁸ Francis Galton, “Vox Populi,” bit.ly/44kPaZY, and “The Ballot-Box,” bit.ly/3PzB9U3; Kenneth Wallis, “Revisiting Francis Galton’s Forecasting Competition,” bit.ly/443G5Fh.

⁹ James Surowiecki，《群体的智慧》（Doubleday，2004 年）；Michael J. Mauboussin，《解释群体的智慧》，bit.ly/3D0j4Hu；William J. Bernstein，《群体的妄想》（Grove Atlantic，2021 年）。

⁹ James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (Doubleday, 2004); Michael J. Mauboussin, “Explaining the Wisdom of Crowds,” bit.ly/3D0j4Hu; William J. Bernstein, The Delusions of Crowds (Grove Atlantic, 2021).

¹⁰ J. Anthony Cookson 等人，“回音室”，bit.ly/44KpkiC。

¹⁰ J. Anthony Cookson et al., “Echo Chambers,” bit.ly/44KpkiC.

¹¹专业基金经理面临着与个人投资者同样的压力，而且似乎在抵御这些压力方面并没有什么成功：Harrison Hong 等人，“邻居的投资组合”，bit.ly/44KJyZq；Richard W. Sias，“机构羊群行为”，bit.ly/3pOeB7G；David S. Scharfstein 和 Jeremy C. Stein，“羊群行为与投资”，bit.ly/3JZJ8WS；Hao Jiang 和 Michela Verardo，“羊群行为能揭示技能吗？”，bit.ly/44p0aWN。

¹¹ Professional fund managers face the same pressures as individual investors—and seem to have little more success resisting them: Harrison Hong et al., “Thy Neighbor’s Portfolio,” bit.ly/44KJyZq; Richard W. Sias, “Institutional Herding,” bit.ly/3pOeB7G; David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy C. Stein, “Herd Behavior and Investment,” bit.ly/3JZJ8WS; Hao Jiang and Michela Verardo, “Does Herding Behavior Reveal Skill?,” bit.ly/44p0aWN.

¹² Lauren E. Sherman 等人，“青少年时期点赞的力量”，bit.ly/4a596CG；Matthias Pelster 和 Bastian Breitmayer，“吸引同龄人的关注”，bit.ly/44M8osi；William J. Brady 等人，“在线社交网络中的算法介导的社会学习”，bit.ly/44GszY4。

¹² Lauren E. Sherman et al., “The Power of the Like in Adolescence,” bit.ly/4a596CG; Matthias Pelster and Bastian Breitmayer, “Attracting Attention from Peers,” bit.ly/44M8osi; William J. Brady et al., “Algorithm-Mediated Social Learning in Online Social Networks,” bit.ly/44GszY4.

¹³本杰明·格雷厄姆，《通过股票积累的一些投资方面》，bit.ly/3RLiNjV，以及《不安全世界中的证券》，bit.ly/449pBuT。

¹³ Benjamin Graham, “Some Investment Aspects of Accumulation Through Equities,” bit.ly/3RLiNjV, and “Securities in an Insecure World,” bit.ly/449pBuT.

*格雷厄姆在这里说漏了嘴。在第一章中，格雷厄姆坚称“进取型”投资者的定义并非取决于你愿意承担的风险，而是取决于你愿意付出的努力，之后他又回到了传统的观念，认为进取型投资者更“激进”。然而，本章的其余部分明确表明，格雷厄姆坚持他最初的定义。（伟大的英国经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯似乎是第一个将“进取型”一词用作分析型投资同义词的人。）

* Here Graham has made a slip of the tongue. After insisting in Chapter 1 that the definition of an “enterprising” investor depends not on the amount of risk you seek, but the amount of work you are willing to put in, Graham falls back on the conventional notion that enterprising investors are more “aggressive.” The rest of the chapter, however, makes clear that Graham stands by his original definition. (The great British economist John Maynard Keynes appears to have been the first to use the term “enterprise” as a synonym for analytical investment.)

* “高息债券”是指支付高于平均水平利率（在当今市场至少为8%）的公司债券或支付高额股息收益率（6%或更高）的优先股。如果一家公司必须支付如此高的利率才能借款，这本身就是一个风险较高的基本信号。“二级债券”现在被称为“高收益债券”或“垃圾债券”。

* “High-coupon issues” are corporate bonds paying above-average interest rates (in today’s markets, at least 8%) or preferred stocks paying large dividend yields (6% or more). If a company must pay such high rates to borrow money, that is a fundamental signal that it is risky. “Second-grade bonds” are now called “high-yield” or “junk bonds.”

^*截至 2024 年初，高等级公司债券的等效收益率约为 5.5%，20 年期免税市政债券的等效收益率约为 3.5%。

^* As of early 2024, the equivalent yields are roughly 5.5% on high-grade corporate bonds and 3.5% on 20-year tax-free municipal bonds.

*债券价格以“面值”（即100）的百分比表示。定价为“85”的债券，其售价为其本金价值的85%；例如，一只债券最初发行价为10,000美元，现在以85的价格出售，其成本为8,500美元。低于100的债券被称为“折价债券”；高于100的债券被称为“溢价债券”。

* Bond prices are quoted in percentages of “par value,” or 100. A bond priced at “85” is selling at 85% of its principal value; a bond originally offered for $10,000, but now selling at 85, will cost $8,500. When bonds sell below 100, they are called “discount” bonds; above 100, they become “premium” bonds.

*新发行的普通股——首次公开募股（IPO）——通常会以4%或更高的“承销折扣”（内置佣金）出售。相比之下，购买老股普通股的佣金可能接近于零。每当华尔街出售新产品的利润远高于出售老产品时，新产品就会更难出售。

* New issues of common stock—initial public offerings or IPOs—normally are sold with an “underwriting discount” (a built-in commission) of 4% or more. By contrast, the buyer’s commission on older shares of common stock can be close to zero. Whenever Wall Street makes much more for selling something new than for selling something old, the new will get the harder sell.

^*公司往往在股市接近峰值时公开发行新股。请参阅 Lubos Pastor 和 Pietro Veronesi 合著的《理性的 IPO 浪潮》，bit.ly/450Y1Rd，以及 Owen Lamont 和 Jeremy Stein 合著的《投资者情绪与公司财务》，bit.ly/3Kzmzc2。

^* Companies tend to offer new shares to the public when the stock market is near a peak. See Lubos Pastor and Pietro Veronesi, “Rational IPO Waves,” bit.ly/450Y1Rd, and Owen Lamont and Jeremy Stein, “Investor Sentiment and Corporate Finance,” bit.ly/3Kzmzc2.

*从1960年6月到1962年5月的两年间，超过850家公司首次公开发行股票，平均每天发行超过一只。1967年末，IPO市场再次升温；1969年，新股数量惊人，达到781只。这种供过于求的局面导致了1969年以及1973-1974年的熊市。1974年，IPO市场一片萧条，全年仅有9只新股诞生。这种供不应求的局面催生了20世纪80年代的牛市，当时约有4000只新股涌现，最终引发了导致1987年股市崩盘的过度热情。20世纪90年代末，华尔街重新回归新股发行业务，成功发行了近5000只新股。 2000年泡沫破裂后，2001年仅有88家公司IPO，创下1979年以来年度IPO数量最低纪录。每一次IPO，公众都会遭受重创，至少两年内不会再入场，然后再次重蹈覆辙。自从股市诞生以来，投资者就一直经历着这种躁狂-抑郁的循环。1825年，美国第一次IPO热潮中，据说一名男子在试图购买新成立的南华克银行（Bank of Southwark）股票的投机者蜂拥而至时被挤死；最富有的买家雇佣了打手强行挤到队伍最前面。果然，到1829年，股票市值蒸发了约25%。

* In the two years from June 1960 through May 1962, more than 850 companies sold their stock to the public for the first time—an average of more than one per day. In late 1967 the IPO market heated up again; in 1969 an astonishing 781 new stocks were born. That oversupply helped create the bear markets of 1969 and 1973–1974. In 1974 the IPO market was so dead that only nine new stocks were created all year. That undersupply fed the bull market of the 1980s, when roughly 4,000 new stocks sprang up, ultimately triggering the overenthusiasm that led to the 1987 crash. In the late 1990s, Wall Street got back into the business of creating new stocks, cranking out nearly 5,000 IPOs. Then, after the bubble burst in 2000, only 88 IPOs were issued in 2001—the lowest annual total since 1979. In every case, the public has gotten burned on IPOs, stayed away for at least two years, then returned for another scalding. For as long as stock markets have existed, investors have gone through this manic-depressive cycle. In America’s first great IPO boom, back in 1825, a man was said to have been squeezed to death in the stampede of speculators trying to buy shares in the new Bank of Southwark; the wealthiest buyers hired thugs to punch their way to the front of the line. Sure enough, by 1829, stocks had lost roughly 25% of their value.

^*格雷厄姆在这里描述的是配股，即已经持有股票的投资者被要求支付更多资金，以维持公司原有的权益比例。这种融资方式在欧洲仍然很普遍，但在美国已变得罕见，除了封闭式基金。

^* Here Graham is describing rights offerings, in which investors who already own a stock are asked to pony up even more money to maintain the same proportional interest in the company. This form of financing, still widespread in Europe, has become rare in the U.S., except among closed-end funds.

*在格雷厄姆的时代，最负盛名的投资银行通常对IPO业务避而不谈，因为这被认为是对天真的投资者的不体面的剥削。然而，到了1999年末和2000年初IPO热潮的顶峰，华尔街最大的几家投资银行却全力投入其中。2020年和2021年，各大券商纷纷将SPAC强加给渴望投机的公众，这种狂热在未来几十年里都将成为金融界的耻辱。（参见本章的评论。）

* In Graham’s day, the most prestigious investment banks generally steered clear of the IPO business, which was regarded as an undignified exploitation of naïve investors. By the peak of the IPO boom in late 1999 and early 2000, however, Wall Street’s biggest investment banks had jumped in with both feet. And the frenzy among major brokerage firms to foist SPACs on the eager speculative public in 2020 and 2021 should live in financial infamy for decades to come. (See the Commentary on this chapter.)

¹ Carol Tavris 和 Elliot Aronson，《我们犯了错误（但不是我）》（Mariner，2020 年），第 296 页。

¹ Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (but Not by Me) (Mariner, 2020), p. 296.

² 第9章及其评论讨论了共同基金。年金是一种保险合同，通常在多年期内提供收益，并收取预付费用和其他费用。在IPO中，私人公司会将部分股份出售给公众，为投资银行和经纪公司带来4%或更高的佣金收入。

² Chapter 9 and its Commentary discuss mutual funds. Annuities are insurance contracts that provide income, usually over a multiyear period, in exchange for an upfront fee and other charges. In an IPO, a private company sells some of its shares to the public, generating 4% or more in fees for investment banks and brokerage firms.

³并非总是如此。请参阅第8章及其注释。

³ Not all the time. See Chapter 8 and its Commentary.

⁴ Paul A. Gompers 等人，“风险投资家如何做出决策？”bit.ly/3XOsTBL；以及“私募股权公司说他们做什么？”bit.ly/3rnxoHr。

⁴ Paul A. Gompers et al., “How Do Venture Capitalists Make Decisions?,” bit.ly/3XOsTBL; and “What Do Private Equity Firms Say They Do?,” bit.ly/3rnxoHr.

⁵有关 WeWork 和 Theranos 兴衰的精彩描述，请参阅 Eliot Brown 和 Maureen Farrell 的《我们的崇拜》（Crown，2021 年）和 John Carreyrou 的《坏血》（Knopf，2018 年）。

⁵ For brilliant accounts of the rise and fall of WeWork and Theranos, respectively, see Eliot Brown and Maureen Farrell, The Cult of We (Crown, 2021), and John Carreyrou, Bad Blood (Knopf, 2018).

⁶ Richard M. Ennis，“卓越已消失”，bit.ly/3NQ4xmH。其他低于平均水平的回报证据，请参阅Arthur Korteweg，“私募股权回报中的风险调整”，bit.ly/3Of4NNf；Simon Lack，“对冲基金幻影”（Wiley出版社，2012年）；以及Daniel Rasmussen，“私募股权：被高估还是被高估？”，bit.ly/3XPsn6F。

⁶ Richard M. Ennis, “Excellence Gone Missing,” bit.ly/3NQ4xmH. For other evidence of below-average returns, see Arthur Korteweg, “Risk Adjustment in Private Equity Returns,” bit.ly/3Of4NNf; Simon Lack, The Hedge Fund Mirage (Wiley, 2012); and Daniel Rasmussen, “Private Equity: Overvalued and Overrated?,” bit.ly/3XPsn6F.

⁷ SEC.gov，“了解保证金账户”，bit.ly/3O6Zb7U。您还欠经纪人保证金贷款的利息。

⁷ SEC.gov, “Understanding Margin Accounts,” bit.ly/3O6Zb7U. You also owe the broker interest on the margin loan.

⁸本杰明·格雷厄姆，《财务分析的未来》，载于杰森·茨威格和罗德尼·N·沙利文著《本杰明·格雷厄姆：职业建设》（麦格劳希尔，2010 年），第 240 页。

⁸ Benjamin Graham, “The Future of Financial Analysis,” in Jason Zweig and Rodney N. Sullivan, Benjamin Graham: Building a Profession (McGraw-Hill, 2010), p. 240.

⁹ Tom McGinty 等人，“SPAC 破产前公司内部人士赚了数十亿美元”，bit.ly/3rXfSdy；Amrith Ramkumar，“SPAC 破产使初创企业价值蒸发 750 亿美元”，bit.ly/46wXd7F；Michael Klausner 等人，“冷静看待 SPAC”，bit.ly/3M0G4eh。

⁹ Tom McGinty et al., “Company Insiders Made Billions Before SPAC Bust,” bit.ly/3rXfSdy; Amrith Ramkumar, “SPAC Rout Erases $75 Billion in Startup Value,” bit.ly/46wXd7F; Michael Klausner et al., “A Sober Look at SPACs,” bit.ly/3M0G4eh.

*如前所述（见此处），新住房管理局债券和新社区债券不再发行。

* As already noted (see here), the New Housing Authority and New Community bonds are no longer issued.

*如今，这些“特殊情况”领域中的“低质量债券”被称为不良债券或违约债券。当一家公司陷入（或濒临）破产时，其普通股实际上变得一文不值，因为美国破产法赋予债券持有人比股东更强大的法律权利。但如果公司成功重组并摆脱破产，债券持有人通常会获得新公司的股票，而一旦公司能够再次支付利息，债券的价值通常会恢复。正如格雷厄姆所说，在这些特殊情况下，“债券和普通股之间没有真正的区别。”

* Today these “lower-quality bonds” in the “special situation” area are known as distressed or defaulted bonds. When a company is in (or approaching) bankruptcy, its common stock becomes essentially worthless, since U.S. bankruptcy law entitles bondholders to a much stronger legal claim than shareholders. But if the company reorganizes successfully and comes out of bankruptcy, the bondholders often receive stock in the new firm, and the value of the bonds usually recovers once the company is able to pay interest again. In these special situations, as Graham puts it, “no true distinction exists between bonds and common stocks.”

*仔细听听格雷厄姆在这里说了什么。他在1972年的文章中指出，自1949年以来——超过22年——这段时间太短，不足以得出可靠的结论！格雷厄姆精通数学，他从未忘记，客观结论需要大量数据组成的长期样本。那些兜售“回测”选股花招的骗子，几乎总是基于比格雷厄姆所能接受的更小的样本来得出假设性结果。（格雷厄姆经常用50年的时间周期来分析过去的数据。）

* Note carefully what Graham is saying here. Writing in 1972, he contends that the period since 1949—a stretch of more than 22 years—is too short a period from which to draw reliable conclusions! With his mastery of mathematics, Graham never forgets that objective conclusions require very long samples of large amounts of data. The charlatans who peddle “back-tested” stock-picking gimmicks almost always base their hypothetical results on smaller samples than Graham would ever accept. (Graham often used 50-year periods to analyze past data.)

^*今天，您可以通过谷歌搜索“过去 10 年（或您选择的任何其他时期）表现最佳的股票”等短语来汇总这样的列表。

^* Today, you can assemble such a list by googling a phrase such as “best performing stocks last 10 years” (or any other period you choose).

*截至2002年12月31日的20年间，95.6%投资于大型成长型公司的基金（相当于如今格雷厄姆所说的“成长型基金”）的业绩低于基准。然而，同期，90.9%投资于估值更合理的大型公司的“大型价值型”基金的业绩也低于各自的基准。请参阅bit.ly/47yjBwQ。

* Over the 20 years ending December 31, 2002, 95.6% of funds investing in large growth companies—today’s equivalent of what Graham calls “growth funds”—underperformed their benchmark. However, 90.9% of “large value” funds investing in more reasonably priced big companies also underperformed their respective benchmark over the same period. See bit.ly/47yjBwQ.

*有关另一种方法，请参阅第 15 章评论中的“什么让超级股票变得超级” 。

* For another approach, see “What Makes Superstocks Super” in the Commentary on Chapter 15.

^*请注意，格雷厄姆坚持以过去多年平均盈利为基础来计算市盈率。这样一来，你就不会因为公司短暂的盈利高峰而高估其价值。想象一下，一家公司过去12个月每股盈利3美元，但过去六年平均每股盈利仅为50美分。哪个数字——突然上涨的3美元还是持续上涨的50美分——更有可能代表一种可持续的趋势？如果市盈率为该公司最近一年每股盈利3美元的25倍，那么股价应为75美元。但如果市盈率为过去七年平均盈利的25倍（总盈利除以7，等于平均年盈利85.7美分/股），那么股价仅为21.43美元。选择哪个数字至关重要。如今华尔街盛行的市盈率计算方法——主要基于“明年的收益”——对格雷厄姆来说无疑是天方夜谭。你怎么能根据一家公司尚未产生的收益来估值呢？这就像根据“灰姑娘即将建造新城堡”的传言来定价房价一样。

^* Notice that Graham insists on calculating the price/earnings ratio based on a multiyear average of past earnings. That way, you lower the odds that you will overestimate a company’s value based on a temporarily high burst of profitability. Imagine that a company earned $3 per share over the past 12 months, but an average of only 50 cents per share over the previous six years. Which number—the sudden $3 or the steady 50 cents—is more likely to represent a sustainable trend? At 25 times the $3 it earned in the most recent year, the stock would be priced at $75. But at 25 times the average earnings of the past seven years ($6 in total earnings, divided by seven, equals 85.7 cents per share in average annual earnings), the stock would be priced at only $21.43. Which number you pick makes a big difference. The prevailing method on Wall Street today—basing price/earnings ratios primarily on “next year’s earnings”—would be anathema to Graham. How can you value a company based on earnings it hasn’t even generated yet? That’s like setting house prices based on a rumor that Cinderella will be building her new castle right around the corner.

*这就是为什么快速增长公司的股价如果比华尔街对每股收益增长的高预期低一分钱，就会下跌 20% 或更多。

* That’s why the stocks of fast-growing companies can drop 20% or more if they fall even one penny short of meeting Wall Street’s high expectations for growth in earnings per share.

^*如今，与“与特定公司关系密切”的投资者等同的，是控制人——那些经营公司并持有大量股票的高级管理人员或董事。像特斯拉的埃隆·马斯克或Facebook母公司Meta Platforms的马克·扎克伯格这样的高管，直接掌控着公司的命运——外部投资者希望他们持有大量股份，以示信任。但级别较低的管理人员和普通员工无法通过个人决策影响公司股价；因此，他们不应将超过一小部分资产投入自己雇主的股票。至于外部投资者，无论他们自认为多么了解公司，他们也面临同样的反对意见。

^* Today’s equivalent of investors “who have a close relationship with the particular company” are control persons—senior managers or directors who run the company and own huge blocks of stock. Executives like Elon Musk of Tesla or Mark Zuckerberg of Meta Platforms, Facebook’s parent, have direct control over a company’s destiny—and outside investors want them to maintain large shareholdings as a vote of confidence. But less-senior managers and rank-and-file workers can’t influence the company’s share price with their individual decisions; thus they should not put more than a small percentage of their assets in their own employer’s stock. As for outside investors, no matter how well they think they know the company, the same objection applies.

*费城投资银行德崇证券 (Drexel Firestone) 于 1973 年与 Burnham & Co. 合并，后来更名为德崇证券伯纳姆兰伯特 (Drexel Burnham Lambert)，因其在 20 世纪 80 年代收购热潮中提供的垃圾债券融资而闻名。

* Drexel Firestone, a Philadelphia investment bank, merged in 1973 with Burnham & Co. and later became Drexel Burnham Lambert, famous for its junk-bond financing of the 1980s takeover boom.

^*这种买入道琼斯工业平均指数中最便宜股票的策略被称为“道琼斯狗股”。它在 20 世纪 90 年代开始流行，但近年来效果并不理想。

^* This strategy of buying the cheapest stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average is nicknamed the “Dogs of the Dow.” It became popular in the 1990s but has only worked sporadically in recent years.

*格雷厄姆所说的“净营运资本”是指一家公司的流动资产（如现金、有价证券和库存）减去其总负债（包括优先股和长期债务）。

* By “net working capital,” Graham means a company’s current assets (such as cash, marketable securities, and inventories) minus its total liabilities (including preferred stock and long-term debt).

*现在情况已不再如此。私募股权公司手握数万亿美元，已经将“二级”公司的股价推高至超出了交易价位。

* This is no longer true. Private-equity firms, with trillions of dollars to spend, have bid up the share prices of “secondary” companies past bargain levels.

*从1975年到1983年，小型股（“二级”）的表现每年平均比大型股高出17.6个百分点，令人惊叹。投资大众对小型股热情不减，共同基金公司推出了数百只专门投资小型股的新基金，而小型股在接下来的十年里，每年的表现都比大型股低5个百分点。1999年，这一循环再次出现，小型股的表现比大型股高出近9个百分点，这促使投资银行家们首次向公众出售数百只热门的小型高科技股票。这些股票名称中不再出现“电子”、“计算机”或“特许经营”等词，取而代之的是“.com”、“光学”、“无线”，甚至还有“e-”和“I-”这样的前缀。投资界的流行语总是会变成电锯，把任何相信它们的人都撕碎。

* From 1975 through 1983, small (“secondary”) stocks outperformed large stocks by an amazing average of 17.6 percentage points per year. The investing public eagerly embraced small stocks, mutual fund companies rolled out hundreds of new funds specializing in them, and small stocks obliged by underperforming large stocks by five percentage points per year over the next decade. The cycle recurred in 1999, when small stocks beat big stocks by nearly nine percentage points, inspiring investment bankers to sell hundreds of hot little high-tech stocks to the public for the first time. Instead of “electronics,” “computers,” or “franchise” in their names, the new buzzwords were “.com,” “optical,” “wireless,” and even prefixes like “e-” and “I-.” Investing buzzwords always turn into buzz saws, tearing apart anyone who believes in them.

*近期的诉讼和监管行动往往规模巨大、突如其来且难以预测。因此，“永远不要相信诉讼”仍然是一条有效规则，除非是最勇敢的投资者。

* The outcomes of more-recent lawsuits and regulatory actions have often been large, sudden, and unpredictable. Thus, “never buy into a lawsuit” remains a valid rule for all but the most intrepid investors to live by.

¹ Shane Parrish 的知识项目播客，bit.ly/3JXBnRu。

¹ The Knowledge Project podcast with Shane Parrish, bit.ly/3JXBnRu.

²参见第 1 章和第4章。

² See Chapters 1 and 4.

³ Patricia A. Dreyfus，“两堂简单的投资分析课”，bit.ly/3rlxejF。

³ Patricia A. Dreyfus, “Investment Analysis in Two Easy Lessons,” bit.ly/3rlxejF.

*华尔街那些高薪的“市场策略师”、经济学家和其他预测者，不仅年复一年地无法准确预测股票回报率，甚至常常连方向都预测不准。他们经常预测市场会下跌，而实际上却上涨了，反之亦然。

* Wall Street’s highly paid “market strategists,” economists, and other forecasters not only fail, year after year, to predict the rate of stock returns accurately; they often don’t even get the direction correct. They frequently forecast that the market will fall when, in fact, it ends up rising—and vice versa.

*请参阅此处。

* See here.

*如果没有熊市拉低股价，任何等待“低买”的人都会感到完全落后——而且，往往最终会抛弃之前的谨慎，一头扎进去。正因如此，格雷厄姆关于情绪自律的教诲才如此重要。牛市持续的时间越长，投资者患上健忘症的可能性就越大；大约五年后，许多人甚至不再相信熊市的可能。所有忘记的人注定会被提醒；而在股市中，恢复记忆总是令人不快的。

* Without bear markets to take stock prices back down, anyone waiting to “buy low” will feel completely left behind—and, all too often, will end up abandoning any former caution and jumping in with both feet. That’s why Graham’s message about the importance of emotional discipline is so important. The longer a bull market lasts, the more severely investors will be afflicted with amnesia; after five years or so, many people no longer believe that bear markets are even possible. All those who forget are doomed to be reminded; and, in the stock market, recovered memories are always unpleasant.

^*格雷厄姆在第 4 章中讨论了这一“推荐政策”。

^* Graham discusses this “recommended policy” in Chapter 4.

* 1954年底，美国股市上涨52.6%，创下当时有记录以来第二高的年度回报率，许多“公式化投资规划师”会抛售手中持有的所有股票。在接下来的五年里，这些市场时机把握者很可能会在股市翻倍之际袖手旁观。

* Many of these “formula planners” would have sold all their stocks at the end of 1954, after the U.S. stock market rose 52.6%, the second-highest yearly return then on record. Over the next five years, these market-timers would likely have stood on the sidelines as stocks doubled.

*格雷厄姆今天所说的“二线公司”是指未纳入标准普尔 500 指数的数千只股票中的任何一只。

* Today’s equivalent of what Graham calls “second-line companies” would be any of the thousands of stocks not included in the S&P 500.

^*仔细听听格雷厄姆在这里说了什么。你持有的大多数股票，无论你持有哪只股票，也无论整个市场是涨是跌，都会从最低价上涨至少50%，从最高价下跌至少33%，这不仅是可能的，而且是很有可能的。如果你无法接受这种情况——或者你认为你的投资组合神奇地免受这种影响——那么你还没有资格称自己为投资者。（格雷厄姆将33%的跌幅称为“相当于三分之一”，因为50%的涨幅会将一只10美元的股票推高至15美元。而从15美元，33%的跌幅（或下跌5美元）会将其跌回10美元，也就是最初的水平。）

^* Note carefully what Graham is saying here. It is not just possible, but probable, that most of the stocks you own will gain at least 50% from their lowest price and lose at least 33% from their highest price—regardless of which stocks you own or whether the market as a whole goes up or down. If you can’t live with that—or you think your portfolio is somehow magically exempt from it—then you are not yet entitled to call yourself an investor. (Graham refers to a 33% decline as the “equivalent one-third” because a 50% gain takes a $10 stock to $15. From $15, a 33% loss [or $5 drop] takes it right back to $10, where it started.)

*对于当今的投资者来说，追求这一“公式”的理想策略是重新平衡；请参见此处。

* For today’s investor, the ideal strategy for pursuing this “formula” is rebalancing; see here.

*如今，大多数公司仅在特殊要求的情况下才会提供“刻字股票证书”。股票大多以纯电子形式存在（就像你的银行账户里有电脑化的借贷记录，而不是实际的货币），因此比格雷厄姆时代更容易交易。

* Most companies today provide “an engraved stock certificate” only upon special request. Stocks exist, for the most part, in purely electronic form (much as your bank account contains computerized credits and debits, not actual currency) and thus have become even easier to trade than they were in Graham’s day.

^*净资产价值、账面价值、资产负债表价值和有形资产价值都是净值的同义词，即公司实物资产和金融资产的总价值减去所有负债。它可以通过公司年度和季度报告中的资产负债表计算得出；从股东权益总额中减去所有“软”资产，例如商誉、商标和其他无形资产。再除以完全稀释后的流通股数，即可得出每股账面价值。

^* Net asset value, book value, balance-sheet value, and tangible-asset value are all synonyms for net worth, or the total value of a company’s physical and financial assets minus all its liabilities. It can be calculated using the balance sheets in a company’s annual and quarterly reports; from total shareholders’ equity, subtract all “soft” assets such as goodwill, trademarks, and other intangibles. Divide by the fully diluted number of shares outstanding to arrive at book value per share.

*格雷厄姆使用“悖论”一词，可能暗指大卫·杜兰德的经典文章《成长股与彼得堡悖论》（bit.ly/3Qt2xn9）。杜兰德将投资高价成长股比作押注一系列抛硬币的结果，每次抛硬币带来的收益都会增加。杜兰德指出，如果一只成长股能够在一段无限长的时间内持续保持高增长，那么投资者（理论上）应该愿意为其股票支付无限的价格。那么，为什么从来没有股票以无限美元/股的价格出售呢？因为假设的未来增长率越高，预期增长率的周期越长，允许误差的幅度就越大，即使是微小的误算，其代价也会越高。格雷厄姆在附录2中进一步讨论了这个问题。

* Graham’s use of the word “paradox” is probably an allusion to a classic article by David Durand, “Growth Stocks and the Petersburg Paradox,” bit.ly/3Qt2xn9, which compares investing in high-priced growth stocks to betting on a series of coin flips in which the payoff escalates with each flip of the coin. Durand points out that if a growth stock could continue to grow at a high rate for an indefinite period of time, an investor should (in theory) be willing to pay an infinite price for its shares. Why, then, has no stock ever sold for a price of infinity dollars per share? Because the higher the assumed future growth rate, and the longer the time period over which it is expected, the wider the margin for error grows, and the higher the cost of even a tiny miscalculation becomes. Graham discusses this problem further in Appendix 2.

*最近，A&P 的股价在 2015 年寻求破产保护之前大幅波动。

* More recently, A&P’s share price fluctuated wildly before it sought bankruptcy protection in 2015.

^* “仅在符合其账簿的范围内”的意思是“仅在价格足够优惠，有理由出售股票的范围内”。在传统的经纪术语中，“账簿”是投资者持股和交易的分类账。

^* “Only to the extent that it suits his book” means “only to the extent that the price is favorable enough to justify selling the stock.” In traditional brokerage lingo, the “book” is an investor’s ledger of holdings and trades.

^*格雷厄姆用这113个字总结了他一生的经验。这些话你再怎么读也不为过；它们就像熊市里的氪石。如果你把它们放在手边，让它们指引你的整个投资生涯，无论市场给你带来什么，你都能安然无恙。

^* In these 113 words Graham sums up his lifetime of experience. You cannot read these words too often; they are like Kryptonite for bear markets. If you keep them close at hand and let them guide you throughout your investing life, you can survive whatever the markets throw at you.

*格雷厄姆对如今所谓的“公司治理”还有更多论述。请参阅第19章及其评论。

* Graham has much more to say on what is now known as “corporate governance.” See Chapter 19 and its Commentary.

*根据格雷厄姆所谓的“对立律”，2020年美国长期国债收益率跌至1963年以来的最低水平。由于债券收益率与价格成反比，低收益率意味着价格上涨——使得投资者在债券价格最高时最渴望买入。2022年，美国长期国债下跌高达39%，给近期买家带来了惨痛损失。

* By what Graham calls “the rule of opposites,” in 2020 the yields on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds hit their lowest levels since 1963. Since bond yields move inversely to prices, those low yields meant that prices had risen—making investors most eager to buy just as bonds were at their most expensive. In 2022, long-term U.S. Treasury bonds lost as much as 39%, delivering brutal losses to recent buyers.

*正如第二章评论中所提到的，国库通胀保值证券（TIPS）是格雷厄姆在此所建议的新的改进版本。

* As mentioned in the Commentary on Chapter 2, Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities, or TIPS, are a new and improved version of what Graham is suggesting here.

¹ Blaise Pascal，《Pensées》（企鹅出版社，1995 年），第 1 页。 220.

¹ Blaise Pascal, Pensées (Penguin, 1995), p. 220.

²机构仍然能够获得更多、更优质的数据，它们处理和分析这些数据的速度比个人更快，尽管只有少数机构因此持续表现优异。参见 Gregory Zuckerman 著《解决市场问题的人：吉姆·西蒙斯如何发起量化革命》（Portfolio，2019 年）。

² Institutions still have access to more and better data, which they can process and analyze faster than individuals can, although only a few institutions have consistently outperformed as a result. See Gregory Zuckerman, The Man Who Solved the Market: How Jim Simons Launched the Quant Revolution (Portfolio, 2019).

³ Eugene F. Fama 和 Kenneth R. French，“移民”，bit.ly/44W1O26。

³ Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, “Migration,” bit.ly/44W1O26.

⁴约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯，《就业、利息和货币通论》（麦克米伦，1936 年），第 12 章，bit.ly/3rF2SsN。

⁴ John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (Macmillan, 1936), chapter 12, bit.ly/3rF2SsN.

⁵ Mark Kritzman，“错误与孤独”，Peter L. Bernstein, Inc.，《经济学与投资组合策略》（1998 年）；Dimitri Vayanos 和 Paul Woolley，“动量与逆转的制度理论”，bit.ly/3Kcbg9t；Jason Zweig，“学习速度与主动管理的未来”，bit.ly/3Yhl4VH。

⁵ Mark Kritzman, “Wrong and Alone,” Peter L. Bernstein, Inc., Economics & Portfolio Strategy (1998); Dimitri Vayanos and Paul Woolley, “An Institutional Theory of Momentum and Reversal,” bit.ly/3Kcbg9t; Jason Zweig, “The Velocity of Learning and the Future of Active Management,” bit.ly/3Yhl4VH.

⁶格雷厄姆在1974年的一次演讲中说道：“我坚信，从长远来看，一个拥有健全原则、得到合理建议的个人投资者，能够比大型机构投资者取得更好的业绩。”半个世纪过去了，机构投资者面临的障碍已经变得像锁链一样沉重，而个人投资者过去面临的障碍已经消失。

⁶ In a speech in 1974, Graham said: “I am convinced that an individual investor with sound principles, and soundly advised, can do distinctly better over the long pull than a large institution.” A half-century later, the handicaps on institutions have become as heavy as chains, while those formerly faced by individuals have fallen away.

⁷ Marwa El Zein 和 Bahador Bahrami，“加入团体将遗憾和责任从个人身上转移开”，bit.ly/452X2zx；Garriy Shteynberg，“集体视角：共同的注意力和思想”，bit.ly/3OvXWzt。

⁷ Marwa El Zein and Bahador Bahrami, “Joining a Group Diverts Regret and Responsibility Away from the Individual,” bit.ly/452X2zx; Garriy Shteynberg, “A Collective Perspective: Shared Attention and the Mind,” bit.ly/3OvXWzt.

⁸伊隆·马斯克推文，bit.ly/3Ur5OUC；丹尼尔·布拉德利等人，“下注了吗？”，bit.ly/453LdcE。“Stonk”，如同“Gamestonk”，是“stock”的故意拼写错误，网络评论者用它来炫耀他们对传统投资分析的漠不关心。

⁸ Elon Musk tweet, bit.ly/3Ur5OUC; Daniel Bradley et al., “Place Your Bets?,” bit.ly/453LdcE. “Stonk,” as in “Gamestonk,” is an intentional misspelling of “stock” that online commenters use to flaunt their indifference to conventional investing analysis.

⁹ Jennifer S. Lerner 等人，“情绪与决策”，bit.ly/3q37okj；Rebecca A. Ferrer 等人，“重新探讨愤怒对冒险行为的影响”，bit.ly/3Kccp0O。

⁹ Jennifer S. Lerner et al., “Emotion and Decision Making,” bit.ly/3q37okj; Rebecca A. Ferrer et al., “Revisiting the Effects of Anger on Risk-Taking,” bit.ly/3Kccp0O.

¹⁰ Catherine A. Hartley 和 Elizabeth A. Phelps，“焦虑与决策”，bit.ly/3uaGYPg；George F. Loewenstein 等人，“风险即感受”，bit.ly/3Y76rnr；Jason Zweig，“恐惧”，bit.ly/3Do3CF8。

¹⁰ Catherine A. Hartley and Elizabeth A. Phelps, “Anxiety and Decision-Making,” bit.ly/3uaGYPg; George F. Loewenstein et al., “Risk as Feelings,” bit.ly/3Y76rnr; Jason Zweig, “Fear,” bit.ly/3Do3CF8.

¹¹ John T. Cacioppo 和 Louise C. Hawkley，“感知到的社会孤立和认知”，bit.ly/3O8ctQe。

¹¹ John T. Cacioppo and Louise C. Hawkley, “Perceived Social Isolation and Cognition,” bit.ly/3O8ctQe.

¹² Jennifer S. Lerner 等人，“悲伤的经济成本”，bit.ly/3Kw0MSH；Rajagopal Raghunathan 和 Michel Tuan Pham，“并非所有负面情绪都一样”，bit.ly/43vHjrK。

¹² Jennifer S. Lerner et al., “The Financial Costs of Sadness,” bit.ly/3Kw0MSH; Rajagopal Raghunathan and Michel Tuan Pham, “All Negative Moods Are Not Equal,” bit.ly/43vHjrK.

¹³ Anthony J. Porcelli 和 Mauricio R. Delgado，“压力与决策”，bit.ly/3rxcEgj；Katrin Starcke 和 Matthias Brand，“压力下的决策”，bit.ly/44C4Ngk；Elizabeth A. Phelps 等人，“情绪与决策”，bit.ly/3q1R0R3。

¹³ Anthony J. Porcelli and Mauricio R. Delgado, “Stress and Decision Making,” bit.ly/3rxcEgj; Katrin Starcke and Matthias Brand, “Decision Making Under Stress,” bit.ly/44C4Ngk; Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., “Emotion and Decision Making,” bit.ly/3q1R0R3.

*截至2023年底，美国共有6,973只共同基金，净资产总额达18.82万亿美元；426只封闭式基金，净资产总额达2,430亿美元；3,076只交易所交易基金，净资产总额达7.63万亿美元。全球共同基金资产总额达63.39万亿美元。

* As of late 2023, in the U.S. 6,973 mutual funds held a total of $18.82 trillion in net assets; 426 closed-end funds held $243 billion; and 3,076 exchange-traded funds held $7.63 trillion. Worldwide, mutual funds’ assets totaled $63.39 trillion.

^*字母股票基金不再存在，而对冲基金通常不以共同基金的形式提供。

^* Letter-stock funds no longer exist, while hedge funds are generally not available in a mutual-fund format.

*如今，股票基金的最高销售费用往往在 5.75% 左右，尽管大多数财务顾问会免除预付费用；相反，您需要支付每年高达 1% 的“分销费”。

* Today, the maximum sales load on a stock fund tends to be around 5.75%, although most financial advisers will waive the upfront charge; instead, you will pay “distribution fees” that can reach 1% per year.

^*如今，几乎所有共同基金都作为“受监管投资公司”纳税，只要其收入基本全部派发给股东，即可免征企业所得税。格雷厄姆为了“避免混乱”而省略的“选项”是，基金可以向美国证券交易委员会申请特别许可，将其部分持股直接分配给股东——就像他的格雷厄姆-纽曼公司在1948年所做的那样，将GEICO的股份分配给基金自己的投资者。这种分配方式极为罕见。

^* Nearly every mutual fund today is taxed as a “regulated investment company,” which is exempt from corporate income tax so long as it pays out essentially all of its income to its shareholders. In the “option” that Graham omits “to avoid clutter,” a fund can ask the SEC for special permission to distribute some of its holdings directly to its shareholders—as his Graham-Newman Corp. did in 1948, parceling out shares in GEICO to the fund’s own investors. This sort of distribution is extraordinarily rare.

^* 20 世纪 80 年代末流行的双重用途基金已经消失。

^* Dual-purpose funds, popular in the late 1980s, have disappeared.

* “业绩基金”在20世纪60年代末风靡一时。它们在经历了一两年的火爆之后，就让投资者感到失望，随后便走向了寒冬。

* “Performance funds” were all the rage in the late 1960s. After one or two hot years, they scorched their investors and then went cold.

*在长达10年的时间内，道琼斯指数和标准普尔500指数的回报率可能会出现相当大的差异。然而，在典型的投资周期中——比如25到50年——它们的回报率往往趋于接近。

* For periods as long as 10 years, the returns of the Dow and the S&P 500 can diverge by fairly wide margins. Over the course of the typical investing lifetime, however—say 25 to 50 years—their returns have tended to converge quite closely.

*格雷厄姆提到的“注定失败的公司”之一是全国学生营销公司（National Student Marketing Corp.），一家伪装成股票的骗局公司，其故事在安德鲁·托拜厄斯（Andrew Tobias）的《有趣的金钱游戏》（The Funny Money Game，花花公子出版社，1971年）一书中被精彩地讲述。那些被NSM魅力十足的创始人科特·兰德尔（Cort Randell）欺骗的所谓老练投资者中，包括康奈尔大学和哈佛大学的捐赠基金，以及摩根担保公司（Morgan Guaranty）和信孚银行（Bankers Trust）等知名银行的信托部门。

* One of the “doomed companies” Graham refers to was National Student Marketing Corp., a con game masquerading as a stock, whose saga was told brilliantly in Andrew Tobias’s The Funny Money Game (Playboy Press, 1971). Among the supposedly sophisticated investors who were snookered by NSM’s charismatic founder, Cort Randell, were the endowment funds of Cornell and Harvard and the trust departments at such prestigious banks as Morgan Guaranty and Bankers Trust.

* “变化越大，保持不变的越多”的后验证明，想想29岁的瑞安·雅各布（Ryan Jacob）在1999年底创立了雅各布互联网基金（Jacob Internet Fund），此前他之前的互联网基金回报率高达216%。2000年头几周，投资者向雅各布的基金投入了近3亿美元。然而，该基金随后在2000年下跌了79.1%，2001年下跌了56.4%，2002年下跌了13%，累计跌幅达92%。

* As later proof that “the more things change, the more they stay the same,” consider that 29-year-old Ryan Jacob launched the Jacob Internet Fund at year-end 1999, after producing a 216% return at his previous dot-com fund. Investors poured nearly $300 million into Jacob’s fund in the first few weeks of 2000. It then proceeded to lose 79.1% in 2000, 56.4% in 2001, and 13% in 2002—a cumulative collapse of 92%.

* 1999-2002年灾难性的繁荣与萧条也发生在上一次疯狂周期之后约35年。然而，2007-2009年和2020-2022年的暴涨暴跌间隔较短。明智的投资者应该随时做好迎接繁荣与萧条的准备。

* The disastrous boom and bust of 1999–2002 also came roughly 35 years after the previous cycle of insanity. The binges and crashes of 2007-09 and 2020-22 came at shorter intervals, however. Intelligent investors should brace themselves for booms and busts at any moment.

*如今，格雷厄姆所说的“稀缺例外”往往是开放式基金，它们不再向新投资者开放——这意味着基金经理不再吸纳任何现金。虽然这会降低他们能够赚取的管理费，但却最大化了现有股东的回报。由于大多数基金经理宁愿追求第一，也不愿成为第一，因此，停止向新投资者开放基金是一个罕见而勇敢的举动。

* Today’s equivalent of Graham’s “scarce exceptions” tend to be open-end funds that are closed to new investors—meaning that the managers have stopped taking in any more cash. While that reduces the management fees they can earn, it maximizes the returns their existing shareholders can earn. Because most fund managers would rather look out for No. 1 than be No. 1, closing a fund to new investors is a rare and courageous step.

*在2020年代，封闭式基金通常存在一些缺陷：交易量稀少，通常使用借来的资金进行杠杆操作，而且年度费用高昂。这使得它们比ETF或传统共同基金风险更高、成本更高。因此，除了极少数例外（尤其是在市场崩盘期间），除非能以低于净资产价值至少15%的折扣价购买封闭式基金，否则它们不值得投资。

* In the 2020s, closed-end funds generally have several handicaps: They are thinly traded, often leveraged with borrowed money, and have high annual expenses. That makes them riskier and costlier than ETFs or conventional mutual funds. So, with rare exceptions (particularly during a market crash), closed-end funds are not worth exploring unless they can be bought at discounts of at least 15% below net asset value.

¹ Fred Schwed, Jr.，《顾客的游艇在哪里？》（Wiley，2006 年），第 140 页。

¹ Fred Schwed, Jr., Where Are the Customers’ Yachts? (Wiley, 2006), p. 140.

²基金的交易成本通常高于 0.25%；参见 Phil Mackintosh 的“买方交易成本是多少？”，bit.ly/3Dychoy。交易成本不计入共同基金或 ETF 的年度费用，而是从其总收益中扣除。如果市场仅上涨 5%，那么我们示例中的基金扣除费用后需要上涨 6.65% 才能与其持平；这比市场收益高出 33%。

² Funds’ trading costs are often higher than 0.25%; see Phil Mackintosh, “How Much Does Trading Cost the Buy Side?,” bit.ly/3Dychoy. Trading costs aren’t reported in a mutual fund or ETF’s annual expenses; instead, they are deducted from its gross return. If the market went up only 5%, then the fund in our example would need to rise 6.65% to match it after expenses; that’s 33% greater than the market’s return.

³ Jason Zweig，“本杰明·格雷厄姆会讨厌指数基金吗？”bit.ly/3qb7iXS。

³ Jason Zweig, “Would Benjamin Graham Have Hated Index Funds?,” bit.ly/3qb7iXS.

⁴ William F. Sharpe，“主动管理的算术”，bit.ly/4572gud。另请参阅Lasse Heje Pedersen，“锐化主动管理的算术”，bit.ly/3OgJucZ。

⁴ William F. Sharpe, “The Arithmetic of Active Management,” bit.ly/4572gud. See also Lasse Heje Pedersen, “Sharpening the Arithmetic of Active Management,” bit.ly/3OgJucZ.

⁵晨星，“利用指数基金挖掘阿尔法”，bit.ly/3YhHZjw。

⁵ Morningstar, “Mining for Alpha with Index Funds,” bit.ly/3YhHZjw.

⁶请参阅此处。您可以在 ETF 网站以及 ETF.com、Finominal.com、PortfolioVisualizer.com 或 VettaFi.com 上研究 ETF 的多元化程度。

⁶ See here. You can research how broadly an ETF is diversified on its website and on ETF.com, Finominal.com, PortfolioVisualizer.com, or VettaFi.com.

⁷ James Mackintosh，“可持续投资”，bit.ly/3rJxMA2；Justin Scheck 等人，“环境投资狂潮延伸‘绿色’的含义”，bit.ly/3QkkvIE。

⁷ James Mackintosh, “Sustainable Investing,” bit.ly/3rJxMA2; Justin Scheck et al., “Environmental Investing Frenzy Stretches Meaning of ‘Green,’” bit.ly/3QkkvIE.

⁸ Jason Zweig，“巨额资金如何淹没 Cathie Wood 的 ARK”，bit.ly/3OeNDyo；Amy Arnott，“为何 ARKK 股东仍陷于困境”，bit.ly/3qdh7Vb。

⁸ Jason Zweig, “How a Flood of Money Swamped Cathie Wood’s ARK,” bit.ly/3OeNDyo; Amy Arnott, “Why ARKK Shareholders Are Still Underwater,” bit.ly/3qdh7Vb.

*在格雷厄姆写下这篇文章的半个多世纪后，金融咨询行业“仍在摸索着成为真正职业的标准和地位”，并没有一套统一的教育要求、能力资格或道德标准。

* More than half a century after Graham wrote this, the financial-advisory industry is “still feeling its way toward the standards and standing of a true profession,” with no single set of educational requirements, qualifications of competency, or ethical criteria.

* 20 世纪 90 年代末以及 2020-21 年，华尔街毫无悔意地将劣质股票强加给公众。

* In the late 1990s, and again in 2020–21, Wall Street foisted shoddy stocks onto the public without a whiff of remorse.

^*有趣的是，格雷厄姆当年针对全服务经纪商的尖锐批评，最终在 1990 年代末适用于折扣互联网经纪商，并在 2020 年代初适用于交易应用程序。这些公司斥资数百万美元进行华丽的营销，以刺激客户进行更多、更快的交易。大多数客户最终都是自掏腰包，而不是花钱请别人代劳。

^* Interestingly, this stinging criticism, which in his day Graham was directing at full-service brokers, ended up applying to discount internet brokers in the late 1990s and trading apps in the early 2020s. These firms spent millions of dollars on flashy marketing that goaded their customers into trading more and trading faster. Most of those customers ended up picking their own pockets, instead of paying someone else to do it for them.

*这一点至今依然成立，尽管更奇怪的是，管理他人投资几乎没有任何正式的执照、教育背景或能力要求。在美国许多州，成为美容师比成为财务顾问更难。

* This remains true, although in an even stranger quirk, there are almost no formal licensing, educational, or competency requirements for managing other people’s investments. In many U.S. states it is harder to become a cosmetologist than a financial adviser.

*本杰明·格雷厄姆是特许金融分析师 (CFA) 课程创立的主要推动者，他为该课程的创立付出了近二十年的倡导，最终使该课程成为现实。

* Benjamin Graham was the prime force behind the establishment of the CFA program, which he advocated for nearly two decades before it became a reality.

*格雷厄姆心目中的两家公司可能是杜邦公司（由这家化学巨头的继承人创立）和古德博迪公司（Goodbody & Co.）。杜邦公司（由这家化学巨头的继承人创立）在1970年免于破产，这要归功于德克萨斯州企业家H·罗斯·佩罗（H. Ross Perot）向该公司提供了超过5000万美元的贷款；如果美林证券没有收购古德博迪公司，那么美国第五大经纪公司古德博迪公司将在1970年末倒闭。如果海登斯通公司（Hayden, Stone & Co.）没有被收购，它也会破产。约翰·布鲁克斯（John Brooks）在其著作《飞速发展的年代》（The Go-Go Years，Wiley出版社，1999年）中精彩地讲述了20世纪60年代末华尔街疯狂扩张的滑稽故事。

* The two firms Graham had in mind were probably Du Pont, Glore, Forgan & Co. and Goodbody & Co. Du Pont (founded by the heirs to the chemical fortune) was saved from insolvency in 1970 only after Texas entrepreneur H. Ross Perot lent more than $50 million to the firm; Goodbody, the fifth-largest brokerage in the United States, would have failed in late 1970 had Merrill Lynch not acquired it. Hayden, Stone & Co. would also have gone under if it had not been acquired. The farcical story of Wall Street’s frenzied overexpansion in the late 1960s is beautifully told in John Brooks’s The Go-Go Years (Wiley, 1999).

*如今几乎所有经纪交易都以电子方式进行，证券不再以实物形式“交付”。得益于1970年证券投资者保护公司（SIPC）的成立，投资者通常可以确保在经纪公司破产时收回其全部账户价值。SIPC是由政府授权的经纪商财团；所有成员同意汇集其资产，以弥补任何破产公司的客户所遭受的损失。正如格雷厄姆所倡导的那样，SIPC的保护消除了投资者通过银行中介进行付款和收货的需要。

* Nearly all brokerage transactions are now conducted electronically, and securities are no longer physically “delivered.” Thanks to the establishment of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, or SIPC, in 1970, investors are generally assured of recovering their full account values if their brokerage firm becomes insolvent. SIPC is a government-mandated consortium of brokers; all the members agree to pool their assets to cover losses incurred by the customers of any firm that becomes insolvent. SIPC’s protection eliminates the need for investors to make payment and take delivery through a bank intermediary, as Graham urges.

*那些听从格雷厄姆建议的人就不会被骗去购买 1999 年和 2000 年的互联网 IPO，或者 2020 年和 2021 年的 SPACS。

* Those who heeded Graham’s advice would not have been suckered into buying internet IPOs in 1999 and 2000, or SPACS in 2020 and 2021.

^*银行家的这一传统角色大部分已被财务规划师所取代。

^* This traditional role of bankers has for the most part been supplanted by financial planners.

¹行为经济学家理查德·泽克豪瑟 (Richard Zeckhauser) 称之为“分母盲区”的现象，指的是人们往往会忽略判断频率或幅度所依据的总体价值。聪明的营销人员会将人们的注意力集中在较小的数字上，例如百分比，从而转移他们对高昂成本的注意力。参见山岸公彦 (Kimihiko Yamagishi) 的“12.86% 的死亡率何时比 24.14% 更危险”，bit.ly/3QnX5St。

¹ In what behavioral economist Richard Zeckhauser calls “denominator blindness,” people tend to overlook the total values on which judgments of frequency or magnitude should be based. Clever marketers focus people’s attention on a small number, like a percentage, that distracts them from the high costs they’re paying. See Kimihiko Yamagishi, “When a 12.86% Mortality Is More Dangerous than 24.14%,” bit.ly/3QnX5St.

²孤立的投诉不一定会引起担忧；持续不断的投诉模式才值得警惕。美国法规允许顾问自行决定是否应就民事诉讼、客户

² An isolated complaint isn’t necessarily cause for concern; a persistent pattern of complaints is cause for alarm. U.S. regulations permit advisers themselves to determine whether such events as civil lawsuits, customer

^{3 项}投诉和仲裁索赔都足够“重大”以在其 ADV 表格中披露，因此您也必须亲自询问。请参阅 Jason Zweig 的“您不知道自己对财务顾问有什么不了解”，bit.ly/44VryMo。假设您的投资组合 100% 都是股票。扣除通货膨胀因素后，股票的长期年均回报率约为 7%。除非全部投资于广泛的指数基金，否则费用可能会将回报率降至 6%。1% 的咨询费会将其降至 5%，而税收很容易将其削减至 4%。如果未来的回报率低于过去（很可能如此），并且您的投资组合部分由现金和债券组成（很可能如此），那么即使是 4% 也很高。

³ complaints, and arbitration claims are “material” enough to disclose on their Form ADV, so you must also ask about them in person. See Jason Zweig, “You Don’t Know What You Don’t Know About Your Financial Adviser,” bit.ly/44VryMo. Imagine your portfolio is 100% in stocks. After inflation, the long-term return on stocks has averaged about 7% annually. Unless it’s entirely in broad index funds, expenses could reduce that return to 6%. A 1% advisory fee takes it down to 5%, and taxes could easily shave it to 4%. If future returns are lower than in the past (as they might well be), and your portfolio consists partly of cash and bonds (as it probably does), even 4% is high.

⁴有关此类面试的更多信息，请参阅 Jason Zweig 的“向你的财务顾问提出的 19 个问题”，bit.ly/45kjlRJ，以及“找到合适的财务顾问的特殊技巧”，bit.ly/440yq9T。

⁴ For more on such interviews, see Jason Zweig, “The 19 Questions to Ask Your Financial Adviser,” bit.ly/45kjlRJ, and “The Special Trick to Find the Right Financial Adviser,” bit.ly/440yq9T.

⁵俄亥俄州证券专员安德里亚·塞特 (Andrea Seidt) 和马里兰州证券专员梅拉妮·森特·鲁宾 (Melanie Senter Lubin) 参与编制了这份名单。更多关于有毒投资方案的信息，请参阅约书亚·M·布朗 (Joshua M. Brown) 著《华尔街幕后》(Backstage Wall Street)（麦格劳-希尔出版社，2012 年）。

⁵ Ohio Securities Commissioner Andrea Seidt and Maryland Securities Commissioner Melanie Senter Lubin helped compile this list. For more on toxic investment pitches, see Joshua M. Brown, Backstage Wall Street (McGraw-Hill, 2012).

*美国全国金融分析师联合会现为特许金融分析师协会，在全球拥有超过 190,000 名会员。

* The National Federation of Financial Analysts is now the CFA Institute, with more than 190,000 members worldwide.

*你预测的增长率越高，预测的未来时期越长，你的预测对哪怕是最微小的误差就越敏感。例如，如果你估计一家每股收益1美元的公司可以在未来15年内每年将利润提高15%，那么它的收益最终将是8.14美元。如果市场对该公司市盈率为35倍，那么该股在这段时期结束时的股价将约为285美元。但如果收益增长率为14%而不是15%，那么该公司在这段时期结束时的收益将是7.14美元——而由于这一差距，投资者将不再愿意支付35倍的市盈率。假设市盈率为20倍，那么该股最终的股价将约为每股140美元，即下跌50%。

* The higher the growth rate you project, and the longer the future period over which you project it, the more sensitive your forecast becomes to the slightest error. If, for instance, you estimate that a company earning $1 per share can raise that profit by 15% a year for the next 15 years, its earnings would end up at $8.14. If the market values the company at 35 times earnings, the stock would finish the period at roughly $285. But if earnings grow at 14% instead of 15%, the company would earn $7.14 at the end of the period—and, in the shock of that shortfall, investors would no longer be willing to pay 35 times earnings. At, say, 20 times earnings, the stock would end up around $140 per share, or 50% less.

* 1972年，公司债券投资者几乎别无选择，只能自行构建投资组合。如今，数百家共同基金和ETF投资于公司债券，构建了便捷且高度分散的证券组合。由于除非你拥有至少10万美元的资金，否则通常无法自行构建分散的债券投资组合，因此，典型的精明投资者最好直接购买低成本的债券基金，并将繁琐的信用研究工作留给基金经理。

* In 1972, investors in corporate bonds had little choice but to assemble their own portfolios. Today, hundreds of mutual funds and ETFs invest in corporate bonds, creating convenient, well-diversified bundles of securities. Since it often is not feasible to build a diversified bond portfolio on your own unless you have at least $100,000, the typical intelligent investor will be best off simply buying a low-cost bond fund and leaving the painstaking labor of credit research to its managers.

*格雷厄姆所说的“优先股发行”指的是普通股。优先股被认为是“优先于”普通股的，因为公司必须先支付优先股的所有股息，然后再支付普通股的股息。（参见第四章。）

* By “junior stock issues” Graham means shares of common stock. Preferred stock is considered “senior” to common stock because the company must pay all dividends on the preferred before paying any dividends on the common. (See Chapter 4.)

* 1929 年至 1932 年间，投资者因鲁莽组建的公用事业公司股票损失了数十亿美元，此后，国会根据 1935 年《公用事业控股公司法》授权美国证券交易委员会监管公用事业股票的发行。

* After investors lost billions of dollars on the shares of recklessly assembled utility companies in 1929–1932, Congress authorized the SEC to regulate the issuance of utility stocks under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.

*对于像沃伦·巴菲特这样技艺精湛的投资者来说，广泛分散投资是愚蠢的，因为它会削弱少数优秀理念的凝聚力。但对于典型的基金经理或个人投资者来说，不分散投资更是愚蠢，因为要选择有限数量的股票，涵盖大多数盈利股票，同时排除大多数亏损股票，实在是太难了。随着你持有的股票越来越多，任何一只亏损股票可能造成的损失都会下降，而持有至少一些大赢家股票的概率也会上升。对于大多数投资者来说，理想的选择是全股票指数基金，这是一种低成本持有所有值得持有股票的方式。

* For indisputably skilled investors like Warren Buffett, wide diversification would be foolish, because it would water down the concentrated force of a few great ideas. But for the typical fund manager or individual investor, not diversifying is foolish, since it is so difficult to select a limited number of stocks that will include most winners and exclude most losers. As you own more stocks, the damage any single loser can cause will decline, and the odds of owning at least some big winners will rise. The ideal choice for most investors is a total stock market index fund, a low-cost way to hold every stock worth owning.

*格雷厄姆关于20世纪60年代化工和石油公司的观点几乎适用于所有行业和所有时期。华尔街对任何特定行业未来的共识通常要么过于乐观，要么过于悲观。更糟糕的是，当股价被高估得最厉害时，共识往往最为乐观；而当股价最低时，共识往往最为悲观。历史证明，华尔街的“专家”预测者同样无法预测1）整体市场、2）行业板块以及3）特定股票的表现。正如格雷厄姆指出的那样，个人投资者能够取得更好回报的可能性并不大。聪明的投资者之所以能够脱颖而出，是因为他们做出的决策不依赖于任何人的预测准确性，包括他们自己的预测。（参见第8章。）

* Graham’s point about chemical and oil companies in the 1960s applies to nearly every industry in nearly every time period. Wall Street’s consensus view of the future for any given sector is usually either too optimistic or too pessimistic. Worse, the consensus is at its most cheery just when the stocks are most overpriced—and gloomiest just when they are cheapest. History proves that Wall Street’s “expert” forecasters are equally inept at predicting the performance of 1) the market as a whole, 2) industry sectors, and 3) specific stocks. As Graham points out, the odds that individual investors can do any better are not good. Intelligent investors excel by making decisions that are not dependent on the accuracy of anybody’s forecasts, including their own. (See Chapter 8.)

*这个数字，现在被称为“股息支付率”，自格雷厄姆时代以来一直在下降，因为美国税法阻碍了投资者寻求股息，也阻碍了公司支付股息。截至2023年底，标准普尔500指数的股息支付率约为38%。如果算上股票回购的影响，这个数字会高得多；参见第19章的评论。

* This figure, now known as the “dividend payout ratio,” has dropped since Graham’s day as American tax law discouraged investors from seeking, and corporations from paying, dividends. As of year-end 2023, the payout ratio was approximately 38% for the S&P 500. Include the effects of share buybacks and that number is considerably higher; see the Commentary on Chapter 19.

*参见第 20 章及其评论。

* See Chapter 20 and its Commentary.

*为什么会这样？根据“72法则”，当利率为10%时，一定数量的资金在短短七年多的时间里就会翻一番；而当利率为7%时，则在短短十年多的时间里就会翻一番。当利率高时，你今天需要存下的资金在未来达到一定价值所需的金额会更低——因为高利率会使资金以更快的速度增长。因此，今天利率的上升会降低未来的收益或股息的价值——因为投资债券的替代方案相对更具吸引力。

* Why is this? By “the rule of 72,” at 10% interest a given amount of money doubles in just over seven years, while at 7% it doubles in just over 10 years. When interest rates are high, the amount of money you need to set aside today to reach a given value in the future is lower—since those high interest rates will enable it to grow at a more rapid rate. Thus a rise in interest rates today makes a future stream of earnings or dividends less valuable—since the alternative of investing in bonds has become relatively more attractive.

*此类行业通常不太容易受到利率或原材料价格冲击的影响。它们可能包括一些消费品、食品饮料、博彩业和废物管理业。

* Such industry groups would tend not to be overly vulnerable to shocks from interest rates or the prices of raw materials. They might include some consumer products, food and beverages, gaming, and waste management.

¹ “投资、洞察和启发：约翰·邓普顿爵士的智慧之言”，富兰克林邓普顿投资。

¹ “Investments, Insights and Inspiration: Words of Wisdom from Sir John Templeton,” Franklin Templeton Investments.

²正如格雷厄姆在本书第一版中所写：“投资者不可能带着任何真正的成功希望进入股票市场的舞台，除非他拥有精神武器，这种武器能够在本质上——而不是在想象中的优越程度上——区别于交易公众。”

² As Graham wrote in the first edition of this book: “The investor cannot enter the arena of the stock market with any real hope of success unless he is armed with mental weapons that distinguish him in kind—not in a fancied superior degree—from the trading public.”

³ Robin M. Hogarth，《培养直觉》（芝加哥，2001 年）。

³ Robin M. Hogarth, Educating Intuition (Chicago, 2001).

⁴ Atul Gawande，《清单宣言》（Metropolitan出版社，2009年）。另请参阅Anabatic Investment Partners的Phil Ordway（bit.ly/43ue88u）、Cambria Investment Management的Meb Faber（bit.ly/3uvjg0x）以及投资者Brett Caughran（bit.ly/45DGZsD）编写的清单指南。

⁴ Atul Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto (Metropolitan, 2009). See also the checklist guidelines compiled by Phil Ordway of Anabatic Investment Partners at bit.ly/43ue88u; Meb Faber of Cambria Investment Management at bit.ly/3uvjg0x; and investor Brett Caughran at bit.ly/45DGZsD.

⁵我所说的“年度报告”是指公司的完整财务报表。在美国，它被称为10-K表格，可从美国证券交易委员会的EDGAR网站sec.gov/edgar免费获取。我不是指邮寄给股东的那种用光面纸印着精美图片和宣传内容的宣传文件。

⁵ By “annual report,” I mean the company’s full financial statement. In the U.S., it is called Form 10-K and is freely available from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR website at sec.gov/edgar. I do not mean the report mailed to shareholders, a promotional document on glossy paper featuring pretty pictures and propaganda.

⁶请参阅第 19 章的评论。

⁶ See the Commentary on Chapter 19.

⁷ Carol Loomis，《巴菲特谈股市》，bit.ly/3Dbxi8x。关于如何识别具有持久优势的企业的经典讨论，请参阅Philip A. Fisher的《普通股与非凡利润》（Wiley出版社，1996年）。关于竞争“护城河”和网络效应，请参阅Pat Dorsey的《财富小书》（Wiley出版社，2009年）；Michael J. Mauboussin和Dan Callahan的《市场份额》，bit.ly/44u1hVg；以及《客户企业的经济学》，bit.ly/3XSyK98。为了保持护城河的持久性，公司应该能够自主定价，而不受政府监管机构的任意干预。

⁷ Carol Loomis, “Mr. Buffett on the Stock Market,” bit.ly/3Dbxi8x. For a classic discussion on identifying businesses with durable advantages, see Philip A. Fisher, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits (Wiley, 1996). On competitive “moats” and network effects, see Pat Dorsey, The Little Book That Builds Wealth (Wiley, 2009); Michael J. Mauboussin and Dan Callahan, “Market Share,” bit.ly/44u1hVg and “The Economics of Customer Businesses,” bit.ly/3XSyK98. For its moat to endure, a company should be able to set prices without arbitrary actions by government regulators.

⁸此规则唯一允许的例外是，如果您使用“疯狂资金”账户进行购买（参见第 1 章及其评论）——在这种情况下，您不能向其中存入超过极小的金额。

⁸ The only permissible exception to this rule would be if you make the purchase in your “mad-money” account (see Chapter 1 and its Commentary)—in which case you can’t put more than a minuscule amount into it.

* “稀释”是流体力学中描述股票的众多词汇之一。交易量大的股票被称为“流动性强”。当一家公司首次公开募股（IPO）时，它会“浮动”其股票。一家大幅稀释其股份（通过大量可转换债券或多次发行普通股）的公司被称为“浇水”其股票。这个术语可能起源于市场操纵者丹尼尔·德鲁（1797-1879），他最初是一名牲畜商人。他会把牛赶到曼哈顿南部，强迫它们吃盐。当它们到达哈莱姆河时，它们会大量饮水来解渴。然后德鲁会把它们带到市场上，在那里，它们刚刚喝下的水会增加体重。这使得他能够获得更高的价格，因为活牛是按磅出售的。德鲁后来通过在没有警告的情况下大量发行新股来浇水伊利铁路的股票。

* “Dilution” is one of many words that describe stocks in the language of fluid dynamics. A stock with high trading volume is said to be “liquid.” When a company goes public in an IPO, it “floats” its shares. A company that drastically diluted its shares (with large amounts of convertible debt or multiple offerings of common stock) was said to have “watered” its stock. This term may have originated with the market manipulator Daniel Drew (1797–1879), who began as a livestock trader. He would drive his cattle south toward Manhattan, force-feeding them salt. When they got to the Harlem River, they would guzzle huge volumes of water to slake their thirst. Drew would then bring them to market, where the water they had just drunk would increase their weight. That enabled him to get a much higher price, since cattle on the hoof is sold by the pound. Drew later watered the stock of the Erie Railroad by massively issuing new shares without warning.

^* 格雷厄姆指的是中世纪和文艺复兴时期意大利抄写员的优雅书法。这个词后来成为“灵巧手法”的同义词。同样，会计师也能将简单的财务事实转化为复杂甚至难以理解的模式。

^* Graham is referring to the elegant calligraphy of medieval and Renaissance scribes in Italy. The phrase later became a synonym for “sleight of hand.” Accountants, likewise, can transform simple financial facts into intricate and even incomprehensible patterns.

*这位国王的灵感可能源自英国作家威廉·哈兹利特（William Hazlitt）的一篇著名文章。哈兹利特对威尼斯附近的一座日晷进行了一番沉思，日晷上刻着“我只数宁静的时光” （Horas non numero nisi serenas），意为“我只数那些宁静的时光”。那些长期以负面事件“非同寻常”或“不经常发生”为借口，将坏消息排除在财务业绩之外的公司，正在效仿哈兹利特的做法。哈兹利特敦促读者“用光明和温柔的时刻构建我们的生活，永远关注事物向阳的一面，让其他的事物从我们的想象中溜走，不去理会或遗忘！”（威廉·哈兹利特，《论日晷》，约1827年）。不幸的是，投资者必须始终将晴天和阴天的时间一视同仁。

* The king probably took his inspiration from a once-famous essay by the English writer William Hazlitt, who mused about a sundial near Venice that bore the words Horas non numero nisi serenas, or “I count only the hours that are serene.” Companies that chronically exclude bad news from their financial results on the pretext that negative events are “extraordinary” or “nonrecurring” are taking a page from Hazlitt, who urged his readers to “compose our lives of bright and gentle moments, turning always to the sunny side of things, and letting the rest slip from our imaginations, unheeded or forgotten!” (William Hazlitt, “On a Sun-Dial,” ca. 1827.) Unfortunately, investors must always count the sunny and dark hours alike.

*格雷厄姆如此含蓄地提到的公司似乎是美国机器铸造公司（或 AMF 公司），它是 20 世纪 60 年代末最混乱的企业集团之一。

* The company to which Graham refers so coyly appears to be American Machine & Foundry (or AMF Corp.), one of the most jumbled conglomerates of the late 1960s.

*西北工业公司（Northwest Industries）是芝加哥西北铁路公司（Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co.）和联合内衣公司（Union Underwear，BVD和Fruit of the Loom内裤的制造商）等多家企业的控股公司。1985年，负债累累的金融家威廉·法利（William Farley）收购了该公司，并将公司经营至破产。2002年初，沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）旗下的伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway Inc.）在破产程序中收购了Fruit of the Loom。

* Northwest Industries was the holding company for, among other businesses, the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. and Union Underwear (the maker of both BVD and Fruit of the Loom briefs). It was taken over in 1985 by overindebted financier William Farley, who ran the company into the ground. Fruit of the Loom was bought in a bankruptcy proceeding by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. in early 2002.

^*格雷厄姆指的是联邦税法允许公司“结转”其净营业亏损的条款。这些亏损可以结转，但有一些限制，从而减少公司未来的纳税义务（并进而提高其税后收益）。因此，投资者应该考虑近期的严重亏损是否真的能够改善公司未来的净收益。

^* Graham is referring to the provision of Federal tax law that allows corporations to “carry forward” their net operating losses. These losses can be carried forward, with some restrictions, thereby reducing the company’s future tax liability (and thus raising its after-tax earnings). Therefore, investors should consider whether recent severe losses could actually improve the company’s net earnings in the future.

* “平均数”指的是格雷厄姆在上句中描述的平均数。

* “Mean figure” refers to the average that Graham describes in the preceding sentence.

*格雷厄姆似乎在使用“资本基金收益”这一传统意义上的账面价值回报率——本质上就是净收入除以公司的有形净资产。

* Graham appears to be using “earnings on capital funds” in the traditional sense of return on book value—essentially, net income divided by the company’s tangible net assets.

^*请参阅此处。

^* See here.

^* 近期历史以及大量的金融研究表明，市场对快速增长却突然公布盈利下滑的公司非常不友好。增长较为温和稳定的公司，如果公布的盈利令人失望，股价下跌幅度往往相对较小。如果预期过高，未能实现，就会带来巨大的失望；如果预期过低，股价下跌幅度则会小得多。因此，持有成长型股票的最大风险之一并非增长停止，而仅仅是增长放缓。从长远来看，这不仅仅是风险，而几乎是必然的。

^* Recent history—and a mountain of financial research—have shown that the market is unkindest to rapidly growing companies that suddenly report a fall in earnings. More moderate and stable growers tend to suffer somewhat milder stock declines if they report disappointing earnings. Great expectations lead to great disappointment if they are not met; a failure to meet moderate expectations leads to a much milder reaction. Thus, one of the biggest risks in owning growth stocks is not that their growth will stop, but merely that it will slow down. And in the long run, that is not merely a risk, but a virtual certainty.

¹个人通信。

¹ Personal communication.

²在美国以外，大多数公司使用国际财务报告准则 (IFRS) 而不是 GAAP；他们也可能提供其他业绩数据，从而引发类似的公平性和可比性问题。

² Outside the U.S., most companies use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) instead of GAAP; they may also present alternative performance numbers that raise similar issues of fairness and comparability.

³ Eliot Brown 和 Maureen Farrell， 《我们的崇拜》（Crown，2021 年），第 196-98 页、第 321-22 页。

³ Eliot Brown and Maureen Farrell, The Cult of We (Crown, 2021), pp. 196–98, 321–22.

⁴ Olga Usvyatsky，“深入了解：制药公司如何使用非公认会计准则”，bit.ly/47R3BYa。

⁴ Olga Usvyatsky, “In-Depth: How Pharma Firms Use Non-GAAP,” bit.ly/47R3BYa.

⁵ Ilia Dichev 等人，“收益的虚假陈述”，bit.ly/3YNVA27，以及“收益质量：来自实地的证据”，bit.ly/3stivng。

⁵ Ilia Dichev et al., “The Misrepresentation of Earnings,” bit.ly/3YNVA27, and “Earnings Quality: Evidence from the Field,” bit.ly/3stivng.

⁶ Patricia Dechow 等人，“评估非公认会计准则排除质量的评级系统”，bit.ly/3KSOfc6。

⁶ Patricia Dechow et al., “A Rating System to Evaluate Non-GAAP Exclusion Quality,” bit.ly/3KSOfc6.

⁷伯克希尔哈撒韦公司 2015 年年度报告，bit.ly/3YQPgaj，第 16 页。

⁷ Berkshire Hathaway 2015 annual report, bit.ly/3YQPgaj, p. 16.

⁸ Jason Zweig，《魔鬼的金融词典》（PublicAffairs，2015 年），第 114 页。

⁸ Jason Zweig, The Devil’s Financial Dictionary (PublicAffairs, 2015), p. 114.

⁹对于有进取心的投资者来说，Howard M. Schilit 等人合著的《金融诡计》 （麦格劳-希尔出版社，2018 年）是一本优秀的公司财务报表可靠性法证指南。另请参阅 Doron Nissim 的“盈利质量、基本面分析与估值”，bit.ly/3R2pkX8。

⁹ For enterprising investors, an excellent forensic guide to the reliability of companies’ financial statements is Howard M. Schilit et al., Financial Shenanigans (McGraw-Hill, 2018). See also Doron Nissim, “Earnings Quality, Fundamental Analysis and Valuation,” bit.ly/3R2pkX8.

*在格雷厄姆的四个例子中，只有艾默生电气仍然以相同的形式存在。

* Of Graham’s four examples, only Emerson Electric still exists in the same form.

*格雷厄姆在每种情况下都参考了表 13-2的 C 部分，并将 1936 年至 1968 年期间的最高价除以最低价。例如，埃默里股票的最高价 66 美元除以其最低价 1/8 美元等于 528 美元，即最高价与最低价之比为 528:1。

* In each case, Graham is referring to Section C of Table 13-2 and dividing the high price during the 1936–1968 period by the low price. For example, Emery’s high price of 66 divided by its low price of 1/8 equals 528, or a ratio of 528 to 1 between the high and low.

^* 1970年底，艾默生16亿美元的市值，以当时的平均股票规模来看，确实堪称“巨额”。2024年初，艾默生普通股的总市值约为540亿美元。

^* At the end of 1970, Emerson’s $1.6 billion in market value truly was “enormous,” given average stock sizes at the time. In early 2024, Emerson’s common stock had a total market value of approximately $54 billion.

*格雷厄姆是对的。在1972年最流行、估值最高的“漂亮50”股票中，埃默里的表现却是最差的。

* Graham was right. Of the “Nifty Fifty” stocks that were most fashionable and highly valued in 1972, Emery fared among the worst.

*格雷厄姆的观点是，根据当时的价格，投资者可以以略高于账面价值的价格购买这两家公司的股票，如表 13-2 B 部分第三行所示。

* Graham’s point is that, based on their prices at the time, an investor could buy shares in these two companies for little more than their book value, as shown in the third line of Section B in Table 13-2.

¹ 《当代人类学》，第 36 卷，第 5 期（1995 年），第 836 页。

¹ Current Anthropology, vol. 36, no. 5 (1995), p. 836.

*格雷厄姆在第 4 章至第 7 章中描述了他推荐的投资政策。

* Graham describes his recommended investment policies in Chapters 4 through 7.

^{*正如我们在} 第 4章和第9 章的评论中所讨论的那样，当今的防御性投资者只需购买低成本指数基金即可实现这一目标，理想情况下，该基金是跟踪整个美国股市回报的指数基金。

^* As we have discussed in the Commentaries on Chapters 4 and 9, today’s defensive investor can achieve this goal simply by buying a low-cost index fund, ideally one that tracks the return of the total U.S. stock market.

* 2024年初，高评级公司债券的收益率约为4.9%，根据格雷厄姆公式，股票投资组合的市盈率至少应达到这一水平。取该数字的倒数（将4.9除以100），我们可以得出“建议最高”市盈率为20.4。在本段开头，格雷厄姆建议“平均”股票的定价应比“最高”市盈率低约20%。这表明，考虑到近期利率和市场状况，格雷厄姆认为，市盈率约为三年平均收益的16倍的股票具有潜在吸引力。

* In early 2024, the yield on highly rated corporate bonds was around 4.9%, suggesting—by Graham’s formula—that a stock portfolio should have an earnings-to-price ratio at least that high. Taking the inverse of that number (by dividing 4.9 into 100), we can derive a “suggested maximum” P/E ratio of 20.4. At the beginning of this paragraph Graham recommends that the “average” stock be priced about 20% below the “maximum” ratio. That suggests Graham would consider stocks selling at roughly 16 times their three-year average earnings to be potentially attractive given recent interest rates and market conditions.

*仅剩少数几只大型铁路股，包括CSX、诺福克南方铁路和联合太平洋铁路。本节中的建议对如今频频出现巨额亏损且近半个世纪以来业绩几乎持续低迷的航空股至少同样适用，就像对格雷厄姆时代的铁路股一样。

* Only a few major rail stocks remain, including CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific. The advice in this section is at least as relevant to airline stocks today—with their frequent massive losses and a half-century of almost incessantly poor results—as it was to railroads in Graham’s day.

*格雷厄姆正在总结“有效市场假说”（EMH）。这一学术理论认为，每只股票的价格都包含了该公司所有公开的信息。由于每天都有数百万投资者在市场上搜寻，严重的错误定价不太可能持续很长时间。一个老笑话讲的是两位金融学教授在人行道上行走；其中一位发现一张20美元的钞票，弯腰去捡，另一位却抓住他的胳膊说：“不用了。如果真的是20美元的钞票，早就有人捡走了。” 虽然市场并非完全有效，但大多数时候都相当接近有效——因此，聪明的投资者只有在彻底研究股市的20美元钞票，并尽量降低交易成本和税收后，才会弯腰捡起它们。

* Graham is summarizing the “efficient markets hypothesis,” or EMH, an academic theory claiming that the price of each stock incorporates all publicly available information about the company. With millions of investors scouring the market every day, it is unlikely that severe mispricings can persist for long. An old joke has two finance professors walking along the sidewalk; when one spots a $20 bill and bends over to pick it up, the other grabs his arm and says, “Don’t bother. If it was really a $20 bill, someone would have taken it already.” While the market is not perfectly efficient, it is pretty close most of the time—so the intelligent investor will stoop to pick up the stock market’s $20 bills only after researching them thoroughly and minimizing the costs of trading and taxes.

^*这是格雷厄姆的核心观点之一。所有投资者都面临着一个残酷的讽刺：我们投资于现在，却投资于未来。不幸的是，未来几乎完全不确定。因此，基于预测进行投资是愚蠢之举；即使是所谓专家的预测也比抛硬币更不可靠。对大多数人来说，基于保护——避免为股票支付过高的价格以及对自身判断的准确性过度自信——进行投资才是最佳解决方案。参见第20章及其评论。

^* This is one of Graham’s central points. All investors labor under a cruel irony: We invest in the present, but we invest for the future. And, unfortunately, the future is almost entirely uncertain. Therefore, investing on the basis of projection is a fool’s errand; even the forecasts of the so-called experts are less reliable than the flip of a coin. For most people, investing on the basis of protection—from overpaying for a stock and from overconfidence in the quality of their own judgment—is the best solution. See Chapter 20 and its Commentary.

¹分别参阅第9章、第 5 章和第4 章的注释。

¹ See the Commentaries on Chapters 9, 5, and 4, respectively.

² Caroline E. Preston 和 Stanley Harris，“交通事故中驾驶员的心理学”，bit.ly/3EziGAx。

² Caroline E. Preston and Stanley Harris, “Psychology of Drivers in Traffic Accidents,” bit.ly/3EziGAx.

³有关过度自信的出色概述，请参阅 Don A. Moore 的《完美自信》（HarperCollins，2020 年）。

³ For an excellent overview of overconfidence, see Don A. Moore, Perfectly Confident (HarperCollins, 2020).

⁴文化研究中心，“2020 年美国世界观清单”，bit.ly/44ruIrE。

⁴ Cultural Research Center, “American Worldview Inventory 2020,” bit.ly/44ruIrE.

⁵ Lauren A. Leotti 等人，“生来就要选择：控制需求的起源和价值”，bit.ly/48cIrnA。

⁵ Lauren A. Leotti et al., “Born to Choose: The Origins and Value of the Need for Control,” bit.ly/48cIrnA.

⁶ Ellen J. Langer，“控制的幻觉”，bit.ly/460LptO；Suzanne C. Thompson，“控制的幻觉：我们如何高估自己的个人影响力”，bit.ly/3Qsnmyr。

⁶ Ellen J. Langer, “The Illusion of Control,” bit.ly/460LptO; Suzanne C. Thompson, “Illusions of Control: How We Overestimate Our Personal Influence,” bit.ly/3Qsnmyr.

⁷ Mark Fenton-O'Creevy 等人，“幻想交易：对控制和交易业绩的不切实际的认知”，bit.ly/46aUFv8。

⁷ Mark Fenton-O’Creevy et al., “Trading on Illusions: Unrealistic Perceptions of Control and Trading Performance,” bit.ly/46aUFv8.

⁸ Baruch Fischhoff 和 Ruth Beyth，“我知道这会发生：记忆中曾经发生过的事情的概率”，bit.ly/45PPH7u；Neal J. Roese 和 Kathleen D. Vohs，“后见之明偏差”，bit.ly/3PCeGFB；Jason Zweig，《你的金钱和你的大脑》（西蒙与舒斯特出版社，2007 年）。

⁸ Baruch Fischhoff and Ruth Beyth, “I Knew It Would Happen: Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things,” bit.ly/45PPH7u; Neal J. Roese and Kathleen D. Vohs, “Hindsight Bias,” bit.ly/3PCeGFB; Jason Zweig, Your Money and Your Brain (Simon & Schuster, 2007).

⁹ Jason Zweig，“2020 年的恐慌？哦，我赚了一大笔钱——你也是”，bit.ly/3RnXWTM，“魔镜魔镜，谁知道股票会下跌？””，bit.ly/45NHbWz，“打破后见之明偏差”，bit.ly/3r3aJ3u；Katrin Gödker 等人，“投资者记忆”，bit.ly/3EDKDXS。

⁹ Jason Zweig, “The Panic of 2020? Oh, I Made a Ton of Money—and So Did You,” bit.ly/3RnXWTM, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who Knew That Stocks Would Fall?,” bit.ly/45NHbWz, “Busting Your Hindsight Bias,” bit.ly/3r3aJ3u; Katrin Gödker et al, “Investor Memory,” bit.ly/3EDKDXS.

*随后几十年的数十项严谨的学术研究得出了相同的结论：共同基金的平均表现低于市场，其差距大致相当于其运营费用和交易成本。

* Dozens of rigorous academic studies in later decades came to the same general conclusion: that mutual funds, on average, underperform the market by a margin roughly equal to their operating expenses and trading costs.

*格雷厄姆在本节中，正如他在这里所做的那样，总结了有效市场假说。但最近的情况恰恰相反，当今股市的问题不在于太多金融分析师是白痴，而在于他们中太多人太聪明了。随着越来越多的聪明人在市场上寻找便宜货，这种寻找行为本身就使得这些便宜货变得更加稀缺——而且，一个残酷的悖论是，这让分析师看起来似乎缺乏足够的智力来证明这种寻找的合理性。ChatGPT 等人工智能工具的出现，通过提高分析效率，可能会让市场更难被击败，而不是更容易被击败。

* In this section, as he did also here, Graham is summarizing the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Recent appearances to the contrary, the problem with the stock market today is not that so many financial analysts are idiots, but rather that so many of them are so smart. As more and more smart people search the market for bargains, that very act of searching makes those bargains rarer—and, in a cruel paradox, makes the analysts look as if they lack the intelligence to justify the search. The advent of artificial-intelligence tools such as ChatGPT, by making analysis even more efficient, is likely to make the market harder to beat, not easier.

^* 格雷厄姆于 1936 年 1 月创立了格雷厄姆-纽曼公司 (Graham-Newman Corp.)，并于 1956 年从积极的资金管理领域退休后解散了该公司；该公司前身是本杰明·格雷厄姆联合账户 (Benjamin Graham Joint Account)，格雷厄姆从 1926 年 1 月到 1935 年 12 月一直经营该公司。

^* Graham launched Graham-Newman Corp. in January 1936 and dissolved it when he retired from active money management in 1956; it was the successor to a partnership called the Benjamin Graham Joint Account, which he ran from January 1926 through December 1935.

* “非关联”对冲是指买入一家公司发行的股票或债券，同时卖空（或押注另一家公司发行的证券）另一家公司发行的证券。“关联”对冲是指买入和卖出同一家公司发行的不同股票或债券。格雷厄姆所描述的“新型”对冲基金在1968年左右广泛存在，但后来美国证券交易委员会的监管限制了公众对冲基金的使用。

* An “unrelated” hedge involves buying a stock or bond issued by one company and short-selling (or betting on a decline in) a security issued by a different company. A “related” hedge involves buying and selling different stocks or bonds issued by the same company. The “new group” of hedge funds described by Graham were widely available around 1968, but later regulation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission restricted access to hedge funds for the general public.

*如今，一位遵循格雷厄姆思路的进取型投资者可能会在（例如）小型股、房地产公司、电力公司、欧洲股票，甚至中国上市公司中寻找机会。历史表明，昨日的失败者往往是明日的赢家。

* Today, an enterprising investor following Graham’s train of thought might be searching for opportunities among (for example) small stocks, real-estate companies, electric utilities, European stocks, and perhaps Chinese-listed firms. History has shown that yesterday’s losers are often tomorrow’s winners.

*标准普尔股票指南不再发行，但有关股票的基本免费数据在网上和经纪应用程序上广泛可用。

* The S&P Stock Guide is no longer distributed—but basic, free data on stocks is widely available online and on brokerage apps.

*经过多次合并，罗德岛工业国民银行最终被美国银行公司吸收。

* After many mergers, Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island ended up being absorbed into Bank of America Corp.

*对于今天的投资者来说，这个门槛更有可能在每股1美元左右——低于这个价格，许多股票就会被“摘牌”，或被宣布不再有资格在主要交易所交易。仅仅监控这些公司的股价就需要花费大量精力，这对于防御型投资者来说并不切实际。交易低价股票的成本可能非常高。最后，股价极低的公司很容易倒闭，这令人担忧。然而，如今，一个包含数十家此类困境公司的多元化投资组合，可能仍然对一些有进取心的投资者具有吸引力。

* For today’s investor, the cutoff is more likely to be around $1 per share—the level below which many stocks are “delisted,” or declared ineligible for trading on major exchanges. Just monitoring the stock prices of these companies can take a considerable amount of effort, making them impractical for defensive investors. The costs of trading low-priced stocks can be very high. Finally, companies with very low stock prices have a distressing tendency to go out of business. However, a diversified portfolio of dozens of these distressed companies may still appeal to some enterprising investors today.

*按照格雷厄姆的说法，大量商誉的产生可能有两个原因：一家公司以远高于其资产价值的价格收购其他公司，或者其自身股票的交易价格远高于其账面价值。

* In Graham’s terms, a large amount of goodwill can result from two causes: a corporation can acquire other companies for substantially more than the value of their assets, or its own stock can trade for substantially more than its book value.

*从技术角度来看，股票的营运资本价值等于每股流动资产减去每股流动负债，再除以流通股数。然而，格雷厄姆在这里指的是“净营运资本价值”，即每股流动资产减去总负债后的净值。

* Technically, the working-capital value of a stock is the current assets per share, minus the current liabilities per share, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Here, however, Graham means “net working-capital value,” or the per-share value of current assets minus total liabilities.

* Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point.这首诗是这位伟大的法国神学家在讨论后来被称为“帕斯卡的赌注”时得出的结论之一（参见第20章的评论）。

* Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point. This poetic passage is one of the concluding arguments in the great French theologian’s discussion of what has come to be known as “Pascal’s wager” (see the Commentary on Chapter 20).

¹ WH 奥登，《先跃后看》（1940 年）。

¹ W. H. Auden, “Leap Before You Look” (1940).

²有关监视列表，请参阅第 7 章的评论。

² On watchlists, see the Commentary on Chapter 7.

³有进取心的个人投资者还可以考虑机构投资者避开的领域，例如分拆（公司首次公开发行子公司的股票）和“孤儿股”，即从市场指数中剔除的股票。

³ Enterprising individual investors can also consider areas shunned by institutions, such as spinoffs, in which companies offer publicly traded shares in a subsidiary for the first time, and “orphans,” or stocks that are removed from a market index.

⁴这种方法风险极高，并且是我们规则的罕见例外（参见第4章和第20章的评论）。我们的规则是，一旦你通过将大部分资金投入一只全股票市场指数基金来实现广泛的多元化，你就可以把剩余的资产集中在少数几家公司上。生物科技股波动性极大，只持有少数几只股票并非明智之举。在考虑这种多元化策略之前，请参阅Verdad Capital的《生物科技骨场》，bit.ly/48TDksc。

⁴ This approach is extremely risky and would be a rare exception to our rule (see the Commentaries on Chapters 4 and 20) that once you diversify widely by putting most of your money in a total stock-market index fund, you can then focus the remainder of your assets on a handful of companies. Biotech stocks are so volatile that owning only a handful of them is a bad idea. Before considering even this diversified approach, see Verdad Capital, “The Biotech Boneyard,” bit.ly/48TDksc.

⁵请参阅第 19 章的评论。

⁵ See the Commentary on Chapter 19.

⁶有关护城河的更多信息，请参阅第 11 章的评论。

⁶ For more on moats, see the Commentary on Chapter 11.

⁷约翰·伯尔·威廉姆斯，《投资价值理论》（北荷兰出版社，1938 年），第 57 页。

⁷ John Burr Williams, The Theory of Investment Value (North-Holland, 1938), p. 57.

⁸有关如何计算和调整投资资本回报率的指导，请参阅 Michael J. Mauboussin 和 Dan Callahan 的《投资资本回报率》(Return on Invested Capital)，bit.ly/3L8ccMJ，《投资资本回报率与投资流程》(ROIC and the Investment Process)，bit.ly/45cvLus，以及《投资资本回报率与无形资产》(ROIC and Intangible Assets)，bit.ly/3GGRRvh；Kai Wu 的《无形价值：第六个因素》(Intangible Value: A Sixth Factor)，bit.ly/48g91f0。ROIC 或许是衡量企业及其管理者素质的最佳方法；请参阅 Pulak Prasad 所著《我从达尔文那里学到的投资》(What I Learned About Investing from Darwin)（哥伦比亚商学院，2023 年）中的“西伯利亚解决方案”。

⁸ For guidance on how to calculate and adjust return on invested capital, see Michael J. Mauboussin and Dan Callahan, “Return on Invested Capital,” bit.ly/3L8ccMJ, “ROIC and the Investment Process,” bit.ly/45cvLus, and “ROIC and Intangible Assets,” bit.ly/3GGRRvh; Kai Wu, “Intangible Value: A Sixth Factor,” bit.ly/48g91f0. ROIC may well be the single best way to measure the quality of a business and its managers; see “The Siberian Solution” in Pulak Prasad, What I Learned About Investing from Darwin (Columbia Business School, 2023).

⁹ “累计净收益”和“创造的财富”是相对于美国国库券的回报来衡量的；参见 Hendrik Bessembinder 的《股东财富增值，1926 年至 2022 年》bit.ly/44yB08i，以及 Hendrik Bessembinder 等人的《长期股东回报：来自 64,000 只全球股票的证据》bit.ly/3ROcJXz。

⁹ “Cumulative net gain” and “wealth created” are measured relative to the return on U.S. Treasury bills; see Hendrik Bessembinder, “Shareholder Wealth Enhancement, 1926 to 2022,” bit.ly/44yB08i, and Hendrik Bessembinder et al., “Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence from 64,000 Global Stocks,” bit.ly/3ROcJXz.

¹⁰ Antti Petajisto，“集中股票仓位表现不佳”，bit.ly/48BFpd2。结果为定期交易股票中位数相对于CRSP市值加权美国股票投资组合的比率。

¹⁰ Antti Petajisto, “Underperformance of Concentrated Stock Positions,” bit.ly/48BFpd2. Results are for the median regularly traded stock relative to the CRSP market-capitalization-weighted portfolio of U.S. stocks.

¹¹正如格雷厄姆在后记中所写，“一次幸运的突破，或一个极其精明的决定——我们能区分它们吗？——可能比一生的努力更有价值”（此处）。在随附的尾注中，他承认自己职业生涯中最大的投资可能归功于“愚蠢的运气”。

¹¹ As Graham writes in the Postscript, “one lucky break, or one supremely shrewd decision—can we tell them apart?—may count for more than a lifetime of . . . efforts” (here). In the accompanying endnote he confesses that the greatest investment of his career might have been attributable to “dumb luck.”

*格雷厄姆厌恶逮捕令，正如他在这里明确表示的那样。

* Graham detested warrants, as he makes clear here.

*格雷厄姆指出，尽管投资者通常听到各种宣传花言巧语，但可转换债券并非必然带来“两全其美”的回报。高收益和低风险并非并存。华尔街一只手给予，另一只手却往往收回。一项投资可能带来一个方面的最佳回报，也可能带来另一个方面最坏的回报；但两全其美的回报很少能同时实现。

* Graham is pointing out that, despite the promotional rhetoric that investors usually hear, convertible bonds do not automatically offer “the best of both worlds.” Higher yield and lower risk do not go hand in hand. What Wall Street gives with one hand, it usually takes away with the other. An investment may offer the best of one world, or the worst of another; but the best of both worlds seldom becomes available in a single package.

*可转换债券市场近期的结构性变化抵消了部分批评。1973年至2020年间，可转换债券的表现略优于标准普尔500指数，且波动性较低。然而，在那段时期的大部分时间里，专门投资可转换债券的低成本基金并不存在。

* Recent structural changes in the convertible market have negated some of these criticisms. Between 1973 and 2020, convertible bonds slightly outperformed the S&P 500, with lower volatility. However, low-cost funds specializing in convertibles didn’t exist for most of that period.

*当发行公司在规定到期日或债券的最后还款日之前强制偿还债券时，该债券即被“赎回”。

* A bond is “called” when the issuing corporation forcibly pays it off ahead of the stated maturity date, or final due date for the bond to be paid off.

*近年来，金融、医疗保健和科技行业的公司大量发行可转换债券。

* In recent years, convertible bonds have been heavily issued by companies in the financial, health-care, and technology industries.

*认股权证是19世纪极为普遍的公司融资手段，即使在格雷厄姆时代也相当普遍。尽管在2020年代初，SPAC（特殊目的收购公司）曾短暂地、不光彩地卷土重来，但认股权证的重要性和受欢迎程度已逐渐下降。

* Warrants were an extremely widespread technique of corporate finance in the nineteenth century and were fairly common even in Graham’s day. They have since diminished in importance and popularity, despite a brief, ignominious comeback among SPACs in the early 2020s.

*如果有人愿意向您出售任何公司的“单位”，您可以肯定其中涉及认股权证，而且这是一笔糟糕的交易。

* If anyone ever offers to sell you “units” in any company, you can be quite certain that warrants are involved and that it’s a bad deal.

* “臭名昭著的法国指券”发行于1789年革命期间。它们原本是革命政府的债务，据称以激进分子从天主教会和贵族手中夺取的不动产价值作为抵押。但革命者们的财务管理能力并不高。1790年，指券的利率被下调；很快，它们就完全停止支付利息，并被重新归类为纸币。但政府拒绝将其兑换成黄金或白银，并发行了大量新的指券。1797年，它们被正式宣布为一文不值。

* The “notorious French assignats” were issued during the Revolution of 1789. They were originally debts of the Revolutionary government, purportedly secured by the value of the real estate that the radicals had seized from the Catholic church and the nobility. But the Revolutionaries were bad financial managers. In 1790, the interest rate on assignats was cut; soon they stopped paying interest entirely and were reclassified as paper money. But the government refused to redeem them for gold or silver and issued massive amounts of new assignats. They were officially declared worthless in 1797.

*格雷厄姆是一位西班牙文学的热心读者，他正在解释佩德罗·卡尔德隆·德·拉·巴尔卡 (1600-1681) 的戏剧《人生如梦》中的一句话：“人类最大的罪行就是出生。”

* Graham, an enthusiastic reader of Spanish literature, is paraphrasing a line from the play Life Is a Dream by Pedro Calderon de la Barca (1600–1681): “The greatest crime of man is having been born.”

¹迈克尔·勒博夫 (Michael LeBoeuf) 讲述，2001 年。

¹ As told by Michael LeBoeuf, 2001.

² Tracy V. Maitland 等人的《可转换证券》（麦格劳希尔，2022 年）是一本适合任何有兴趣了解更多可转换债券知识的人的综合手册。

² Tracy V. Maitland et al., Convertible Securities (McGraw Hill, 2022) is a comprehensive handbook for anyone interested in learning more about convertible bonds.

³ Rob Bauer 等人，“期权交易和个人投资者表现”，bit.ly/3ZITgdp；Svetlana Bryzgalova 等人，“期权零售交易和三大批发商的崛起”，bit.ly/46yemh2；Tim de Silva 等人，“亏损是可选的”，bit.ly/3FqiPX7。

³ Rob Bauer et al., “Option Trading and Individual Investor Performance,” bit.ly/3ZITgdp; Svetlana Bryzgalova et al., “Retail Trading in Options and the Rise of the Big Three Wholesalers,” bit.ly/46yemh2; Tim de Silva et al., “Losing Is Optional,” bit.ly/3FqiPX7.

* 1970年6月20日至21日的周末，宾夕法尼亚中央铁路公司申请破产，金融界对此“震惊”到了什么程度？6月19日（星期五），宾夕法尼亚中央铁路公司的股票收盘价为每股11.25美元——这远非一个倒闭的价格。近代以来，安然、世通和Bed Bath & Beyond等公司的股票在申请破产保护前不久也曾以相对较高的价格售出。

* How “shocked” was the financial world by the Penn Central’s bankruptcy, which was filed over the weekend of June 20–21, 1970? The closing trade in Penn Central’s stock on Friday, June 19, was $11.25 per share—hardly a going-out-of-business price. In more recent times, stocks like Enron, WorldCom, and Bed Bath & Beyond have also sold at relatively high prices shortly before filing for bankruptcy protection.

*宾夕法尼亚中央铁路公司是 1966 年宾夕法尼亚铁路公司和纽约中央铁路公司合并的产物。

* Penn Central was the product of the merger, announced in 1966, of the Pennsylvania Railroad and the New York Central Railroad.

^* 这种会计花招，即报告利润时好像“不寻常的”、“非常的”或“非经常性的”费用并不重要，预示着近期对非 GAAP 财务报表的依赖（见第 12 章的评论）。

^* This kind of accounting legerdemain, in which profits are reported as if “unusual” or “extraordinary” or “nonrecurring” charges do not matter, anticipates the recent reliance on non-GAAP financial statements (see the Commentary on Chapter 12).

*铁路的“运输率”（现在更常称为运营率）衡量的是运营列车的费用除以铁路的总收入。该比率越高，铁路的效率就越低。如今，即使是60%的比率也被认为是优秀的。

* A railroad’s “transportation ratio” (now more commonly called its operating ratio) measures the expenses of running its trains divided by the railroad’s total revenues. The higher the ratio, the less efficient the railroad. Today even a ratio of 60% would be considered excellent.

^* 如今，宾夕法尼亚中央铁路已成为一段淡去的记忆。1976年，它被并入联合铁路公司（Conrail），这是一家由联邦政府资助的控股公司，曾救助过几家倒闭的铁路公司。Conrail于1987年公开发行股票，并于1997年被CSX公司和诺福克南方公司联合收购。

^* Today, Penn Central is a faded memory. In 1976, it was absorbed into Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail), a federally-funded holding company that bailed out several failed railroads. Conrail sold shares to the public in 1987 and, in 1997, was taken over jointly by CSX Corp. and Norfolk Southern Corp.

^* Ling-Temco-Vought 公司由电气承包商詹姆斯·约瑟夫·林于 1955 年创立。他通过成为自己的投资银行家，在德克萨斯州博览会上设立的摊位兜售招股说明书，向公众出售了第一笔价值 100 万美元的股票。他的成功使他收购了数十家不同的公司，几乎总是使用 LTV 的股票作为收购价格。LTV 收购的公司越多，其股价就越高；股价越高，它就能负担得起收购的公司越多。到 1969 年，LTV 已成为美国财富 500 强企业中第 14 位。然后，正如格雷厄姆所示，整个纸牌屋轰然倒塌。（LTV 公司当时是一家专门的钢铁制造商，最终在 2000 年底申请破产保护。）主要通过收购实现增长的公司被称为“连续收购者”——它与“连环杀手”一词的相似性并非偶然。正如LTV案例所示，连续收购几乎总是会留下财务上的死亡和毁灭。如果投资者能够理解格雷厄姆的这一教训，他们就能避免康塞科、泰科、世通和瓦伦特等公司后来的惨败。

^* Ling-Temco-Vought Inc. was founded in 1955 by James Joseph Ling, an electrical contractor who sold his first $1 million worth of shares to the public by becoming his own investment banker, hawking prospectuses from a booth set up at the Texas State Fair. His success at that led him to acquire dozens of different companies, almost always using LTV’s stock to pay for them. The more companies LTV acquired, the higher its stock went; the higher its stock went, the more companies it could afford to acquire. By 1969, LTV was the 14th biggest firm on the Fortune 500 list of major U.S. corporations. And then, as Graham shows, the whole house of cards came crashing down. (LTV Corp., then exclusively a steelmaker, ended up seeking bankruptcy protection in late 2000.) Companies that grow primarily through acquisitions are called “serial acquirers”—and the similarity to the term “serial killers” is no accident. As the case of LTV demonstrates, serial acquirers nearly always leave financial death and destruction in their wake. Investors who understood this lesson of Graham’s would have avoided such later fiascos as Conseco, Tyco, WorldCom, and Valeant.

*用重组费用掩盖公司真实盈利状况的卑鄙传统仍然存在。在一年内累积所有可能的费用有时被称为“大浴缸”或“厨房水槽”会计。这种记账技巧使公司能够轻易地炫耀其次年的增长——但投资者不应将其误认为是真正的业务健康。

* The sordid tradition of hiding a company’s true earnings picture under the cloak of restructuring charges is still with us. Piling up every possible charge in one year is sometimes called “big bath” or “kitchen sink” accounting. This bookkeeping gimmick enables companies to make an easy show of apparent growth in the following year—but investors should not mistake that for real business health.

^* “债券折价资产”似乎意味着贷款价值比（LTV）以低于票面价值的价格购买了一些债券，并将折价视为一项资产，理由是这些债券最终可以按票面价值出售。格雷厄姆对此嗤之以鼻，因为很少有办法知道未来某一天债券的市场价格。如果这些债券只能以低于票面价值的价格出售，那么这种“资产”实际上可能是一种负债。

^* The “bond-discount asset” appears to mean that LTV had purchased some bonds below their par value and was treating that discount as an asset, on the grounds that the bonds could eventually be sold at par. Graham scoffs at this, since there is rarely any way to know what a bond’s market price will be on a given date in the future. If the bonds could be sold only at values below par, this “asset” could in fact be a liability.

*格雷厄姆看到商业银行长期支持“不健全的扩张”肯定会感到失望，但肯定不会感到惊讶。安然、世通和硅谷银行这三家企业历史上最大的倒闭企业，都得到了数十亿美元银行贷款的帮助和怂恿。

* Graham would have been disappointed, though surely not surprised, to see that commercial banks have chronically kept supporting “unsound expansions.” Enron, WorldCom, and Silicon Valley Bank, three of the biggest collapses in corporate history, were aided and abetted by billions of dollars in bank loans.

* 1972年6月（格雷厄姆完成本章后不久），一名联邦法官裁定，NVF董事长维克多·波斯纳不当挪用了莎朗·斯蒂尔公司的养老金资产，“以协助其关联公司收购其他公司”。莎朗·斯蒂尔公司正是格雷厄姆以冷漠和怀疑的眼光挑出来的，后来在华尔街的风趣人士中被称为“分享与窃取”。

* In June 1972 (just after Graham finished this chapter), a Federal judge found that NVF’s chairman, Victor Posner, had improperly diverted the pension assets of Sharon Steel “to assist affiliated companies in their takeovers of other corporations.” Sharon Steel, which Graham had singled out with his cold and skeptical eye, became known among Wall Street wags as “Share and Steal.”

*当NVF员工行使认股权证购买普通股时，将触发“大幅稀释因素”。届时，公司将不得不发行更多股份，其净利润将分配到更多流通股中。

* The “large dilution factor” would be triggered when NVF employees exercised their warrants to buy common stock. The company would then have to issue more shares, and its net earnings would be divided across a much greater number of shares outstanding.

^* 杰基·G·威廉姆斯（Jackie G. Williams）于1958年创立了AAA企业。上市首日，股价飙升56%，收于20.25美元。威廉姆斯后来宣布，AAA将每月推出一个新的特许经营理念（如果人们能走进移动房屋，让“美国税务先生”帮他们报税，想象一下，在拖车里他们还能做什么！）。然而，在威廉姆斯创意枯竭之前，AAA已经耗尽了时间和资金。AAA企业的历史令人想起后来一家拥有魅力十足的管理层和微薄资产的公司：ZZZZ Best在20世纪80年代末实现了约2亿美元的市值，尽管其所谓的工业吸尘器业务只不过是一部电话和一间租来的办公室，由一个名叫巴里·明科（Barry Minkow）的青少年经营。ZZZZ Best最终破产，明科则锒铛入狱。就在你读到这篇文章的时候，另一家类似的公司正在成立，新一代的“投资者”将被蒙蔽。然而，任何读过格雷厄姆著作的人都不应该加入其中。

^* Jackie G. Williams founded AAA Enterprises in 1958. On its first day of trading, the stock soared 56% to close at $20.25. Williams later announced that AAA would come up with a new franchising concept every month (if people would step into a mobile home to get their income taxes done by “Mr. Tax of America,” just imagine what else they might do inside a trailer!). But AAA ran out of time and money before Williams ran out of ideas. The history of AAA Enterprises is reminiscent of the saga of a later company with charismatic management and scanty assets: ZZZZ Best achieved a stock-market value of roughly $200 million in the late 1980s, even though its purported industrial vacuum-cleaning business was little more than a telephone and a rented office run by a teenager named Barry Minkow. ZZZZ Best went bust and Minkow went to jail. Even as you read this, another similar company is being formed, and a new generation of “investors” will be taken for a ride. No one who has read Graham, however, should climb on board.

*在英国浪漫主义诗人利·亨特（Leigh Hunt，1784-1859）的诗作《阿布·本·阿德姆》（Abou Ben Adhem）中，一位正直的穆斯林看到一位天使在一本金书中写下“爱主之人的名字”。第二天晚上，天使回来向阿布展示这本书，书中“本·阿德姆的名字排在第一位”。

* In “Abou Ben Adhem,” by the British Romantic poet Leigh Hunt (1784–1859), a righteous Muslim sees an angel writing in a golden book “the names of those who love the Lord.” The angel returns the next night to show Abou the book, in which “Ben Adhem’s name led all the rest.”

*通过以高于账面价值的价格购买更多普通股，投资公众提高了AAA每股权益的价值。但投资者只是自力更生，因为股东权益的增长大部分源于公众愿意为股票支付过高的价格。

* By purchasing more common stock at a premium to its book value, the investing public increased the value of AAA’s equity per share. But investors were only pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps, since most of the rise in shareholders’ equity came from the public’s willingness to overpay for the stock.

^* 格雷厄姆的观点是，投资银行无权将热门股票首次公开募股（IPO）后可能产生的收益归功于自己，除非他们也愿意为该股票的长期表现承担责任。1999年和2000年初，许多互联网公司IPO上涨了1000%甚至更多；但其中大多数在随后三年下跌了95%以上。

^* Graham’s point is that investment banks are not entitled to take credit for the gains a hot stock may produce right after its initial public offering unless they are also willing to take the blame for the stock’s performance in the longer term. Many internet IPOs rose 1,000% or more in 1999 and early 2000; most of them lost more than 95% in the subsequent three years.

*正如卫生局局长在香烟盒侧面的警告并不能阻止所有人吸烟一样，任何监管改革都无法阻止投资者沉溺于自身的贪婪。（即使是共产主义也无法禁止市场泡沫；中国股市在1999年上半年飙升了101.7%，随后崩盘。）投资银行也永远无法完全摆脱以市场所能承受的任何价格抛售股票的冲动。这个循环只能由一位投资者和一位财务顾问来打破。掌握格雷厄姆的原则（尤其参见第1章、第8章和第20章）是最好的入门方法。

* Just as the Surgeon General’s warning on the side of a cigarette pack does not stop everyone from lighting up, no regulatory reform will ever prevent investors from overdosing on their own greed. (Not even Communism can outlaw market bubbles; the Chinese stock market shot up 101.7% in the first half of 1999, then crashed.) Nor can investment banks ever be entirely cleansed of their own compulsion to sell any stock at any price the market will bear. The circle can only be broken one investor, and one financial adviser, at a time. Mastering Graham’s principles (see especially Chapters 1, 8, and 20) is the best way to start.

¹阿尔弗雷德·诺斯·怀特黑德，《科学与现代世界》（自由出版社，1967 年），第 187 页。

¹ Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Free Press, 1967), p. 187.

¹米尔顿于 2023 年 12 月被判刑，目前正在对判决提出上诉。

¹ Milton, sentenced in December 2023, is appealing his conviction.

²关于尼古拉的权威报道，请关注本·福尔迪（Ben Foldy）在《华尔街日报》播客节目《坏赌注》（Bad Bets）的六集报道（on.wsj.com/3VycmT1）。另请参阅兴登堡研究公司（Hindenburg Research），bit.ly/3Mb091p，以及罗宾追踪公司（Robintrack），bit.ly/46K2VDm。

² The definitive account of Nikola is the six-part Wall Street Journal podcast Bad Bets by Ben Foldy at on.wsj.com/3VycmT1. See also Hindenburg Research, bit.ly/3Mb091p, and Robintrack, bit.ly/46K2VDm.

³ Peloton IPO 招股说明书，bit.ly/3FrLZFs；Sharon Terlep，“Peloton 一年历程：从疫情赢家到 HBO 笑柄”，bit.ly/497qCXO。

³ Peloton IPO prospectus, bit.ly/3FrLZFs; Sharon Terlep, “Inside a Year at Peloton: From Pandemic Winner to HBO Punchline,” bit.ly/497qCXO.

⁴ Peter Rudegeair 和 Maureen Farrell，“当 SPAC 人 Chamath Palihapitiya 发言时，Reddit 和华尔街都会倾听”，bit.ly/3QFwbWh；Tom McGinty 等人，“公司内部人士在 SPAC 破产前赚了数十亿美元”，bit.ly/3rXfSdy。

⁴ Peter Rudegeair and Maureen Farrell, “When SPAC-Man Chamath Palihapitiya Speaks, Reddit and Wall Street Listen,” bit.ly/3QFwbWh; Tom McGinty et al., “Company Insiders Made Billions Before SPAC Bust,” bit.ly/3rXfSdy.

*格雷厄姆这里描述的是房地产投资信托公司（Real Estate Investment Trust），该公司于1983年被旧金山房地产投资者公司（San Francisco Real Estate Investors）以每股50美元的价格收购。下一段描述的是纽约的房地产股票公司（Realty Equities Corp.）。

* Here Graham is describing Real Estate Investment Trust, which was acquired by San Francisco Real Estate Investors in 1983 for $50 a share. The next paragraph describes Realty Equities Corp. of New York.

^* 演员保罗·纽曼曾短暂地成为纽约房地产股票公司 (Realty Equities Corp.) 的主要股东，该公司于 1969 年收购了保罗·纽曼的电影制作公司 Kayos, Inc.。

^* The actor Paul Newman was briefly a major shareholder in Realty Equities Corp. of New York after it bought his movie-production company, Kayos, Inc., in 1969.

*格雷厄姆是一位诗歌爱好者，他引用了托马斯·格雷的《乡村墓地挽歌》。

* Graham, an avid reader of poetry, is quoting Thomas Gray’s “Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard.”

*房地产股权公司（Realty Equities）于1973年9月从美国证券交易所退市。1974年，美国证券交易委员会起诉房地产股权公司的会计师涉嫌欺诈。房地产股权公司创始人莫里斯·卡普后来承认了一项重大盗窃罪。1974年至1975年，格雷厄姆所批评的过度负债导致包括大通曼哈顿银行在内的大型银行爆发金融危机，这些银行曾向最激进的房地产信托公司提供巨额贷款。

* Realty Equities was delisted from the American Stock Exchange in September 1973. In 1974, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission sued Realty Equities’ accountants for fraud. Realty Equities’ founder, Morris Karp, later pleaded guilty to one count of grand larceny. In 1974–1975, the overindebtedness that Graham criticizes led to a financial crisis among large banks, including Chase Manhattan, that had lent heavily to the most aggressive realty trusts.

^* “Heteroclite” 是古希腊语中的一个术语，格雷厄姆用它来表示异常或不寻常。

^* “Heteroclite” is a technical term from classical Greek that Graham uses to mean abnormal or unusual.

*格雷厄姆所说的“数量”是指销售额或收入——每家公司业务的总金额。

* By “volume,” Graham is referring to sales or revenues—the total dollar amount of each company’s business.

^* “资产支持”和账面价值是同义词。在表18-2中，可以通过将第一行（“1969年12月31日的价格”）除以“每股账面价值”来显示价格与资产或账面价值之间的关系。

^* “Asset backing” and book value are synonyms. In Table 18-2, the relationship of price to asset or book value can be seen by dividing the first line (“Price, December 31, 1969”) by “Book value per share.”

^* 格雷厄姆引用了他对价值股的研究，他在第 15 章中对此进行了讨论（参见此处）。

^* Graham is citing his research on value stocks, which he discusses in Chapter 15 (see here).

*空气产品及化学品公司 (Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.) 仍作为上市公司存在，并被纳入标准普尔 500 股票指数。空气减量公司 (Air Reduction Co.) 于 1978 年成为英国氧气公司 (British Oxygen) 的全资子公司，后者现为林德公司 (Linde PLC) 的一部分。

* Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., still exists as a publicly-traded stock and is included in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index. Air Reduction Co. became a wholly-owned subsidiary of British Oxygen, now part of Linde PLC, in 1978.

^* 您可以参考表18-3的“比率”部分来确定盈利能力。“净销售额/销售额”衡量销售回报率；“收益/账面价值”是衡量资本回报率的一种方法。

^* You can determine profitability by referring to the “Ratios” section of Table 18-3. “Net/sales” measures return on sales; “Earnings/book value” is one way to measure return on capital.

*美国家庭用品公司后来被辉瑞公司收购。美国医院供应公司于 1985 年被百特医疗保健公司收购。

* American Home Products Co. was later absorbed into Pfizer Inc. American Hospital Supply Co. was acquired by Baxter Healthcare Corp. in 1985.

* “接近30倍”反映在表18-4 “比率”部分“市净率”下的2920%中。H&R Block仍是一家上市公司，而Blue Bell于1984年以每股47.50美元的价格被私有化。

* “Nearly 30 times” is reflected in the entry of 2920% under “Price/book value” in the Ratios section of Table 18-4. H & R Block remains a publicly-traded company, while Blue Bell was taken private in 1984 at $47.50 per share.

*格雷厄姆提醒读者警惕一种“赌徒谬误”，即投资者认为一只被高估的股票价格必然下跌，纯粹是因为其本身被高估了。正如一枚硬币连续九次抛出反面后，正面朝上的概率并不会提高一样，一只被高估的股票（或股市！）也可能在意想不到的很长一段时间内保持高估状态。这使得卖空，即押注股价下跌，对普通人来说风险过大。

* Graham is alerting readers to a form of the “gambler’s fallacy,” in which investors believe that an overvalued stock must drop in price purely because it is overvalued. Just as a coin does not become more likely to turn up heads after landing on tails for nine times in a row, so an overvalued stock (or stock market!) can stay overvalued for a surprisingly long time. That makes short-selling, or betting that stocks will drop, too risky for mere mortals.

^* 国际收割机公司（International Harvester）是麦考密克收割机公司（McCormick Harvesting Machine Co.）的继承者，麦考密克收割机公司生产的麦考密克收割机帮助美国中西部各州成为“世界粮仓”。但国际收割机公司在20世纪70年代陷入困境，并于1985年将其农用设备业务出售给天纳克公司（Tenneco）。国际香精香料公司（International Flavors & Fragrances）是标准普尔500指数成分股。

^* International Harvester was the heir to McCormick Harvesting Machine Co., the manufacturer of the McCormick reaper that helped make the midwestern states the “breadbasket of the world.” But International Harvester fell on hard times in the 1970s and, in 1985, sold its farm-equipment business to Tenneco. International Flavors & Fragrances is a member of the S&P 500.

*格雷厄姆关于股东积极主义的更多想法，请参阅第十九章及其评论。在批评Harvester拒绝最大化股东价值时，格雷厄姆惊人地预见了该公司未来管理层的行为。2001年，大多数股东投票决定取消纳威司达（Navistar）对外部收购的限制——但董事会干脆拒绝执行股东的意愿。一些公司文化中的反民主倾向竟然能够持续数十年，这真是令人惊讶。

* For more of Graham’s thoughts on shareholder activism, see Chapter 19 and its Commentary. In criticizing Harvester for its refusal to maximize shareholder value, Graham uncannily anticipated the behavior of the company’s future management. In 2001, a majority of shareholders voted to remove Navistar’s restrictions against outside takeover bids—but the board of directors simply refused to implement the shareholders’ wishes. It’s remarkable that an antidemocratic tendency in the culture of some companies can endure for decades.

*麦格劳-希尔和麦格劳-爱迪生不再公开上市。

* McGraw-Hill and McGraw-Edison are no longer publicly traded.

*格雷厄姆所说的“1970年5月大崩盘”是指美国股市下跌了5.5%。从1970年3月底到6月底，标准普尔500指数下跌了19%，是有史以来最糟糕的三个月回报率之一。

* In “the May 1970 debacle” that Graham refers to, the U.S. stock market lost 5.5%. From the end of March to the end of June 1970, the S&P 500 fell 19%, one of the worst three-month returns on record.

* National Presto 仍然是一家上市公司。National General 于 1974 年被另一家备受争议的企业集团美国金融集团 (American Financial Group) 收购，该集团曾多次涉足有线电视、银行、房地产、共同基金、保险和香蕉等行业。

* National Presto remains a publicly-traded company. National General was acquired in 1974 by another controversial conglomerate, American Financial Group, which at various times has had interests in cable television, banking, real estate, mutual funds, insurance, and bananas.

* Whiting Corp. 和 Willcox & Gibbs 不再公开交易。

* Whiting Corp. and Willcox & Gibbs are no longer publicly traded.

¹约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷斯，《金融欣快症简史》（企鹅出版社，1994 年），第 13 页。

¹ John Kenneth Galbraith, A Short History of Financial Euphoria (Penguin, 1994), p. 13.

² Alexander Gladstone 和 Erich Schwartzel，“AMC 疯狂、疯狂、颠倒的猿猴年、表情包和短裤内幕”，bit.ly/40jSILe；Caitlin McCabe 和 Alexander Osipovich，“GameStop 投资者仍在等待史诗级空头挤压带来的财富”，bit.ly/40mH0PT。

² Alexander Gladstone and Erich Schwartzel, “Inside AMC’s Crazy, Bonkers, Upside-Down Year of Apes, Memes and Shorts,” bit.ly/40jSILe; Caitlin McCabe and Alexander Osipovich, “GameStop Investors Still Await Riches from Epic Short Squeeze,” bit.ly/40mH0PT.

³ Hendrik Bessembinder，“长期股市回报：巨额收益和事件后回报的概率”，bit.ly/3QKh11N。

³ Hendrik Bessembinder, “Long-Run Stock Market Returns: Probabilities of Big Gains and Post-Event Returns,” bit.ly/3QKh11N.

⁴监管机构于 2023 年消除了这种会计不对称现象。

⁴ This accounting asymmetry was eliminated by regulators in 2023.

⁵有关非公认会计准则会计的其他滥用情况，请参阅第 12 章的评论。

⁵ For other abuses of non-GAAP accounting, see the Commentary on Chapter 12.

*格雷厄姆在此描述的讽刺在20世纪90年代愈发强烈，当时的公司似乎实力越强，就越不可能支付股息——或者说，股东也越不愿意支付股息。“股息支付率”（即公司以股息形式支付的净收入占比）从格雷厄姆时代的“60%到75%”下降到近年来的约35%到40%。

* The irony that Graham describes here grew even stronger in the 1990s, when it seemed the stronger the company was, the less likely it was to pay a dividend—or for its shareholders to want one. The “payout ratio” (the percentage of net income companies paid out as dividends) dropped from “60% to 75%” in Graham’s day to roughly 35% to 40% in recent years.

* 20世纪90年代末，科技公司尤其强烈地主张将所有收益“重新投入到公司业务中”，这样他们就能获得比外部股东在其他地方获得的更高回报。令人难以置信的是，投资者很少质疑这种居高临下的“老子最懂”原则的真实性，或者承认公司的现金属于股东，而不是管理层。

* In the late 1990s, technology companies were particularly strong advocates of the view that all of their earnings should be “plowed back into the business,” where they could earn higher returns than outside shareholders could get elsewhere. Incredibly, investors seldom questioned the truth of this patronizing Daddy-Knows-Best principle—or recognized that a company’s cash belongs to the shareholders, not its managers.

^* 1959年，Superior Oil的股价达到峰值，达到每股2165美元，当时该公司派发了4美元的股息。多年来，Superior一直是纽约证券交易所上市价格最高的股票。Superior由休斯顿的凯克家族控制，于1984年被美孚公司收购。

^* Superior Oil’s stock price peaked at $2,165 per share in 1959, when it paid a $4 dividend. For many years, Superior was the highest-priced stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Superior, controlled by the Keck family of Houston, was acquired by Mobil Corp. in 1984.

*如今，几乎所有股票分割都是通过价值变动来实现的。在二拆一的分割中，一股变成两股，每股的交易价格是原先一股价格的一半；在三拆一的分割中，一股变成三股，每股的交易价格是原先价格的三分之一；以此类推。只有在极少数情况下，才会有一笔款项“从盈余转入资本账户”，就像格雷厄姆时代那样。

* Today, virtually all stock splits are carried out by a change in value. In a two-for-one split, one share becomes two, each trading at half the former price of the original single share; in a three-for-one split, one share becomes three, each trading at a third of the former price; and so on. Only in very rare cases is a sum transferred “from earned surplus to capital account,” as in Graham’s day.

*这项政策在格雷厄姆的时代就已经很不寻常，如今更是凤毛麟角。1936年和1950年，纽约证券交易所大约一半的股票都派发了所谓的特别股息。然而，到了1970年，这一比例下降到不足10%，到了20世纪90年代，更是远低于5%。

* This policy, already unusual in Graham’s day, is extremely rare today. In 1936 and again in 1950, roughly half of all stocks on the NYSE paid a so-called special dividend. By 1970, however, that percentage had declined to less than 10% and, by the 1990s, was well under 5%.

^* 学术界对股息的批评主要由默顿·米勒和弗朗哥·莫迪利亚尼发起，他们颇具影响力的文章《股息政策、增长和股票估值》（1961年）帮助他们赢得了诺贝尔经济学奖。米勒和莫迪利亚尼认为，股息无关紧要，因为投资者不应该关心他们的回报是来自股息和股价上涨，还是仅仅来自股价上涨，只要总回报相同就行。

^* The academic criticism of dividends was led by Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani, whose influential article “Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares” (1961) helped win them Nobel Prizes in Economics. Miller and Modigliani argued that dividends were irrelevant, since investors shouldn’t care whether their return comes through dividends and a rising stock price, or through a rising stock price alone, so long as the total return is the same.

*今天的投资者可以放心地跳过这一段。股东不再需要担心“必须拆分”股票证书，因为现在几乎所有股票都是电子版，而不是纸质版。

* Today’s investors can safely skip over this passage. Shareholders no longer need to worry about “having to break up” a stock certificate, since virtually all shares now exist in electronic rather than paper form.

^* 认购权，通常简称为“权利”，如今使用频率已不如格雷厄姆时代。它赋予现有股东购买新股的权利，有时价格会低于市场价。不参与认购的股东最终持有的公司股份比例会相应减少。因此，与许多其他以“权利”之名出现的事物一样，认购权通常包含一些强制手段。如今，认购权在封闭式基金、保险公司或其他控股公司中最为常见。

^* Subscription rights, often simply known as “rights,” are used less frequently than in Graham’s day. They confer upon an existing shareholder the right to buy new shares, sometimes at a discount to market price. A shareholder who does not participate will end up owning proportionately less of the company. Thus, as is the case with so many other things that go by the name of “rights,” some coercion is often involved. Rights are most common today among closed-end funds and insurance or other holding companies.

¹本杰明·格雷厄姆，《聪明的投资者》（Harper & Row，1949 年），第 233 页。

¹ Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor (Harper & Row, 1949), p. 233.

²本杰明·格雷厄姆和大卫·多德，《证券分析》（麦格劳·希尔，1951 年版），第 600 页；斜体为原文。

² Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, Security Analysis (McGraw-Hill, 1951 edition), p. 600; italics in original.

³ Michael J. Mauboussin 和 Dan Callahan，“资本分配”，bit.ly/3MQIBbj。

³ Michael J. Mauboussin and Dan Callahan, “Capital Allocation,” bit.ly/3MQIBbj.

⁴ John R. Graham，《总统演讲：公司财务与现实》，bit.ly/46IcNfG。公平地说，高管们可能认为他们的股票被低估了，但不一定会回购。

⁴ John R. Graham, “Presidential Address: Corporate Finance and Reality,” bit.ly/46IcNfG. To be fair, executives may think their stock is undervalued without necessarily buying it back.

⁵ Jason Zweig，“股票回购不是坏事，也不是好事”，bit.ly/3sAl2N1。

⁵ Jason Zweig, “Stock Buybacks Aren’t Bad. They Aren’t Good, Either,” bit.ly/3sAl2N1.

⁶ Cliff Asness 等人，“回购错乱综合症”，bit.ly/40Izgbe；Alex Edmans，“股票回购案例”，bit.ly/3sGqZbk；Joachim Klement，“关于那些股票回购”，bit.ly/3umPn2l；Michael J. Mauboussin 和 Dan Callahan，“关于股息和回购的思考”，bit.ly/3G6Plho；Patrick O'Shaughnessy，“高信念回购”，bit.ly/40Mil7y。

⁶ Cliff Asness et al., “Buyback Derangement Syndrome,” bit.ly/40Izgbe; Alex Edmans, “The Case for Share Buybacks,” bit.ly/3sGqZbk; Joachim Klement, “About Those Share Buybacks,” bit.ly/3umPn2l; Michael J. Mauboussin and Dan Callahan, “Thoughts on Dividends and Buybacks,” bit.ly/3G6Plho; Patrick O’Shaughnessy, “High-Conviction Buybacks,” bit.ly/40Mil7y.

⁷他的潜在总收入中有很大一部分尚未以现金形式支付，而是以股票期权的形式支付，其最终价值取决于 WBD 的股票能否在 2027 年底之前达到雄心勃勃的目标。

⁷ Much of his potential total hasn’t been paid out in cash, but resides in stock options whose ultimate value is contingent on whether WBD’s stock can hit ambitious targets before the end of 2027.

^8.谨慎选择；有些申请来得快去得也快。你应该和其他认真负责、善于分析的投资者交往，而不是和那些互相煽动、互相刺激的投机者交往。2021年买入AMC股票的“猿人”们互相怂恿，崇拜该公司的管理层，却无视高管们在发行新股之前几乎抛售了所有股份，而新股的发行大幅削减了猿人们的持股比例。要成为一个明智的股东，你必须先独立思考，然后再加入一个团体。

⁸ Be selective; some apps come and go quickly. And you should associate with other investors who are serious and analytical, not with speculators who whip each other into a frenzy. The “apes” who bought AMC stock in 2021 egged each other on in adoration of the company’s management, ignoring the fact that the executives had dumped nearly all their own shares before issuing new stock that radically reduced the apes’ ownership. To be an intelligent owner, you must first think for yourself before you join a group.

^*据说一位东方君主曾嘱咐他的智者为他发明一句话，要时刻铭记在心，在任何时间和情况下都应正确适用。他们向他提出了这样一句话：“这一切，也将过去。 ”这句话表达了多么深刻的道理！在骄傲的时刻，这句话是多么令人警醒！在深陷痛苦的时候，这句话是多么令人欣慰！“这一切，也将过去。”然而，我们希望这句话并非完全正确。——亚伯拉罕·林肯，1859年9月30日，威斯康星州农业协会演讲，bit.ly/3OOT60g。

^* “It is said an Eastern monarch once charged his wise men to invent him a sentence, to be ever in view, and which should be true and appropriate in all times and situations. They presented him the words: ‘And this, too, shall pass away.’ How much it expresses! How chastening in the hour of pride!—how consoling in the depths of affliction! ‘And this, too, shall pass away.’ And yet let us hope it is not quite true.”—Abraham Lincoln, Address to the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society, September 30, 1859, bit.ly/3OOT60g.

^* “盈利能力”是格雷厄姆用来指代公司潜在利润的术语，或者用他的话说，是指一家公司“在一段时期内，商业环境保持不变的情况下，预计年复一年能够盈利的金额”（《证券分析》， 1934年版，第354页）。格雷厄姆原本打算用这个术语来指代五年或更长时间的时期。

^* “Earning power” is Graham’s term for a company’s potential profits or, as he puts it, the amount that a firm “might be expected to earn year after year if the business conditions prevailing during the period were to continue unchanged” (Security Analysis, 1934 ed., p. 354). Graham intended the term to cover periods of five years or more.

^*格雷厄姆在1972年的一次演讲中优雅地总结了随后的讨论：“安全边际是股票以你支付的价格获得的收益百分比与债券利率之间的差额，而这个安全边际是可以吸收不令人满意的发展的差额。在1965年版的《聪明的投资者》出版时，典型的股票市盈率为11倍，回报率约为9%，而债券回报率为4%。在这种情况下，你的安全边际超过100%。现在（1972年），股票的收益率和股票利率之间没有差额，我认为不存在安全边际……股票的安全边际是负的……”

^* Graham elegantly summarized the discussion that follows in a lecture he gave in 1972: “The margin of safety is the difference between the percentage rate of the earnings on the stock at the price you pay for it and the rate of interest on bonds, and that margin of safety is the difference which would absorb unsatisfactory developments. At the time the 1965 edition of The Intelligent Investor was written the typical stock was selling at 11 times earnings, giving about 9% return as against 4% on bonds. In that case you had a margin of safety of over 100 per cent. Now [in 1972] there is no difference between the earnings rate on stocks and the interest rate on stocks, and I say there is no margin of safety . . . you have a negative margin of safety on stocks . . .”

^*这一段——格雷厄姆很可能在 1972 年初写下——是对 2020 年代初市场状况的近似描述。

^* This paragraph—which Graham probabaly wrote in early 1972—is an approximation of market conditions in the early 2020s.

^*在“美式”轮盘赌中，大多数轮盘包含数字 0 和 00，以及 1 到 36 的数字，总共 38 个槽位。赌场提供的最高赔率为 35 比 1。如果您在每个数字上都下注 1 美元会怎样？由于球只能落入一个槽位，因此您将在该槽位上赢得 35 美元，但在其他 37 个槽位上各输 1 美元，净亏损 2 美元。这 2 美元的差额（或您总共 38 美元赌注的 5.26% 的差额）就是赌场的“庄家优势”，它确保轮盘赌玩家平均输的总是多于赢的。正如轮盘赌玩家的利益在于尽可能少下注一样，赌场的利益在于让轮盘保持旋转。

^* In “American” roulette, most wheels include 0 and 00 along with numbers 1 through 36, for a total of 38 slots. The casino offers a maximum payout of 35 to 1. What if you bet $1 on every number? Since only one slot can be the one into which the ball drops, you would win $35 on that slot, but lose $1 on each of your other 37 slots, for a net loss of $2. That $2 difference (or a 5.26% spread on your total $38 bet) is the casino’s “house advantage,” ensuring that, on average, roulette players will always lose more than they win. Just as it is in the roulette player’s interest to bet as seldom as possible, it is in the casino’s interest to keep the roulette wheel spinning.

^*格雷厄姆的意思是，股票没有好坏之分，只有便宜的股票和昂贵的股票。即使是最好的公司，如果股价过高，也会被“卖出”，而即使是最差的公司，如果股价跌到足够低，也值得买入。

^* Graham is saying that there is no such thing as a good or bad stock; there are only cheap stocks and expensive stocks. Even the best company becomes a “sell” when its stock price goes too high, while the worst company is worth buying if its stock goes low enough.

^* 1999年末和2000年初，科技和电信股价格高得离谱，当时那些认为这些股票“稳操胜券”的人，在2002年却以“风险太大”为由避之不及——尽管用格雷厄姆早期的话来说，“股价下跌约90%使得许多这类证券极具吸引力，而且相当安全”。同样，华尔街的分析师们也总是倾向于在股价高企时称其为“强力买入”，而在股价下跌后则将其标记为“卖出”——这与格雷厄姆（以及简单的常识）的观点完全相反。正如他在整本书中所阐述的那样，格雷厄姆一直在区分投机（即希望股价持续上涨而买入）和投资（即基于标的企业价值而买入）。

^* The very people who considered technology and telecommunications stocks a “sure thing” in late 1999 and early 2000, when they were hellishly overpriced, shunned them as “too risky” in 2002—even though, in Graham’s exact words from an earlier period, “the price depreciation of about 90% made many of these securities exceedingly attractive and reasonably safe.” Similarly, Wall Street’s analysts have always tended to call a stock a “strong buy” when its price is high, and to label it a “sell” after its price has fallen—the exact opposite of what Graham (and simple common sense) would dictate. As he does throughout the book, Graham is distinguishing speculation—or buying on the hope that a stock’s price will keep going up—from investing, or buying on the basis of what the underlying business is worth.

^*请参阅第 16 章中格雷厄姆对权证的批评。

^* See Graham’s criticisms of warrants in Chapter 16.

¹ bit.ly/413BsdL。

¹ bit.ly/413BsdL.

²格雷厄姆正式将安全边际定义为盈利收益率（市盈率的倒数）减去投资级债券的利率。股票的市盈率越低，盈利收益率就越高，最终超过债券收益率的可能性也就越大。利率越低，盈利收益率超过债券收益率所需的时间就越短。相反，较高的市盈率和利率会缩小安全边际。

² Graham formally defines the margin of safety as the earnings yield (or reciprocal of the price/earnings ratio) minus the interest rate on investment-grade bonds. The lower a stock’s P/E ratio, the higher the earnings yield and the greater the likelihood that the resulting number will exceed the bond yield. The lower interest rates go, the less it takes for an earnings yield to exceed the bond yield. Conversely, higher P/E ratios and interest rates shrink the margin of safety.

³请参阅第 5 章及其评论中有关美元成本平均法的讨论

³ See the discussion of dollar-cost averaging in Chapter 5 and its Commentary.

⁴ Jason Zweig，“亚马逊崛起至第一名对股市有何影响”，bit.ly/3R2v3ea。

⁴ Jason Zweig, “What Amazon’s Rise to No. 1 Says About the Stock Market,” bit.ly/3R2v3ea.

⁵ Brian Portnoy，bit.ly/4aUtwyz；Nick Maggiulli，“多元化的弊端”，bit.ly/47G1gz4；Wesley Gray，“即使是上帝，如果是积极的投资者，也会被解雇”，bit.ly/3qoTLfz。

⁵ Brian Portnoy, bit.ly/4aUtwyz; Nick Maggiulli, “The Downsides of Diversification,” bit.ly/47G1gz4; Wesley Gray, “Even God Would Get Fired as an Active Investor,” bit.ly/3qoTLfz.

⁶ bit.ly/4boI7mx。

⁶ bit.ly/4boI7mx.

⁷ Philip E. Tetlock 和 Dan Gardner，《超级预测：预测的艺术与科学》（Crown，2015 年）；Jason Zweig，《做出更佳预测的诀窍》，bit.ly/3GrKgAv；以及《洞察金融未来的五种方式》，bit.ly/3uKtrhK。

⁷ Philip E. Tetlock and Dan Gardner, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (Crown, 2015); Jason Zweig, “The Trick to Making Better Forecasts,” bit.ly/3GrKgAv; and “Five Ways to See the Financial Future,” bit.ly/3uKtrhK.

^*格雷厄姆羞涩地提到的两个合伙人是杰罗姆·纽曼和本杰明·格雷厄姆本人。

^* The two partners Graham coyly refers to are Jerome Newman and Benjamin Graham himself.

^* 格雷厄姆描述的是政府雇员保险公司（GEICO）。他和纽曼在1948年购买了该公司50%的股份，当时正是他完成 《聪明的投资者》一书的时候。 格雷厄姆和纽曼向GEICO投入的71.25万美元，约占当时他们基金资产的25%。格雷厄姆多年来一直担任GEICO的董事会成员。命运的安排妙不可言，格雷厄姆最得意的学生沃伦·巴菲特在1976年对GEICO进行了巨额押注，当时这家大型保险公司已濒临破产。这笔投资后来也成为巴菲特最成功的投资之一。

^* Graham is describing the Government Employees Insurance Co., or GEICO, in which he and Newman purchased a 50% interest in 1948, right around the time he finished writing The Intelligent Investor. The $712,500 that Graham and Newman put into GEICO was roughly 25% of their fund’s assets at the time. Graham was a member of GEICO’s board of directors for many years. In a nice twist of fate, Graham’s greatest student, Warren Buffett, made an immense bet of his own on GEICO in 1976, by which time the big insurer had slid to the brink of bankruptcy. It turned out to be one of Buffett’s best investments as well.

^* 由于法律上的技术性原因，美国证券交易委员会指示格雷厄姆和纽曼将格雷厄姆-纽曼公司持有的GEICO股份“分拆”或分配给该基金的股东。如果一位投资者在1948年初持有100股格雷厄姆-纽曼股票（价值11,413美元），并且之后继续持有GEICO的股份，那么到1972年，他将拥有166万美元。GEICO“后来组建的关联公司”包括政府雇员金融公司（Government Employees Financial Corp.）和标准保险公司（Criterion Insurance Co.）。

^* Because of a legal technicality, Graham and Newman were directed by the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission to “spin off,” or distribute, Graham-Newman Corp.’s GEICO stake to the fund’s shareholders. An investor who owned 100 shares of Graham-Newman at the beginning of 1948 (worth $11,413) and who then held on to the GEICO distribution would have had $1.66 million by 1972. GEICO’s “later-organized affiliates” included Government Employees Financial Corp. and Criterion Insurance Co.

¹ 《本杰明·富兰克林自传》（耶鲁大学，1964 年），第 207 页。

¹ The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin (Yale, 1964), p. 207.

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作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig

作者：Jason Zweig

by Jason Zweig